Pearl Harbor The attack on December 7 th, 1941 was not done in
isolation, but was the culmination of years of declining relations
between the United States and Japan. The reason for the attack and
ultimate war was which nation would dominate commerce in East Asia.
Commerce and Christianity-White Mans burden- Whaling
Slide 3
Early contacts In 1791, two American ships commanded by the
American explorer John Kendrick stopped for 11 days on Kii Oshima
island, south of the Kii Peninsula. He is the first American known
to have visited Japan. He apparently planted an American flag and
claimed the islands, although accounts of his visit in Japan are
nonexistent. The USS Columbus of James Biddle, and an American
crewman in Edo Bay in 1846. From 1797 to 1809, several American
ships traded in Nagasaki under the Dutch flag, upon the request of
the Dutch; they were unable to send their own ships due to their
conflict against Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. n 1837,
Charles W. King, an American businessman in Canton, saw an
opportunity to open trade by trying to return to Japan three
Japanese sailors (among them, Otokichi) that had been shipwrecked a
few years before on the coast of Oregon. He went to the Uraga
Channel with Morrison, an unarmed American merchant ship. The ship
was fired upon several times, and it eventually had to sail back
unsuccessfully. In 1846, Commander James Biddle, sent by the United
States Government to open trade, anchored himself in Tokyo Bay with
two ships, one of which was armed with seventy-two cannons.
Regardless, his demands for a trade agreement remained
unsuccessful. In 1848, Captain James Glynn sailed to Nagasaki,
which lead to the first successful negotiation by an American with
sakoku Japan. Upon his return to North America, Glynn recommended
to the U.S. Congress that any negotiations to open up Japan should
be backed up by a demonstration of force; this paved the way for
the later expedition of Commodore Matthew Perry.
Slide 4
Tokugawa Japan Sakoku from mid 17 th century Ends when West
wishes to open Japan to trade.
Slide 5
America expands outside the Continent The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History 1660-1805
Slide 6
Japan(1852-1914) Begins a crash program of modernizing on the
European model Looks at itself as equal to Europe Builds modern
militaries. Wages aggressive war against Russia and China in order
to acquire overseas territories Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895 Ends
with Japanese victory. Russia, France and Germany do not allow
Japan to occupy Port Arthur. Japan looks at this as a betrayal
Japans forms an alliance with Great Britain 1902. Russo-Japanese
War 1904-1905 end with Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan wins but is
forced to give concessions thru US mediation.
Slide 7
World War 1 Japan seizes German possessions, Caroline,
Marshall, and part of Marianas Islands, Chinese port of Tsingtao
Australia prohibits Japanese from immigration US looks to increase
the size and readiness of Pacific forces. US-Japan on a collision
course Washington-London Naval treaties 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 Treaty
525,000, 525,000, 315,000
Slide 8
Slide 9
Japan 1931-1939 18 Sep31 Mukden Incident, followed by Invasion
of Manchuria. Puppet State of Manchukuo established. Shanghai
Incident, Jan 32 to Mar 32, City demilitarized Marco Polo Bridge
Incident 7 Jul37 to 9 Jul 37, (Boxer Agreement)
Slide 10
Second Sino-Japanese War Beginning of World War 2? 7 Jul37 to 9
Sep45 Rape of Nanking Dec37 to Mar38 Panay Incident 12 Dec37 3
Killed 48 wounded
Slide 11
Second Sino-Japanese War
Slide 12
Slide 13
The Pacific 31-39
Slide 14
Battle of Khalkhin-Gol Arguably the most decisive battle of
World War Two! 5/11/39 to 9/16/39 Japan is badly beaten decides not
to take on the Red Army Georgi Zhukov
Slide 15
Formation of Modern Japan 1 st Sino-Japanese war 1894
Russo-Japanese War 1904- 05 Japan fights as ally in 1 st World War
Rise of the Army 1930s Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere
Slide 16
The Road to Pearl Harbor 1940 to July 1941 US freezes Japanese
assets, closes the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping, embargoes
scrap metal, and all oil exports to Japan July 1941 the Imperial
Japanese Navy High Command informs government that is its oil
stockpiles will last 2 years Nov 5, 1941 Hirohito approves war
plan, including Operation Z, for Dec start if negotiations
fail
Slide 17
Taranto
Slide 18
Planning Operation Z Jan 1941 General outline of plan prepared
by Yamamoto Onishi and Genda work out detailed plan Operation Z by
April 1941 June-Aug 41 pilots train at Kagoshima City,
modifications to Type 91 torpedo completed
Slide 19
Pulp fiction predicts attack Throughout the 1930s there are
many versions of a Pearl Harbor Attack in Japanese pulp fiction. As
early as the 1931 the US Navy considered an air attack a
possibility, however, extremely remote and unlikely. US Pacific
Fleet moved to Pearl Harbor May 9, 1940, after fleet exercises, as
a diplomatic posture towards Japan. Decision opposed by fleet
commander James O Richardson. Hurt FDRs feelings.
Slide 20
US military responses 1940-1941 Both the Army and Navy intel
and ops considered an air attack on Pearl harbor unlikely, because
the Pacific Fleet was incapable of doing much to hinder anticipated
Japanese movements. Largely because the support ships, Oilers, etc,
were being sent to the Atlantic. Well publicized in newspapers.
However, Jan 24, 1941 in a communiqu from Navy Sec Frank Knox
(authored Richmond Kelly Turner at Navy WarPlans)sent to CinCPAC
that an aerial attack on Pearl a possibility, and that steps should
be taken to remedy deficiencies. However, the remedy (ies) were
well beyond the capability of both the Army and Naval forces in
Hawaii at that time. In response US drops War Plan Orange in favor
of Rainbow 5 which included accepting the lose of the
Philippines.
Slide 21
US military responses 1940-1941 However, chromic shortages
because of the material aid to Great Britain and Russia, material
sent to the Philippines, in contradiction to existing war plan, and
material kept stateside prevented minimum recommendations from
being implemented in Hawaii. The revised memo in conjunction with
the War Dept. emphasized possible sabotage. (160,000 Japanese
38,000 foreign born) Sudetenland.
Slide 22
New Commanders Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short March 1, 1941 Vice Adm.
Husband Kimmel- Feb 1941
Slide 23
Short and Kimmel accomplishments Steps taken by Short Restored
harmony between air corps and ground forces Established radar air
defense system (new and untried in US hands)- fights with NPS Steps
taken by Kimmel Viewed air attack as a possibility Under orders
from Washington prepared force for offensive operations
Slide 24
Washington doublespeak Marshall to Short- Mar 5- deferred to
NPS on setup of radar sites on Park service grounds. Let it be
known to overseas commanders that they wished Japan to make first
overt move and stressed that no action was to be taken to provoke
hostile action Navy sent official intelligence estimates that
stressed that no air delivered torpedo could be used at Pearl
Denied Magic intercept machines to both commanders, in spite of one
being sent to MacArthur Washington adopted a policy of crewing
newly constructed ships by taking &2 of their crews from the
Pacific.
Slide 25
Magic and counterintelligence Read Japanese diplomatic (not
military codes) Army and Navy dominated Japanese politics and did
not always provide Diplomatic corps with information Magic
intercepts could be days and weeks behind because of lack of
interpreters FBI, Naval and Army intelligence ignored Honolulu
consulate personnel
Slide 26
Martin-Bellinger Report Composed by Hawaiian Air Corp Co MG
Edawrd Martin and R Adm Patrick NL Bellinger head of Air Patrol
Japan may attack before declaration of war. Will attack on a
Saturday or Sunday or holiday at dawn. The effectiveness of defense
depended entirely upon advance knowledge of an attack. There were
not enough planes or crews to establish a permanent air patrol and
that an effective air seach was entirely dependent upon advanced
warning from resources outside the Dept of Hawaii.
Slide 27
Diplomatic front Japan was pressed for time. United States was
doing everything to could to delay. Neither Britain of the United
States were prepared for war in the Pacific because of priority to
the Atlantic theater. US expected an attack, but all indicators
focused on theaters other than Hawaii.
Slide 28
Short and Kimmel Short never appreciated airpower. In fact
spent much time training his airmen as infantry, etc. Short bunched
his aircraft. Short failed to appreciate that his mission included
protecting Pacific Fleet and not just the islands. Both short and
Kimmel repeatedly and emphatically informed Washington that the
forces at their disposal was inadequate Kimmel informed FDR that
the Pacific Fleet was being stripped of men and material at a rate
that was jeopardizing the command. Also chastised President for
National policy of using the military more for diplomatic measures
than for national defense. June 9, 1941
Slide 29
Major Ship Types BB- Battleship 20,000 plus tons, 11 inch or
better BC-Battlecruiser- 20,000 plus tons, 11 inch or better CA-
Heavy Cruiser 8000-20,000 tones 8 inch guns CL-Light Cruiser
6000-12,000 6 inch guns DD- Destroyer 3000-7000 tons- 5 inch guns
CV- aircraft carrier 40- 100 planes CVL-light carrier- 20-50 planes
CVE-escort carrier less than 25 planes
Slide 30
The Rise of the Air Power Enthusiasts July 21, 1921
Slide 31
The Birth of the Aircraft Carrier
Slide 32
Was Billy Mitchell correct?
Slide 33
Taranto
Slide 34
Slide 35
Slide 36
Midget Subs Kazuro Sakamaki
Slide 37
Nakajima B5N Kate
Slide 38
Aichi D3A1 Val
Slide 39
Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Model 21 Zero
Slide 40
Japanese War games Misconception of what military wargames hope
to achieve No need to practice operations that would be canceled.
For example when the wargames cited by Prange showed 2 carriers
sunk, the umpires noted what effective measures needed to be taken
to make sure of their survivial and allowed them back in the game.
Admiral Ugaki notes state emphatically that the operation would
have been called off by the Naval General Staff if the risk was
deemed to great. The summary of all the war games expected a 50%
loss of aircrew and aircraft, a contingency deemed acceptable.
Slide 41
Pre-War/ Early War Japanese Naval strategy Fight battleship
battle in near Japanese waters in conditions favorable to
Japanese
Slide 42
Japanese Carrier tactics for Pearl Harbor Lack of combined arms
attacks Too many AP level bombers with a low probability of
inflicting damage (Yamamoto/Fuchida) to torpedo A great priority
given to sinking battleships vs cruisers and other types of ships
No consideration or ordnance for attacking shipyard facilities or
oil fields The early plan called for a 2 wave attack and in spite
of reports to the contrary (Fuchida) a 3 rd attack was never
seriously considered. Adding the midget subs to the plan could have
seriously compromised operational security for little gain
(Yamamoto).
Slide 43
Last Events November 26: The Japanese Hawaii task force leaves
the Kurile Islands, bound for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Later in the
day, in a note to the Japanese ambassador, U.S. secretary of state
Cordell Hull demands the complete withdrawal of all Japanese troops
from China. Japanese prime minister Hideki Tojo will refer to this
as "an ultimatum. FDR notifies Philippines of imminent attack
Slide 44
Slide 45
Last Events Stark and Marshall issue joint statement asking for
additional time through diplomatic means.. FDR passed news of
expected failure in diplomatic activity to British.
Slide 46
Last Events November 27: War Warning issued to Army and Navy
commands Negotiations with Japan appear to terminated for all
practical purposes Further action by Japan unpredictable, but
hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot,
repeat cannot, be avoidedthe United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act. However, this should not be construed
as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your
defense. Reconnaissance and other measures should be carried out
with caution so as not to alarm the civilian populace or disclose
intent. However, Marshall was aware of Hawaiis inability to conduct
proper reconnaissance only 8 operational aircraft existed. Hawaiian
Army forces placed on Alert 2 (air attack) through November30.
Slide 47
Last Events November 28: War Department sends Short message
warning of possible sabotage to aircraft and asks for what concrete
steps he has taken to ensure safety of air forces. Navy ordered to
ferry aircraft to Wake and Midway weakening Army and Navy fighter
aircraft in Hawaii by 20%. November 30: Tojos inflammatory speech,
however, Japan advises ambassadors to continue.
Slide 48
Last Events December 1: Japanese Navy changes ships call signs.
Army (Miles Memorandum) and Navy issue intel estimates stressing
importance of Atlantic, while stressing Japans limited ability to
project is forces. Expected Japanese offensive targets: Thailand,
Malay Peninsula, Burma, Philippines, Dutch East Indies. Concluded
that Japan was unable to project its forces into the Eastern
Pacific for extended periods. No mention of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel
and Short given summary. Japan alerts Berlin of impending war Japan
orders embassys worldwide (US and Allied) to destroy cipher
machines.***** FDR assures Britian of support in event of Japanese
attack in the Pacific. Adm Hart ordered to locate and shadow
convoys. Japanese government issues order for war.
Slide 49
Last Events December 2: Hirohito briefed on War Plans. Kimmel
ask PacFlt Intel for assessment-Do you mean to say that they could
be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldnt know it? Japan orders all
embassies and consulates in US to burn secret documents. Climb Mt.
Niitaka message sent to Adm Nagumo
Slide 50
Last Events December 3: War Departments orders military
attaches to destroy secret codes, equipment and messages in
embassies and consulates in Japan and Germany. Japans Wind Codes
message Navy orders outposts to destroy secret documents. US Army
in Hawaii goes to Alert 1 (Sabotage) thru December 5
Slide 51
Last Events December 5: Navy Dept assesses the Japanse attack
on Southeast Asia imminent December 6: US recon picks up Japanses
task force in South China Sea. Army-Navy signals pick up the 1 st
part of the 14 part message This is considered by Administration
that war with Japan was imminent. The message to destroy codes
interpreted by US intel. FDR sends direct note to the Emperor.
Slide 52
Last events All on Washingtom time December 7 th : 8:45 Army
Navy Signals decipher 14 th part 10:20 Adm Stark briefed on
contents 11:25 Gen Marshall briefed on contents
Slide 53
The 14 th Part WAS NOT A DECLARATION OF WAR Obviously it is the
intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain
and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the
establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East
Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest
by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed
clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the
earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-
American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the
Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has
finally been lost. The Japanese Government regrets to have to
notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude
of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is
impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
Slide 54
Japanese Dramatis Personae
Slide 55
1 st Wave he first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north
of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. It included: [nb
9]CaptainMitsuo Fuchida [nb 9] 1st Group (targets: battleships and
aircraft carriers) [58] [58] 50 Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed
with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, organized in four
sectionsNakajima B5Narmor piercing bombs 40 B5N bombers armed with
Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sectionsType 91 torpedoes 2nd Group
(targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)Ford IslandWheeler Field 54
Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general
purpose bombsAichi D3Ageneral purpose bombs 3rd Group (targets:
aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barbers
Point, Kaneohe) 45 Mitsubishi A6M Zeke fighters for air control and
strafinMitsubishi A6Mstrafin
Slide 56
2 nd Wave The second wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81
D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu
Shimazaki. [57] Four planes failed to launch because of technical
difficulties. [36] This wave and its targets comprised:
[57]Lieutenant-CommanderShigekazu Shimazaki [57] [36] [57] 1st
Group 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general
purpose bombs [58] [58] 27 B5Ns aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe,
Ford Island, and Barbers Point 27 B5Ns hangars and aircraft on
Hickam Field 2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers) 81
D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four
sections 3rd Group (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field,
Wheeler Field, Barbers Point, Kaneohe) 36 A6Ms for defense and
strafing
Slide 57
Battle Damage Assessment Japan claims 4 BBs, 2 CAs, 1 tanker
and 1 type uncertain sunk 2 BBs, 2 CLs and 2 DDs heavy damage 2 BBs
4 CLs light damage Usual for WW2 aircrews to assess damage by a
factor of three to actual. Actual 2 BBs total loss, 2 aux (Utah,
Oglala) sunk, 4 BBs heavy damage, 2 BBs lightly damaged. 2 CLs
heavy damage, 2 CLs minor damage. 2 DDs scrapped, 2 DDs minor
damage.
Slide 58
Battle Damage Assessment Japanese claimed 90$ effectiveness of
torpedo attacks- actual 48% Claimed for AP bomb 26%- actual 20% GP
bomb claimed 63%-actual 19% In Mid-1942 the Japanese Naval Staff
reassessed the Pearl Harbor claims and rebuked Mitsuo Fuchida for
overinflated claims.
Slide 59
Myths and controversy FDR knew of the date and time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor in order to get us into the war with Germany
The preponderance evidence suggests that while an attack was
expected its date and time was impossible to determine. An attack
on Pearl would inflate anti-German opinion FDR would risk the fleet
when the BB-CV argument was still unsure
Slide 60
The 3 rd Wave Myth Nagumo was unsure of location of American
carriers Fuchida and Genda argued with Nagumo for an additional
attack. Denied by Genda, not mentioned by Fuchida in March 46
interview to Naval Intelligence. Nobody thought about it. Naval
officer attached to the US Strategic Bombing Survey in a 147 report
stated that Japanese ordance on the Strike Force were inadequate to
seriously hinder shipyard operations or damage fuel facilities. The
estimates that if a 3 rd attack took place stated that the base
would remain operational as the Navy had 4 repair ships and the
fact that shipyard facilities are durable. Worst case scenario-
Pearl Harbor at 45% efficiency for one month. Attacking the
shipyard effectively could only be done by consistent attack by
land based air assets.
Slide 61
3 rd Wave Myth 563,000 gallons of fuel and diesel. Strategic
Bombing Survey- (Ploesti Raids included) stated that for aircraft
weapons only those greater than.50 cal could cause minimal damage
to the oil tanks. HE explosive and incendiary bombs needed over
long term The Germans were able to recover 87% of the leaked oil.
Red Hill Underground Storage facility Tankers able to bring 60,000
gallons per month. 11 tankers existed. The 7.7 and low velocity
20mm on Japanese aircraft unable to damage tanks. The 250 in gp
bomb insufficient to damage oil tanks.