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1 CSM-RA in a mega-project Perspectives from the Danish Signalling Programme Fredrik Schumann, EMO Safety Manager – BDK Signalling Programme 3-11-2016

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1

CSM-RA in a mega-project

Perspectives from the Danish Signalling Programme

Fredrik Schumann, EMO Safety Manager – BDK Signalling Programme 3-11-2016

2

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– CSM versus Cenelec 50126, -28 and -29, status and challenges

– Signalling Programme rollout strategy in a CSM context

– Authorization for Test (Infrastructure), CSM context. A practical case

using CSM

– Focus: Fjernbane part of the SP

Fredrik Schumann, EMO Safety Manager, BDK SP

(With the SP since October 2015)

[email protected]

Perspectives from the Danish Signalling Programme

3

Signalling Programme

SP-org

SP-director

SP-board

Programmemanagement

Finance and Plan (PMO)

Secretariat

Rail-com

S-bane On-board

F-EastF-West F-IT

Kh-R

g

EMOTMS

Contractors

Safety and Commissioning(SP)

Kh-Rg board

Design, Development, Plan(anlæg)

4

Safety stakeholders – Signalling Programme

– NSA (National Safety Authority)

– G-ISA (General Independent Safety Assessor)

o Cover different roles (EU legislation), “bodies”: AsBo, DeBo, G-NoBo,

o CSM assessment as AsBo

– Suppliers (S-ISA, S-NoBo)

– Railway Undertakings (RU’s)

o DSB

o Others

– BDK Base Organisation

5

APIS (Authorisation for Placing in Service)

(SRAC’s)

SRAC = Safety Related Application Conditions

6

Safety case part 1 Safety case part 2

7

The Cenelec approach

8

Cenelec Approach

Supplier equipment

often developed acc.

to this

9

CSM risk management process

10

Project safety related deliverables

G-ISA assessment process

Haz record

AAPP

Safety Plan

Supplier specific safety related deliverables

GASCs & SASCs

HL HL

APIS system definition

G-I

SA

S-IS

A

G-ISA SAR

S-ISA SAR

S-ISA SoW/ Assessm. plans

Assessment

Agreement

Review

Audit

APIS SCs

11

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– Example 1 (probably several):

o Cenelec is still the ”foundation” and the principles are followed both by

supplier, customer and (all) ISA(s) for the signalling part

o CSM-RA is applied in addition and often to control a change which includes

other disciplines than Signalling

o CSM-RA Assessment (AsBo) could be done ”in-house”

– Example 2:

o Cenelec evidence from supplier being used directly to justify the

requirement of ”explicit risk estimation” in CSM-RA

– Conclusion: BDK SP is probably ”early” in implementing the CSM-RA

to the full extent

The situation in some other ERTMS / signalling programmes?

12

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– Supplier ISA (named S-ISA) is doing Cenelec based assessment

(business as usual)

– G-ISA (AsBo) is expecting to see evidence of CSM assessment from

the S-ISA

– Sometimes formalism and/or terminology are more of the problem

than the lack of substancial safety / assessment evidence?

– We are working to solve this with S-ISA, G-ISA and the NSA

Challenges we have met with CSM interpretation/understanding:

13

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– Installation of ”Passive” components, i.e. passive to the legacy:

o Markerboards

o Axle counters

o Foundations

o Cabinets

o Etc.

– Can be demonstrated to be non-significant changes to legacy railway

/ signalling as long as not placed in service

Signalling programme strategy / way of working

14

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– The change to the railway will become significant first when the

components will be powered / placed in service

– Point machines and level crossings will be significant once installed

and COS (ChangeOver System) can be the solution

– This ”generic” approach is necessary to support ”industrial rollout”

Signalling programme strategy / way of working

15

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– System definition, Hazid and significance evaluation must be done for

all installations – a lot of paperwork and a long ”approval chain”

– Specific system definition and significance eval to be done – but very

high volume (thousands of components only on EDL lines)

– Suppliers/subsuppliers skilled for design and installation work but not

necessarily for the CSM documentation work to meet BDK SP

expectations – realized too late by all parties

Challenges we have met:

16

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– Lack of installation strategy suited for CSM – time pressure when

timeslot for installation is available

– Signalling Programme and suppliers aligned too late with BDK Base

development of internal CSM process / procedures

– New approach / concept combined with the lack of skilled resources

Challenges we have met:

17

CSM-RA in a mega-project

– Authorization for Test (AfT) concept (under development)

– Assumption: Significant change to the railway

– We need to define:

o Safe test area within boundaries

o Safety management / organization during test

o Process

– We want to develop a generic approach for the EDL’s that can be

reused for the Rollouts

– The idea is that we invest a lot of work for the EDL – but we will

benefit from it for the rest of the Signalling Programme

The design and installation finalized – what’s next?

18

Customer Lead

Infrastructure sub-system (inc. TCC and new FTN)

Customer System

Integration

ETCS + STM Installation and

integration

ETCS + STM Lab verification

Train Fitment T1 T2

Onboard sub-system (repeated for each EDL fleet type)

ETCS + STM Installation and

integration

ETCS + STM Lab verification

Train Fitment T1 T2

Supplier Lead

Fjernbane Railway System Integration Roadmap 2. Site based testing – EDL basic

PICO SAT

Trial Running Scenario Testing

Trial Running

Performance and Timetable

SCO EDL

Notes: Lab testing and FAT will be completed prior to site testing. Onboard shows first train class and needs to be repeated for each class. Safety Case Part 1 is not part of TRRB Criteria for Trial Running

.

SIT

TRRB SAT Authorisation for Test

Final Commissioning Board (ORR)

ETCS + STM Installation and

integration

ETCS + STM Lab verification

APIS Onboard (STM)

NoBo Certification

GSM-R sub-system (inc. FTN)

QoS (packet & switched)

APIS update GSM-R Phase 3

Rules available (latest date) First drivers needed First operators needed

Rules update c.80% drivers trained c.80% operators trained All drivers trained

Safety Case Part 2

Train Fitment

Rules handed over

S1 S2(a+b)

(S3) S4b S4c S4d

S5

T1 T2

TRRB TR Safety Case Part 1 (APIS)

S4a

T3

TRRB CT

APIS onboard (ETCS) TTSV report

Track-Train System Validation

Key

Installation and Site

Integration Testing

Functional Testing

Trial Running

Safety Milestone

Operational Milestone

Customer Integration

Testing

Safety Case activities

Safety Case Part 1 (Technical) Safety Case Part 2 (Operational)

SRAC Evidence and Hazard Closure

Technical Evidence

Safety Case (Test)

APIS

BDK Operational Rehearsal

19

Authorization for Test AfT

S

c

e

n

a

r

i

o

s

Hazard Id

(Specific hazards)

SRB TRRB

Test Activities

AfT

Area

Process

System Def.

Organisation

Hazard Record For Test

Operational issues

CSM-RA Hazard

Management (Generic hazards)

20

S

c

e

n

a

r

i

o

s

Hazard Id

(Specific hazards)

SRB TRRB

Test Activities

AfT

Area

Process

System Def.

Organisation

Supplier/SP safety interfaces for test

Hazard Record For Test

Operational issues

CSM-RA Hazard

Management (Generic hazards)

QA on content

•Hazard identification

•Hazard analyses

•Hazard mitigations (technical causes)

Safety Plan for Test

(input/review)

Signal layouts (from

engineering Data)

Hazard mitigations from relevant

GASCs +

Data validation (if needed)

Participation of technical specialists

(depending on scope)

Ad Hoc participation of technical specialists,

depending on safety related

issues Participation

(mainly time)

Product

(time + documentation)

Legend:

Railway Safety Case for Test

(BDK responsibility)

21

Defining Interfaces

22

Hazard workshops – Interfaces (examples)

– 01) Legacy area/Test border

– 07) Shunting area/Test border

– 17) Possession area/Test border

– 10) Bridge Guard

– 08) Buffer stops

– 09) Adjacent tracks

Borders

23

Hazard workshops – Interfaces

– 05) Full barrier

– 04) Half barrier

– 03) Warning (lights only)

– 06) Passenger warning

– 15) Farm crossings

– 21) Staff crossings

Crossings

24

Hazard workshops – Interfaces

– 20) Foreign objects

– 13) Trespassers

– 19) Road vehicles via underpass/bridge

– 14) Catenary

Maintenance people

– 12) External maintainer with own remit

– 11) Track workers on adjacent tracks

Unauthorized/Infrastructure

25

Hazard workshops – Interfaces

– 18) Track vehicles/Test border

– 13) Unreported trains/vehicles

Platforms

– 02) Platforms

Track Vehicles

26

Hazard workshops - Hazard Analysis

– Hazard repository containing 52 overall hazards

– Condensed in to 18 Hazard Groups

o Example 1: Train exceeding authorized speed

o Example 2: Train authorized to enter line section occupied by another train

– 1) Identifying hazard groups where technical mitigations from

supplier are relevant / could be used as (part of) mitigation.

Participation from supplier (3-5 workshops?)

o This will identify the need for finalized parts of Safety Documentation when

the actual mitigation is needed

27

Hazard workshops – Hazard Analysis

– 2) Identifying hazards where mitigations can only be done

with BDK procedure or technical mitigation outside supplier

scope

– 3) Creating the Hazard Record for test (BDK)

– 4) Review of the Hazard Record for test (BDK + supplier)

– 5) Assessment of ”full package” with G-ISA

28

AfT Hazard workshops - Hazard Analysis

– 2) Identifying hazards where mitigations can only be done

with BDK procedure or technical mitigation outside supplier

scope (BDK)

– 3) Creating the Hazard Record for test (BDK)

– 4) Review / finalize (BDK+supplier)

– 5) Assessment by the G-ISA

29

HOW we provide a safe environment

29

There is a separate activity that provides the evidence for hazards created by testing…

External Interfaces for Test Area

Provides

context to Test

Area interfaces

Hazard Record for Test

focused on Test Area

External Interfaces

Provides

the top level

hazards

Hazard Record for Test

for specific testing situation (including both External

Interfaces and Inside Test Area)

Hazard Record for Test

for specific testing situation (including both External

Interfaces and Inside Test Area)

Hazard Record for Test

for specific testing situation (including both External

Interfaces and Inside Test Area)

Hazard Record for Test

for specific testing situation (including both External

Interfaces and Inside Test Area)

Test Intentions Specific Location

Provides

context for

specific test

situation

Is basis

for

Fje

rnb

an

e H

azard

Rep

osit

ory