Cultural Autonomy, Carvation, and Secession

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Cultural Autonomy, Carvation, and Secession:Explaining Government Responses to Autonomy Demands

Tavishi [email protected]

Department of Political ScienceEmory University

Atlanta, GA 30322

Amy H. [email protected]

Department of Political ScienceEmory University

Atlanta, GA 30322

Abstract: What explains government responses to autonomy demands? Theexisting literature has focused on either the granting of cultural autonomy orcomplete secession from the state. In this paper, we incorporate a third possibleoption: Carvationthe creation of a subnational unit with its own legislature, fiscaljurisdiction, and representation in the national legislatureis a common institutional

arrangement across various countries but has received little attention in the literature. We argue that studying these responses separately assumes each of these to bemutually independent of the others. We present an alternate scale of concessionsgranted: (a) no cultural autonomy; (b) some cultural autonomy, such as regionallanguage education; (c) the creation of a subnational unit with its own legislature,fiscal jurisdiction, and representation in the national legislature; and (d) completepolitical and economic independence from the national state. Employing a gametheoretic model, we demonstrate that the type of concessions granted depends on (a)the probability of the government winning in the event of a conflict and (b) the netbenefits for the government and the demander. We test our derived hypotheses onthree cases from India where the outcomes have all been different: Uttaranchal(carvation), Bodoland (cultural autonomy), and Telangana (no autonomy).

Draft Prepared for the 2006 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, ILApril 15, 2006


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Acronyms

ABSU All Bodo Students UnionBJP Bharatiya Janata PartyBLT Bodo Liberation Tigers

MoU Memorandum of UnderstandingNDFB National Democratic Force of BodolandPTCA Plains Tribals Council of AssamTPS Telangana Praja SamitiTJS Telangana Janata PartyUKD Uttaranchal Kranti DalULFA United Liberation Front of AssamUP Uttar PradeshUPA United Progressive Alliance


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I. Introduction

As the 1917 Civil War drew to an end, the Finnish government was confronted with an escalating

problem: the fate of the land Islands. On the one hand, the twenty-thousand-some separatist

movement was gaining momentum. The landers were after all geographically remote and

ethnically Swedish. With Swedens King Gustav Vs ambitions for territorial expansion, the

residents of the Islands voiced a unanimous interest in joining Sweden. On the other hand, the

land Islands were a part of Finland since 1809 when Sweden lost to Russia in the Swedish-Russian

War and was of geostrategic importance. Theland Islands geostrategic importance cannot be

understated: During the 1917 Finnish Civil War, the Islands were occupied by Russian, Red Finnish,

White Finnish, Swedish, and German troops almost simultaneously (Jutikkala 1962).

To resolve the fate of the land Islands, Finland and Sweden both turned to the League of

Nations. The result was the 1921 Geneva Convention of the Demilitarization and Neutralization of

the land Islands, which contained a preamble and ten articles. In addition to the demilitarization

and neutralization of the Islands, the Convention officially recognized the land Islands as a part of

Finland and obligated Finland to protect the Islands should it come under attack.

The Finnish followed the demilitarization and neutralization by granting theland Islands

the right to self-government as outlined in the Constitution. This self-government however was

limited. When the League of Nations collapsed in the 1930s, the Finnish and Swedish governments

held talks to fortify the Islands and the Finnish government planned to introduce military

conscription on the Islands. The residents of the land Islands demonstrated in response. It was

not until the Self-Government ofland Act of 1951 that the Islands saw a progression in the

powers of the regional government. The 1951 Act guaranteed extensive protection concerning the

preservation of the Swedish language, of the culture, and of the Swedish traditions. The inhabitants

of the islands were also granted a special land citizenship, which exempted them from military


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service and conscription altogether. Since 1954 the land Islands have had their own Nordic flag

and separate postage stamps since 1984. The Provincial Parliament also has far-reaching taxing

powers and its approval is necessary before Finland can ratify an international treaty that concerns

matters which lie within the domain of the land government (Rotkirch 1986). The 1991 Act of

Autonomy of theland Islands further granted the region more autonomy on matters that concern

domestic issues, such as education, health care, labor, roads, social welfare, and some taxes; the

national government is responsible for defense, ecclesiastical matters, foreign policy, and some taxes.

Although slightly unusual because of the role of the League of Nations, this example of the

land Islands serves two good heuristic purposes. First, it demonstrates how national governments

respondto autonomydemands. Governments do not always respond to demands, and if they do, the

demands are not always granted in full. Sometimes the demanding group is satisfied and the game

ends, but in other times, as in the case of the land Islands, the bargaining continues: Whether the

real preference was independence or reunification with Sweden, the landers demandedsecession.

The Finnish government responded by constitutionally granting them cultural autonomy over

linguistic affairs. However, with escalating discontent in the aftermath of World War II and the

dawn of the Cold War, the Finnish government finally recognized the land Islands as a sub-

national unit with its own legislative body, fiscal jurisdictions, and representation in the national

legislature.

Second, the land Islands example illustrates how the possible outcomes from this

bargaining exchange lie on a spectrum. As we demonstrate in the next section, the existing literature

has focused on specific outcomesthe granting of cultural autonomy and complete secession from

the national stateseparately. In this paper, we incorporate another possible outcome: Carvation

the formation of a subnational unit with its own legislative body, fiscal jurisdiction, and

representation in the national legislatureis a common institutional arrangement across various


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countries but has received little attention in the literature. In this paper we argue all of these

outcomes are available to governments when facing autonomy demands and thus, must be studied

together. We present an alternate scale of concessions granted: (a) no cultural autonomy; (b) the

authority over linguistic and/or religious affairs; (c) the formation of a subnational unit with its own

legislative body, fiscal jurisdiction, and representation in the national legislature; and (d) complete

political and economic independence from the national state.

In Section III we employ a game theoretic model and argue that the type of concessions

granted depends on (a) the probability of the government winning in the event of a conflict and (b)

net benefits for the government and the demander. In Section IV, we test our hypotheses on a set

of cases from India (Uttaranchal, Bodoland, and Talangana) that reflect the range of possible

government responses. In the final section, we conclude and address future avenues for research.

II. Explaining Demands

The body of literature on demands for greater autonomy has concentrated on the occurrence and

avoidance of ethnic conflict. The focus has been on explaining when ethnic conflict occurs, if the

source of this conflict is primordial (Geertz 1994) or social engineering (Conner 1994; Hobsbawm

1994), and how it can be avoided. The latter includes prescriptive institutions (Horowitz 1981, 1985,

1996; Lijphart 1968, 1999) that encourage groups to cooperate and reduce the probability of conflict

between these groups. However, there has been little scholarship devoted to understanding the

demands made by these groups and the conditions explaining the success or failure of these groups

to achieve these demands (Sorens 2005).

The concentration on ethnic conflict and the demands made by ethnic groups also excludes

demands for autonomy, not made on the basis of ethnicity. Demands for greater autonomy may

certainly be made by groups that may share the same ethnicity as the larger group but the region


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they reside in may have a different historical legacy from the larger region. In the Indian state of

Andhra Pradesh, for example, the Telangana region which contains the oldest movement in India,

demanding the carvationof a separate constitutional unit does not share the colonial past of the larger

state and has experienced a different trajectory of economic development. The demand is spurred

more by grievances regarding neglect and underdevelopment of the region (interview with V.

Prakash1) than what are usually understood as ethnic differences.2 This paper studies demands for

greater autonomy made on the basis of ethnicity as well as those on other factors such as a different

historical legacy.

In this study, the phrase autonomy demands has been used to refer to a whole range of

demands made, including linguistic and/or religious demands (such as the Laplanders in Scandinavia

and the Hakkas in Taiwan), the demand for a subnational unit with its own legislative body, fiscal

jurisdiction, and representation in the national legislature (such as Puerto Rico in the United States

and Jharkhand in India) and the demand for complete political and economic independence (such as

the Basque country in Spain and East Timor in Indonesia). These demands are not mutually

exclusive of each other. The Assam movement, for example, started with the demand for

recognition of Assamese as the official language of the state and for education in the state to be

carried out in Assamese (Baruah 1996). This movement consisted of social activists and local

political and cultural leaders while the subsequent demand for complete secession from India was

made by an armed militant group (ULFA). Yet, in spite of several examples where more than one of

these demands has been made on behalf of the same region, scholarship in the area has studied

them separately as language based demands for cultural autonomy (Fenwick 1981; Laitin 1988) and

demands for secession (Islam 1985; Sorens 2005). Instead, we argue this bargaining exchange must

1 Founder member, Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) and long-time member of the Telangana movement2Walker Connors (1994) seminal work on ethnicity explains that ethnicity is used to encompass identificationbased on social realities as different as religion, language and national origin. He posits that ethnic groups may beself-defined or other defined.


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be studied along a continuum. We now turn to a review of the existing literature on linguistic

autonomy demands and secessionist movements.

II.1. Linguistic Autonomy Demands

Demands for cultural autonomy can includeand often dothe freedom for groups to receive

public education in their own language. The implications of language politics are several-fold: first,

language standardization is an important mechanismalong with war, taxes, and marketsfor

state-building. Second, it touches on the politics of regional autonomy: under what conditions does

language repression fuel separatist tendencies? Third, it aids in our understanding of a nation.

Nations are imagined communities (Anderson 1991) and such communities probably share a

common language. Last, it addresses social mobility: The capacity of a minority to learn the majority

language can affect the rate of social mobility (Laitin 1988, 2002).

To the best of our knowledge, little theoretical work has been done on why certain groups

demand language autonomy. However, there has been some scholarship explaining the motivation

behind the choice of language-school made by households for their children. One explanation is the

rational choice, economic-driven model: Regional groups are more likely to assimilate to the central

group in order to improve their economic prospects in an environment that is increasingly favorable

for the central group (see Fenwick 1981; Fierman 2006; Laitin 1988, 2002). Another explanation is a

sociological hypothesis: The level of interethnic contact provides a powerful explanation for school

choices. In an article on Russian identity in Latvia, Kronenfeld (2005) asks, not whether contact

with Latvians make Russians likeLatvians, but whether contact with Latvians makes Russians act like

Latvians (249).

From this literature, we can identify two different mechanisms for why groups demand

language autonomy. The first is an economic mechanism: It benefits the group to have its own


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language-medium schools because of potential employment opportunities. For example, a

moderately-developing economy in Russia combined with possible stagnation in Kazakhstan might

make Russians in Kazakhstan demand Russian language autonomy. Contrast that to another

example: A fast-paced growing economy in Estonia makes Russian language demand less important.

The second mechanism is sociological: Groups demand language autonomy when they are

geographically concentrated and have minimal contact with the majority ethnic group. We see this

in the example of theland Islands and the demand for Swedish language schools.

Having identified the mechanisms for why groups demand language autonomy, we can now

seek to explain why governments grant this autonomy? We argue little work has been done to

answer this question. To the best of our knowledge, the only systematic work is Laitin (1988). In

his paper, he identifies six game theoretic models for representing different sources of language

conflictsstate rationalization, nation building, regional reactivation, regional tipping, postcolonial,

and competitive assimilation. In all six categories, the equilibrium is for the government to not grant

linguistic autonomy. Although this theoretical framework is a valuable step for studying language

based conflicts systematically, this literature still has yet to provide any empirical evidence that

expands on these games.

II.2. Secessionist Movements

Prominent work explaining the conditions necessary for successful secessionist demands includes

Islam (1985) and Sorens (2005). Islam (1985) compares the failures of Katanga and Biafra to the

success of Bangladesh. His argument hinges on the physical distance between East and West

Pakistanalso known as territorial anomalyas a major reason for the international community

supporting Bangladeshs claim for independence; the majority claim for independence in Bangladesh


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versus those in Biafra and Katanga that were led by minority groups; and whether these movements

were democratic in nature.

In addition to territorial noncontinguity, Sorens (2005) also highlights the lack of potential

for irredentism- uniting with ethnic kin in a neighboring country (Saideman 2000), wealth in

comparison to the rest of the country and the presence of a multiparty system as contributing

factors. Sorens paper uses the percentage of votes received by secessionist parties in elections to

the lower house of the national legislature as well as the provincial legislatures. He argues that the

significance of secessionist parties in his analysis supports the claim that secessionist movements

should be studied separately from other forms of autonomy movements. He posits that, in most

cases these variables should have no impact on non-secessionist regional parties (319).

What Sorens ignores in this analysis is the strategic interaction between these groups making

demands for greater autonomy and the national government. There is an aspect of bargaining that

takes place in these interactions. Groups also learn from previous interactions and those of other

groups that have made demands with the state. It may be beneficial for a group that hopes to gain

carvationa subnational unit with its own legislative body, fiscal jurisdiction, and representation in

the national legislatureto ask for cultural autonomy initially, knowing well that the government is

likely to grant such autonomy because the costs are low. At the same time, it may be a better

bargaining strategy to begin with secession and agree to bargain down to a newly carved state, or an

autonomous district as in the case of the Bodo movement in India.

Sorens also argues that secessionist movements in democracies and autocracies need to be

studied separately, as regime type may have a conditional effect on the determinants of

secessionism (319). Although we concur with Sorens that different mechanisms may be at play

between different regime types, we argue that his approach suffers from a selection bias empirically

and theoretically. Empirically, there are large numbers of dropped negative cases in his universe (see


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Mahoney and Goertz 2004). By looking only at countries where secessionist parties are allowed to

run in elections, Sorens captures only those parties that have already had some degree of success as

they are recognized as legal parties and allowed to contest elections. Theoretically, he also omits

parties, that seek independence for regions much smaller than the province (316) without

providing a theoretical justification for doing so.

Another weakness in this approach is the underlying assumption that the revealed preference

of the group is the sincerepreference of the group. For example, as illustrated by the Finnish example,

and as we demonstrate in the model and in the Indian cases, the group may present a secessionist

demand as an ideal situation in order to utilize it as a bargaining tool but may be willing to settle for

less. For instance, their real preference may be for getting a constitutionally recognized subnational

unit with its own legislative body and fiscal jurisdiction. How accurately the revealed preference

reflects the sincere preference depends on a several factors. In the next section, we present the

model to demonstrate our argument.

III. Autonomy Demands, Government Responses, and Outcomes

[Figure I] presents the structure of the game. The demander D moves first and demands some

division of control aD where aD~ [0, 1]. For example, a demand ofaD= 1 means the demander

wants fully autonomysecession; aD = 0.67 translates into significant autonomy but short of

secessioncarvation; aD = 0.33 suggests some basic cultural autonomysuch as linguistic or

religious freedoms; and aD= 0 indicates the government assumes full control. The demander and

the government G have diametric preferences for the division of control, whose values we

normalize to one. We do not make any assumption about the status quothe initial distribution of

control.


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Figure I: The Game Form

The government G can accept or reject this division of autonomy. If the government

accepts, the demander gets aD and the government is left with the remainder of the pie: 1 - aD. If the

government rejects, the government then counteroffers with some division of control to the

demander aGwhere aG~ [0, aD] and aG < aD. We make an assumption here that the government will

always present a counteroffer that is smaller than the initial demand.

The demander can then decide to accept or reject this new counteroffer. If the demander

accepts, the demander gets aG and the governments receives 1 aG. If the demander rejects, the two

sides fight. Because war is politically and economically costly, both the demander and the

government assume costs for fightingcwhere c~ [0, 1]. Under such conditions, the utility for the

demander is equal to the probability of it winning the war 1-p minus the cost of the war: 1 p cD.

Similarly, the utility for the government for fighting is the probability of it winning the war p minus

the cost of war: p cG. These utilities hold under the assumption that conflict yields one of two

results: (a) victory for the government which means no autonomy whatsoever for the demander; or

(b) victory for the demander which means secession. Also, because the government makes the

counteroffer, we assume what it proposes to keep for itself will always be larger than what it expects

from fighting 1 aG > 1 p cD..

D G G D A

R

A

R

[aD; 1 - aD]

[1-p-cD; p-cG]

aG ~ [0, aDaD ~ [0, 1]

[aG; 1-aG]


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III.1. Preferences

Thus far we have only stated that the demander and the government have strictly opposing

preferences. In other words, for the demander, anylevel of autonomy is strongly preferred to no

autonomy; and conversely for the government, anylevel of division is strongly less preferred to no

autonomy. Yet, the outcome of war can be inefficient (Fearon 2004). What this means for our

model is that after fighting, although one actor may receive its most preferred outcome, the costs of

war may render both the demander and the governments utility less preferable than peacefully

accepting some division of autonomy. For instance, let us consider a scenario where the cost of

fighting for both the demander and the government is 1. If the demander wins the civil war, the

payoffs for the two actors are [0; -1]; if the government wins, [-1; 0]. Regardless of who wins the

war, in both conditions the demander and the government are no better off from fighting than from

peacefully accepting.

It is important to note that this inefficiency happens only under certain conditionswhen

there are costs. One shortcoming in the secessionist movement literature is the common

assumption of a threshold: secessionist movements happen only when the costs drop below some

threshold. Sorens (2005), for example, argues people vote for secessionist parties only when they

expect political and economic benefits from independence (309). We argue the same mechanism

can be logically applied to carvation or cultural demands as well. As illustrated in [Table 1], the costs

of warwhether it is low, moderately low, moderately high, or highcan change the linear

preferences of both actors regardless of the level of autonomy demands.

III.2. Equilibrium Results

Having specified the model, we now turn to a discussion of the equilibrium results. Using

backwards induction, we identify three equilibria:government accepting, demander accepting, andfighting.


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Table I: Preferences

Cost Demander Government

Low:[0.00, 0.32]

secession [1.00] secession minus cost ofwar [0.68, 1.00] > carvation [0.67] carvation minus cost of war [0.35, 0.67] >cultural autonomy [0.33] culturalautonomy minus cost of war [0.01, 0.33] >no autonomy [0.00] no autonomy minuscost of war[-0.32, 0.00]

no autonomy [1.00] no autonomy minuscost of war [0.68, 1.00] > culturalautonomy[0.67] cultural autonomy minuscost of war [0.35, 0.67] > carvation[0.33] carvation minus cost of war [0.01, 0.33]> secession [0.00] secession minus cost ofwar[-0.32, 0.00]

Moderately

Low:[0.33, 0.50]

secession [1.00] > carvation [0.67]

secession minus cost of war [0.50, 0.67] >cultural autonomy[0.33] carvation minuscost of war [0.17, 0.34] > no autonomy[0.00] cultural autonomy minus cost ofwar [-0.17, 0.00] > no autonomy minuscost of war[-0.50, -0.33]

no autonomy [1.00] > cultural autonomy

[0.67]

no autonomy minus cost of war[0.50, 0.67] > carvation[0.33] culturalautonomy minus cost of war [0.17, 0.34] >secession [0.00] > secession minus cost ofwar[-0.33, -0.50]

ModeratelyHigh:

[0.51, 0.67]

secession [1.00] > carvation [0.67] >secession minus cost of war [0.33, 0.49] cultural autonomy[0.33] > carvation minuscost of war [0.00, 0.16] no autonomy[0.00] > cultural autonomy minus cost ofwar [-0.34, -0.18] > no autonomy minuscost of war[-0.67, -0.51]

no autonomy [1.00] > cultural autonomy[0.67] > no autonomy minus cost of war[0.33, 0.49] carvation[0.33] > culturalautonomy minus cost of war [0.00, 0.16] secession [0.00] > carvation minus cost ofwar[-0.34, -0.18] > secession minus cost ofwar[-0.67, -0.51]

High:[0.68, 1.00]

secession [1.00] > carvation [0.67] >cultural autonomy [0.33] > secession minuscost of war [0.00, 0.32] no autonomy[0.00] > carvation minus cost of war [-0.33, -0.01]> cultural autonomy minus costof war[-0.67, -0.35] > no autonomy minus

cost of war[-1.00, -0.68]

no autonomy [1.00] > cultural autonomy[0.67] > carvation [0.33] > no autonomyminus cost of war [0.00, 0.32] secession[0.00] > cultural autonomy minus cost ofwar [-0.33, -0.01] > carvation minus costof war[-0.67, -0.35] > secession minus cost

of war[-1.00, -0.68]


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Proposition #1: When condition [1] below holds, the following strategy, let us call this the

Government Accepting Equilibrium, forms a subgame perfect equilibrium: The government

always accepts the initial offer proposed by the demander.

Proposition #2:When conditions [1] fails to but [2] holds, the following strategy, let us call this

the Demander Accepting Equilibrium, forms a subgame perfect equilibrium: The government

always rejects the initial offer proposed by the demander, and the demander always accepts

the governments counteroffer.

Proposition #3:When both conditions [1] and [2] fail to hold, the following strategy, let us call

this the Fighting Equilibrium, forms a subgame perfect equilibrium: The government always

rejects the initial offer proposed by the demander, and the demander always rejects the

governments counteroffer.

The conditions are:

)cp(*a GD 1 [1]

GGD cp*acp +


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demander and the probability of the governing winning the war are both very low at coordinate (0,

0), the plane reaches z = 1 in the farthest back point of the figure. What this suggests is that under

such conditions, we should expect the autonomy levels of the demander to be high; conversely,

when the cost of fight for the demander and the governments probability of winning are high, such

as at coordinate point (1, 1), we should expect the division of autonomy in favor of the government.

Having specified our model, in the next section we turn to the empirical evidence. We first lay out

our research design, which includes the ex ante predictions, the cases, and the operationalization of

the dependent and independent variables.

Figure II: Level of Autonomy Offered to Demander

00.25

0.5

0.75

1

C

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

P-1-0.50

0.51

__AUTON

00.25

0.5

0.75

1

C

IV. Research Design and Evidence

Ideally, we would be able to test the hypotheses generated from this study on all cases of demands

made for greater autonomy. Currently, there is no dataset available which would allow such a test

and we certainly encourage the collection of this data for future research in the area. As an

alternative, we use three cases to test these hypotheses. What do we expect to gain from looking at


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these cases? As we have employed a game theoretic model to understand the strategic interaction

between governments and demanders, it is first essential to check if the assumptions we have made

hold. To reiterate, we have made the following assumptions in the model. First, the demander

makes the initial demand, and if the government rejects this demand, the government then

counteroffers. Second, government counteroffers are never larger than the initial demands. Third,

governments always prefer settling peacefully than going to war. If our assumptions hold in these

cases, then we can test our argument that the demander and governments calculations are a

function of the probability of winning a war and the cost of war.

To test this argument, we need to operationalize the costs and benefits for the demanders

and governments. One driving parameter in our model is the cost of war. One way to

conceptualize cost is to think ofaudience cost(see Fearon 1994, 1997, Gaubatz 1996, Guisinger and

Smith 2002). The intuition is that state leaders who escalate the conflict and then back down face

the threat of being electorally removed by the population. The assumption is that the public always

prefers its leader to stand firm (for an exception, see Chapman and Wolford nd). Another way to

measure cost, which we employ here, is to think of it as the net benefit. Costs affect both the

demander and the governments overall utility, and thus, it is not sufficient to consider payoffs just

in terms of simple costs or benefits. Instead, we need to consider costs and benefits as an additive

function. What this means is that the net benefit is high for a demander who has low costs; and

conversely, the net benefit is low when the cost is high.

[Table II] presents our ex ante indicators for the different levels of net benefits. On the

demanders side, there are both economic and political net benefits from being granted additional

autonomy. The region may have much to gain economically, as pointed out in an earlier discussion

from being granted language autonomy. This could be seen in terms of acceptance of the regional

language as official parlance which would open up jobs to people who speak the regional language.


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Also, carvation of a subnational unit implies both increased economic funding from the government

for the region and increased control of its own finances. Political net benefits may include control

of education and direct representation. Complete secession may have high economic net benefits

for regions with great natural resources that have little net benefit from the resources under the SQ

as well as political benefits from self-rule.

Table II: Expected Political and Economic Net Benefits

Demander

Net Benefits Political Economic

Low No change from SQ Low Spending from Government &High Taxes to Government

Moderately Low Slightly better political representationthan SQ

Low Spending from Government &Low Taxes to Government

Moderately High Moderately better politicalrepresentation than SQ

High Spending from Government &High Taxes to Government

High Much greater political representationthan SQ

High Spending from Government &Low Taxes to Government

Government

Net Benefits Political Economic

Low Electoral loss Low Revenues from SubnationalUnit & High Spending on

Subnational Unit

Moderately Low No change from SQ Low Revenues from SubnationalUnit & Low Spending on

Subnational Unit

Moderately High Small electoral gains High Revenues from SubnationalUnit & High Spending on

Subnational Unit

High Large electoral gains High Revenues from Subnational &Low Spending on Subnational Unit


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For the government, the net political and economic benefits of is a function of holding on to

the status quo (SQ) versus giving away some autonomy. The political net benefits are best

understood as electoral gains as we have restricted ourselves to democratic cases. For example, in

the case of Uttaranchal, political gains refer to the electoral gains the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

government hoped to make in the new state of Uttaranchal by granting the region carvation. The

larger state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), from which Uttaranchal had been carved, was already ruled by a

majority BJP government and they imagined that the granting of the state would make people

associate their autonomy with the BJP and thus vote for them, thus, leading to the BJP gaining an

additional state government that would be ruled by their party. Economic net benefits for the

government include holding on to economic resources in the region that they may not be able to

control if they grant a greater level of autonomy, whether carvation in the formation of a

subnational unit ruled perhaps by a different party or secession where they lose control of the

resources. Alternatively, if the region is extremely poor and has little to offer in terms of economic

resources and involves more expenditure on the governments part, then the government may

calculate a low net economic benefit from holding on to the region in its current position.

The modern Indian state has had a varied number of demands for greater autonomy since its

independence in 1947from cultural autonomy to carvation to secession. To test the empirical

evidence, we employ a most similar systems design(Prezworski and Teune 1970), which allows us to

concentrate on the variables of interest as the institutional context within which the demands are

made and responded to remain the same for all cases. India provides us with a wide range of

demands and outcomes within the same federal, institutional context. We choose three cases, all of

which have seen the same demand being madecarvation, but has seen different outcomes, ranging

from carvation (Uttaranchal), cultural autonomy (Bodoland), and no autonomy (Telangana).


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In the next section, we discuss each case in further detail and its sequence of moves. We

examine the (a) net benefits for the demander, (b) the net benefits for the government, and (c) the

outcome. Uttaranchal was the northern hilly region part of the largely plains-dominated (both

geographically as well as politically) state of Uttar Pradesh. Bodoland continues to be a part of the

larger state of Assam; and the areas included in the demanded state of Telangana are the inland areas

that fall within the larger coastal state of Andhra Pradesh.

IV.1. Case #1 (Uttaranchal): Carvation Demand, Carvation Outcome

The demand for a separate state for the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh was placed several times since

the 1950s by political party leaders, local non profits and community groups from the region which

was never accepted by the central government in New Delhi. The movement gained momentum

since 1994, after the Mandal Commission controversy across the country (interview with Ranjit

Singh Verma3) and even gained the support of national political parties such as the BJP. The state

was finally granted in 2000 when the BJP government was in power at both the center as well as the

state level in the larger state of Uttar Pradesh, which contained Uttaranchal. The original state

demanded did not include the district of Haridwar which was included in the new state. The name

was also changed to Uttaranchal from the original name of Uttarakhand used by the movement

(interview with Kashi Singh Aeri4).

Net Benefits for Demander:There were high political benefits and high economic benefits

expected by the different factions within the larger movement for a separate Uttaranchal. The

prominent regional party, the Uttaranchal Kranti Dal (UKD) had hoped to gain a political presence

in the newly formed legislature within the state. The region would also be granted a separate

legislature thus guaranteeing proper representation for these hill areas that had remained a political

3Ranjit Singh Verma, independent member of the movement for a separate Uttaranchal

4 Kashi Singh Aeri, President, Uttarakhand Kranti Dal, a political party that participated and led the movement


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minority in the larger Uttar Pradesh assembly which had long been dominated by caste politics of

the plains areas, bearing little relevance to the Uttarkhand regions which had a completely different

demographic makeup.

Net Benefits for Government:The central government saw high political benefits from granting

greater autonomy as the ruling party at the center, the BJP itself had taken up the cause of a separate

state in the preceding years. The BJP was in power at the state level in Uttar Pradesh which

contained the region of Uttaranchal. The BJP, through its own admission (interview with Mr. I.D.

Swamy5), expected to make great electoral gains in the new state once formed as it had been a part

of the movement in the last years before the state was granted, had unanimously passed the

resolution for a separate state when it was in majority at the state and granted a separate state at the

national level. Thus it expected extremely high political benefits from the carvation of a new state.

The expected economic benefits, on the other hand were low as the government expected to spend

more after the formation of the new state in direct transfers to it, but expected low revenues from

this less developed region of the country.

Outcome:Carvation. A separate state of Uttaranchal has been granted to the region within the

federal framework of India. This is in keeping with our first equilibrium where the government

always accepts if the expected gains from accepting the demanders demand are higher than the net

benefits from a conflict. In this case, the BJP believed it had much to gain from granting the state

peacefully as it wanted to be seen as the government that granted the state and hoped this would

result in electoral gains which was a greater gain than what they would receive after a conflict with

the region, where they would have lost their status as the government that had participated in the

movement and then peacefully granted the state.

5 Mr. I.D. Swamy, a former Indian Administrative Service officer, was State Minister of Home during the periodwhen three new subnational units with their own legislative bodies, fiscal jurisdictions, and representation in thenational legislatureChattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchalwere created.


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government. At the same time, there were high political benefits and economic benefits from

carvation as Bodo leaders only formed a very small portion of the Assam legislative assembly and

the Bodo areas had seen little economic development in comparison with the rest of Assam.

Net Benefits for Government: The granting of secession to Bodoland was a completely unviable

solution and never considered (interview with Mr. Oscar Fernanes, the Indian National Congress in-

charge for the North East) due to the total size of the Bodo areas and its location within Assam

which is Indias connector to the North Eastern region. Also, the changing demographics of the

Bodo areas and Assam more generally with increasing immigration from Bangladesh made the

Bodos a much smaller majority in the region (Chadha 2005). Granting a state to the Bodos would

also give spark discontent amongst the large number of other groups in the seven states of the

Northeastern region of India, a heavy cost that the government was unwilling to pay. There were

also costs related to the formation of a territorial council under the VI-th Schedule of the Indian

constitution which included direct transfers from the Central government in Delhi but these were

much lower than the costs associated with the ongoing violent conflict in the Assam. Thus political

costs of secession were extremely high whereas economic costs of granting secession or greater

autonomy were also high but somewhat lower than the political costs. Phrased in the language of net

benefits, the political net benefits for keeping as much control as possible over the Bodo areas was

high for the government whereas the economic net benefits were medium.

Outcome: Cultural autonomy. This was awarded through the formation of the Bodo

Territorial Council in 2000, to fulfill economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and the

preservation of land-rights, socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos7. Here, both condition 1

and 2, as specified in the model, failed to hold. The costs to the government for granting the state of

Bodoland were too high, the counteroffer by the government was not acceptable to the movement

7 Memorandum of Understanding on Bodoland Territorial Council, signed between the Government of India, theGovernment of Assam, and the Bodo Liberation Tigers on 10th February 2003 in New Delhi.


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unit with its own legislative body, fiscal jurisdiction, and representation in the national legislatureis

a common institutional arrangement across various countries but has received little attention in the

literature. We present an alternate scale of concessions granted: (a) no cultural autonomy; (b) the

authority over linguistic and/or religious affairs; (c) the formation of a subnational unit with its own

legislative body, fiscal jurisdiction, and representation in the national legislature; and (d) complete

political independence from the larger national unit. We demonstrate formally that the type of

concessions granted is a function of (a) the probability of the government winning a civil war and (b)

the expected net benefits for both the demander and the government. The empirical evidence from

several Indian regionsUttaranchal, Bodoland and Telanganareflects this strategic calculation.

Future research on this topic can proceed most notably along two dimensions. Theoretically,

in this paper we have modeled the interaction between the demander and the government as a one-

period stationary game. However, in real lifeand as reflected in the Indian casesthe bargaining

process often happens over several iterations. Intuitively, there is a difference between (a)

demanding carvation in the first period and (b) demanding incrementally increasing autonomy and

culminating in carvation in the n-th period. Governments are not as willing to make extreme

concessions, and we see this difference reflected in the case of Bodoland.

Empirically, we have thus far tested our theory on a set of Indian cases. This has allowed us

to control for a host of variables and to get at the mechanisms of interest. However, we are aware

that our cases in this paper reflect no variation in original demand. Ideally, we would like to include

cases where the original demand was either cultural autonomy, as in the case of Assam, or secession,

as in the case of Nagaland. Most certainly, focusing only on Indian cases raises the question of

generalizability. We believe our theory is applicable to all democracies and unlike Sorens (2005),

certain subset of dictatorships. There is institutional variation among dictatorships (see Bueno de

Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999, 2002, 2003; Gandhi 2004; Geddes 1999; Lai and


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Slater 2006; Linz and Stepan 1996; Slater 2003). Some have political institutions that resemble those

found in democracies, such as competitive parties, elected legislatures, and decentralization. Thus,

our theory should be extendable to include cases that are considered partly free by Freedom

House. Examples of cases in these quasi-democracies include Abkhazia, Ajaria, and South Ossetia

in Georgia, and Aceh, East Timor, and Yogyakarta in Indonesia.


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Documents

Cultural Autonomy, Carvation, and Secession