CRUZ, ROLANDO JR., T. CE31FA2

WRITTEN REPORT ON JOB SAFETY ANALYSIS AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

JOB SAFETY ANALYSIS A Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is one of the risk assessment tools used to identify and control workplace hazards. A JSA is a second tier risk assessment with the aim of preventing personal injury to a person, or their colleagues, and any other person passing or working adjacent, above or below. JSAs are also known as Activity Hazard Analysis (AHA), Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) and Task Hazard Analysis (THA).

Purpose

The purpose of a JSA is to identify workplace hazards with a 'Likelihood' of possible or

greater. Controls are then selected and applied to reduce the risk associated with the identified

hazards to acceptable levels in accordance with the principles of 'ALARP' and using the 'Hierarchy

of Control'.

Workplace Hazard Definition

A workplace hazard is defined as ‘anything that has the potential to injure or harm’.

Workplace Hazard Categories 1. Types, 2. Groups 3. Families.

Workplace Hazard Types

1. Hazards to Safety - Anything assessed as 'possible', or greater, to cause an immediate injury

2. Hazards to Health - Anything assessed as 'possible', or greater, to cause harm by exposure over time.

Workplace Hazard Groups 1. Physical Object Hazard – Touch or inhale it. 2. Hazardous Work Type – Requires a permit, qualification etc. 3. Duty of Care Breaches - Legislative &/or company contraventions.

Hazard Families There are many hazard families. The following list is not exhaustive. Many hazards will fit into more than one family. Physical, Chemical, Electrical, Mechanical, Hydraulic, Pneumatic, Biological, Magnetic, Thermal, Gravitational, Environmental, Psychological, Invisible, Visible, and Developing.

Workplace Hazard Criterion The criterion is a set of standards to assist in deciding to include, or exclude, certain identified hazards related to our task. The workplace hazard criterion used to identify genuine workplace hazards is:

1. It is ‘clearly identifiable’ - ‘Clearly identifiable’ means that we are specific about the hazard to the point where the hazard type, group and family are instantly linked to it.

2. ‘A scenario is not required for its articulation’ - It can be clearly described in five, or less, words. If you cannot, it probably is not a hazard.

3. It has an inherent likelihood of ‘possible’ or greater - If the hazard you are applying the criteria to does not have an inherent likelihood of ‘Possible’, or greater, then drop it and move on.

4. It is without ‘judgmental adjectives’ - Judgmental adjectives are negative and sometimes overlap with ‘descriptions of absence’. Adjectives such as poor, deficient, defective, scant, weak, unsound, faulty are not to be used in the hazard column.

5. It contains no ‘descriptions of absence’ - Descriptions of absence are usually negative and sometimes overlap with Judgmental adjectives. They include: Without, lack of, minimal, unsuitable, unavailable, inadequate, missing, non-existent.

When a JSA is required

- Workplace hazard identification and an assessment of those hazards should be performed before every job.

- JSAs are usually developed when directed to by a supervisor, when indicated by the use of a first tier risk assessment and whenever a hazard associated with a task has a likelihood rating of 'possible' or greater.

- A JSA is a documented risk assessment developed when company policy directs people to do so.

- Generally, high consequence, high likelihood tasks are addressed by way of a JSA. - High consequence, high likelihood tasks include, but are not limited to, those with:

A history of, or potential for, injury, harm or damage such as those involving:

1. Fire, chemicals or a toxic or oxygen deficient atmosphere. 2. Tasks carried out in new environments. 3. Rarely performed tasks. 4. Tasks that may impact on the integrity or output of a processing system.

How a JSA is created The JSA or JHA should be created by the work group performing the task. Sometimes it is expedient to review a JSA that has been prepared when the same task has been performed before but the work group must take special care to review all of the steps thoroughly to ensure that they are controlling all of the hazards for this job this time. The JSA is usually completed on a form. The most common form is a table with three columns (although each company has a variation with many having five or six columns). The headings of the three columns are (1) Job Step (2) Hazard (3) Controls. A Hazard is any factor that can cause damage to personnel, property or the environment (some companies include loss of production or downtime in the definition as well). A Control is any process for controlling a hazard. The work group firstly breaks down the entire job into its component steps. Then, for each step, hazards are identified. Finally, for each hazard identified, controls are recorded in the 3rd column. After the JSA worksheet is completed After the JSA worksheet is completed, the work group that is about to perform the task should have a toolbox talk, and discuss the hazards and controls, delegate responsibilities, ensure that all equipment and PPE described in the JSA are available, that contingencies such as fire fighting are understood, communication channels and hand signals are agreed etcetera. Then, if everybody in the work group feels that it is safe to proceed with task, work should commence. If at any time during the task circumstances change, then work should be stopped (sometimes called a "time-out for safety"), and the hazards and controls described in the JSA should be reassessed and additional controls used or alternative methods devised. Again, work should only recommence when every member of the work group feels it is safe to do so. When the task is complete it is often of benefit to have a close-out or "tailgate" meeting, to discuss any lessons learned so that they may be incorporated into the JSA the next time the task is undertaken.

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS Accident analysis is carried out in order to determine the cause or causes of an accident or series of accidents so as to prevent further incidents of a similar kind. It is also known as accident investigation. It may be performed by a range of experts, including forensic scientists, forensic engineers or health and safety advisers. Accident investigators, particularly those in the aircraft industry, are colloquially known as "tin-kickers". Accident analysis is performed in four steps:

1. Fact gathering: After an accident happened a forensic process starts to gather all possibly relevant facts that may contribute to understanding the accident.

2. Fact Analysis: After the forensic process has been completed or at least delivered some results, the facts are put together to give a "big picture." The history of the accident is reconstructed and checked for consistency and plausibility.

3. Conclusion Drawing: If the accident history is sufficiently informative, conclusions can be drawn about causation and contributing factors.

4. Counter-measures: In some cases the development of counter-measures is desired or recommendations have to be issued to prevent further accidents of the same kind.

There exist numerous forms of Accident Analysis methods. These can be divided into three categories

1. Causal Analysis uses the principle of causality to determine the course of events. Though people casually speak of a "chain of events", results from Causal Analysis usually have the form of directed a-cyclic graphs – the nodes being events and the edges the cause-effect relations. Methods of Causal Analysis differ in their respective notion of causation.

2. Expert Analysis relies on the knowledge and experience of field experts. This form of analysis usually lacks a rigorous (formal/semiformal) methodological approach. This usually affects falsify-ability and objectivity of analyses. This is of importance when conclusions are heavily disputed among experts.

3. Organizational Analysis relies on systemic theories of organization. Most theories imply

that if a system's behaviour stayed within the bounds of the ideal organization then no accidents can occur. Organizational Analysis can be falsified and results from analyses can be checked for objectivity. Choosing an organizational theory for accident analysis comes from the assumption that the system to be analysed conforms to that theory.