DATABASE: FORMER ISIS MEMBERS NOW PART OF ......4.2 ABUSES AND WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE SNA (P. 9) 4.3 COMPARING ISIS AND THE SNA (P. 10) 5 DATABASE (P. 15) FORMER ISIS MEMBERS

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DATABASE: FORMER ISIS MEMBERS NOW PART OF TURKISH-BACKED FORCES IN SERE KANIYE AND TEL ABYAD OCTOBER 2020

DATABASE:FORMER ISIS MEMBERS NOW PART OF TURKISH-BACKED FORCES IN SERE KANIYE AND TEL ABYAD9 OCTOBER 2020

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CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION (P. 3)

2 METHODOLOGY (P. 5)

3 TACIT TURKISH SUPPORT FOR ISIS (P. 6) 3.1 SHELTERING ISIS (P. 7) 4 THE SYRIAN NATIONAL ARMY (P. 8) 4.1 TURKISH CULPABILITY: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SNA (P. 8) 4.2 ABUSES AND WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE SNA (P. 9) 4.3 COMPARING ISIS AND THE SNA (P. 10) 5 DATABASE (P. 15) FORMER ISIS MEMBERS NOW PART OF TURKISH-BACKED FORCES IN SERE KANIYE AND TEL ABYAD

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1 INTRODUCTION

Turkey justified its 2019 invasion of North and East Syria (NES) with anti-terror rhetoric, claiming that the presence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on its southern border constituted an existential threat to the Turkish state. In fact, it was Turkish forces that launched over 30 cross-border attacks against NES from January 2019 up to the invasion in October.1 While these Turkish attacks killed and injured scores of civilians, primarily farmers and shepherds tending land near the border, Turkey itself experienced only one cross-border attack from NES in the same time period, with the perpetrator captured by SDF.

Turkey’s bad faith anti-terror rhetoric did not convince the international community, with all major international powers and bodies condemning the invasion. Nonetheless, the US-led International Coalition to Defeat ISIS withdrew their small border garrisons on orders from US President Donald Trump. Around 200 civilians were killed, and 200,000 displaced, as Turkey launched a wave of airstrikes and seized control of two border cit-ies, Sere Kaniye (also known as Ras al-Ayn) and Tel Abyad (also known as Gire Spi).

Turkey relied on its air superiority to drive back the SDF, backed by a ground assault led by the Syrian National Army (SNA), a Turkish-controlled, commanded and funded entity comprising scores of primarily Sunni Arab and Turkmen militias.

The same tactics were deployed in Turkey’s January 2018 invasion and occupation of Afrin. This isolated region was formerly almost entirely populated by Kurds, but the majority of this population has been driven out as part of an ongoing process of forcible demographic change. The region is being repopulated by Sunni Arab militiamen and their families, transferred by Turkey into the homes of displaced Kurds, Yezidis, Alevis and Christians, in a process which is now being repeated in Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad.

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is generally recog-nized as providing the highest levels of religious and ethnic tolerance, human rights and respect for rule of law of any actor in Syria. Since their occupation, Afrin, Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad have moved from a situation of relative peace, secularism and prosperity to one in which Turkish-controlled armed groups commit a wide range of war crimes against the civilian population, including raping women, torture, summary executions, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, forcibly confining women to the home, and in some instances the imposition of a strict interpretation of Sharia law (see section 4 below).

1 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2019/08/database-over-30-turkish-cross-border-attacks-against-rojava-in-2019-only-1-attack-targets-turkey/

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Far from acting to combat terror, then, Turkey’s invasions and installation of the SNA in regions formerly controlled by SNA have provided safe havens for globally-wanted terrorists. US airstrikes regularly target top-level militants linked to al-Qaeda or ISIS, moving freely in Turkish-controlled territory.

In 2019, Rojava Information Center published a widely-covered report identifying over 40 former ISIS members now part of Turkish-backed forces in Afrin. They include former emirs, commanders and those responsible for coordinating jihadist fighters with their handlers in the Turkish military intelligence services (MIT).2

The present report expands on this work. Applying a more stringent methodology, it identifies over 40 former ISIS members now safely sheltered as part of Turkish-con-trolled factions in Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad, many for the first time. Along with pre-vious RIC reports addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the occupied areas, it constitutes further evidence that Turkey is acting as a state sponsor of terror.

Though formally a member of the International Coalition Against ISIS, in practice Tur-key has launched two destructive operations against the force which led the struggle to defeat ISIS as a territorial entity, while simultaneously offering shelter, wages and support to ISIS elements. Turkey’s actions in NES grant ISIS elements the opportunity to re-group, re-organise, and continue to impose a radical Islamic ideology on the local population. Turkey’s brazen sheltering of former ISIS elements will have grave security outcomes for Europe, the USA and the international community.

2 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2019/08/database-over-40-former-isis-members-now-part-of-turkish-backed-forces/

3 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2020/05/six-months-on-political-security-and-humanitarian-out-comes-of-turkeys-2019-invasion-of-north-and-east-syria/

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2 METHODOLOGY

Local press and regional monitors have been documenting the presence of ISIS ele-ments in Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad since the first days of the Turkish invasion. Most notably, a widely-circulated list published by the Violations Documentation Center of Northern Syria (VDC-SNY), among others, identified around 80 former ISIS and al-Qaeda members now part of SNA militias in the two occupied cities.

For the present report, RIC has only included cases where the identity of the former ISIS member has been confirmed by two or more separate sources. Some – such as Faysal Belo and the al-Aqal family – are prominent ISIS figures whose presence in the Turk-ish-controlled region has been repeatedly covered by regional monitors. The majority of individuals in the list were identified by two local interlocutors, while in some instances the identity and background of individuals on the VDC-SNY list was confirmed to RIC by a single local interlocutor. Minor biographical information has been included on the basis of a single source.

Our local interlocutors are local journalists and activists from the cities occupied by Tur-key in 2019, or else from other cities in NES where ISIS have been able to recruit mem-bers. They include activists who were involved with Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions in Tel Abyad in the beginning of the Syrian revolution before moving to AANES areas as the FSA grew increasingly radicalized, and activists who lived under ISIS in Raqqa.

This means the list as published here is dominated by individuals originating from Tel Abyad or other regions of NES, primarily Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa. It is therefore likely that there are many more former ISIS members present in Tel Abyad and Sere Kaniye, origi-nating from other regions of Syria or further abroad, but whose identities could not be confirmed by the present investigation.

Likewise, we were able to verify the identities of over 50% of those individuals from the VDC-SNY list who originate from the regions now under AANES control, suggesting that much of the information on that list concerning individuals from other regions of Syria is also likely to be broadly accurate – though the VDC-SNY list does also contain some clear errors.

The present report is thus the most accurate record to date of former ISIS members now present in the newly-occupied region as part of the Turkish-controlled SNA.

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3 TACIT TURKISH SUPPORT FOR ISIS

“When I look at Turkey they are fighting against those who fought with us shoulder to shoulder against ISIS (Islamic State) and sometimes they work with ISIS proxies,”4 French President Emmanuelle Macron said in December 2019 following Turkey’s latest opera-tion against the SDF.

The French President’s accusations have been frequently substantiated by Western journalists, analysts and intelligence reports. While simultaneously facing multiple ISIS bombing attacks on its own territory, and conducting limited anti-ISIS operations in Syr-ia, Turkey has strategically manipulated the ISIS threat to its own ends, pursuing a viru-lent anti-Kurdish policy in Syria even at the expense of strengthening the terror group’s hand. A full survey of the Turkish government’s record in aiding and abetting ISIS – by omission and in some cases by commission – is beyond the scope of this report. Testimony sub-mitted to the US Congress draws together evidence of “military cooperation and weap-ons transfers [through to] logistical support, financial assistance, and the provision of medical services,” citing research from scores of sources, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian, The Daily Mail, BBC, Sky News, as well as Turkish sources such as CNN Turk, Hurriyet Daily News, Taraf, Cumhuriyet, and Radikal.5

Multiple reports indicate Turkey allowed ISIS fighters to cross into its territory to launch attacks against Kurdish positions during ISIS assaults on the cities of Kobane and Tel Abyad: purchased oil from ISIS via middlemen: allowed ISIS fighters to travel into its territory for medical care: and transferred lorries of arms into Islamist-held territory and ultimately into ISIS’ hands, disguised as humanitarian aid.6/7/8/9/10/11/12 Similar reports have been repeated to RIC by ISIS members in SDF captivity during multiple interviews conducted throughout 2019 and 2020.

4 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-macron-turkey/macron-says-time-for-turkey-to-clarify-ambiguous-stance-on-islamic-state-idUSKBN1Y71VE

5https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20170405/105842/HHRG-115-FA14-Wstate-PhillipsD-20170405-SD001.pdf6https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34973181

7https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11697764/Isil-reenters-key-Syria-border-town-of-Kobane-live.html

8https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-arms/exclusive-turkish-intelligence-helped-ship-arms-to-syrian-islamist-rebel-areas-idUSKBN0O61L220150521

9https://web.archive.org/web/20141205180043/https:/news.yahoo.com/islamic-state-group-attacking-kobani-turkey-102358724.html

10https://www.google.com/search?q=turkey+treated+isis+fighters+hospital&oq=turkey+treated+isis+fighters+hospi-tal&aqs=chrome..69i57l2j69i59l2j69i60l4.6100j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

11https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/12/turkeys-double-isis-standard/12https://www.commentarymagazine.com/michael-rubin/turkey-active-isis-support/

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Most significantly, Turkey allowed tens of thousands of foreign fighters to cross through its territory unmolested to join with the Islamic State in Syria. As of early 2016, more than 25,000 foreign ISIS recruits had flooded into Iraq and Syria via Turkey, making use of a network of safe-houses and ISIS agents operating in Turkey to pass from Europe, North America, and elsewhere into the zone of ISIS control through the so-called ‘Gate-way of Jihad’.13/14

The Guardian newspaper obtained documents indicating that Turkey ran a formal bor-der crossing with ISIS, constituting “a sophisticated immigration operation… Passenger manifests dated between December 2014 and March 2015, which were seized by Kurd-ish commanders in Tel Abyad, carry the stamps of Isis’s ‘department of immigration’ and ‘department of transport’. They show that buses passed through the town having submitted the names, dates of births, ID numbers and even birthplace of scores of trav-ellers.”15

As ISIS were gradually hemmed in and defeated by the U.S.-led International Co-alition to Defeat ISIS, the SDF and Coalition partner forces in Iraq, the flow of ISIS members slowly reversed. Throughout ISIS’ final defeat until the present day, most foreign ISIS members able to pay smugglers to flee have typically headed for Turkey or Turkish-controlled territory within Syria, from where they can at-tempt to return back to their countries of origin.

The US assassination of former ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, sheltering just 5KM from the Turkish border, drew fresh attention to Turkey’s relationship with ISIS. Speaking after the operation, security experts noted that “there have been real concerns about Turkey’s willingness to provide a wide range of support for groups that the U.S. and the West and NATO consider associated with ISIS.”16

Multiple US drone strikes have targeted top ISIS and al-Qaeda commanders living and operating freely in the zones of direct Turkish control in north-west Syria. Most recently, ISIS’ former emir in Raqqa was assassinated by a U.S. missile strike

13 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2734239/How-seven-radicalised-young-Britons-week-taking-Gateway-Jihad.html

14 https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351511?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents15 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/

isis-immigration-operation-turkey-syria-border-passenger-manifests-tel-abyad-islamic-state16 https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/10/28/isis-and-turkeys-relationship-questioned-after-u-s-raid/

3.1 SHELTERING ISIS

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in al-Bab, under Turkish control since 2016.17 He had previously attended meet-ings in newly-occupied Tel Abyad.

As noted above, a previous RIC database lists scores of former ISIS elements who participated in Turkey’s 2019 invasion of Afrin as part of Turkish-backed forces, and are now living and operating freely on the Turkish payroll in Afrin and other Turkish-occupied territories in north-west Syria.18

A cursory investigation of the command and control structure of factions in the SNA shows that responsibility flows directly up to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) – and by extension their commander-in-chief, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

These factions are technically subordinate to the Syrian Interim Government, a Turkish-sponsored body which lobbies on behalf of the SNA in Geneva and other foreign capitals. In practice, they are trained, armed, funded and commanded by the Turkish government. The SNA number “at least 35,000 full-time fighters, all under the near-total control of Turkey’s Ministry of Defense and National Intelli-gence Organization (MIT).”19

In areas under nominal SNA control, they are granted limited autonomy to plun-der and extort money from the local population. But real power is retained by Turkey, through direct control of local political bodies, top-down exploitation of economic resources, and governance through proxies “dependent on Turkey’s political, economic and military backing for their survival.”

On the battlefield, likewise, the SNA take their commands directly from Turkey. A piece of in-depth research by Elizabeth Tsurkov, speaking to multiple sources within the ranks of the SNA, confirms: “All decisions, big and small, in the ‘National

17 https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/was-the-us-secretive-ninja-missile-used-again-in-syria-saturday-632232

18 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2019/08/database-over-40-former-isis-members-now-part-of-turkish-backed-forces/

19 https://www.mei.edu/blog/turkish-backed-syrian-armed-opposition-groups-unite-under-one-banner20 https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/11/27/who-are-turkeys-proxy-fighters-in-syria/

4 THE SYRIAN NATIONAL ARMY4.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE AREAS OF TURKISH OCCUPATION

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Army’ are made by the operations room run by Turkish intelligence.” 20

Turkey relies on these militias to spearhead attacks on Syrian territory, at once minimising Turkish losses, terrorizing the civilian population and driving IDP flight out of the zone of conflict, and serving as a figleaf for Turkish expansionism. SNA militiamen are primarily Syrian Sunni Arabs, plus a significant minority of Turk-men, along with some foreign fighters from Iraq and further afield. However, the majority of these fighters have no connection to Afrin, Sere Kaniye or Tel Abyad, having been transferred by Turkey from other Syrian cities such as Homs, Ghouta and Idlib to participate in the offensives.

Per local journalist Diyar Ahmed, this overall picture holds true in the new zone of occupation: “[The SNA factions] don’t have a well-organized structure. Because there are 20 armed groups in [Sere Kaniye], and they fight with one another. What system there is has been imposed by Turkey.

“The majority of those people who participate in the town council are those who left the city in 2013 [when YPG took the city from Jabhat al-Nusra], and went to Turkey. They returned during the recent invasion of Sere Kaniye, and work togeth-er with the Turkish intelligence services. The border crossing is under the control of the Turkish state. Recently, a number of the Turkish-backed fighters wanted to change their location, with fighters from Idlib wanting to return [to Idlib]. But Tur-key closed the crossing and didn’t allow them to return. At the same time, Turkey cut their salaries in order to apply pressure.”21

The UN has found that Turkish-controlled militias have committed a range of atrocities and war-crimes, including:

- “Civilians ‘primarily of Kurdish origin’ beaten, tortured, denied food or water, and interrogated about their fath and ethnicity”- “Prevalent and recurrent” hostage-taking and torture for extortion and to pun-ish dissenters

21 RIC interview with Diyar Ahmed, April 2020

4.2 ABUSES COMMITTED BY SNA

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- Kurds systematically and violently displaced, often on ethnic basis- Mass rape, abduction, forced marriage, ‘climate of fear’ for women now unable to leave home- Gang-rape of a minor as method of torture- Mass detention of Kurdish and Yezidi women in unknown black sites- Forcible conversion and near-total displacement of Yezidis- “‘Systematic’ and ‘coordinated’ looting and property appropriation- “Coercing primarily-Kurdish residents to flee through threats, extortion, mur-der, abduction, torture, detention”- Desecration and destruction of graveyards, historic & religious sites

These violations “may entail criminal responsibility for Turkish commanders who knew or should have known about these crimes,” the UN has concluded.22

A 2019 database published by RIC details over 150 incidents of abuses and war crimes committed by SNA factions during the invasion of Sere Kaniye and Tel Ab-yad,23 while a 2020 RIC report gives a fuller picture of life under the Turkish occu-pation, drawing on interviews with 10 civilians who have been arrested, tortured and extorted by SNA forces in Sere Kaniye.24 A database compiled by independ-ent researcher Meghan Bodette, meanwhile, provides comprehensive informa-tion on over 150 women who have been forcibly disappeared, raped, physically abused and held for ransom by SNA factions in Afrin.25

Civilians in NES often refer to the SNA and ISIS in the same breath, with Kurman-ji Kurdish speakers using the same term to refer to both groups – ‘çete’, that is ‘bandit’ or ‘gangster’. Despite the significant presence of former ISIS elements in the ranks of the SNA, however, there are major differences between the ideology, organization and practice of the two organizations.

Indeed, one local interlocutor who fled ISIS rule only to face SNA control in Afrin went so far as to assert: “I tell you the truth, life for the people [was] better under ISIS than under [the SNA]. ISIS have a system. They do not accept non-Muslims,

22 https://twitter.com/UN_HRC/status/123443646124567347223 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2019/12/report-turkeys-war-against-civilians-1/

24 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2020/05/six-months-on-political-security-and-humanitarian-out-comes-of-turkeys-2019-invasion-of-north-and-east-syria/

25 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17df7kuQGWkaMsi6wK088-hmfpq5lzrlL_ZLNZWbRXik/edit?ts=5e9723da#gid=0

4.3 COMPARING THE SNA AND ISIS

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but for Muslims who accept ISIS’ system, they don’t have any problems. It is possible to live under ISIS. But under [the SNA], there are no rules. They only loot and steal from the people. Women, children, Kurds, Arabs, old, young, no-one can live under them.”26/27 These comments serve not to make a value judge-ment, but to illustrate the extent of the difference between ISIS and SNA.

The SNA incorporates a wide range of groups, some which subscribe to a salafist ideology. Some of the more extremist militias Turkey has united under its control have been accused of war crimes by the UN and Amnesty International, includ-ing raping women, carrying out mass killings against Kurdish civilians, torturing, electrocuting, executing and parading caged civilians in the streets as a human shield.28

Turkish-backed militias often worked alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, and together “ap-plied a strict interpretation of Shari’a and imposed punishments amounting to torture or other ill-treatment for perceived infractions,” as well as torturing and disappearing lawyers and civil society activists.29 Reports from Afrin, Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad indicate that some groups have continued to impose this ideology in the regions under their control.

Women are unable to leave the home with an uncovered head or without a male chaperone, and face abuse. Members of the Yezidi minority in Afrin, meanwhile, have been forced to ‘convert to Islam’ by saying the Shuahada, with some indi-viduals reportedly killed for refusing to comply. Scores of Christian, Yezidi and syncretic holy sites, and Christian, Yezidi and Kurdish graveyards, have also been desecrated or destroyed by SNA forces.

From Erdogan down to rank-and-file SNA members, SNA militias undeniably justi-fy their actions through the language of jihad. SNA-linked clerics issued a fatwa to justify Turkey’s 2019 invasion of NES as “jihad for the sake of Allah” against “sep-aratists… atheists who mock religion.”30 Erdogan’s rhetoric – “we will be violent among the heathens, as we are in Syria”31 – was echoed on the ground by SNA fighters issuing death threats against “infidels,”32 wearing ISIS patches and mak-

26 RIC interview, Shebha, September 201927 Similar remarks have been made to journalists by civilians comparing ISIS’ rule in Mosul in Iraq,

and the efforts of the Iraqi state to govern the same city. See, for example: https://www.nytimes.com/interac-tive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html

28 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/storage/2019/03/TNA_report.pdf29 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/

syria-abductions-torture-and-summary-killings-at-the-hands-of-armed-groups/30 https://sy-sic.com/?p=6465&fbclid=IwAR07pknOEcL8-Z6JxhPJJHRTDxlJzluT2qwaqkj2Rcf6edRfUD8mGYpUw0w

31 https://ahvalnews.com/operation-peace-spring/erdogan-gives-conquest-sermon-support-turkeys-syria-operation

32 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/opinion/syria-kurds-turkey-women.html

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ing the raised-finger gesture commonly associated with ISIS as they rode Turkish armor into conflict during the 2019 offensive.

Nonetheless, the SNA’s primary motivation is not the imposition of radical Is-lamic practices on the local population per se. As researchers working with SNA fighters and commanders have indicated, the majority of SNA militias operate as criminal gangs rather than ideological enforcers. These groups’ modus oper-andi is extorting, taxing, looting and kidnapping the local population, with rival SNA militias getting into lethal clashes over property, checkpoints and roads on a daily basis. Turkey pays only a minimal salary to rank-and-file SNA fighters (while amply rewarding commanders), but allows them effective carte blanche to profit from criminal acts against the local civilian population.

It is true that in many instances, SNA groups’ ideological affinity feeds into their actions, for example when imposing ‘religious’ taxes on the local population or conducting mass gender-based violence. More broadly, Islamic rhetoric is used to justify extorting and robbing civilians. The fatwa cited above grants SNA fighters the right to seize property belonging to SDF members. With mandatory military service in the SDF for at least one person in every family – and many more volun-teering to join YPG, YPJ or other forces within the SDF – every family de facto be-comes a legitimate target, with civilians reporting that SNA members will simply toss an old YPG uniform onto the yard of a desirable property before seizing it.33

These differences are not black-and-white. ISIS itself did experience severe bouts of infighting, while ISIS cadres also looted civilian properties and extorted money from the local population on a systematic basis. Likewise, many of the SNA do subscribe to a radical Salafist ideology – or cherry-pick elements of this ideology, abusing women, Kurds and Yezidis while also abusing drugs and drink.

Nonetheless, the difference between ISIS and the SNA is the difference between an independent, disciplinarian, strictly hierarchical quasi-state driven and united by a common ideological aim on the one hand; and a broad coalition of scores of disorganized, disreputable, infighting militias engaging in widespread criminality on the other.

Former ISIS cadres now part of SNA factions therefore find themselves in a very different environment to the defeated caliphate. It is likely that many of those ISIS members now part of the SNA are taking the opportunity to shelter and regroup

33 RIC interview with IDP from Sere Kaniye, Washokani camp, June 2020

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under Turkish state sponsorship, taking the opportunity to bolster their personal finances. It is also easier than ever for ISIS members seeking to flee the Syrian sphere of conflict altogether to cross into Turkey. Other individuals who worked with ISIS during their occupation of Tel Abyad are now re-engaging in the admin-istration of the city under Turkish sponsorship.

U.S. drones strikes aside, ISIS members are able to move around freely, using Turkish-issued IDs as they hold meetings and participate in the military and ad-ministrative structures set up by the Turkish intelligence services at high levels. Despite ideological and tactical differences, scores of former ISIS members have found enough ideological affinity with the SNA that they can work together, build up their strength, and continue to commit crimes and acts of violence amounting to war crimes against the local, civilian population.

ISIS and the SNA comparedISIS SYRIAN NATIONAL ARMY

ESTABLISHING A CALIPHATEGOVERNED UNDER SHARIA LAW

PRIMARY CONDUCTINGTURKISH MILITARY OBJECTIVES;

PERSONAL FINANCIAL GAIN

TOP-DOWN,HIERARCHICAL ORGANISATION

ORGANIZATION LOOSE COALITION OF MILITIAS UNITED BY TURKISH CONTROL

INFIGHTING AND PURGESON IDEOLOGICAL LINES

FREQUENT INFIGHTING OVER LOOT, PROPERTY AND CONTROL OF

CHECKPOINTS FOR EXTORTION

OIL SALES, STOLEN GOLD,FUNDING FROM GULF STATES

AND FOREIGN DONORS

FUNDING TURKISH SALARIES SUPPLEMENTED BY LOOTING AND EXTORTION

BLITZKRIEG ASSAULTS USING CAPTURED TANKS AND ARTILLERY

TACTICS GROUND WAR BACKED BY TURKISH AIRPOWER, TANKS AND ARTILLERY

SEIZING LAND AND PROPERTYBY CONDUCTING FORCIBLE

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

SEIZING LAND AND PROPERTYBY CONDUCTING FORCIBLE

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

RULE THROUGH VIOLENCE,TORTURE & SUMMARY EXECUTION

RULE THROUGH VIOLENCE,TORTURE & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

COMPARISON CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

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ISIS SYRIAN NATIONAL ARMY

SALAFI ISLAM IDEOLOGY SELECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF SALAFI ISLAM

SUNNI MUSLIM SUPREMACISMSUNNI MUSLIM SUPREMACISM

INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONOF SHARIA LAW

STRICT INTERPRETATIONOF SHARIA LAW

KURDS SEEN AS ‘INFIDELS’AND SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS:

A NUMBER OF KURDS JOINEDAND FOUGHT AS PART OF ISIS

APPROACH TOMINORITY GROUPS

KURDS SEEN AS ‘INFIDELS’AND SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS:

TOKEN REPRESENTATION OF KURDS IN SOME MILITIAS

CHRISTIANSKIDNAPPED, EXECUTED,

HOLY SITES DESECRATED

CHRISTIANSKIDNAPPED,

HOLY SITES DESECRATED

CONDUCTED GENOCIDEAGAINST THE YEZIDIS IN 2014

YEZIDIS DISPLACED, EXECUTED, FORCED TO CONVERT TO ISLAM

WOMEN TREATED ASSECOND-CLASS CITIZENS, ABUSED,

ENSLAVED AND RAPED

WOMEN TREATED ASSECOND-CLASS CITIZENS, ABUSED,

KIDNAPPED AND RAPED

MILITARY HOSTILITY IN SOME SPHERES, TACIT RELIANCE ON

TURKEY IN OTHERS

RELATIONSHIP TO TURKEY COMMAND, CONTROLAND FUNDING ALL DIRECTLY

ISSUED BY TURKEY

OIL SALESVIA MIDDLEMEN

SALES OF WHEAT, BARLEY, LOOTED MACHINERY AND OTHER GOODS

SCORES OF ISIS FIGHTERSNOW UNDER TURKISH PROTECTION

IN OCCUPIED REGIONS OF SYRIA

OPERATE UNDER TURKISHSPONSORSHIP AND PROTECTION IN

OCCUPIED REGIONS OF SYRIA

ISIS and the SNA compared continued

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5 DATABASE

1

NAME Saed al-Shahed al-Antare AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN al-Mshur tribe,Mstirhet Antere, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF SNA

ROLE IN ISIS Worked in emni (internal security) in Raqqa, in the so-called ‘black prison’; fled to Turkey after fall of Raqqa.

ROLE IN TURKISH-BACKED FORCES

Now stationed in Tel Abyad. Translator working with Faysal Belo.

Saed al-Antare featured inpropaganda video

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2

NAME Abdullah Ahmed al-Abdullah AKA Rihab al-Sheblekh

YEAR OF BIRTH 1991 PLACE OF ORIGIN Homs

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Present in Tel Abyad

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2014 and worked as part of ‘emni’ (internal security).


Fled to Turkish-controlled Azaz and joined Hamzat Division; now sta-tioned in Sere Kaniye, working in the looted grain silos there.

Abdullah al-Abdullah in Sere Kaniye

3

NAME Fadel al-Aqal AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Suluk, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Hamzat Division

ROLE IN ISIS Stationed in Raqqa; authority figure along with his brother Faiz al-Aqal who was wali (governor) of Raqqa.


Present in Tel Abyad for meetings along with Ismael al-Aydo and Khaled al-Aqal (see below).

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4

NAME Faiz al-Aqal AKA Abu Saad al-Shamali, Ahmed al-Darwish


ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Deceased,was present in Tel Abyad

ROLE IN ISIS Imprisoned by Syrian Government for terror offenses prior to 2008; freed by FSA in 2013 and joined Jabhat-al-Nusra before moving to ISIS; rose to become Wali (governor) of Raqqa; described as close to ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and responsible for group’s finances and logistics; was rumoured to be the new emir of ISIS following assassi-nation of al-Baghdadi.


Was present in Tel Abyad for meetings; he and other members of the al-Aqal family were trying to establish a local force under their control in the region around Suluk. Assassinated by assumed US drone strike in Turkish-occupied al-Bab on 20 June 2020, carrying Turkish-issued ID card in false name at time of his death.

Turkish-issued ID card being carried by ISIS chief Faiz al-Aqal at the time of his assassination

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5

NAME Khaled al-Aqal AKA Abu Walid al-Raqqawi



ROLE IN ISIS Imprisoned by Syrian Government for terror offenses prior to 2008; freed by FSA in 2013 and joined Jabhat-al-Nusra before moving to ISIS; leading figure in creation of ISIS media agency al-Amaq in the Raqqa area; filmed atrocities including dumping of bodies into ‘Houta’ mass grave near Raqqa. Cousin of Faiz al-Aqal (see above).


Travelled into Turkey in 2014 while an ISIS member, before fleeing into Turkey following YPG takeover of Tel Abyad; now present in Tel Abyad. He and other members of the al-Aqal family are reportedly trying to establish a local force under their control in the region around Suluk.

Khaled al-Aqal during a media appear-ance

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NAME Izza al-Aqal AKA


ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Deceasedwas present in Tel Abyad

ROLE IN ISIS Appointed to senior position in Raqqa by his brother Faiz al-Aqal.


Was present in Tel Abyad for meetings; also killed in recent assassina-tion by assumed US drone strike in Turkish-occupied al-Bab, targeting Faiz al-Aqal (see above).

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7

NAME Basel Ghassan Al-Asoura AKA Abu Osama al-Shami

YEAR OF BIRTH 1993 PLACE OF ORIGIN Damascus

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Hamzat Division, SNA

ROLE IN ISIS Moved from Al-Nusra Front to ISIS in 2014; fought in Ghouta and Su-weida.


Moved via Idlib to Turkish-controlled regions; participated in 2018 invasion of Afrin and 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; currently stationed in Tel Abyad.

Basel al-Asoura

8

NAME Huzeyfa al-Assad AKA Abu Zaid

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Raqqa

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Ahrar al-Sharqiya

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2015; fought with heavy weapons unit in multiple cam-paigns.


Participated in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; after seen in Sere Kaniye.

Huzefa al-Assad

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9

NAME Ismael al-Aydo AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN al-Jais tribe,Abu Kharaza, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Works with SNA and MIT

ROLE IN ISIS Part of local FSA group Sa’aq al-Rahman before joining ISIS; stationed in Tel Abyad and Raqqa with ISIS; official responsible for weapons and finance, channelling money for ISIS through an exchange office in Tel Abyad and procuring weapons and explosives for ISIS.


Fled to Turkey where he spent some months in prison before starting to work with Turkish intelligence services; now stationed in Tel Abyad, working with MIT. One source adds he provided information leading to the assassination of top AANES official in Raqqa, Omar Alloush.

10

NAME Khosayi Said al-Aziz AKA



ROLE IN ISIS Fought as part of ISIS in Damascus countryside and Homs.


Moved to Euphrates Shield region and fought in 2018 invasion of Afrin; fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye; now stationed in Aliya grain silos. One source adds he has been involved in moving recruit-ing former ISIS fighters and moving them into Turkish-controlled regions.

Khosayi al-Aziz

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11

NAME Samir Mohammedal-Baghdadi

AKA Abu Bakir Tesinet

YEAR OF BIRTH 1987 PLACE OF ORIGIN Al-Chelebiya, Deir-ez-Zor

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Hamzat Division, SNA

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2014 in Shedadi; worked in Deir-ez-Zor as emir responsible for fortifications; after moved to Raqqa.


Escaped to Azaz in 2017 and joined Hamzat Division; fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye; now stationed in Sere Kaniye countryside.

Samir al-Baghdadi

12

NAME Musab al-Badr AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS Participated in al-Nusra Front capture of Tel Abyad and looted prop-erty in the city; subsequently joined ISIS and worked on the border.


Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; stationed in Tel Abyad until in-jured in an explosion and transferred to a hospital in Turkey.

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13

NAME Mohammed al-Badriyah AKA Abu Julebib al-Ansari


ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Ahrar-al-Sharqiya

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2015 and fought in several campaigns.


Fled to Turkish-held Azaz in 2018 and joined Hamzat Division; fought in Shebha campaign; fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye.

Mohammed al-Badriyah

14

NAME Faysal Belo Qiyadi AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN East Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS While part of Jabhat al-Nusra carried out at least one execution; af-terward joined ISIS as an emir, and spent some time with ISIS in Iraq; moved to Turkey as ISIS lost territory.


Fought in 2019 offensive against NES; now stationed in Ayn al-Arus; also present in recent meetings in Tel Abyad with al-Aqal family (see above).

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15

NAME Raghed ad-Dash AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN al-Badi, Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS Worked with Faysal Belo (see above) alongside his brother Rami.


Participated in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; still working with Faysal Belo; prominent in media

Raghed ad-Dash pictured in a propa-ganda video released during the 2019 invasion following the capture of Tel Abyad

Raghed ad-Dash pictured leading a recent pro-SNA demonstration in Tel Abyad

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16

NAME Rami ad-Dash AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Tel Abyadcountryside


ROLE IN ISIS Joined local FSA faction, then Ahrar-al-Sham, then ISIS; stationed in Tel Abyad; worked with Faysal Belo (see above) providing intelligence.


Now stationed in Tel Abyad, still working with Faysal Belo; stationed in Ayn al-Aros.

Rami ad-Dash pictured in a propa-ganda video released during the 2019 invasion following the capture of Tel Abyad

Rami ad-Dash

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17

NAME Hanes al-Diban AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Diban, Deir-ez-Zor


ROLE IN ISIS Emir in Tel Abyad.


Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; now stationed in Suluk.

18

NAME Azad Jelal Hassan AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Tel Khader, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Civil Council in Tel Abyad

ROLE IN ISIS Kurd stationed in Tel Abyad and assisting with administration.


Part of civilian administration in Tel Abyad, working with the SNA in-ternal security forces.

19

NAME Haj Hassan AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Shenina, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Ahrar al-Sharqiya, SNA



Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; now stationed in Tel Abyad.

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20

NAME Hamdan al-Jamus AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Jamus tribe

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Ahrar-al-Sharqiya, SNA

ROLE IN ISIS Stationed in Tel Abyad; joined along with his sons, two of whom were killed during fighting.



21

NAME Ibrahim Joher AKA



ROLE IN ISIS Stationed in Tel Abyad.


Military commander in Ahrar-al-Sharqiya; Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; stationed in Tel Abyad.

22

NAME Muhammed al-Kajal AKA



ROLE IN ISIS Armed militant working with ISIS; participated in at least one assassi-nation in Raqqa; fled to Turkey as ISIS lost territory.


Present during recent meetings in Tel-Abyad with al-Aqal family (see above).

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23

NAME Mohammed Khedir al-Alwani AKA Abu Islam al-Ansari

YEAR OF BIRTH 1984 PLACE OF ORIGIN Deir-ez-Zor

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Ahrar-al-Sharqiya

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2013; worked in ISIS’ military apparatus in both Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa.


Escaped to Turkish-held NWS and joined Ahrar-al-Sharqiya; fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye.

Mohammed al-Alwani

24

NAME Khelil Osman Khelil AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Tel Khadar, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF works with SNA

ROLE IN ISIS Kurd who worked with al-Nusra Front and after ISIS in Tel Abyad, working with Faysal Belo (see above) to help them smuggle and transfer goods from Turkey; left into Turkey when Tel Abyad was taken by YPG.


Returned to Tel Abyad, assisting SNA with logistics and looting; still working with Faysal Belo.

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25

NAME Khelil Hesus Khenjer AKA



ROLE IN ISIS Stationed in Sekeri village.



26

NAME Mohammed Hesus Khenjer AKA



ROLE IN ISIS Joined along with his brother Khelil (see below); stationed in Sekeri village.



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NAME Ghassan Ali al-Kurdi AKA Abu Khaled

YEAR OF BIRTH 1992 PLACE OF ORIGIN Ghweiran, Heseke


ROLE IN ISIS Kurd who joined ISIS in 2015 in Shedadi; participated in military cam-paigns.


Escaped to al-Rai and joined Ahrar al-Sharqiya in Afrin; Fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye; stationed in Sere Kaniye.

Ghassan Ali al-Kurdi

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28

NAME Tariq Qasim al-Deiri AKA Al-Hemsheri

YEAR OF BIRTH 1999 PLACE OF ORIGIN Kesrat, Deir-ez-Zor

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Ahrar al-Sharqiya

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in Raqqa in 2016; worked as part of internal security division; one source adds he was responsible for creating VBIEDs.


Escaped to al-Rai in 2017 and joined Ahrar al-Sharqiya; fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; currently stationed in Tel Abyad.

Tariq Qasim al-Deiri

29

NAME Khalil Mako AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Kherbet al-Fires,Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS Joined along with his brother (see below); stationed in Tel Abyad; after moved to Raqqa.


Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad as commander in Ahrar-al-Shar-qiya; now stationed in Tel Abyad.

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30

NAME Wahil Mako AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Kherbet al-Fires,Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS Joined along with his brother (see above); stationed in Tel Abyad; after moved to Raqqa.


Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad as commander in Ahrar-al-Shar-qiya; now stationed in Tel Abyad.

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NAME Khalil Hamid Melko AKA Abu Zehra

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Evdikoy, Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS With the FSA’s Najeb-al-Sham; after joined ISIS member in Tel Abyad.


Fled to Turkey after ISIS’ defeat; returned to Tel Abyad during 2019 invasion, primarily as an interpreter and guide working with Turkish forces; now stationed in Kormaza village.

32

NAME Azedin Mislim AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Silik Quran, Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS First joined local Free Syrian Army (FSA) faction in Tel Abyad, then ISIS.


Travelled to Jarabalus when ISIS were defeated in Tel Abyad; Fought in 2019 offensive against NES; now stationed on the border at Tel Ab-yad.

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NAME Samir al-Khaled al-Abdal-Omar

AKA Abu Suleiman al-Ansari

YEAR OF BIRTH 1997 PLACE OF ORIGIN Raqqa

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Sultan Murad Division

ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2015 in Raqqa; fought both in Raqqa and afterward in Deir-ez-Zor.


Escaped to Azaz in 2017 and joined Sultan Murad Division; fought in invasion of Suluk with heavy weapons unit.

Samir al-Omar

33

NAME Hassan Mohammed Ofi AKA Abu Raid

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Hummeymi, Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS Moved from local FSA faction to Ahrar-al-Sham to Jabhat al-Nusra to ISIS; stationed in Tel Abyad.


Fought in 2019 offensive against NES; now stationed in Suluk.

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35

NAME Fehid al-Ali al-Said AKA Al-Hemsheri

YEAR OF BIRTH 1999 PLACE OF ORIGIN Raqqa


ROLE IN ISIS Joined in 2015 and fought in multiple campaigns in Deir-ez-Zor region.


Escaped to Turkish-held NWS and joined Hamzat Division; fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye.

Fehid al-Said

36

NAME Mohammed Abdulkarim Shedo AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Sikeri, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Sultan Murad Division, SNA

ROLE IN ISIS Stationed in Tel Abyad.


Commander in Sultan Murad Division; Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; now stationed in Tel Abyad.

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37

NAME Mohammed Jassem al-Resho AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Sere Kaniye


ROLE IN ISIS Stationed in Tel Abyad in 2014.


Fled when YPG seized Tel Abyad; Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Ab-yad; now stationed in Tel Abyad.

Mohammed al-Resho

38

NAME Abed Al-Aziz Mohamed Siji AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Gire Sor, Tel Abyad


ROLE IN ISIS Moved from local FSA faction to Ahrar-al-Sham to Jabhat al-Nusra to ISIS; became an ISIS emir in Tel Abyad.


Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; now stationed in Tel Abyad once again; runs the border crossing with Turkey. One source added that his brothers Anan, Yasir, and Ibrahim Siji are all also former ISIS mem-bers now stationed in Tel Abyad.

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39

NAME Ali Hassan Taha AKA Abu Dawla Harun

YEAR OF BIRTH 1992 PLACE OF ORIGIN Miwezfin, Deir-ez-Zor


ROLE IN ISIS Joined in Shedadi in 2015; part of heavy weapons unit in south Hese-ke countryside; after moved to Raqqa.


Escaped to Azaz in 2017 and joined Ahrar al-Sharqiya; fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye.

Ali Taha

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NAME Awwad al-Sultan AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Ayn al-Arus, Tel Abyad

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Civil council in Tel Abyad

ROLE IN ISIS Former Syrian government administrator in Tel Abyad who joined FSA and after ISIS along with his brother Dr. Ayed al-Sultan; expelled from ISIS after six months and travelled to Turkey.


Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; now stationed in Tel Abyad once again; runs the border crossing with Turkey. One source added that his brothers Anan, Yasir, and Ibrahim Siji are all also former ISIS mem-bers now stationed in Tel Abyad.

Awwad al-Sultan makes a media appearance following his returnto Tel Abyad

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NAME Abu Adi al-Tedmuri AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Palmyra, Homs

ISIS MEMBER YES NOW A MEMBER OF Sultan Murat Division, SNA

ROLE IN ISIS ISIS member for a year and a half in al-Bukamal.


Travelled to Turkish-occupied Afrin and joined Sultan Murad Division; Fought in 2019 invasion of Sere Kaniye.

Abu Adi al-Tedmuri

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NAME Hemdan Al-Temidi AKA

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Janus tribe




Fought in 2019 invasion of Tel Abyad; now stationed in Suluk.

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NAME Sami Fouad Yazelji AKA Abu Walid al-Deiri

YEAR OF BIRTH PLACE OF ORIGIN Al-Muafazin, Deir-ez-Zor


ROLE IN ISIS Joined ISIS in 2015 and fought in several campaigns.


Escaped to Turkish-held NWS in 2017 and joined SNA; fought in inva-sion of Tel Abyad.

Sami Yazelji

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ROJAVA INFORMATION CENTER9 OCTOBER 2020

[email protected] +963 996 827 521

Documents

DATABASE: FORMER ISIS MEMBERS NOW PART OF ......4.2 ABUSES AND WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE SNA (P. 9) 4.3 COMPARING ISIS AND THE SNA (P. 10) 5 DATABASE (P. 15) FORMER ISIS MEMBERS