Death in the · advanced a 1¾-inch handline through the front door as the Captain and Lieutenant from Ladder 11 were ordered to set up a positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fan at

August 2, 2001

The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and PreventionProgram is conducted by the National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose ofthe program is to determine factors that cause or contributeto fire fighter deaths suffered in the line of duty.Identification of causal and contributing factors enableresearchers and safety specialists to develop strategies forpreventing future similar incidents. The program does notseek to determine fault or place blame on fire departmentsor individual fire fighters. To request additional copies ofthis report (specify the case number shown in the shieldabove), other fatality investigation reports, or furtherinformation, visit the Program Website at

www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.htmlor call toll free 1-800-35-NIOSH

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

F2000 Death in theline of duty...44

Residential House Fire Claims the Life of One Career Fire Fighter–Florida

A Summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

SUMMARYOn November 25, 2000, a 30-year-old career malefire fighter (the victim) died in a residential housefire. At 0135 hours, fire fighters received a callof a reported structure fire. Engines 5, 2, 1,Ladder 11, and Rescue 32 responded to the earlymorning call. At 0141 hours, Engine 5 arrivedon the scene and the Captain assumed incidentcommand (IC). The IC reported to dispatch thatthey had a well-involved, single-story house fire.He then decided to send a search team inside thestructure because it was unclear if thehomeowners had exited. The victim from Engine5, and the Captain and the Lieutenant from Rescue32, teamed up to enter the house and completethe search. The victim, Captain, and Lieutenantadvanced a 1¾-inch handline through the frontdoor as the Captain and Lieutenant from Ladder11 were ordered to set up a positive pressureventilation (PPV) fan at the front door and thenback up the search crew. The Lieutenant and afire fighter from Engine 1 advanced a second lineto the rear of the structure to attack the fire. Thevictim, and the Captain and Lieutenant fromRescue 32, advanced their line down a hallway

and into a bedroom when the Captain noticedheavy fire in a room off to their right. The Captainrequested that the victim pass him the nozzlebecause there was heavy fire in an adjacent roomin the rear of the structure and he was afraid itwas going to flash. The Lieutenant responded,saying that they could not locate the nozzle. Infear of a possible flashover, the Captain orderedthe victim and Lieutenant to exit immediately. Asthe three attempted to exit, the hallway becameheavily involved with fire. The Lieutenant andCaptain fell over debris and the victim becamedisoriented. The Captain and Lieutenant exitedthe structure but the victim did not exit. The ICimmediately ordered exterior crews to enter thestructure and search for the missing victim.Approximately 56 minutes later, fire fighters foundthe victim. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimizethe risk of similar occurrences, fire departmentsshould

• ensure that the department’s standardoperating procedures (SOPs) are followed

Incident Site: Single-Story Residential Home

Photo courtesy of the Fire Department

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Investigative Report #F2000-44Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation And Prevention Program

• ensure that when entering or exiting asmoke-filled structure, fire fighters followa hoseline, rope, or some other type of guideand refresher training is provided toreinforce the procedures

• ensure that a rapid intervention team(s)(RIT) is established when fire fighters enteran immediately dangerous to life and healthatmosphere, and the RITs be properlytrained and equipped

• consider providing all fire fighters with apersonal alert safety system (PASS)integrated into their self contained breathingapparatus

• consider increasing the number of firefighters on engine companies to perform inaccordance with NFPA standards

• consider providing all fire fighters withportable radios or radios integrated into theirface pieces.

Additionally, dispatchers and emergency calltakers should

• obtain as much information as possible fromthe caller and report it to the respondingcompanies.

INTRODUCTIONOn November 25, 2000, a career male fire fighter(the victim) died in a residential house fire. At0135 hours, the victim responded to the call andbecame a part of the interior search crew. Thecrew stretched their line to the rear of the structurebefore being forced to exit due to fire conditions.During their exit, the victim became disorientedand did not exit. The victim was located andpronounced dead at the scene at 0250 hours.

On November 27, 2000, the U.S. FireAdministration and the International Associationof Fire Fighters (IAFF) notified the NationalInstitute for Occupational Safety and Health(NIOSH) of this incident. On December 14, 2000,two safety and occupational health specialistsfrom the NIOSH Fire Fighter FatalityInvestigation and Prevention Programinvestigated this incident.

Meetings and interviews were conducted with theChief, Battalion Chiefs, the Safety Officer, firefighters who were involved in the incident, thefire department’s Fire Marshal, a representativewith the local police department, and arepresentative from the IAFF. Investigatorsvisited the incident site, and took photographs andcompleted drawings of the incident site.Additional photographs and drawings wereobtained from the local police department.NIOSH investigators also reviewed witnessstatements, a copy of the dispatch tape andtranscribed notes, the victim’s training records,the fire department’s training procedures andstandard operating procedures, the victim’sautopsy report and video footage of the incidentsite.

The fire department involved in this incident iscomprised of 137 uniformed personnel. Thedepartment serves a population of approximately60,000 in a geographical area of 25.9 square miles.The department requires all new fire fighters tocomplete a City orientation program, Fire FighterLevel I and Fire Fighter Level II (in accordancewith NFPA standards), and a physical agility exam.Refresher training is provided periodically. Therefresher training consists of courses such assearch and rescue, blueprint reading, high angleand confined space rescue, and fire origin andcause. The victim’s training records werereviewed by NIOSH investigators and appeared

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to be sufficient. The victim had approximately 4years of experience as a fire fighter.

The structure involved in this incident was asingle-story residential home (Photo 1). Thestructure measured approximately 52 feet by 59feet. The structure had an attached roof on sideC, measuring approximately 19 feet by 21 feet,which served as a carport. The fire’s origin wasdetermined to be in the kitchen (see Diagram).The fire was declared as accidental due tocooking.

INVESTIGATIONOn November 25, 2000, at 0135 hours, firefighters received the call of a reported structurefire. Engine 5 (a Captain, an acting Lieutenant,and a fire fighter [the victim]), Engine 2 (aCaptain, a Lieutenant, and a fire fighter), Engine1 (an acting Captain, an acting Lieutenant, and afire fighter), Ladder 11 (an acting Captain and anacting Lieutenant), and Rescue 32 (an actingCaptain and an acting Lieutenant) responded tothe call. At 0141 hours, Engine 5 arrived on thescene and the Captain assumed incident command(IC). He reported to dispatch that they had awell-involved, single-story house fire (Photo1 andDiagram). The majority of the fire fightersinterviewed stated that they recalled seeing heavysmoke and fire extension from side C of thestructure, indicating that the fire was self-ventingthrough the rear of the structure. The IC ordereddispatch to get the utility (power) company enroute and ordered all other responding companiesto stand by for their assignments. Within the next1½ minutes, all first-alarm companies reportedas on the scene. The IC ordered his fire fighter(the victim) to pull a 1¾-inch preconnect handlineoff their engine and stretch it to the front door.He then radioed the Captain and Lieutenant fromRescue 32 to team up with the victim, make entrythrough the front door, and search for possible

occupants. Note: Due to the time of the call, theIC was concerned that the structure might beoccupied.

The IC then attempted to complete a walk-aroundsize-up of sides A, B, C, and D before orderingthe Captain and Lieutenant from Ladder 11 to setup their positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fanin the front door. Note: The IC could only sizeup sides A, B, part of C, and D, because of afence which cut off the rear. After setting up thePPV fan, the Captain and Lieutenant were orderedto enter the structure, follow the hoseline takenin by the search crew, and assist in the search foroccupants. The IC ordered dispatch to strike asecond alarm and Engine 3 and Ladder 16 weredispatched to the scene at 0143 hours. The ICthen ordered Engine 1 to pull a second 1¾-inchpreconnect handline off of Engine 5 and advanceit through the front door for fire attack, and toback up the search crew. Unclear of the order,the Captain from Engine 1 ordered his fire fighterto stretch a 1¾-inch handline to the B/C cornerof the structure for fire attack (Photo 2 andDiagram). The Lieutenant from Engine 1 met upwith the fire fighter and assisted in advancing thehoseline to the rear of the structure. The crewfrom Engine 2 was ordered to pull a 5-inch mainsupply line from Engine 5 and hook it into a nearbyfire hydrant. After making their hookup, the ICordered them to pull a 1¾-inch preconnect offtheir engine, hook it up to Engine 5, and protectthe D exposure.

The search crew (the victim and the Captain andLieutenant from Rescue 32) advanced theirhandline through the front door and down thecluttered hallway toward the rear of the structure(Photo 3 and Diagram). Note: Fire fighters statedthat there was debris and furniture throughoutthe hallway. The Captain and Lieutenant fromLadder 11 positioned the PPV fan in front of the

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front door and fed additional hoseline to the searchcrew. The interior crews stated that there was novisible fire, but heavy smoke when they enteredthe structure.

The Lieutenant and the fire fighter from Engine 1opened their line up on a trailer with lawnequipment, which was burning in the rear. Afterknocking down most of the lawn equipment fire,they opened up a straight stream and applied it tothe heavy fire emitting from the eaves of thepartially collapsed carport (B/C corner) (Photo4). Note: The Lieutenant stated that he neverreceived a direct order of operation and wasunaware that any fire fighters were inside thestructure at this time. Shortly thereafter, theLieutenant and the fire fighter from Engine 1turned their hoseline to a small, burning shed, tothe left of the covered carport. The Captain andLieutenant from Rescue 32 stated that the victim,who was on the nozzle, entered a bedroom nearthe rear of the structure (Photo 5 and Diagram).The Lieutenant stood at the door of the room asthe Captain remained in the hallway. The Captainand the Lieutenant stated that at this time the PPVfan was clearing up the heavy smoke conditions.The Captain from Rescue 32 stated that he lookedinto a room toward the D side of the structure (aroom in front of the kitchen where the fire started)and saw a large amount of fire through the kitchendoorway. He yelled at the Lieutenant from Rescue32, requesting the nozzle in fear that the roomwould flashover. The Lieutenant responded tothe Captain’s request stating that they could notlocate the nozzle. With the heat intensifying, theCaptain ordered the victim and Lieutenant to exitthe structure immediately. At this point, theLieutenant and fire fighter from Engine 1, whowere on the B/C corner, recalled seeing the roofover the kitchen begin to collapse. The Captainfrom Rescue 32 stated that the Lieutenant turnedand went in front of him toward the front door

and the victim turned and was face to face withhim. The Captain then turned, which placed thevictim behind him, and attempted to exit. TheLieutenant stood and began to run toward the exitbefore falling over heavy debris (clothing,furniture, and paper products). At approximately0147 hours, the Captain stated that heavy fire filledthe hallway and he also fell to the floor. He thentold the Lieutenant that they had to go throughthe fire to exit the structure. The Captain thenproceeded to pass the Lieutenant and exit thestructure. The Lieutenant exited the structureshortly after. The Captain did not see the victimexit, but assumed the victim was right behind him.He asked the Lieutenant if the victim had exitedand the Lieutenant could not recall if he did.

At this point the Captain and the Lieutenant fromLadder 11 recalled seeing fire emitting from thefront door and the Captain then shut down thePPV fan. The IC reported seeing a civilian in theroad, just in front of the house, stating that herhusband was going to need an ambulance forsmoke inhalation. The IC radioed dispatch for anambulance at 0149 hours. The Captain fromRescue 32 approached the IC reporting that thevictim did not exit the structure. The Lieutenantfrom Engine 1, who was still on the B/C corner,broke out the rear window on the B side wall(Photo 2). He recalled being able to see fire onthe interior D-side wall. The IC ordered theCaptain and Lieutenant from Ladder 11 to enterthe structure with the line that the crew fromEngine 2 were using for exposure control, andsearch for the victim. The Captain from Rescue32 told the IC that the victim should be in therear of the structure, in a room on the left. TheCaptain and Lieutenant from Ladder 11 advancedthe line down the hallway. As they advanced theirline, they stated that the line taken inside by thesearch crew was damaged and water was free-flowing. The Captain and Lieutenant reported

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that they encountered fire in a room near thekitchen (Diagram). They hit the fire three timeswith a fog stream and stated that the fire wasquickly knocked down, but not completelyextinguished. Given the information that thevictim was in a room off to their left, they retreatedand entered the doorway of the room on their leftand recalled seeing a small fire. They opened theirline on this fire and the Lieutenant’s low-air alarmsounded. Noticing that all fire fighters on thescene were occupied, the IC radioed dispatch at0150 hours requesting a second ambulance,Engine 6, and Rescue 36. Engine 3 arrived onthe scene at 0152 hours and was ordered to pull ahandline from their engine and protect the Dexposure.

Over the next 40 minutes, several fire fighterstook part in the search, which consisted offollowing the initial hoseline taken inside by thesearch crew. The fire fighters stated that theyhad reached the nozzle and the victim was notnear it. The fire fighters stated that the searchwas hampered by a large amount of debris,clothing, and furniture, which was throughoutthe structure (Photo 5). The fire fighterscontinued the search for the victim, thinkingthat he could have been under some of thedebris. At 0234 hours, the crew from Engine1, along with a Captain reported to be in therear (C side), stated that a section of the roofnear the kitchen was down, and they wereattempting to knock down some hot spots andsearch that area. As the crew from Engine 1hit the hot spots, the Captain searched throughthe burned-out debris in the rear, C side. At0245 hours, the Captain was searching in thekitchen, near the doorway which led into theroom off of the kitchen, and located the victim(Photo 6 and Diagram). The victim was foundin his full array of personal protectiveequipment, lying on his left side with his head

toward the doorway and his feet toward the Cside. Note: His personal alert safety system(PASS) was severely damaged in the fire andwas not sounding. The Captain radioed the ICreporting that the victim was found and theywould need a paramedic in the rear. Soon after,a paramedic arrived at the rear of the structureand pronounced the victim dead at 0250 hours.

CAUSE OF DEATHThe medical examiner listed the cause of death asasphyxia due to smoke inhalation and carbonmonoxide poisoning. A positive carbon monoxidereading of 69.5 percent was recorded.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONRecommendation #1: Fire departments shouldensure that the department’s standard operatingprocedures (SOPs) are followed.1,2

According to the department’s SOPs, thefollowing should take place:

• Ensure that when the IC orders an interiorfire attack or search, the fire fighters followthe SOPs for an interior attack.

Department SOPs state that when the IC initiatesan interior attack or a search for civilians, the firefighters should follow the SOPs for an offensiveattack. The offensive attack should consist of firefighters advancing one hoseline to the interior fora fast, aggressive attack, provide support activities(e.g., ventilation), complete a primary search,advance a second hoseline to the interior to backup the first hoseline, pump water, and quicklyevaluate success. The SOPs should be followedto avoid simultaneous offensive and defensiveattacks in the same area.

• Ensure that fire fighters do not opposehoselines.

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If a defensive or exterior attack is being performedwhile fire fighters are inside a structure performingan interior or offensive attack, the fire, smoke,and heat can be driven back into the structure,placing the interior crew(s) at risk. Additionally,when an interior or offensive attack takes place,the SOPs state that ventilation should take placeand positive pressure should be injected into theunburned section of the structure to force thesmoke and heat to the burning or ventilatedsection. Fire fighters should avoid attacking thefire from the exterior, burning side of the structure.Attacking the fire from the exterior burning sidecan possibly drive the heat, smoke, or fire backinto the structure eliminating the positive pressureventilation.

• Ensure that crews stay together at all times.

The department’s SOPs state that crews shouldstay together at all times. The company officer isresponsible for keeping his/her crew intact at alltimes and should provide the crew with thedirection ordered by the IC.

• Ensure that all orders given by the IncidentCommander (IC) are followed and all tasksbeing performed are communicated to the IC.

The Incident Command System (ICS) is used tofacilitate the completion of the tactical priorities.The Incident Commander (IC) is in overall chargeof the incident and will be responsible to directall assignments to achieve the tactical priorities.The IC is also responsible for the safety,accountability, and welfare of all personnel on thescene. The ICS is being used by many firedepartments throughout the fire service and hasproven to ensure fire ground organization. Toensure that the ICS is effective, all fire fightersand officers should complete the assignmentsgiven by the IC.

It is also important that the IC is aware of all tasksbeing performed on the fireground. Since the ICinitiates all tasks to be performed, he assumes thatthey will be carried out. If at any time, the task isaltered or aborted, the IC must immediately benotified of the change.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments shouldensure that when entering or exiting a smoke-filled structure, fire fighters follow a hoseline,rope, or some other type of guide and refreshertraining is provided to reinforce the procedures.3

Fire fighters should always try to maintain a senseof direction when performing interior fire fightingoperations. When structures become smoke-filledand the visibility is poor, fire fighters can becomeeasily disoriented. A hoseline, rope, or some othertype of guide or reference point can assist firefighters in maintaining a sense of direction in casean evacuation becomes necessary. Fire fightersshould always make a mental note of the locationof the closest hoseline, rope, or other type of aguide or reference points in case conditionschange.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments shouldensure that a rapid intervention team(s) (RIT)is established when fire fighters enter animmediately dangerous to life and healthatmosphere, and the RIT be properly trainedand equipped.4

A RIT should consist of at least two fire fightersand should be available for rescue of a fire fighteror a team if the need arises. The RIT should befully equipped with the appropriate protectiveclothing, protective equipment, SCBA, and anyspecialized rescue equipment that might beneeded, given the specifics of the operationunderway. Once the RIT is established, theyshould remain the RIT throughout the operation.

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They should constantly survey the firegroundoperations and be in communication at all timeswith the IC and companies on the fireground. Asfireground operations continue, the RIT teamshould observe the following:

• where fire fighters are entering and exiting• how many fire fighters are inside• where the fire fighters are operating• what operations are taking place• the layout of the structure• the structure (e.g., trussed roof, metal roof,

etc.) and hazards that could exist with thestructure (e.g., possible collapse areas, etc.)

• hazards they might encounter (e.g., chemicals,tanks, etc.)

• the fire’s condition (e.g., fire spread, fire inthe roof, etc.)

• if an emergency occurs, what will be their bestroute to enter or exit

• what equipment they will need if an emergencyoccurs (e.g., airbags, hydraulic jacks,additional air bottles, etc.)

Each incident is different and additional concernsshould also be taken into consideration. There aremany functions expected from the RIT membersduring an incident. If an emergency occurs, theRIT should be rested, have full air bottles, a goodunderstanding of the overall situation, and be ableto respond in a safe manner to perform the searchor rescue. If the RIT is used for an emergencyoperation, a second RIT should be put in place incase an additional emergency should occur. Note:Fire departments should ensure that they haveassessed all risk factors when making the decisionto send a RIT into a structure that has alreadybeen the scene of an emergency evacuation,search, or rescue. When a RIT enters a structure,they generally will use a rope or some type ofguide to enter and exit. When more than one RITenters at the same time, more than one rope would

be taken into the structure. If multiple ropes aretaken into the structure they could possibly getentangled and cause confusion. If multiple ropesare used for search and rescue, a plan of actionshould be put into place to avoid confusion, or toprevent the ropes from being entangled.

Recommendation #4: Fire departments shouldconsider providing all fire fighters with apersonal alert safety system (PASS) integratedinto their self-contained breathing apparatus.5

PASS devices, which are electronic devices wornby the fire fighter, emit a loud and distinctive alarmif the fire fighter becomes motionless for morethan 30 seconds. Fire fighters entering hazardousareas should be equipped with a PASS device.There are several types of PASS devices available.One device that could be used is the PASS that isintegrated into the SCBA. PASS devicesintegrated into the SCBA will be activated whenthe SCBA air cylinder is turned on. Manual PASSdevices are also used throughout the fire service.These devices require the fire fighter to manuallyturn on the device each time they use it.

• Fire fighters should manually activate theirPASS device whenever they become lost orin distress.

When fire fighters become lost or in distress, theyshould immediately make an attempt to notify theIC or other fire fighters to assist them. If the firefighter is equipped with a portable radio theyshould make an attempt to send an emergencytransmission. In some instances, the fire fighterwho needs assistance may not be equipped with aportable radio to make an emergency transmissionand should activate the manual PASS device. Theloud audible tone will assist other fire fighters indetermining the location of the fire fighter who isin distress or lost.

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Recommendation #5: Fire departments shouldconsider increasing the number of fire fighterson engine companies to perform in accordancewith NFPA standards.4,6

The NFPA Appendix A-6-4.4 recommends severalresponse options and states in part “It isrecommended that a minimum acceptable firecompany staffing level should be 4 membersresponding on or arriving with each engine andeach ladder company responding to any type offire. The minimum acceptable staffing level forcompanies responding in high-risk areas shouldbe 5 members responding or arriving with eachengine company and 6 members responding orarriving with each ladder company.” Whenstructural fire fighting takes place, it isrecommended that backup personnel, a RIT team,and other fire fighters be in place to perform anyoperations needed (i.e., stretch lines to protectexposures, vertical ventilation, horizontalventilation, forcible entry to secondary exits, etc.).If the personnel are not available, the operationsand tactics can be hindered or delayed.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments shouldconsider providing all fire fighters with portableradios or radios integrated into their facepieces.7,8

Communication on the fireground between firefighters and Incident Command is paramount.Fire fighters will enter buildings as a pair or team,and generally a company officer will accompanythem. In most fire departments, the companyofficer or one of the fire fighters will be equippedwith a portable radio to maintain a line ofcommunication with Incident Command. Allother fire fighters who enter a hazardous conditionshould also be equipped with a portable radio so,if the officer or fire fighter with the portable radiobecomes separated from his partner or crew, voice

contact can still be maintained. Additionally, firefighters can maintain fireground communicationsto avoid confusion of plans or strategies.

The following recommendation applies todispatchers or emergency call takers.

Recommendation #7: Dispatchers or emergencycall takers should obtain as much informationas possible from the caller and report it to theresponding companies.3

Dispatchers or emergency call takers shouldalways try to obtain all information available fromthe caller. This would include any informationregarding the structure (e.g., house, warehouse,plant, etc.), occupancy, injuries, the fire oremergency condition, the possible location of thefire, the use of the structure, address of theincident, nature of the emergency, call-backnumbers, and any names. Because of the time ofthis incident, fire fighters suspected that thestructure could have been occupied. However,the fire was reported by one of the structure’sowners after they had vacated the structure. Thefire fighters were unaware that the structure wasvacant.

REFERENCES1. NFPA [1997]. Fire Protection Handbook. 18ed. Quincy MA: National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

2. Fire Department [1984]. Written StandardOperating Procedures.

3. The International Fire Service TrainingAssociation [1995]. Essentials of Fire Fighting,3rd ed., Fire Protection Publications.

4. NFPA [1997]. NFPA 1500: Standard on FireDepartment Occupational Safety and Health

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Program. Quincy, MA: National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

5. Dunn V [1999]. Safety and survival on thefire ground: Disorientation, A firefighter killer.Firehouse Magazine, November issue.

6. Dunn V [1999]. Safety and survival on thefireground: Fire fighters caught and trapped.Firehouse magazine, July issue.

7. Dunn V [2000]. Safety and survival on thefireground: The dangers of opposing hoselines.Firehouse magazine, January issue.

8. NFPA [1995]. NFPA 1561: Standard on FireDepartment Incident Management System.Quincy, MA: National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATIONThis incident was investigated by Frank C.Washenitz II and Thomas P. Mezzanotte, Safetyand Occupational Health Specialists, Division ofSafety Research, NIOSH.

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NOT TO SCALE

CLOSETSSHELVING

BEDROOM

BEDROOM

FRONTPORCH

ATTACHEDSHED

CARPORT

PORCH

KITCHEN

LIVINGROOM

LAWNEQUIPMENT

21'-0" 9'-0"22'-0"

52'-0"

59'-0"

11'-0"

19'-0" X 22'-0"19'-0" X 21'-0"

25'-0" X 21'-0"

15'-0" X 21'-0"20'-0" X 22'-0"

20'-0" X 22'-0"

FIREORIGIN

1st 1 3/4" INTERIORATTACK LINE

ENGINE 2 LINE

2nd 1 3/4"EXTERIOR

ATTACK LINE

A SIDE

B SIDE

C SIDE

D SIDE

TRAILER

Diagram. Floor Plan

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Photo 1. Single-Story Residential Home


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Photo 2. B/C Corner of Structure


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Photo 3. Interior Hallway


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Photo 4. Carport/Kitchen Area on B/C Corner


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Photo 5. Bedroom


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Photo 6. Victim’s Position

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Documents

Death in the · advanced a 1¾-inch handline through the front door as the Captain and Lieutenant from Ladder 11 were ordered to set up a positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fan at