“TheSocialUnderpinningsofDecentralizedGovernance:Networks,TechnologyandtheFutureofSocialAccountability”1

ErikWibbels

RobertO.KeohaneProfessorofPoliticalScienceDukeUniversity

PreparedfortheUSAID/DRGCentreVolume

DecentralizedGovernanceandAccountability:AcademicResearchandtheFutureofDonorProgramming

Accountablegovernanceisdefinedbyfourelements:First,thedefinitionofinterestsonthepartofcitizensandgroupsofcitizens;second,theaggregationoraccumulationofthoseinterestsviasome“technology”,whetheritbebyanelection,lobby,orsocialmedia;third,thetranslationofthosepreferencesintogovernmentbehavior;andfourth,ameanswherebycitizenscanevaluatethequalityofgovernmentbehavior.Decentralizationhasthepotentialtoimpacteachoftheselinks.Mostoftherigorousthinkingonhowitdoessohasbeeninstitutionalinnature.Inotherwords,ithasfocusedonhowformalrulesgoverningelections,leadershipselection,fiscalfederalism,etc.impactpoliticalaccountability.Donorprogrammingandaccompanyingimpactevaluations,ontheotherhand,havefocusedlessoninstitutionsandmoreonmobilizingcivilsocietyand“socialaccountability”,i.e.onapproachestoinformingandmobilizingcitizenssuchthattheymightbecomebetterparticipantsinpolitics.Theseprogrammingeffortshaveprogressedwithconsiderablenormativeenthusiasmbutwithout,forthemostpart,referencetorecentacademicbreakthroughsonthesocialconditionsforcooperativebehaviorandcollectiveaction.Thegoalofthischapteristoconsiderhowrecentinnovationsinthestudyofinformationflowsandcooperationinsocialnetworksmightinformdonorprogrammingonsocialaccountability.Researchonsocialnetworksprovidesinsightsintotherelationalcharacteristicsofcommunitiesthatarecertaintoimpacttheprospectsforaccountability,andgivesrigorousunderpinningsintothefrequent,ifunderspecified,claimthat“contextmatters”.Theargumentsinfavorofdecentralizationarenowabundantlyfamiliar:itprotectscitizensagainstencroachmentbythestate,limitsethnicconflict,safeguardsindividualandcommunalliberty,allowsforatailoringoftaxingandspendingtolocalpreferences,andofferscitizenstheopportunitytomorecloselymonitorthebehaviorofpublicofficials(seeRodden2006;Beramendi2007).Inpoorcountrieswherethecentralstatehaslimitedcapacitytoimplement,regulate,build,etc.acrossconsiderableterritory,theseargumentstakeonaddedsaliencebecausedecentralizedgovernmentsareoftentheonlygovernmentsthatmateriallyimpactthelivesofcitizens.Insuchsettings,deconcentratingresponsibilitiesisperhapstheonlymeansofimprovingservicesformanycitizens,butit

1TheauthorwouldliketothankGuyGrossman,AnnaWetterberg,DerickBrinkerhoffandparticipantsinthe“GeospatialData,GovernanceandtheFutureofDevelopmentAid”workshopfortheirhelpfulcomments.

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alsoraisesthestakesofunderstandingtheconditionsunderwhichlocalsocialorders(asdefinedbysocial,politicalandeconomicnetworks)areconsistentwithgoodgovernance. Whiletraditionalargumentscontinuetofuelhundredsofmillionsofdollarsofdevelopmentaidaimedatdecentralization,ithasbecomeclearthatdecentralizationuntoitselfisnopanacea.Itcanpromoteelitecapture(Véronetal.2006;MansuriandRao2013),obfuscatelinesofgovernmentresponsibility,andunnecessarilyexpandthesizeofthepublicadministration.Thuswhiledecentralizationcanhelppromoteaccountabilitywhenthepropermechanismsareinplace(WorldBank2004),inmanycasestheyarenot.Intheabsenceofmechanismsofaccountability,citizenscannotdisciplinedecentralizedofficials.Intheabsenceofsuchdiscipline,decentralizationneithersolvesagencyproblemsnorensuresthatlocalpublicgoodsbundlesreflectlocalpreferences.Indeed,formanyanalyststheinabilitytoholdlocalofficialsaccountableandthetendencyforittoproducelocal“elitecapture”isattheveryheartofdecentralization’sfailures.2Unsurprisingly,theterm“accountability”appears105timesinUSAID’s2009“DemocraticDecentralizationProgrammingHandbook”.Itfollowsthatidentifyingthekeymechanismsofaccountabilityandunderstandinghowtheyworkarekeytopromotingbetterdonorprogrammingondecentralizedgovernance.InthischapterIreviewsomeofthekeymechanismsofsocialaccountabilitythatunderpinthecapacityofdecentralizationtofulfillitspromise.Indoingso,Irelyontraditionalnotionsofgovernanceascharacterizedbyaseriesofprincipal-agentproblems,albeitwitharecognitionthatinmanysettingsthereisnosingleprincipal,sincecitizens,publicofficialsandadministratorshavecompetingnotionsastowhatconstitutesthepublicgood.Ialsoemphasizethattheseprincipal-agentscanoftenbebetterunderstoodasrelationalnetworksandthatthecharacteristicsofthosenetworksarecrucialtounderstandingtheconditionsunderwhichsocialaccountabilityislikelytoexistoremergeasaresultofdonorefforts.Improvingthemultipleaccountabilityrelationsthatdefinegovernmenthastwogoals:first,tighteningthelinkbetweencitizenpreferencesandgovernmentbehavior;andsecond,improvingthequalityofpublicsectoroutputs.Itisworthunderscoringthatthesetwogoalsarenotalwayscoincidentandcareshouldbetakennottoconflatecitizensatisfactionandhighquality,lowcostserviceprovision.Infact,theremaybeawiderangeofsettingsinwhichinterventionsfosterparticipationorincreasecitizensatisfactionwhilehavingnoimpacton(orperhapsevendecreasingthequalityorefficiencyof)serviceprovision,asinOlken(2010).Thereare,ofcourse,aplethoraofpotentialmechanismsthatmightpromotepoliticalaccountability.Severalimportantformalinstitutionsofaccountabilityaredealtwithinlaterchaptersofthisvolume,includingtheroleofelections(WantchekonandLeon)andrulesgoverningthechoiceofdecentralizedleaders(Grossman).Otherkeyinstitutionsthroughwhichcitizensmightholdofficialsaccountable,suchasthepoliceandcourts,havereceivedtoolittlecomparativeacademicandpolicyresearchtoproduceacoherentbodyof 2Onelitecapture,seeBardhanandMookherjee2005;Olken2007;BanerjeeandDuflo2006.

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knowledgeandthusarelefttotheside.Likewise,thephysicalmobilitythatunderpinsclassicTieboutiannotionsofefficiencyandthatcanpromoteaccountabilitybyinducingcompetitionamongdecentralizedgovernmentsislargelyabsentinthedevelopingworld.Theremigrationislargelydrivenbyperceptionsofimprovedjobopportunitiesincitiesratherthaninter-jurisdictionalshoppingforpublicgoods;totheextentrapidurbanizationbearsondecentralizedgovernance,itisdiscussedinthechapterbyPostandCarter.Inlieuofformalinstitutions,Ifocusonthesocialunderpinningsofaccountability.By“socialunderpinnings”Irefernotjusttotraditionalnotionsofcivilsociety,butmorebroadlytotheinterpersonal,socialandpoliticalnetworksinwhichcitizensareembedded.Myoverarchingclaimisthatcurrentresearchandprogrammingonsocialaccountabilitywouldbenefitfrommoresystematicengagementwiththeevidenceandanalyticaltoolsthathaveemergedfromresearchonsocialnetworks.ExperienceswithSAtheoryandprogrammingtodatesuggestsseveralrecurringweaknesses–suchasoverrelianceontransparency,poorlyspecifiedtheoriesofchange,andlackofattentiontolocalcontext–weaknessesthatcouldbeatleastpartiallyaddressedbypayingmoreattentiontosocialnetworks.Suchresearchprovidesarigorousmeansofthinkingaboutandmeasuringsocialcapital,thedensityofcivilsociety,socialtrustandtheconditionsunderwhichsocialaccountabilityinitiativesarelikelytowork.Tosupportthisclaim,thechapterdiscusses:a)theongoingpushtoencourage“socialaccountability”bypromotingcitizeninformationon,engagementwithandoversightoflocalgovernment;b)theemergentworkonsocialnetworksquacivilsocietyinshapingtheprospectsforcollectiveactionandsocialaccountability;andc)theroleofnewinformationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICT)inpromotingcitizeninformation,broadeningsocialnetworksandallowingfornetworkedmonitoringofgovernmentbehaviorandoutputs.IalsounderscorehowthetoolsofnetworkanalysisareparticularlywellsuitedforthekindofdatathatthepromotionofICTgenerates.Thesediscussionsfollowonasetofintroductoryissues,namelyadiscussionofwhatismeantbytheterm“accountability”andwhatcitizensaremeanttoholdtheirdecentralizedgovernmentsaccountablefor.BasicApproachestoAccountableGovernanceTheinitialenthusiasmamongacademicsandpractitionersaboutdecentralizationwasbasedonthenotionthatitwould:a)enhancethematchbetweenpreferencesandpolicies;andb)reduceagencycosts.Thisdistinctiondelineatestwobasicapproachestounderstandingaccountablegovernance,andhencetwobasicapproachestoprogramdesignandevaluation.BothviewsbuildonnaïveandacontextualassumptionsofanidealizedTocqueviliancitizenryandtheeaseofcultivatingsuchacitizenrywhereitdoesnotalreadyexist.Somestraightforwardattentiontothestructureoflocalsocialandpoliticalrelations,i.e.networkcharacteristics,wouldprovideinsightintothesettingswheresuchassumptionsaremoreorlesswarrantedand,thus,wherepractitionersmightcontributetoaccountability.Inthefirstview,accountabilityoccurswhengovernmentofficialssuccessfullyimplementwhatonemightconsider“thewillofthepeople”.Thekeychallengeofgovernance,inthisview,istoaligntheincentivesofpublicofficialssuchthattheyhavereasonandcapacityto

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gatherinformationonthedesiresofcitizensandtranslatethemintopolicyoutputs.Wehaveelsewherecalledthis“prospectiveaccountability”(RoddenandWibbels2013),althoughitalsogoesundertheguiseof“responsiveness”,“pre-electionpolitics”(PerssonandTabellini2002),etc.Itisinthespiritofenhancingprospectiveaccountabilitythatdonorshavesetouttoencourageelectoralturnout,civilsocietymobilization,attendanceatmeetings,participatorybudgeting,andotherformsofengagementwithlocalgovernment.Thecentralnotionisthatpoorgovernancethriveswhentheelectorateisdisengagedandinactive,andpoliciescanbetterapproximatethe“collectivewill”whencitizenstakeanactiveroleindirectingpublicofficials.Analternativeviewofaccountabilityisborneofskepticismthat“thepublicgood”isplausibletouncover,since:a)citizenswhovarybygender,age,income,ethnicity,religion,etc.oftenhavecompetingpreferencesoverwhatgovernmentshoulddo;andb)alternativeproceduresforaggregatingthosepreferencescanproducedifferentoutcomes(Riker1982).Instead,thisviewreliesoncitizens’capacitytoevaluatethepastbehaviorofgovernment.Theseretrospectiveevaluationscanbedifficultbecausereliableinformationaboutthechoicesfacingpublicofficialsishardtocomeby,andthoseofficialsoftenhaveincentivestohideinformationinordertoprotecttheirowninterests.Sinceinformationisscarce,votersoftenuseinformationshortcutsbaseduponeverydayexperienceswiththeeconomyorserviceprovisiontojudgehowtheirgovernmentisperforming(Fiorina1981).Whentheseindicatorsfallbelowsomethreshold,citizenscanremove(orotherwisesanction)officialsandgivesomeoneelsetheopportunitytodobetter.Aslongaspublicofficialsdesiretoretainoffice,thisretrospectivejudgmentcanbeaneffectivewayofkeepingthemincheck.Werefertothisaccountabilitymechanismasretrospectiveaccountability.Itisinthespiritofenhancingthiskindofaccountabilitythatdonorshavepromotedvarioustechnologiesforimprovingcitizeninformation,includingscorecards,mediacampaigns,informationsheets,comparativedataondifferentofficialsorlocalities,andpublishedaudits.Boththeprospectiveandretrospectiveviewsofaccountabilityarefundamentallyrootedinaprincipal-agentmodelofgovernance.Thekeyprincipal-agentrelationshipsrunfromvoterstolocalelectedofficials,fromthoseofficialstolocalserviceproviders/implementers,andfromserviceprovidersandimplementerstotheconsumersofthoseservices.Broadlyspeaking,thegoalofdonorprogrammingaimedatpromotingaccountabilityindecentralizedgovernanceistotightenuponeormoreoftheseagencyrelationshipssuchthattheagenthaslessscopeforactingcontrarytotheinterestsoftheprincipal.Therearetwoseriousshortcomingswiththisapproachtodonorprogramming,andjointlytheyrepresentablindspotinsocialaccountabilityinitiatives:First,theprincipal-agentapproach’semphasisoninformationasymmetriesreliesonidealizedassumptionsaboutsocialrelationsthatrarelyaccordwithrealityontheground.Justasimportantasinformationaretheunderlyingrelationsofpoweramongcitizens,officialsandserviceproviders.Indeed,feedinginformationtocitizenswhoareinadependentorclientelisticrelationshipwithlocalelitesisunlikelytopromoteaccountability.Thebasicpointisthatshouldunderstandtheseprincipal-agentrelationshipsasembeddedinlocalsocial

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networksthatconditiontheuseofinformationandtheprospectsforsocialaccountability.Second,theprincipal-agentapproachassumesthatcitizensareahomogenousbunchthatshareunderlyingpreferencesoverwhatgovernmentshoulddoorwhatconstitutesgoodperformance.Ofcoursetherearemanyvalenceissues—mostcitizenswantastrongereconomy,betterschools,higherqualityhealthcare,etc.—buttheyoftenhavedifferingideasaboutpolicypriorities,taxratesandthelike.Thus,inmanysettingsthereisnosingleprincipal.Thesetwinshortcomingsraiseawholerangeofchallengingquestions:Whatarethekeyfeatureoflocalsocial,politicalandeconomicnetworks?Andhowdothosefeaturesoflocalcontextconditionthelikelysuccessofsocialaccountabilityinitiatives?Howtopromoteaccountabilityinheterogeneouslocalsettingswithdiverselocalnetworkcharacteristics?Mightpromotingcitizenmobilizationpromoteconflictratherthanaccountabilityinsettingswheretheyhavedivergentopinions?Aretheremeansofconflictmediationthatcanpromotelocalaccountabilityandparticipationatthesametime?Ireturntotheseissuesinthesectionon“Frontiers:ResearchandProgramming”below.AccountableforWhat?:DecentralizationandtheAllocationofResponsibilitiesTheconceptofaccountabilityinlocalgovernanceraisesthequestionastowhatitisthatdecentralizedgovernmentsaretobeheldaccountablefor.Thereisalargeliteratureontheoptimalallocationofresponsibilitiesacrosslevelsofgovernment.3Itprovidesahandfulofguidingprinciples(seeRodden’schapterinthisvolumefordetails):1)Expendituredecentralizationshouldfollowuponheterogeneityinpreferencesacrosscommunities;2)Totheextentpossible,revenueresponsibilitiesshouldfollowuponexpendituredecentralizationsoastominimizeintergovernmentaltransfers,limitfiscalillusion,andpromotetheaccountableexpenditureoftaxdollars;and3)governmentresponsibilitieswithconsiderableexternalitiesacrossjurisdictions—suchasdefense,environmentalregulationandenforcement,andinterpersonalredistribution(suchasthroughCCTs)—shouldbecentralizedtopreventaracetothebottomacrosssubnationaljurisdictions.Theseprinciplesaresystematicallyviolatedinmostdevelopingcountries.Thisresultslargelyfromthefactthatmajorrevenuesourcesarecentralizedandmostlocalitieshavethintaxbases.AsGadenneandSinghal(2015)noteintheirrecentreview,thishasnotpreventedconsiderabledecentralizationofexpenditureresponsibilitiesoverthelast15years,withtheresultbeingthatfiscalgapshavegrown.Thus,whileregional,districtandlocalgovernmentsareplayingalargerandlargerroleintheprovisionand/oroversightofbasicserviceslikeeducation,healthandinfrastructure,theyaredoingsowithrevenuesraisedelsewhere.Thedonorcommunitymightwellhaveexaggeratedthesefiscalgapscourtesyofthepushtodecentralizefunctionalresponsibilitiestolowerlevelsofgovernment,despitetheabsenceofrobustlocaltaxbasesandtheongoingrelianceoncommunity-drivendevelopment(CDD)programmingincountrieswithweakstatecapacities.Thegrowthofexpendituredecentralizationhastwobigimplicationsforaccountabilityrelations.First,theservicesthatcitizensrelyonareincreasinglytheresponsibilityof 3SeeGadenneandSinghal(2014)forarecentreview.

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decentralizedgovernments.Whetherthatresponsibilityisthin—aswhendecentralizedgovernmentsareresponsibleforimplementingcentralgovernmentpolicies,schemesandexpenditures—orthick,localanddistrictgovernmentshavemoreandmoreimpactonthegovernmentoutputsthatmostimmediatelyaffectcitizens,includinghealthcare,education,infrastructure,andpublicsecurity.Thatthecase,understandingthehugeheterogeneityacrosslocalitiesandthemannerinwhichcontextmattersbecomeshugelyimportant.Asdiscussedbelow,anetworkedapproachtodecentralizedsettingsoffersadistinctlyrigorousmeansofapproachthiscontextualvariation.Second,thelargefiscalgapsproducedbydecentralizationhaveexaggeratedaprobleminherentinoverlappingjurisdictions,namelythedifficulty(andatleastsometimes,theunfairness)ofholdingdecentralizedgovernmentsaccountableforpublicservicesandotheroutputsthattheyareonlypartiallyresponsiblefor.Williams(2015)providesarecentexamplefromGhana,whereongoingdecentralizationhasleftdistrictgovernmentsresponsibleforagooddealofpublicinfrastructure.Heshowsthat1/3ofthecapitalprojects(representing1/5oftotalinfrastructureexpenditures)begunbydistrictgovernmentsarenevercompleted.Giventhattheseinvestmentsincludetheruralclinics,schoolhousesandmarketsthatcitizensrelyon,thislookslikeastrikingfailureofdecentralizedgovernance.Butacloserlookshowsthatnosmallpartoftheproblemisthatcentralgovernmentfiscaltransfersoftenappearlate,ifatall,whichresultsindistrictsbeingunabletopaycontractors.Thereisnodoubtthat:a)citizenswantthecapitalinvestments;b)somedistrictgovernmentsareinefficientandevencorrupt;andc)thatthefailureofthecentralgovernmenttodeliverrevenuesontimemakesdistrictgovernmentplanningverydifficult.WhoareGhanaiancitizenstoholdaccountablefortheresultingoutcomes?Incaseslikethis,thepotentialincreasedresponsivenessofdistrictassembliesmustbebalancedagainsttheagencyproblemsgeneratedbytheprocessofdecentralizationandthecorrespondingmisalignmentbetweenrevenuesandexpenditures.ADecadeofSocialAccountabilityProgramsInstitutionalfixesaside,themostsignificantpushtowardspromotingaccountabilityhasoccurredvia“socialaccountability”programmingbyinternationaldonors.Althoughthesearenotalwaystiedtoformaldecentralizationprograms,theyareinherentlylocal,andmostoftheprogrammingaimstoaffectthelocalclinics,schools,administratorsandelectedofficialswhodefinemostcitizens’day-to-dayexperienceswiththestate.TheWorldBankdefinessocialaccountabilityas“thebroadrangeofactionsandmechanisms,otherthanvoting,thatcitizenscanusetoholdthestatetoaccountaswellasactionsonthepartofgovernment,civilsociety,mediaandotheractorsthatpromoteorfacilitatetheseefforts.”4Thewaveofsocialaccountabilityenthusiasmisbuiltonabelief(andoccasionallyawell-developedtheory)thattheprimaryobstaclestoaccountablegovernancearepoorcitizeninformation(Pande2011)andalackofvenuesthroughwhichtheycanhaveinputintogoverningprocesses.Muchofitalsobuildsonawell-developedbodyofworkon“socialcapital”thatemphasizesthekeyroleofcitizenengagementinpromotinggoodgovernance(Putnam1993;Ostrom2001;Krishna2007).Asdiscussedbelow,theoftenvagueconcept 42007:p.5.

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ofsocialcapitalcanbecomemoreexplicit,rigorousandoperationalwhenapproachedfromasocialnetworkperspective.Consistentwiththeconceptualizationofretrospectiveaccountabilityandprospectiveaccountabilityabove,socialaccountabilityinitiativescanbeorganizedintothosethat:1)aimatimprovingtheknowledgeofcitizensabouttheperformanceofthepublicsectorandthebehaviorofgovernmentofficialssuchthattheycanholdthemretrospectivelyaccountable;and2)aimtoimprovetheresponsivenessofgovernmentofficialsbyprovidingavenuesforcitizenstoprovideinputsintodecisionmakingandpublicsectormanagement(i.e.prospectiveaccountability).Theformersetofprojectsfocusonpublishingauditreports,scorecards,increasingtransparency,etc.(Olken2007;Andrabietal.2014;PeisakhinandPinto2010).Thelattersetofprojectsfocusonpromotingparticipatorymodesofdecisionmaking(Olken2010;BjorkmanandSvensson2009).Therearenowseveralextensivereviewpapersofsocialaccountabilityprogrammingthatthereadercanconsultforamoredetailedandexpansivediscussionofthedozensanddozensofsocialaccountabilityprojectsofthelastdecade.5Inlieuofanothersuchreview,Iprovideseveralkeypointsthatareorganizedaroundkeythemesinresearchonsocialnetworks,whichIexploreinthenextsection.Someoftheseareaddressedintheaccumulatedwisdomexpressedinthereviewpapers,butothersarenot.Theoriesofchangeneedclearspecification.Theoreticalworkoninformationflow,collectiveactionandcoordinationinsocialnetworksoffersanimportantsourceofinsights:

• Socialaccountabilityprogramsarenottypicallyderivedfromcleartheoreticalprinciples.Thisresultsinafailuretospecifyprecisemechanismslinkingprojectactivitiestooutcomes.Aproperlyspelledout“theoryofchange”wouldspecifywhotheprincipalsandagentsare,thekindofinformationavailabletothem,andthenatureofinstitutionsstructuringtheirrelationship.Asdiscussedinthefollowingsection,suchtheoryshouldconsiderthatcitizensaredeeplyembeddedinlocalsocial,politicalandeconomicnetworks.

• Thereisacommoncritiquethatrigorousimpactevaluationsofsocialaccountabilityprogramsfailtospecifythe“mechanisms”throughwhichtheydoordonotwork(see,forinstance,Devarajan,KhemaniandWalton2013).Insomecases,thisfailureisheldupasinstructiveofaweaknessofRCTsorotherrigorousmethodsofevaluation.Butthefailuretospecifythemechanismsthroughwhichasocialaccountabilityprojectisexpectedtoimpactoutcomesisfirstandforemostafailureoftheoryratherthanevaluation.Ifthe“theoryofchange”issufficientlypreciseaboutmechanisms,thereisnoreasonimpactevaluationscannotbedesignedtoevaluatethem.

• Thereisadisjuncturebetweenthescaleofthemostrigoroussocialaccountabilityimpactevaluationsandourknowledgethatlocalitieswithincountriesvaryhugelyintermsoftheirsocialorganization,socialcapitalandcollectiveactioncapacity.To

5See,forinstance,Fox(2015),BrinkerhoffandWetterberg(2015),andWilliamson(2015).Onthecloselyrelatedtopicofcommunitydrivendevelopmentandabroaderlookateffortstopromoteparticipation,seeMansuriandRao(2013).

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theextentimpactevaluationsestimateaverageeffects,theylimitwhatwecanlearnfromtheheterogeneityacrossdecentralizedsettings.Theimplicationisnottodofewerrigorousimpactevaluations.Instead,“theoriesofchange”shouldaimtosystematicallytheorizetherelationshipbetweencommunitycharacteristicsandinterventionssuchthattheheterogeneityisnotsweptundertherug.

Transparencyandinformationarenotenough.Theflowofinformationandaccountabilityamongcitizensandgovernmentaredeeplyconditionedbylocalsocialnetworks:

• Increasingcitizeninformationisnot,untoitself,enoughtopromoteaccountability.Therearecertainlystudiesshowingthataugmentinginformationontheperformanceofgovernmentandactivecitizenparticipationimproveoutcomes(BjorkmanandSvensson2009;Andrabietal.2014;FerrazandFinan2008),buttherearemanyrigorousevaluationsthatuncovernoeffectsofincreasedinformation(Banerjeeetal.2010;KeeferandKhemani2012;HumphreysandWeinstein2007;Lieberman,PosnerandTsai2014)andatleastoneshowingthatitcanactuallydiscourageparticipation(Chongetal.2015).Thereareatleasttwoissues:First,theinformationhastobesalienttolocalcitizens,andwedonothaveaconsistentevidencebaseonwhatinformationtheycaremostaboutorhowbesttodelivertheinformation;andsecond,absentsomeclearaccountabilitymechanism,itisnotalwaysclearhowcitizenscanbeefficaciousintheiruseofadditionalinformation.

• Consistentwiththepointabove,increasingthesupplyofinformationismorelikelytoworkwhenitiscombinedwithsomemeansofimpactingtheincentivesofgovernmentofficialsandgovernmentofficialswiththeadministrativecapacitytorespond(Fox2015;BrinkerhoffandWetterberg2015).Theprovisionofinformationalonerunsintothefactthatcitizensareresource-andcognitively-constrained.Absentaclearpathbetweentheinformation,citizenactionandapotentialchangeingovernmentoutputs,theinformationwillhavelittleeffect.

Complexdemandslimittheusefulnessofsocialaccountability.Thecapacityofsocialnetworkstosolveproblemsdeclinesinthecomplexityoftheproblemstheyhavetosolve:

• Thevalueofcitizeninputandparticipationisdeclininginthecomplexityofthetasksassignedtothem.Themorecomplicatedtheadministrative,oversightorimplementationtask,theharderitisfortime-andattention-challengedindividualcitizensandcollectionsthereoftoefficientlyandeffectivelycompletethem.Whetheroneconsiderscitizeninputintoestablishingprioritiesforthegovernment(Khwaja2004;2008)ortheircapacitytoactivelyandproductivelymonitordevelopmentprojects(Olken2007),itisbesttokeepthingssimple.

• Evenifoptimallydesigned,theneedforsimplicitypointstoinherentlimitsinthecapacityofsocialaccountabilitytopromotedemocracy.Simple,highlyinvolvedmodesofparticipationimposelimitsofscaleandattention.Totheextentsome(perhapsmany)failuresofgovernancedonothavelocalordecentralizedroots,sustainablesolutionsalmostcertainlyrequiremassdemocraticorganizations,suchaspartiesandinterestgroups,thatcanscaleupandcontributetodeliberativeproceduresbeyonddecentralizedlevels.

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Contextmatters.Awarenessoflocalcontext,asindicatedbysocialnetworkcharacteristics,arecrucialtosuccessfulSAinitiatives:

• Socialaccountabilityinitiativesworkbestwhentheyaredesignedinacontext-relevantwaythattakesaccountoftheconcernsoflocalcommunities.Theeasiestwaytoknowwhatinformation,serviceneeds,andprioritiesarerelevanttolocalcitizensandsocialgroupsistoaskthembeforeprogrammingbeginsandtodesignprojectsappropriately.Thisisadifficulttaskgivenhowdonorcontractsareawardedandrun,butasIdescribeintheConclusionthechallengesaresurmountable.

• Powerrelationsamongcitizensconditionthesuccessofparticipatoryproceduresandthemannertowhichcitizensusenewinformationprovidedviasocialaccountabilityinitiatives.Highlevelsofsocialhierarchyorinequalitycontributetotheelitecaptureofparticipatoryprocesses;theyalsomilitateagainstasenseofpoliticalefficacywhichwouldencouragecitizenstoactuponinformationinitiatives.Asdiscussedinthefollowingsection,researchonpoliticalnetworksprovidesasystematicwaytodesignsocialaccountabilityprogrammingthatisreflectiveoflocalpowerrelations.

SocialNetworks,CivilSocietyandAccountabilityInrecentdecades,donorshavelaidagreatdealoffaithinthecapacityofNGOsandcivilsocietymoregenerallytoredresslocalgovernancefailuresandpromoteaccountability.Themotivatingimpulsehasbeenthatarobustcivilsocietyoffersthecapacitytogatherinformationongovernmentbehavior,provideinputsintocitizenneeds,andholdpublicofficialsaccountable(Putnam1993;Devarajanetal.2014).Civicengagementiscostly,ofcourse,andindividualself-interestcanmilitateagainstit.AsOstromnotes,“Somehow[citizens]mustfindwaysofcreatingmutuallyreinforcingexpectationsandtrusttoovercometheperverseshort-runtemptationstheyface.”6Socialcapitalprovidesthemeansandthemotivationforindividualcitizenstocontributetoaccountablegovernment,andOstromnotesthatitismorelikelytooccurviamutuallearningandnormdevelopmentintightsocialnetworks.Totheextentdecentralizationbringsgovernment“closertothepeople”,therehasbeenanobviousaffinitybetweeneffortstopromotecivilsocietyanddecentralization.Totheextentsocialaccountabilityinitiativesrelyonthemobilizationofcivilsociety,theyimplicitlyrelyonthecapacityoflocalsocialnetworkstodelivercollectiveaction.Early,naïveassumptionsaboutthecapacityoflocalcivilsocietiesandcivicassociationstoproviderobustchecksandbalancesondecentralizedgovernmentshavegivenwaytoarecognitionthatcommunitiesarehighlyvariedintheirsocialorganizationandcapacityforcollectiveaction.Todate,programmingonsocialaccountability,civilsocietyanddecentralizationhaveproceededwithoutcarefulattentiontothatvariation.Agrowingbodyofresearchonsocialnetworks—thepersistentinformational,socialandeconomiclinksbetweenindividuals—providesarigorousbasisforassessingtheconditionsunderwhich 62001:p.176.

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communitiesofdifferenttypesandatdifferentscalesmightworktopromoteaccountability.Figure1givessomesenseofthehugevariationinthestructureoflocalsocialnetworksevenwithinasinglecity.ThefigurepresentsgraphsofleadershipnetworksacrosssixslumsinBangalore,wherecolleaguesandIhaveaskedhouseholdrespondentswhothemostimportantlocalleaderis.Centralnodesreflectleadernames,andouternodestherespondentsthatnamethem.Ifsocialaccountabilityrequiresarecognizedleaderand/oralocusforcollectiveaction,thesenetworkgraphsindicatesubstantialvariationinthecapacityofthesesixslumstopromoteit.Theslumsrangefromenvironmentsofalmostcompletesocialanomieinwhichthereisnorecognizedleader,toanalmostfullycentralizednetworkwhereeveryonerecognizesasingleleader,tobipolarnetworks,toeverythinginbetween.Inabroadersetof72slumswehavefoundevidencethatcentralizedleadershipnetworksfacilitatethecapacityofcommunitiestocoordinatevotesandextractbetterpublicservicesinslums(RojoandWibbels2014;Wibbels,KrishnaandSriram2015).Themainpoint,however,isthataone-size-fitsallsocialaccountabilityprogramthatpursuesastandardizedapproachtoinformationdelivery,communitymeetingsanddecision-makingprocedureswiththeaimofpromotingcollectivedecisionmakingoroversightoflocalgovernmentisunlikelytoworkinthesamewayacrosstheseslums.Indeed,itseemsclearthattakingaccountofthesedifferencescouldreallyhelptailorsocialaccountabilityprogrammingtolocalcontexts.

Figure1:LeadershipNetworksin6SlumsinBangalore

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Muchoftheworkonsocialnetworksbeginswiththerecognitionthatcooperativebehaviorandcollectiveaction,bothcrucialingredientsofarobustcivilsociety,requiresomesortofdeviationfromnarrowshort-termself-interest(Henrichetal.2001).Iteratedinteractionsbetweenindividualsareawell-knownmechanismforovercomingcollectiveactionproblems(Kranton1996),butothercharacteristicsofsocialnetworksarealsoimportant.Mostimportantly,densenetworksofferahostofadvantageswithregardtocollectiveaction(Greif1993).First,theyareassociatedwithahighdegreeofpreferencehomogeneityandsharedexpectationsaboutwhatconstitutesacceptablebehavior.Second,theyprovideamonitoringtechnologythatprovidesinformationonhowmembersofthenetworkbehave.Whileitisverydifficultforoutsiderstoknowwhetherindividualsareshirkingordoingtheirshare,itismucheasierfortightlyknitneighborsandlocalleaderswholiveinthosecommunitiestoknowthesethingsabouteachother.Thirdandfinally,densesocialnetworksprovideamechanismforsanctioningcommunitymemberswhodeviatefromsociallyexpectedbehavior.Asdiscussedbelow,densenetworkscanalsosufferfromseriousproblems,andthereareconditionsunderwhichweaktiesamongcitizenscanfacilitateinformationflowandaccountability(LarsonandLewis2016),butinmanysettingstheinformationandsanctioningcharacterizedbydensenetworksprovidethetoolsforovercomingcollectiveactionproblemsthataretheheartofcivilsocietyactivism.Aboveandbeyondthesegeneralfeaturesofsocialnetworks,wehavealsolearnedsomeofthefactorsthatconditiontheircapacitytogenerateconsensusandcollectiveaction.Successtendstoincreaseinthesimplicityofthetask(Khwaja2008)anddeclineinthecostofcommunicationwithinthenetwork.AsnotedbyKhwaja(2004)manyimportantlocaldecisionsaboutserviceprovisionaretechnicalinnature,andsubstantialparticipationbynon-expertscanintroduceinefficiencies.Thisinsightisreflectedinlaboratorywork,wheretaskcomplexityandthenumberofpotentialsolutionsslowthecapacityofnetworkstosolvecollectiveproblems(McCubbinsetal.2013).Somestraightforwardimplicationsforthedesignofsocialaccountabilityinitiativesfollow:First,whatcivilsocietywilloverseeandprovideinputintoshouldberelativelystraightforward;complextasksofpublicadministration(suchas,forinstance,socialaudits)seemlikepoorcandidatescomparedtomoresimpletasks.Second,whilesocialaccountabilityinitiativeshavefocusedalotofeffortongettinginformationintothehandsofcitizensasindividuals,theywouldbenefitfrommoreeffortatloweringthecostofcommunicationamongcitizens.Idiscussthisingreaterdetailinthenextsection.Asubstantialbodyofworkalsoshowsthatthestructureofcommunicationacrossmembersofanetworkcaneaseorcomplicateproblemsolving,knowledgeacquisition,consensusandcollectiveaction(GolubandJackson2010;Banerjeeetal.2013;McCubbinsetal2013).Andherepopularconceptionsofarobustcivilsocietyatleastpotentiallyconflictwithavailableresearch.StandardthinkingwouldprobablysuggestthatFigure2arepresentsanidealdecentralizedcitizenry—citizens(representedhereasnodes)areconnectedtomanyothercitizens(thetiesmightreflectweeklyconversations),andthereisnohierarchysincenoindividualismorecentraltothenetworkthananyother.Giventhelargenumberofconnections(oredges),suchnetworkscanbeslowandinefficient,however,andcollectiveactioncanbedifficulttomobilize(asingleuncooperativedefection

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reverberatesthroughoutthenetwork).Figure2bshowsanalternativenetworkstructurethatsolvestheseproblemsviasomesortofleader,i.e.anactorwhoiscentraltothenetworkstructure.Thisfocalpointcancoordinateothers,facilitateproblemsolvingandencouragecollectiveeffort.RelyingonahugestudyofsocialnetworksindozensofIndianvillages,Banerjeeetal.(2013,2014)haveshownthatsuchindividualsdiffuseinformationfurtherandhelpsocialnetworkslearn;Brezaetal.(2015)showthatsuchactorscanalsohelppromotecooperativebehavior.7

Figure2aand2b:TwoAlternativeSocialNetworks8

ThesetwonetworkspresentSAandcivilsocietyprogrammerswithachoice:Theycaneitheraimtopromoteoneofthesenetworkstructures,whichinsomelocalitieswillinvolveattemptstodisruptandreconstructexistingnetworks,oritcantakethesenetworkcharacteristicsasgivenandpromoteSAinitiativesthat“fit”particularlocalcontexts.Initscurrentstate,programmingisnotanalyticallyclearwhichisintendedorwhy.Giventhatalotoftimeandmoneyis,infact,beingspentontheseprograms,itisworthbeingintentionalaboutthem.9Researchalsoprovidesinsightintosomeofthekeyobstaclestodensenetworksandthereasonsthatlocalcommunitiesmighthavetroublemobilizingcollectiveresponsestofailuresofaccountability.Ethnicandreligiousheterogeneityarewellknowncharacteristicsthatmakescoordinatedsocialpressuremoredifficult,andthereisrecent,microevidencethatinformationflowsmorebroadlyinhomogenoussocialnetworks(LarsonandLewis2016).10Nevertheless,itisalsoworthnotingthatlocalheterogeneitydoesnotprecludecollectiveactionorarobustcivilsociety.11Beyondsocialidentities,highlevelsofinequality 7Contrarytotheemphasisoncentralactorstonetworks,thereisatleastsomeevidencethatperipheralmembersofsocialnetworksplayakeyroleinmobilizingcollectiveaction(CentolaandMacy2007;Steinert-Threlkeld2015).8FigurescourtesyofMcCubbinsetal.(2013).9AsMcCubbinsetal(2013:514)write:“…legalandpoliticalenvironmentsareoftenintentionallydesigned,whichmeansthatitmaybepossibletobuildastructureofcommunicationthatencouragesagreement.”10 Though note that Larson and Lewis find that this information transmission occurs despite the fact that homogenous networks are not more dense. 11I,forinstance,amunabletouncoveranyrelationshipbetweenslum-levelcaste-orreligious-basedheterogeneityandeitherthecentralizationoflocalleadershipnetworksorindicatorsoflocalcollectiveactionin72slumsinBangaloreandUdaipur,India.

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and/orsocialhierarchyinlocalnetworksareassociatedwithlesscooperativebehavior(Chandrasekharetal.2015).Macro-levelevidenceindicatesanegativerelationshipbetweenheterogeneityandpublicgoodsprovision(AlesinaandLaFerrara2005),eveniftheprecisemechanismsaren’tclear.Atamoremicro-level,Bhavnani(2013)providesnaturalandsurveyexperimentalevidenceofcaste-baseddiscriminationagainstcandidatesinIndia,andGrossmanetal.(2015)exploittherandomallocationofdefendantstoIsraelijudicialpanelstoshowthatethnicityhasanimportantimpactonoutcomes.Theseindividual-levelresultsareechoedinDufloetal.’s(2005)evidenceoncaste-basedtargetingoflocalpublicgoodsbylocalvillagecouncilsandBurgessetal.’s(2015)researchonco-ethnictargetingofroadprojectsinKenya.Severalpossiblemechanismslikelyunderpinthesefindings,includingthatidentityprovidesaninformationshortcutandthatitisdifficulttosanctionsocialcheatersacrossethnicboundaries(MiguelandGugerty2005).Anyefforttobuilddonorprogramminguponthegrowingevidenceonsocialnetworksshouldrecognizethatnetworkdensitycomeswithfourpotentialproblems.First,densesocialnetworksandamobilizedcivilsocietyneednotworkinwaysthataredemocraticorotherwisenormativelyappealing.Densesocialnetworks,forinstance,havehelpedspreadeverythingfromNazism(Berman1997)toinfectiousdiseases(LukeandStamatakis2012),andawholehostofnegativebehaviorsaresociallycontagious.Second,densenetworkscanbequiteclosed,resistanttolearningfromtheoutsideandresilienttoeffortstopromoteaccountability.BrinkerhoffandKeener(2003:p.26),forinstance,describeasituationinMadagascarwhereasmallgroupofprofessional,tightlyknitdecentralizedadministratorsproveclosedtooutsideinformationandpressure.Theywritethat: “ManyoftheSSDs[districthealthoffices]arecomposedofasmallgroupof professionalswhooftenhaveclosefamilytiesormultipleaffiliations,thus providingroomfordegradingtheeffectivenessofinternaloversightand auditingmechanismsorforbenefitssuchaslessformalsharingofresources. Intermsofthekindsofchecksandbalancesthatsupportformal accountability,theseinformalinterrelationshipsriskcompromisingthe necessaryseparation,andopenthedoortocollusionandmutual“back- scratching.” Theseunderlyingfeaturesseemquiteprevalentinmanybureaucraciesacrossthedevelopingworld.Third,whilecentralizednetworkscanpromotecollectiveaction,theyalsomaylendthemselvestocapturebyelites.Fourthandfinally,densenetworksinheterogeneoussettingscanimpedeinformationflowstotheextentmanysocialinteractionsoccurwith“other”typeswithwhomoneislesslikelytoshareimportantinformation(LarsonandLewis2016). Tosummarize,densesocialnetworkscanfacilitateaccountabilitybypromotinginformationflow,buildingasharedsenseofwhatacommunityneeds,andfacilitatingcollectiveaction.Therebycancommunitiessuccessfullygenerateprospectiveaccountabilityevenastheyeasethesanctioningofcorruptorexploitativebehavior.Thesebenefitshavetobeweighedagainstthepotentialcostsdiscussedabove.Animportantimplicationofthesefindingsisthatwealreadyknowagooddealaboutwhichcommunitiesarelikelytoberesponsivetodonorprogrammingaimedatpromotingaccountability.This,

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however,leavestwochallenges.First,donorsneedtodevelopthecapacitytoassesskeycharacteristicsoflocalsocialnetworks,includingthoseindividualswhoaremostcentraltothem.AsBanerjeeetal.(2014)note,thisisnotashardasitsounds,sincemembersofanetworkcanidentifycentralindividualswithoutknowinganythingaboutthebroadernetworkstructure.Second,weknowverylittleabouthowdense(orotherwise)socialnetworksemergeendogenously,andthisplacesasharpconstraintonthecapacityofoutsiderstoalterthecivilunderpinningsofaccountablegovernancewhereitdoesnotalreadyexist.Nevertheless,evenwearenotinapositiontopromotetheemergenceoflocal,participatorydemocraticorderswheretheydonotexist,socialaccountabilityprogrammingwouldbenefitagreatdealfromrecognizinginadvancewhereitisunlikelytowork,wheretweaksoflocalprogrammingareinorderandhowlocalsocial“context”islikelytoconditiontheimpactofprojects.InformationTechnology,SocialNetworksandAccountabilityAkeyelementofthepushtowardsocialaccountabilityhasbeenagrowingefforttouseinformationcommunicationstechnology(ICT)asameanstopromotecitizeninformation,governmenttransparency,andanavenueforcitizeninputintogovernmentprocesses(PeixotoandFox2016).Giventhedifficultyforcitizensofgettinggood,timelyinformationoneverythingfromthebehavioroftheirpoliticianstothehoursanddrugstocksatlocalhealthclinics,cell-phonebasedICToffershugepotential.Potentialefficiencygainsaside(imaginethetimesavedbyeachpersonnotwalkingtoaclosedclinicoronewithoutdrugs!),suchinformationisobviouslycrucialforthecapacityoflocalcitizenstoholdlocalofficialsaccountablefortheirperformance.Itcanalsoprovidelesstime-consumingandmoredirectmeansforcitizenstoprovideinputintogovernmentdecisionmaking.Participation,particularlyinitstraditionalandmoreactiveforms—beitviaschoolcommittees,participatorybudgetmeetingsorwhatever—isdemandingandcanproduceanelitebias(Alatasetal.2013;DasguptaandBeard2007).ICT-basedinputs,ontheotherhand,arelesscostlyandhavethebenefitofanonymity.Asaresult(andastheboominsocialnetworkingapplicationsmakesclear)ICThasthepotentialtobroadennetworksamongcitizensandcreatenewnetworksofaccountabilitybetweencitizens-as-service-consumersandgovernments-as-service-providers.Inshort,innovationsinICTofferthepotentialtokeepcitizensinformedandprovidevenuesforfeedbackthatrequirelesseffort.Indeed,thepotentialforICTtoimproveaccountabilitymightbegreatestinverypoorcountries,since:a)cellphoneownershipanduseageisubiquitous,eveninmanyruralsettings;andb)civilsocietyisoftenweak;andc)traditionalformsofpoliticalaccountability,suchascourts,lobbying,elections,afreepress,areweakormissing.Indeed,inspiredinnosmallpartbythereportedroleofsocialmediaintheArabSpring,theU.S.governmenthasfundedsimilareffortselsewhere,12andthereisagreatdealofoptimismthatICTcanaddressmanyofthechallengesofgovernanceinthedevelopingworldbydevelopingnetworksofengagedcitizens. 12RonNixon,“U.S.SaysitBuiltDigitalProgramsAbroadWithanEyetoPolitics.”NewYorkTimesApril25,2014:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/us-ran-social-media-programs-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan.html?_r=4

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OnegrowingbranchofworkontherelationshipbetweenICTandpoliticsexplicitlyfocusesonthenetworkcharacteristicsinherenttocellphones,SMSandsocialmedia(PierskallaandHollenbach2013;ShapiroandWedmann2011;Kingetal.2013;Lawrenceforthcoming;Steinert-Threlkeld2015;Bergeretal.2015).Focusedlargelyontheincidenceofviolenceandrepression,itprovidesinsightnotjustintothecorrelationbetweencellphonecoverageandviolencebutalsointothemannerinwhichuseagechangesbeforeandduringprotestevents.13Atthispoint,thefindingsareinconclusive,withsomeresultssuggestingapositiveassociationbetweenprotestactivityandcellcoverage(PierskallaandHollenbach2013)andothersnot(ShapiroandWedmann2011).Itisclear,however,thatauthoritarianregimesarewellcapableofusingICTtofurthertheirrepressiveaims(Kingetal.2013;RodandWeidmann2015).Totheextentprotestsandcivilviolencerepresentmechanismsofaccountability,thisworkprovidesanentryintobroaderquestionsaboutthelinkbetweenICTandcitizenship.ItisearlytoassesstheimpactofICTondevelopmentprogramming,butsomeresultsareinfromeffortstopromote“digitaldemocracy”.Inlieuofelectionsandpolls,whichprovidesomeimperfectmeansofidentifyinga“publicwill”,therehavebeenseveralattemptstoencouragecitizenstocommunicatedirectlywithpublicofficialsandadministrators.Onecanthinkoftheseasattemptstocreatelow-costnetworktiesbetweencitizensandgovernmentofficials.ThereissomeevidencefromapilotprojectinUgandathatanSMS-basedsystemcanservetopromoteparticipation,particularlybytypicallymarginalizedcitizens(Grossmanetal.2014),butalargefollow-upstudyhasfoundnosucheffect(Grossman,HumphreyandSacramone-Lutz2016).Theauthorssummarizethat“uptakeintreatmentconstituencieswaslow,marginalizedpopulationslargelyrefrainedfromusingtheICTplatform,andtherewasnopriceeffect.”14Obviously,approachessuchasthisonearemuchmorepromisinginmoredemocraticsettingswherethesocialnetworkenhancingfeaturesofICTwouldfindamorefertilecontext.Shortoffeedbacktopoliticians,thereareseveraleffortstopromotetheuseofICTbycitizenstomonitorgovernmentoutputsandprovidefeedbackonservices.Examplesabound:Theichangemycity.complatforminBangaloreisanSMS-basedmeansforcitizenstoidentifylocalserviceneedsandvotethemup(ornot)intermsofimportance;onlineplatformsforcommentingonproposedlegislationinChina;web-basedplatformsforreportingcorruptioninUgandaandKenya.15 Manyofthesehavenotyetbeensubjecttorigorousevaluation,butGrossmanetal.(2015)provideevidencefromanRCTsuggestingthatalow-costSMS-basedattempttoelicitservicefeedbackfromcitizensinUgandadoubledparticipation(albeitoffafairlylowbaseline).Itisearlyinthelivesoftheseefforts,buttheyofferthepotentialtopromotenetworksoflinkedcitizen-consumerswhoservetoprovidegovernmenthighlylocalinformationonhowitisperforming.

13SeeDafoeandLyall(2015)andaccompanyingpiecesforareview.142016:p.3.15Seemakingallvoicescount.org,adonorfundedgrandchallengetodevelope-platformstoimprovegovernance.

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TherearesomereasonstodoubtthecapacityofICTtofundamentallyalteraccountabilityrelations.SMSsystems,openbudgetinitiativesorotherformsofdirectdigitaldemocracycanbepowerfultoolsforuncoveringcorruptionanddiffusinginformationaboutpoorperformance.Butalltheopennesshascoststoo:Itcanservetomakebargainingmoredifficult,sincesidepaymentsbecomepublicandbargaininggiveswaytoposturing;likewise,allofthescrutinyassociatedwithpoliticscandissuadeentrybygoodandqualifiedpotentialleaders.Itisalsothecase,thatmostoftheICTinitiativescurrentlyprovidevenuesforindividualaction—thetechnologytypicallyfacilitatesthereporting,overseeing,etc.byindividualswhoexperienceafailedirrigationpumporanactofcorruption.Totheextentthatisthecase,technologydoesnotsolvetheunderlyingsocialchoiceproblemsthatplagueanyefforttodivinethepublicgoodorcitizenintentvis-à-visthepublicsector.Morepromisingmightbetolinkcitizenstogetherintoanetworkofgovernmentoversight.SucheffortsmightdisplacegovernmentfromthecentralnodeoftheseICT-basedsolutionsinfavorofpromotingtiesofoversightamongcitizens.YetiftherearegoodreasonstodoubtthecapacityofICTtofundamentallyimprovethenatureofsocialchoices,itdoesshowremarkablepromiseforwringingefficienciesfromsystemsofpublicadministration.Astechnologyandlearningspreadthroughthepublicsector,thecostsofmanyimportantpublicgoodsarelikelytogodown.Governmentwillknowmoreandbetteraboutwhichroadsneedsfixing,whenandwheredrugstockoutsareoccurring,whichofitscitizensneedtovisitahealthcareprovidertopreventanemergencyroomvisit,etc.ManyofthesebenefitsresultfromthecapacityofICTtotightenthenetworktiesbetweenhigherandlower-leveladministrators,whereprincipal-agentproblemsareendemicandabsenteeismoffront-lineprovidersisendemic.Otherbenefitsemergefromthebuildingonmanyweaknetworktiesamongcitizensandpublicofficials,wheretheformercanbecomeimportantsourcesofinformationontheperformanceofverylocalpublicsectors.Whereitwantsto,governmentislikelytofindbigbillsonthesidewalkcourtesyofextendingtechnologyintopublicadministrationandbuildingstrongerinformationnetworksbetweenandamongcitizens,publicofficialsandserviceproviders.FrontiersforPolicyandLearningonAccountabilityThemostdauntingchallengesinthestudyofsocialnetworksaretounderstand:a)whytheyhavethestructurethattheydo?andb)Cantheybealteredpredictablyfromtheoutside?ThishasobviousimplicationsforSAprogramming.Evenifpractitionerscanalreadyleverageresearchonsocialnetworkstounderstandthekeyfeaturesoflocalsocialcontexts,itwouldbehelpfultoknowwhenandiflocalnetworksaremalleablesuchthatonecanpromotesocialaccountability.Hereacademicresearchersandpractitionershaveverysignificantsharedinterestsinworkingtogether.Researcherscouldembedresearchontheadaptabilityofsocialnetworksintoprogramming,andthelearningcouldfuelbetter,morecontext-sensitiveprogramming.Aboveandbeyondlearningaboutsocialnetworksandtheirroleinconditioningtheprospectsforsocialaccountability,itisworthemphasizingthatsomeofthekeyactorsindecentralizedsettingsacrossmuchofthedevelopingworldareleftoutsideoftraditionalnotionsofaccountability.Threeactorsareparticularlyimportant:1)Centralgovernments;2)Privatesectorserviceproviders;and3)internationalNGOsanddonorswhoplaya

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prominentroleinfinancingordeliveringlocalservicesandinfrastructureinmanylocalities.Centralgovernmentsfinancealargeshareofdecentralizedexpendituresinmanycountries,andlocalgovernmentsservelargelytoimplementprogramsandprioritiesestablishedbycentralgovernments.Inthesesettings,localofficialsfaceincentivesestablishedbytheirnationalsponsors.Althoughbottom-upaccountabilityoflocalofficialsisdesirable,itisdifficulttoachieveiftheyarenotelectedorfacefewincentivestoworryabouttheconcernsoflocalcitizens.Inthesesituations,thebestwaytoimproveperformancemightbetostrengthenmechanismsofhierarchicaloversightratherthanthroughprogrammingaimedatenhancinglocalaccountability.Likewise,wheretheprivatesectorisanimportantserviceprovider—asitiswithwaterinagreatmanysettingsandincreasinglyinbotheducationandhealth—promotingdecentralizedpoliticalaccountabilityisunlikelytoimprovekeyservices.Particularlywhereprivateprovidersaretheonlygameintown,arobustsystemofgovernmentoversightisthefirststepinimprovingtheservicesthatlocalcitizensholddear.Finally,internationalNGOsanddonorsplayaverylargeroleinthelocalprovisionofinfrastructureandcitizensinmanylocalities;insomecases,thisprovisionisdirectwhileinothersitoperatesthroughdirectbudgetarysupportofdecentralizedgovernments.Thoughanascentbodyofresearchindicatesthecitizensmighthavegreaterfaithinthetransparencyandcapacityoftheseoutsideproviders(Findleyetal.2015;Wibbelsetal.2015),therearetypicallynomeansthroughwhichcitizensmightholdtheseoutsidersaccountable.Andthereisatleastsomepossibilitythatbyprovidingservicesdirectly,internationalactorserodeaccountabilitybyerodingthelinkbetweengovernmentsandthegoverned.EchoingGadenneandSinghal,howshouldwethinkaboutaccountabilityif“agoodlocalgovernmentisnotonethatbuildsschoolsbutratherissuccessfulatcompetingwithotherjurisdictionstoattractaninternationallyfundedNGOtobuildschools”?16Eachoftheseaccountabilityrelations—betweencentralgovernmentsandlocaladministrations,citizen-consumersandprivatesectorserviceproviders,andcitizensandinternationalactors—deserveadditionalacademicandpolicyattention.Mostoftheaccountabilitymechanismsdiscussedaboveandinthebroaderbodyofworkonpoliticalaccountabilityemphasizethelinkbetweenvotersandelectedofficials.Yetitseemsunlikelythatcitizenscaremuchaboutthebehaviorofelectedofficialsaboveandbeyondthequalityofthefrontlineservicestheygetfromgovernment.Thatthecase,oneofthemostimportantaccountabilityrelationsbearsonthecapacityoflocalpoliticianstoinducegoodbehavioronthepartofunelectedbureaucratsandserviceproviders.Absenteeismandweakeffortinthepublicsectorarehugeproblemsinmanycountries(RogersandVegas2009,BanerjeeandDuflo2005),andasmallbutimportantbodyofresearchandprogrammingaimstounderstandtheincentivesofbureaucratsandfrontlineserviceproviders(Leonard2010;Hasnainetal.2014;Gingerich2012;MuralidharanandSundaraman2009;Dufloetal.2012;Khanetal.2014).Theevidencepointstoconsiderablevariationinadministrativeresponsivenessacrossagencieswithincountries;italsosuggeststhathigh-poweredincentivescanpromotebetterperformance,althoughthismaycomewithsomesocialcost(Khanetal.2014)andfrontlinebureaucratsarecreativeinfindingwaysaroundincentiveschemes(Banerjeeetal.2008).Oneplaceforresearchand 162014:p.597.

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donorprogrammingtoexploreisintheuseofalternativeandlessexpensivemeansofpromotingbetteremployeeperformance.Workoncorporatecultureandworkplacenetworksprovidesomefoundationforthinkingabouthowfrontlineagentsmightbemotivatedwithoutrelyingonhighpoweredincentives.Experimentingonadministrativerulesaside,accountabilityisparticularlydifficulttogenerateindecentralizedsettingswherelocaladministrators—betheyteachers,healthworkers,orpolice—areagentsofthecentralgovernmentratherthanlocalvoters.Inthesesettings,thebestwaytocombatabsenteeism,corruptionandrentseekingmightinvolveoversightandincentivesfromthecentralgovernmentratherthanfosteringdistinctlylocalaccountability(seetheGrossmanchapterinthisvolume).Formanycitizens,oneofthemoreimportantavenuesforimprovementwouldbeinthepracticesoflocalpoliceandcourts.Formanycitizens,theveryfirst(andperhapsonly)experiencewiththestatecomesintheformofthelocalpoliceofficerandjudgeswhoareofttobeavoidedatallcost.Unfortunately,thesefundamentalagentsoftheruleoflawhavelargelyoperatedoutsideofacademicresearchonaccountabilityevenasdonorprogramminghasrecognizedtheirimportanceforquiteawhile(USAID2002).Therecentboomindonorprogramingontheseareasisconceptualizedlargelyintermsofcrimepreventionratherthanasameansofpromotingaccountablegovernance,butitisimportantthatwelearnhowtopromoteprofessionalandresponsivefrontlineagentsoftheruleoflaw.Finally,politicalaccountability—beitdecentralizedorotherwise—isnotoriouslydifficulttomeasure.Thereareseverallargecross-nationaleffortstomeasurethequalityofgovernance,includingelementsofaccountability(Agrastetal.2009;KaufmannandKray2008).Therearealsorelatedeffortstoharmonizemeasurementsofthequalityoflocalgovernance,againwithimportantelementsofaccountabilitythrownin(Bloom,SunseriandLeonard2007),albeitwithlimiteduptakeinthefield.Allsucheffortsareplaguedwithseriousproblems(KaufmanandKray2008),nonemoreseriousthantheatheoreticalconstructionofindicesfrompotentiallyunrelatedunderlyingdimensionsofgovernance.Academicsanddonorsarecollectingahugeamountofdatarelevanttodecentralizedpoliticalaccountability,buttheseeffortsareuncoordinatedandreflecttheidiosyncraticneedsofparticularprojects.Assuch,itisdifficulttoaccumulatewisdomacrossresearchprojectsevenastheyaimtounderstandfairlysimilaraccountabilitymechanisms.Totheextentdonorprogrammingaimingtoimproveaccountabilityistotakepartintheongoingevaluationrevolution,itisimportantthatresearchersanddonorsbegintocoordinatetheireffortsthemeasureaccountability.Thechallengeisconceptual(whatarethekeydimensionsofaccountability?),empirical(howtomeasurethekeyconceptsappropriatelyacrossdiversesettings?)andadministrative(whowilldothecoordinating?).AddressingthesechallengesisevenmorepressinginlightofthehighprofilethattheUN’sSustainableDevelopmentGoalsplaceon“accountableinstitutions”.17USAIDcouldplayanimportantroleinpromotingaharmonizedefforttomeasuredecentralizedaccountabilitythroughitsresearchsupportandprogrammingondecentralization.Conclusions 17SeeSDG#16:http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/

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“Contextmatters”.Everyonehasheardthis,andeveryonebelievesit.Alas,itisaslipperyslopeindeedfrom“contextmatters”tothenotionthateverythingmatters.Andifeverythingmatters,whatisagovernanceofficer(orasocialscientist)todo?Anawfullotofacademicresearchonsocialcapital,civilsocietyandcommunity-drivendevelopmenthasassumedacommonendpointforalocal,democraticorder.Perhapsevenmoredonorprogrammingonsocialaccountabilityhasignoredlocalcontextintheexpectationthatarobust,participatorysocialorderwasaninterventionaway.Inthefaceofmountingacademicandpolicyfrustrationwiththesenaïveanddecontextualizednotionsoflocalpoliticaleconomies,itisimportantthatresearchersandthedevelopmentcommunityaliketakearigorousapproachtolearningandprogrammingonlocalsocialcontextsandalternativemeansofpromotingbetterlocalgovernance.Luckily,whilemanyofusinterestedindevelopmentwerenotpayingattention,ahostofformaltheorists,sociologists,statisticiansandsocialnetworkinganalystshavebeendevelopingabodyofknowledgeonwhatfeaturesofnetworks,i.e.ofsocialcontext,matterforoutcomesthatwecareabout.AsSiegelnotes“Networksmayvaryinimportancebysubstantivetopicandspatiotemporalsetting,buttheirconceptualizationisclearandconstant….”18Thischapterhasprovidedasummaryofsomeofthekeyinsightsofworkonsocialnetworksandhowtheymightinstructdonorprogrammingonsocialaccountability,civilsocietypromotionandcommunity-drivendevelopment.Programminginawaythatisconsistentwithwhatweknowaboutsocialnetworksdoesrequiresomepracticalchange.Atthepointofprojectdesignitrequiresacapacitytotailorinterventionstolocalconditionssoastomaximizetheprospectsforaccountability.Asnotedabove,thisrequiresimplementerstomakeachoice:Dotheywanttoengineerlocalsocialnetworksthatpromoteaccountabilityordotheywanttotakeexistingnetworksasgivenanddesignprojectsthatreflectthem.Ineithercase,existingacademicworkprovidessomeguidance.AnetworkedapproachtoSAalsorequiressomechangestomonitoringandevaluationpractices.Baseline,midlineandendlinedata(wheretheyexist)aretypicallynotrelationalandthusprovidelimitedinsightintonetworkproperties.Ifprogrammingistoberesponsivetolocalcontexts,relationaldatahastobecollectedatbaselinesoastoinformthatprogramming.Suchdatacollectioncanbeexpensive,buttechnologyisdrivingcostsdown,andinnovationsinsamplingonnetworksoffersavings.WhenitcomestoM&E,therearetremendousgainstobehadfromcooperationbetweenthedevelopmentindustryandacademics—theformerwantstoknowwhatworks,andthelatterspecializesinfiguringthatoutandcanhelpbuildarigorouslearningagendaintosocialaccountabilityprogramming.Thechallengesofimplementingthiskindofprogrammingarenottrivial,butmanyofthemhavealreadybeensolved.Takingthosesolutionsonboardiscrucial,becausearelational,networkedapproachtodecentralizedsocialordersoffersthepotentialtomovebeyondtheoft-vapidnotionthat“contextmatters”toarigorousunderstandingofwhen,whereandwhysocialaccountabilityexists.Weareatanadvantageousmoment:donordesirefor 18Siegel2011:p.51.

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systematicprogrammingandevaluation,academicresearchinterests,andthetechnologyofdatacollectionandcitizenmobilizationareallconverginginsuchawaythatwecanmakegreatprogressinlearningonthesecrucialissues.

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