Dead and Buried: The demise of carbon capture and storage

April 2012 1

DeaD anD burieD:

The demise of carbon capture and storage

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2 The Demise of Carbon Capture and Storage

Time’s up for Carbon CapTure anD sTorage

However, the reality is that CCS has been an abject failure. Every attempt to construct a large-scale project has fallen over, revealing numerous technical, economic, social and regulatory risks that should sound alarm bells for potential investors. As the risks mount, the timeframe for when commercial-scale CCS power stations arrive slips further over the horizon.

Even one-time advocates of CCS have begun to dismiss the technology. Former Energy and Resources Minister Ian Macfarlane had supported CCS as a member of the Howard Government, but said in 2009:

“The reality is, you are not going to see another coal-fired power station built in Australia. … You can talk all the stuff you like about carbon capture storage,

that concept will not materialise for 20 years, and probably never”.

This report describes the numerous risks that are preventing commercial -scale CCS power stations from ever becoming a realistic energy option. It shows how these risks have been borne out as the coal industry has attempted to make CCS happen.

The report then draws on research conducted for Greenpeace by the Institute of Sustainable Futures, University of Sydney4, demonstrating the immense economic and technical undertaking that would be required if government aspirations for CCS were based in reality.

Australia is one of many countries faced with the challenge of reducing carbon pollution while replacing an aging fleet of power stations.

Decisions will be made in the coming years that determine our energy future for decades to come. CCS has proven itself to be a useful public relations exercise for the coal industry, buying a few more precious years of social acceptance and allowing new dirty power stations to continue to be built. But the charade cannot be allowed to continue.

This report makes is clear that the game is up. The CCS myth was always a dangerous distraction from real, clean, renewable energy solutions. It needs to be laid to rest once and for all. And, having pronounced it dead and buried, we need to accept that there is no such thing as “clean coal” and the only safe energy future requires a rapid shift from coal to renewables – nationally and internationally.

A few years ago you could be excused for thinking that a new era was beginning for coal technology. As awareness grew of the impact of carbon pollution on the world’s climate, coal-fired power faced an “adapt or die” moment. What followed was a flurry of activity: announcements of pilot projects,

impressive websites and slick marketing gave the impression that the coal industry was hard at work developing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology.

Some bold claims were made about the potential of CCS. One prediction stated that “by 2030,

CCS could be one of the most important carbon abatement technologies1”. The International Energy Agency projected the construction of 3,400 CCS projects across the globe (i.e. 90 per year on average) by 2050 in order to halve global carbon pollution2.

Images from www.newgencoal.com.au/carbon-capture-and-storage.aspx and www.globalccsinstitute.com/ccs/what-is-ccs

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“The reality is, you are not going to see another coal-fired power station built in Australia. … You can talk all the stuff you like about carbon capture storage, that concept will not materialise for 20 years, and probably never3” – Former Energy and Resources Minister Ian Macfarlane, 9th November 2009

April 2012 3

Developing CCS at commercial scale would require overcoming numerous major challenges.

Costs are prohibitively expensive. Coal power with CCS would be one of the most expensive options for generating electricity. Power station capital costs would be 2½ times that of concentrating solar power and more than 4 times that of wind power (see chart below).

Too risky for serious invesTmenT

Coal industry investment in CCS has been scant, reflecting a lack of confidence in the technology overcoming the many risks and hurdles it faces. Instead of investing heavily in CCS, the coal industry has largely relied on public funding to support programs and projects.

The carbon price is too low to drive commercial investment towards CCS. Dick Wells, Chairman of the National Low Emissions Coal Council, recently remarked that the carbon price is not high enough to drive investment towards Carbon Capture and Storage and that in the absence of a carbon price signal, “companies with shareholders – I mean, people have their superannuation with these companies – aren’t going to do things which aren’t sensible economically11”. However, other technologies that will not be driven by a carbon price such

as wind and solar attracted over $5 billion in investment in Australia during the 2010-11 financial year12. Private investment in renewable energy is at least one order of magnitude greater than in CCS.

In Australia, the coal industry has committed $1 billion to CCS over 10 years, equivalent to only 1% of the black coal mining industry’s pre-tax profit from 2002 – 201013 (see graphic to right) and less than the federal government’s CCS Flagships program. The European Union’s NER 300 policy, the main vehicle for supporting CCS projects, is expected to generate €4.5 billion, matched by a combination of member states and industry funding14.

In the United States, projects supported by funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act have been allocated nearly twice as much public funding as industry is providing15. This reveals a lack of belief from the coal industry that CCS is a genuine option for generating power at commercial scale with low carbon pollution.

Black Coal mining pre-tax profits from 2002 - 2010 ($ billions)

Coal Industry committment to CCS investment over 10 years ($ billions)

CCS is highly energy intensive. Capture and compression technology would consume up to a third of a power station’s output, meaning that for every three power stations operating with CCS, another would have to be constructed just to maintain overall electrical supply6.

Safe storage cannot be guaranteed. Geological formations must at a minimum be perfectly sealed with a cap rock and behave as expected by modelling.

However, several established fuel recovery projects have revealed that very little is understood of actual CO2 movements once injected underground7.

Climate change action to outstrip the need for CCS. CCS is not expected to become available at commercial scale until at least 2020, by which point alternatives to polluting power will already need to be in mass production.

Limitations to storage capacity. Early estimates of CO2 storage capacity were grossly oversimplified and likely to have produced unreliable data8. One study suggests storage capacities have been out by a factor of between 5 and 20, rendering “geologic sequestration of CO2 a profoundly non-feasible option for the management of CO2 emissions9.”

The Kwinana project in Western Australia was cancelled after it was found that the proposed CO2 storage location could not be relied upon10.

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IDGCC – Integrated Drying Gasification and Combined Cycle IGCC – Integrated Gasification and Combined Cycle


The prospects for CCS have changed dramatically in recent years as the technology has failed to overcome technical and economic hurdles while facing growing community opposition.

The European Union anticipated that twelve “first of a kind CCS” projects would need to be operational in the region by 2015 in order to create a track record suitable for rolling out CCS beyond 202016. However, no power station-based CCS project in Europe has moved beyond the ‘defining’ stage17. In the United States, a similar situation exists. The most advanced CCS power station projects all remain in the ‘evaluate’ stage18. This includes the FutureGen project, first proposed in 2007 and once the US flagship of CCS.

A number of projects have been cancelled over the past year due to technical or economic issues and governments have begun halting carbon storage plans in reaction to community opposition. The maps opposite and below highlight some of the more significant setbacks for CCS in recent months.

global CCs projeCTs biTe The DusT

Australia went to great lengths to establish itself as a leader and testing ground in CCS technology. The Australian Government has committed $1.68 billion to the CCS Flagships Program19, numerous pilot projects and studies have been announced and Canberra is host to the Global CCS Institute. However, even in Australia the star of CCS is quickly fading. ZeroGen, a 550 MW IGCC power station was the only fully integrated CCS project proposed under the government’s CCS Flagships program. It was cancelled in December 2010.

With less than four years remaining until projects under CCS Flagships are due to be operational, it is clear that the program’s objective of having projects commissioned by 2015 will not be met.

This leaves Australia with several expensive pilot projects that only serve to demonstrate how far the industry is from actual commercialisation of CCS. For example:

• In Victoria, the Otways project has stored 65,000 of an originally intended 100,000 tonnes CO2 over two years20. This equates to approximately 0.2% of the annual carbon pollution from Hazelwood Power Station.

• At Loy Yang Power Station, a unit is being tested to capture approximately 0.0001% of the station’s total carbon pollution21.

ausTralia fails To Deliver

North America

July 2011 American Electric Power suspends its US$668 million CCS project at its Mountaineer power station in West Virginia, despite the US Department of Energy having agreed to fund half the project costs23.

Australia

December 2010 Queensland’s ZeroGen project is cancelled, considered commercially unviable22.

April 2012 5

June 2011 Austria introduces legislation to ban the geological storage of carbon dioxide32.

November 2010 Rotterdam-based CCS project owned by C.GEN cancelled due to a combination of technical difficulty29 and public opposition30.

October 2011 The proposed Logannet coal-fired power station in Scotland is cancelled when its financial backers withdrew24.

November 2010 Shell’s proposed CO2 storage in Barendrecht, Netherlands, cancelled due to lack of public acceptance27.

27 October 2010 Finncap demonstration CCS project in Finland cancelled after the withdrawal of TVO and Fortum, the main companies backing the project26.

20 October 2010 E.On withdraws from the controversial Kingsnorth project, citing economic conditions as too poor to go ahead28.

15 February 2011 All CCS projects in the Netherlands that involved onshore storage abandoned, mainly due to community opposition31.

31 March 2011 Danish Minister of Climate and Energy, Lyyke Friis, rejects a proposal by Vattenfall to store CO2 onshore after sustained opposition from local communities25.

Europe


Despite the many social, technical, regulatory and financial risks that warrant ruling out CCS as a future energy option, the coal industry is still claiming that CCS will be a major part of our energy future. As unlikely as this is, Greenpeace commissioned research from the Institute of Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney to demonstrate what Australia would look like if CCS was a significant portion of our future energy mix33. All of the information presented on in this section is from this research unless otherwise stated.

To make the economics as favourable towards CCS as possible, conservative values were taken and cost estimates from industry and government were used whenever possible. The analysis

was then compared to the costs of delivering an ‘Energy [R]evolution’ scenario34, where already existing renewable energy technologies (such as solar, wind, wave and geothermal) are deployed as fast as technically possible, regardless of cost.

The Australian CCS model in this report used what in theory is the cheapest option for implementing CCS – building new power stations with pre-combustion capture. These were either ‘Integrated Gasification and Combined Cycle’ (IGCC) stations or, if using brown coal, the same technology with a drying stage added (IDGCC). The rationale for avoiding retrofits of existing power stations is explained on the opposite page.

CCs in ausTralia – moDelling The impossible

Carbon Capture and Storage Facility

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The TeChniCal ChallengeIn order to reduce costs in the CCS scenario, storage ‘hubs’ are created to host CO2 waste from multiple sources, reducing pipeline requirements and costs of transport and storage. Despite this, almost 2,000km of CO2 transport pipeline would still be required to accommodate the CCS scenario. This infrastructure would be required to transport and store a volume of CO2, over the period 2015-2031 equivalent to all the oil Australia has extracted in the past half-century.

finDing a home for The Co2The ‘hub’ model of using one storage location to service multiple CCS sites results in CO2 storage concentrated in four main regions: the North Denison and Surat Basins in Queensland, the Gippsland Basin in Victoria and Bunbury Basin in Western Australia.

The map opposite shows the approximate location of power stations, pipelines and CO2 storage locations if the CCS scenario was to become a reality.

eConomiCs of CCs

Period 2015-2031 CCS Analysis Energy [R]evolution

Total costs* $34.7 billion $27.2 billion

Total CO2 avoided 560 million tonnes 610 million tonnes

Cost per tonne of CO2 avoided $147 $105

Unit cost of energy in 2031 $139 per MWh $110 per MWh

*Total costs include the construction capital for construction and network augmentation, operation and maintenance, and carbon.

Bunbury Basin: By 2030, 6.1 million tonnes of CO2 stored per year

The table above presents the key economic indicators of the CCS and Energy [R]evolution scenarios for Australia. Essentially, renewable energy delivers greater emission reductions at less cost. In fact, if the entire cost of CCS was invested in renewable energy, it would generate 27% more power with 38% less carbon pollution.

April 2012 7


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The expensive TruTh abouT reTrofiTTing CCsMuch has been made of the potential to retrofit power stations by adding post-combustion CCS technology. However, few analyses of retrofitting costs exist; many authors simply regarding it as too expensive to be feasible. A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology35 estimates the capital cost for post-combustion equipment at US$1,604 per kilowatt of capacity, meaning a power station of only 500 MW would cost US$800 million to retrofit. However, this figure does not include the costs of transportation and storage of CO2, nor does it account for the drop in sent out power due to the massive energy consumption of the CCS technology itself. In this example, an additional 206 MW of power station, complete with its own capital and operational costs, would need to be built simply to make up for the power consumed by the capture and compression equipment. A similar result emerged from a US Department of Energy Study36, which estimated capital costs of US$1,319 /kW to retrofit post-combustion capture and a 31% loss in energy output as a result. Recent findings of the CSIRO indicate a similar drop in power output would be expected for Australian power stations37.

Capital costs of retrofitting using oxy-firing technology are also high, in the order of US$1044-1060/kW with reductions of 33-36% of power output38, leaving the option of integrating CCS into new, pre-combustion capture stations as least expensive of all three options and therefore the technology used in the Institute for Sustainable Futures analysis featured in this report.

By 2031, the annual storage rate of CO2 would be equivalent to 6 times Australia’s current oil production.

North Denison Basin: By 2030, 2.6 million tonnes of CO2 stored per year

Surat Basin: by 2030, 14.4 million tonnes of CO2 stored per year

Gippsland Basin: By 2030, 43.4 million tonnes of CO2 stored per year

The absurDiTy of CreaTing Carbon polluTion To TreaT ClimaTe Change

forCing The Two TogeTherHRL’s project underpins CarbonNet, despite HRL never intending to build a CCS power station. HRL’s initial proposal for Commonwealth funding

did not include CCS. Carbon capture was added to their plans at the request of the federal government after their initial application was not recommended for funding41. The amended proposal was awarded $100 million by the Howard Government.

Before these Commonwealth grant funds can be transferred to HRL, a number of preconditions must be met, including HRL providing a clear pathway for how CCS would be achieved42. In 2010 HRL was given $3.5 million in order to conduct a pre-feasibility study into pre-combustion capture43. This money came from the CarbonNet project, after it was bankrolled by the Commonwealth’s CCS Flagships program44. Essentially, HRL was paid through one program in order to meet its funding requirements of another. However, by mid-2011 HRL had still not produced this CCS pathway. A Triple Bottom Line assessment of HRL’s project provides the most information

on its CCS plans, merely stating that the project would be“capture ready” and that space would be set aside on its site in order to install carbon capture equipment in the event that it becomes commercially available45.

Documents revealed to Greenpeace through Freedom of Information (available on request) show HRL’s project becoming increasingly linked to CarbonNet, with federal departmental memos, emails and documents describing HRL as “supporting the CCS Flagships CarbonNet proposal”, “the most promising emissions source for the CarbonNet project” and offering “feed in support to CarbonNet”. In 2011, the Victorian Department of Primary Industries transferred its management of HRL’s project to CarbonNet, indicating that as far as the State of Victoria is concerned, HRL’s is a CCS project.

The reality is that HRL is not interested in CCS. Any attempt to make CCS part of its plans has been driven by governments keen to keep the CCS myth alive. Even in late 2010, when the connection between HRL and CarbonNet was clear, one federal energy department memo concedes that “the carbon capture component

of the project is not a high priority [for HRL] at this stage”. HRL’s intentions to hand over the project after after four years is further evidence that they are not intending to hang around and wait for CCS to become available.

On 16 April 2012, HRL’s subsidiary Dual Gas announced that work on the project would be frozen46. With HRL’s future very much in doubt, CarbonNet – a project that has been awarded over $100 million in public funding - may soon be rendered irrelevant.

senDing baD afTer baDIn the transition to an economy powered by clean, renewable energy, coal communities need support and real solutions. HRL’s dirty and expensive coal power station would enable CarbonNet, a project based on the fantasy of CCS, to proceed. These projects would result in hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars sunk into projects that offer nothing to except false hope when this money could be spent on providing coal communities real opportunities to become part of a renewable energy-powered economy.

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CarbonneTIn 2009 the Victorian Government submitted a proposal to the CCS Flagships program for its “CarbonNet” project, which is intended to provide an infrastructure network for CO2 storage in Victoria in the event that CCS ever becomes commercially available40. The intention is to ultimately use CarbonNet to sequester one million tonnes of CO2 per year, although it is not expected to be operational until at least 2020. CarbonNet was accepted as part of CCS Flagships in late 2011.


hrl “Dual gas” projeCTOne of the few remaining coal-fired power station proposals in Australia is the HRL’s “ Dual Gas” IDGCC project, situated in Victoria’s Latrobe Valley. HRL proposes to build a 600 MW power station that would use IDGCC technology dry out brown coal, convert it to gas and then use the synthetic gas as its fuel. If it goes ahead, HRL’s project would generate more than three million tonnes of carbon pollution each year at the rate of a standard black coal power station39, despite Prime Minister Gillard commiting there will be no more dirty coal fired power stations built in Australia.

The concept of “capture ready” suggests that coal-fired power stations could be built today but able to apply CCS at a later date once the technology becomes available. This concept overlooks several technical issues that, if mishandled, could take hundreds of millions of dollars off a project’s balance sheet.

Coal-fired power stations with CCS are intended to operate at very different temperatures and pressures to a standard coal power stations. An IGCC plant without CO2 capture would use a boiler designed to operate at a pressure of 400-600 psi, compared with a required operational pressure of 1000 psi if designed for CCS47.

There is also no certainty regarding how much space must be set aside on a power station site or the appropriate =configuration of a facility that intends to be “capture ready”, as CCS coal-fired power stations do not exist at anything near commercial scale.

Risky assumptions are also required for sequestration, as each storage site will be unique and require stringent testing before the cost and reliability of transport and storage can be factored into project costs. A huge degree of confidence would be required that transport and storage of CO2 could take place without regulatory or technical impediments.

Being “capture ready” therefore represents a major gamble. Owners must either construct a power station that uses inefficient equipment until such a time that CCS arrives at full scale or build a standard power station with the knowledge that the emergence of commercial-scale CCS technology would require the immense expense of replacing much of their plant equipment. Both scenarios involve project owners taking cavalier risks in terms of power plant design and siting while having faith that their facility will be compatible with a regulatory environment working to constrain CO2 emissions.

The “CapTure reaDy” whiTe elephanT

ClimaTe poliCy anD CCs Don’T mix

While the federal government continues to pour public money into research and make statements promoting the potential of CCS, the direction of climate and energy policy is leaving it increasingly isolated and risk-exposed. The implications of the carbon price reduce the viability of the technology even further.

The carbon price, as part of the Clean Energy Future package, will take effect on 1 July 2012 at $23/tonne of CO2

48. This is well short of the $147/ tonne cost of abatement from CCS as calculated in this study, meaning that the carbon price will not shift investment decisions towards coal-fired power stations with CCS.

With a carbon price in place, the failure of CCS technology to operate properly could expose power station owners to unplanned carbon liabilities in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

Renewable energy will receive over $8 billion in funding from the Clean Energy Future package in its first five years, while none of the revenue raised will be directed towards CCS.

emissions performanCeThe carbon price is expected to drive changes in the power sector that reduce its carbon intensity over time. For CCS, the pace of change may prove too great to keep up with. Treasury modelling anticipates that under the proposed future carbon price, CCS would only become available by 2035, by which time the electricity sector’s emissions intensity will need to have fallen to 0.53 tonnes per megawatt hour as indicated by the dotted line in the graph below. The sector’s emissions intensity continues to

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fall, reaching 0.2 tonnes per megawatt hour by 2050.This poses an additional challenge for CCS. While a CCS power station that comes online in 2035 would initially be able to operate while storing little to none of its emitted carbon, by 2050 it and any other new coal-fired power station with CCS would have to store almost all of their generated CO2.

This represents yet another gamble for would-be operators of CCS power stations and in the event that emissions performance of power stations are regulated in future, one that risks creating stranded assets.

Modified from Treasury Modelling 201149

Medium global action scenario

Core policy scenario

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April 2012 9

The science of climate change calls for urgent and dramatic reductions in carbon pollution. At the same time, the cost of energy from fossil fuels is increasing rapidly. Australia’s energy prices are projected to double between 2008 and 201550, primarily due to our reliance on polluting fossil fuels and maintaining the aging infrastructure that supports them. This is in contrast to renewable energy technologies, which have fallen dramatically in cost around the globe over recent years51.

The Energy [R]evolution scenario developed for Greenpeace demonstrates how Australia can achieve a rapid transition from polluting energy sources to clean, renewable energy technologies52. The Energy [R]evolution shows that it is possible, using technologies available today, to halve Australia’s carbon pollution over the coming decade. By 2020 the Energy [R]evolution scenario eradicates the need for coal-fired electricity – and with it CCS – and sees 70% of Australia’s power sourced from renewable energy. At the same time, the Energy [R]evolution would

create an additional 43,000 jobs in the power sector by 2020, compared to a business as usual scenario where power sector jobs barely change overall.

The news is also good for energy costs, with the Energy [R]evolution a better prospect than business as usual. The cost of electricity increases initially in both scenarios but by 2018 it reaches a maximum and then begins to fall in the Energy [R]evolution, while in the highly-polluting fossil fuel-driven business business as usual scenario, the cost of power continues to increase.

The energy [r]evoluTion - a posiTive energy ouTlook

In order to adequately deal with the challenges of reducing carbon pollution, tackling energy costs and replacing an aging fleet of power stations, clarity and certainty for industry and investors will be key to allowing confident and effective decisions to be made.

It is the role of government to provide that certainty to the power sector and investors through clear regulation and direction of public funds. Greenpeace

calls on the federal government to withdraw all public financing of CCS and develop transition plans based on real renewable energy solutions that allow Australia’s coal communities to become as much as part of the clean energy future as possible.

The coal industry has distracted policy-makers and the community with the promise of CCS for long enough. CCS is one of the least likely and would be one of the most expensive and, if it

existed, risky future energy options. It is time to take CCS off the table once and for all and acknowledge that building new coal-fired power stations is no longer acceptable.

We must immediately invest in large-scale renewable energy technologies that can be deployed today, sustain our power needs long into the future and provide the safest solution to the climate crisis.

Taking CCs off The Table

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April 2012 11

1. United Kingdom Carbon Capture and Storage Association presentation, Carbon Capture and Storage – enabling a low carbon world. Available at http://www.ccsassociation.org.uk/docs/2009/CCSA%20International%20Manifesto.pdf

2. IEA 2009 CCS Roadmap. http://www.iea.org/papers/2009/CCS_Roadmap.pdf

3. ABC TV, Four Corners, 9 November 2009. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2009/s2737676.htm

4. Usher, J, Riedy, C, Milne, G & Rutovitz, J (2010). Carbon Capture and Storage in Perspective. Prepared for Greenpeace Australia Pacific, by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, UTS, Sydney. Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org.au/climate /assets/docs/CCS_in_Perspective_2010.pdf

5. Ibid. Capital costs per kW in 2015: IDGCC CCS $9430; IGCC CCS $8,573; Concentrating Solar Power $3,118; Onshore Wind $1,982.

6. As demonstrated of page 7 of this report.

7. See “Reality Check on Carbon Storage”, Greenpeace International, 2009.

8. K. Spencer et al. / Energy Procedia 4 (2011) 4857–4864

9. C. Ehlig-Economides, M.J. Economides/Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering 70 (2010) 123–130

10. Fiona Harvey, BP axes plan for carbon capture plant, Financial Times, May 12, 2008. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2dfcb732-204c-11dd-80b4-000077b07658,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2F

11. ABC News Online (Michael Atkin), ‘Clean Coal unviable for two decades’, 17 February 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02/clean-coal-unviable-advisor-says/3828946

12. Clean Energy Council, Clean Energy Australia report 2011, http://cleanenergyaustraliareport.com.au/

13. Response to question on notice in 2011 Budget estimates http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/economics_ctte/estimates/bud_1112/RET/answers/BR1.pdf

14. http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/lowcarbon/ner300_en.

15. United States Department of Energy media release, 10 June 2010, Secretary Chu Announces Nearly $1 Billion Public-Private Investment in Industrial Carbon Capture and Storage. http://www.energy.gov/9065.htm

16. European Commission Technology Roadmap, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set_plan/doc/2009_comm_investing_development_low_carbon_technologies_roadmap.pdf

17. As of 21 March 2012, according to the Global CCS Institute’s Project Map, http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/map

18. Op cit.

19. See Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism website: http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/clean/ccsfp/Pages/default.aspx

20. CO2CRC, “CO2CRC Otway Project Overview”, http://www.co2crc.com.au/otway/ accessed 21 March 2012

21. CSIRO media release, Coal Generated CO2 captures in Australia – a first. 9 July 2008. http://www.csiro.au/news/CarbonDioxide Capture.html Emissions captured will be up to 1000 tonnes per year. Based on an estimation of Loy Yang’s emissions at 11 Mt/a

22. AAP, reproduced in Climate Spectator, 20 December 2010. Bligh says CCS spending not wasted http://www.climatespectator.com.au/news/bligh-says-ccs-spending-not-wasted

23. PR Newswire, 14 July 2011, AEP Places Carbon Capture Commercialization on Hold, Citing Uncertain Status of Climate Policy, Weak Economy, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aep-places-carbon-capture-commercialization-on-hold-citing-uncertain-status-of-climate-policy-weak-economy-125557738.html

24. The Guardian, Longannet carbon capture project cancelled, 19 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/19/david-cameron-longannet-carbon-capture?intcmp=239

25. Nordjyske, 31 March 2011. “No CO2 storage in the North” http://www.nordjyske.dk/artikel/10/5/2/3829513/3/intet%20co2-lager%20i%20nordjylland (article in Danish).

26. Fortum Media Release, 27 October 2010, http://fortum.com/en/mediaroom/Pages/fortum-to-discontinue-meri-pori-carbon-capture-and-storage-project.aspx

27. Carbon Capture Journal, Shell Barendrecht project cancelled, 5 November 2010. http://www.carbon capturejournal.com/displaynews.php?NewsID=676&PHPSESSID=4p7vju5b989s5a4c4nthilp8t6

28. Energy Business Review, E.ON withdraws from next stage of UK government’s CCS competition, 20 October 2010 http://carbon.energy-business-review.com/news/eon-withdraws-from-next-stage-of-uk-governments-ccs-competition_201010

29. C.GEN Power website. http://www.cgenpower.com/en/projects_rotterdam.html

30. De Pers Online Newspaper (in Dutch) http://www.depers.nl/economie/525045/Bouw-energiecentrale-in-Rotterdam-gaat-niet-door.html

31. Letter from Economy, Agriculture and Innovation minister, M. Verhagen, to Dutch Parliament, 14 February 2011 (In Dutch) http://www.rijksoverheid .nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/02/14/ccs-projecten-in-nederland/ccs-projecten-in-nederland.pdf

32. Legislation available in German only. http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/Ministerium/Rechtsvorschriften/entwuerfe/Documents/CCS-Gesetz%20Entwurf%20aktuell.pdf

33. As per reference #4

34. See http://www.greenpeace.org.au/climate/GI-ER-Report2010.php

35. Massatchusetts Institute of Technology, 2007, The Future of Coal. http://web.mit.edu/coal/, based on Bozzuto, C.R., N. Nsakala,G. N. Liljedahl, M. Palkes, J.L. Marion,D. Vogel, J. C. Gupta, M. Fugate, and M. K. Guha, Engineering Feasibility and Economics of CO2 Capture on n Existing Coal-Fired Power Plant [Report No. PPL-01-T-09], NETL, U.S. Department of Energy, 2001, Alstom Power Inc

36. http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/CO2%20Retrofit%20From%20Existing%20Plants%20Revised%20November%202007.pdf

37. CSIRO Media Release, Carbon Capture Technology moves a step closer, 29 March 2012, http://www.csiro.au/en/Portals/Media/Carbon-capture-technology-moves-a-step-closer.aspx

38. Massatchusetts Institute of Technology, 2007, The Future of Coal. http://web.mit.edu/coal/

39. Details of the HRL proposal can be found in the Triple Bottom Line report on the website of their subsidiary company, “Dual Gas”, http://www.dualgas.net.au/www/609/1001127/displayarticle/1001306.html

40. Details available on the Victorian Department of Primary Industries website: http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/energy/sustainable-energy/carbon-capture-and-storage/the-carbonnet-project/fact-sheet-carbonnet-project

41. Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, 13-14 July 2006, revealed to Greenpeace through Freedom of Information Laws and available at http://www.greenpeace.org.au/assets/2006_07_expert_panel_minutes.pdf

42. Testimony from Drew Clarke, Federal Resources, Energy and Tourism Department Secretary to Senate Estimates Economics Committee, 31 May 2011. Transcript available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=@Hansard/s80.pdf

43. As per reference #39, section 5.1.5

44. Response given from the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism to question on notice from Senator Scott Ludlam during senate estimates 19 October 2011, confirms CarbonNet were advanced $26.5 million from CCS Flagships and some of this money was passed through to HRL Dual Gas Pty Ltd.


46. Dual Gas media release, 16 April 2012. http://www.dualgas.net.au/www/609/1001127/displayarticle/1001311.html


48. Details available at http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/

49. Australian Treasury, Strong Growth, Low Pollution: modelling a carbon price, Chapter 5, Chart 5.18, http://www.treasury.gov.au/carbonprice modelling/content/report/09chapter5.asp

50. Australian Industry Group, 2011, Energy shock: confronting higher prices http://www.aigroup. com.au/portal/binary/com.epicentric.content management.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/LIVE_CONTENT/Publications/Reports/2011/Energy_shock_confronting_higher_prices.pdf

51. See, for instance, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation, Chapter 10. Available at http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Ch10

52. The Energy [R]evolution scenario report can be found on the Greenpeace website - http://www.greenpeace.org.au/climate/assets/docs/energyrev2010/energyrev2010-summary.pdf

referenCes


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