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Debate on the Developmental State

By Ethiopian Scholars

Compiled by

Geza Hayet

http://hayet11.blogspot.com

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Contents

Meles Zenawi’s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit... 2

Messay Kebede

Mind the Jump: A Brief Response to Prof. Messay Kebede .............................................. 17

Abiye Teklemariam

A rejoinder of Prof. Messay Kebede's article: Meles' political dilemma ........................ 20

Seid Hassan

A short reply to Messay's paper - specifically on the power of dictators ....................... 22

Girma Moges

Another rejoinder of Messay Kebede's article: Meles Zenawi's dilemma ...................... 24

Minga Negash

Demobilizing Ethiopians will never be the solution to Ethiopia’s existential problems : A

response to Prof. Daniel kindie and to Prof. Messay Kebbede ....................................... 28

Wedi Samre

Messay Kebede and his "Manifesto" ............................................................................. 46

Tekola Hagos

Some remarks on Messay's article ................................................................................. 52

Demeke Taye

A few points on democracy vs development ................................................................... 54

Wondemhunegn Ezezew

Developmental state or neo-liberal economic policy? ................................................... 654

Fekadu Bekele

COMMENTS FROM READERS .......................................................................................... 70

Selected Coments

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Meles Zenawi’s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit

By Messay Kebede June 14th, 2011

This paper can be taken as a manifesto of an individual who has pondered on the tragedy of

Ethiopia for many years and whose specific features is that he is passionate about the country,

has no political ambition or affiliation, even though he is firmly anchored in the opposition

camp, and feels no grudge is worth nursing if it stands in the way of a much higher cause.

These features possess the virtue of providing a vantage point, not only to analyze the

problems of Ethiopia, but also to approach them from the perspective of the best way out for

everybody. In a sense, the paper is a mental reenactment of the 2005 election triggered by the

question of what would have happened if its outcomes were used to institute a grand coalition

instead of exasperating mutual suspicion and the desire to oust or suppress the opponent. In

conceiving the election as a lost opportunity, the paper attempts a theoretical construction

whereby what came through the ballot box could be recreated through the learned decision of

the ruling elite and opposition groups. Not that it entertains any illusion about the

predictability of the future, but because the constant availability of different choices in history

allows us not to always expect the worst.

Narrowing of the Playing-Field

One cannot explain the circumstances and outcomes of the 2010 national election without the

aftermaths of the 2005 election, rightly considered as a watershed in Ethiopia‘s recent politics.

In light of the opening of the political field for free and fair election in 2005, it is reasonable

to assume that Meles and his supporters had caressed the idea that they would easily emerge

winners. Meles allowed free election, not because he was ready to cede power after a fair

fight, but because he thought that the opposition was too weak and its popular support too

fragmented and numerically feeble to constitute a serious challenge. The underestimation of

both the opposition and the extent of the popular frustration alone explain the opening of a

competitive scenario.

From his electoral defeat that he had to reverse by a violent crackdown on protesters and the

imprisonment of opposition leaders, Meles drew the conclusion that only the path of

authoritarian politics can keep him and his supporters in power, a conclusion that,

unfortunately, opposition leaders failed to acknowledge––despite numerous signs indicating

the closure of the political field––with their declared hope of a repeat of the 2005 election.

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They badly missed Meles‘s determination never to go back to the situation of 2005 and his

scheme to prepare the conditions for the institution of a de facto one-party state. His

resolution was all the firmer as a repeat of the 2005 election crisis would cripple his

leadership and end his ascendency within the EPRDF.

On the other hand, it was also clear that Meles would not go to the extent of banning political

parties, thereby going against the present constitution, which justifies the hegemony of the

EPRDF, and the international opinion favoring democracy and multiparty states. Meles could

not take the road of openly establishing a one-party state, not only because of the international

opinion, but primarily because outlawing political parties would entail the dissolution of the

EPRDF as a coalition of ethnic parties in favor of a single party, and hence the renunciation of

ethnic politics. Indeed, how could the EPRDF transform itself into a single party unless the

idea of ethnic groups having their own autonomous representation is done away with? And

how could Meles and the TPLF maintain their political hegemony without the fragmentation

of Ethiopia along ethnic lines, which becomes effective only through the existence of ethnic

parties representing ethnic groups? Without ethnic based elections, ethnic distinctions would

be simply linguistic and not political. Elections are thus an indispensable component of the

ethnicization of Ethiopia: they give primacy to ethnic entities over the larger notion of

Ethiopia as a single nation.

Another reason for maintaining a semblance of democracy is that the facade of open election

is an important tool for Meles‘s repressive policy. In a country where opposition is forbidden,

people have no other choice than the violent overthrow of the regime, either through a popular

insurrection or an organized guerrilla movement. The recognition of the right to oppose and

compete for state power, in addition to detracting people from the idea of a violent overthrow

of the regime through the hope of a peaceful, democratic access to power, gives the ruling

party an arsenal of legal and covert means to harass and undermine opposition forces. The

state allows the existence of opposing parties, but makes sure that the electoral contest never

reaches the level of real threat to the ruling elite. Only through the establishment of a peaceful

order achieved through the weakening of the opposition could Meles prevail in his party and

retain the loyalty of the army. His political prevalence and his ability to retain the loyalty of

senior party members and army officers depend on his success in providing a safe and

extended environment for a tranquil enjoyment of preferential treatments and privileges.

Failure to do so brings about anxiety and frictions that will threaten his absolute power.

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That is why it is absolutely mistaken to interpret the rise of Meles to absolute power as his

own doing. No doubt, Meles had the temperament and the qualities needed to emerge as a

strongman within the TPLF and used his prominent position to alter the original egalitarian

tendency prevailing in the upper leadership of the party. However, individual dispositions are

not enough to create dictators or authoritarian leaders; social forces are also necessary. In

particular, the TPLF‘s persistence to retain a hegemonic position within the EPRDF and the

state despite its minority status in terms of regional weight compelled the organization to put

its fate in the hands of a strong man. When political hegemony is achieved through the

exclusion of rival elites, it calls, sooner rather than later, for the enthronement of a dictatorial

ruler as the best guarantee to preserve the hegemony. The only way by which the TPLF could

maintain its egalitarian tradition was to relinquish its hegemonic aspirations, thereby making

the recourse to a strongman unnecessary.

Toward the Developmental State

Faced with the dilemma of allowing political pluralism while ensuring the dominance of the

EPRDF, Meles opted for the strategy of using all the means of the state to cripple opposition

parties until such time his own power and the party he represents acquire a hegemonic status.

This new strategic choice is none other than the recourse to the theory of the developmental

state. The purpose of the policy is to create the conditions for a long-term rule of Meles and

his party by siphoning off popular support from opposition parties to the point of making

them irrelevant.

A word of caution: I am not saying that Meles‘s love affair with the theory of the

developmental state dates from the 2005 election. As shown by his doctoral thesis, he has

reflected on the theory for quite a long time. Even so, what remains true is that the 2005

electoral crisis and its consequences turned the theory from a personal preference into an

indispensable strategy and provided him with the opportunity of convincingly presenting it to

his supporters as the only viable policy.

To begin with, Meles criticizes neoliberalism even before he has made any genuine effort to

apply it. The reason is that the application of the theory would simply result in him and his

followers losing power, as evidenced by the 2005 election. What made the theory of

developmental state a necessity is thus the single and overriding issue of Meles‘s control of

absolute power. The theory, we know, has been praised and advocated by many scholars for

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its ability to promote rapid economic growth. As a model drawn from the successful and rapid

development of Japan and East Asian countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, etc.,

the theory has been prescribed as an efficient remedy for countries struggling against

underdevelopment. For Meles, the economic advantages are worth considering only to the

extent that they guarantee the control of state power. In effect, the theory is usually associated

with the presence of authoritarian states that reject the path of liberalism.

I know that some scholars, Meles himself, and his ideologues maintain that the developmental

state is not incompatible with the defense of democracy and human rights, that the new state

can be democratic and developmental at the same time. This kind of approach ignores, mostly

for political reasons, the defining character of Asian developmental states. Countries that

seriously engage in the path of the developmental state do so because they think that the

liberal paradigm of development has failed in Africa and elsewhere. Born of a critique of

neoliberalism, it is inconsistent to assume that the theory is compatible with democratic

principles. Had it been the case, the difference with liberal policy would become difficult to

establish. The truth about the theory is that authoritarianism is conceived as the best and most

efficient way to achieve rapid development, especially for lagging countries. Witness those

countries that are cited as examples were or still are defined by an authoritarian state. Rather

than being both democratic and developmental, this model of development promises the

gradual institution of a democratic state once economic progress is put on a firm footing.

The prescription of authoritarianism as a remedy to achieve the goal of rapid development

vindicates that all authoritarian states are not developmental. They become so only when they

harbor the clear goal of using a strong state to achieve growth. It is, therefore, a mistake to

argue that popular insurrections in the Arab world testify to the failure of the authoritarian

model of economic progress at the expense of democratic rights. None of the Arab states has

sincerely applied the Asian model of development, given that authoritarianism was used to

defend the interests of predatory elites rather than to accelerate national development.

In the case of Ethiopia, the economic dimension must be emphasized as it is the key to the

project of a long-term rule of Meles and his cronies. Like most people, Meles has observed

that people living in regimes that show robust economic performances are little prone to

protests and insurrections. What essentially drives people is not so much the pursuit of

freedom in the abstract sense of the word as their ability to satisfy their most basic needs.

Freedom becomes mobilizing when it is invoked to overthrow regimes that have lamentable

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economic records. Accordingly, a regime that succeeds in providing bread and butter for its

people is guaranteed for a long rule. Of course, elections will be held in such a regime, but

they are more about popular consecration or approval than genuine contests. In a situation of

economic progress, the ruling party need not use fraud and intimidation to win elections; it

prevails because the economic success of the regime makes opposition groups irrelevant.

Such is the course that Meles would like to take in order to institute the conditions for an

indefinite retention of power. The developmental state promises the defeat of the opposition

achieved no more by suppression and rigged elections, but based on the economic

achievement of the regime. In this way, contests for power become less threatening as the

regime will draw its legitimacy from popular approval, which is not concerned with the

conquest of state power. This popular approval guarantees a long-term rule, the very one

needed by Meles‘s cronies and military elite to entrench their interests and privileges, thereby

transforming them into permanent acquisitions. The establishment of a firm but silent and

condescending rule is what they want in exchange for allowing Meles the exercise of absolute

power.

Characteristics of Developmental States

The whole question is to know whether Meles‘s new strategy can be successful in the

conditions of Ethiopia. Since success entirely depends on the ability to furnish appreciable

economic growth to the Ethiopian masses, we need to say a few words about the basic

characteristics of the developmental state. According to many scholars, some crucial and

commonly held features define the developmental state or the Asian mode of development.

Market Economy: The commitment to free market must be unwavering even if the state is

called upon to play a leading role both in terms of planning, investments, and directives. The

economic role of the state, though decisive and extensive, is not tantamount to running the

economic machine, as was the case with the socialist policy; rather, it is to render a helping

hand for the establishment of vibrant private enterprises and a capitalist class. Besides actual

economic functions, the developmental state supports capitalism by providing a lasting

political and social stability together with the rule of law and the protection of property rights.

The fact that the state assumes a supporting role significantly reduces rent-seeking activities,

such as government extracting revenues by the control of land and natural resources, the

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imposition of exorbitant tax and restrictive regulations affecting free enterprise, or

government agents demanding bribes and other payments from individuals or firms in

exchange for preferential treatments. The net outcome of such rent-seeking activities is, of

course, the prevention of economic growth through the falsification of market economy and

fair distribution. The national wealth cannot grow in a country where rent-seeking behaviors

prevail, since the imposition of restrictive controls hampers economic activity and an

important part of the wealth goes to a sector that makes no contribution to productivity.

Clearly, in light of most underdeveloped countries being held back by states that have grown

into rent-seeking systems, the supportive role of the developmental state to market economy

constitutes a major shift.

That the state limits its role to supporting private business does not mean that we are dealing

with a weak state, in the liberal sense of the state confined to providing law and order. The

developmental state requires a strong and authoritarian state, that is, a state that enjoys

financial autonomy, is free of internal cleavages and frictions, and faces a disabled opposition.

It is also endowed with effective institutions so that it is able to soar above particular social

forces. Only thus can it direct economic forces toward national development and have enough

leverage to prevail over adverse forces.

Bureaucratic Autonomy: The strength of the state is actually a condition for the other defining

character of the developmental state, namely, the autonomy of the bureaucracy. Indeed,

bureaucrats rather than the political elite supervise and direct the economy, with the

consequence that, unlike the ruling political elite, the bureaucracy is established on the basis

of merit, efficiency, and high skills. What is required of the bureaucrats is less political

allegiance than efficiency in exchange for handsome remunerations. The advantages enjoyed

by the bureaucrats are, therefore, not due to rent-seeking activities but to their contribution to

economic growth.

Development-Oriented Elite: What makes the autonomy of bureaucracy possible is the control

of state power by development-oriented political elites. Instead of using the state to sideline

rival elites, as is often the case in underdeveloped countries, such elites are motivated by the

desire to increase the national wealth. As they make political legitimacy conditional on

economic achievement, they allow an autonomous functioning of the bureaucracy, given that

autonomy is how bureaucracy can function efficiently. Such is not the case in rent-seeking

states: government is used to undermine rival elites for the simple reason that the dearth of

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economic growth entails the extraction of revenues through political exclusion and illegal

means.

Nationalist and Elite Education: The strategy of using skill and merit to perpetuate the rule of

a political elite fosters the other necessary component of the developmental state, to wit, the

centrality of education. Not only does the strategy advocate the expansion of education so as

to increase human resources in all areas of social life, but also insists on providing a quality

education, especially an elite education at the higher level of university. The provision of

highly trained people is a component part of the policy of rapid economic growth and hence

of direct interest to the ruling elite.

Needless to say, education is also geared toward nation-building: in conjunction with the

values of meritocracy, it promotes national consciousness and unity. Obviously, the

promotion of nationalism is necessary to justify the prerogatives of a strong state and

inculcate discipline, just as it is necessary to galvanize and mobilize people around the

national goal of development. Without the inculcation of the values of loyalty, unity,

dutifulness, meritocracy, and the drive to learn, the developmental state cannot achieve the

mobilizing power it needs to lead the country into the road of rapid development.

The Ethiopian Situation

In thus exposing the main characteristics of the developmental state, we secure the ability to

see whether Ethiopia under Meles has the required attributes for a successful move. It must be

admitted that, once again, we find a repeat of the mistake of Ethiopia‘s previous modernizing

regimes, namely, the attempt to copy a model of development and apply it in a country

lacking the necessary prerequisites.

Most observers acknowledge that market economy in Ethiopia not only operates under

unfriendly conditions, but has also taken a skewed form. For instance, despite the primacy

given to improving agricultural production, the entire agricultural activity is hampered by the

state‘s control of land. The absence of private ownership of land does not allow peasants to

use their allotted land for transaction purposes. Nor does it encourage them to invest so as to

improve productivity. The state‘s ownership of land and its subsequent disincentive effect on

agricultural production represent a major disparity with East Asian countries that is not likely

to be removed any time soon. State ownership of land is necessary to keep control over the

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peasantry and protect the ethnic boundaries. If land becomes a commodity that peasants can

sell and buy at will, the confinement of people to ethnically defined areas would be seriously

jeopardized.

The ethnic borders add further restrictions on economic activity in that they prevent the free

mobility of labor and capital. People isolated behind ethnic borders and increasingly turned

into alien groups by a denationalized education, the nurture of animosity over past treatments,

and a separatist language policy, are understandably little inclined to move from region to

region in search of opportunity. The hampering effect of internal borders is no less true for

capital owners: their ethnicity can restrict their freedom to invest wherever they like or can

cost them heavy losses in the form of bribes to local agents to get the necessary permission.

Another major distortion to market economy is the fact that the Ethiopian economy is

increasingly dominated by conglomerates that have close ethnic and political ties with those

controlling state power. Directly owned and managed by senior members of the TPLF, the

conglomerates extend their activities in numerous and crucial agricultural and industrial

productions as well as in service areas, such as banking, insurance, import/ export, etc. There

is no denying that the provision of political support to these TPLF-controlled businesses

structurally distorts the operation of free market. The distortion encourages the wide practice

of corruption and embezzlement, given that enterprises owned by businessmen non-ethnically

related to the ruling elite cannot hope to operate without bribing officials of the regime.

The weight of political intervention undermines efficiency and quality in all spheres of

business and bureaucratic activities. Not only does political protection foster the wide practice

of corruption, but it also erases free competition, the result of which is that merit and the

norms of efficiency and quality are set aside. Likewise, it creates insecurity since the lack of

the rule of law, basically manifested by the complete subordination of the judicial system to

the ruling elite as well as by the ethnically charged social atmosphere, gives property rights a

precarious status, to say the least. Insecurity, wide corruption, and the absence of free

competition, all conspire to discourage investment and block the improvement of productivity.

In short, the characteristics of the Ethiopian economy are at the antipode of what is needed to

launch a process of development that could be branded as an application of the Asian model

of development.

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Another crucial disparity is that the cumbersome weight of political intervention does not

allow the autonomy of the bureaucratic sphere which, as we saw, is a defining feature of the

Asian model of development. Far from allowing autonomy, Meles and his cronies are using

the bureaucracy as an extended organ of the political machinery, thereby undermining

impartiality and professionalism, and distributing favorable treatments on the basis of political

patronage, ethnic affiliation, and bribes. What must be emphasized here is that the ethnic basis

of the Ethiopian state, as fashioned by the TPLF, is structurally adamant to the autonomy of

the bureaucracy. In order to build a competent and professional bureaucracy, recruitment and

promotion must be based on merit rather than on ethnic affiliation and political patronage.

The whole ideology and political goal of Meles and his followers are thus directly opposed to

the establishment of a professional bureaucracy.

One necessary condition for creating a competent bureaucracy and improving the human

capital in terms of skills, knowledge, and expertise is, of course, education. In this regard, the

records of the Meles regime show some improvement, but alas an improvement that is only

quantitative. We can even say that the quantitative improvement is obtained to the detriment

of quality. The tense relationship of the regime with students and teachers further weighs on

the regime‘s inability to raise the standard of education. Also, the lack of political

accommodation and material improvement cause a systematic brain drain that further

impoverishes the country of skilled people. If the regime cannot find incentives by which it

retains the services of the people it educates, then it can never attain the level of human

capital needed to launch a developmental state.

Another obstacle disabling the educational policy is the lack of nationalist themes extolling

Ethiopia. Civic education is polarizing in that it is not directed toward national integration and

the development of national consciousness; rather, it exalts ethnic identity and fragmentation.

It reiterates past grudges, but does little to create a new national consciousness based on the

inheritance of the past. Whatever nationalism the educational system or the regime is

propagating, it is an exhortation to a clean slate, start-from-zero nationalism. This futuristic

nationalism answers every question except the most important one, which is: Why an Oromo

person, for instance, would prefer the construction of a new Ethiopia to the creation of an

independent Oromia? The futuristic nationalism lacks the excitement and commitment

flowing from continuity, from the sense of belonging to a historical and transcendental

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community. The future generates excitement when it connects with the past so that it tells a

story, a saga by assuming the mission of looking after and moving forward a legacy.

Interestingly, Meles knows that the developmental state needs a nationalist theme, that

popular mobilization around national goals is one of its strengths. That is why he is now

fanning the theme of ―war on poverty‖ and the Abay dam project. Especially, the latter project

is highly nationalist: (1) it enables Meles to blame Western countries for their reluctance to

support the project; (2) it revives a longstanding grudge against Egypt over the control of the

Nile; (3) it appeals to the contribution of each Ethiopian, thereby supplying a common

national goal, regardless of ethnic belonging, and allegedly able to pull Ethiopia out of

poverty.

In his address during the 20th anniversary of the victory of the TPLF, Meles made a short

speech about the Abay dam project that was saturated with nationalist slogans and boastings.

The themes of unity, common goal, and eradication of poverty promised the renaissance of

Ethiopia, the restoration of the eminent place it had in the past. Not once was the ethnic issue

mentioned, rather, the historical identity of Ethiopia was back to the forefront.

One would be tempted to shout ―Alleluia‖ were it not for the fact that this tardy nationalist

discourse does not agree with the actual ideology, political structure, and economic policy of

the regime. This brings us back to the fundamental issue, to wit, the question of knowing

whether the Ethiopian ruling elite has the characteristics of a development-oriented elite, as

forcefully required by the theory of the developmental state. As we saw, the non-predatory

character of the ruling elite is the sine qua non of the whole theory: in addition to being

nationalist, the ruling elite must draw its legitimacy and its retention of state power from its

ability to deliver economic growth rather than through the use of repression.

To the question of whether Meles and his cronies are anywhere close to being a

developmental elite, the answer is, of course, no. This negative answer does not, however,

mean that they are unable to become developmental. I am not saying that some such

transformation will occur or that it is inevitable. As a strong skeptic of determinism in history,

I am simply referring to the possibility inherent in the human person to finally make the right

choice and laying some conditions necessary to effect the transformation. Since my position

will certainly cause an array of objections, even angry attacks, it is necessary that I set out the

arguments liable to back it up.

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Conditions for the Emergence of Developmental Elites

Serious studies on the rise of developmental states agree that threat to power is the reason

why authoritarian elites decide to initiate reforms promoting economic growth. The reforms

are meant, not to satisfy any sudden democratic aspiration, but essentially to preserve power.

The threat can be internal or external or both; the point is that it is clearly perceived that the

ruling elite will soon lose everything unless it initiates reforms. Such was the case with Japan,

which adopted drastic reforms toward modernization in order to counter the threat of

colonization. Such countries as Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and South Korea undertook

reforms to weaken the menace of communism. If we take the case of some Latin American

countries, we find that their modernization is a response to the danger of internal insurrections

led by Marxist groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution. In the face of serious threats, ruling

elites adopt either a repressive policy as the right response or opt for reforms as the best way

to ensure their long-term interests. History testifies that, of the two methods, the avenue of

reform has best served ruling elites.

Additionally, the wise policy of reforms is perceived as a way of getting out of the political

stalemate caused by authoritarian regimes. When traditional elites engage in the process of

modernization, they initiate the formation of a modernizing elite, especially through Western

education, whose interests and outlooks clash with the traditional system of power legitimacy.

This conflict is easily translated into a competition for the control of political power.

Authoritarianism is then used as a repressive power to maintain rising elites in a subordinate

position. All the same, the assessment of the ruling elite could also be that a policy of

repression brings about neither economic development nor ensures peace and political

stability. The expectation of an indefinite and inconclusive political conflict creates a

rapprochement between the authoritarian elite and aspiring modernizing elites. Stated

otherwise, both parties realize the existence of a political stalemate and take the decision to

engage in negotiations. The decision means the renunciation of repression on the part of the

ruling elite and the withdrawal of the call for the overthrow of the regime on the part of

aspiring elites. These decisions show their respective readiness to compromise on reforms to

the system.

My contention is that the Ethiopian situation precisely exhibits a political stalemate, itself

fraught with dangerous possibilities. The tangible repressive tendency of the regime after the

2005 election has forced opposition forces and leaders to opt either for an armed conflict, with

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all the uncertainties that are attached to this form of struggle, or pursue a peaceful struggle

whose success depends on Meles‘s guarantee of democratic rights, which, I believe, is no

longer likely. The third possibility is the path of popular uprising of the kind shaking up the

Arab world. The likelihood of a popular uprising in Ethiopia cannot be underestimated even if

no one can tell when and how it is going to materialize. One thing is sure, though: unless

something is done, it will occur and, given the political structure established by the TPLF, it is

not set to be peaceful and probably will invite dangerous confrontations. What is likely is not

the Egyptian situation of the army refusing to shoot demonstrators, but the Libyan or Syrian

scenario of bloody confrontation and civil war.

Redoubtable though Meles‘s repressive power may be, he is not likely to marginalize the

opposition and achieve a final victory. The fact that the state becomes a repressive power

blocks the economic progress that he needs to sideline the opposition. On the other side, the

challenge of the opposition is bound to grow but without endangering Meles‘s hold on power,

that is, so long as it sticks to a peaceful form of struggle. This stalemate can implant nothing

else but the seeds of an angry popular insurrection that no one can seriously claim to control.

In other words, the present situation is deepening the political stalemate, which can only

develop into a dangerous state of affairs for everybody unless a mood for compromise soon

emanates from all parties concerned.

Toward a Transitional State

The only way by which the present ruling elite can begin its transformation is through the

establishment of a grand coalition materializing a power-sharing arrangement among various

elite groups, especially with those representing opposition forces. This grand coalition brings

a major change: it means the forging of a national political elite and, more importantly, the

rejection of the embedded practice of using the state to exclude rival elites.

I say ―embedded‖ because the practice goes back to Haile Selassie . It was taken up and

amplified by the Derg; under the TPLF, it took an open ethnic form. In all these cases, the

principle is the same: all the means of the state are used to marginalize and exclude rival elites,

be they ethnic, religious, or class-based. The practice of exclusion instead of integration or

coalition denotes the lack of development-oriented elites and the preponderance of rent-

seeking, predatory elites. The use of the state to keep out rivals betrays a quest for wealth that

is not based on growth but on political entitlement and predatory practices.

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The call for a grand coalition may seem utopian since it amounts to asking the TPLF to

abandon its hegemonic position in favor of a shared leadership. However, the utopian

character decreases as soon as we see it from the perspective of the long-term interests of all

the players and as the only viable way out from a dangerous situation. As we saw,

developmental elites emerge not so much from an ideological or moral conversion to

democracy as from an existential dilemma. The dilemma applies to opposition forces as well:

it means competing elite groups renounce the principle of conditioning change on the

overthrow of government. Instead of positing change in terms of one group losing and another

group winning, they espouse the idea of change occurring as a result of coalition formation or

power-sharing with the ruling elite, which amounts to a win-win outcome. I hasten to add that

the EPRDF should not be cited as an example of grand coalition, given the hegemonic

position of the TPLF.

The idea of a grand coalition is workable because it contains a valuable incentive for

everybody, that is, the incentive to effect changes so as to avoid dangerous developments. Let

me clarify: change cannot be an incentive for Meles and his cronies if it is coined in terms of

them giving up power. There is no incentive for the opposition, either, if compromise is

posited in terms of maintaining the status quo. Each camp must come half way so that they all

meet where power-sharing arrangement takes form.

The interesting thing about power-sharing is that it creates the conditions needed to apply the

developmental state. Meles is thus taken at his word and provided with the incentive of being

able to preserve the long-term interest of himself and his group. Indeed, we have indicated

that the developmental state requires the dismantling of the rent-seeking state, the

consequence of which is that elite rivalry for the control of the state is significantly

diminished. The rivalry has its source in the fact that the control of power gives an exclusive

access to wealth through various legal and illegal means. The establishment of a genuine

market economy removes the incentive of state control as a privileged access to wealth.

If the road of earnest reforms is rejected, what else remains but the maintenance of the

political structure of the TPLF, the consequence of which is that Meles has to adhere

indefinitely to a repressive policy and the practice of electoral fraud? The expectation that he

will be able to marginalize the opposition by offering to the masses tangible economic

betterment cannot happen if the present political structures and practices are preserved. The

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developmental state cannot be a reality so long as the state is used as an instrument of

exclusion.

One outcome of Meles‘s rise to absolute power that could turn out positive is his ability to

dismantle the rent-seeking state. I venture to say that absolute power has given Meles some

autonomy vis-à-vis his followers; I even suggest that a disparity between his interests and that

of his followers is inevitable. The passion of Meles is power; the goal of his followers is

enrichment. The rent-seeking activities that they use to enrich themselves prevent Meles from

achieving the economic growth by which he can justify his control of absolute power. He has

now the choice of maintaining the old structure, with the consequences that his power will

become increasingly fragile, or resolutely dissolve it through reforms. In order to do the latter,

he needs the support of the opposition.

The dissolution of the rent-seeking state means that Meles takes the opportunity to lay the

foundation of the developmental state by promoting integration or coalition instead of

exclusion. This enormous contribution is the manner he protects his long-term interest and

that of his followers. Is there a better way of effectively guaranteeing his assets and a great

place in history than by becoming the great benefactor, the architect of Ethiopia‘s final entry

into the road of modernization? He is entitled to keep whatever he and his followers have

amassed if the reforms he realized say to Ethiopians: ―you owe me.‖

Meles‘s goal to use authoritarianism to bring about economic growth so as to marginalize the

opposition thus faces one major stumbling-block. The projected growth cannot occur unless

the state is reformed. The only exit is to present the change in terms of a win-win option, that

is, in terms offering incentives for both Meles and the opposition to come to an agreement.

The problem is none other than the design of an agreed transition allowing the ruling elite a

constitutional guarantee of continuity and an effective control of power while including the

opposition in a genuine system of power-sharing. For example, a strong presidential power

that retains the control of the armed forces and the right to nominate the prime minister

working with a parliament elected by the people could do the job. In this way, the prime

minister becomes accountable both to the president and the parliament, thereby incarnating

the rule of consensus that animates the entire political system.

To sum up, to solve the present political stalemate of Ethiopia, one prescription is for

democratization to occur gradually and under the sponsorship of an authoritarian ruling elite.

Page | 16 Geza hayet

Various systems of power-sharing guaranteeing the interests of the ruling elite and of the

opposition can be designed. The point is that the movement toward greater democratization

begins, no more through the overthrow of a ruling elite, but through a formula of power-

sharing and the building of trust among various elite groups. This type of democratization is

not uncommon: the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is not only the trajectory of

the Asian countries that applied the formula of the developmental state, but also of other

countries, such as Turkey, Spain, Brazil, Chile, etc. The truth is that the birth of democratic

states from an evolution of authoritarian regimes is no less a historical trend than the

establishment of democracies as a result of the violent overthrow of authoritarianism.

(Messay Kebede, Ph.D, can be reached at Messay.Kebede@notes.udayton.edu)

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Mind the Jump: A Brief Response to Prof. Messay Kebede

Abiye Teklemariam Megenta June 15, 2011

Professor Messay Kebede‘s challenging essay, ―The fallacy of TPLF‘s developmental state,‖

makes a lot of fresh arguments and suggestions. Some of them are deeply unsettling to many

of us who consider ourselves to be part of a pro-democracy struggle in Ethiopia. To the extent

that we believe Messay himself is a member of our community — a towering intellectual

figure at that — it is hard to escape a sense of deep disenchantment with what appears to be

his abandonment of our deepest convictions. But that is not a good enough reason to react

negatively towards the article. I agree with American political philosopher Michael Walzer

that the internal critics, the incrementalists and foot-draggers, the prophets that are honored in

their own city, are better in achieving the goals of their criticism than the external hammer-

on-the-skull critics. But the axe and the furious witnessing (to use Kafka‘s phrase) are needed

if communities are not to stagnate beyond reprieve, as ours seems to be heading towards. It is

refreshing to see that Messay is willing to stick his neck out in service of reason and progress.

But alas, most of his arguments, at least the arguments which matter, are far from persuasive.

The main point in Messay‘s article is that it is not beyond Meles Zenawi to establish a

developmental state provided that the present political structure is reformed in such a way that

leaves, at least for some time, the ruling elite in power, but does not exclude the opposition

from participating in the act of governing. This is an authoritarian scheme, insofar as its

grounding is elite agreement, not voter choice. But Messay takes a hopeful, if not an

overconfident, view that democratization is possible under the tutelage of these power sharing

authoritarian elites.

The relevant literature in political science and political economy shows that this

overconfidence is misplaced. There are diverse explanations of the democratization process,

and Messay is on point to claim that elite-conceded or – to a lesser degree – elite-imposed

democracies are not implausible. But there are few places where these democratization

processes have started with power-sharing arrangements among competing political parties.

As Harvard Political Scientist Pippa Norris argues, there is little evidence that power sharing

―serves the long-term interests of democratic consolidation and durable conflict management‖.

As it turns out, the bulk of literature points to an opposite conclusion: that power sharing

arrangements in full-scale authoritarian systems unravel quite quickly since the currency of

Page | 18 Geza hayet

trust and strength of agreement-enforcing political institutions on which the effectiveness of

these arrangements rely are very low, or even worse, they lead to exclusionary bargaining

systems and political culture that frustrate the emergence of democracy. It is good to note that

in the very few cases where power sharing schemes have positive democratization effects,

including some of the examples mentioned by Messay, the authoritarian states happened to

have strong selectorate accountability, or they were less than full-scale authoritarianisms. In a

simple language: the more the scale of authoritarianism, the less the actual democratization

effect of power sharing arrangements. If what Messay says about the nature of Meles

Zenawi‘s rule is true, it makes his idea hopelessly mistimed.

It seems to me that what prompts Messay to consider this path to democratization is his

enthusiasm for the developmental state. In a way, his aim is to kill two birds with one stone.

But accepting elite authoritarian tutelage would not have been necessary had Messay been

less dismissive of the concept of a democratic developmental state. Messay insists, plausibly

enough, that the concept ignores the ―defining characteristics of Asian Developmental States‖.

But that is not a good reason to reject altogether its realizability. Indeed, the histories of post-

war Germany, Botswana, South Africa and many other countries suggest that a developmental

state can be democratic. I do not know the ―serious literature‖ on this issue to which Messay

refers, but my understanding is that a good many developmental scholars agree that such

states are possible, in both an ideal and non-ideal sense. If such agreement exists for political

reasons as Messay contends – which I think is an implausibly strong claim – he fails to offer

any evidence.

Also, Messay makes two rather common errors – both of the conflating sort – when he

constructs his argument. First, he takes it for granted that neo-liberalism = liberalism. I think

it is fair to say that this is a troublesome position. Philosopher John Holbo rightly calls the

general tendency to conflate the two as ―strawman-ing liberalism‖. Some of the most

vociferous critics of neo-liberalism – an economic philosophy that is best represented by

the ‖Washington consensus‖ – including Joseph Stiglitz, Meles Zenawi‘s unabashed

champion, are self-proclaimed liberals. The dominant thought in liberalism qua philosophy (to

which such egalitarian stalwarts as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson and John Rawls belong)

doesn‘t prima facie reject a developmental role for the state since the underpinnings of this

thought are not property rights. Second, Messay seems to think that democracies are ipso

facto liberal. I am sympathetic to the view that no democracy can be illiberal. This is not,

Page | 19 Geza hayet

however, similar to saying that no democracy can be non-liberal. Certainly, in Messay‘s

exalted field (political philosophy) there is a rich scholarly work on normative non-liberal

democratic theories. The institutional implications of these theories have also been a subject

of serious discussion by political scientists. It is not my aim to nitpick Messay for trivial

purposes. It is to show that once one escapes such confusions, one can imagine the possibility

of a democratic developmental state, and, dare I say, a liberal democratic developmental state.

Messay has much else to say, not least in his kicking of opposition parties in the shin for

failing to grasp that Meles Zenawi had no intention to ―go back to the situation of 2005‖. This

is an odd claim. My impression before the 2010 election was that if there was any single point

that Ethiopian opposition groups agreed on, it was that Ethiopia was backsliding towards

absolute authoritarianism. Am I missing something here? Some believed that their only way

of connecting to Ethiopians was to use whatever political space the system provided them;

some decided that this was a naïve view and chose a different path; there was a minority who

continued to participate in the process with the hope that Meles Zenawi would come to see the

follies of his ways. If members of this latter group committed any offence, it is in their anti-

determinism, a view with which Professor Messay openly associates. I do not see how a

person who advises Meles to make concessions can hold it against the opposition for acting

on a similar belief unless the advice is intended to be no more than gestural.

I believe that Messay‘s attempt to reflect on the matter of development and democracy in a

decently nuanced manner is commendable. The Ethiopian opposition seems unwilling to give

up the tiresome but emphatically false argument that democracy is a precondition for

economic development. Democracy needs a better and a more convincing defence than one

that tastes as a picked cherry or is based on dogmatic assertions that fly in the face of well-

grounded knowledge. I can‘t emphasise enough how emancipatory Messay‘s article is. But its

emancipatory value is in the freshness of its approach, not the force of its reason.

(The writer can be reached at abiyetk@gmail.com)

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A rejoinder of Prof. Messay Kebede's article: Meles' political dilemma By Prof. Seid Hassan | June 16, 2011

I am writing this brief note as a rejoinder to Professor Messay Kebede‘s article titled as

―Meles‘s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit‖ and do so

without overshadowing the points that Professor Messay has made and without repeating

them here. My rejoinder stems from two perspectives:

1. That the ideas advanced by Professor Messay represent ―out-of-the-box‖ thoughts, and I

strongly believe that such bold ―out-of-the-box‖ thoughts encourage discussions, which in

turn could (hopefully) open the door for new thinking and new approaches/paradigms. I call

upon other intellectuals, concerned citizens, opposition party members and their supporters,

and even the ruling party members and its supporters to come up with new ideas of this kind

(of their own), and/or entertain them, all geared towards the emancipation of Mother Ethiopia

and the well-being of its people.

2. That, as I argued and stated elsewhere (see, here and here for example), ―…if the last 18

years that Ethiopia has been under the EPDRF are any witness, this country is neither in a

position to mimic these countries (that is, Southeast Asia) and bring about measurable

economic change, nor is the political and economic phenomena of Ethiopia comparable to

those countries…‖ In that specific article, I listed, using a few references, particularly the

extensive study made by the World Bank, the common practices of those particular countries.

In short, the common policies and practices of those countries included, among other things: a)

Shared Growth which encouraged all citizens to cooperate with the ruling parties and which

raised everyone‘s hopes thereby encouraging them to work hard. In contrast, Ethiopia is

engulfed with a highly discriminatory system that is dangerously widening the income gaps

between the haves and the have-nots, the major beneficiaries being EPRDF leaders and

regional kingmakers. The others are: b) Increased accumulation of human capital; c)

Rapid accumulation of physical capital; d) Rapid growth of manufactured exports; and

e) Targeting Specific Industrial Policies and Avoiding Rent-Seeking; f) Stable

Macroeconomic Environments.

None of these are being replicated in Ethiopia, nor does Mr. Zenawi‘s highly corrupt system

fit ―Developmental State‖ that was applied Southeast Asia. What is created in Ethiopia is a

rather peculiar (opaque) rent-seeking and highly greedy system which has completely stifled

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free enterprise and freedom, where the TPLF owns and operates numerous key business

sectors, the sole beneficiaries being party leaders and their followers, including the members

of the military leadership.

One more point is in order here: As I understood from the segment of his analysis that deals

with the ―Developmental State‖, I do not believe, as some readers may be mistakenly inclined

to think, that Professor Messay believes Mr. Zenawi‘s ―Developmental State‖ theory and

practice is either the ―preferred‖ method to other alternatives or the panacea for Ethiopia‘s ills.

I, for one, do not believe that authoritarian systems, particularly as exemplified by the practice

of Zenawi‘s ―Developmental State‖ ideology and practice, do a better job of promoting

economic growth and stability, for the empirical evidence testifies otherwise. It is just that,

given the political and economic circumstances and realities that Ethiopia is in, one cannot

jump to the ―Promised Land‖ without understanding these realities and creating the necessary

conditions for the transitions.

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A short reply to Messay's paper - specifically on the power of dictators By Girma Moges | June 18, 2011

Messay‘s assertion that elections or popular revolts are not going to either work or to be

controllable by anyone is, I think, a wrong assertion.

It is completely wrong to assume that TPLF/EPRDF or any other dictatorship for that matter

is undefeatable. Dictators are dependent on the people they rule for their existence. It is this

dependence that creates their Achilles-heel. Thus dictators are defeatable if they are struck at

their Achilles-heel. (I have discussed these weaknesses of dictators in one of my articles under

የሰላም ትግል ሠራዊት posted on Ethiomedia).

Yes, it may take years to build a nation-wide millions-man strong army of peaceful struggle to

wage a successful nation-wide peaceful uprising. Yes, it may require a lot of work to bring all

or major opposition parties together, exposing the regime as well as building a nation-wide

election-result-defending millions-man strong army to force TPLF/EPRDF accept its defeats

following elections. Of course, if there is defeat!

I do not see any reason why Ethiopian pro-democracy force can not defeat its dictatorship

given all the required homework is sufficiently met before waging the peaceful struggle. Just

like the pro-democracy forces of any other countries, Ethiopian pro-democracy forces are also

good enough to stand up and defeat their own dictators when the time is ripe. That is, if there

is a clearly defined goal, a well-thought grand strategy and campaign strategies are calculated,

error-free tactics are planned as well as appropriate mass political defiance and mass non-

cooperation weapons of peaceful struggle are selected. Yes, Ethiopia may have its

peculiarities including ethnic issues within the army and between regions the regime would

love to exploit! Thus the peaceful struggle or uprising may not be as easy as was in Egypt.

However, the solution is not to declare defeat and surrender even before trying a single day

political defiance sit-in at Ethiopian ―change square‖ or a single nation-wide non-cooperation

strike. Therefore the solution is simply to be prepared better not quit!

Regarding the idea of grand-coalition proposed by Messay, if he meant power sharing, I do

not think that dictators are in the business of sharing or rendering power at will. In addition,

that issue was raised by the opposition during 2005 post-election period and did not get

acceptance by Meles. I remember his answer was short to the demand: ―Coalition with the

opposition is unthinkable.‖ I think he has also characterized coalition with opposition as

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undesirable debating club (I stand to be corrected if I am mistaken). So I think Meles is

beyond a point of return on that issue. Of courses, if TPLF/EPRDF was forced to accept its

election defeat by a nation-wide organized millions-man strong peaceful struggle army and if

also it believed that accepting defeat was the only best option left for TPLF/EPRDF to

continue staying on power it would have accepted the proposal. Alternately if Messay meant

the formation of an authoritarian grand coalition that simply focuses on developmental stuff

abandoning democracy, I doubt its feasibility.

In closing, I always believe that the power of the Ethiopian people is much more stronger than

the power of TPLF/EPRDF.

---

Girma Moges has written extensively on the power of a non-violent form of struggle. He can

be reached at girma.moges@yahoo.com

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Another rejoinder of Messay Kebede's article: Meles Zenawi's dilemma By Prof. Minga Negash | June 17, 2011

Professor Messay Kebede of the University of Dayton recently wrote a philosophical article

entitled ―Meles Zenawi‘s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and

Exit.‖ Abiye Teklemariam, the founding editor of Addis Neger responded by alluding that

political liberalization is difficult if not impossible in present day Ethiopia.2

In a third and short rejoinder Professor Seid Hassan of Murray State University, using

euphemism, argued that everyone in Ethiopia, including the members of the ruling party, must

―think out of the box‖. The two professors appear to focus on finding ways and means for

resolving the apparent stand-off between the ruling regime and the opposition. With regard to

the so called developmental State, in my August 2006 commentary, I argued that Mr Meles

Zenawi‘s incomplete essay was self-serving, contained no new knowledge, and more

importantly it did not address the then critical issues of governance. I shall not return to it now.

In this short rejoinder, I attempt to show that within a number of Ethiopian political

organizations, the opportunity for an out of the box thinking does not exist. The parties mix

scientific research with policy and propaganda. One might attribute this void to poor

leadership, intransigence, authoritarianism and to our collectivist culture that instills

conformance, fear and submission to authority. I submit that it is the absence of this critical

mass of independent thinking within organizations and government that plunged the country

into a sorry state of polarization. Independent thinking is even more risky in organizations that

are armed, secretive, sectarian, radical and in networks that attempt to convert themselves

from liberation fronts to modern political parties. Hence, a successful out of the box thinking

in our settings require time, space and more importantly a visionary leadership.

Furthermore, new thinking has had its own rewards and risks. In the late 1980s the new

thinking in China resulted in unprecedented economic growth without a political development.

In the Soviet Union and South Africa the new thinking ended up washing away the regimes

themselves, sparked revolutions in Eastern Europe, and dismantled one of the superpowers of

the century. Meles Zenawi‘s series of thinking: - from his days as the chief ideologue of the

Marxist Leninist League of Tigrai to the chief conductor of Ethiopian affairs for 20 years,

might be considered as an out of box thinking. The results are there for all to see. An out of

the box thinking within organizations therefore is both difficult and risky if implemented

without the scrutiny of democracy. It instills fear among the intellectual community. In this

Page | 25 Geza hayet

short rejoinder I argue that the ruling party in Ethiopia has been incapable of providing the

required leadership for the development of the culture of an out of the box thinking. It has

missed several opportunities. Hence, if TPLF is to have relevance to the new environment, it

ought to have new vision and new leadership. New thinking cannot come from its present

leaders. It is also unexpected of Meles to return the country to the 2005 situation. As regards

his exit plan, if he has one, he has missed the opportunity of stepping down with grace. His

present efforts appear to be focused more on preventing the bubbles from bursting.

If one turns the clock back to 2006, the time when Mr. Meles Zenawi wrote the article entitled

―African Developments: Dead Ends and New Beginnings‖, the reader would quickly realize

that the idea was not original. However, Meles is smarter than some of his Ambassadors. One

cannot accuse him of ordinary plagiarism. Leaving the intellectual debate to scholastic forums,

there were, as Professor Messay has shown, the developmental State argument, which was a

response to the 2005 election crisis. Since 2006, a number of unexpected political and

economic developments have occurred. First, within the TPLF/EPRDF, Meles Zenawi and his

wife were able to consolidate power. Every contender of power within the party was either

sidelined or purged without an event. The net effect of this power concentration was to

solidify Meles Zenawi‘s authority and a build-up of cult within the party, and the entire

governance system. By May 2010 the consolidation of power within the party manifested

itself in an absurd election statistics. It resulted in a 99.6% control of the 547 seats in the

parliament. In other words, the space and time for an out of the box thinking within

TPLF/EPRDF and the country was completely closed, and the likelihood of reopening the

broader political space now is remote as the regime is even more threatened by the revolutions

of the Middle East and North Africa and hyperinflation.

Indeed, like most of the rulers who are threatened by youth revolutions, rather than dealing

with the root causes of the problems of governance, Meles unfortunately elected to label his

adversaries, including the legal opposition, as Eritrea‘s agents and terrorists. On June 15, 2011

the House of Peoples Representatives (Parliament) regrettably failed to correct Meles‘s

excesses. It labeled the regime‘s adversaries as terrorists. Hence, I argue that it is impossible

to exercise an out of box thinking within TPLF/EPRDF. Meles‘s dilemma therefore appears

to be more on the modalities of extending his prolonged rule, evidently at all costs.

Consequently, one can argue that Meles is no exception to the ordinary dictators of Africa.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s speech on June 13, 2011 at the summit of the African

Page | 26 Geza hayet

Union, in Addis Ababa, in the presence of Meles Zenawi, is interesting. Her speech contained

the following:-

“….But, even as we celebrate this progress, we do know that too many people in Africa still

live under longstanding rulers, men who care too much about the longevity of their reign, and

too little about the legacy that should be built for their country‟s future. Some even claim to

believe in democracy – democracy defined as one election, one time...”

And on the link between revolutions Mrs. Clinton argued as follows:-

“…Every country in the world stands to learn from these democracy movements, but this

wave of activism, which came to be known as the Arab Spring, has particular significance for

leaders in Africa and elsewhere who hold on to power at all costs, who suppress dissent, who

enrich themselves and their supporters at the expense of their own people. To those leaders

our message must be clear: Rise to this historic occasion; show leadership by embracing a

true path that honors your people‟s aspirations; create a future that your young people will

believe in, defend, and help build. Because, if you do not – if you believe that the freedoms

and opportunities that we speak about as universal should not be shared by your own people,

men and women equally, or if you do not desire to help your own people work and live with

dignity, you are on the wrong side of history, and time will prove that."

Mrs Clinton‘s speech might embarrass her host, Mr Meles Zenawi, but she also appears to be

fishing for an out of box thinking in the wrong waters. Her speech did not take cognizance of

the institutions that manufacture dictators. It is the presence of separation of powers in the

governance system and term limits that prevent the rise of autocracy. Notwithstanding this, if

the rulers of Ethiopia have the willingness to learn, there are still many ways to safely exit

from political power. Within the realms of the African experience, TPLF/EPRDF leaders can

still arrange an exit for Meles and his close associates. How the dominant ruling regimes in

Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania arranged safe exits to their

former leaders is an important reference point. The recent election histories of Ghana, Kenya,

Malawi, Zambia, etc also show that loss of government power does not necessarily lead to

retributions and loss of privileges. My sense however, is that the TPLF has lost both the space

and the time for an out of box thinking.

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Meles could have exited honorably from both party and State power just after the May 2005

election. He could have opted for sharing cabinet positions. He could have kept his words and

exited after the May 2010 election, however deficient the election might have been. Any one

of these missed opportunities would have earned him respect. It would have changed the

political landscape for the better. If he allows an out of box thinking within the secretive party

at this late hour, the process opens a major Pandora box. There is no known succession plan

and, the scandals are too many to be put under the carpet. There are also competitions among

the various wings of EPRDF. In other words he is at a point of no return. Meles‘s dilemma

aside, if and when TPLF‘s out of the box thinkers come out, as was the case of the Afrikaner

intellectuals in the early nineties, the opposition and the broader Ethiopian society are duty

bound to give them the opportunity to succeed.

---

Prof. Minga Negash can be reached at minga.negash@yahoo.com

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Demobilizing Ethiopians will never be the solution to Ethiopia’s existential problems : A

response to Prof. Daniel kindie and to Prof. Messay Kebbede

By Wedi Samre June 18th, 2011

Post cold-war Ethiopia has been in the throes of existential crisis. It has been dismembered

and landlocked. Its territories have been stolen in broad day light and ceded to neighboring

countries. It was exposed to Eritrean invasion and wanton destruction.

Its national language has been relegated to the status of a regional language. Its people have

been played off against each other on the basis of region, religion and language. Of late, the

Ethiopian people have been victims of land grabbing. In a word, Ethiopia has been confronted

with unprecedented existential crisis in three thousand years of its history. Yet Ethiopian

intellectuals and politicians have not risen to the challenge of the crisis. Two recent articles

published by two high-profile intellectuals, Prof. Daniel Kindie‘s ―የኢትዮጵያንና የኤርትራን ሕዝብ

የሚያስተሳሥሩ ቋሚ ሠንሰለቶች ‖ (Abugida 12, june2011)and Prof. Messay Kebbede‘s ―Meles‘s

Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit (Abugida, 13june 2011)

evince the inaptitude of Ethiopian intellectuals to be up to the challenge. The two gentlemen

avoid addressing the existential problems of the country and talk about minor issues which

deflect public attention away from the big one. Prof. Daniel talks about the enduring bonds

between Eritrea and Ethiopia and about his desire to see the formation of a North-East African

common market. Prof. Messay tells us barefacedly that Melis Zinwi is in a political dilemma.

He adds that Melis Zinwi ―thinks‖ that developmental state can be a solution to his ―political

dilemma‖. But according to Messay, it has become a dead end for Melis Zinwi. In Messay‘s

infinite wisdom, the developmental state can be an exit (and not a dead end) if and only if

Melis Zinwi accepts to share power with what Messay calls the opposition parties. Messay

says clearly to Melis Zinwi that Ethiopians are ready to acknowledge their defeat if he accepts

to share power with ―opposition parties‖. Unbelievable!

The thesis that I am going to defend is that the articles of the two gentlemen are defeatist and

have the devastating consequence of demobilizing Ethiopians. To put it bluntly, the message

of the two articles is Shabia (EPLF/TPLF) friendly. By talking about Ethio-Eritrean

relationship, Prof. Daniel Kindie obscures the truth that the cause of the existential problem of

our country is intimately connected to the desire of Shabia ( EPLF/TPLF) to guarantee the

Eritrean independence in the future. Likewise Prof. Messay Kebbede downplays Ethiopia‘s

existential problems by saying without the slightest proof that Melis Zinwi is in a dilemma.

Page | 29 Geza hayet

The truth is that Melis Zinwi has never been in a dilemma. He has been incredibly and

admirably consistent for the last thirty seven years in his crusade against the Ethiopian nation.

This is in sharp contrast with Messay who has never been consistently loyal to the Ethiopian

nation. Indeed, both Prof. Daniel Kindie and Prof. Messay Kebbede are men of contradictions.

Let‘s begin with Prof. Daniel Kindie. On the one hand, he is known for advocating the return

of Eritrea to Ethiopia under a federal arrangement. He also promised to take up his pilgrim‘s

staff and to roam around the Horn of Africa to preach the economic necessity of forming a

common market of the Horn African countries. As if the ―debalkanization‖ (i.e. the

suppression of custom duties) of the Horn of Africa could provoke the development of the

region, Daniel Kindie says the ―balkanization‖ of the countries of the Horn of Africa is an

obstacle for development . However we know that the main problem of the Horn of Africa is

not the absence of a regional common market; the problem is the absence of market worth the

name within each country of the Horn of Africa. This is particularly the case of Ethiopia, one

of the future biggest markets in Africa with 120 million potential consumers, to use a Western

market phraseology. Why don‘t we have a national market worth the name in Ethiopia? The

answer is that Western educated Ethiopians have always been obstacles to modern nation-

building. And here is the rub. Prof. Daniel says he wants to work for the formation of

common market of the countries of the Horn of Africa. Yet he is not known for working for a

strong national cohesion of Ethiopia. To the contrary, he is known for his vitriolic Tigray

bashing. Even though the day to day activities of the ―TPLF‖ during the last thirty seven years

leave no room for doubt as to its Eritrean identity, Daniel Kindie would have us believe that it

is a ―Tigray organization‖. Isn‘t this a sufficient proof that prof. Daniel has been engaged in

the intellectual and political balkanization of Ethiopia? The problem is that like the rest of our

educated Amhara brothers, Daniel Kindie has never tried to demonstrate how an organization

which fought to dismember Ethiopia and which has been moving heaven and earth to destroy

the Ethiopian nation can be considered Tigrayan. Weren‘t the signature of the Algiers intra-

Hamasin Agreement and the EPLF/TPLF self-serving Eritrean advocacy prodomo in The

Hague meant to facilitate the stealing of Ethiopian territory in Tigray and its cession to Eritrea?

(For additional information concerning the ―TPLF‘s‖ conspiracy against Tigray, the reader

can refer to Beyene Gebray‘s article published by Irobmablo) The regional history of Tigray

has always been a history of Ethiopian bravery and patriotism. A Tigrayan dies for Ethiopia,

he never conspires against Ethiopia. That has always been always the case since the dawn of

Ethiopian history. And yet our educated Amhara brothers are determined to put a Tigray label

on the Eritrean secessionist organization calling itself ―TPLF‖. But the unpatriotic choice of

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Amhara intellectuals and politicians to collaborate with the enemy does not mean that the

TPLF is a ―Tigray organization‖. The position of Amhara intellectuals and politicians is

untenable all the more so since they have never ceased saying that the ―TPLF‖ is an anti-

Ethiopian organization. If the ―TPLF‖ is anti-Ethiopia organization, it should be a fortiori an

anti-Tigray organization. What is odd is that Ethiopian intellectuals and politicians refuse to

accept that the TPLF is an anti-Tigray organization. This is for example the case of Prof.

Messay Kebbede, the number one intellectual balkanizer of the Ethiopian nation and

demobilizer of Ethiopians. Some years ago, Messay described the ―TPLF‖ as an ―anti-

Ethiopia Tigre group‖. Yet today, he argues that a developmental state under the leadership of

the ―anti-Ethiopia Tigre group‖ could be an ―exit‖ to the ―Ethiopian stalemate‖ if the anti-

Ethiopia ―Tigre‖ group accepts to share power with the ―opposition parties‖. Why the volt-

face prof. Messay? How on earth can there be a power-sharing arrangement between what

you call anti-Ethiopia ―Tigre‖ group and the ―opposition parties‖? Are you advising

Ethiopians to collaborate with what you call an anti-Ethiopia ―Tigre‖ group? Aren‘t there

already legions of collaborators who rule the different regions of Ethiopia on behalf of what

you call ―anti-Ethiopia Tigre group‖?

If Messay is not advising Ethiopians to stop to defend Ethiopia and to collaborate with the

enemy in implementing its project of dismantling the Ethiopian nation, what is the point of

power-sharing? If power-sharing is a means to prevent the enemy to destroy our country, it is

unclear what has led Messay to think that the anti-Ethiopia ―Tigre‖ group would be ready to

share power with patriotic Ethiopians. No patriotic Ethiopian can work with the sworn enemy

of their country. Messay‘s manifesto is an exercise in intellectual mystification of the root

causes of Ethiopia‘s existential problems. Melis Zinwi has never been interested in power for

the sake prestige and amassing unearned huge wealth. Melis Zinwi has a superior mission

which Messay feigns to ignore. If the desire of Melis Zinwi were only the retention of power,

he would not have rendered Ethiopia landlocked; he would not have stolen Ethiopian

territories to cede them to Eritrea and to the Sudan. He would not either work to destroy the

national language of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo church. The life mission

of Melis Zinwi is clear for anyone who does not want to behave like an ostrich. The

destruction of the national language of Ethiopia is another way destroying Ethiopia politically,

socially, economically and culturally. Imagine how American economy would be totally

crippled if the different federated states were to have no common language of communication?

This is to say that Messay has sinned by his excessive unrealism since his manifesto for

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power-sharing does not give due consideration to Melis‘s satanic calculus. Messay is a

prisoner of his own perverse theory of Tigray hegemony. It leads him to obscure the mission

which Melis Zinwi set out to fulfill since he arrived at the age of 10 in Addis-Ababa. That

mission is the dismantling of the Ethiopian nation so that Ethiopian nationalism would never

represent again a threat for Eritrean independence.

Messay denies this (despite the facts on the ground) and has always said that the TPLF is not

an Eritrean organization. Messay tried to no avail to refute the declaration of Sebhat Nega that

the TPLF was an Eritrean organization and that it would defend Eritrea from any foreign

attack (read: they would do the best they could to destroy the Ethiopian nation once and for

all). That is why Messay says that the ―developmental state‖ can be an exit out of what he

calls ―Meles‘s political dilemma‖. Yet he knows that the TPLF is an Eritrean organization.

Didn‘t he mention once the possibility of activating the Eritrean connection if the TPLF‘s rule

of Ethiopia was to be threatened seriously? It was an indirect way of saying that if Ethiopians

were united and decided to destroy the TPLF, the Eritrean army would never hesitate to fight

on side of the TPLF against Ethiopians. This should have led him to exhort Ethiopians to rally

around the defense of their country. But he preferred to point the finger at Tigray rather than

making his own self-introspection.

Messay has also contributed to what he calls now ―Ethiopian stalemate ― by exhorting

Ethiopians to avoid describing the ―TPLF‖ as an Eritrean organization or by saying that

―TPLF‖ would work for the modernization if Ethiopians stopped fighting to regain their

Assab Autonomous Administrative Region. Forgetting the great disservice he has been

rendering to the Ethiopian nation, Messay thinks that the developmental state can be an exit

for Melis Zinwi‘s ―dilemma‖ and for the Ethiopian ―stalemate‖. The problem of Messay is

that he does not explain how one can envision the existence of an Ethiopian developmental

state led by what he himself calls an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group? Messay, the philosopher,

draws conclusions without demonstrating his arguments. For the Ethiopian from Tigray, the

expression ― anti-Ethiopia Tigre group‖ is a contradiction in terms because it is impossible for

an anti-Ethiopia group to be Tigrayan; describing an anti-Ethiopia group as Tigrayan is a

despicable attempt to tarnish the image of Tigray. But since the aim of Messay is to put a

Tigray label on the Eritrean organization, he talks about developmental state. This reminds me

the Amharic saying ―lam balwalechibet Kubet lekema‖. Because the reality of post-cold war

Ethiopia is that it has been without state, government and leader. Without showing first the

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existence of an Ethiopian state, Messay cannot talk about the possibility of a developmental

state as a solution to the country‘s existential crisis which he calls euphemistically ―the

Ethiopian stalemate‖. Messay knows full well that the reason why there is neither state,

government nor a leader in Ethiopia is that Ethiopia has been occupied by a branch of the

Eritrean people‘s liberation front calling itself ―TPLF‖. The EPLF branch has succeeded in

passing for a Tigrayan organization thanks to the unfailing help it enjoys from collaborationist

Amhara intellectuals and politicians in general and from Messay Kebbede himself in

particular. Messay says he belongs to the ―opposition camp‖. The reality is that Messay hates

Tigray. He does not hate Shabia (TPLF/EPLF). Messay‘s earlier writings and his latest article

show in no uncertain terms that he is, in spite of himself, a Shabia (TPLF/EPLF) ―wedo geb‖.

To describe the ―TPLF‖ as an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group is to be a TPLF propagandist; it is a

subtle way declaring an intellectual war on the Ethiopian nation in general and on the Tigray

people in particular.

Besides, there is one thing which Messay does not seem to have thought over. If as he says

the ―TPLF‖ is an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group, then it is impossible for him to say that he

belongs to ―opposition camp‖. Because there cannot be an opposition party in a country ruled

by its enemies (i.e. by what he calls anti-Ethiopia Tigre group). Could there be an opposition

party in the United States, in the United Kingdom or in any other Western country if the

group holding power were anti-America, anti-Britain, anti-Germany or anti Sweden group,

etc.? It seems that Messay and the so-called opposition parties have forgotten the crucial fact

that the very idea of politics is predicated on the dichotomous opposition between a friend and

foe, between a citizen and a foreigner. This means that if a country is ruled by foreigners

(enemies), it is conceptually and empirically impossible for politics to exist. So if Messay

says that the ―TPLF‖ is an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group, he must accept (if he is consistent with

himself) that there cannot be an opposition party in Ethiopia. There can be only an Ethiopian

national liberation front which must fight to liberate the country from enemy rule. If we

accept that there is no politics in Ethiopia (because Messay and other Amhara intellectuals

have admitted publicly that those who rule Ethiopia are anti- Ethiopia ―Tigre‖ group), then it

is impossible for developmental state to exist in Ethiopia. If Messay addressed the

problematic of the developmental state in Ethiopia from the angle of the Ethiopian concept of

―mengist‖, he would realize that the very concept of Mengist militates against Ethiopia being

ruled arbitrarily let alone by her enemies (i.e. by what Messay calls anti-Ethiopia Tigre group).

But is Messay really interested in defending the causes of Ethiopia? If he were attached to the

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defense of the Ethiopian nation, he would plead for national unity and for a united national

resistance as the only solution to our problems and would tell Ethiopians that the discourse on

developmental state is an evil hoax which, like other evil hoaxes such as revolutionary

democracy, Melis Zinwi uses to mask the fact that he is Eritrean enemy at the helm of of

Ethiopia. Messay seems to forget that the only responsible factor for economic development

in Ethiopia is the Ethiopian people and never the collaboration of political parties with the

occupation force. Only when Ethiopia is led by patriotic Ethiopians and only when the

Ethiopian people are convinced that they have leaders committed to working for their well-

being, will they work for the development of their country. In the absence of such conditions,

talking about developmental state or simply about economic development is either a sheer

stupidity or a semantic manipulation.

Personally, I thought that Melis Zinwi‘s discourse on developmental state could hoodwink

only the uneducated rank and file of the ―TPLF‖. But it seems that there are high-profile

educated Ethiopians who take it seriously. What interest does Melis Zinwi have to work for

the development of the country which he wants to destroy? As for Messay, I am not sure that

he really believes that developmental state through ―power-sharing‖ can be a solution. I don‘t

believe that Messay is stupid. But since my aim here is not to correct Messay but to protect

Ethiopians from being mistaken by Messay‘s esoteric talk about developmental state, I would

like to say a word or two on the subject. One reason why I say Messay‘s manifesto is Shabia

(TPLF/EPLF) friendly is because he compares Melis Zinwi with the leaders of East Asian

countries without first showing whether the comparison is possible and desirable. The Asian

model of development, let it be said, is the result of a patriotic choice made with view to

enabling the countries in question to catch-up the Western world. That is why it was based on

the « flying geese pattern development model » developed in 1936 by the Japanese economist

Kaname Akamatsu to explain the catch-up industrialization by latecomer economy, i.e. his

own country Japan. In other words, it did not have, contrary to what seems to believe Messay,

anything to do with authoritarianism. The Asians came up with their own development model

after having studied Western economic history and rejected Western economic theory and

especially the neo-classical economic development model (they rejected the idea of the

invisible hand). They also rejected the dependency theory developed by Latin American

scholars because for Asians international trade (or what we call today globalization) is not an

end in itself, but a means to their industrial development. As we know, following president

Truman‘s 1949 inaugural address to the American Congress that the United States was duty-

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bound to to help ―back-ward countries‖ achieve development, American leaders encouraged

the newly decolonized countries of the then called Third World to espouse free market

capitalism. The idea was to contain Soviet expansionism in the Third World. But following

the decolonization process which started in earnest the 1950‘s, some economists realized that

neither Keynesian nor neoclassical economics were pertinent for the newly decolonized

countries in their quest for development. This led to the birth of development economics. But

hardly was development economics born than the United States started to wage ideological

and diplomatic war against developmentalist economic policies. The developmentalist

policies were considered to be hostile to the interests of American multinational corporations.

So the United States leadership preached that free market capitalism accompanied by Western

development aid was the royal road to development. American leaders did not have a problem

in influencing African and Latin American leaders. That was not the case of Asia. The Asians

rejected the teachings of Western mainstream economics theory, but they abstained

themselves from being opposed publicly to the United States crusade against developmentalist

economic policies. Unlike Eritrean hero and imposter, Melis Zinwi, the Asians did not say

that they were for a developmental state and against free market capitalism (the only

exception was Japan which threatened (in the 1990‘s) not to finance the the world bank unless

the latter recognized the specificity of the Japanese development model). Melis, the born-liar,

says he is against neoliberalism while it is a public knowledge that he is politically,

diplomatically and economically hundred percent dependent on the support of his British and

American protectors. As for the Asians, they continued secretly implementing their

developmentalist policies while expressing in public their full adherence to the principles of

free market economy. Until the publication of Chalmers A. Johnson‘s book ―MITI and the

Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial policy, 1925-1975″ in 1982 (Johnson was the first

to speak of the ―developmental state‖), it had been believed in Western academia, that free

market and international trade were responsible factors for Asia‘s industrialization. But

Western academia had refused to accept Johnson‘s study of Japanese industrialization until

the publication in 1992 of other books concerning Taiwanese and South-Korean model of

development. Be that as it may, the United States leadership knew from the outset that the

Asians did not tell the truth when they presented themselves as adherents to free market

capitalism. But America was obliged to turn a blind eye because of the East-West rivalry

during the cold war. It was obliged to open its market to Asian products for geopolitical

reasons.

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I make this digression to show why Messay is wrong when he associates developmental state

with authoritarianism. To the contrary, the patriotic desire to efface the national humiliation

inflicted on Asians by Western domination was the driving force behind the invention of the

Asian model of development. When Chalmers A. Johnson coined the expression

―developmental state‖, it was by way of contrast with what is thought to be the ―regulatory‖,

―laissez-faire‖ or ―night watchman‖ state of the Anglo-Saxon world. Of course, I am not

saying that Asian leaders were convinced democrats. I am saying they were imbued by a

patriotic desire to work for the glory of their respective nations. That is why I doubt Messay‘s

sincerity when he compares Melis Zinwi, the sworn enemy of Ethiopia with the patriotic

Asian leaders like Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, or with South

Korean and Taiwanese leaders . The authoritarian nature of Asian leaders is not surprising in

view of the history of the Western world. The history of the West from the 17th century to

1945 shows that authoritarian regimes (officially called parliamentary democracies) created

the market and the market in turn then gave birth to ―democratic oligarchic regimes‖. But one

should not confuse authoritarian regimes with unpatriotic, corrupt, arbitrary and incompetent

regimes. If authoritarian regimes play an active role in economic development, it is because

they are patriotic. The proof is that where there is an authoritarian patriotic regime, the

construction of a modern state becomes indispensable. Indeed, contrary to what is asserted by

orthodox economic theory, a modern state is by definition a developmental one. There has

never existed a state which is anti-development or which does not work development. For

example the question why the Industrial Revolution took place in England is still a moot point.

But it is safe to say that England would not have been the cradle of the industrial revolution

without the existence of an authoritarian regime ( as is discussed brilliantly by Karl Marx in

his magnum opus: Capital) determined to make England a dominant world power. After

England, the two countries to industrialize were Germany and France. Their industrialization

was led by the state. This is/was also the case in the United States as is demonstrated by

Joseph E. Stiglitiz in his Globalization and its discontents. The idea defended by some

Western scholars that the United States is a stateless society may be true when it comes to

political, administrative and social issues. But that is not the case concerning economic,

technological, scientific and military issues. Americans are opposed to big government when

it comes to political, administrative and social issues. But there is a national consensus in

favor of big government regarding economic, technological, scientific and military issues.

The huge bailout received by banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial meltdown is a good

illustration of that. In other words, for historical reasons it may be probably correct to say that

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the United States has a government (mestedadir) but not a state (mengist) in the strict sense of

the word. The problem in the Western social science literature is that there is a confusion

between a state and a political power. A state is a form of political power, but not every

political power is a state. This statement finds confirmation from the Ethiopian conception of

mengist.

Indeed, the Ethiopian concept of Mengist shows that there is neither state nor political power

in post-Mengistu Ethiopia. Why? The answer was given by Messay himself. He said that

Ethiopia was ruled by an anti-Ethiopia Tigre group. This means that Ethiopia has been ruled

by an enemy rule no matter what the mother tongue of the enemy is. The problem is that

Messay contradicts himself by saying that the enemy which rules Ethiopia is a Tigre group

and this group can work for development of Ethiopia if it shares power with the ―opposition

parties‖. However unbelievable it may be, Messay tells us that one can be Tigrayan and the

sworn enemy of Ethiopia. There is no telling where Messay has found that idle crotchet.

Anyway, so long as Messay does not deny the Ethiopianity of the natives of Tigray, he cannot

show how one can be anti-Ethiopia and Ethiopian at the same time. Like other Amhara

intellectuals and politicians, Messay is mired in self contradiction. That is why also he says

the ―opposition parties‖ can share power with an anti-Ethiopian Tigre group. Would it have

been possible for our ancestors to envision the possibility of power sharing with Italian fascist

invaders? How can you envision power sharing with those who came to humiliate you, to

reduce you to slavery, to destroy your history, your national language, your religion? And

what leads you to believe that the enemy who is bent on destroying you once and for all is

ready to share power with you?

I am afraid that Messay should be the spiritual descendant of Afewerk Gebreyesus who

pleaded that Ethiopians should accept Italian colonial rule for the sake of modernization.

Messay would certainly retort that the ―TPLF‖ is a Tigray organization although it is anti-

Ethiopian. Why does Messay put a tribalist slant on the problems of Ethiopia if his aim is to

defend Ethiopia? Doesn‘t Messay say incessantly that he is against ― ethnic politics‖

It is very unfortunate for Ethiopia that Amhara intellectuals and politicians have developed a

genius for putting a tribalist slant on what is essentially a problem of loss of national

independence! One thing is certain, though. However hard Messay and Amhara intellectuals

and politicians may try to convince us that one can be a Tigrayan and the archenemy of

Ethiopia, we Tigrayans will never accept such a sheer blinking political and intellectual idiocy.

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The reason is simple. It is against our history and our Ethiopian identity. Messay or Amhara

intellectuals need not tell the natives of Tigray what it means to be Ethiopian (Tigrayan).

They should rather relearn to accept that a Tigrayan is an Ethiopian nationalist. Period. I defy

any Ethiopian intellectual to come up with a well-reasoned argument showing that one can be

Ethiopian (Tigrayan) and anti-Ethiopian at the same time. Don‘t try to repeat G7‘s argument

which consists to say that the ―ministry of defense‖ and the economic sector is totally

monopolized by ―Tigrayans‖. This is a backward and pro-Shabia argument intended at pitting

Ethiopians against each other. Because, unless the aim is to mask the true Eritrean identity of

the TPLF, we Ethiopians don‘t care about the mother tongue of those who rule our country.

For the Ethiopian people what is crucial is to know whether those who rule Ethiopia work for

the defense of Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity or whether they work to destroy

Ethiopia. In nutshell, the yardstick of Ethiopiawinet (or being Tigraway) is the defense of

Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity. As stated previously, Messay Kebbede has

never been a defender of Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity. To the contrary, he

exhorted Ethiopians to accept the violation of Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity

for the sake of what he called ―modernization‖. His latest article is rehash of that despite the

esoteric discourse about developmental state. The gist of Messay‘s message can be summed

up as follows. ―Let‘s give to Melis Zinwi the guarantee that we Ethiopians endorse his

decision to render our country landlocked, to steal Ethiopian territories and to cede them to

the Sudan and to Eritrea. Let‘s give him also the guarantee that he would not be held to

account for the huge amount of money he stole on his own behalf and on behalf of his Eritrea.

In exchange, Melis Zinwi must share power with ―us‖‖. Melis Zinwi and his hirelings must be

very happy with Messay‘s anti-Ethiopia manifesto. For the nth time, Messay is demobilizing

eighty six million Ethiopians.

Although Messay has been the number one demobilizer of the Ethiopian people, he is not the

only one. Daniel Kindie is another example. Messay Kebbede and Daniel Kindie have one

thing in common in the sense that they seize upon every opportunity to segregate the Tigray

people from the rest of Ethiopia. As readers may remember, Daniel Kindie once said that the

―TPLF‖ had a project of creating a Tigray republic. This could mean three different things. It

could mean that the TPLF would separate Tigray from Ethiopia with the help of the Tigray

people. It could mean also the TPLF could try to separate Tigray from Ethiopia despite the

opposition of the Tigray people. But we can also say that since the TPLF is an Eritrean

organization, it will try to separate Tigray from the rest of Ethiopia so that Tigray would be

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used as a buffer zone to protect Eritrea. Undoubtedly, the preference of Daniel Kindie goes to

the idea that TPLF would separate Tigray with the help of Tigray people. That is why he is

concerned more about Welkait and Tsegede being part of Tigray than about the further

dismemberment of Ethiopia. That explains also why Daniel has never told Ethiopians to

strengthen their national unity against any Eritrean attempt to further dismember Ethiopia. To

the contrary, he came up with an imaginary map of the so-called Tigray Republic. Many

innocent Ethiopians believed him even though he did nothing other than repeating the same

old trick of putting a Tigray label on what is indisputably an Eritrean organization. It is

difficult for me to understand what led Daniel Kindie to ―believe‖ that Tigray would not fight

together with their fellow Ethiopians against any attempt by the Eritrean secessionist

organization calling itself ―TPLF‖ to separate Tigray from the rest of the country. If only

Daniel and others of his ilk knew Tigray.

But there is one very amazing thing about Daniel Kindie. He does not see any contradiction

between his declared anti-Tigray bias and his plea for the rapprochement of Ethiopia and

Eritrea. Wouldn‘t it be more urgent to fight against the poisonous anti-Tigray Amhara

intellectual tribalism (including against his own) rather than making a meaningless plea for

the return of Eritrea. What does Ethiopia stand to gain from Eritrea‘s return? Daniel Kindie

argues that Ethiopia could not achieve economic development without cooperation with

Eritrea. One can argue that the chief reason why Daniel Kindie pleads for Eritrea‘s return is

probably he is not aware of the fact that the reunification of Eritrea in 1952 contributed to the

postponement of modern national building in Ethiopia. If he were aware of that, he would

probably not plead that Eritrea should be given a second chance to return to the bosom of

God‘s chosen people. But if we were to follow Daniel Kindie, what iron-cast guarantees do

we have that the Hamasin will not be used again by Arabs to wage a proxy war against

Ethiopia? Without Eritrea not only our country would not be today under foreign military

occupation, but a part of our territory would not be stolen by the Hamasin occupation force

and be ceded to neighboring countries. So, instead of causing more problems to our own

country by pleading for the return of ungrateful Eritrea, we should rather work hard to

strengthen our internal cohesion so that our country can regain its stolen territory of the Assab

Autonomous Administrative Region (i.e., the area inhabited by our Afar compatriots) annexed

to Eritrea by the occupation force.

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Let it be observed that my opposition against the return of Eritrea to Ethiopia even as a simple

province is not motivated by any hate toward the Hamasin. My opposition is based solely on

love for my own country, which country has not yet unfortunately produced nationalist elite

capable of raising up to the challenges of modern nation-building. My conviction is that the

Hamasin will never be genuine Ethiopians nor do they deserve to be allowed to return again

into the bosom of the chosen people. If by miracle Eritrea were to be an economic success

story, I bet that no Hamasin would envisage confederating her province with Ethiopia.

Moreover, it is because the Hamasin don‘t feel Ethiopians that some Hamasin like Tesfa-

Tsion Medhanie plead for a confederal arrangement. This is clear evidence that if Eritrea

returns to Ethiopia, the Hamasin elite (yes I say the elite and not the people) will be an

obstacle to nation building in Ethiopia as it has been for the last fifty years. The Hamasin

intellectual Diaspora has made tawdry attempts to smear Ethiopia by peddling unmitigated

lies. Under such circumstances, it would be silly to think that the new Hamasin generation

brought up with a rabid Ethiopian hatred would develop an Ethiopian we feeling.

So, although historically at least half of Christian Eritrea is of Tigray origin which emigrated

to Eritrea between 1910-1930 in search for work and even though the Ethiopianity of Eritrea

is not open to doubt, the imperative of building a strong Ethiopian nation in the twenty first

century militates against any rapprochement with Eritrea. If by misfortune Ethiopian

politicians were to decide to establish a federal or a confederal arrangement with Eritrea, the

Ethiopian people in general and the Tigray people in particular should, for the sake of their

nation‘s well-being, prevent that from happening if necessary by taking up arms against the

powers that be. I must repeat that this has nothing to do with any hate toward the Hamasin.

The objective of keeping the Hamasin at bay is to spare the next generation of Ethiopians the

ordeals of war, under-development and the deferment of modern nation-building faced up by

our generation owing to the mistakes made in 1952 to reunite an extremely under-developed

and depersonalized Eritrea with Ethiopia, a proud independent country, which was pre-

industrial but certainly not under-developed. I say the Hamasin suffer from depersonalization

because among the formerly colonized peoples of the world, they are the only ones to

consider the European rule reducing them to colonial slavery and washing of dishes as a sign

of their modernization. This alone is a compelling reason to prevent them from becoming

again part of the God‘s chosen people.

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That being said, Daniel Kindie should know that nothing is solved between Ethiopia and its

renegade province. Once the occupying force is chased away from Ethiopia, Eritrea will be

forced to return the territories, resources and money which EPLF and TPLF gangsters stole on

its behalf from Ethiopia. The Hamasin should not forget the Ethiopian saying: rist beshi ametu

lebalebetu. It remains to be seen under what conditions a future government of liberated

Ethiopia will recognize Eritrea. Whatever may be the policies of liberated Ethiopia toward

Eritrea, Ethiopia is too old, too big, too populous and too potentially rich to be associated with

Lilliputian Eritrea. If Ethiopians succeed in building an internally cohesive nation, if we can

sweep away the moral decay, treason, corruption, opportunism, tribalism, immorality,

illegality, disrespectful attitude towards each other left behind by the anachronistic regime of

Haileslassie, by the renegade student movement of the 1960‘s and the early 1970‘s, by the

bestial Derg regime, and that which will be left by the Hamasin occupation force and its

collaborators, the destiny of our country is to be a very important geopolitical player in Africa

and in the Middle-East in general and in North-East Africa in particular. So, instead of trying

to distract Ethiopians by raising the irrelevant issue of mending fences with Eritrea, we

Ethiopians should rather concentrate all our efforts on strengthening our internal cohesion,

because that is the only means to liberate our country from the rule by the foreign occupation

forces.

In addition to the problem of nation-building, there is another factor which militates against

the return of Eritrea in any form. I want to talk about the demographic explosion. By the year

2025, the population of Ethiopia will have been somewhere in the region of 120 million. If

our country is lucky enough to be ruled by a new generation of patriotic and competent

Ethiopians committed to making it the economic power house of Africa, it will be possible to

convert the demographic dividend into economic miracle. But feeding, educating, finding

work, housing and providing efficient heath service to the population will also be a

formidable challenge to our country. Meeting successfully such a challenge would certain

require that federalism as an option be rejected. If by misfortune Ethiopians were to hold brief

for ―federalists‖ such Daniel Kindie, federalism will lead to spend a lot of money to pay the

salary of bureaucrats instead of enabling the Ethiopian people to eat three times a day and to

have access to efficient educational, administrative and heath services. What I am saying is

that federalism will militate against the improvement of the living conditions of the Ethiopia

people. What our country needs is a strong unitary state, strong in the sense one capable of

mapping out and pursuing vigorously a dynamic political and economic development agenda

Page | 41 Geza hayet

with the active participation of the Ethiopian people. Why advocate federalism whereas our

country did not have a unitary state let alone a centralized one? Ethiopian intellectuals and

politicians are convinced to the contrary. They believe that Menelikean and post Menelikean

Ethiopia (1916-1991) had a centralized state, which is why some writers even go as far as

saying that centralization was an obstacle to the modernization of Ethiopia (Messay Kebbede,

1999). The truth is that if Ethiopia had had a centralized state administration that could have

by no means been by itself an obstacle to modernization, all the more so since most of the

industrialized countries of the planet have a centralized administration. The problem of pre-

1991 Ethiopia was not the centralization of power. The number one problem was that political

power was considered by rulers as their own real estate and they used it for personal

aggrandizement and for controlling the people rather than for transforming the society. Under

the Derg, individual rule couched in the personal cult of Mengistu, where the latter ruled

according to his whims and caprice. There was nothing which could stop Mengistu even when

it became very clear that he was driving the country on the road to ruin.

Unfortunately, the mistaken belief that ‖ state centralization‖ was used as a means of

oppressing the Ethiopian people has now led centrifugal forces such as MEDREK (whose

leadership is composed of individuals whose loyalty to the Ethiopian nation is questionable)

to say that federalism is a panacea for Ethiopia. Once again, this shows that Ethiopians are

looking for a solution without correctly diagnosing the political ills of the country. I hasten to

add that Ethiopia has nothing to gain from federalism but everything to lose from it.

Federalism will certainly be part of the problem and never part of the solution. Federalism

will militate against the political and economic nation building of twenty first century

Ethiopia. It is because federalism creates more problems that it does not exist elsewhere in

Africa. The only country which considers itself as federal state is Nigeria. We should however

know that federalism in Nigeria has been used as a means of divide and rule, and not as an

instrument of nation building. The Nigerian elite has made the bad choice of weakening

centrifugal forces (through territorial balkanization) rather than building a strong central state

capable of satisfying the political and economic aspirations of its people.

When it comes to our country, Ethiopian history shows that the weakening of the central state

had always been a source of great suffering for the Ethiopian people. For example, the decline

of Axumite Ethiopia and the loss of full control of the Red Sea area were due to the

weakening of the central state. Ethiopia‘s Axumite kings could not control effectively the

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Beja population who rebelled against the central state. Under kings Amda Tsion (1314-1344)

and Zera Yacob (1434-1468) Ethiopia had a strong state whose territory was as big more or

less as the Ethiopia of the 1970‘s. However, the fateful decision of king Beide Mariam (1468-

1478) to reverse the centralizing policies of his father, king Zera Yacob weakened the central

state that some decades later, a young man of 19 named Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim (alias Gragn)

rebelled against the central government and wreaked havoc on the country between 1526 and

1542. King Gelawdewos (1540-1559) defeated Gragn and restored the authority of the

weakened state by establishing his ―capital‖ in what is today the Southern Ethiopian region of

Arssi. But the able Gelawdewos did not seem to be interested in reimposing central authority

over Harar. That had enabled Gragn‘s nephew, Nur Ibn Mujahid, to have more time to make

the necessary military preparations and to rebel against the central government in 1558 and to

even kill and behead Gelawdewos in 1559. Gelawdewos was then succeeded by his elder

brother, Minas (1559-1563). But King Minas was not of the same stature as Gelawdewos.

After four years of reign, Minas was succeeded by his son of thirteen years old who, under the

royal name of Sertsa Dengel (1563-1597), was to become one of the greatest kings.

However,the fiscal and military decentralization measures taken by Sertsa Dengel with view

to warding off the threat of Ottoman incursion in the north and to stopping the Oromo internal

migration in the South resulted eventually in the advent of the zemana mesafint (1755-1855).

Sertsa Dengel could have rebuilt a strong central state had he not dispersed himself fighting

against the Ottomans and their stooge, Bahri negash Yishak, in the North, the Beta isra‘el in

the north-west and the Oromo in the south and South West. Although history is not made with

ifs, Sertsa Dengel could have integrated the Oromo into the state rather than trying in vain to

rebuff them. Four years after his reign, i.e. in 1567, Sertsa Dengel succeeded in rebuffing the

Oromo from the present day area of Jimma. But as the Oromo needed more space, they were

unstoppable. The inexorable march of the Oromo toward the South, South-west, central and

northern Ethiopia had debilitating consequences for the state to the extent that Ethiopian kings

were forced to abandon the south and the south-western part of the country to it‘s fate and to

flee to northern Ethiopia with view to avoiding encountering the Oromo. Ethiopian kings

thought that Gondar could be their safe haven. But the Oromo followed Ethiopian kings

where they moved on. Thanks to their exceptional military capacity, the Oromo even became

king makers as they helped the apostate king Susenyos (1607-1632) to take power at the

expense of Sertsa Dengel‘s sons. After the abdication of Susenyos, his son, Fasiledes was

crowned as king. The reign of Fasildes witnessed the further territorial contraction of the

country and the diminution of the prestige of the Solomonic monarchy. Indeed, Gondar

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epitomized the military and the political atrophy of the central state, although it witnessed the

renaissance of Ethiopian arts and architecture.

What is remarkable about the Oromo is that only three decades after the premature death of

Sertsa Dengel at the age of 47, did they become a force to be reckoned with in the Ethiopian

political landscape whilst they had been at the periphery of Ethiopia (Borona) until Ibn

Ibrahim Ahmed‘s rebellion against the central government in 1526. One can wonder if the

Zamana mesafint (i.e. the atrophy of the central state) would have been possible without the

Oromo internal migration. Be that as it may, the Zamana mesafint, which era witnessed the

apotheosis of Oromo political domination of Ethiopia, had the negative consequence of

separating northern Ethiopia from Southern Ethiopia. After its political integration to the

Ethiopian state for almost two hundred years, Southern Ethiopia started a separate evolution

from northern Ethiopia because of the lack of will on the part of the Oromo aristocracy ruling

northern Ethiopia (with the exception of Northern Shewa and Tigray) to reunite the north and

the south by creating a central state. Fortunately for Ethiopia, Menelik II applied himself

seriously to the task of reuniting the south and the North after almost three centuries of

separation. Oddly enough, Menelik never tried to put in place a centralized administration,

although he presided over the territorial division of the country into administrative regions

called Awraja. Before Menelik, king Tewodros had tried to reinstate the Solomonic state by

abolishing the hereditary character of regional governments which had come into being

during the Zamana Mesafint. However, Tewodros‘ project for Ethiopia was too good, too

revolutionary to be implemented. After one hundred years of anarchy, it was very difficult to

abolish overnight the hereditary nature of regional governments. Because of their

revolutionary character, Tewodros‘s policies even led his own close relatives to rise in armed

opposition against him (Shiferaw Bekele). That explains also why Yohanes renounced

pursuing Tewodros‘ project of creating a strong central state. But the lack of will on the part

of king Yohanes (albeit his military superiority) to put in place a centralized administration

enabled Menelik to be in cahoots with the enemies of Ethiopia: the Egyptians and the Italians

(Harold Marcus, 1975, Zewde Gebreselasse, 1975). Had Yohanes not been killed by one of

Tigray‘s provincial rulers, Ethiopia would not have survived the colonial encounter, because

of the otherwise inevitable fratricidal war between Yohanes and Menelik. Thanks to the

assassination of Yohanes by one of his own men, Menelik was able to rally all Ethiopians

around him in 1896 and to defeat the Italians. However, Menelik was not a nation builder. He

was more obsessed with weakening his northern adversaries in general and Tigray in

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particular than in strengthening the defensive capacity of the nation. He was more afraid of

Tigray than of the colonial powers which encircled Ethiopia. Although Tigray fought

heroically against the Italians to defend their country‘s independence and their king‘s throne,

Menelik chose to be ungrateful and disrespectful toward them. He refused to treat Tigray

respectfully as he himself had been treated when he was governor of Shewa. The curse started

to hang over Ethiopia when Menelik decided to marginalize Tigray, the core of God‘s chosen

people. It was a strange thing on part of Menelik to claim his genealogy of Tigray and to

refuse at the same to be the king of the Tigray people, too. I don‘t know if Menelik‘s claim of

Tigray descent was made for political reasons or if his claim was based on the awareness of

the historical fact What is certain is that Menelik fought against Tigray in 1899 and in 1909

while acquiescing to the demands of the British for the restriction of Ethiopia‘s internal

sovereignty by not constructing a dam on the lake Tana. Menelik was the first Ethiopian king

to accept the restriction of the internal sovereignty of God‘s chosen people in favor of non-

chosen people. He had no internal adversary, but he squandered the historical opportunity of

presiding over nation-building, which unique opportunity none of his predecessors had had.

One can imagine how Tewodros would have worked for the modernization of the country if,

like Menelik, he had had the chance of having the whole Ethiopian people behind him.

Because of Menelik‘s lack of will to work for nation-building and the inability of the

generation of intellectuals to rectify those errors, Menelik‘s patriotic and noble campaign of

reunifying the country is now considered by some quarters as a colonial ―empire building‖.

Although it is a conceptual error to describe Ethiopia as an empire, it is nonetheless indicative

of the absence of nation-building in contemporary Ethiopia.

Centralization is one way of nation-building inasmuch as it implies the integration of the

peripheral elite into the national decision making process. So, if there had been centralization,

it would have been necessarily accompanied by the integration of the regional northern and

southern Ethiopian elites into the decision making process at national, regional and district

levels. This did not happen in twentieth century Ethiopia.

The moral of this cursory look at Ethiopian history is that we Ethiopians have not succeeded

in establishing a strong central state for almost five hundred years. It is for this reason that

Daniel Kindie seems to me a dangerous idealist. We cannot put the future of our country in

jeopardy for the sake of bringing back the Hamasin. So in light of this historical experience,

Ethiopians are well advised to reject completely any future federalization of their country. I

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understand that some Ethiopians are wedded to federalism, because they are fearful of the

return of ―Amhara‖ rule. The point is that Amhara rule never existed in Ethiopian history. It

must not be forgotten that this generation has been paying a steep price as a result of the

wrong diagnosis of the political anatomy of twentieth century Ethiopia by the intellectual

generation of the 1960‘s and the early 1970‘s. Who can deny that Haileselassie and Mengistu

wielded an absolute power, and that neither the Ethiopian people in general nor the ―Amhara‖

in particular could stop those two autocratic and unpatriotic rulers? Besides, it is perfectly

possible to enjoy under a unitary state all the supposed advantages that a federal system may

offer.

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Messay Kebede and his "Manifesto" By Tecola Hagos | June 20, 2011

In our troubled times, the written word is a powerful tool. I am referring to the recent article

by Professor Messay Kebede titled “Meles‟s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State:

Dead-Ends and Exit” that has been posted in most Ethiopian Websites on 15th

June 2011,

which has started a tsunami of controversial ideas. I found also some well written pieces in

response to the article by Messay Kebede, which comments and criticisms I read with great

interest, such as the pieces by Said Hassan [―A Rejoinder of Professor Messay‟s article:

„Meles‟s Political Dilemma…‟”], Abiye Teklemariam [―Mind the Jump: A Brief Response to

Prof. Messay Kebede”] et cetera. Thus, let me interject that one must read the statements of

our fellow Ethiopians with alertness, care, and respect.

This article or ―manifesto,‖ as Messay identified it, is a piece of writing which raised and

resolved several complex issues in mere twelve pages that others would have written books

and still fail to reach the profound insights that Messay generously shared with us. I wish

Messay had not used the word ―manifesto‖ to identify his article, for the piece is far more

insightful and reasoned than being mere reductionist declaratory advocacy that a ―manifesto‖

usually is.

First, let me consider in much generalized form what some of the critics of the Article by

Messay had written: in case of Said, the criticism revolves around allegation that Messay had

left out some significant aspects of a ―developmental State‖ vis-à-vis the situation of Ethiopia

under Meles Zenawi and his EPRDF supporters; and in case of Abiye, an expressed ―deep

disenchantment‖ of Messay‘s ―abandonment‖ of the election based democratic development

struggle, for elite-controlled authoritarian ―developmental state‖ processes. Of course, both

Said and Abiye have stated much more in their responses, both authors have augmented their

comments with theoretical insights and practical observations of our Ethiopian struggle for

―democracy.‖ I understand the concerns of both, for their concerns are genuine and very much

well known to us all from their long list of articles and commentaries posted in Websites and

their long standing unwavering opposition to oppressive and dehumanizing political and

economic systems focusing on Ethiopia under the iron-rule of Meles Zenawi and his

supporters.

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I see misunderstanding in the reading of Messay‘s Article by very many other readers as well,

who actually cared to read the Article (highly commendable) and shared their comments. I

read also very few belligerent and irresponsible statements that were completely out of line.

Personal attack in all instances is ad homineum, it does not enlighten or expand the discourse

at hand; it is more of a detraction and undermines the seriousness of the subject matter under

consideration. As an aside, I have noticed in general in recent time that there is a decline of

Ethiopians attacking each other in delinquent and irresponsible manners in blogs/websites

except in Warka. I give great credit for such positive changes in the polite and disciplined

responses of very many Ethiopians, such as Eskinder Nega, Abebe Gelaw, Abiye

Teklemariam, Said Hassan, Teodros Kiros, Lt. Ayal-Sew Dessie, Seyee Abraha, Fekadu

Bekele, Aregawi Berhe, and Messay Kebede himself who under fire in websites, public

conferences, and/or radio programs lead the way in civility. Actually, several more could be

listed here. I do have serious disagreements with some of the aforementioned individuals;

nevertheless, I acknowledge here their contributions in presenting their ideas with manifest

respect of their audience, for they have greatly ennobled public discourse. I hope we all adopt

their public demeanor in dealing with some belligerents or hacklers.

What seems to have irked both Said and Abiye, for example, Messay in his article is not

defending or writing an apology for ―developmental states‖ economic theories. For example,

Abiye wrote, ―It seems to me that what prompts Messay to consider this path to

democratization is his enthusiasm for the developmental state.‖ Here is where the first

misunderstanding starts. Messay is merely explaining what ―developmental states‖ stands for,

what local conditions need be taken into account, how genuine the leadership ought to be or

whether the leadership has the capacity to carry out the intricate structural adjustments that

need be made, et cetera. I understand there is a very thin line between explanation and

justification. Some may have misunderstood the essence of Messay‘s article and may have

read it as justification rather than for what it truly is—an explanation and discussion of a

concept. Messay is not supportive of the ―developmental States‖ let alone the brutally

oppressive Government of Meles Zenawi. It would require some tortured logic to squeeze out

such finding form the Article by Messay.

There are, on the other hand, some pointed superb discussions on the point of democratization

(on its philosophy and manifestations), about a magical point in the life of a struggle where

the breakthrough to democracy manifests. Especially, I find Abiye‘s statements, in defending

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views that he thought was abrogated or abandoned by Messay, namely the roughs in liberal

democracy vs. neo-liberal democracy and the process of development quite impressive, but

presumptuous. The attempt to delaminate philosophical theory from economic theory is futile,

for we may be surprised to find how interconnected the two are. This is a situation where we

are in circular argument, the old dilemma of the ―chicken or the egg.‖ My concern goes

beyond mere issues of rhetorical arguments, but why must we need to have contrasts to

understand problems. I find the same type of problems in mathematics ―equalization‖ process

too, to mention an analogy to better understand my concerns. Why should there be such

designation in order to understand a situation. The economic ramifications is even more

problematic, bordering the absurd if we try to use the economic concepts that go with neo-

liberalism in case of Ethiopia whose economy is not of consequence in the global economic

system of globalization.

I find it quite presumptuous for us Ethiopians to be hairsplitting between liberalism and

neoliberalism when we are the least developed nation on earth with minuscule involvement in

the global economy. Labeling and categorization had done us tremendous harm in the past. I

cannot forget the countless Ethiopians murdered as a result of pseudo Marxist theoreticians

and military thugs who wiped out whole generations of Ethiopians by labeling them

―Adharis,‖ Tsere Abyotegnoch‖ et cetera. I am always skeptical about any argument that is

based on definitions of particular words. I prefer to consider the facts of a case and the

circumstance in which it figures rather to match label to some selected facts or situation.

The dispute whether a ―developmental state‖ is a democratic state seems superfluous, for it

seems to equate economic development with democratic system of government, which of

course is not a bright argument or supposition. All one needs to present is the case of China,

or the case of former Soviet Union, or the cases of countless East European countries and

Latin American countries; even the United States is a borderline socialist state with its social

welfare system and extensive regulation of production not to mention its extortionist tax

system that effectively redistribute income. We soon find out that we are dealing with shades

rather than stark or sharp contrasts. The dispute could be resolved by defining what is meant

by development and what is meant by democracy. It is possible to see a confluence point for

such understanding, and we will have less zeal in establishing differences, but devotion in

finding solutions.

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Messay is not a hasty thinker; he is capable of maintaining sustained discourse on a subject

matter for years at times. He is a reflective thinker, as would be expected of his caliber and

stature. We had several conversations on such issues on Meles Zenawi and the political and

economic situation of Ethiopia. Although our discourse was contentious, we usually seem to

end up with similar conclusions on a number of controversial issues including the many

points Messay discussed in his article. The reason I am saying all this is to lay out some

background setting. However, I have serious disagreement on some suppositions Messay has

made in his article, although not that important in the overall picture of his analytical essay.

He made the unnecessary delaminating between power and wealth in characterizing the

leaders of the EPRDF and TPLF, namely between Meles and his supporters ―cronies‖ as

Messay would call them.

―One outcome of Meles‘s rise to absolute power that could turn out positive is his

ability to dismantle the rent-seeking state. I venture to say that absolute power has

given Meles some autonomy vis-à-vis his followers; I even suggest that a disparity

between his interests and that of his followers is inevitable. The passion of Meles is

power; the goal of his followers is enrichment. The rent-seeking activities that they

use to enrich themselves prevent Meles from achieving the economic growth by which

he can justify his control of absolute power. He has now the choice of maintaining the

old structure, with the consequences that his power will become increasingly fragile,

or resolutely dissolve it through reforms. In order to do the latter, he needs the support

of the opposition.‖ [page 11]

I believe in order to make such grand distinction about the motives of political players,

Messay, must depend on careful individual psychological profiling of Meles Zenawi and his

supporters. In short of that, one may make guarded suppositions based on empirical evidences

collected over a period of time on the life-histories of the same. In both Meles and his

supporters‘ cases, their families‘ histories establish the facts of their poverty, almost all

coming from poor rural or semi-urbanized peasant families.

Meles‘s primary needs from childhood to the time of his adulthood were of the material kind;

he is no different than Mengistu Hailemariam‘s social and economic poverty as his

background. He suffered social ostracization, poverty, and social stigma of a different kind,

but no less traumatic than the one suffered by Mengistu. Thus, in contradistinction to what

Messay‘s thesis, I hold that Meles‘s first and foremost motive must have been the acquisition

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of wealth and material security rather than power. And he used that control of material wealth

to acquire political power, and more wealth, with the absurd result that he now controls

fabulous wealth estimated to be worth billions of dollars. Even now with all his billions,

people who knew him closely say that he is the stingiest/miserly individual in the TPLF. Thus,

the deriving motive for Meles and almost all of the TPLF members first and foremost was

materially secured existence. I have not seen in my research of over fifteen years any

convincing evidence of Ethiopian nationalism or patriotism in the history of TPLF and its

Leaders. The moving force behind all the power struggle and tenacious attachment to power is

insatiable greed for money and wealth.

Messay is clearly convinced that Meles cannot bring about even the ―developmental State‖ let

alone democracy based on elections because Meles‘s interest is in staying in power, and not

economic development per se, but Messay also points out the eternal contradiction that

Meles‘s pursuit of power stands in conflict with economic developmental changes that need

be in place to maintain the state structure and Meles‘s power. Messay was not advocating that

Meles must do this or that, but simply pointing out the fault lines where Meles Zenawi falters

and the deep chasm of political and economic outlooks and understanding between Meles and

his supporters in Government and/or the EPRDF.

―To the question of whether Meles and his cronies are anywhere close to being a

developmental elite, the answer is, of course, no. This negative answer does not,

however, mean that they are unable to become developmental. I am not saying that

some such transformation will occur or that it is inevitable. As a strong skeptic of

determinism in history, I am simply referring to the possibility inherent in the human

person to finally make the right choice and laying some conditions necessary to effect

the transformation. Since my position will certainly cause an array of objections, even

angry attacks, it is necessary that I set out the arguments liable to back it up.‖ [page 9,

emphasis mine in bold]

Messay went on explaining the basic theory of transformations and theories on power. His

statements are not justifications for a particular action or program helpful for Meles and his

supporters; rather it explained the situation most likely to be the case. In this instance, Messay

is at best just sharing his conjectures based on his deep understanding of both philosophical

underpinnings of political systems and the surprises of historical reality in the day to day life

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of a system with people in it, and at worst one may dismiss it as some wild speculation of an

aging Marxist. I prefer the former.

I admire Messay Kebede greatly, he is one of the finest philosophers I had the good fortune to

have met in my life, even comparing him with some of my own teachers who are quite

renowned philosophers. He is my enduring good friend, a man of great charm, who is a truly

polite and civilized man. And I say all these with emotion, for I am witness of Messay‘s

greatest love being Ethiopia, all of it. He is someone I could entrust the fate of Ethiopia. It is

of no interest to me how he lived his intellectual life before 1991. What I see in Messay now

is a sincere deep thinker who loves his country and his people dearly. It pains me greatly

when we translate our failure in understanding his profound and deep thoughts and attack his

person because of our own mediocrity or hasty conclusions.

The highly informative and well presented criticisms and/or statements by Said Hassan and

Abiye Teklemariam on Messay‘s Article are not in the categories I am castigating. In fact,

such brief responses by two greatly gifted and skilled scholars are of tremendous importance

in promoting discourse and understanding with depth. I commend them both. My concern

here is that even the best of us could make mistaken assessments under our overcharged

political and economic circumstances. And such differences of views ought not be raised to a

point of condemnations or personal attacks. I believe there is a misunderstanding, maybe a

confusion between what is being offered by Messay as an explanation and hypothetical

positing of our current political and economic situation, and a perceived justification of

unacceptable flirtation with the work of a deranged and brutal dictator Meles Zenawi, whose

traitorous crimes against the State of Ethiopia and the People of Ethiopia will never be

excused on any ground.

God Bless Ancient and Lovable Ethiopia.

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Some remarks on Messay's article By Demeke Taye | June 20, 2011

I read Professor Messay Kebede‘s article, ―Meles Zenawi‘s Political Dilemma and the

Developmental State: Dead End and Exit.‖As usual Professor Messay comes through as

passionate as ever about his country, Ethiopia. As one of the leading and active observers of

Ethiopian politics, he comes up with different perspectives to help us come out of the

dilemma we all are in. Looking at the article from this angle I have nothing but admiration for

his thoughts and reflections.

Ethiopia is in a comprehensive crisis and we all should think of how to come out of this quack

mire. This entails that all of us should come up with some idea how to do so, and this must be

welcomed by all of us. The old student notion of my way or the highway should be put to rest.

I believe that people who jump to attack the character of persons rather than evaluate their

ideas are short of ideas themselves. People use curses because they do not want to think and

because they do not have ideas to advance. Our student days saw this approach and we all

know what the result has been.

Professor Messay‘s Article deals with a number of important points regarding the current

political situation in Ethiopia, but the main focus is about the developmental state and what it

needs as a prerequisites. He enumerates the lacking requirements in Ethiopia by referring to

other developmental states in the world. Some of the requirements mentioned include a

comprehensive economic betterment to all, the independence of the bureaucrats, and the

judiciary, and the vision by the ruling party to move towards an inclusive political system.

The party in power in Ethiopia has a very narrow social base and stays in power because it

controls the means of coercion. It is scarred of any coalition because it fears that its power

will be eroded and loses power. Meles is talking about development and economic growth

because he sees in it a way to avoid revolt by the masses of Ethiopia. Messay suggests that

Meles can be encouraged to move to compromise if the opposition can show him the way to

do so and thus free him from his base is, to say the least, a very optimistic view of Meles. I do

not think Meles is capable of thinking such long-term strategies. Meles has shown some

ability, like most Ethiopians, in dealing with imminent and immediate problems, not

envisaging grand political strategies. Perhaps Messay‘s article may give him some idea of

what he should do in the long run. Given the political culture we have had, it is hard to believe

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that Meles and his followers will give much thought to what should be done in the long run,

and more importantly, they may feel that compromise is defeat and surrender.

What is said about Meles and his followers apply to the opposition groups too, in that they too

will see compromise as surrender and defeat. I think the great challenge to Messay‘s idea is

the ingrained political culture in Ethiopia. Somehow, we Ethiopians, think in terms of either

winning all or losing it all. In conclusion we should welcome Messay‘s idea and we should

discuss it. If Messay‘s idea has place in the political culture of Ethiopia, then we can build on

what is positive and move on to a higher plane; we do not have to start from zero and build

everything up from nothing.

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A few points on democracy vs development

By Wondemhunegn Ezezew | June 23, 2011

The ongoing debate on the relevance of the ―developmental state‖ for Ethiopia has been really

encouraging. Though I was intrigued by Prof. Messay‘s emphasis on the role of the elite in

shaping the historical courses of their respective countries, I did not, however, like the

authoritarian flavor that he wished to generously lavish upon them. Why would one choose to

hold onto the authoritarian road when we could follow the democratic one?

Now I do not want to bombard you with all sorts of definition about democracy. I think, for

the present purpose, we all agree that apart from the periodic elections and other rituals

associated with them, democracies are generally supported by the triple-pillar of

accountability, transparency and legitimacy, which together constitute the supremacy of the

law. Where the rule of law is the highest authority, there can be no arbitrary violations of

human and property rights, officials and bureaucrats will be held accountable in the event they

misuse their positions and public resources, and the media will serve as a strong arm of the

country‘s justice system by investigating and exposing political scandals and corrupt practices.

To the extent that these things are the main parts and components that make up a democratic

society, I do not see why they shouldn‘t comprise the precondition for development. After all,

development is all about the effective utilization of a country‘s available resources to generate

the maximum possible benefits for its citizens. If the system in place prevents or discourages

the active monitoring and supervision over how these resources are used, then the entire

project about achieving all-round development will be an exercise in futility.

There is no doubt that the elite everywhere are the makers and breakers of their own societies.

But they are more successful in discharging their social duties and responsibilities when they

operate in democratic and transparent ways. So, in order to substantiate my case and convince

you that democracy is a must for development, at least for Ethiopia, we will briefly look at the

role of different elites in morphing their countries‘ politics, economy, and social development

through some comparative lens that guides us across China, Nigeria, Botswana, and Greece.

China

Most of the pro-developmental state argument will not, typically, wrap up its journey without

showering lots of praises on the remarkable achievements of China, which is often upheld as

the paragon of a successful state-directed capitalist society. It is true that China‘s hands-on

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approach has delivered spectacular economic outcomes in terms of ensuring sustained

economic growth for over three decades and lifting more than 250 million of its citizens out

of poverty during the same period. But no matter how beautifully one portrays the miraculous

economic performance China enjoyed since 1978, the hard facts remain that it is more the

result of gradual erosion of the government‘s role in directing the national economy and the

subsequent rise of private capital and responsibility, not the other way around.

Reform, Reform and Reform

One widely dispersed, and often mistaken, assertion about China‘s economic successes in

particular and the attendant monomania with the ―Beijing Consensus‖ in general is that people

wrongly attribute this success to the authoritarian features of the Communist Part of China

(CCP), which is often assumed to have controlled the magic wand that kept the country‘s

unprecedented economic expansion going for a long time now. The truth, however, is that

China‘s strong growth and prosperity are the result of continuous reform, opening of the

economy to foreign capital and expertise, gradual decentralisation in the organization of

production, and with it the increasing shrinkage of government presence in the economic

scene.

China‘s reform train began with the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in agriculture

which dismantled the Maoist collective farms and allowed greater active participation of

families in production and marketing decisions. Though the HRS still imposed quota

requirements, it however empowered households to enjoy greater autonomy over the

utilization of their surplus value, such as to dispose it at market determined prices at will. This

new found relative freedom and autonomy combined with the prospect of making more

money from selling their extra-quota produce encouraged farmers to spend more time and

resources on their farms which further increased the quality and quantity of food production.

Though the legal framework governing land use and ownership rights is far from complete,

the there is no doubt that the HRS has played a pivotal role in transforming China‘s

agriculture for the better. China which lost over 30 million of its population to famine under

Mao‘s failed collectivization programmes became more than self-sufficient within five year

period (1978-1983) and net food exporter (1983-2004).

The CCP is not just a self-selected group wishing to hold onto power at all costs. Besides the

economic re-organization of production under the HRS, the Chinese political elite have made

Page | 56 Geza hayet

enormous efforts to modernize the country‘s agricultural sector by deploying new

technologies and innovative methods of production. When the reform programme was

launched in 1978, less than 30% of China‘s 13 million hectare of arable land had irrigation

facilities; today more than 50% China‘s agricultural land is irrigated. China is also among the

top countries (after Japan, South Korea and Holland) in the world in terms of fertilizer

application per unit of hectare, with fertilizer consumption level more than twice the world

average. The government also actively promotes intensive agriculture by earmarking

substantial funds for research, demonstration, capital investment, infrastructure and marketing

support.

The Chinese reformers were far from being complacent. Having achieved remarkable

productivity gains in agriculture and having made great strides in ensuring food security, they

pushed similar radical reforms in other sectors of the economy albeit ―with Chinese

characteristics‖—on gradual, piecemeal, incremental and cautious approaches.

On the industrial front, Chinese politicians followed even stronger decentralization measures

by gradually privatizing state owned enterprises (SOEs) and further withdrawing state

direction and guidance in economic life. Some of these former SOEs were transferred to

individual Chinese investors; others—the so called Township and Village Enterprises

(TVEs)--were restructured and put under the nominal responsibility of local governments

(though in effect privately operated); still in other cases foreign participation was allowed in

the form of joint venture, outright acquisition and portfolio investments. Today, after nearly

three-decade-long rigorous implementation of market-oriented reforms, the private sector in

China accounts for nearly 70 percent of the country‘s total domestic production, which before

1978 was totally and completely micromanaged by central planners and coordinators.

Perhaps China‘s most important achievement lies in the external sector. Exchange rate

reforms, favourable taxation and regulatory incentives as well as stable social and political

conditions combined with cheap but competent labour have enabled China to jump-start its

export economy, especially by attracting foreign capital and technology in labour intensive

manufacturing sector that produce electronic goods, textiles, electric gadgets, etc. for both

domestic and export markets. Despite certain irregularities here and there, generally attractive

and investor-friendly environment has made China the biggest destination for private capital

among developing countries.

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Still there are many problems that threaten to derail China from its market-oriented heydays.

Increasing income inequality, corruption and environmental degradation spring to mind. The

financial sector has been overwhelmingly controlled by the country‘s four biggest state owned

banks, which often make no hesitation to direct big loans to inefficient government owned

enterprises often at the expense of innovative individuals and businesses. Its trading partners,

and the US at large, are unhappy about Beijing‘s deliberate manipulation of the value of

renminbi, which has been artificially kept undervalued through massive foreign reserve

accumulation, often by purchasing US government bonds. Property rights are far from secure

and the Communist Party can sometimes bring down an entire village by brute force followed

by the arrest or execution of anyone who questions such government actions or decisions.

As tough as these challenges are, Chinese economic and political elites will be determined to

find solutions in their own ways and there is no reason to expect that China will reverse

course and fall back to its unworkable, complex and failed communist past. Though the state

still controls major industries in finance, energy and telecommunication, its role in organizing

the Chinese economy is generally on the wane. Freedom of entry and exit for private players

as well as increasing competition and mushrooming entrepreneurial culture are behind

China‘s astounding economic achievements. NOT increasing government guidance and

interference.

Obviously, China is nowhere close to being a fully-fledged democratic country. But if

despotism is the small price to pay for development, the Chinese elite have a lot to show for it.

In less than three decades, they have built the second biggest economy in the world. What do

you say about the current ruling elite in Ethiopia who have failed to achieve even national

food security goals after twenty solid years?

Botswana and Nigeria

Consider Botswana and Nigeria, two African countries, with colonial past, endowed with rich

mineral deposits, both inhabited by diverse cultural and religious groups. Their similarities

end here.

Nigeria is notorious for its entrenched, institutionalised corruption and its politicians rank

among the most ruthless professional thieves in the world. Both electoral and political

corruption is rife and holding public office is a highly lucrative business in the country. Since

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the early 1980s, Nigeria has received over 300 BILLION US dollars mainly from petroleum

extraction. This is an incredibly huge sum of money, at least by African standards. But

Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries on our planet, with well over 60 percent of its

citizens languishing below the national poverty line. The level of corruption in Nigeria is so

deep-rooted that it has become part of the national way of life to the extent that in many parts

of the world MONEY and NIGERIANS have come to be perceived as synonymous.

Obviously, without all-round cultural and moral revolution, Nigeria as a nation has a gloomy

future—it is simply a failed state no matter how you choose to define its failure.

On the other hand, Botswana has received lots of praise from international opinion leaders for

its open and transparent dealings. In its November 6th

-12th 2004 issue, The Economist

Magazine lauded Botswana‘s British educated presidents for their efficiency, moderate

attitude, honesty and willingness to ―leave office‖ when ―the constitution says no.‖ In its 2009

Corruption Perception Index Report, Transparency International identified Botswana as the

least corrupt country in Africa (ranking 37 out of 180 countries) with a score of 5.6 (10 being

the best score). In this country, fiscal responsibility and social responsiveness go together.

The government has effectively used the windfall from its diamond and other mineral

resources by focusing on productive infrastructure and inclusive social spending schemes. As

a result, Botswana has transformed itself from a poor post-colonial nation to a middle income

country, with its citizens enjoying higher standard of living than most of their Sub-Saharan

African counterparts.

If democracy -- that is the legal and institutional foundations to hold public officials

accountable—are not the necessary preconditions for economic development, how does one

explain the divergence in the economic trajectories followed by Botswana and Nigeria?

Even if we accept the need for stronger government activism in guiding the country‘s

investment and production decisions, Ethiopia, or most of Africa for that matter, is far from

the ideal candidate for such serious national endeavours. If by a developmental state we mean

the ability and freedom of the state to mobilize national resources to achieve clearly defined

social and economic objectives, this will hardly happen in a country markedly divided by

ethnicity and riven by corruption. In an environment where people are deliberately

encouraged to commit themselves to parochial and narrow nationalist pursuits, the local will

always prevail over the national.

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Of course, this does not mean that cultural homogeneity is the only ideal condition to execute

developmental state programmes. Even though homogenous nations have certain comparative

advantages that heterogeneous countries do not have, they are not insulated from moral, social

and economic degeneration as demonstrated by the recent Jasmine contagion in the corrupt

Arab world.

Greece

If anything the current popular crisis in Greece has shown us it is the fact that the past cannot

guarantee the present or the future. For starters Greece is the cradle of much of the World‘s

civilization—most importantly it is the birth place of democracy. But unfortunately the

country is deeply corrupt (ranking worse than Ghana in the Transparency International‘s 2009

Corruption Perception Index) and one of the most difficult places to start business (it was

ranked worse than Ethiopia in World Bank‘s 2010 Ease of Doing Business Report). The

shadow economy (which is based on unreported income) accounted for one-fourth of the

gross domestic production in 2007, which, for instance, compared with 11.8% for France and

7.2% for the U.S. Tax evasion is so pervasive that the national treasury loses an estimated 20

BILLION dollars a year, a whopping sum which could have avoided any recourse to the IMF

and the ECB for financial assistance to cushion its current sovereign debt crisis.

How could a nation that successfully exported democratic values to the rest of the world could

suddenly find itself in a situation where national moral standards hit rock bottom? Of course,

there is a multiplicity of causes that made the current Greek sovereign debt problem a

veritable hot potato. The adoption of the euro and the forfeiture of its fiscal and monetary

autonomy to a supranational authority (the ECB) is one of them. But I think no other factor

would rival the existence of rampant corruption for the country‘s current social and economic

predicament. When the elite neglect or abandon their traditional role as social transformers

and reduce themselves to mere parasites on their society, the entire nation will simply become

cynical about the elite‘s superficial rhetoric on patriotism and public spirited ness. Thus,

naturally, unable to reign in the astray elite, ordinary people will choose to engage in their

own tiny malpractices, which over time develop into major national puzzle. No wonder, in

present day Greece, as of 2010, ―nearly a third of Greek income was undeclared, with ―fewer

than 15,000 Greeks declar[ing] incomes of over €100,000, despite tens of thousands living in

opulent wealth on the outskirts of the capital.‖

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Greece is at cross roads as a nation. Not because it will be unable to service its debt and fall

pray to its domestic and European creditors. It will certainly overcome its current financial

challenges with or without its EU members‘ support, though ordinary people will have to

endure some pain for some time. Rather what is more worrisome about Greece is the gradual

erosion of its critical social norms and institutions. A recent poll conducted to survey the

confidence of the Greek people in various public institutions revealed a startling result. The

proportion of respondents who said they have NO TRUST for political parties in general was

a whopping 89%. Similarly, the have-no-trust response for governments was 90%, for

parliament (85%), for trade unions (80%), for the media (72%), for banks (69%). The only

two institutions that the people seemed to have some trust were social movements (42%) and

fellow citizens (54%).

Though Greece seems to have been drifting helpmessly due to the elite‘s loss of moral

compass, it has still some introspective and vigilant children who are aware of its problems

and who are making loud calls about the urgent need to, ―redefine the public debate. Talk

about public morality, a new political ethos, and the common good. Cultivate consensus, and

try hard to win hearts and minds in the cause of remaking Greece.‖

Lessons for Ethiopia

1. Over all the elite are the makers and breakers of their society.

2. The experience of Greece shows that the past or the present is no guarantee for the

future. Responsible elite like good school children are to be nurtured and cultivated to

ensure their continuous existence in their societies. Where negligence and ignorance

prevail, a single demagogue can intoxicate and poison an entire elite generation and

turn them into forces of catastrophe. Think about the historical role of Hitler and his

intellectual rear guard.

3. Cultural homogeneity is not a necessary and sufficient condition to create and develop

a healthy society. And heterogeneous communities are not doomed to eternal rivalry

and conflict. Altruistic, God-fearing and humane elites from a cross-section of their

communities can and should defuse potentially mutually destructive tensions and

create cooperative environments if they put their personal or clique interests over and

above the interests of ordinary people.

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4. The Chinese experience, contrary to widely held assertions, reveals that what is

critical for achieving rapid and inclusive socio-economic advancement is not

government‘s heavy-handed, ubiquitous presence in national economic affairs rather it

is sustained reforms towards opening up the national economy to the outside world,

protecting and enforcing property rights and contracts, encouraging stronger private

sector engagement, and above all limiting government intervention to correcting

market failures, providing social safety net for the economically downtrodden,

expanding infrastructure development, as well as promoting knowledge creation and

dissemination. Even though China is nowhere close to being a democratic country, the

role of its government in guiding national economic affairs cannot and should not be

overrated.

5. Corruption is a big, and perhaps the biggest, obstacle against poverty reduction efforts

in many developing countries. We were recently surprised to find out that some 8.4

billion dollars left Ethiopia illegally during the past twenty years of TPLF/EPRDF rule.

But we should understand that the problem is not a new one and has its roots in the

final years of the monarchy and became deeply entrenched during the chaotic Derg era.

One insightful study by Léonce Ndikumana & James K. Boyce (2008) which

examined capital flight in 40 Sub-Saharan African countries found that between 1970

and 2004 some 17 billion dollars were illegally smuggled out of Ethiopia, of which

some 10.5 billion (60%) was stolen under TPLF/EPRDF. The reader can see that it

would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate abject poverty in our

country before one can have the appropriate insecticide to fight and eliminate these

bloodsucking ticks from the Ethiopian body politic.

6. The comparison between Botswana and Nigeria shows that even if two countries have

abundant natural resources, strong rules and institutions that support transparency on

government activities lead to superior economic and social outcomes (in Botswana)

while a culture of endemic corruption inhibits a country‘s political and economic

progress (Nigeria).

7. Though one cannot rule out the practical relevance of developmental state for

Ethiopia, it is quite impossible in the current political setting as created and advanced

by the TPLF/EPRDF regime. This aspect of the problem is best captured by Dr.

Berhanu Nega:

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There is also another peril associated with EPRDF‟s ethnically-oriented politics when viewed

from the perspective of building a democratic system [in Ethiopia]. This problem arises from

the distribution of state resources. Usually ethnic sentiment or identity politics is extremely

intractable as it is driven by emotional rather than rational considerations. Ethnic

nationalism is especially sensitive to feelings of subjugation or grievances. It is very easy to

fan the flames of ethnic nationalism even based on sheer rumour or propaganda. Such

developments, when coupled with conflicts of interest among the elite groups, will make

recourse to nationalistic appeal even more attractive. This is clearly evident among the

members that constitute the EPRDF coalition who usually engage in fierce confrontation over

federal-to-regional budget subsidy allocation sessions--wrangling so common when

parliament convenes every year to ratify annual budget proposals. But the problem is more

severe than that. In a government structured along ethnic lines, if there is a dominant ethnic

group in it, there will always be the perception that the dominant group is favouring its own

ethnic enclave, regardless of the factual foundation of such claims. Even when the alleged

relatively better economic activities are not based on explicit favouritism, others will use it as

evidence of exploitation to agitate and mobilize their own resentful ethnic groups. In the case

of Ethiopia, the all-around accusations directed at Tigray illustrate the severity of this

problem. Regardless of whether or not such accusations are true, the mere existence of such

perception kills any sense of solidarity among its citizens, who instead become preoccupied

with bitter feelings of envy and rivalry. (Berhanu Nega in „Yenetsanet Goh Siqed‟, my own

free translation, pp.99-100)

It is true that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has had plenty of opportunities to bring

Ethiopians together for Grand National transformation mission. But sadly from the outset he

chose to stick to counterproductive ―Shoa Amhara‖ bashing campaign which later on would

backfire on him earning him a bad name for leading ―Wedi Adwa‖ robber barons. That is not

all. Like his Marxist godfathers, instead of accepting criticisms for his government‘s

damaging actions and decisions, he preferred extreme reliance on propaganda. He was right in

some sense. The Stalinists in Soviet Russia were such loud and determined propagandists that

observers in the West had the tendency to speculate that life in Soviet Russia must have been

superior compared with the US. This speculation could not have been more plausible

especially when judged against the Soviet Union‘s demonstrated achievements in cutting-

edge space technology. All this propaganda, however, was exposed when Gorbachev

―uncovered‖ Russia to the rest of the world.

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In that sense, what we wait for right now is the Ethiopian Gorbachev, an Ethiopian leader who

values honesty and self-examination more than his commitment to some askew ideological

superstructure.

Certainly Meles Zenawi alone is not the root of all evils in Ethiopia. Far from it. We have

plenty of them among other ethnic groups including the Amhara, the Oromo, the Somali, etc.

An OLF activist who vows to stamp out the ―children of invaders‖ from the ―Oromo country‖

or an Amhara jingoist who dreams to impose his language on every other ethnic group are

both as destructive as Meles Zenawi himself. It takes a simple principle to bring harmony in

our nation: do not do unto others what you do not want others do unto you.

So, it must be understood that all-encompassing social transformation is brought about by

people we look well beyond ethnic loyalty or even racial barriers (Mandela comes to mind)

and who have profound commitment to the promotion and protection of human dignity

regardless of their provincial, religious or linguistic background. Genuine transformers are

those who lead their subjects by example. The elite can be the light or the darkness of their

society depending on how they behave or act in accomplishing certain stated objectives and

goals. When our leaders give a penny, we will donate a pound; when Meles Zenawi frequents

in and around Gondar, we will make Adwa our home; when our politicians shake hands with

respect and genuine smile, we will return to the true Ethiopian tradition where tolerance, love

and mutual respect are the norm. You do not create a healthy society simply because you have

an excellent constitution or simply because ethics is taught as a subject at schools and

universities. In stressing the decisive influence of his predecessors on his great scientific

achievements, Isaac Newton once said, ―If I have seen further than others, it is by standing

upon the shoulders of giants.‖ Where are our academic, political and religious giants on

whose shoulders the current and future generations could stand with pride?

Wondemhunegn Ezezew

bishangary@yahoo.com.

Resources

1. Amvona (2011), The Greek Restructuring Debate, available at

http://www.amvona.com/latest-news/foreclosure/14627-the-greek-restructuring-debate.html

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2. Eklogika (2011), Confidence in Greek public Institutions (in Greek) available at

http://www.eklogika.gr/uploads/files/Dimoskopiseis/pi-skai-all-18-5-2011.pdf

3. Open Democracy (2011), Facing the Greek Crisis: it’s the Politics, Stupid, available at

http://www.opendemocracy.net/takis-s-pappas/facing-greek-crisis-it%E2%80%99s-

politics-stupid

4. Marangos, J. and Bitzenis, A. (2007), ‗Economies in Transition‘, Stamouli Publishers,

Athens, pp.397-441.

5. The Wall Street Journal (2011), Greece Grapples with Tax Evasion, available at

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704182004575055473233674214.html

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Developmental state or neo-liberal economic policy?

Answer to Professor Messay`s Essay on Grand Coalition to save Ethiopia

By Fekadu Bekele | June 20, 2011

From the outset I would like to express my frustration that Professor Messay`s article does not

have any new substance or cannot be accepted as entailing a thoughtful idea. Those who side

with the position of the Professor may think and believe that Professor Messay wrote a grand

theory which might be seen as a panacea to save Ethiopia from all the evils the Meles regime

has inflicted.

After reading the article twice, I cannot detect the theoretical and methodological foundation

of the article of Professor Messay. Howerver, Professor Messay believes that his approaches

in characterizing the Meles regime, and Meles himself, and the theory of developmental state

are new theoretical reflections which can be carefully studied. In all the three points I cannot

scrutinize the exact methodological and scientific approaches to substantiate his theory.

Except that he commands the English language which makes impossible for many to detect

his theoretical weakness, I am not convinced that the article can teach us new things.

If somebody writes such an article he must either explicitly or implicitly clarify that he

follows some paradigmatic approaches to prove that the article he writes reflects things which

are taking place on the ground.

First of all to pursue authoritarian politics is not a matter of choice, but it is a desire of certain

groups to impose their interests and thereby to shape the entire political landscape according

to these interests. Such kind of authoritarian politics emanates from the nature of the person

who seizes political power. In order to understand the character of such an authoritarian ruler

one should study the society and the circumstances he grew up in, and the education system

which shaped his mind to behave like this. Family backgrounds also play decisive roles in

shaping the mind of such an authoritarian ruler. As Meles and his compatriots are the products

of a particular area, even though they boast that they follow this or that ideology, what

ultimately decides their thinking and handling is the socioeconomic condition and the family

background in which they grew up. Philosophers, psychologists, and men of drama like

Schiller have already proved that the exercise of political power for good or bad can be

conditioned on the particular circumstance in which the political actors are grown up. To say

Page | 66 Geza hayet

that Meles had no other option than to be an authoritarian means that he can alter his mind at

any time and become a democrat. That is why Professor Messay thinks that there is no other

option than building a grand coalition before the country falls into pieces or the situation ends

in bloodshed.

If we accept the argument of Professor Messay as he tried to analyze in his essay, what Meles

and his friends did against Ethiopia was not calculated from the outset, and they were

compelled to follow an ethnic and a neo-liberal policy because they did not have any other

choices. As we all know Meles and his group could not seize political power without the help

of Blair and the American government. The West in general and America in particular did

everything to eliminate the Mengistu regime to wipe Ethiopian nationalism out once and for

all. Therefore ethnic politics and neo-liberal economic policy as Meles had introduced and

practiced in Ethiopia could not be materialized without the help of America and England. In

all his previous analysis when Professor Messay accuses the Meles regime, he either

deliberately or unconsciously omits the role of the Americans and the British in shaping the

Ethiopian politics over the last 20 years. Only in a weakened country in which a regime which

pursues ethnic or any other politics which fits the interests of the West and practices a neo-

liberal economic policy, it is easy for the West to meddle in the internal affairs of such a

weakened country.

Coming to neo-liberalism, it seems that Professor Messay did not understand the economic

policy of the Meles regime prior to the 2005 election. As if the regime until then did not

follow a neo-liberal economic policy, Professor Messay tells us that the Meles regime

understood well the danger of neo-liberalism and has done everything to convince his

comrades to follow his developmental policy which is strictly regulated and manipulated by

the state. To my understanding, prior to the election of 2005, Meles and his regime had agreed

with the IMF and the World Bank to strictly apply the structural adjustment program (SAP).

Devaluation of the Ethiopian birr in relation to the US Dollar, privatization, liberalization of

the internal and foreign market, reducing state budget for social purposes, so as to canalize the

money for productive ―purposes‖, are all instruments of neo-liberal economic policies. In all

Sub-Saharan African countries where such a policy was applied, though the negative effects

vary from country to country, in general such a policy has enriched the few and impoverished

the masses. There are well documented studies which show the negative effects of SAPs. In

short the main agenda of SAPs was to de-industrialize Africa, and to make her dependent on

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one or two raw material or agricultural products. The chaotic situation in many Sub-Saharan

African countries, including Ethiopia prove that how SAP was designed to impoverish the

entire continent and canalize wealth to the capitalist West via different mechanisms. If any

country accepts the shock doctrine of the IMF, it will end up in permanent debt, and payments

of this debt permanently by transferring her hardly won wealth every year become a natural

law which must continue indefinitely. It is a calculated intrigue of the West to systematically

unlock such kinds of governments to pursue a macroeconomic economic policy which does

not work in such backward countries like that of Ethiopia. After the Meles regime has been

applying for almost fifteen years such a bitter economic policy, to say that he has well

understood the danger of neo-liberalism is a pure mockery against the Ethiopian people. The

misunderstanding of the work of the IMF and the World Bank is not only the fault of

Professor Messay. Many Ethiopian economists whom I know have the same attitudes; and

many of them cannot understand the ideological foundation of neo-liberalism. Because all

hate the Meles regime, they believe that what our country had to experience over the last 20

years is solely the work of one dictator. It is perceived that all foreign forces and their

international organizations which shape economic polices for Third World Countries are by

their nature innocent. The widespread belief is that African dictators block the application of

the policy as is prescribed by the IMF and the school books and thus all countries are

condemned to poverty.

Coming to the developmental state, many development experts, by eliminating social history

and economic anthropology from their heads convinced many Third World students that the

policy of developmental state is a new phenomenon which can be reduced to few countries. If

one studies the economic history of Europe, at least from the fourteenth century onwards,

state systems had played crucial roles in shaping and manipulating their economies and social

systems. Especially from the sixteenth century onwards, European Monarchs had pursued an

active economic policy to develop a home market in their respective boundaries. Their

approaches were holistic, and supported by all available instruments to build a coherent and

strong nation in their respective countries. If we come to Japan, there were well established

relationships on one hand between the German and the Japanese governments, and on the

other hand between the United States of America and Japan during the Meiji dynasty. Japan

had sent some young men to Germany to study the economic performance of Germany, and

sent others to America to study modern administration systems. The Meiji dynasty which had

a well disciplined military organization, and which was determined to modernize the economy

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had forced the industrialization of Japan. The unique socio-cultural condition of Japan and

their disciplined psychological make-up helped Japan to materialize her inward looking

strategy. Without a disciplined bureaucracy, and without a unique culture which prevails in

the society, it was not possible for Japan and others to pursue their policies. As Professor

Messay believes these countries did not follow a strict free market economic policy and the

rule of law, but the unique relationship that had prevailed between the banking system, the

state and the industrial sector helped the industrialization of Japan and South Korea. During

the 70s and 80s South Korea was governed by military dictators which did not allow any

political participation, and the organization of trade union was strictly forbidden. As some

critical analysts affirm, foreign debt and military dictatorship are behind the industrialization

of South Korea.

To apply in countries like Ethiopia such a strictly state oriented economic development policy

like that of Japan and South Korea is an impossible task, because the cultural situation of the

society and the psychological make-up of the intelligentsia are factors which block any

meaningful economic agenda. The fragmented and intriguing characters we have, and the loss

of our self-reliance, and weak theoretical background we posses, are some of the factors

which block our wishes to develop Ethiopia. I do not know any Ethiopian economist who has

extensively studied the role of Mercantilism, and the Works of Friedrich List, Heinrich Pesch,

and others, which are crucial indeed for the application of a developmental state economic

policy. Neither do I know who has a good understanding of philosophy and tries to combine

philosophy, sociology and cultural transformation with a kind of renaissance economic policy

to foster industrialization policy in our country. As so long as we are stick to the market

economic policy of the IMF and the World Bank it is practically impossible to get Ethiopia

out of the present situation.

Having this in mind, if we come to the advice of Professor Messay to create a power-sharing

arrangement with the regime, I do not believe that the Meles regime with such a bloody past,

and which has been selling our country to the so-called foreign investors, and systematically

destabilizes our country so that patriotic feelings could not develop among the youth, will

accept an arrangement which could save Ethiopia. Meles and his clique are determined to see

a much weakened Ethiopia, and could stay on power when they follow such an intriguing

policy. Foreigners who know the regime very well say that Meles and his clique hate Ethiopia,

and the divide and rule system which they have been systematically applying nation-wide

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over the last 20 years weakened the entire nation. Today we have in Ethiopia not a political

elite as Professor Messay thinks and believes; instead we have a Mafia system across the

country which has corrupted all the local administrators. How is it possible to build a grand

coalition with such a regime which dreams day and night to see a very fragmented and

weakened Ethiopia? Meles like his masters, the West hates the concept of a Nation-State,

because only through a strong Nation-State the people of a given country could freely

exercise their true freedom, and build a strong economy which is based on science and

technology. It seems that Professor Messay does not know what is going on in Ethiopia, and

the real economic and social conditions which the Ethiopian people are subjected to.

Therefore, not only from a theoretical, and paradigmatic point of view, but also from the

conditions which are existing on the ground, and from the nature of the regime, the proposal

of Professor Messay is not acceptable. At the same time when the Meles regime is in a very

desperate position, and no more in a position to cope with the social and economic crises of

the country it is unwise to call for a grand coalition.

---

The writer can be reached at fekadubekele@gmx.de

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COMMENTS FROM READERS

Mesay Kebede says:

Your comments on my article raise interesting points and invite a serious debate. For now I

say the following:

1. Your statement that ―what prompts Messay to consider this path to democratization is his

enthusiasm for the developmental state‖ completely misunderstands the main idea of the

article. What prompts me is the present political impasse of Ethiopia: Neither Meles can

succeed in marginalizing the opposition through rapid economic development, nor the

opposition can overthrow him through electoral victory (the only way is armed struggle or

popular revolution). What is the way out from these dead-ends? That is the main question of

the article and I am surprised that you think that Ethiopia is not in a political stalemate.

2. I think that your understanding of the genesis of democratic systems is not complex enough.

It still reflects some Marxist assumptions. Democratic systems emerge, not only because of

popular pressure or uprising, but also when conflicts between elites reach an impasse.

Democracy is a way out from a political stalemate. I think numerous historical facts confirm

the assumption.

3. You say that authoritarian states lead to democracy when they have strong selectorate

accountability. This is a structuralist argument that ignores the importance of subjective

factors in history. It does not apply to Japan and other East Asian countries, which are now in

the democratic camp. Most importantly, what is crucial is not the presence of some

institutional prerequisites, but the determination of elites to respect them. The TPLF

constitution of Ethiopia is fine; the problem is that the ruling elite does not respect it.

4. I agree when you say that ―no democracy can be illiberal.‖ However, your notion of a

―liberal democratic developmental state‖ misses the characteristic feature of the Asian model

of development. In the latter authoritarianism is perceived as a necessary means to promote

economic progress and modernization. If you adopt liberalism, in whatever form, then I don‘t

see why you need the developmental state.

5. My question concerning the 2010 election is the following: if opposition leaders had known

that the elections would result in complete defeat for them, would they have participated? If I

remember correctly, MEDREK was hesitant because the guarantees of fair elections were not

enough. But they had to follow others, especially Hailu Shaul and his party, who thought that

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a fair competition was possible. I have heard many interviews of opposition leaders in which

they say that they expect a significant victory. I have also read many articles stating that the

Meles regime is on its last leg.

Abiye Teklemariam says:

Professor Messay,

Thank you for the response. On the misreading, I stand corrected. But it doesn‘t change the

substance of my response. Here are my comments.

1. I don‘t deny that democracy can be a way out of a political stalemate. I actually did not

state my views about the genesis and development of democracy fully. My main point is there

is little evidence to suggest that grand power sharing coalitions lead to democracy. In fact, the

evidence points to the contrary.

2. I didn‘t say authoritarian states lead to democracy when they have strong selectorate

accountability. It is that authoritarian power sharing coalitions lead to democracy if they are

preceded by either an authoritarian system that had strong selectorate accountability or that is

less than full-scale. It is a structuralist argument, but backed by a strong empirical evidence.

3. The theory of developmental state is an economic theory(not an all encompassing political

philosophy) that informs the priorities of economic policy and how to mobilize resources to

execute them. It is insensitive to regime typology. The fairness vs. prosperity, employment,

taxes and spending, deficits etc economic debates in liberal states can be informed by

developmentalism.

4. I think the election time declarations of the opposition party leaders were intended to

redirect people‘s attention to political contest. I thought it was not a great strategy, but the

truth is it had nothing to do with their beliefs that 2010 elections could be like 2005

Enanu Agonafer says:

1. Ethiopia needs new thinkers and Dr. Messay and Abiye are not two of them.

Ethiopia Dr. Messay and Abiye know has evolved. New economic relations have created

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new classes. The military, ethno – military and academic elites are no more in command.

The future of Ethiopia is the new emerging middle class – the economic elites. Any

analysis that shuns this force from consideration is wrong. And that‘s why most attempts

to introduce change in the form of democracy or other continues to fail.

In the past century, Ethiopia was feudal under absolute monarchy close for seventy five years.

Regent H. Selassie took power from Empress Zewditu through palace intrigue. A coup d‘Etat

was tried by military elites against him but failed. In the name of revolution, military elites

came to power in 1974 until they were removed by another ethno – military elites. The latter

are still in power but losing grip to new elites.

For hundred years, the power exchange in Ethiopia has been from a monarch to military elites

to ethno – miliary elites. It was done by palace intrigues, ―revolution‖ and violent civil war.

Coup d‘Etats have not succeeded. Democracy and peaceful transfer of power has not been

tried except in 2005 in which the ethno – military elites were defeated. The academic elites

had always been in the background of these power exchange in the country. Academic elites

such as leaders of OLF, EPRP and AESM are examples here. They paid enormous prices but

never succeeded to achieve independence, form their own government or share power with

others.

The century of military, ethno – military and academic and quasi- academic elites in Ethiopia

is over. A recent study of the Ethiopian military has confirmed that its interest to take power

through coup d‘Etat is almost nil. In case situations go out of hand, it might step in but only

upon the request of parliament or the government itself. Some say it has understood that the

Constitution prohibits its take over of power. The quasi- academic – ethno -military forces

such as OLF and ONLF (if they want to succeed like TPLF) have to take their hit-and-ran to a

higher level to be taken seriously. They have not done that for the last three- four decades and

they are losing momentum. The diaspora academic elites are still talking whereas those in the

country are not. The ones in the country have changed to the extent that their mission is not to

liberate the masses but rather prosper and join the emerging economic elite.

The century is for the emerging economic elites in the country. The opposition is dead and

buried in the country. TPLF/EPRDF, let alone share power with the opposition, it will not talk

to them as they have no sizable constituency that wields political clout. As a political force,

which largely comes from the academic and quasi – elites, the opposition is out. Even in 2005,

it was the economic elites that took the opposition where it found itself. Once they realized

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they cannot do business with the opposition, they let it go. The opposition has not recovered

from the damage the separation caused.

The economic elites have now turned to the government and started demanding wider

economic space (in forms of free economy and market) which they are getting day after day.

The entire bureaucracy is serving them and the police protecting them and their property.

Soon, they will demand further political liberalization in the jargon we hear every day: good

governance, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness,

participatory, consensus, rule of law, etc. And the government will talk to them, respond to

their demands provided they pay money.

The economic elites forming the middle class is the force that will bring democracy in the

country. The military, ethno-military and the academic and quasi -academic elites have been

given the chance in the last fifty years. They have squandered the chance and it is time for

them to leave the field for others.

2. My opinion is meant to show how the vocal diaspora academic elites are detached

from the reality in Ethiopia and feed the day dream of the diaspora opposition. They

cannot be power brokers in a highly charged political environment by suggesting ideas

pulled from nowhere.

First, they have to see if there is economic change that has affected relations in the country to

the extent politics is impacted by it. Nobody begins with that. The discussion is always

TPLF/EPRDF is in power for so long and how can we remove it. If anything different comes,

it is how power can be shared with the government – obviously with academic and quasi –

academic elites. Some get angry if you say both TPLF/EPRDF and academic elites are no

more important political forces in the country. The worst thing is they do not ask who these

new forces are.

TPLF/EPRDF have not talked for a while and will not talk to the opposition both from within

and without the country. They have reach a point where they consider the opposition a hit

away from total elimination. They will not listen to any kind of suggestion to re-invent and

strengthen the opposition because democracy needs them. They have, time and again, said

democracy is not an urgent affair for the country; growth and development are.

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So, with whom does TPLF/EPRDF with its government deal today? The economic elites. As

noted widely, the service, industry and agriculture sector are moved by foreign and domestic

capital. The finance source of the five-year budget and plan is foreign and domestic capital

and tax. Behind capital and tax are mainly business people on whom the government is

dependent. The government talks to these people, works to meet their interests and sometimes

they clash. There are several recent examples to this effect. The future challenge these people

will raise to the government is to create ―enabling economic environment‖ which includes

good governance. In effect, good governance is democracy in a different name.

As the economic elites closely work with the government to advance their interests, they will

fight back any force like the academic and quasi academic elites that aspires to take political

power or share it with the government. First of all, the academic and quasi – academic elites

have no significant stake in the country. They have no economic interest to advance or any

other major interest for that matter. They might claim to be citizens of the country and need

democracy and human rights, but those are not enough to put economic interest of an entire

class in the hands of people who cannot protect it and help it to grow. The academic elites of

the diaspora cannot even claim they are citizens of the country. So much for their concern and

efforts to destabilize it.

TPLF/EPRDF have said they will hand over power after building capitalism in the country.

We do not know if the economic elites will not remove them soon enough to further open up

the country for business. The millions of workers in the newly created farms, service,

manufacturing and construction will join the new economic class to bring about a far reaching

change in our country. EFFORT is TPLF`s platform for joining the emerging economic elites.

Others are supposed to imitate TPLF – EFFORT and join the rush before it is too late; but

they do not seem to have understood the game.

Most Ethiopians are blinded from seeing this reality because of elite dysfunction and empty

bravado about democracy and human rights. Do not get us wrong. We are for democracy and

human rights. The problem is to know how they can be brought about and by whom. The

political discourse in the country and abroad should raise real questions and struggle with

them rather than look for a short cut to power. Time for all of us to reflect hard and long!