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8/10/2019 DAHL Robert_A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model
1/8
8/10/2019 DAHL Robert_A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model
2/8
A
CRITIQUE
OF THE
RULING
ELITE
MODEL
ROBERT
A. DAHL
Yale University
A greatmany people
seem to
believethat they
runthings: he old
families,
the bankers,
he City
Hall,
machine,
or
the
party
boss behind
the scene. This
kind
of view evidently
has a powerful
nd
many-sided ppeal.
It is
simple,
compelling,
ramatic,
realistic. It
gives one
standing s an
inside-dopester.
For
individualswith
a strong trainof
frustrated
dealism, t
has
just
the
right
touch
of
hard-boiledcynicism.
Finally, the
hypothesis
has one very
great
advantage
over
many
alternative xplanations:
t
can be cast
in a form
hat
makes it virtually
mpossibleto disprove.
Considerthe last pointfor moment.There s a typeof quasi-metaphysical
theory
made
up
of what
might
be called
an infinite
egress
of
explanations.
The
ruling
lite modelcan be
interpreted
n
thisway.
If
the overt eaders
of a
community
o
not
appear
to constitute ruling lite,
then the theory
an
be
saved by arguing
hat behindthe
overt eaders
there s a set
of
covert
eaders
who do.
If subsequentevidence
shows
that this
covertgroupdoes not
make a
rulingelite,
then the theory
can be
saved by arguing
that
behind the first
covert
group
there s
another,
nd
so on.
Now
whatever else it
may be,
a
theory
that
cannot
even
in
principle
be
controverted y empiricalevidence is not a scientificheory.The least that
we
can
demand
of
any
rulingelite
theorythat purports
o be
more
than
a
metaphysical
r polemical
doctrine s,
first, hat
the
burden
of
proofbe
on the
proponents
of
the theory
and not
on its
critics;and, second,
that there be
clear
criteria ccording o
whichthe theory
ouldbe
disproved.
With
these
points
n
mind,
shall proceed
n two
stages.
First,
shall
try
to clarify
he
meaning
of
the
concept ruling
lite
by
describing
very simple
formof what
I
conceive
to
be a ruling
elite
system.
Second,
I
shall indicate
what would be
required
n
principle
s
a
simple
but satisfactory
est
of
any
hypothesis sserting hat a particularpoliticalsystem s, in fact,a ruling lite
system.
Finally,
I
shall
deal
with
some
objections.
I. A
SIMPLE
RULING
ELITE
SYSTEM
If a
ruling
lite
hypothesis
ays anything,
urely
t assertsthat within
ome
specificpolitical
system
there exists
a
group
of
people
who
to
some
degree
exercise
power
or
influence
ver other
actors
n
the
system.
shall
make
the
following
ssumptions
bout
power:'
1.
In
order to
compare
the
relative
nfluence
f
two
actors
(these
may
be
individuals,groups,classes,parties,orwhat not), it is necessary o state the
scope
of the
responses
upon
which
the actors
have an effect. he
statement,
I
See Robert
A. Dahl, The Concept
of Power,
Behavioral cience,
Vol.
2
(July1957),
pp. 201-215.
463
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3/8
464
THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
REVIEW
A
has
more
power
han
B,
is
so
ambiguous
s to
verge
on the
meaningless, ince
it does not specify he scope.
2. One cannot
compare
the
relative nfluence f
two
actors who
always per-
form dentical ctionswithrespect o thegroup nfluenced.What thismeansas a
practical matter
s that
ordinarily
ne can test for
differences
n
influence nly
where there
are cases of
differences
n
initial preferences. t
one
extreme, he
difference
ay
mean that
one
group prefers
lternative
A
and another
group
prefers
,
A
and
B
beingmutually
xclusive.
At
the
other xtreme, t may mean
that
one
group prefers
lternative
A to other
alternatives,
nd
another
group
is indifferent.
f
a
political systemdisplayed completeconsensus t all times,
we should
find t
impossible
o construct
satisfactory
irect est
of
the hypo-
thesis that
it was a
ruling
elite
system, lthough
ndirect nd
ratherunsatis-
factory estsmightbe devised.
Consequently,
o know whether
r not we have a
ruling lite,
we
must have
a
political system
n
which there
s a
difference
n
preferences,
rom
ime to
time,
among
the individual human
beings
n the
system.Suppose, now,
that
among
these
ndividuals
here s a set whose
preferences egularly revail
n
all
cases
of
disagreement,
r at
least
in all cases of
disagreement
ver
key political
issues
(a
term
propose
to
leave undefined
here).
Let
me call
such a set of
individuals controlling roup.
n
a
full-fledgedemocracy perating trictly
according
o
majorityrule,
the
majority
would
constitute
controlling roup,
even thoughthe individual membersof the majoritymight changefromone
issue to the
next.
But
since
our model
s
to
represent ruling
lite
system,we
require that the
set
be
less than
a
majority
n
size.
However,
n
any representative ystem
with
single
member
voting districts
where
more than
two candidates receive
votes,
a
candidate
could
win with
less than
a
majority
of
votes;
and it
is
possible, therefore,
o
imagine a truly
sovereign egislature
lected
under the
strictest democratic
rules
that was
nonetheless
overned y
a
legislativemajority epresenting
he
first
references
of
a
minority
f
voters.
Yet I
do not
think
we
would
want
to
call such a political
system ruling litesystem.Because ofthis kindofdifficulty, propose that
we
exclude
from
ur
definition
f a
ruling
lite
any controlling roup that is a
productof rulesthat
are
actually
followed
that s, real rules) underwhich
majority
f ndividualscould dominate
f
they
took certain
ctions permissible
under
the real
rules.
n
short,
o constitute
ruling
lite
a
controlling roup
must not be a pure artifact f democratic
ules.
A
ruling lite,then,
s a
controlling roup
ess
than a
majority
n
size that is
not
a
pure
artifact
f
democratic
rules. It is
a
minority
f
individuals
whose
preferences egularlyprevail
in
cases
of
differences
n
preference
n
key
political issues. If we are to avoid an infinite egressof explanations,the
composition
f
the
ruling
lite must
be
more or ess
definitelypecified.
II.
SOME
BAD TESTS
The
hypothesis
we are
d.1ing-
with wquld
run
aloig these
1ines; Such
and
such
a
political system the
U.
S.,
the
U.S.S.R.,
New
Haven,
or
the
like)
is
a
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4/8
CRITIQUE
OF THE RULING ELITE MODEL
465
ruling lite system
n which
the ruling
elite
has
the
followingmembership.
Membership
would
then
be
specified y name, position,
ocio-economic
lass,
socio-economic oles,
or what
not.
Let me now turnto the problemof testing hypothesis f this sort, and
begin
by
indicating
few tests that are sometimes
mistakenly
aken
as ade-
quate.
The first mproper
est confuses
ruling
lite with
a
group that has a high
potential or
control. et me
explain. Suppose
a set of ndividuals
n
a
political
system
has the
following roperty:
here
s a
veryhighprobability
hat
if
they
agree
on a
key political alternative,
nd if
they
all act in
some
specifiedway,
then that
alternative
will
be
chosen.
We
may say
of such
a
group that it has a
high otential or
ontrol.
n
a
large
and
complex ociety
ike
ours,
there
may be
many such groups. For example, the bureaucratictriumvirate f Professor
Mills
would
appear
to have a
high potential
for
control.2 n
the
City
of New
Haven,
with
which have
some
acquaintance,
do
not
doubt
that
the leading
business
figures ogether
with
the leaders of both
political parties
have
a
high
potential
forcontrol.
But
a
potential
for
control
s
not, except
n
a
peculiarly
Hobbesian world, equivalent
to
actual
control.
f the
militaryeaders ofthis
country
nd
their
ubordinates
greed
that it
was
desirable, hey
could
most
assuredly
establish
a
militarydictatorship
f
the most
overt
sort;
nor
would
they
need the
aid of eaders of business
corporations
r
the
executivebranchof
our government. ut theyhave not set up such a dictatorship. or what is
lacking
re
the premises
mentioned
arlier, amely greement
n
a key politi-
cal
alternative
nd
some set of
specific mplementing
ctions.
That is
to say,
a
group may
have a
high potential
for
control nd
a
low
potential or unity.
The actual political ffectiveness
f
a
group
s
a function
f
ts potentialforcon-
trol
and
its
potential
for
unity.
Thus a
group
with
a
relatively
ow
potential
for
ontrol
ut
a
highpotential
for
unitymay
be
more
politically ffectivehan
a
group
with a
highpotential
forcontrolbut
a
low
potential
for
unity.
The second mproper
est
confuses ruling
lite
with a
group of ndividuals
who have more nfluencehan any others n the system. take it for granted
that
in
every
human
organization
ome
individuals
have
more
nfluence
ver
key
decisions
than do
others.
Political
equality may
well be
among the most
Utopian
of
all human
goals.
But
it
is
fallacious
to assume
that
the
absence of
political equality proves
the existence
f
a
ruling
lite.
The
third mproper
est,
which s
closely
related
to the
preceding
ne,
is to
generalize
from
single scope
of
influence.Neither
ogically
nor
empirically
does it
follow hat a
group
with
a
high degree
of
nfluence
ver one
scope
will
necessarily
ave a
high degree
of nfluence ver
another
cope
within he
same
system.This is a matter o be determinedmpirically.Any investigation hat
does
not take
into account
the
possibility
hat
different
lite
groups
have
dif-
ferent
copes
is
suspect. By
means
of
sloppyquestions
one
could
easily seem to
discover
hat
there exists
a unified
uling
lite
in New
Haven; forthere s no
2
C.
Wright
Mills,,
The
Power
Elite
(New York, 1956),
pa-sim.
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466
THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
doubt that
small
groups
of
people
make
many key
decisions.
t appears to be
the case, however,
hat the small
group
that runs urban
redevelopments not
the
same as the small
group
that runs
public education,
and neither
s
quite
the same as the two smallgroups hatrun thetwoparties.Moreover he small
groupthat
runsurban
redevelopment ith
a
highdegree f unitywould almost
certainly isintegrate
f ts activitieswere extended
to either
ducation
or
the
two political parties.
III.
A
PROPOSED TEST
If
tests
ike these are not
valid,
what can we
properly equire?
Let
us
take
the
simplestpossible
situation. Assume
that there have
been
some
number-I
will
not
say
how
many-of
cases where there has
been dis-
agreementwithin hepolitical systemon key politicalchoices. Assumefurther
that
the
hypothetical uling
lite
prefers
ne alternative nd
other ctors
n
the
system refer
ther lternatives.
hen unless t is true
that
n
all
or
verynearly
all ofthese
cases the alternative
referred y
the
ruling lite
s
actually dopted,
the
hypothesis that
the
system
s
dominated
by
the
specified uling lite)
is
clearly
false.
I
do
not
want to
pretend
ither
hat the research
necessary
o such a
test s
at all
easy
to
carry
ut
or that
community
ife ends tself
onveniently
o
strict
interpretationccording
o
the
requirements
f
the test.
But
I
do not see
how
anyone an supposethathe has establishedhedominance fa specific roup n a
community
r a nationwithout
asing
his
analysis
on
the
areful
xamination
fa
series
of
concrete ecisions.
And
these
decisionsmust either
onstitute he uni-
verse or
a
fair
sample
from
he universe
of
key political
decisions aken
in
the
political system.
Now
it is
a remarkable nd indeed
astounding
fact that
neither
Professor
Mills
nor Professor
Hunter has
seriously ttempted
to examine
an array of
specific
ases to test
his
major hypothesis.3
et
I
suppose
these
two
works
more
than
any
others
n
the
social sciencesof
the last
few
years
have
sought
to
in-
terpret omplexpolitical ystems ssentially s instancesofa ruling lite.
To
sum
up:
The
hypothesis
f
the existence
of a
ruling
lite
can be
strictly
tested
only
f:
1.
The
hypothetical uling
lite s
a
well-defined
roup.
2.
There
is a fair
sample
of cases
involvingkey political
decisions
n
which
the
preferences
f
the
hypothetical uling
elite
run
counter to those
of
any
other
ikelygroup
that
might
be
suggested.
3.
In
such
cases,
the
preferences
f the
elite
regularly revail.
IV. DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS
Several
objectionsmight
be raised
against
the test
propose.
First,
one
might rgue
that the test is too
weak.
The
argument
would
run
as
follows:
f a
ruling
lite doesn't xist
n
a
community,
hen the test
s
satisfac-
3
Mills, op. cit.; Floyd Hunter,
CommunityowerStructureChapel Hill, 1953).
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6/8
CRITIQUE OF THE RULING ELITE
MODEL 467
tory; that is,
if
every hypotheticalruling
elite is compared with alternative
control roups,
nd in factno
ruling
lite
exists,
hen the test will ndeedshow
that there s no minoritywhose preferences egularly revail on key political
alternatives.But-it mightbe said-suppose a ruling litedoes exist. The test
will
not necessarily
emonstrate ts
existence,
ince we
may
not have selected
the rightgroup
as our
hypothetical uling
elite. Now this
objection
s
valid;
but it suggests
he
point
I made at the
outset
about
the
possibility
f an in-
finite egress f explanations.
Unless we use
the
test on everypossible combina-
tion
of individuals
n
the
community,
we cannot be certainthat there s not
some combination
hat constitutes
ruling
elite.
But since
there s
no more
a
priori
reason
to assume that a
ruling
lite
does exist
than
to assume that one
does not exist, he
burden f
proof
oes
not
rest
upon
the critic fthe
hypothesis,
but upon its proponent.And a proponentmust specifywhat grouphe has in
mind as his ruling lite. Once the group s
specified,
hen the test I have sug-
gested s,
at
least
in
principle,
alid.
Second,
one could
object
that the
test s too
trong.
or
suppose
that the
mem-
bers of
the ruled
group
are indifferents to the outcome of
various political
alternatives. urely one
could
argue)
if
there
s
another
group
that
regularly
gets ts way
in
the
face of
this ndifference,
t is
in
fact the
rulinggroup
n
the
society.
Now
my
reasons for
wishing
o discriminate his
case
from he
other
involve more than a mere question of the propriety f using the term ruling
elite, which s onlya termof convenience.There is, I think, differencef
some theoretical
ignificance
etween
a
system
n
which a small
group dorni-
nates
over
another hat
is
opposed
to
it,
and one
in
which a group dominates
over an indifferent ass.
n
the
second
case, the
alternatives t stake can hardly
be
regarded
s
key political
ssues
if
we assume the
pointof
view
of the
in-
different ass;
whereas
n
the first
ase
it is
reasonable
to say that the alterna-
tives
nvolvea
key political
ssue from he
standpoint
f both groups.Earlier
refrained
rom
defining he concept key political ssues.
If we were
to do so
at this
point,
it
would
seem reasonable to
require
as
a
necessary although
possiblynot a sufficientonditionthat the issue should involve actual dis-
agreement
n
preferences mong
two
or
more
groups.
In
short, the case of
indifferences.
preference would
be
ruled out.
However,
I
do
not
mean
to
dispose
of
the problemsimply by definition.
The
point
is
to make
sure
that the two systems
re distinguished. he test
for he
second,
weaker
system
f elite
rule
would then be
merely modification
of
the
test
proposed
for
the first nd more
stringent
ase. It would
again
re-
quire
an
examinationof a series of cases
showinguniformly hat
when
the
word was
authoritatively assed
down from
he designated
lite,the hitherto
indifferent ajorityfell into ready compliance with an alternative hat had
nothing
lse
to recommend t intrinsically.
Third, one might argue that the test will not discriminate etween
a true
ruling lite
and
a ruling lite togetherwith its satellites.
This objection s in
one
sense true and
in
one sense false.
t is true that on
a series
of key political
questions,
n
apparentlyunified roup mightprevail
who
would, according o
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468
THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE REVIEW
our
test, therebyconstitute
ruling
elite. Yet an inner
core
might actually
make the decisionsfor
the whole group.
However,
one of
two
possibilities
must
be
true.
Eitherthe nner
ore and the
frontmen always agree at all times n thedecisionprocess, rthey do not. But
if
they always agree, then it follows
fromone
of
our
two
assumptions bout
influence hat the
distinction etween
an
inner core and frontmen has
no operational
meaning; that is, there is
no
conceivable
way to distinguish
between
hem.
And
if
they
do not
always
agree,
then the test
simplyrequires
a
comparison
t
those
points
n time when
they disagree.
Here
again,
the
ad-
vantages
of
concrete
ases
are
palpable,
forthese enable one
to
discover
who
initiates
or
vetoes and
who merely
omplies.
Fourth,
t
mightbe said that
the test
is eithertoo
demanding
or
else it is
too arbitrary.f it requires hat thehypothetical liteprevails n every ingle
case, then t demands
too much. But
if
t
does not
require
this
much, then at
whatpoint
can a
ruling
lite
be
said to exist?When t
prevails
n
7 cases out of
10? 8 out of10? 9 out of
10?
Or what? There are
two answers o
this objection.
On the one
hand,
it
would
be
quite
reasonable
to
argue, think,
hat
since we
are
considering
nly key
political
choices and not trivial
decisions,
f
the
elite
does not
prevail
in
every
ase
in
which it
disagrees
with
a
contrarygroup,
it
cannot properly
be called a
ruling
elite. But
since
I
have
not
supplied
an
independent efinition
f
the term
key political
choices,
I
must
admit that
this answer s notwholly atisfactory. n the otherhand, I wouldbe inclined
to
suggest
hat
in
this nstance s
in
many
others
we
ought
not
to
assume
that
political reality
will
be
as
discrete
nd
discontinuous
s
the
concepts
we
find
convenient o employ. We can
say
that a
system pproximates
true
ruling
elite
system,
o
a
greater
r
lesser
degree,
without
nsisting hat it
exemplify
the
extreme nd
limiting
ase.
Fifth,
t
might
be
objected
that the test
I
have
proposed
would
not work n
the
most obvious
of
all cases of
rulingelites, namely
n
the
totalitarian
dic-
tatorships.
For the
control of
the
elite over the
expression
of
opinion
is so
greatthatovertly here s no disagreement; ence no cases onwhichto base a
judgment
rise. This
objection
s a fairone. But we are not
concerned
erewith
totalitarian
ystems.
We are
concernedwith the
application
of
the
techniques
of
modern
nvestigation
o
American
communities, here,
xcept
n
very
rare
cases,
terrors not
so pervasive hat
the
nvestigator
s barredfrom
iscovering
the
preferences
f
citizens.
Even in
Little Rock,
for
example, newspaper
men
seemed to
have
had little
difficulty
n
finding
iverse
opinions;
and a
northern
political
cientist
f
my acquaintance
has
managed
to
complete
large
number
of
productive
nterviews
with
White and
Negro
Southerners
n
the
touchy
subject of integration.
Finally
one could
argue
that
even
in a
society
ike
ours
a
ruling
lite
might
be so
influential
ver
ideas, attitudes,
nd
opinions
that
a kind
of
false con-
sensus
will
exist-not
the
phony
consensus
f
a
terroristic
otalitarian ictator-
ship
but the
manipulated
and
superficially elf-imposed
dherence
to the
norms nd
goals
of
the elite
by broad
sections
of
a
community. good
deal of
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8/8
CRITIQUE
OF THE RULING
ELITE MODEL
469
Professor
Mills' argument an be interpreted
n
this
way, although t
is not
clear
to mewhether his
s
what he
means
to
rest
his case on.
Even more han the
others his
objectionpoints
o
the
need to be circumspect
in interpretinghe evidence.Yet here,too, it seemsto me that the hypothesis
cannot
be satisfactorily
onfirmed ithout
omething quivalent
to
the test
I
have proposed. For
once
again
either
the
consensus s perpetual
and un-
breakable,
n
which
case there s
no conceivable
way
of
determining
who
is
ruler
nd
who
is
ruled. Or it is
not. But
if t
is not,
then
there s
some
point
n
the
process
of
forming
pinions
t whichthe
one
group
will be seen to initiate
and
veto,
whilethe restmerely espond.
Andwe can onlydiscover
hese points
by
an examination f
a
series
of
concrete ases where
key
decisions
are
made:
decisions
on taxation
and
expenditures,
ubsidies,
welfare
programs,military
policy, and so on.
It
would be interesting
o
know,
for
example,
whether he initiation nd
veto
of
alternativeshaving
to
do with
our
missile
program
would confirm
ProfessorMills' hypothesis,
r
indeed
any
reasonable
hypothesis
bout the
existence
f a
ruling
lite.
To
the
superficial
bserver
t would
scarcely
ppear
that the
military
tself
s
a
homogeneousgroup,
to
say
nothing
of
their
sup-
posed
coalition
with
corporate
nd
political
executives.
f
the
military
lone
or
the
coalition
together
s a
ruling lite,
t is either ncredibly ncompetentn
administering
ts
own
fundamental ffairs
r
else
it
is
unconcernedwith the
successof tspoliciesto a degreethat I find stounding.
However
I
do not
mean
to
examine
the evidence here.
For
the
whole
point
of this
paper
is that the
evidencefora
ruling lite,
either
n
the United States
or
in
any specific
ommunity,
as not yet
been
properly
xamined
so
far
as
I
know.Andthe
evidence
has
not been
properlyxamined,
have tried
o argue,
because
the examination
has
not
employed
satisfactory
riteria o
determine
what
constitutes
fairtest
of
the basic hypothesis.
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