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CSD
Students' Working Paper Series
Euroscepticism in the UK:
Explaining individual level support for
membership of the EU.
Lucy Hatton
MA Politics, Department of Politics & International Studies,
University of Warwick
Working Paper n. 10/ 2011
Centre for Studies in Democratisation
Department of Politics and International Studies
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Abstract
To understand what affects individual level support for the European Union
is to understand the pace and direction of European integration, as the
policy outputs from Brussels are increasingly affecting the everyday lives of
European citizens, and their reactions to them impact upon the policies’
success. This essay considers what affects individual level support for the
EU in the UK, which is one of, if not the, most Eurosceptic member state. By
empirically analysing the results of the spring 2009 Eurobarometer survey
among the respondents from the UK in relation to the four main theories of
individual level support for the EU: cognitive mobilisation, utilitarian
theory, proxy theory and the effects of partisan affiliation, I discover that the
level of support a British individual expresses towards the national
government is the strongest predictor of the level of support that individual
expresses towards the EU. Importantly, however, none of these explanations
can be considered a sufficient explanatory factor for levels of support for the
EU from individuals in the UK.
Keywords: Euroscepticism; cognitive mobilisation; utilitarian theory; proxy
theory.
Euroscepticism in the UK: Explaining individual level support for
membership of the EU
Lucy Hatton
Introduction
Euroscepticism, or opposition to the process of European integration
(Abts et al 2009:8), has been a problem in the United Kingdom for a long
time (Spiering 2004:127); Britain has famously been described as the EU‟s
„awkward partner‟ (Haesly 2001:83). Public support for the European Union
among the British people has been declining for almost two decades
(Anderson and Kaltenhaler 1996:175), and the UK is consistently rated as
the member state with the lowest popular support for the EU (Anderson and
Kaltenhaler 1996:182; Grant 2008:1-2; Haesly 2001:82; Spiering 2004:134).
Many arguments have been put forward for why the UK is the most
Eurosceptic of the EU member states, including: post-war divergence,
distinctive Britishness and difference from the continent, which fosters an
„us and them‟ attitude towards the other states of Europe, economic and
cultural differences, an overtly Eurosceptic public press, and fear for the
threat to British nationalism (Grant 2008; Haesly 2001; Hooghe and Marks
2007; Spiering 2004).
However, why the UK is the most Eurosceptic member state is not at
issue in this essay. This essay attempts to answer the research question „what
factors affect an individual‟s level of support for membership of the EU?‟ by
empirically investigating the impact of various individual characteristics on
the public‟s opinion about the UK‟s membership of the EU. I aim to identify
which of the four most frequently cited theories of individual level support
2
for the EU is the most successful at explaining the levels of support for the
most Eurosceptic member state‟s membership of the EU among British
individuals.
An assessment of public support for the EU at the individual level is
important because to know what drives support for the EU is to be able to
interpret developments in European integration (Anderson 1998:570). The
policies emerging from Brussels are increasingly affecting the everyday
lives of the people in the UK, and the level of support the public gives to
these policies and the institutions which design and implement them
undoubtedly affects their success (Anderson and Kaltenhaler 1996:176). As
the recent negative responses to referenda held on the Constitutional Treaty
demonstrate, public opinion can affect the direction and pace of the
integration process (Anderson and Kaltenhaler 1996:178), and as the process
is becoming increasingly constrained by public opinion, it is vital that the
factors affecting support for the EU are identified (Gabel 1998:333),
especially among “the most Eurosceptic people in Europe” (Grant 2008:2).
The first section of this essay, „Theories and hypotheses‟, will identify
the factors that have been argued to influence individual support for the EU,
namely cognitive mobilisation, utilitarian theory, proxy theory and the
effects of partisan affiliation, as well as important control variables of age
and gender. I will then operationalise the concepts central to these theories
and systematically analyse how each affects individual level support for
membership of the EU. The discussion section will consider the results and
possible imperfections of the analysis and make suggestions for future
research in this area, before I make some concluding remarks.
3
Theories and Hypotheses
Several authors have theorised about what influences individual
support for European integration, primarily relying on analyses across the
entirety of the EU member states. However, as Anderson points out, it
should not be assumed that the citizens of every member state are affected in
the same way by the same factors (Anderson 1998:592). As such, I think it is
important to consider whether the theories generated are applicable to the
most Eurosceptic member state, the UK. The most frequently put forward
explanations for support for the EU are cognitive mobilisation, utilitarian
theory, proxy theory and partisan affiliation effects, each of which will be
discussed in turn, and the hypotheses to be tested will be identified. Figure 1
illustrates the relationships that will be analysed in the next section on the
basis of the hypotheses presented here.
Cognitive Mobilisation
It has been argued by several scholars that the level of
individual cognitive mobilisation affects the extent to which individuals
support the EU. Those who are more cognitively mobilised, that is, have a
greater interest in and knowledge of European politics, are thought to be
more supportive of the integration project (Abts et al 2009:5). This theory
was first advanced by Ronald Inglehart in 1970 who saw that the cognitive
mobilisation process will increase an individual‟s “capacity to receive and
interpret messages relating to a remote political community”, and
consequently theorised that the more politically aware citizens “could not
only be more likely to have an opinion concerning European integration;
they would also be more likely to have a favourable orientation toward it”
4
(Inglehart 1970:47-8). The basis for this argument is that as cognitive
mobilisation increases, an individual will be more familiar with and less
fearful of European integration (Gabel 1998:335). Investigations undertaken
by Anderson (1998) and Inglehart (1970) have found empirical support for
this theory: individuals with higher levels of cognitive mobilisation with
regard to the EU were more favourable supporters of integration. Gabel also
found support for the effects of cognitive mobilisation, but the effects were
only significant in the original member states (Gabel 1998:348, 351).
However, there has not been unanimous support for the
cognitive mobilisation theory. Abts et al‟s empirical analysis of individual
public support for the EU in Belgium resulted in a rejection of the cognitive
mobilisation hypothesis, and their results actually found support for the
reverse: that Belgians who are more cognitively mobilised displayed less
support for the EU (Abts et al 2009:16, 19). McLaren, similarly, found
cognitive mobilisation to have an insignificant effect on support for the EU
when compared with other factors consistent with the utilitarian theory
discussed below (McLaren 2007:243). Despite these contradicting results,
support has still been found for the cognitive mobilisation theory and so it is
necessary to investigate it in relation to the UK.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with high levels of cognitive mobilisation are
more likely to support UK membership of the EU.
[Null hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between level of cognitive
mobilisation and level of support for membership of the EU.]
5
Utilitarian Theory
An alternative suggestion as to what affects level of support for
the EU is the utilitarian theory. Utilitarian theory is a rational, economic
theory of support for the EU, which posits that what individuals are set to
gain or lose, in economic terms, from European integration influences their
opinions towards it (Abts et al 2009:2). Those with higher economic, social
and cultural capital are likely to gain more from the central aspect of the EU,
the free market, and so more skilled, educated and wealthy individuals are
more supportive of the EU than those who are set to lose out from the
integration process (de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007:310); those with
lesser skills are not as likely to gain from the free market as the associated
economic migration has the potential to threaten their job security (McLaren
2004:900). It is therefore suggested that individuals conduct some kind of
cost-benefit analysis regarding European integration to determine whether
they, as individuals, are likely to gain or lose from the integration process,
and their resulting evaluation impacts upon the level of support they give to
the EU (Tucker et al 2002:558).
Support for the utilitarian theory has come from studies covering
many countries undertaken by McLaren (2004:905), Hooghe et al
(2007:339) and Gabel (1998:351), who all find that the more skilled and
educated the individual, the more support they express for the EU. Gabel
suggested that there may be a significant link between the cognitive
mobilisation and utilitarian theories, with the impact of utilitarian theory
merely being a reflection of the cognitive mobilisation effect (Gabel
1998:338), yet his empirical analysis found that it was in fact utilitarian
6
factors that had a significant impact upon support for integration, and not
cognitive mobilisation (Gabel 1998:351). Therefore, more skilled and
educated individuals are argued to be more supportive of the EU than the
less skilled and educated.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with higher level skills and education are more
likely to support UK membership of the EU.
[Null hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between level of skills and
education and level of support for UK membership of the EU.]
Proxy Theory
However, Anderson argues that individuals are not informed
or knowledgeable enough about the EU to be able to conduct such an
accurate and systematic cost-benefit analysis of the impact European
integration would have on their lives (Anderson 1998:573). Because of this
lack of information, he posits that individuals rely on the more complete
information and crystallised opinions they have about their national political
institutions to form their opinions about the EU (Anderson 1998:574). This
is proxy theory, whereby an individual‟s level of support for the EU is
formulated on the basis of their level of support for national institutions, and
particularly their national government (Abts et al 2009:5), as dissatisfaction
with the EU emerges as a by-product of dissatisfaction with the national
government (McLaren 2004:903). The proxy theory is in line with the
„second-order elections‟ thesis whereby citizens use European elections and
referenda as an opportunity to voice their opinions of the national
7
government, as illustrated by Garry et al‟s analysis of the referenda on the
Nice Treaty (Garry et al 2005:204). The proxy theory therefore argues that
those who are happy with the workings of their national governments are
more likely to support the EU, and those who are less happy nationally are
less likely to (Anderson 1998:590).
Many studies find support for the proxy theory in their empirical
analyses (Anderson 1998:591; Abts et al 2009:17; Hooghe and Marks
2007:121; Garry et al 2005:216; de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007:319).
Karp et al discover an interplay between the proxy theory and the cognitive
mobilisation theory, whereby individuals who are less politically
knowledgeable and aware have no basis on which to form an opinion on the
EU and as such are more likely to rely on their opinions of the national
government to formulate their views (Karp et al 2003:287).
However, in contrast with those studies which support the idea that
dissatisfaction at the national level leads to dissatisfaction at the
supranational level is the suggestion put forth by McLaren (2007) and
Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) that in fact the converse may be true: that an
individual who is satisfied with the actions of their national government does
not see the need for any functions to be delegated to a supranational level
and so does not support the EU (McLaren 2007:234; Sánchez-Cuenca
2000:148). Even though the direction of the relationship between support for
national government and support for the EU is a contested one, the vast
majority of previous studies find support for the proxy theory.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are supportive of the national government
are more likely to support UK membership of the EU.
8
[Null hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between level of support for the
national government and level of support for UK membership of the EU.]
Party Affiliation
Linked with people using their opinions of the national
government to form their opinions of the EU is the theory that people use the
views of the domestic political party they support to shape their opinions on
the EU (Gabel 1998:338). That is, supporters of a pro-EU political party are
likely to be supportive of the EU, and supporters of an anti-EU political
party are unlikely to be supportive of the EU (Evans and Butt 2007:172).
The relationship between party affiliation and support for the EU in the UK
was investigated by Evans and Butt, who suggested that support for the EU
among the supporters of the Conservative and Labour parties should
fluctuate over time according to the realignment of the parties‟ stance on
Europe in the 1980s. They found support for this argument, but only up until
the 1990s when they discovered that attitudes on the EU became
independent of the partisan views of the public (Evans and Butt 2007:187).
This is partly consistent with the earlier findings of Inglehart, who
considered support for the EU in France in 1968 and found partisan
affiliation to be a strong predictor of level of support (Inglehart 1970:66).
Therefore, the political and partisan views of individuals may affect their
level of support for the EU. As currently in the UK the Conservative Party is
considered both more right wing and more Eurosceptic in outlook than the
Labour Party, it could be suggested that individuals who identify themselves
to the left will be more likely to support membership of the EU.
9
Hypothesis 4: Individuals whose political views are towards the left are
more likely to support UK membership of the EU.
[Null hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between an individual’s
political views and level of support for UK membership of the EU.]
Age
Inglehart discovered that age is a complementary factor in
explaining individual support for the EU, and finds it particularly important
among British respondents, where younger people are more supportive of
the EU (Inglehart 1970:69). This finding is supported by Tucker et al
(2002:561). Age may have an effect on the hypotheses stated above, so it
may be important to include it in this study.
Hypothesis 5: Younger individuals are more likely to support UK
membership of the EU.
[Null hypothesis 5: There is no relationship between age and level of
support for UK membership of the EU.]
Gender
Gender has also been controlled for in a number of previous
studies. Again, Inglehart and Tucker et al find a relationship between gender
and support for the EU, yet this time with contradicting results (Inglehart
1970:60; Tucker et al 2002:561). Inglehart finds men more likely to support
the EU, and considers a link between this and the cognitive mobilisation
theory, suggesting that men are more likely to be more cognitively mobilised
10
than women (Inglehart 1970:54). Tucker et al, conversely, find men
significantly less likely to support the EU than women, yet this support is
only based on analysis of three Eastern European countries (Tucker et al
2002:567). However, Abts et al also find men to be more Eurosceptic than
women, indicating that the relationship found by Tucker et al may be more
widespread across Europe (Abts et al 2009:14). Therefore it may be that
gender plays a role in influencing individual support for the EU, even if the
effect is merely intervening.
Hypothesis 6: Women are more likely to support UK membership of the EU.
[Null hypothesis 6: There is no relationship between gender and level of
support for membership of the EU.]
Figure 1: A diagram to illustrate the hypothesised relationships to be analysed.
Level of Support for the EU
Gender
Age
Level of cognitive mobilisation
Level of skill and education
Level of trust in national
government
Partisan affiliation
11
Concepts and Measurements
I test my hypotheses using data from the Eurobarometer Survey
71.1 conducted in January and February 2009. This particular survey was
selected as it includes suitable questions and information to operationalise
all of the hypotheses. Eurobarometer surveys are carried out on behalf of the
European Commission at frequent intervals to assess the opinions of the
European public on various issues related to integration. The data is
collected through face to face interviews in all member states and often in
candidate countries also, and respondents are selected using a multi-stage
random sampling process covering all citizens aged over 15 resident in the
member states and having a sufficient command of the national language
(European Commission 2009b:74)1. The analysis includes only the
responses of the 1289 individuals interviewed in the UK.
Dependent Variable – Support for Membership of the EU
The dependent variable is measured using the responses
individuals gave to the following question in the Eurobarometer survey:
„Generally speaking, do you think that the UK‟s membership of the EU is: a
good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad or don‟t know?‟ (European
Commission 2009b:13, QA6a). Responses are reported on a three point
scale, with 1 denoting „bad thing‟ and being considered a low level of
support for the EU, and 3 denoting „good thing‟ and considered a high level
of support. Responses of „don‟t know‟ were excluded from the analysis, as
ambivalent responses are denoted by a response of „neither good nor bad‟.
1 The sampling procedure and methodology used in the survey is reproduced in full in appendix 1.
12
Cognitive Mobilisation
I measure cognitive mobilisation by the extent to which the
respondents discuss European politics, with those who discuss European
politics more frequently being considered to have a higher level of cognitive
mobilisation. Scores for this variable are based on the response to the
question: „When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say
you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about European political
matters?‟ (European Commission 2009b:5, QA1:2). Again responses are
reported on a three point scale, with 1 denoting never and 3 denoting
frequently. „Don‟t know‟ responses are excluded from the analysis.
Level of Skills and Education
I measure level of skills and education by the age at which the
respondents left education, as identified in their response to the question:
„How old were you when you stopped full time education?‟ (European
Commission 2009b:65, D8). The responses to the question are in years, with
the older an individual left education indicating a higher level of skills and
education. Those respondents who were still in full time education, did not
know or refused to answer the question are excluded from the analysis.
Level of Support for National Government
Level of support for national government is measured by the
level of trust the respondents to the survey purport to have in the UK
government, based on their response to the question: ‘I would like to ask you
a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of
the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to
trust it: The UK Government‟ (European Commission 2009b:16, QA9:1).
13
Responses are reported on a three point scale, with 1 denoting tend not to
trust and taken to be a low level of support for the UK government, and 3
denoting tend to trust and a high level of support. „Don‟t know‟ responses
are taken to be ambivalent and so are given a score of 2 on the scale. Only
those who refused to answer the question are excluded from the analysis.
Political Views
Political views are identified by the self-positioning of the
respondents on a scale from extremely left wing to extremely right wing.
The question is phrased as follows: „In political matters, people talk of “the
left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale?‟
(European Commission 2009b:65, D1); respondents are shown a scale from
one to ten, with 1 denoting furthest left and 10 denoting furthest right.
Responses between 1 and 5 are considered on the left, and between 6 and 10
on the right. Those who responded with „don‟t know‟ or refused to answer
are excluded from the analysis.
Age and Gender
Age is measured in whole years. For the gender variable, male
is coded as 1 and female as 2.
Analysis
Univariate
Regarding the dependent variable, of the UK respondents to the
survey consider the UK‟s membership of the EU a bad thing. The mean
score, 1.96, indicates a slight negative skew in the data towards perceiving
14
EU membership as a bad thing: as expected given the UK is considered a
Eurosceptic member state overall. Table 1 shows the frequencies for the
dependent variable. Very few of the respondents, a mere , reported that
they frequently discussed European political issues with their friends or
relatives. The modal response was never: the majority of the people in the
UK never discuss European political issues with their friends or relatives.
The age at which the respondents left full time education ranged from 7 to
75, with a mean response of 17.6 years and the modal response being 16. A
staggering of respondents tended not to trust the UK government, with
less than half of that figure reporting to trust the national government
( ), as illustrated in figure 2. The median response to the political
views self-placement question was a score of 5, indicating that most people
reported being to the left. The youngest respondent to the survey was 15
years old and the eldest 96 years old, with the mean age being 51.52 years;
the ages of the respondents are illustrated in figure 3. A slightly higher
percentage of the sample is female ( ) compared to male ( ).
Table 1: The frequencies of responses to the question regarding level of support for UK membership of
the EU.
UK Membership of the
EU is considered a: Frequency Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
Bad thing 417 35.2 35.2
Neither good nor bad 396 33.4 68.5
Good thing 373 31.5 100.0
Total 1186 100.0
15
Bivariate
The analysis finds a weak positive relationship between level of
support for the EU and level of political discussion ( ), and this was
found to be significant at a confidence level ( ) so null
hypothesis 1 can be rejected. This finding implies that individuals with
higher levels of cognitive mobilisation are not necessarily more likely to
support membership of the EU: we would make fewer errors in
predicting level of support for UK membership of the EU when we know
how frequently they discuss European politics; a relationship does exist, but
it is weak. However, the relationship is in the expected direction, that is,
those with a higher level of cognitive mobilisation are slightly more likely to
support UK membership of the EU, as suggested in hypothesis 1.
16
Figure 2: The level of trust in the UK Government as reported by the UK respondents to the
Eurobarometer 71.1 survey.
Figure 3: The distribution of ages of the UK respondents to the Eurobarometer 71.1 survey
17
A weak positive relationship is also uncovered between the
level of support for the EU and the age at which the respondents left
education, with the latter explaining ( ) of the variation in the
former. The relationship is significant ( ) and so null hypothesis 2
can be rejected. The regression formula ( ) indicates that
for each extra year an individual remains in education, he or she moves
points towards the more supportive end of the spectrum of level of support
for membership of the EU. The relationship is shown to be in the expected
direction: the more skilled and educated a British individual is, the more
likely they are to be supportive of membership of the EU, as suggested in
hypothesis 2, yet the relationship is not particularly strong.
A much stronger relationship is found between level of support
for the EU and level of support for the national government ( ). A
chi square test demonstrates that this relationship is significant at a
confidence level ( ), allowing us to reject null hypothesis 3. We
would make almost fewer errors in predicting an individual‟s level of
support for the EU when taking into account their level of support for the
UK government. This indicates that the more support a British individual
provides for his or her national government, the more support he or she is
likely to give to the UK‟s membership of the EU, as expected in hypothesis
3, which can thus be confirmed.
The analysis finds a weak negative relationship between
ranking on the scale of political views and support for UK membership of
the EU ( ), and the relationship is significant at the 99.9%
confidence level ( ) thus null hypothesis 4 can be rejected. This
18
indicates that the respondents who identified their views as more left wing
were more likely to support the UK‟s membership of the EU, but the
relationship is weak: we would only make fewer errors in predicting
level of support for UK membership of the EU through knowing the
respondents‟ placement on the scale of political views. The direction is,
however, as predicted in hypothesis 4.
The relationship between age and level of support for the EU is
also weak, with age explaining just of the variation in support
( ). Although this relationship is very weak, it is significant
( ), null hypothesis 5 can be rejected, and it is in the same direction
as suggested in hypothesis 5. The regression line formula ( )
illustrates that an increase in one year in age of the respondents is likely to
result in a move of 0.09 points less support for the UK‟s membership of the
EU. Therefore, as predicted, younger people in the UK are more likely to
support membership of the EU, but the relationship is very weak.
A moderate to weak relationship has been found to exist
between gender and level of support for the UK‟s membership of the EU
(Cramer‟s ), and the relationship is significant ( ), so null
hypothesis 6 can be rejected. It appears that men are more likely to support
the EU than women, as illustrated in figure 4, and women tend to be more
ambivalent. The results indicate that when predicting level of support for
membership of the EU within the UK, knowing an individual‟s gender
decreases the amount of errors made by ( ). Therefore,
inconsistent with the findings of Tucker et al (2002) and Abts et al (2009),
and contrary to hypothesis 6, men in the UK are slightly more likely to
support EU membership than women. The findings of the bivariate analysis
19
are summarised in table 2.
Figure 4: The differences of opinions on the UK’s membership of the EU on the basis of gender.
Table 2: The strength and direction of the bivariate relationships between the level of support for UK
membership of the EU and the hypothesised influential factors. All relationships are significant at
α=0.01.
Level of
Cognitive
Mobilisation
Level of
Skills and
Education
Level of
Support for
National
Government
Political
Views Age Gender
Level of
Support for
EU
Membership
Weak
Positive
Weak
Positive
Moderate
Positive
Weak
Negative
Weak
Negative Moderate
20
Multivariate
As my bivariate analysis has discovered the strongest
relationship between level of support for national government and level of
support for membership of the EU, I want to check that this relationship is
direct and that my control variables of age and gender do not affect it, as
suggested might be the case by Inglehart (1970) and Tucker et al (2002).
When re-analysing the relationship between level of support for the UK
government and level of support for membership of the EU whilst
controlling for age, it is evident that the relationship is direct and age does
not significantly affect it. When the effects of age have been removed from
the measure of association between level of support for the UK government
and level of support for the EU, the relationship remains moderate-strong
and positive ( ). When controlling for gender, the moderate-strong
relationship between level of support for membership of the EU and level of
support for the national government remains exactly the same ( )2.
This indicates a direct relationship between the variables: the relationship
found earlier between level of support for UK membership of the EU and
level of support for the UK government is not affected by the age or gender
of the respondents. The zero-order and partial gamma values are displayed
in table 3.
Gamma
Zero-Order
1st-Order Partial
(Controlling for age)
1st-Order Partial
(Controlling for gender)
0.481 Table 3: The zero-order and 1
st-order partial gammas for the relationship between level of support for
the UK government and level of support for membership of the EU when controlling for age and gender.
2 The partial bivariate tables constructed for these calculations are available in appendices 2 and 3.
21
When comparing the effect of all of the independent variables
on the level of support for UK membership of the EU, the standardised
multiple regression formula
confirms the expectation that level of support for the national government
( ) has the greatest impact on levels of support for EU membership.
According to the formula, the second most influential factor is political
views ( ), followed by age ( ) and level of education ( ). The factors with
the least effect on the level of support for UK membership of the EU are
found to be level of cognitive mobilisation ( ) and gender ( ). Level of
cognitive mobilisation, level of education and level of support for the
national government all have positive overall effects on level of support for
UK membership of the EU, whereas the effects of political views, age and
gender are negative.
A calculation of the multiple correlation coefficient indicates
that there is something significant missing from this analysis, as taken all
together the variables presented here are able to explain only of the
variation in levels of support for membership of the EU ( ). This
means that of the variation in levels of support for UK membership of
the EU must be explained by other factors that have not been included here.
Discussion
The findings report that the most successful theory used to
explain levels of individual support for UK membership of the EU is proxy
theory: British individuals who report a high level of support for the UK
22
government are more likely to support UK membership of the EU. This
finding is consistent with the previous studies undertaken by Anderson
(1998), de Vries and van Kersbergen (2007), and McLaren (2007). The
relationships hypothesised for the other theories, although generally
consistent with the directions predicted (excluding the case of gender which
was opposite that hypothesised), were weaker than I expected based on the
evidence in previous studies. Most strikingly, as the main theories presented
here were only able to explain less than a quarter of the variation in levels of
support for the EU, it is clear that something important is missing from the
theories or analysis presented here and that further investigations are
required to discover what the key factors are that can better explain
individual level attitudes towards the EU in the UK.
As such, it would be foolish to claim that the results reported
here are not without flaw. Using the results of just one survey carried out at
one point in time may limit the validity of my findings, and a future study
examining the dynamics of the relationships investigated here over a longer
period of time would paint a more detailed, valid, and potentially different,
picture. It may be that, whatever the missing influential factors are, they are
too personal or non-quantifiable and as such impossible to identify and
measure the effects of, but nevertheless additional investigation is required.
It could also be, as suggested by Anderson, that the UK is a special case with
regard to what affects the public‟s views on Europe (Anderson 1998:592),
and that there is an important explanatory variable that has not been
hypothesised here which is specific to the UK. Alternatively, there may be
more effective measures of the concepts analysed, for example, an
individual‟s income has been used in some previous studies to operationalise
23
the utilitarian theory of support for the EU, on occasion with very promising
results (McLaren 2004). The use of income was not used in this essay as the
data was not available, and equally significant results have been found in
past studies when the utilitarian theory is operationalised using level of
education (Hooghe, Huo and Marks 2007; Abts et al 2009).
In conclusion, it is possible to say that of the four main
competing theories of individual level support for European integration, in
the EU‟s most Eurosceptic member state, the UK, proxy theory is the most
successful explanation for levels of support for UK membership of the EU.
In the UK, those who are more supportive of the national government are
significantly more likely to support the UK‟s membership of the EU, and
those who are less supportive of the UK government are significantly less
likely to support EU membership. However, the results have indicated that
there is something substantial missing from this model of individual EU
support, and further research is required in order to identify what it might be.
24
Appendix 1: The technical specifications of the data sampling
and collection for the Eurobarometer survey 71.1, Spring 2009.
Reproduced from European Commission (2009b:74).
“EUROBAROMETER 71.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Between the 16th
of January and the 22nd
of February 2009, TNS Opinion & Social, a
consortium created between Taylor Nelson Sofres and EOS Gallup Europe, carried out
wave 71.1 of the EUROBAROMETER, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Directorate-General for Communication, “Research and Political Analysis”.
The EUROBAROMETER 71.1 covers the population of the respective nationalities of
the European Union Member States, resident in each of the Member States and aged 15
years and over. The EUROBAROMETER 71.1 has also been conducted in the three
candidate countries (Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
and in the Turkish Cypriot Community. In these countries, the survey covers the national
population of citizens and the population of citizens of all the European Union Member
States that are residents in these countries and have a sufficient command of the national
languages to answer the questionnaire. The basic sample design applied in all states is a
multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points was
drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the
country) and to population density.
In order to do so, the sampling points were drawn systematically from each of the
"administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the countries surveyed according to the
EUROSTAT NUTS II (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident
population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further
addresses (every Nth address) were selected by standard "random route" procedures,
from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random
(following the "closest birthday rule"). All interviews were conducted face-to-face in
people's homes and in the appropriate national language. As far as the data capture is
concerned, CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) was used in those countries
where this technique was available.”
25
Appendix 2: Partial bivariate tables showing the relationship
between level of support for the national government and level
of support for UK membership of the EU when controlling for
the effect of gender.
Male
Level of Support for National Government Tend not to
trust
Don‟t
know
Tend to
trust
Total
Level of
Support for
Membership
of the EU
Bad thing 169
(45.7%)
1
(6.7%)
42
(20.5)
212
(35.9%)
Neither good nor
bad
106
(28.6%)
3
(20.0%)
57
(27.8%)
166
(28.1%)
Good thing 95
(25.7%)
11
(73.3%)
106
(51.7%)
212
(35.9%)
Total 370
(100.0%)
15
(100%)
205
(100%)
590
(100%)
Gamma = 0.467
Female
Level of Support for National Government Tend not to
trust
Don‟t
know
Tend to
trust
Total
Level of
Support for
Membership
of the EU
Bad thing 172
(42.7%)
6
(16.2%)
27
(17.3%)
205
(34.4%)
Neither good nor
bad
156
(38.7%)
20
(54.1%)
54
(34.6%)
230
(38.6%)
Good thing 75
(18.6%)
11
(29.7%)
75
(48.1%)
161
(27.0%)
Total 403
(100%)
37
(100%)
156
(100%)
596
(100%)
Gamma = 0.495
26
Appendix 3: Partial bivariate tables showing the relationship
between level of support for the national government and level
of support for UK membership of the EU when controlling for
the effect of age.
Age group 15-34
Level of Support for National Government Tend not to
trust
Don‟t
know
Tend to
trust
Total
Level of
Support for
Membership
of the EU
Bad thing 40
(26.5%)
2
(10.0%)
8
(8.3%)
50
(18.7%)
Neither good nor
bad
62
(41.1%)
11
(55.0%)
39
(40.6%)
112
(41.9%)
Good thing 49
(32.5%)
7
(35.0%)
49
(51.0%)
105
(39.3%)
Total 151
(100%)
20
(100%)
96
(100%)
267
(100%)
Gamma = 0.359
Age group 35-54
Level of Support for National Government Tend not to
trust
Don‟t
know
Tend to
trust
Total
Level of
Support for
Membership
of the EU
Bad thing 99
(40.4%)
2
(15.4%)
22
(20.0%)
123
(33.4%)
Neither good nor
bad
92
(37.6%)
5
(38.5%)
31
(28.2%)
128
(34.8%)
Good thing 54
(22.0%)
6
(46.2%)
57
(51.8%)
117
(31.8%)
Total 245
(100%)
13
(100%)
110
(100%)
368
(100%)
Gamma = 0.464
27
Age group 55-74
Level of Support for National Government Tend not to
trust
Don‟t
know
Tend to
trust
Total
Level of
Support for
Membership
of the EU
Bad thing 149
(51.9%)
3
(20.0%)
22
(21.2%)
174
(42.9%)
Neither good nor
bad
82
(28.6%)
6
(40.0%)
27
(26.0%)
115
(28.3%)
Good thing 56
(19.5%)
6
(40.0%)
55
(52.9%)
117
(28.8%)
Total 287
(100%)
15
(100%)
104
(100%)
406
(100%)
Gamma = 0.548
Age group 75-100
Level of Support for National Government Tend not to
trust
Don‟t
know
Tend to
trust
Total
Level of
Support for
Membership
of the EU
Bad thing 53
(58.9%)
0
(0.0%)
17
(33.3%)
70
(48.3%)
Neither good nor
bad
26
(28.9%)
1
(25.0%)
14
(27.5%)
41
(28.3%)
Good thing 11
(12.2%)
3
(75.0%)
20
(39.2%)
34
(23.4%)
Total 90
(100%)
4
(100%)
51
(100%)
145
(100%)
Gamma = 0.489
28
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