REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES~anbiganhauanQuezon City

FOURTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,P laintiff-Appellee,

SB-15-AIRI0003

For: Malversation thruFalsification of PublicDocuments

- versus - Present:Quiroz, J., ChairpersonCruz, J.Jacioto, J.

MELBA T. TRINQUITE,Accused-Appellant. Promulgated 00:

Do"" Ax,... f, u} 1

x-------------------------~---------------------------------------------------~---------x

DECISION

JACINTO, J:

This is an appeal from the Decision I of the Regional Trial Court(Branch 3), Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 8159 entitled "People of thePhilippines, Plaintiff versus Melba Trinquite, et. al., Accused," findingaccused-appellant MJ;LBA T. TRINQUITE guilty of Falsification ofPublic Document as defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of theRevised Penal Code (RPC).

Accused-appellant Melba T. Trinquite (appellant), together with JorgeT. Jimenea, Edna Gido and Fidel Padillo, Jr., were charged withMalversation through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217in relation to Article 171(2) of the RPC before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) ofButuan City in connection with their acts as the Secretary, Captain,Treasurer and Kagawad, respectively, of Barangay Kinabjangan, Nasipit,Agusan del Norte. The Information' against them reads:

tI Rollo, Vol.llI, pp. 18-24.2 Records, vo!. I, pp. 1-2.

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-15-A/R-0003Page 2 of 11

The Undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Office of theDeputy Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby accuses Jorge T. Jimenea,Melba T. Trinquite, Edna S. Gido and Fidel D. Padillo, Jr. of the complexcrime of Malversation thru Falsification of Public Documents defined andPenalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 171, par. 2 of theRevised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That sometime in or about January to April, 1998,or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Kinabjangan,Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, accused Jorge T. Jimenea, Melba T.Trinquite, Edna S. Gido, and Fidel D. Padillo, Jr., all lowranking public officers, being the Barangay Captain,Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, BarangayKagawad, respectively of Barangay Kinabjangan, Nasipit,Agusan del Norte, taking advantage of their officialpositions, and committing the offense in relation to theirrespective functions, with gross abuse of confidence,conniving and confederating with one another, did thereand then, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsifyResolution No. 07, Series of 1998 which gives BarangayKinabjangan the authority to collect dumping fees ofP2,500.00 a month from Burmeister and Wain

. Scandinavian Contractor, Inc. (BWSCI) by making itappear that said resolution exists and validly passed by allmembers of the Sangguniang Barangay of Kinabjanganwhen in truth and in fact, accused fully knew that no suchresolution was passed; after having made the collectionsamounting to P 15,000.00, all accused will fully , unlawfullyand feloniously appropriated the said amount for theirpersonal use and benefit thereby defrauding, damaging andprejudicing Barangay Kinabjangan in the said amount ofPI5,000.00.

CONTRAR Y TO LAW.

Before the accused could be arraigned, lorge T. limenea passed awayon 7 March 2004, thus extinguishing his criminal and civil liabilities.' Trialensued only as against the three remaining accused with the prosecutionpresenting the following witnesses: (1) Pedro P. Lagumabay;" (2) MarjorieC. Rosal.? (3) Alfredo B. Sacay, lr.;6 and, (4) Cesar Parenas, lr.7 Theirtestimonies may be summarized as follows:r3 See Order dated 25 April 2004, Records, vo!. I, p. 491 ;4 Former Barangay Kagawad of Kinabjangan.5 Secretary at the Power Barge owned and operated by Burmeister and Wain Scandinavian Contractor, Inc.(BWSCI)6 Also a former Barangay Kagawad of Kinabjangan.7 Former Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay Kinabjangan and ex-officio member of theSangguniang Barangay of Kinabjangan.

a /

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-lS-AlR-0003Page 3 of 11

1. Appellant, as Secretary of the Sangguniang Barangay ofKinabjangan and the other accused made it appear that theSangguniang Barangay passed Resolution No. 07, Series of1998 (Resolution No. 07) requesting that beginning November1997, Bunneister and Wain Scandinavian Contractor, Inc.(BWSCI) pay P2,500.00 as dumping fees for the "wastematerials or soot" being dumped by its power barge within thebarangay's territorial jurisdiction.

11. The accused made it appear that Resolution No. 07 was adoptedon 18 1anuary 1998 and that all the Barangay Kagawads werepresent during its deliberation. A copy of the said Resolution -marked as plaintiff's Exhibit B - shows that it was certifiedcorrect by the accused Jorge T. limenea as the BarangayCaptain and attested to by appellant as Barangay Secretary.

lI1. The Minutes of the 18 January 1998 regular. session of theSangguniang Barangay - marked as plaintiff's Exhibit H -shows that Resolution No. 07 actually refers to theauthorization given to the Barangay Captain (the late Jorge T.Jimenea) and Kagawad Asterio T. Aguirre, to follow up therelease of certain construction materials. Moreover, twokagawads were actually absent on said date.

IV. The accused were able to collect a total of Pl 5,000.00 fromBWSCI which were not recorded in the books of the barangay.

On the other hand, all the three remaining accused testi fied in theirdefense: (1) appellant Melba T. Trinquite, former Barangay Secretary; (2)accused Edna S. Gido, former Barangay Treasurer; and, (3) accused Fidel D.Padillo, lr., former Barangay Kagawad. Their testimonies may summarized,to wit:

1. Resolution No. 07 was a "walk-in" resolution in the sense thatit was not duly deliberated upon during the Barangay Council'smeeting, and was passed via individual consultation and votingafter the meeting adjourned. The Resolution was requested byBWSCI to enable it to comply with a DENR requirement;

11. Some of the Barangay Kagawads were absent when the matterspertaining to Resolution No. 07 was passed upon;

lll. BWSCI payments Were not immediately recorded becauseanother barangay made a claim thereon. However, uponsettlement of the issue, the collections were reflected in the

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-lS-A/R-0003Page 4 of 11

Statement of Operations and deposited with the Barangay'sBank Account; BWSCI payments were duly covered byreceipts and the P15,000.00 collected was returned to thebarangay.

IV. Accused Trinquite and Padillo, Jr. had no custody overBarangay funds by reason of their respective functions.

Upon the evidence submitted by the parties, the court a quo renderedjudgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and for failure to proveaccused guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused MELBA TRINQUIETE(sic), EDNA GIDO And (sic) FIDEL PADILLO, JR. are ACQUITTEDfor the crime of Malversation.

AS TO FALSIFICA TION, the prosecution not havingsubstantiated the claim against accused EDNA GIDO And (sic) FIDELPADILLO, JR., the latter are absolved and hence likewise [ACQUITTED]for the crime of Falsification. However, accused MELBA TRINQUITE isfound by this Court as GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT forthe crime of falsification and is hereby ordered to serve the penalty ofPRISION MAYOR in its MEDIUM PERIOD of eight (8) years and one(1) day to ten (10) years and to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos(PS,OOO.OO).

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant (hereinafter referred to as appellant) thereafterfiled a Notice of Appeaf indicating therein that she was appealing the courta quo's decision to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City. In aResolution' dated 13 June 20 I4, the court a quo gave due course to theNotice of Appeal, and ordered that the records be forwarded to the Court ofAppeals, Cagayan de Oro City. IQ

On 8 August 2014, the court a quo issued an Amended Order I I

rectififying its earlier ruling by ordering that the records, exhibits andtranscript of stenographic notes be forwarded to this Court.

Hence, this appeal on the following assignment of errors: 12

8 Records, vo\. I, pp. 791-792.9 Records, vo\. I, pp. 805-806.10 In the meantime, accused was granted temporary release upon posting of a P50,OOO.00 bond per Orderdated 20 August 2014, id. p. 8 J 5.11 Records, vo\. J, pp. 819-820.12 Appellant's Brief dated 22 March 2017, Rollo, vo!. Ill, pp. 40-6l. r

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-1S-A/R-0003Page 5 of 11

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT TRINQUITE'S ACTION OF ATTESTING TOBARANGAY RESOLUTION NO. 07, SERIES OF 1998 WAS ANACT OF FALSIFICATION PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 171PAR 2 OF THE RPC.

11. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF FALSIFfCA TION IN THE CLEARABSENCE OF PROOF THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACYAMONG THE ACCUSED.

Ill. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING RESOLUTION NO. 7,SERIES OF 1998 A CLEAR CUT AUTHORITY TO COLLECTDUMPING FEES WHEN IN FACT, IT WAS ONLY A REQUEST TOCOLLECT, THUS, WHAT WAS ALLEGED IN THEINFORMATION AS TO THE INTENT OF THE RESOLUTIONWAS NOT ACTUALLY PROVEN BY THE DOCUMENTALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN FALSIFIED.

Plaintiff-appellee (appellee), on the other hand, argues as follows: 13

The decision of the lower court must be accorded great weigh in the absenceof grave abuse of discretion committed by the court a quo considering that itwas better situated to assess the testimonies of the witnesses and theevidence before it. In this connection, appellee points out that as theBarangay Secretary, appellant Trinquite had the duty to prepare and keepthe minutes of all the meetings of the Sangguniang Barangay so that whenshe attested to the truthfulness of Resolution No. 07, despite knowledge ofthe false entries therein, she undoubtedly took advantage of her officialposition to perpetrate the falsification.

Appellee adds that appellant's claim that she cannot be held liable ascharged since the prosecution failed' to prove the existence of conspiracyamong the accused has no merit. It is enough that appellant "knowinglyattested" to the truthfulness of Resolution No. 07 in accordance with herduties and functions as Barangay Secretary, knowing the false entries

erein to consummate the crime charged.

Finally appellee claims that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertainthe present appeal since appellant's Notice of Appeal stated that she wasappealing the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals. As such, theassailed judgment had already become final before the erroneous designationof the appellate court could be corrected and the case records endorsed tothis Court.

" Appellee's Brief dated 29 May 20 17, Rollo, vol. Ill, pp. 70,8r

DECISION. People v. Trinquite

SB-15-A/R-0003Page 6 of 11

RULING OF THE COURT

The Sandiganbayan hasjurisdiction over thisappeal.

At the outset, it must be stated that this Court has jurisdiction over theappeal. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has held that "an error indesignating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal."!" Moll v. Bubanand Villamin'? is instructive on this matter:

Petitioner's first notice of appeal, filed well within the requisitefifteen-day period and with notice duly furnished to the prosecution, wasvalid. The designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect thevalidity of the notice of appeal. The Court has held that the rule requiringa party to specify the court where the appeal is being taken is merelydirectory. An error in designating the appellate court is not' fatal to theappeal.

Further, petitioner's Manifestation/Motion and second notice ofappeal, in substance, merely sought a correction of where to bring thepetitioners appeal. The Manifestation/Motion is not the withdrawal ofappeal contemplated under Section 12 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,which results in the finality of the judgment of the trial court. Petitioner'sintent is clear - to appeal the trial courts decision. Petitioner had nointention to abandon his appeal and to serve the sentence imposed by thetrial court. Once validly perfected, the appeal, if not abandoned, continues.

Upon perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction overthe case under appeal subject to the last paragraph of Section 9, Rule 41,to wit:

Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.

A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as tohim upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

xxx

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction overthe case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due timeand the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

xxx

14 See People v. Torres, G.R. No. 130661, 27June 2001; Valerio v. Tan, G.R. No. L-8446, 19 September1955; Heirs of Pizarro, s-. v. Consolacion, G.R. No. L-51278, 9 May 1988 .. At""?

15 G. R. No. 136974. August 27,2002. (Emphasis and citations omitted) /' . / r

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-1S-AlR-0003Page 7 of 11

In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record orthe record on appeal, the court may issue orders for theprotection and preservation of the rights of the parties which donot involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approvecompromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, orderexecution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

The right to appeal, which petitioner availed of on time, is a rightnot litigated by the appeal. The correction of the court where petitionersappeal is to be taken merely preserves petitioners right to an appeal he hasalready perfected within the reglementary period. 'The trial court retainsjurisdiction to make such correction before actual transmittal of therecords to the proper appellate court.

It is the law, not the choice of the parties, which determinesjurisdiction.

There is evidenceto sustain the trialCourt's findings.

In convicting appellant, the trial court held as follows:

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Be it noted that both the Resolution No. 07 and the Minutes of theSession all dated January 18, 1998 bears (sic) the signatures of Brgy.Captain Jimenea and Melba Trinquiete (sic). That the signature of aBarangay Captain and Barangay Secretary are the signatures that appears(sic) in every Resolution made by the Barangay.

To rebut the claim against them, accused Trinquiete (sic) testifiedthat the resolution pertaining to the collection of dumping fees by theBWSC was a walk in resolution. The same claim made by accused FidelPadillo Jr. That the subject resolution was considered walk in because thesame was treated, discussed pass upon (sic) after the meeting wasadjourned. That because the passing of the resolution was urgent at thattime as the power barge company made a follow up, the resolution beingrequired to (sic) them by the DENR, the council upon request of the Brgy.Captain decided to pass Resolution No. 07. That said walk in resolutionhas been done by the Sanggunian as a practice.

Such bare, unfounded and self-serving alibis deserve no credit andfavour (sic) in th eyes of the law. The documentary evidence (Minutes ofthe Session) as offered by the prosecution speaks for itself that on thatsession no Resolution was passed pertaining to the collection of dumpingfees. The testimony of witnesses present during the session and those whowere absent confirmed the matters stated in the Minutes of the Session.The defense of being a walk in resolution is not at all believable not onlythat its truthfulness was categorically denied by persons present at fur

r:

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time, the claim also came from the mouth of the sa~e person accused ofthe crime and assignatory to both documents (Resolution No. 7 andMinutes of Session). By then it became clear that Resolution No. 7 aswalk in Resolution is self-serving alibi for the accused.

The participation of accused Gido and Padillo in the allegedfalsification of Resolution No. 7 was not however established by theprosecution.

A review of the evidence on record supports the trial court'sconclusion that appellant Trinquite and the late Barangay Captain Jimenea,as shown by the concurrence of their actions in certifying and attesting,respectively, to the truthfulness of Resolution No. 07. In People v. Guittap;"the Supreme Court held that -

xxx to hold an accused liable as eo-principal by reason ofconspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuanceor furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of activeparticipation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consistof moral assistance to his eo-conspirators by being present at the time ofthe commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over theother eo-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement theconspiracy.

In this connection, it is worthy to stress that the trial court's findingsare entitled to weight and respect, thus:

We have held time and again that "the trial court's assessment ofthe credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even withfinality." As We have reiterated in the very recent case of People v. JosePepito Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court overlookedor misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused itsdiscretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of thefacts and the credibility of the witnesses. This is clearly because the judgein the trial court was the one who personally heard the accused and thewitnesses, and observed their demeanor as well as the manner in whichthey testified during trial. Accordingly, the trial court, or moreparticularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to assess andweigh the evidence presented during trial. 17

The evidence on record fully establish that: (1) appellant was a public. officer during the period material to the case; (2) as Barangay Secretary, itwas her duty to keep the records of the meetings of the SangguniangBarangay; (3) she prepared Resolution No. 07 purportedly showing that itwas adopted by all members of the Sangguniang Barangay in its 18 January

r16 People v. Guittap, G.R. No. J 44621,9 May 2003 (citations omitted).17 People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 191266,6 June 2011.

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-lS-A/R-0003Page 9 of 11

1998 Session; (4) two members of the Sangguniang Barangay were actuallyabsent on that day and, more importantly, Resolution No. 07 actually refersto another matter - the authorization given to the Barangay Captain (the lateJorge T. Jimenea) and Kagawad Asterio T. Aguirre, to follow up the releaseof certain construction materials - and not to the collection of dumping feesfrom BWSCI.

Thus, the lower court did not err in finding appellant liable forattesting to the truthfulness of Resolution No. 07. To attest is "to affirm to betrue or genuine" or "to authenticate by signing as witness.?" Moreover, theact of attesting is an act of intervention in the preparation of the questionedresolution. Thus, when appellant attested to the truthfulness of the saidresolution, knowing full well of its falsify - she committed an act offalsification.

However, the penalty imposed upon appellant needs to be modified inview of the trial court's failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law(ISL). The trial court imposed the penalty of pr ision mayor in its mediumperiod of eight years and one day to ten years.

The penalty for violation of Article 171 of the RPC is prision mayor(six [6] years and one [1] day to 12 years). Applying the ISL, the minimumimposable penalty should "within the range of the penalty next lower" -which is prision correccional (six [6] months and one [1] day to six [6]years). The maximum penalty in the absence of any mitigating oraggravating circumstance, shall be the medium period of prision mayorwhich ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the RegionalTrial Court (Branch 3) of Butuan City convicting appellant MELBATRINQUITE of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171(2) ofthe Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to thepenalty imposed. Appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminatepenalty of IMPRISONMENT from six (6) months and one (1) day of prisioncorrectional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of pris ion mayor

//'//~s maximum and to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) .

SO ORDERED. ..

18 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1479111 ed.

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WE CONCUR:

t

Associate JusticeChairperson

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached inconsultation with the Justices of the Court's Division.

DECISIONPeople v. TrinquiteSB-15-A/R-0003Page 11 of 11

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and theDivision Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the aboveDecision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned tothe writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.