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INVESTIGATION REPORT:THE SINKING OF THE KANDI WON,JULY 4,2012

INVESTIGATED BY THE NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

KATHLEEN M.RICE

NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

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Investigation Report: The Sinking of the Kandi Won

Overview:

On July 4, 2012 at approximately 10:05 p.m. the overloaded Kandi Won boat attempted to return

to Huntington Harbor following a fireworks display in Oyster Bay Harbor. There were 27 peopleon board, including 15 adults and young adults, and 12 children aged 16 and under. The totalpassenger weight on the boat was approximately 3,519 pounds. A wave apparently struck thevessel at the worst possible angle, causing the boat to rock and then tip over until the Kandi Wonlay on its side. Eleven-year-old Harley Treanor, seven-year-old Victoria Gaines, and 12-year-old

David Aureliano were trapped in the boat's cabin with David's parents, Deborah and GregAureliano. The cabin was dark and filled quickly with water. Mr. and Mrs. Aureliano attempted

to hold the children above the water as they struggled to find a way out. They were unable tokeep hold of the children. Tragically, the three children drowned. The boat eventually sank to adepth of 65 feet on the floor of the Long Island Sound.

This report will document the immediate aftermath and investigation of the events, analyze the

existing legal authorities, and make recommendations in an effort to prevent this type of tragedyin the future.

A review of the statutes and regulations governing pleasure craft revealed a system of laws thatrely heavily on long-standing, informal practices. Some people maintain a cultural belief that

pleasure boating is the last bastion of recreation that is free from over-regulation. Unfortunatelythese views tend toward a sentimental oversimplification of the nature of recreational boating.

Governments first role is to ensure public safety, and boaters safety must be balanced withfreedom and recreation. Basic safety provisions are necessary to provide freedom for individuals

to enjoy the waterways knowing that the other people and vessels around them do not pose athreat.

The tragic events of July 4, 2012 should cause a re-examination of the laws, regulations and

common boating practices. The nature of this tragedy has raised issues at the federal, state andlocal levels and these issues are discussed comprehensively in this report. It is imperative thatwe learn from the capsizing of the Kandi Won and use those lessons to improve boating safety inour communities.

Synopsis of Findings:

The Kandi Won capsized and sank as a result of being overloaded and apparentlyencountering a 90 wave.

Operation of the boat, including the number of people on board, is ultimately theresponsibility of the boat operator and, in this case, the boat owner since he was alsoonboard. However there was no capacity plate required by federal regulation indicating

maximum occupancy weight and distribution. Witnesses recalled that the Kandi Wonhad previously been operated with a large number of people without incident. Thecombination of the weight, its distribution and the angle of the incoming wave each

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contributed to making the capsizing of the Kandi Won inevitable. The responsibility ofthe boat operator and owner did not rise to the level of criminality under thesecircumstances.

Proposals:1. Recreational boating safety regulations under federal law should be mandated in thesame manner as motor vehicle safety regulations. The current safety standards should bereviewed, expanded to include all sizes of recreational vessels, and the European modelof categorizing vessels according to their intended use and geographic location should be

explored.

2. 33 CFR 183.21 should be amended to require capacity standards and capacity platesas a basic safety requirement of all vessels, regardless of size or use.

3. The U.S. Coast Guard, law enforcement and rescue agencies must re-open

discussions regarding inter-agency dependency and resource allocation. If permissible,

U.S. Coast Guard members should be given peace officer status for the issuance ofsummons and the availability of rescue divers and their response times should berevisited.

4. The New York State Legislature recently passed a bill requiring boating safetycertificates for all operators born on or after May 1, 1996. Persons born before the May 1date are exempt. The bill goes into effect May 1, 2014 and represents a good first step.However lawmakers should work toward endeavor to include all boaters and shouldamend the provisions relating to children.

5. The Department of Motor Vehicles should be the repository for all

licensing/certifications for any type of vehicle or vessel operated in New York State.

Licenses and non-driver IDs should be marked accordingly. All convictions, suspensionsor revocations should be reflected on the operating record. Although the law currentlyrequires this record, significant effort must be undertaken to improve reporting.

6. New York State should conform its laws relating to operating any type of vehicle orvessel while intoxicated or impaired by drugs; operating while intoxicated or impairedwith a child in the car, vessel, snowmobile or ATV, leaving the scene of collisions, etc.

7. Vessels should not only be registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles, theyshould be required to undergo a safety inspection in a manner and intervals to bedetermined by the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation.

8. Regulators should convene a work group consisting of boating experts and

associations, members of law enforcement and local governments to create a strategicboating safety plan with specific legislative and educational goals. New York Stateshould take the lead on these important public safety issues and become the nationalmodel for boating safety.

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Detailed Statement of Facts

The Capsizing:

On July 4, 2012 at approximately 7:00 p.m. the Treanor and Aureliano families gathered at

Knutsons Marina at Huntington. The families and a group of friends packed food, soda, beerand wine and boarded Kevin Treanors 34-foot Silverton boat, the "Kandi Won", which wasmoored at the marina. They intended to travel to Oyster Bay Harbor in the area of Cove Neck towatch a fireworks display. There were 27 occupants on the boat when it left the marina, 12adults, seven young adults or teenagers ranging from 15 -21 years old, and eight childrenbetween seven and 12 years old. The total passenger weight on the boat was approximately3,520 pounds.

Most witnesses interviewed stated it was an "uneventful" trip from the Marina to Oyster BayHarbor. Guy Denigris, a friend of the boats owner, Kevin Treanor, piloted the boat out of themarina and to the area of the fireworks in Cove Neck. A few witnesses stated the boat had"rocked" or "listed" (leaned or tilted) to varying degrees during the outgoing trip. Specifically

Mr. Denigris stated to P.O. Norman McCloy that as he operated the boat he thought the vesselhad water in its bilge, or, as an afterthought now, maybe a lot of weight on board because the

vessel had been listing (leaning or tilting) back and forth. He indicated in retrospect that at onepoint between Huntington Harbor and Oyster Bay Harbor the boat listed quite a bit, but thevessel recovered.

The Kandi Won anchored among numerous other boats to wait for the fireworks display to start.The boat's occupants ate, conversed and some of the children went swimming. According torecords, the fireworks began at 9:20 p.m. and lasted for a half hour. It took approximately 10minutes to raise the anchor and start to leave the area, along with numerous other boats. Theboat was being operated by 50 year-old Sal Aureliano. Mr. Aureliano had taken a boating safetycourse and had received a boating safety certificate.

1He reports over 500 hours of marine

experience prior to the capsizing.

The Kandi Won travelled north out of Oyster Bay Harbor. Mr. Aureliano stated that he "was notoperating at full speed, probably around half throttle for that vessel, maybe 12-15 knots". He didnot know how many passengers were on board. He advised P.O. Norman McCloy at 1:15 a.m.on July 5, 2012 that there were vessels going in his same direction on both his left and rightsides. It was very dark and he could not distinguish the type or size of the vessels. He could

only see their navigation lights but the boat to his left was slowly overtaking him.

Mr. Aureliano stated that just before the Kandi Won capsized, the boat started turning to the rightand then leaned hard to the right. He stated that he tried to steer to the left and used the throttlesto slow the boat to "idle". The boat just kept leaning further and further until it capsized and then

eventually overturned completely. The bridge contained approximately 985 pounds of passengerweight at the time. Mr. Aureliano stated that it was very dark and he could not tell if he had

1 The New York State Dept. of Parks and Recreation confirmed this.

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caught a wave. The first call about the incident was received at approximately 10:06 p.m. As aresult, the time of capsizing is estimated to be approximately 10:05 p.m.

The boat capsized at the mouth of Cold Spring Harbor at latitude 40, 55.473 north; longitude073, 30.718 west. Accounts vary about how long it took for the boat to turn completely upsidedown from its position on its side. Most say the boat turned over very quickly. A U.S. CoastGuard boat was at the scene in approximately five minutes and other law enforcement vessels

followed shortly thereafter. Three Oyster Bay Bay Constable boats were on scene andparticipated in the rescue and recovery. Those boats were staffed by Bay Constables Mike Rich,Carmine Montesano, John Plank and Thomas Dillman. Two civilian boats were also there withina few minutes and picked up passengers. Mitchell Kramer was also on scene with a tow boatfrom BoatUS. Mr. Kramer provided substantial aid to the operation by securing a line to thebow of the capsized Kandi Won at approximately 10:30 p.m. He later handed off the line tomembers of the NCPD at about 1:00 a.m. after the boat completely submerged. Mr. Kramerassisted throughout the operation and his tow boat was used as a temporary working platform

during the rescue and recovery. The Kandi Won drifted and submerged at approximately 11:30

p.m.

Law enforcement personnel did not observe any signs of impairment on either the boat operator,Sal Aureliano or the boat owner, Kevin Treanor. Both men denied consuming any alcohol whileon the boat. There was no smell of alcohol emanating from either man, and neither displayed andsigns of intoxication. As a precaution both men were administered a preliminary breath test(PBT) at 3:10 a.m. and 3:12 a.m. respectively. Both men registered .00 BAC at those times.

Witness Statements:

Ray Rivers was travelling in his 24-foot boat with three other people behind Kandi-Won in itswake. Mr. Rivers describes the water as good condition, stating the wakes were not crazy,with no wind but a storm was approaching. Mr. Rivers was gaining on the Kandi Won when it

stopped. He cut his power and drifted toward the boat which was on its side with people in thewater. Mr. Rivers called the Coast Guard at approximately 10:10 p.m. Mr. Rivers stated thatfrom the time of his arrival it only took the boat one minute to turn completely upside down inthe water. Mr. Rivers said that the police were there in five minutes followed by approximately10 emergency boats. Mr. Rivers opined that the boat had a bad design since he saw three people

on one side of a similar boat rock it while docked in Connecticut. He blamed this on the boatsflat bottom.

An employee of Knutsons Marina had just finished work and was preparing to sail over toOyster Bay to watch the fireworks with a friend. He stated that Kevin Treanor left about a halfhour before the employee. The employee stated he only saw around 10 to 12 people on the boatas it left. He met up with the Kandi Won in Oyster Bay and they tied off together to watch the

fireworks. The employee asked Mr. Treano where he got all these people but Mr. Treanordidnt really answer. It was the employees opinion the boat was overloaded so he offered totake some of the people back to Huntington on his boat but once again, he said, Mr. Treanorreally didnt answer. Mr. Treanor also kind of signaled to me that they were okay. Theemployee heard a distress call on the way back to Huntington and saw the flare and the policeresponding but did not know it was the Kandi Won until the next day.

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Sal Aureliano is related to theboat's owner through marriage. Mr. Aureliano was operating theboat when it capsized. In addition to the statement given to P.O. Norman McCloy (above), Mr.Aureliano also gave a statement to assigned NCPD Homicide Detective, David Nystrom at 4:30a.m. on July 5, 1012. He stated:

After the fireworks were done we left along with some other boats. This was about alittle after 10 p.m. and I was piloting the boat. People were in the cabin, in the back and

some older kids were on the front of the boat...At this time there was a boat on my rightand a boat on my left. After the boat passed me on my left I think I hit a wave and astorm was developing and the water got rough. After hitting the wave I tried to controlthe boat but it went over fast to my right. The boat started to fill fast with water...I didn'tdrink any alcohol while we were on the boat.

Guy Denigris is a friend of the boats owner, Kevin Treanor. He operated the boat on the tripfrom Huntington to Oyster Bay. He did not know the number of people on board the boat. Mr.Denigris stated that as he drove the boat out of Huntington Harbor and got towards the sound,the boat hit multiple wakes and the boat rocked a little. We got to Cold Spring Harbor around

8:30 and waited till about 9:15 when the fireworks started. It was dark out and the weatherwas still nice when they left after the fireworks. Mr. Denigris stated everybody was spread outon the boat. After about 15 minutes I felt that the boat was moving back and forth and it caughtmy attention. I wasnt alarmed but I yelled to Sal Whats going on? I dont remember if hereplied. I went up top and Sal seemed to be in control. The boat seemed fine and then the boatwent over to the right. The water seemed choppy but I dont recall a big wave or multiple waves

when the boat went over. Two-and-a-half weeks after the capsizing, Mr. Denigris stated to P.O.Norman McCloy that as he operated the boat he thought the vessel had water in its bilge or, asan afterthought now, maybe a lot of weight on board because the vessel had been listing (leaningor tilting) back and forth. He indicated in retrospect that at one point between HuntingtonHarbor and Oyster Bay Harbor the boat listed quite a bit, but the vessel recovered.

LuAnn Denigris is the wife of Guy Denigris and a friend of Kevin Treanors. Mrs. Denigisstated that everyone boarded at Knutsons Marina and that the only stop the boat made on theway to Oyster Bay was to empty the bathroom. Mrs. Denigris stated my husband and I felt thatthe boat didnt seem as stable as in the past and we had gone out on the boat before with plenty

of people. She also stated that on the way back, the boat rocked once to the right and myhusband, Guy, went up top to Sal to see what was wrong. When Guy got up to the top, the boatwent over to the right and everybody got thrown out.

Greg Aureliano is David, Rocco and Kimberlys father. Mr. Aureliano stated he did not knowhow many people were on the boat when they left Knutsons marina. He said they were headedto watch the fireworks in Oyster Bay like we have done for years. He described the trip to

Oyster Bay as uneventful. Mr. Aureliano also stated there were boats docked all aroundthem during the fireworks. He stated my wife and I were inside the cabin of the boat with myson, David, Kevins daughter, Harley, and Victoria Gaines. Mr. Aureliano indicated that about10 minutes into the trip back from Oyster Bay the boat unexpectedly rolled to the right sidethrowing myself, my wife Deborah, and the three children to the right side of the boat, alongwith the couch, and other things inside. The boat filled up quickly with water and my wife and I

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lifted all three children above the water as it rushed in. He stated it was dark and they weretrying to find a way out when they lost their grip on the children. Mr. and Mrs. Aureliano wereeventually able to get out of the boat.

Deborah Aureliano is David, Rocco and Kimberlys mother. She states there were more than 20boats watching the fireworks in the area where they anchored. When the fireworks display wasover, she went below into the cabin with her husband, Greg and her son, David. Mrs. Aureliano

stated that as the boat was heading back to Huntington, the boat was rocking because it felt likewe hit a wake. The boat rocked and then turned over and was not able to recover. Mrs.Aureliano stated the cabin was filling up with water and she tried to help her son, David andseven year-old, Victoria Gaines. She lost David and Victoria, saw a light and was able to get outfrom under the boat. Thereafter she swam to a Coast Guard boat where she met up with herhusband, Greg and her son, Rocco.

Rocco Aureliano (16 years old) is the brother of David (deceased). He stated that the KandiWon left after the fireworks display at about 9:50 p.m. He stated that a lot of boats [were]leaving at the same time. He had been on the forward bow when the boat capsized and he saw

his 10-year-old sister, Kimberly, and his 11-year-old cousin, Julia Aureliano in the water. Roccoalso stated I grabbed hold of them and helped them to get onto a speed boat that came over toassist us. I then swam back to the boat that capsized and tried to get into the cabin to save mybrother, David, and my second cousin, Harley Treanor. Rocco stated that a Coast Guard boatpulled up to him and Coast Guard officials made him get into the boat with them.

Candida Treanor is Kevin Treanors sister-in-law. She stated the weather was fine when theyleft from the fireworks display. About 10 minutes into the ride back, while I was sitting in the

back of the boat on the left side, I felt a thrust which pushed the boat over to the right side. Iwatched the people on the right side of the boat get pulled into the water, and I think I mighthave been one of the last people into the water. The boat went over onto its right side and totallycapsized within secondsI tried to get into the boat along with Sal, Guy and otherswe knewthat Harley and David were inside and we were frantically trying to get to them. Eventuallyrescue people came and took over

Joan Treanor is Kevin Treanors mother. She did not know the number of people who boardedthe boat at Knutsons Marina and further stated the boat seemed to be handling the same [as

before]. Mrs. Treanor further stated As we were heading back, I was sitting in the right rearcorner of the boat. While we were heading out of the bay on the way back, boats were speedingpast us causing wakes, which at the time didnt alarm me. Then it seems a big wave hit us,rocking the boat. Water seemed to come into the back by me from the left and then the right andthen the boat went over to the right. We all got thrown out of the boat

Eric Machado is a friend of the boats owner, Kevin Treanor. He stated the trip to Oyster Bay

was uneventful and that he did not know how many people were on the boat. Mr. Machadostated while they were stopped to watch the fireworks, people ate and some people swam. Hestated that after about 10 minutes on the way back All of a sudden the boat went over to theright and everybody ended up in the water. Everybody was around me in the water. A lot ofboats stopped to help us.

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Deborah McGovern stated that she was seated in the back of the boat with her boyfriend, EricMachado, and some other people when they were heading back to Huntington after the fireworksdisplay. [A]ll of a sudden the boat went over to my left side (I was standing at this time facingthe rear of the boat). This happened real fast and I found myself in the water[there was] a lot

of screaming.

Casey Spanier (21 years old) is a friend of Laine Treanor. She and her friends were the last on

the boat and were not concerned with the number of people. The young adults and teens rode onthe forward bow of the boat. They had been anchored among other boats to watch the fireworks.When it ended, the boats began leaving the harbor. About eight minutes into the trip back toHuntington Harbor, the boat rocked slightly to the right, then left and then back to the right anddid not recover. The boat was at 90 to the water and everybody was falling or jumping off theboat. Ms. Spanier described the boat as remaining on its side and then slowly sank andeventually went totally upside down.

Sydney Shlakman (16 years old) is a friend of Laine Treanor. He estimated the Kandi Won wascarrying approximately 17 people to Oyster Bay for the fireworks. He described the trip there as

normal, uneventful. He stated after the fireworks they pulled anchor and about 8 10minutes later they started back toward Huntington. About 10 minutes into the ride, I sawlightning and the water seemed a little choppy. Other boats were leaving at the same time, but Idont know how many. All of a sudden the boat started to roll slowly to its right. Everybodystarted to scream and I let go and fell into the water. Mr. Shlakman made it to a boat but knewfrom the way everybody was reacting I know that someone was still on the boat.

Brendan Gellerstein is a friend of Laine Treanor. He described the trip to Oyster Bay as

normal. He said it took them about 10 minutes to leave Oyster Bay after the fireworks ended.The boat then travelled about another 10 minutes when the boat went over. Right before theboat went over, the boat was rocking a little more than normal and then it went up and rolledover to the right side. The water when we left seemed more choppy then on the way overEveryone was screaming in the water. Mr. Gellerstein was eventually picked up by anotherboat.

Recovery of the Children:

The body of 11-year-old Harley Treanor was recovered underneath the boat at 11:10 p.m. byAtlantic Steamer/Oyster Bay Fire Company firefighter divers Ronald Bagen and Daniel Rivera.The boat was capsized and floating upside down in the water. A second body was observed bythe divers but the boat began to sink and the divers were unable to recover the body at that time.Harley Treanor was removed and emergency CPR was performed by Town of Oyster Bay, BayConstable John Plank. Petty Officer 3rd Class Dillon Palmer of the U.S. Coast Guard assisted

transporting Harley Treanor to the Town of Oyster Bay, Roosevelt Park launching ramp whichwas being used as a staging area. Constable Plank continued CPR throughout the transport.Harly was transported a 1:16 A.M. to Syosset Hospital by East Norwich Fire Departmentambulance where she was pronounced dead at 3:46 a.m. NCPD diver Sgt. Andrew Sawula,shield number 527, was on-duty on July 4. NCPD divers P.O. Brian Frey, shield number 2769,P.O. William Gordon, shield number 851, P.O. Gene Drum, shield number 1571 and P.O.

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Norman McCloy, shield number 301, were called in and responded to the location. The NewYork City Police Department (NYPD) also dispatched a helicopter with 2 divers who landed atRoosevelt Park in Oyster Bay, NY. Seven members of the Cold Spring Harbor Fire Departmentdivers also responded to the scene but NCPD had re-classified the dive operation at 12:35 a.m.

from a rescue to a deep dive recovery because the boat had submerged to a depth of 65 feet. There-classification required the remaining dives to be conducted by police divers.

The body of seven-year-old, Victoria Gaines, was recovered at 1:30 a.m. on July 5, 2012 byNCPD police divers Brian Frey and Gene Drum. The body of 12-year-old David Aureliano, wasrecovered at 2:12 a.m. by NCPD police divers Brian Frey and William Gordon. Both wererecovered from inside the cabin of the boat, which had submerged. Both children were

pronounced dead by AMT Joshua Gallub, shield number 70, aboard NCPD vessel, Marine 13:48 a.m. and 3:50 a.m. respectively. The boat had drifted .7 nautical miles southeast from theposition of its original capsizing. It was approximately mile from the shore. The boat waslocated at latitude 40, 55.113 north; longitude 073, 29.819 west at a depth of 65 feet.

Other Boat Occupants:

Passengers were removed from the water. Seventeen passengers were taken by an NCPD vesseland a private boat to the first staging area at the Seawanhaka Yacht Club in Centre Island, NY.Bayville Fire Chief Dennis Kelly provided their large passenger bus and an ambulance to theSeawanhaka location. Six passengers were taken by an Oyster Bay Fire Department vessel and aTown of Oyster Bay Bay Constable boat to the second staging area at Roosevelt Park in Oyster

Bay, NY. Four passengers from that location were transported by fire department ambulances toarea hospitals. Deborah and Rocco Aureliano were treated for shock at Glen Cove Hospital.Candida Treanor and Guy Denigris were treated for shock at Syosset Hospital

Occupants and Their General Locations at the Time of Capsizing:

The operator of the boat was Salvatore Aureliano (50 years old). He was located on the bridge.The three children who died were located in the boat's cabin with two adults. The children were11-year-old Harley Treanor, 12-year-old David Aureliano and seven-year-old Victoria Gaines.Harley is the daughter of the boat's owner. David is the nephew of the boat's operator, SalAureliano. Victoria Gaines was not related to any of the parties. Her mother, Lisa, was a friend

of the boat's owner. (See the relationship list below.)

Cabin Occupants (in addition to the 3 children): Combined Weight in Location

Greg Aureliano (45 years old) Approximately 632 poundsDeborah Aureliano (45 years old)

Forward Bow Occupants:Sydney Shlakman (16 years old) Approximately 934 pounds

Brendon Gellerstein (18 years old)Caitlyn Kemerson (14 years old)Rocco Aureliano (16 years old)Lainie Treanor (20 years old)

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Casey Spanier (21 years old)Haily Treanor (15 years old)

Aft Cockpit (Back) of Boat:

Luann Denigras (47 years old) Approximately 965 poundsDeborah McGovern (43 years old)Eric Machado (42 years old)Kevin Treanor (46 years old) - OwnerJoan Treanor (74 years old)Candida Treanor (49 years old)Christina Aureliano (12 years old)

The Bridge:

Madison Treanor (8 years old) Approximately 988 poundsLisa Gaines (45 years old)

Salvatore Aureliano (50 years old) - OperatorCathy Aureliano (49 years old)Ryan Gaines (12 years old)Julia Aureliano (11 years old)Guy Denigris (50 years old)Kimberly Aureliano (10 years old)

Total weight: Approximately 3,519 pounds

Relationship of Occupants (Those not listed below are friends):

Candi Treanor Sister-in-law of-- Kevin Treanor (Owner)

(Married to Joe Treanor) (- Not on boat -) (ex- wife: Joy)Mother of: Father of:Haily Treanor Harley TreanorLaine Treanor Madison Treanor

Sister of-- Sal Aureliano (Operator)Married to:Cathy Aureliano

Parents of:Julia AurelianoChristina Aureliano

Sister of-- Greg Aureliano

Married to:Deborah Aureliano

Parents of:David AurelianoRocco AurelianoKimberly Aureliano

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Daughter-in-law of-- Joan TreanorMother of adults:

Kevin (Boat owner)Joe (**Not on boat)

Grandmother of Harley

Weather:

On July 4, 2012 at 7:18 p.m. the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a forecast for LongIsland Sound west of New Haven, Connecticut/Port Jefferson New York. The forecast for thatnight indicated northwest winds around 5 knots with seas at one foot or less. It also indicated achance of showers and thunderstorms for the evening.

At 9:15 p.m. National Weather Service Doppler radar indicated thunderstorms producing windsaround 30 knots. The storm was located 21 nautical miles northwest of Bridgeport, (northern) CTand was travelling southeast at 20 knots. Mariners were warned to expect gusty winds up to 30knots with locally higher waves and occasional lightning strikes. Boaters were advised to seek

safe harbor until the storm passed.

At 10:04 p.m. the NWS issued a bulletin and requested immediate broadcast of a special marinewarning for the Long Island Sound, west of New Haven, CT/ Port Jefferson, NY. Radar detecteda thunderstorm 4 nautical miles northwest of Captain Harbor, CT and moving southeast at 30knots. The bulletin advised that mariners could expect gusty winds, high waves, dangerouslightning and heavy rains.

The storm was forecast to be in the area of Captains Harbor, CT around 10:10 p.m., HempsteadHarbor, NY around 10:20 p.m. and Cold Spring Harbor, NY around 10:25 p.m. Boaters wereagain advised to seek safe harbor until the storm passes.

At 10:13 p.m. NWS radar continued to indicate a thunderstorm producing winds over 35 knots inthe area of Captains Harbor, CT moving southeast at 35 m.p.h. The storm was forecast to be 3

miles southwest of Cold Spring Harbor by 10:25 p.m. The same precautions about seeking safeharbor and the effects of the storm remained in effect till 10:30 p.m.

Despite these reports, weather does not appear to have played a significant role in this capsizing

other than speculation that boaters were hurrying to beat the weather and return to their homedocks. At the time of the capsizing the wind was northwest at 7-14 m.p.h., water temperaturewas 73 and high tide was due at 12:47 a.m. A weather buoy stationed by the University ofConnecticut in the general area did not record the weather and wave data. A few of thewitnesses indicated their belief that the water was "choppier", or more rough, on the return trip toHuntington. Heavy rains and storm conditions commenced shortly after the capsizing. The wind

conditions could play a role in any initial aviation response.

Fireworks:

On July 4, 2012 there was a fireworks display scheduled for approximately 9:30 p.m. in OysterBay Harbor in the area of Cove Neck. The display was hosted by James Dolan who had

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submersion the engine is likely to have overheated. P.O. McCloy also noted the seacock shut-offhandle was missing. (A seacock is a valve in the hull that protects the plumbing pipes from waterfrom outside the vessel and/or permits water to flow into or out of the boat depending on theneed. Seacocks can be used to intake salt water for a faucet or to cool an engine or to release

water out of the boat, such as for a sink drain or a toilet.)

The boats 12 volt batteries were energized. There were two bilge pumps, and the bilge pump inthe engine compartment had compromised wiring. The pump functioned properly when attached

to intact wires. P.O. McCloy was unable to determine whether the corrosion to the wiringexisted before the boat sank or whether the corrosion was the result of the submersion. P.O.McCloy's inspection concluded there was no significant source of water entering the vesselbefore the boat capsized. It was his opinion that even if only one of the bilge pumps wasfunctioning, it should have been able to control any water in the bilge since there was no

significant amount of water entering.

There was some pressure crushing and resulting leaks in the fuel tanks which P.O. McCloyattributed to the external pressure created by the sea water as the boat sank and remainedsubmerged. There was no water intrusion from the shower and toilet connections. There weretwo bilge blowers (essentially two engine fume exhaust fans). P.O. McCloy indicated it couldnot be determined with certainty if they were functioning pre-submersion. However, he notedthat the motors did not appear to be seized. The switches for the steaming lights and the

navigation lights were in the on position when the boat was recovered. The navigation lightsdid not work upon inspection but again, the submersion could have damaged the lights.

Life Jackets:

Homicide Detective Nystrom reported the recovery of 21 assorted sized life jackets confirmed tobe recovered from the boat along with a throwable life ring. There were 16 adult-sized and fiveyouth-sized jackets specifically attributable to the Kandi Won. David Aureliano was recovered

wearing one of the youth sized life jackets. There were also numerous life jackets in the vicinityof where the boat capsized. It is impossible to discern how many of these jackets came from theKandi Won or the other boats who responded to the emergency.

Stability Test:

Neil Gallagher, B.S., M.S., P.E, Professor of Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture atWebb Institute, performed a stability analysis of the Kandi Won on October 18, 2012 after theboat's recovery.

2He first noted that the hull of the boat had no apparent damage. This indicated

the most likely cause of the capsizing was "related to the stability of the vessel". Professor

Gallagher did a stability test of the vessel "using a procedure called an "inclining experiment"according to methods normally used by U.S. Coast Guard to demonstrate stability on commercial

passenger vessels. This method required the boat to be place in the water and outfitted with testequipment. The center of gravity was determined for the empty vessel as well as its "lightship"weight (empty weight) of 16, 500 pounds.

2

The Stability Analysis is attached hereto.

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Then the center of gravity, "lightship" weight and hull shape were used to examine operatingstability with various weights on board such as the weights of passengers, fuel, water, etc. Theweights and approximate locations of all persons on board the Kandi Won at the time of thecapsizing were required information which was obtained through NCPD interviews. All weights

and individual centers of gravity were entered into a computer program that uses the hull shapeto determine the stability characteristics.

The Kandi Won's stability in flat water conditions (no waves) was substantially impacted by theweights on the boat. The empty boat with no fuel and no passengers was slightly less than 2.5times more stable than the fully loaded boat. The fully loaded boat indicated that it was capableof righting itself when "heeled" (tilted or leaned) in flat water but the boat received a low "score"in this regard. The empty boat with no passengers or fuel would have had adequate stability toreturn upright when heeled (tilted or leaned), but the boat as loaded at the time of the incidenthad marginal stability in flat water. One commonly used numerical indication of stability wasreduced by about 60% when the empty boat was loaded as it was at the time of the incident.

The stability of the Kandi Won was examined against different size waves encountered from

various angles. Waves approaching any vessel at a 90 angle to the centerline of the ship's "keel"(center of the hull) "will impart a significant rolling movement". In the case of the Kandi Wonthe greatest "heel" angle was caused by these 90 waves. "(I)n particular with a 2-foot waveheight...the vessel has insufficient stability to remain upright and has capsized."

Gallagher observed:

When loaded with the twenty-seven persons...there was low stability in flat water,although enough to remain upright. However, in beam (90) waves of only two feet, theboat had inadequate stability to remain upright and was likely to capsize...(T)his analysisdemonstrates from a naval architectural standpoint why it happened. While the exactseries of events with regards to whether another boat was passing the Kandi Won, and

what steering and throttle movements may have been made that had an influence on thecapsize, may not be known with certainty, what this analysis shows is that the capsizewas very likely to have occurred given the loading...Once the boat rolled to 75 or 80degrees, the deck and interior would have flooded, and the predictions of heel angle nolonger would apply as flooding and sinking at any angle of heel with the deck edge

immersed sinking was inevitable...It can be concluded that the load of 27 passengers,located as they were on July 4th led to the capsizing and sinking of the vessel.

Eric Sorensen is the author of "Sorensen's Guide to Powerboats". He was also the foundingdirector of J. D. Power and Associates Marine Practice and is a consultant for the Navy, boatbuilders and boat owners. Mr. Sorenson did a theoretical or "academic" analysis of the capsizingfor "Soundings: Trade Only Today", posted online on July 27, 2012. He indicated that the Kandi

Won (Silverton boat) had "little depth below the waterline, and it has a correspondingly highcenter of gravity, with most of the boat's mass well above the waterline." In addition ..."no matterwhere you are standing on board, your own body's CG (center of gravity)... will be above theboat's CG." He also stated generally "The lower the boat's center of gravity with all passengersand gear on board, the more stable it will be." As a result, Mr. Sorenson states "A planingconvertible such as the Silverton would likely capsize at 60 or 70 degrees of list..."

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It should be reiterated that Mr. Sorenson's analysis was based on boat specifications (rather thanan examination of the Kandi Won) and estimated weights using U.S. Coast Guard averages. Inconjunction with naval architects David Gerr, Eric Sponberg and Steve Dalzell, Mr. Sorensonfound "with 27 passengers on board ...the resulting calculations appear to satisfy the

requirements of the 46 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) stability standards which issurprising." (46 CFR actually applies to commercial boats because there is no such stabilitystandard for recreational boats under 20 feet). He goes on to state "Unfortunately there are nopassenger capacity regulations for uninspected boats of this size in the United States, as there arein Europe. But in speaking with other designers and operators of similar planing boats, I findthat a sort of bell curve of consensus is that 8 to 12 people is a full load for a boat of this type insheltered waters. Some went as high as 15 people if half were children...I would allow, at most,

3 of those 8 on the flybridge at any given time..."

Mr. Sorenson observes that "the Silverton is by every indication a fine inshore boat. Moderatelyloaded and judiciously operated, it should offer safe and satisfactory service in coastal waters..."

In other words, the seaworthiness of the boat is directly related to its loading and operation.

Experts agree that the Kandi Won capsized and sank because it was overloaded and apparentlyencountered a 90 (beam) wave. The wave was likely the result of a vessel of unknown sizepassing the Kandi Won on its left. It was dark and the specific wave was not observed by theboat's operator or other occupants of the boat. There was no indication the wave was weather-related in spite of the approaching storm. The type and design of the boat did not permit it to"right" itself once it tipped and the "deck edge" immersed. At that point, the capsizing and

eventual sinking were inevitable according to Professor Gallagher.

Recommendations and Proposals:

USCG's National Recreational Boating Safety Program, The European Recreational CraftStandard and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)

Both NHTSA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) have a legislative obligation to issue

safety standards and regulations to which manufacturers of both motor vehicles and vessels mustconform and certify compliance. Both NHTSA and the USCG rely on self-certificationprograms. There is a distinction in the federal language used and the resulting responsibility.Whereas the U.S. Secretary of Transportationshallpromulgate motor vehicle safety standards(through NHTSA), the U.S. Secretary of the Interiormay prescribe regulations for recreational

vessels.

According to its website the USCG's mission is:

To minimize the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental impact

associated with the use of recreational boats, through preventive means, in order tomaximize safe use and enjoyment of U.S. Waterways by the public.

Its vision is:

As an agency of the Federal government and a servant of the public, the U.S. CoastGuard, in its role as the designated National Recreational Boating Safety Coordinator, is

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a leader in improving the boating experience of the maritime public. We are anorganization noted for working in partnership with all stakeholders within the waterwaysactivity spectrum and across all modes of transportation to reach consensus solutions. Wemeasure our success by our customer satisfaction, and our customers' needs help define

our workload and priorities.

Title 46 of the United States Code, Subtitle II - Vessels and Seamen, Part B, Chapter 43, -

Recreational Vessels contains USCG's legislative directive. According to the USCG website theRecreational Boating Product Assurance Branch is part of the U.S. Coast Guard's Boating SafetyDivision, and is responsible for developing and enforcing Federal safety standards, investigatingconsumer complaints, interpreting Federal standards. This includes, but is not limited to:

Inspecting and testing recreational boats for compliance.

Investigating consumer complaints involving alleged safety defects and non-compliancewith Federal standards.

Issuing recalls of recreational boats and associated equipment.

Encouraging development of voluntary safety standards for recreational boats by

international and national standards organizations.

Interpreting Federal standards.

Handling requests for exemptions to Federal standards.

Assigning Manufacturer Identification Codes (MICs) to boat manufacturers.

Publishing the Boating Safety Circular newsletter.

USCG safety standards are data-driven. Annual boating fatality and injury data are compiledand reviewed as trends. That data indicates the majority of these incidents occur on recreationalboats under 20 feet and as a result recreational vessel safety standards are targeted at these boatsto the exclusion of larger vessels.

The USCG sets minimum safety standards that boat manufacturers must self-certify as being

met. The USCG conducts factory visits/inspections to insure compliance. However, consistentwith the data-driven approach, the USCG standards do not currently include stability or capacitystandards for recreational vessels over 20 feet. Federal pre-emption law prohibits states fromcreating their own standards. However, the American Boat and Yacht Council (ABYC) setsvoluntary manufacturer standards that "include and expand upon the regulations of the USCG".

The site goes further to state "Federal Regulations cover very little when it comes to boatconstruction. This is where the Standards of the ABYC take over". According to its website theABYC "was created in 1954 as a non-profit organization to develop safety standards for thedesign, construction, equipage, repair and maintenance of boats. The mission of ABYC is toimprove boating safety and reduce the number of injuries and fatalities. Membership isrecommended and rewarded." The National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA) is a

trade association representing the recreational marine industry. It is another voluntary

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membership organization. NMMA certifies vessels by applying the ABYC standards. AnNMMA inspector will inspect each model annually to ensure each vessel is compliant with theapplicable USCG and ABYC standards for that model year.

3There is no requirement that these

voluntary recommendations/standards must be met. It should be noted that the majority of vessel

manufacturers participate in one or both of these programs. However, it should also be notedthat the USCG, the ABYC and the NMMA do not provide standards for recreational boats over26 feet.

The Kandi Won was 34 feet in length and therefore not subject to the standards. The inspectionof the boat also revealed other hazards that could benefit from industry regulation. The slidingcabin door slammed shut and locked when the boat tipped. The cabin furniture, provided with

the boat, was unsecured by design. The couch, table, etc. became obvious projectiles as the boatrolled. It seems clear that safety standards would be appropriate to address these circumstancesin the same way that seatbelts and head restraints are mandated for cars.

By contrast the European Recreational Craft Directivesets essential requirements for the designand construction of recreational craft which it defines as any craft intended for sport orleisure purposes, regardless of the type or the means of propulsion, with a hull length of 2.5m(just over eight feet) to 24m (just over 78 feet), measured according to the appropriateharmonized standards.

4The directive sets regulations and requirements based on four possible

design categories:

A OCEAN: Designed for extended voyages where conditions may exceed wind force 8

(Beaufort scale) and significant wave heights of 4 m and above but excluding abnormalconditions, and vessels largely self-sufficient.

B OFFSHORE: Designed for offshore voyages where conditions up to, and including, windforce 8 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 4 m may be experienced.

C INSHORE: Designed for voyages in coastal waters, large bays, estuaries, lakes and riverswhere conditions up to, and including, wind force 6 and significant wave heights up to, andincluding, 2 m may be experienced.

D SHELTERED WATERS: Designed for voyages on sheltered coastal waters, small bays,small lakes, rivers and canals when conditions up to, and including, wind force 4 and significantwave heights up to, and including, 0.3 m may be experienced, with occasional waves of 0.5 m

maximum height, for example from passing vessels

The European directive requires in section 3.6:

The manufacturer's maximum recommended load (fuel, water, provisions, miscellaneous

equipment and people (in kg)) for which the boat was designed shall be determined

3 See the comparison between USCG requirements and NMMA Certification Requirements available at

http://legcon.nmma.org/certification/about/chart.asp4

See Directorate General for Internal Policies: Design Categories of Watercrafts, available at

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120615ATT46965/20120615ATT46965EN.pdf.

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according to the design category, stability and freeboard (section 3.2) and buoyancy andflotation (section 3.3).

Section 2.2 requires a "Builder's plate" - Each craft shall carry a permanently affixed platemounted separately from the boat hull identification number, containing the followinginformation:

The manufacturer's name; CE marking (The mandatory conformity marking for products sold in the European

Economic Area [EEA]. It is a statement from the manufacturer that the product meets therequirements of the applicable EC directives. In this case, the recreational craftdirective.);

The boat design category; The manufacturer's maximum recommended load excluding weight of the contents of the

fixed tanks when full; and

The number of persons recommended by the manufacturer for which the boat wasdesigned to carry when under way.

By comparison to the Coast Guard regulations, the National Highway Traffic SafetyAdministration (NHTSA) has a legislative "mandate" to issue safety standards and regulations.NHTSA's mandate is under Title 49 of the United States Code, Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle

Safety. NHTSA is required to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) andRegulations to which manufacturers of motor vehicle and equipment items must conform andcertify compliance.

Motor vehicle travel is not a luxury and is inextricably intertwined with the daily living of theAmerican people. As a result, NHTSA has implemented a vehicle safety program that has awider scope than the National Recreational Boating Safety Program conducted by the U.S. CoastGuard. NHTSA's scope is fundamentally more proactive inasmuch as it regulates and causes all

types of motor vehicles to be inspected, regardless of which vehicles are overrepresented in fataland injury crashes.

NHTSA provides for an Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC). According to NHTSA,

OVSC tests new vehicles and regulated equipment items to applicable Federal Motor VehicleSafety Standards (FMVSSs), enforces importation and certification regulations, maintainsidentifying and VIN-deciphering information submitted by motor vehicle and equipmentmanufacturers, and monitors light and heavy vehicle fuel economy requirements for credits andmonetary penalties. OVSC carries out its mission by conducting random compliance testing, andcompliance inspections, and by reviewing import data from the Customs and Border Protection

Agency, and fuel economy data from the Environmental Protection Agency.

According to NHTSA, the FMVSS is also a self-certification program. The NHTSA does notcertify that vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment meet the requirements of variousFMVSSs or issue "approval" stickers, labels, certificates, etc. A NHTSA compliance testing

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program has been in place since 1968. Each year the OVSC randomly selects vehicles and itemsof motor vehicle equipment for compliance testing by independent testing laboratories undercontract with the OVSC to verify that the manufacturer's certification is valid. The OVSCcompliance testing program is a strong incentive for manufacturers of vehicles and/or items of

motor vehicle equipment to institute and maintain a strong quality control/product surveillanceprogram.

Recommendation: Title 46 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 43 was specifically enacted as "a directresponse to the dramatic increase in the number of recreational boats and the Congressionalrecognition of the maritime safety problems that recreational boating has imposed upon our morethan 25 million miles of waterways." There are more than 12 million boats registered in theUnited States. It is advisable for the federal officials to re-visit its approach to recreationalvessels. Boating safety regulations should be the mandate of the Secretary of the Interior ratherthan an "option". Data-driven regulations that pre-empt states from enacting stricter safetymeasures are counterintuitive. It is difficult to justify regulations that do not encompass all

recreational boats. Therefore, we recommend that federal officials examine and revamp the

federal approach to this fundamental safety issue and consider adopting the European model or ahybrid that includes broad stability, capacity, design and "intended use" considerations.

Capacity Standards:

Capacity standards have specific relevance to the capsizing of the Kandi Won. There was no"capacity plate" affixed to the Kandi Won indicating the maximum number of persons or weightthe vessel was capable of safely carrying. There is no federal requirement that this basic

information be posted on the boat simply because it exceeded 20 feet in length. There wasconsequently no information about the importance of weight distribution on this particularvessel, with its high center of gravity and flat hull, indicating the critical need to limit the numberof person on the fly bridge. It seems to be a matter of common sense that this fundamentalinformation ought to be visibly posted where any operator would see it. This is especially trueconsidering the current state of the law that permits persons with no boater safety training orlicense to pilot this 34-foot vessel.

Capacity standards are currently imposed by federal regulation applying capacity standards to

boats less than 20 feet.5

46 USCA 4306 specifically pre-empts any state laws with differentboating safety or equipment standards. Until 2012, New York had a requirement that capacitystandards must be affixed via plate to all vessels under 26 feet (N.Y. Nav. L. 71-c). Recentlegislation repealed 71-c to comply with the federal pre-emption. It is one of the onlyNavigation Law provisions passed by the legislature in the two legislative sessions preceding thesinking of the Kandi Won. [Note: There were 19 Navigation Law bills submitted in the last two

sessions ranging from requiring boater safety certificates to requiring VTL license suspensionsafter a BWI conviction. The repeal of 71-c, the suspension of the boater safety certificaterequirement for leased jet skis under certain conditions and the increased penalties for BoatingLeaving the Scene (making them consistent with the VTL) are the only items that passed.]

5 See Code of Federal Regulations 33 CFR 183.21, 183.23.

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We must call upon New York's elected federal representatives to submit a request for anamendment to 33 CFR 183.21:

Proposal: The federal regulations must be changed to require capacity plates on all vessels(public and private) as follows:

183.21 Applicability. [Deletion] Added Language

This subpart applies to all mechanically propelled vessels [monohull boats less than 20 feet inlength], except sailboats, canoes, kayaks, and inflatable boats.

As indicated, New York State cannot require these capacity plates due to the federal pre-emption. However, if the requested federal change were accomplished, enforcement wouldbecome the next necessary step. It would be incumbent on NYS to enact and enforce steppedpenalties for capacity violations. The Coast Guard, the Police Marine Bureaus and boatingexperts (such as the Power Squadrons and NASBLA) should be enlisted to assist in the creationof this legislation. Their expertise should be used to determine which capacity violations should

result in violations and fines and which should result in misdemeanor charges. It is equally andcritically important that education accompany any regulatory/legislative change.

Law Enforcement:

The waterways surrounding Long Island have overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities amongthe federal government, New York State, Nassau and Suffolk counties and local authorities.Interagency assistance and coordination is an essential part of providing appropriate lawenforcement coverage that addresses deterrence and public safety. This need has beenheightened in recent years as resources have become increasingly strained. Nassau County alone

covers 225 square miles of Marine District territory and 300 square miles of

Law enforcement was geographically and temporally nearby due to the fireworks display coming

to an end. The USCG, NCPD and Town of Oyster Bay, Bay Constables all responded to thecapsizing within minutes. There was a fast-moving strong storm that passed through the areathat may have played a role in the response time of additional emergency service personnel whowere not already on the water. The Atlantic Steamer/Oyster Bay Volunteer Fire Departmentdivers received an alarm, acquired their gear, arrived on scene and conducted the first dive at11:00 p.m. They recovered Harley Treanors body at 11:10 p.m., approximately one hour afterthe Kandi Won capsized. Just two minutes later during their second dive, the boat began sinking

to its ultimate depth of 65 feet and the dive had to be terminated. NCPD divers, the Cold SpringHarbor Volunteer Fire Department divers, and NYPD divers arrived thereafter.

This incident exposed a vulnerability on our waterways. Long Island is fortunate to have theservices of so many heroic volunteer firefighters and volunteer rescue divers. The nature of their

service relies on those divers receiving an emergency call, obtaining the dive equipment,travelling to the water and then boating to the area of the emergency. In spite of every best

effort, valuable time is lost in this process.

It is not widely known by Long Islanders engaged in casual water sports that the USCG, NassauCounty PD and Bay Constable boats are not regularly equipped with rescue dive gear. These

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entities are prepared to engage in rescue swimming but their dive operations are targeted towardsearches and recoveries rather than rescues. Only the NYPD has rescue dive teams on standbywith the aviation capability of getting multiple divers and their equipment in the air and to anemergency quickly. The New York State Police have approximately 65 divers but there are no

divers stationed on Long Island. The closest dive unit is located in Troop K in Poughkeepsie,NY.

Joy Treanor is Harley Treanors mother. She was not on the Kandi Won at the time it capsized.She became aware of the anomaly that law enforcement boats patrolling Long Islands busywaterways did not have dive equipment through this tragedy. It was incomprehensible to herthat a USCG boat was on-scene so quickly, accompanied by the Bay Constables and NCPD, butunable to provide diving assistance.

Joy Treanor has actively worked with Christopher Briggs, president of the Bay ConstableBenevolent Association, to provide the Oyster Bay Bay Constables with Rapid Diver units. Theunits include air sources for both the rescuer and the victim. Briggs raised the money topurchase a number of units. On May 21, 2013 the Oyster Bay Town Board agreed to accept the

equipment for future use. Two units will be deployed to the south shore and two to the northshore.

It is advisable that the U.S. Coast Guard, law enforcement and rescue agencies across LongIsland re-open the discussion of inter-agency dependency and resource allocation. Thisdiscussion should include the reliance on volunteer rescue divers as well as daily patrol coverageand emergency coordination. Consideration should be given to making members of the U.S.Coast Guard peace officers for the purpose of issuing summons rather than simply "boarding

officers" capable of doing safety inspections.

Licensing and Other Legislation:

In July of 2012 there was no licensing or general boating safety certificate requirement in theState of New York other than the narrow requirement for 10 18 year-old boaters and those

operating personal watercraft such as jet skis.

According to NASBLA (National Association of State Boating Law Administrators), Alabama isthe only state that requires a boating license. 47 states have some form of boating safety course

(including New York). Most states only require the course for young operators. 27 states do notrequire an adult to take a boater education course. 14 states specify a born after date forrequired certification. Four states have an age and horsepower requirement. New Jersey,Connecticut and Florida are the only three states that do not tie certification to a boaters age.FLA does specify a minimum of 10 horsepower however.

There were at least nine bills relating to boating before the legislature in the 2013 session. Onlyone, a boating safety certificate bill, passed both houses and awaits the Governors signature. If

enacted, the bill will ultimately require all persons born on or after May 1, 1996 to obtain aboating safety certificate before regularly operating a boat alone. People born on or before April30, 1996 are "grandfathered" into the provision and are exempt from the requirement. It is animportant step toward a comprehensive boater safety legislative scheme. The bill also authorizes

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the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation to "develop a method for approving internet-basedboating safety courses". This eventual on-line capability (perhaps with an "in-person', proctoredexam) is another important step forward. The more accessible boating safety training becomes,the more likely it is to be extended to all boaters. When New Jersey amended its law to require a

boating safety certificate for all operators, there were major implementation problems.Apparently there were not enough courses available to meet the needs of both new and existingboaters.

Unfortunately the bill falls short of requiring persons renting boats to have a boating safetycertificate while jet skiers (owners or renters) are still required to have a certificate. It seems alittle like requiring a driver's license for a motorcycle but not for an automobile. However, as astarting point the bill does require that an explanation of the operation of the rental craft andbasic navigational rules are given to the renter before operation. This bill still permits boaters asyoung as 10 years old to continue to operate power boats alone as long as they have a boatingsafety certificate. It also continues to have no bottom age limit for allowing a child to operate a

boat, without a boater safety certificate, as long as they are accompanied by a person who is 18

years old or older and either has a boating safety certificate or is otherwise exempt. The Town ofHuntington's Senior Harbor Master, Harry Acker summed up the reality of this continuingprovision during the Public Hearing on boating safety conducted by Senator Carl Marcellino onAugust 8, 2012 in Oyster Bay. Mr. Acker stated in substance: There's nothing to stop a two-year-old, with an adult on board, from operating a power boat while pulling a water skier.

Finally, the bill states "The commissioner ( of Parks and Recreation) is authorized and directed

to establish a system for tracking and replacing boating safety certificates issued by thecommissioner. The commissioner is further authorized to require that any other entity approvedby the commissioner to provide courses of instruction and award boating safety certificatesestablish a system for tracking and replacing boating safety certificates so as to enable thereplacement of lost or stolen certificates to those who have previously been awarded such

certificates."

This provision was apparently enacted because the entities authorized to provide boatingeducation and boating safety certificates had widely variant practices and could not alwaysreplace a lost certificate. It was suggested during the Oyster Bay hearings that all designations

relating to the operation of motor vehicles, boats, jet skis (personal watercraft), all-terrainvehicles (ATV) and/or snowmobiles should be centralized through the Department of MotorVehicles (DMV) Operator's Record. A driver's license or non-driver I.D. could reflect whether aperson had a boating safety certificate rather than relying on the decentralized certificatesprovided by individual safety trainers. This would be consistent with the requirement that boats

be registered through DMV.

Likewise, legislation presented by Senator Charles J. Fuschillo, Assemblyman HarveyWeisenberg and others proposed that New York State conform its laws relating to operatingwhile intoxicated or impaired by drugs, operating while intoxicated or impaired with a child inthe car, vessel, or other vehicle, leaving the scene of collisions, etc. There should be parity andconsistency among the laws relating to operation of motor vehicles, boats (including sailboats),snowmobiles or (ATVs). All vehicle operating suspensions or revocations, as well as all

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convictions for summons resulting from the operation of any type of vehicle should be containedin this one record. And a second DWI, BWI or OWI conviction from type of vehicle should beelevated to a felony charge based on a prior conviction from any type of vehicle. A trulycomprehensive and integrated approach should be the goal.

The legislature should be congratulated for taking the first steps necessary toward implementinga comprehensive boating safety legislative scheme for the State of New York. Perhaps this

starting point can be used to continue the discussion among legislators, law enforcement and themany boating associations and experts who know what is needed to accomplish New York'sboating safety goals.

Registration and Inspection of Vessels:

Registration of all vessels is required pursuant to N.Y. VTL 2251, (unless the vessel has a USmarine or foreign country document which will serve as a substitute for NY registration). Vesselregistration is the responsibility of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Vessel registrations assigna unique number, certificate and sticker to the vessel. The registration is valid for three years and

can thereafter be renewed. However vessels should not only be registered with DMV, theyshould be required to undergo a safety inspection in a manner and intervals to be determined by

the Commissioner of Parks and recreation. There is something inherently wrong with alegislative scheme that requires the inspection of a trailer carrying a boat, but not the boat itself.

Boating privilege and registration suspensions are supposed to be noted on a separate part of the

DMV motor vehicle driving abstract pursuant to both the Navigation Law and the DMVregulations. If a boater does not have a driving abstract, a new client ID would be assigned tothe boater exclusively to have a record of the status of the boaters operating privilege.

Navigation Law 49-a(3)(b) provides:

The court shall report each conviction recorded pursuant to this section to thecommissioner of motor vehicles and the commissioner of parks, recreation and historicpreservation on forms provided by the department of motor vehicles. Such reports shallinclude the length of any suspension imposed on the privilege to operate a vessel and anysuspension imposed against a vessel registration. The department of motor vehicles shallmaintain a record of all convictions and suspensions in order to effectuate the provisions

of this section.

Per this section, DMV is required to post boating while intoxicated convictions/suspensions andboating refusals (if the Department is informed by the court), on theVESSEL/SNOWMOBILE record which follows the regular driving record on a DMV abstract.

Significant efforts should be made to improve reporting of all convictions and suspensions

relating to all types of vehicles. DMV may to have statistics on this reporting but anecdotally,experienced prosecutors in this office have never seen this record.

While the centralization of these records through DMV is a costly undertaking, it is an essentialpart of an effective boating safety program. Deterrence relies on enforcement and

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accountability. There is no real accountability if local convictions are not reported andsuspensions or revocations are not enforced.

Governor Andrew Cuomo recently announced increased access to DMV data for use inlegitimate law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. The use of this data can result insolving criminal enterprises ranging from economic crimes to child abductions to hit and runcrashes. The data also has use in terrorism investigations. It is essential for all purposes that the

data is accurate and thorough.

Title 46 of the U.S. Code provides (in pertinent part);

"(c) A State whose recreational boating safety program has been approved by theSecretary is eligible for allocation and distribution of amounts under this chapter to assist

that State in developing, carrying out, and financing its program. Matching amounts shallbe allocated and distributed among eligible States by the Secretary as provided by section13104 of this title."

As New York State proceeds with creating a comprehensive boating safety program, perhaps theSecretary of the Interior would consider an application to support that program and the computerupgrades essential to its success.

Conclusion:

The tragedy of the Kandi Won was unspeakable. It was the catalyst for public hearings andlegislation. All stakeholders must be open to new common sense regulations to improve boatersafety. Federal policymakers should re-examine the role of the federal governmentseffectiveness in the area of recreational boating safety. New York State must continue to advance

the cause of boating safety through comprehensive and consistent legislation. Local governmentsmust review their own procedures during water events to determine whether additional

precautions are necessary, just as the Town of Huntington did after the incident on July 4, 2012.The New York State Department of Parks and Recreation is the state's leader in the field ofrecreational boating, and the Department should consult with boating experts and associations,members of law enforcement and local governments to create a strategic boating safety plan withspecific regulatory, legislative and educational goals. New York State should become thenational model for boating safety.

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STABILITY Al'lALYSIS OF THE VESSEL K."NDI WON0)/

JULY 4TH , 20121'1

OYSTER BAY, NY

November 25, 2012Performed For

Nassau County Pollee DepartmentNeil Gallagher. P.E.

1

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1.0) IntroductionOn July -tlh , 2012 the 3-t' Silverton powerboat KANDI WO:-': capsized and sank in Oyster BayHarbor. NY. leading to the deaths of three of the 27 passengers on the vessel. After the sinking.the vessel was raised and no apparent damage to the hull was found, indicating that the mostlikely cause of the capsize was related to the stability of the vessel. At the request of the NassauCounty Police Department (NCPD). a stability analysis was made to detennine the probablecause of the capsize. This report presents the result of the analysis.

2.0) MethodologyThis analysis follows the methods nonnally used for any commercial passenger vessel requiredby the US Coast Guard to demonstrate adequate stability. There are n.,.o main components of theanalysis: a stability test of the vessel using a procedure called an inclining experiment, andcalculations that use the results of the stability test to detennine the floating, or hydrostatic,characteristics.The stability test is done to measure the weight and the position of the center of gravity of theempty .,.esse!. commonly called the "lightship weight and center of gravity". The center ofgravity can be considered the average point of all the weight of the vessel and is critical fordetennining stability.The second pan of the stability analysis is to use the weight and center of gravity infonnationdetermined in the stabilit)', lest. along with a hull shape description provided by a lines plan. toexamine the stability of the vessel when operating with loads such as passengers. fuel. water. andany other weight element. The weight and center of gravity of each load item is combinedwiththe lightship weight and center of gravity to detennine the total weight and center of gravity ofthe loaded vessel. The hull shape is then used to determine the equilibrium of weight andbuoyancy, and the stability characteristics o[the loaded vessel can be detennined. Traditionallythis detennination was made by hand calculations from data taken of f the lines plans. In modemtimes this is done by entering the hull shape into a computer program thaI then perfonns thestability calculations.In the case ofKANOI WON, there was no information available with regards to either the hullshape or the lightship weight Although a popular boat, the builder has gone out of business.Some attempts were made to delennlne the designer (often not an employee of the builder), inorder 10 ask for the lines. but they were unsuccessfuL Instead, measurements were made on theboat when it was in the Marine Bureau facility of the NCPD, and used in a CAD program calledAutoCad to create a lines plan.In order to determine the lightship weight and center of gravity. a stability test was conducted onthe vessel. It was placed in the water at the Marine Bureau facility, outfitted with test equipmentand the test was perfonned by the author with assistance from NCPD personnel. In executing

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the test, lhe procedures Hamuilly employed by a US Const Guard approved stability analysiswere followed to maximum extent possible.The weights and locations of all the persons on board on July 4th were required infonnation.),""CPD personnel interviewed the passengers after the incident and provided a graphic thatshowed the weight and approximate location of each person on board. This data was used todetermme the actual loading condition at the time of the incident.The computer program used in the analysis is General Hydrostatics, or GHS, created by CreativeSystems, Inc .. in Port Townsend. \VA. GHS is one of the most widely used stability programs inthe US. and is recognized by the US Coast Guard, among others, for fully approwd stabilitywork on commercial vessels. The lines plan created in AutoCad was entered into GHS to createthe computer model used for the analysis.Once the hull shape and weight data were entered into GHS. it was possible to examine thestability of the KANDI WON as it was operating at the time ofIhe incident. The stability in flatwater was first examined. followed by Ihe stability in waves.

3.0) Hull Shape and Model:The figures below show the hull shape developed from measurements of the hull and created inGHS:

---------------L--.,---........

-------Figure I: Profile (above) and deck plan (below)

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Figure 2: Hull sections. isometric (above) and body plan (below).In the model and in all subsequent calculations, the origin point for longirudinal and venicallocations was the bottom of the transom at centerline, as this was the most easily accessible pointfor measurements. Additionally. the baseline extends forward through this point and serves as areference for drafts and trim. The baseline's angle to the hull happens to be parallel to the floororthe building at the time the measurements were made. but this line's angle is arbitrary, as longas all dimensions and drafts are consistently made from it in this analysis.It should be nOled that the hull shape was modeled only up to the deck edge. In this analysis, itwas presumed that once the vessel rolled to the point that the deck edge was inuncrsed, the boatwould flood, without recovery. This was due to the open nature of the hull, particularly aft of thedeckhouse, as well as the open windows at the side of the hOllse. There were additional openings

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on the hull below the deck edge Ihat would lead 10 nooding under angles of heelless than deckimmersion: there were two large port holes left open in the forward cabin. and there are twovents aft for air entrance inlo the engine room. These openings would have caused flooding atlarge heel angles prior to capsize. but as will be seen below they were probably not significant inthe case of a sudden capsize.

4.0) Stability Test:The stability test was performcd on October IS th 2012. Sincc the purpose of the test was todetermine the lightship weight and center of gra\-ity of the KANDI WO::--J on July 4lh, it wasimportant that the \"essel was in the same condition as on the 4th before the incident. Some minordamage had occurred as a result of the sinking and raising. including the dislocation of the swimplatform. an interior couch and the awning over the flying bridge, but these were replaced priorto the test. Many smaller interior items were damaged, and there was a coating ofmud overmuch of the interior. but nothing of significant weight appeared to be out of position. The vesselhad been on blocks for se\'cral months prior to the test. so everything inside had dried out. It wastherefore assumed that the vessel was in essentially the same weight condition as on July 4th ,with the exception of the fuel tanks. These had fuel in them at the time of the sinking. but lheywere drained prior to the test. Since their location was known the weight of the fuel could beaccounted for by calculation.The \veight of the vessel \vas determined by taking freeboard measurements from the deck edgeto the waterline with the vessel in its as-inclined condition. From the freebonrds the drafts at theforward and an end were detennined and entered into GHS. GHS sets the hull to those draftsand knowing the hull shape detennines the displacement which equals the weight. in the as-inclined condition. By calculation the weight of items onboard during the stability test but notincluded in Ughtship are deducted (these are primarily the testing equipment and personnel).resulting in the determination of the lightship weight. shown below in Figure 3 as 16.500 lb.This is significantly higher than the stated weight of the Silverton 34 in the product literature, butsuch discrepancies between acrual and advertised ,"veights are not uncommon.The as-inclined fore and aft location of the center of gravity, normally referred to as thelongitudinal center of gravity (LeG) as it is located at the same fore and aft location as the centerof buoyancy of the hull determined by GHS. Calculations were then used to correct the as-inclined LCG to the lightship LCG.The inclining segment of the stability test resulted in a determination of venical center of gravity(VCG) of the vessel in Ihe as-inclined condition. Briefly. this was accomplished by movingweights to one side in a series of steps. causing the vessel to heel. The resulting heel angle ateach step was carefully measured by three instruments: a pendulum, a digital inclinometer withan output to a computer, and digirallevel read manually. The weight movements and anglemeasurements were repeated to the opposite side. By recording the amount of weight anddistance moved each step, the relationship of heeling moment and Ihe heel angle gave the as-inclined stability. from which the as-inclined VCG was detennined. By calculation Ihe effect of

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the items not part of lightship was accounted for and the resulting weight and location of thelightship center of gravity was found. The results are also shown in Figure 3.The data and calculations from the stability test are included in the Appendix.

Figure oJ: Stability Test Results

Item: Weight LCG VCGIb ft Fwd 0 ft ABL

As-Inclined 18,247 12.63 3.90Wls to Deduct: -1,729 10.35 6.40

LiQhlship 16,518 12.87 3.64,5.0) Passenger WeightThe othermajor weight element was the passenger weight and center of gra\ity. Theapproximate weight and location of all 27 passengers was obtained byNePD through interviewswith passengers after the incident and provided for this analysis as sketches sho\Vlng weights andlocations. The sketches were used with the CAD model to detennine each passenger's weight.vertical and horizontal distance from the origin point at the bottom of the transom. These wereentered into a spread sheet, also shown in the Appendix. from which a single value of weight.horizontal and vertical center of gravity was found. These are sbown in Figure 4 below. Thesevalues were entered in GHS as a single weight element representing all the passengers at the timeof the incident.

Total Passenger WeightWeight,lb lCG, ft VCG,ft

3,523 12.22 8.65Figure 4: Passenger weIght summary

6.0) Fuel WeightOne remaining significant weight element was the fuel in the tanks. There are two tanks, oneeach P0rl and starboard, located under the deck at the aft end of the boat, and each tank has acapacity or 130 gallons. It was observed that both tanks had crushed and rupmred due to waterpressure during the sinking. so there W

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7.0) Stability Calculations - Flat WaterWith the \veight data entered into GHS. stability wns detennined ror two conditions: in flatwater and in waves. Th e principal measure of stability in nat water is a quantity known as GM.or metacemric height. and it is a measure o f the ability o f a noating vessel to relum uprighl whenheeled by wind or waves. A posi tive G.Y1 (greater than zero) indicates a \'essel will right itselfwhen heeled, while a negative GM (less than zero) indicates a vessel is in danger o f capsizing.(In the Appendix a brief explanation orthe term GM is given.) For KANDI WO N the GM in theJuly 4th load condition wa s calculated by GHS and found 10 be as shown below in Figure 5 forthe Ihree cases o f fuel load:

figure): GM for each fuel tank load.

Fuel Tank load: 100% 50% 0% lightshiplightship weight, lb 16,518 16,518 16,518 16,518Passenger weight, lb 3,523 3,523 3,523 0Fuel weight, lb 1,820 910 I 0 0Total Displacement, Ib 21,861 20,951 20,041 16,518GM, It 1.25 1.31 1.38 3.09-

Th e GM \'alues in Figure 5 are quite low for a typical power boat of the style o f the Silvenon 34.A major cause o f the low GM is the passenger \veight and venical center of gravity, as can beseen by the last column to the right in Figure 5. Ln the lightship case. the weight of thepassengers and fuel are removed. and it ca n be seen thal the GM in the lightship condition is 3.09ft.An additional measure o f stability is the righting an n curve, \vhich while not discussed in thisnarrative. is included in the Appendix for thoroughness.

8.0) Stability Calculations -In WavesTh e stability condition in waves is o f great interest in this case. While there were no largenatural waves present, interviews o f the operator and passengers on the \'esse! indicate thai otherboats were in the immediate vicinity ofKANDI WON and travelling in the same direction. Thereports are nOI entirely clear, but KANDI WON appears to have encountered significant wakesfrom those boats. Waves approaching any vessel from directly ahead or astern will cause thevessel to pitch. while waves approaching from directly abeam will impan a significant rollingmoment. Waves approaching in benveen the beam and the bow or stem are called quaneringwa\'es and cause a combination o f pitch and roll. GHS has the abili ty to examine the resultantstability condition if a wave is encountered from any angle and thus changes the buoyancysupponing the hull. This was used in these calculations to examine the resulting condition withwaves of varying size and direction of approach. In these wave calculations. the fuel load wasconsidered to be 50% in each tank for simplicity, as fuel load has a small effect on the results. A3D-foot wavelength \vas assumed as a typical wake's wavelength.

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Figure 6 shows the sUll1malY of the resulting heel angle caused by the vessel encountering wavesat 45-degree increments. where zero degrees represents a wave approaching from astern and 180represents wave approaching from the bow. These results can be thought of as a static case: inother words, i f the vessel were positioned on a sloped waterplane. the table shows the resultingangle of heel. This is in contrast to a dynamic case in which the momentum of the rolling vesselis incorporated into the analysis. In this analysis. the static case can be considered the less severecase of response to a wave.

Condition: SO% Fuel, All PassengersWave length: 30 ftWave Height, h I 1 1 1 11 1Approach Angle (from stern), degrees 0 45 90 1351 180Static heel angle, degress 0 9.3 46 9.3 0Wave Height, h 2 2 2 2 2Approach Angle (from stern), degrees 0 45 90 135 180Static heel angle, degress 01 20 167 20 0FIgure 6: Wave analySIS results

As can be seen by examining Figure 6, the waves from abeam. 90 degrees. cause the greateslheel angle. and in panicular with a wa\'c beight. the resultant angle of heel is 167 degrees.which simply means that the \essel has insufficient stability to remain upright and has capsized.

9.0) Accuracy ofResultsIn any engineering analysis the results will only be as good as the information and assumptionsused as inputs. In this analysis. a briefdiscussion of these inputs is in order.

Hull shape: as mentioned above, no lines plan was available for detennination ofthe hull shape. There was inevitably some inaccuracy involved in themeasurementS taken with the boal on a concrete surface. However. themeasurements were generally accurate to less than one inch. and the difference inbuoyancy caused by this amount will nOI significantly change the results. Whilemore accurate methods ofmeasuring the hull surface do exist, they involve aphotographic or laser survey to generate a 3dimensional surface model and wereprohibitively expensive.

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Stability Test - Condition of the wssel: the key infonnation detennined by thestability test was the lightship weight and center of gravity. The boat wasccnainly not in nonnal operating condition during the test since it had gonethrough a capsize. sinking. spending over a week on the bottom and raising.Although the interior was mud-covered and loose equipment in shambles. themajor weight items were in place. One question regarding hull weight is thepossibility that water could have emered in core of the hull and increased itsweight. However. there was no sign on the exterior of the hull that any cracks orholes had developed, makLng it unlikely that water dJmage had OCCUlTed to thehull.

Location of passengers: again a key pan of the analysis. the accuracy of theweight and venical positions of the passengers is thought to be quite good. Theinfoftnntion provided shows a sketch with the layout and each passenger's weightindicated on the sketch. The only estimate made herein is whether each passengerwas seated or standing and the difference in wl1ical center relative to the baselinefor either case is not great. The data is probably the best that could be obtainedunder the circumstances of this incident.

10.0) ConclusionsThe purpose of this analysis was to examine the stability characteristics of powerboatWON in its load condi tion on July 41b 2012. and to determine what led to the capsize. Whenloaded with the twenty-seven persons as it was. there was low stability in flat water, althoughenough to remain upright. However, in beam waves of only two feet. the boat had inadequatestability to remain upright and was likely to capsize. This of course is what happened. bUllhisanalysis demonstrates from a naval architectural standpoint why it happened. While the exactseries of events with regards to whether another boat was passing the KA.\D l WON, and whatsteering and throttle movements may have been made that had an influence on the capsize, maynot be known with cenainty, what this analysis shows is that the capsize was very likely to haveoccurred given the loading. II should be noted that while Figure 6 above shows a final heel angleof 167 degrees in beam seas, it is merely a notional equilibrium angle. Once the boat rolled to 75or 80 degrees, the deck and interior would have flooded. and the predictions of heel angle nolonger would apply as flooding and sinking at any angle of heel with the deck edge immersedsinking \vas inevitable.While analysis does not include a sensitivity study, such as what would have happened if fewerpassengers were onboard, or if they were located lower in the vessel, a brief analysis of thestability with tcn persons, located on the main deck forward and aft, shows that significant heelangles would have occurred but nm led to capsizing. It can be concluded that the load of27passengers. located as they were on July 4th led to the capsizing and sinking of the vessel.

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