Dadrian Kant's Concepts of 'Human Nature' and 'Rationality' Two Arch Determinants of an Envisioned 'Eternal Peace

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Kant's Concepts of 'Human Nature' and 'Rationality': Two Arch Determinants of an Envisioned'Eternal Peace'Author(s): Vahakn N. DadrianReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1968), pp. 396-401Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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Research Communication:

KANT'S CONCEPTS OF 'HUMAN NATURE' AND

'RATIONALITY': TWO ARCH DETERMINANTS

OF AN ENVISIONED 'ETERNAL PEACE'

By

VAHAKN N. DADRIANFlorida Atlantic University

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to re-ex-

aminebriefly

Kant'sspecific theory

of

peace (ZumEwigenFrieden) n light of his

dialectical utilization of the principles of

conflict and cooperation in international

relations. Moreover, Kant's notion of

acquisitive human nature, and his postu-lates regarding the regulation of the latter

by institutions - notably legal - invite

reconsideration of the problem from a

contemporary point of view.

We are attempting here to refocus at-

tention on a classical mode of thought,which depicts morality in general and

political morality in particular as issuingfrom practical considerations rather than

from an inner commitment to virtue as

such; by the same token, rationality is

equated with supreme morality.The sequence of political events, par-

ticularly in European history, since Kant,

punctuated by a successionof wars, accents

the necessity for such a refocusing. Inview of the foreboding spectre of nuclear

cataclysm we are prompted to inquire how

'human nature' may respond to the

practical need for 'eternal peace', when

the alternative is global and abiding dis-

aster. In brief, a crucial question is

touched on: Are there conditions under

which there may be practically deter-

mined limits to human irrationality in

international relations;and concomitant-

ly, may there be the rudiments of a com-

pelling rationality?

2. The dialectics f acquisitivenessndpeacefulnational overeignty

The basic tenet of Kant'sthinking

in this

respect is his postulate that the need for

peace among men is inherent in what he

generally calls 'nature'. 'The guaranty of

this treaty is nothing less than the greatand ingenious art, nature.'l Again: 'Her

mechanical march evidently announces

the grand aim of producing among men,

against their intention, harmony from the

very bosom of their discords.' (p. 27)In this postulate, Kant utilizes his broad

view about 'human propensities'and their

being conditioned for peace under circum-

stances which favor the harmoniousstruc-

turing of these propensities. There is a

dialectical principle involved here which

is brought to bear upon a profitable re-

conciliation of the competitive and co-

operative impulses in human nature.2

He argues that the international system

presupposes 'the reciprocal independence

of severalneighboring and separatestates';and this system, by logic and definition,

implies a sort of 'state of war', because

'... this variety contains the germ of

reciprocal hatred and furnished even fre-

quently a pretext for war ...' (p. 36)

However, there are in operation other

forces counterposed to this state of tacit

war, which provide the basis for an

'equilibrium ... in spite of the contest

resultingfrom their diversity.' (p. 36)

On a general level, Kant describes this

countervailing force as developing 'in the







consequence of progress in their civili-

zation', which engenders 'the interested

spirit of all nations ... and a union be-

tween them, which the ideal of cosmo-

political right alone would not have suffi-ciently secured from war and violence.'

(p. 37)On a more specific level, Kant desig-

nates a factor which, in his Weltanschauung,

appears a paramount peace factor among'civilized' nations. His reference is to

business, or to use his term, 'commerce',

through which nations submerge their

other differences in search of material

gains and riches; Kant attributes this to'nature [which thus] by means of the

human propensities, guarantees a perpet-ual peace.' (p. 37)

Underlying these propensities is acquis-itiveness, to regulate r cultiuatewhich, man

established the state. In simpler terms,Kant is referringto the magnetic attraction

of money as a basic element in human

motivation, extended to the organization

of the state. 'The power of money beingthat which of all others gives the greatest

spring to states ...' (p. 37)

Consequently, the drive for business

superimposes itself upon all other disrup-tive and antagonistic forcesamong nations,for 'it is the spirit of commerce that sooner

or later takes hold of every nation and

is incompatible with war.' (p. 37)

3. War-mongeringumannatureand practi-

calityas an antidoteor peaceIn this synthesis of the factors of war

and peace, Kant not only foreshadowed

the post-Darwinian school of 'mutual aidand co-operation' but also outlined the

rationale of the special relationship be-

tween practicality and virtue. It is this

relationship which affords the means to

resolveconflictsbetween groupsor nations.

From thepoint of view of humanmotivation,

then, t is notmorality utpracticality rutilitywhichrenders he questor peacea compellingvirtue.The cultivation of the abstract prin-

ciple of world peace is bound up with com-

397

mon interestswhich produce universalsoli-

darity among men.

In Kant's words, 'they find themselves

obliged to labor at the noble work of

peace, though without any moral view:and instantly seek to stifle, by mediations,

war, in whatever part it may break out,as if for this purpose they had contracted

a perpetual alliance.' (p. 37) The entire

process is subsumed under the category of

'nature' as a source and signpost forpeace.This type of interpretation of nature is

far from being simple; it is as complex asit is dialectical. Indeed, the entire argu-

ment presupposes the recognition of waras a concomitant of international relations.

Here again, nature, and more particularly,human nature, is held responsible. 'Asto war itself, it requires no particularmotive, it appears ingrafted on human

nature ...' (p. 31)

Historical experiences, close observationof developing human relations, and logicaldeductions led him to realize that one

has to reckon with wars. Hence, his attackon the problem has two dimensions:

1) Emphasis on the conditions of peace.

2) Practical measuresto obviate the factorsincidential to war.

Clearly, if a disaster can be preventedor averted, efforts in this direction shouldtakeprecedenceovereverythingelse.Hence

Kant prefaced his discussion of peace

proposals with 'Preliminary Articles' con-

tained in Section One of his treatise. Here,a major provision refers to the manner in

which wars ought to be waged. His im-

plicit contention is that if savage or sub-

human methods are employed, these willthen become the seeds of future hostility,inasmuch as they may engender profoundshock, animosity, and a craving for future

vengeance. By the same token, these

methods may seriously impair any andall confidence in an opponent. As he

states in Article 6 of Section One: 'AState shall not, during war, admit to

hostilities of a nature that would render

reciprocal confidence in a succeeding







398

peace impossible: such as employing as-

sassins, poisoners, violation of a capitu-lation ...' (p. 7)

Likewise, Kant is apprehensive regard-

ing the manner in which a peace treatyis formulated. Certain provisions of such

a treaty can spell future disaster if they are

written not with actual peace in mind but

with exploitative designs projected into

the future. One such provision is 'No

treaty of peace shall be esteemed valid,on which is tacitlyreservedmatterforfuture

war.' (p.2) (Article1 ofPreliminaryArticles)From these two conditions, it is apparent

that the provisions of a peace treaty andthereforethe circumstancesleading to such

a peace treaty are of paramount import.The import derives from the preventive

quality of these provisions. Likewise, the

aftermath of war arising from the condi-

tions of a peace treaty should not be so

structured as to harbor dangers of a sub-

sequent new war. In this respect, Kant

envisagesi. a. five specific categories.These

involve(1)

no demand of restitution of the

cost of war - this, to avoid regarding war

as a 'punitive measure'; (2) 'exchange of

prisoners which is to be carried out with-

out ransom and without regard to equalityof numbers'; (3) no impositions involvingloss of 'political liberty and degradation'of the defeated country; (4) 'guilt cannot

be inherited from the criminality of anoth-

er', and (5) 'amnesty is involved in the

conclusion of a treaty of peace ... implied

in the very idea of peace.'3 His quest of

anticipation of war and the elimination of

the factors contributing to such a war is

strikingly expressed in the stipulation in

Article No. 3 of Section One: 'Standingarmies shall in time be totally abolished.'

(p. 4)

4. Rationalityas the connectingink between

practicalityand internationalmorality-

the problemsof legitimacyand deterrenceKant's significance as a political thinker

is revealed in his incisive analysis of the

nexus between practicality and morality.

This nexus is not a general one suggestingthat everything which is practical, is also

always necessarily moral. In the presentcontext, practicality becomes tantamount

to morality when there is interposed be-tween the two attitudes a basic third

attitude, rationality.This is the instance of

the special nexus, the connecting link,which can transformcapacity for vice into

capacity for virtue.

The fundamental question which arises

here is how do or can people possesssuch

an attitude. Implied in Kant's argumentsis the notion that this attitude is not in-

herent in 'human nature' but must beinculcated. This is only possible when

appropriatenstitutionsrecreatedwhichmightconditionman torationality.The chief instru-

ment for this type of institutionalization

is the 'law' and the concept of 'right'

underlying it. Once more, Kant exercises

here a subtle dialectical logic to suggestthat certain social institutions might be

created by man which eventually mightbecome assets - to the extent that

theydo derive from the recognition of particu-lar human liabilities. In other words,suchinstitutions are intended to thwart in-

dulgence in these liabilities by functioningas a deterrent.

It is not so much the fact of deterrence

that is critical here, but the source of it.

The injection of the idea of legality (or

legitimacy) provides here the framework

through which deterrence becomes a

channel for morality. Men agree to the

necessity of limitations for their behavior,

imposed from without. The resulting laws

are then internalized as maxims of be-

havior. These maxims have a dual func-

tion. First they restrain; second they

guarantee rights and interests. To the

extent that this internalization is thorough,behavior can be equated with moral be-

havior, which then becomes natural be--

havior. Thus, men need instruments ofdeterrence not only to live in peace but

also to be protected form the eventualityof wars. This idea is succinctly expressed







in the opening statement of Section II of

the Definitive Articles:

With men, the state of nature is nota state of peace, but of war; though

not of open war, at least ever readyto break out. A state of peace musttherefore be established; for, in orderto be sheltered against every act ofhostility, it is not sufficient that noneis committed; one neighbor must guar-antee to another his personal security,which cannot take place except in astate of legislation, without which onemay treat another as an enemy ...

(pp. 10, 11)

What matters here most is the trans-

formation of individually-harbored poten-tial hostilities into non-hostile public be-

havior. As he relates under the categoryof civil law:

A multitude of reasonable beingsdesire for their preservation universallaws, though everyone among themhas a secret inclination to exempt him-self from the observance of them. Aconstitution must therefore be giventhem, that so confines their individual

passions ... that in their public con-duct, their effect becomes as incon-siderable as if they had not had thesehostile dispositions. (p. 34)

Here, Kant refines his concept of mo-

rality to suggest that yielding to the'coercive power of legislation' does not

necessarily produce 'the desired effect ofa moral reform in man' (p. 34) but rather

peace by mutual constraint. A properlyorganized state can thus 'force man to be,

if not a good moral being, at least a goodcitizen.' (p. 33)

Moralitythen is not internal,basicpurifi-cationof man, but ratherexternal,practicaladjustments o commonrights and interests,regulatedby laws. Thus, the first Articleof Part I of the Appendix in his treatisedeclares: 'Morality has already in itselfa practical object, it being the sum of the

absolute laws according to which we

ought to act.' (p. 41) The transition fromthis level to that of national and inter-

national relations is thus an easy step for

Kant.

399

'Politics, inasmuch as it is practical

jurisprudence, cannot therefore be in con-tradiction to morality, considered as the

theory of right ...' (p. 41) Consequently,

the tripartite linkage between right, mo-rality, and nature is rendered possible bythe criterion of practicality, and Kant usesthis latter term almost like an independentvariable. It underlies all things and eventsthat are 'natural', 'reasonable', and there-fore 'moral'. It is the ultimate in hisscheme of thought as reflected in this

categorical assertion: 'It is practical reason

alone that can prescribe laws to free

beings.'In his inquiry as to 'what is most essen-

tial relatively to a perpetual peace', Kant

once more focuses his attention on 'whatnature has done with regard to it', onlyto ascertain that 'she [nature] favors themoral views of man and guarantees the

execution of the laws reason prescribesto him.' (p. 32)

Clearly, an appreciation of Kant's ideason

lasting peace hinges on a proper under-standing of things 'practical'4as conceivedand defined by him. Most importantly,we should not detach this preoccupationwith practicality from his absorbtion intothe principle of laws and human rights.By combining the two, Kant obtained a

yardstick which the contemporary social

scientist may call 'common interest'.

5. Thelimitations f Kant's argumentsAs already indicated, it would be un-

warranted for us to subject Kant to a

rigorouscriticismfrom the vantage groundof contemporary knowledge and methodsof inquiry. Nonetheless, his theory is

significant not only in terms of the historyof social and political thought, but alsoin terms of certain views and patterns of

reasoning which are still strikingly cogent

and valid. Moreover, a broad applicationof the contemporary perspective to his

theory might conceivably yield new in-

sights - by way of new foci of interest.







400

Apart from all these considerations,

however, a sketch of some of the short-

comings might be in order. As in many of

the works of current thinkers, Kant's

treatise is predicated upon certain valuesor assumptions, chief among which seem

to be his faith in human ratonalitydictated

by practical necessities. Does it reallyfollow that if man can be induced to

recognize his stakes in a situation, his

ensuing behavior is going to be rational?

If not, can legality and legal institutions

sufficiently ensure such behavior and helpentrench peace on an intra-national and

international basis ?It is a current sociological axiom, for

instance, than any kind of competition,commercial included, is capable of en-

gendering conflict in inter-individual as

well as in inter-group relations. Further-

more, it lies in the nature of a meaningful

competition that there are to be dispro-

portionately more losers than winners. The

ensuing frustrations consitute a matrix of

problems for which no amount of ration-ality in any culture has yet found a

panacea. Consequently, we continue to

remain afflicted with the disruptive and

also perilous spell of the dimensions of

the frustation-aggressioncycle, abetted bythe social system as a whole.

The general trend of human affairs

before and after Kant, and more partic-

ularly the sequence of wars since his times,attest to this intrinsic pitfall. Moreover,the gist of Freudian and post-Freudiancontributions to our knowledge of 'human

nature' stresses the preponderance of hu-

man irrationality - in spite of, or even

because of, high stakes in conflict situ-

ations. This is epitomized in Freud's con-

summate verdict on this nature, in his

Civilizationand Its Discontents: 'The core

of our being consists of wishes which are

unattainable yet cannot be checked.' If

civilization itself thus critically contributesto non-rational and irrational behavior

(the perennial antagonism between the

Id and the Super-ego), what are the

margins for rendering man a rational

being, invariably gravitating to peace?Another weakness is that Kant over-

looks the socio-cultural foundations of

human nature. Complex cultures producecomplex personalitieswhich tend to elude,

defy, or circumvene legal and also moral

inhibitions. The imbalances, incompati-

bilities, contradictions, and ambiguities inthe value systems of Western cultures, for

example, are bound to produce tensions

of role conflict, role failure, and personalitydisorders thus tending to impair or

eclipse 'rational' dispositions in man. For

many of these, the quest for targets orvictims for scapegoating, violence, and

for ultimate relief is bound to ensue. Theyalso contribute to anti-social, criminal,and deviant behavior on an individual

plane.Nor should we disregard the often un-

controllabledynamics resultingfrominter-

group rivalries and culminating in inter-

national conflicts, via the channels of

collective behavior - whether throughelementary forms of such behavior, or

through organized political movements

such as nationalism. In fact, incentives

of commerce, in Kant's view the arch-

hope of mankind, can here accentuate

rather than diminish friction. They can

even be made to subserve the acquisitiveor militant appetite of a nationalist move-

ment. Here, Kant failed even to sense the

utility and the attendant temptations in-

volved in the possession and exercise of

power - as a lever in international re-

lations revolving around competitive com-

merce.

Finally, we might argue that equally

important is the consideration of the

situational determinants,which inexorablybear upon human needs, emotions, or

aspirations in a given contest. The capa-

city for rational reasonig is often sub-

verted by the emergent pressures which,for instance, a competitive, individualistic,

urban, and industrial society is bound

to exert - should we disregard other







401

factors. In this sense, we might argue that radical changes in human behavior - in

'practical reason' must go beyond the this instance, the eradication of destructive

realm of law, attacking the stresses and or violent aggressiveness through any kind

strains created and sustained by allied of war - it may not be enough to ap-

social institutions. The anthropological preciate, crave, or even desperately need

theory of culture configuration suggests, peace. Rather, one may have to restruc-

and a host of prominent social scientists ture the total socio-cultural complex of

indicate, that if one wishes to bring about which that behavior is but a by-product.

NOTES

1 Kant, Immanuel, (Introduction by N. M. Butler), PerpetualPeace, New York: Columbia

University Press, 1939, p. 27. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to this edition.2

One cannot help but note here Kant's anticipation of an entire school of post-Darwin thinkersand scientists who either took issue with the latter or reinterpreted his finding regarding the chief

governing principles of life. The dispute revolved around the two antithetical concepts of 'co-

operation' and 'competition' regulating the human struggle to survive. Eager to over-simplify,many were quick to base Darwin's contributions upon the motto: Survival fthefittest,thus statingthat in every struggle one side was bound to perish and the other to prevail. In other words, a

high premium was placed upon brute force, strength and constitutional or residual power, as thecardinal principle of enduring nature.

As Kropotkin subsequently pointed out, however, a closer scrutiny of life in nature, whether

among animals or plants, will reveal that even in competition there is cooperation, and that the

principle of mutual assistance is superordinate to that of antagonistic struggle.3 Kant, Immanuel (Translated by W. Hastie), TheMetaphysics f Morals,Chapter V, 'Public

Law', EternalPeace (and Other nternational ssays), Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1914,

pp. 158, 159.4 It was this quest for feasibility which aroused Rousseau to inveigh against all exponents of

realism, to which he counterposed his romantic idealism. Overtaken by an urge to reformsociety,and recognizing that everything in it was connected with politics (J'avais vue que tout tenaitradicalement a la politique ...' Les Confessions,II, IX, 7), he decided to concentrate on re-

forming the government - through education of the citizens. This attitude was not bent on

accommodating existing facts of life but on changing them, so that human nature could reallybe reformed from within and not merely checked from without. To this end he wrote his ex-tensive educational work Emile which is prefaced by his attack on the obsession with 'feasibility'- as a guide post of education and reform. In it, he frowned upon the argument: 'proposez ce

qui est faisable,' which he equated with expedient conformism and declared to be tantamountto saying: 'proposez de faire ce qu'on fait.'

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Dadrian Kant's Concepts of 'Human Nature' and 'Rationality' Two Arch Determinants of an Envisioned 'Eternal Peace