Cruysberghs. Hegel Has No Ethics. Climacus Complaints Against Speculative Philosophy

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Hegel Has No Ethics

Climacus Complaints Against Speculative Philosophy

By Paul Cruysberghs

Abstract

In this article I deal with Climacus complaint that Hegels system does not include an

ethics. I agree with Jon Stewart, who writes in his book Kierkegaards Relations to Hegel

Reconsideredthat Hegel has a different understanding of ethics than Kierkegaard, but

that at least some of the basics of Kierkegaards ethics are an essential part of Hegels

ethical system as well. I connect Climacus emphasis on the striving of the individual

with Hegels idea of the good in his Logic,Climacus emphasis on the subjective inten-

tion with the morality chapter in Hegels Philosophy of Right,and Climacus emphasis

on divine governance and providence in world history with the transition of objectivespirit to absolute spirit in Hegels Encyclopaedia.At the same time, I argue that the ap-

parent conflicts between these thinkers are not tied to the text but rather to the polem-

ical context or subtext that, more or less consciously, leads the arguments of the respec-

tive authors in different directions.

When dealing with the question of whether it is possible to construct asystem of existence [et tilvrelsens system], Johannes Climacus enters

into a polemic with Hegel, arguing that the latter had completed hissystem without having set down an ethics.1Two paragraphs earlier herefers to another author (Quidam, as a matter of fact, in hisGuilty-Not Guilty diary), who reproaches Hegel because throughhim a system, the absolute system, was brought to completion with-out having an ethics.2And indeed, even though the quote is not lit-

1 CUP1,121 / SKS7, 116. Whereas the Hegelian system in absentmindednessis fin-

ished without having an ethics (the very home of existence [Tilvrelse]; cf.

CUP1,296 / SKS7, 270fn. and CUP1,307 / SKS7, 279fn. A list of more quotes is

available in Jon Stewarts book Kierkegaards Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, (hereafter: Kierkegaards Relations), p. 515.2 CUP1, 119 / SKS 7, 115.

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176 Paul Cruysberghs

eral, in the midnight insert of February 2, Quidam appears to make anallusion to Hegel when he refers to the project of constructing a sys-tem without including an ethics, the consequence of which is a sys-

tem in which one has everything, everything else, and has omittedthe one thing needful:3an ethics.

For a Hegel scholar these remarks are, to say the least, surprising ifnot shocking. Ethics belongs to the very core of Hegels system and itwas one of his basic interests from the beginning of his authorship. Inthe early Jena years (1802-03), Hegel even suggested the outline of asystem that would end with an ethics rather than with absolute spirit,as was the case later on.4And though Hegel was intelligent enough torealize that religion could not be reduced to ethics, in the 1827 and1830 editions of his Encyclopaedia,he still argued that outside theethical spiritit is vain to seek for true religion and true religiosity.5

This is an evident salute to Kant against those philosophies thattended to overemphasise God as a creator (of nature). And eventhough Hegel did not agree with Kant for several reasons, he was hon-est enough to appreciate Kants preoccupation with the establismentof a close connection between religion and ethics.

When considering these elementary references to Hegels apprecia-

tion of ethics, one might be tempted to consider Climacus reproachto Hegels system for lacking ethics as simply untruthful, or else an in-dication of a serious misunderstanding. Both hypotheses seem im-plausible. Is there another alternative?

In their commentary to the new critical edition of Sren Kierke-gaards Skrifter, the editors of Stadier paa Livets Vei take it for grantedthat Quidams critique and, by extension Johannes Climacus critiquethat Hegels system is lacking an ethics, was quite a general objectionto Hegel by his contemporaries.6 The editors refer to MartensensGrundrids til Moralphilosophiens System (1841); and in his well-docu-mented book on Kierkegaards Relations to Hegel Reconsidered,JonStewartcompletes the picture with a reference to an even earlier pas-

3 CUP1,231 / SKS6, 216.4 In the Jena article on Natural Law,the system closes with a system of ethical life, co-

inciding with a philosophy of spirit and explicitly including religion (G.W. F. Hegel Ge-

sammelte Werke,Hamburg: Meiner 1968, (hereafter: GW) vol. 4, pp. 461ff.). Cf. my ar-

ticle Hegels Critique of Modern Natural Law in Hegel on the Ethical Life, Religion

and Philosophy (1793-1807), ed. by A. Wylleman, Leuven: Leuven 1989, pp. 81-117.5 Hegels Enzyklopdie (1827 and 1830), 552 A, GW19, p. 390; GW20, p. 531.6 SKS K6, 239.


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Hegel Has No Ethics 177

sage in Sibbern.7But the passages from both Martensen and Sibbernmake a different point. Sibbern, referring to the Moralitychaptersin the Encyclopaediaand the Philosophy of Right, complains that He-

gel did not work out in more detail his moralphilosophy; Martensencomplains that Hegel had not offered his time en gjennemfrt Ethik,an elaboratedethics, which is, I will allow myself to say, something dif-ferent than claiming that he has no ethics at all. The complaint is thatHegel did not elaborate on his ethics in the same way that he did onhis aesthetics (or philosophy of art) and his philosophy of religion.8

As a matter of fact, maybe without realizing it himself, Martensencomplains that the editors of the Werke,(thevollstndige Ausgabedurch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten) and not Hegel,were responsible for the absence of an elaborated ethics since theydid not edit his lectures on ethics in the same way as they did with thelectures on aesthetics and religion. Hegel lectured about ethics asmany as six times but, maybe alas, the editors of the Collected Worksgave them the form of additions to the Grundlinien rather than edit-ing them in the form of a reconstruction (by the way, a rather dubiousone) of the real lectures. Today we have quite a number of transcriptsof the lectures on the philosophy of law. From this point of view, even

Martensens complaint is no longer relevant. In this context, Kierke-gaards complaint that Hegel has no ethics at all is quite unique; it ismore radical than just affirming that he had no elaborated ethics ormoral philosophy.

When dealing with Climacus statement, Jon Stewart declares thatthere is no doubt that Hegel had some theory of ethics, although itmay be one that is idiosyncratic in certain ways.9 Of course, I doagree with him, although I do not see as well why Hegels theory ofethics would be idiosyncratic; it is not more idiosyncratic than, say,Kants or Climacus ethics. But anyway, if we want Climacus criticismof Hegel to make sense, then, Stewart suggests, what lies behind thiscriticism must be a specific conception of ethics, which is at odds

7 Stewart Kierkegaards Relations, pp. 516ff. The Sibbern text Stewart refers to is a re-

view of the first issue of Heibergs Perseus. One could in fact say that with Hegel, only

a few fragments though different writes of a highly moral system emerge, Sibbern

in Maanedsskrift for Litteraturno. 19, Copenhagen 1838, p. 323 (with thanks to Jon

Stewart for sending me a copy of the text).8 It is interesting that Martensen finds elements of a higher morality than that whose

end is absorbed in the state in both the Philosophy of Religion and the Aesthetics

(quoted by Stewart Kierkegaards Relations, p. 517).9 Stewart Kierkegaards Relations, p. 518.


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with that of Hegel.10Hegels stress on the state as the ethical instancepar excellence confirms Stewart in his thesis that Kierkegaard hadquite a different conception of ethics. An ethics culminating in a the-

ory of the state is alien to Kierkegaards ethics indeed.However, exaggerating a little bit just for the sake of argument I

would like to show first of all that Climacus ethics is not, or to put itmore modestly, not completely, at odds with that of Hegel, as Stew-art suggests. Rather, I want to show that at least some of the basic ele-ments in Kierkegaards ethics are essential parts of Hegels ethicalsystem as well. At the same time, I argue that the apparent conflictsbetween these thinkers are not connected to the text but rather to thepolemic context or subtext that, more or less consciously, leads the ar-guments of these authors in different directions.

It is my intention to take up Climacus criticism in order to find outhow we should read it. On the one hand, I would like to show that theelements Climacus considered to be essential for ethics are not absentfrom Hegels system of philosophy. Moreover, these elements are nec-essary within the development of his ethical theory; on the other hand,I will show that if we take into consideration the polemic contexts andsubtexts of both Hegels and Climacus arguments, it should become

understandable that both authors say what they say. That Climacustext has a highly polemical component is almost a truism, but Hegelstexts, even the most systematic ones such as the Encyclopaedia, arealso supported and moved by polemic and passionate subtexts. Takinginto consideration the interference of both Hegels and Climacus po-lemic perspectives, I am convinced that we will have a better under-standing of the reasons why Climacus, in the name of a polemics and apassion different from Hegels, rejected Hegels ethical theory.

First, I will consider Kierkegaards point that Hegel did not careabout the individual existence [tilvrelse] and the ethical striving thatis connected with it. It is my intention to show that both the notions ofindividual existence and of striving can be retrieved already on thelevel of Hegels logic. Second, I will connect Climacus conception ofethics with Hegels conception of morality, a concept that has largelybeen neglected in the Hegel literature. Third, I will look at the posi-tion of world history in Hegels ethics as compared with what Kierke-gaard made of it.

10 Stewart Kierkegaards Relations, p. 515.


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Striving, an Ethical Task for the Singular Existing Individual

For Climacus, human existence is immediately connected with a con-

tinued striving and, in this sense, with ethics. The continued striving,he says, is the expression of the existing subjects ethical life-view.11

Though Climacus connects this perspective with Lessing, he could justas well have referred to Fichte, for whom continued striving is the ul-timate transcendental condition for both the theoretical and the prac-tical ego.12Fichtes perspective was vehemently criticized by the JenaHegel in his booklet on the Difference between Fichtes and SchellingsSystem of Philosophy.13The notion that the human subject and hu-man history are condemned to an indefinite striving for a destinationthat is never reached was interpreted by Hegel as a reintroduction ofthe Kantian Ding an sichthat Fichte thought he had eliminated onceand for all in his Wissenschaftslehre. Precisely because Fichte consid-ered the elimination of the Ding an sichas one of his main achieve-ments, he considered Hegels critique to be extremely hard.

Interestingly, Hegels polemics, with Fichte brings us to a better un-derstanding of the difference between Kierkegaard and Hegels con-ceptions of ethics. In the end, Hegel cannot accept an ethics that is un-

able to reconcile the opposition of the real and the ideal, of the is andthe ought, that remains dominant in Fichtes thought. For Hegel, thisopposition is one of the most painful problems that bewitch modern cul-ture.14His main endeavour was to overcome precisely the harshness ofan ethics that presupposes a basic opposition, a split, an Entzweiung,ashe says in Differenz,15between the rational and the sensuous, the sensu-ous being condemned to subject itself to or, rather, to be subjected bythe rational part of the human being. Sure, Hegel is not unaware of thegap between ought and being, but it has only a subordinate position inhis philosophy. Indeed, his ambition is to connect rather than to sepa-rate. In the Preface to the second edition of his Wissenschaft derLogik,Hegel reproached Kant for arguing that thought, though it is themiddle term between the subject and the object, so to speak, separates

11 CUP1, 121-122 / SKS 7, 117.12 Fichte Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre in Gesamtausgabe der Bay-

erischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. I, 2, pp. 397ff.13 Hegel Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophiein GW

4, (hereafter: Differenz)pp. 45ff.14 Cf. Hegel Glauben und Wissen in Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, ed. by Hegel

and Schelling, no. II, 1, (GW4, pp. 315ff.).15 Hegel Differenz, GW4, pp. 12ff.


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[abschliet] them instead of mediating and connecting [zusammenzu-schlieen] them.16What Climacus tries to do is in line with the Kantian(and Fichtean) separation of the subject and the object. Indeed, for him

existence is separation.17For that very reason, he denies the possibil-ity of a unity of the subject and the object, of thought and being. Exist-ence is the spacing that holds apart, he argues, whereas the systematicis the conclusiveness that connects [slutter sammen].18

As a matter of fact, the spacing that Climacus focuses on is not absentin Hegel either. While dealing with The Idea of the Good in his Sub-jective Logic, Hegel takes up a typically Fichtean argument, not just byassigning a position to the idea of the good that is superior to the idea of(theoretical) knowledge, but also by explaining it in terms of Trieb,ofurge.19The idea of the good is characterized as the urge to realize it-self, although the actuality it wants to give itself remains subjective,something that ought to be [soll] realized, but, as a matter of fact, neveris. In this way the good remains an ought-to-be [Sollen]; it is in and foritself, but being, as the ultimate abstract immediacy, remains also, con-fronting it, determined in the form of a not-being.20The idea of the re-alized good [des vollendeten Guten] remains an absolute postulate, butnothing more than a postulate. The good will never take the shape of an

accomplished reality; it will necessarily remain subjective.21Of course, it would be quite unfair to reduce Climacus position to

that of Fichtes notion of an infinite striving or to Hegels logic of theidea of the good. Especially insofar as Hegel is concerned, one shouldtake into account the fact that the idea of the good does not have thevery last word in his logic. The final word is given to the absolute ideain which the subjectivity of the idea of the good is sublated in such away that the subjective idea of the good and the objective world, as itappears for theoretical knowledge, are unified. Indeed, in the abso-lute idea the theoretical idea is united with the practical one in such away that the actuality that is found as given is at the same time deter-

16 Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik, GW21, p. 14.17 CUP1, 123 / SKS7, 118.18 CUP1, 118 / SKS7, 114. Hegels explication of thought as a mediating term between

the subject and the object refers to the syllogism in which the middle term allows us to

connect [German: zusammenschlieen;Danish: at slutte sammen] the minor and the

major term in the conclusion [Schlu]. Kierkegaard, by contrast, stresses that existence

cuts off the object from the subject. Hence there is no room for a decisive conclusion.19 Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik II, GW 12, p. 231.20 Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik II, GW 12, p. 233.21 Ibid.


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mined as the realizedabsolute end [der ausgefhrte absolute Zweck].22

Such a perspective, developed within the context of Hegels polemicswith Fichte, is certainly not Kierkegaardian. And what both Hegel

and Fichte are offering is (in Climacus terms) a metaphysical un-derstanding of the continued striving, whereas he wants us to under-stand it as a task for the singular existing individual.23

But if we limit ourselves to Hegel, we might suggest that eventhough we can consider Hegels logic of the good as metaphysical,24

we must take into consideration that Hegels philosophical system con-tains more than just a logic. It is about reality as well. The logic is fol-lowed by what Hegel termed a philosophy of the reality of the ideain one of the fragments of his Jena lecture on Introductio inPhilosophiam:25 a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of spirit.Maybe the striving for the good should not just be understood in a log-ical sense, but in a real sense as well. And then we can suggest that Cli-macus claim that it should be an ethical task for the singular existingindividual26applies to Hegels philosophy as well. As a matter of fact,the logic of the good, including both the striving and the singularity ofthe striving subject, is not alien to the singular existing individual; it israther his very essence, if I may still speak in terms of objective logic

(maybe I should rather say that it is part of his very concept). As a con-sequence, we may expect to retrieve the logic of the good in HegelsRealphilosophie more specifically, in his philosophy of objectivespirit as well. And indeed, if we look closer at the morality chapter, thestriving and the singularity of the striving subject shows up again.

22

Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik II, GW 12, p. 235.23 CUP1,122 / SKS7, 117.24 In order to distinguish the post-Kantian turn to logic from the pre-Kantian meta-

physics of being, Hegel avoids the term metaphysics when talking about his own

philosophy. Only the objective logic (the logic of being and of essence) might be

termed a metaphysics, with the restriction that being and essence are determinations

of thought [Denkbestimmungen] themselves. Cf. P. Cruysberghs and L. De Vos Van

metafysica tot logica. Hegels kritiek van de traditionele metafysica in Naar leeuwer-

iken grijpen. Leuvense opstellen over metafysica, ed. by M. Moors & J. Van der

Veken, Leuven: Universitaire Pers 1994, pp. 51-81.25 Hegel Die Idee des absoluten Wesens in GW5, p. 263. The common term Real-

philosophie as such does not appear in Hegels own manuscripts. One of his courses in

winter semester 1805-06, however, was announced as Philosophiam realem, i.e.

(cf. Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. by F. Nicolin, Hamburg: Meiner 1977, pp. 81, 84).26 CUP1,151 / SKS7, 141.


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What Makes the Deed the Individuals Own is the Intention

Morality plays an crucial role in Hegels philosophy of objective

spirit.27

It mediates between abstract right and ethical life [Sittlich-keit]. As such it is a more basic structure than ethical life itself; at thesame time, it is more elementary, more abstract.

My thesis is and I admit it is not new that Climacus conceptionof ethics recalls, in its most basic structure, Hegels conception of mo-rality, which in its turn takes up (and criticizes) the Kantian and Fich-tean conceptions of morality over against their systems of legality.

Let me start by recalling that in Hegels system the notion of subjectiv-ity is very closely linked to that of morality. The free individual, who, in

(immediate) right, is only aperson, is now defined as asubject.28Theseare the very first words in the chapter on Morality in the Encyclopae-dia. And subjectivity means that instead of being absorbed in the exter-nal world, the moral subject will reflect infinitely in itself, without accept-ing any external determination. Morality thus constitutes an essentialstep towards human freedom: Only in the will, as a subjective one, free-domcan be actual.29Morality thus presents the real side of the con-cept of freedom.30And if ethics has something to do with freedom, then

it definitely requires this reflection of the will in itself. As a consequence,morality is essentially a matter of self determination: nobody, nothingelse can decide in somebody elses place, Hegel argues in the Grundlin-ien. It is the subject itself which must choose and to decide for itself.

This is also Climacus perspective. Time and again, Climacus re-peats that in the case of ethics, every human being is assigned to him-self,31that ethics is a matter of individuality, subjectivity32and interi-ority,33and that it can only be grasped within oneself.34For Climacus,ethics is a matter of enthusiasm, and true ethical enthusiasm con-

sists in willing to the utmost of ones capability, but alsoin never

27 I will not deal with the morality chapter (C. Der seiner selbst gewisse Geist. Die Mo-

ralitt) in the Phenomenology of Spirit(GW 9, pp. 323ff.), though it is a most inter-

esting one. The dubious status of the Phenomenology(is it an integral part of the sys-

tem or is it just an introduction to it?) made me decide to omit it here.28 Hegel Enzyklopdie(1830), 503, GW20, p. 488; cf. Grundlinien der Philosophie des

Rechts,105.29 Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,106.30 Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,106 A.31 CUP1, 141 / SKS7, 132; CUP1, 316 / SKS7, 288.32 CUP1,148 / SKS 7, 138.33 CUP1,143 / SKS 7, 133.34 CUP1,157 / SKS7, 146.


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thinking whether or not one thereby achieves something.35Just as inKant, it is only the good will, the personal intention, the Gesinnungas Hegel would call it, that grants a deed its moral character.

Of course, the perspectives of Climacus and Hegel are not identical.Whereas Hegel brings the emancipatory aspects of subjectivity tolight, Climacus stresses the individuals personal responsibility. ForHegel, the moral viewpoint, which is to be read as a modern acquisi-tion over against the patronizing of the individual by external author-ities in the past, must be explained as the right of the subjectivewill.36The will does not acknowledge any value as valid unless it canconsider it its own. Climacus subject is a subjected subject:37 sub-jected to the absolute demands of the ethical imperative in the firstplace, subjected to God in the second place (or vice versa).

What these demands consist of does not seem to be Climacus mainpreoccupation, whereas for Hegel it certainly is. It is clear that Hegelsconception of individual freedom cannot to take the form of mere ar-bitrariness. Freedom asks about ones particular needs and leads up tothe willing of the universal, or the rational. Thus the Hegelian free-dom of the will consists in the unity of the rational will with its claimof universality on the one hand, and of the singular will with its singu-

lar given world on the other. Still, it is the singular will that must actu-alize the claim of universality. The singular will is the immediate andpeculiar element of the latters application [Bettigung].38Thus theleast we can say is that Hegels objective spirit has the singular will asits element. There is no ethical life, be it on the level of family life, civilsociety, or state, where the singular will is absent.39Indeed, also withinthe context of family, civil society or state, moral duties must bepresent in me as a free subject, i. e., as a right of my subjective will, ofmy own disposition [Gesinnung].

35 CUP1,134 / SKS7, 126. See also CUP1,155 / SKS 7, 144.36 Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 107. Cf. Enzyklopdie (1830), 503A,

GW 20, p. 489: The subjectivity of the will in itself is its own aim [Selbstzweck].37 I introduced the notion of a subjected subject in Must Reflection Be Stopped? Can

it Be Stopped? in Immediacy and Reflection in Kierkegaards Thought, ed. by P.

Cruysberghs, J. Taels & K. Verstrynge, Louvain Philosophical Studiesvol. 17, 2003,

Leuven: Leuven, pp. 11-24.38 Hegel Enzyklopdie (1830), 485, GW 20, p. 479.39 In an article, Over geloof en vertrouwen van burgers in de politiek in Geweten en

zedelijkheid, Studies van het Centrum voor Duits Idealismevol. 2, Nijmegen, 2000,

pp. 95-119, I have shown how the singular will and its moral Gesinnungis an essen-

tial moment of political institutions.


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The subjective will takes form as purpose [Vorsatz] and intention[Absicht], two crucial concepts in Hegels moral philosophy that link itto that of Climacus. Ethically, what makes the deed the individuals

own is the intention [Hensigten],40Climacus argues against the Hege-lian conception of world history (cf. infra). And in a footnote address-ing the so-called Hegelian thesis that the external is the internal andvice versa, Climacus stresses again that the outer as material for ac-tion is a matter of indifference, because the purpose [Hensigten] iswhat is ethically accentuated.41But it is clear that, at least on the levelof morality, Hegel would completely agree with Climacus position.

Still, he deals with purpose and intention in a broader perspectivethan that of the Kantian good will or Climacus stressing of the inte-riority of our moral intentions over against the external, world his-torical effects of our deeds.42For Hegel, purpose and intention arepart of a general theory of human action, at least initially indepen-dently of the question of whether ones purposes and intentions arethe expression of a good will or not. Hegel wants to take into accountthat one can act with bad intentions as well. For him it is importantthat I assume an act as mine, i. e., as my responsibility, insofar as itwas my purpose and my intention to do so. Still, once he has estab-

lished the importance of both purpose and intention in general, He-gel introduces the notions of good and evil [das Gute und das Bse].And here the logic of the idea of the good has its empirical applica-tion. For the moral consciousness, the good is the absolute final aim[Endzweck] of the world, and dutyfor the subject, who ought[soll] tohave insightinto thegood, make it his intention[Absicht] and bring itabout by his activity.43

Against the subjective will, however, stands an independent worldthat is there for itself. As a consequence, it is accidental whether thegood will realizes itself or not. Therefore morality is essentially aquestion of ought, not of being.44 Hence the moral subject isurged to abstract from everything in order to turn into itself: it is itsdeepest descent into itself [sein tiefstes Insichgehen].45The infinitude

40 CUP1,155 / SKS 7, 144.41 CUP1,297 / SKS 7, 270.42 Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,115-128; Enzyklopdie (1830), 504-

506, GW 20, pp. 490-491.43 Hegel Enzyklopdie (1830), 507, GW 20, p. 491; cf. Grundlinien der Philosophie des

Rechts, 129, 131, 133.44 Hegel Enzyklopdie(1830), 510, GW 20, p. 493.45 Hegel Enzyklopdie,(1830), 511, GW 20, p. 493.


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of subjectivity appears here: it knows itself to be the choosing and thedeciding instance.

From this moment on, however, the good must take the form of a

multitude of duties; the subject is confronted with antinomies and col-lisions, the ought [Sollen] is made into something perennial becausethe subject will never be able to accomplish the good. Thus the space,the gap between the good and its realization due to the finitude of ourexistence that Climacus stressed over against the eventual conclusive-ness of a system, is considered by Hegel to be inherent to the moralconsciousness. The result of this space, this incongruity of the finite andthe infinite, however, is what he considers to be the sickness of moder-nity. The relation of the contradicting determinations to each other isonly the abstract certainty of itself, and for this infinitude of the subjec-tivity the general will, the good, the right, and the duty is as well as it isnot; it is the subjectivity itself that knows itself as the one that choosesand decides.46Thus the modern subject, following its own conscience,risks losing itself in mere subjectivism. Far from considering the con-science to be the closest possible relationship with God (samvittighe-denas a samviden med Gud47) as Climacus did, the modern con-science makes itself into an absolute, into its own God.

Here it becomes clear again that even when the texts of Climacusand Hegel seem to go in the same direction, namely, that of stressingthe crucial position of subjectivity, the subtexts and the contexts arequite different. Hegels pathos of showing the pernicious character ofa modern conscience that reflects into itself and, refusing any objec-tive guideline, turns into mere arbitrariness. For Climacus, the prob-lem of his time is not so much the problem of arbitrariness. At thetime, in the little town Copenhagen, conforming to social conventionsmight be quite a greater cultural threat than the arbitrariness of con-duct. Therefore, Climacus wanted his readers to turn into themselvesand to find inthemselves the guideline for their lives. Hegel and Cli-macus share the conviction that modernity has lost its spontaneoustrust in all that used to be substantial in society. I have always beenstruck by a remark made by A in his essay The Tragic in Ancient

46 Ibid.47 CUP1,155 / SKS 7, 144: The ethical, on the other hand, is predicated on individual-

ity and to such a degree that each individual actually and essentially comprehends

the ethical only in himself, because it is his co-knowledge with God. In their com-

mentary, the editors of SKSrefer to Martensen and, indirectly, to Franz von Baader

as being at the origin of this definition of conscience as samviden med Gud(SKS

K7, 191).


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Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama. Our age, A ar-gues, has lost all the substantial determinations of family, state, kin-dred; it must turn the single individual over to himself completely in

such a way that, strictly speaking, he becomes his own creator.48There is no doubt that As remark has its roots in Hegels critique ofromantic subjectivism. But whereas Hegel tried to show that moder-nity, in spite of its own self-consciousness, could not avoid putting itstrust in the substantial character of the social institutions, Kierke-gaard shared be it in a somewhat ironic way the modern suspiciontowards them. According to Kierkegaard, all that belongs to theworld of objectivity and exteriority is intrinsically ambiguous. There-fore, instead of trying to restore belief and trust in social institutionsas Hegel did, he accepted the subjective turn that was launched byKantianism and radicalized by the romantics, with just one restriction:in his view, romantic radicalism was not radical enough.49If the ro-mantic subject would have gone deep down to its own roots, it wouldhave discovered that the subject is not its own creator at all, but that,as Anti-Climacus argues in Sickness unto Death, it has been posited bysomething else.50

The Philosophy of World History, a Perfidious Evasion?

According to Climacus, only radical subjectivity can secure thechaste purity of the ethical.51For that very reason he also refuses tolend any ethical significance to world history. As a matter of fact alarge part of the chapter on becoming subjective consists in a polemicagainst the, let me call it (post-)Hegelian, tendency to consider worldhistory to be the culmination point of ethical life. Jon Stewart has ar-gued extensively that Climacus does not direct his criticism againstHegel in the first place, but rather against Grundtvig.52Indeed, in the

48 EO1,149 / SKS 2, 148.49 One might suggest that, if we take up the perspective of Two Ages, Hegel felt com-

pelled to react against an age of passion by showing that an overemphasis on passion

and subjectivity risked loosing its ties with the ethical substance of marriage and po-

litical life, whereas Climacus wanted to warn against an age that, by merely conform-

ing to external social conventions, lost all forms of passion and interiority. One might

ask whether today we did not lose both: substantiality as well as interiority.50 SV315, 73.51 CUP1,142 / SKS 7, 132.52 Stewart Kierkegaards Relations, p. 497.


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whole chapter there is no direct reference to Hegel, although it isclear that Hegels emphasis on world history is one of the main mo-tives for Kierkegaard on several other occasions to claim that his sys-

tem lacks an ethics. In a draft of the Fragments,we find the notion thatwhile world history deals with whole generations, ethics deals with thesingular individual and that it is precisely in this sense that ethics hasalmost completely [tildeels ganske] been neglected in Hegel.53And inwhat was projected to become Chapter IV 4 of the Book on Adler,Kierkegaard observes that ethics is about the future, whereas worldhistory deals with the past. In his view, Hegel has taught Adler to dowithout an ethics [at undvre en Ethik].54 And he himself explainsthat, indeed, the Hegelian system has no ethics.55

It is evident that Hegels philosophy of world history does indeeddeal with whole generations and that it is about the past. As such, itdoes not fit in into Climacus typically moral conception of ethics.Nevertheless, we should take into consideration that in Hegels sys-tem, the philosophy of world history, has a specific, transitional char-acter. In particular, it helps us understand the transition from the phi-losophy of objective spirit to that of absolute spirit or, in more com-mon terms, from ethics to religion (ethics being the general term for

the whole of Hegels philosophy of objective spirit, and religion thecommon term for art, religion in the narrow sense, and philosophy).56

In this context it is worth considering that, as such I mean, as transi-tional the philosophy of world history constitutes a transition frompractical to theoretical philosophy without, however, giving up thepractical perspective. Here we can recall the logic of the idea assketched at the beginning, where the one-sidedness of both theoreticaland practical knowledge is sublated by the absolute idea. Anyway,within the philosophy of spirit, world history, as a transitional moment,has a logic of its own that transcends the action of particular individualsand even of particular states. It is a Geschft der Wirklichkeit,a busi-ness of actuality.57It would be a nave and narcissistic overestimation ofones own capacities to think that particular individuals or states are ca-pable of framing world history on their own, either pragmatically orpractically. Even when taking into account the role of so-called world-

53 PF,207 / SKS20, 44, NB:42. In Fear and Trembling we find a similar consideration

FT,83 / SKS4, 173.54 BA,129 / Pap.VIII 2 B 235, p. 214-215.55 Ibid.56 Hegel Enzyklopdie(1830), 554, GW 20, p. 542.57 Hegel Enzyklopdie(1830), 551, GW 20, p. 529.


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historical individuals (such as Caesar or Napoleon) and of dominant na-tional cultures (such as the Greek culture at the time), it is not possibleto consider world history to be the simple effect of their interventions.

When confronted with world history, finite spirit has to content itselfwith a merely speculative attitude. The religious consciousness has un-derstood this perfectly well by connecting world history with GodsGovernance and Providence. Hegel himself suggests this connection,just as Climacus does. Still there is one very important difference. In-stead of simply bowing humbly for divine Providence as religion usu-ally does and as Climacus wants us to do, Hegel completes the religiouscontemplation of Gods Providence [der Plan der Vorsehung] with abold philosophical interpretation of world history.58It is bold becauseit identifies divine Providence with reason in history [Vernunft in derGeschichte]. Divine Providence is not just to be piously acknowledged,as is done by the religious consciousness, it is to be explained by reasonas well. Hegels philosophy of world history remains humble, insofar asit does not dispose over any a priori scheme of understanding nor overany privilege to predict what God has provided for the world.59In try-ing to understand the past, philosophy not only transcends religion(which usually, but not necessarily, remains silent about the logic of

Gods Providence); it transcends world history itself. This transcen-dence consists in the act of thinking (that is what art, religion, and, mostof all, philosophy, each within their own medium, are supposed to do).

Johannes Climacus does not go so far. On the contrary, he contendsthat the speculative endeavour of the Hegelian philosophy of worldhistory and, even more, of absolute spirit (and logic), is to be consid-ered perditions illusion [fortabelsens illusion] or a perfidious eva-sion [svigefuldhedens udflugt], just as all objective thinking is.60In hisunderstanding of ethics and of the Christian religion, Climacus wantsthe subject to be infinitely concerned about himself.61Therefore hewants us to bow for divine Governance [styrelsen] and allow worldhistory be Gods concern. All individuals, world-historical individualsincluded, must act according to subjective ethics.62 If the actions of

58 Hegel Enzyklopdie(1830), 549A, GW20, p. 524.59 Here Climacus critique of Grundtvig comes in since the latter considered himself to

be a prophet. Cf. J. Stewart Kierkegaards Relationships, p. 497.60 CUP1,129 / SKS 7, 121.61 CUP1,130 / SKS 7, 122.62 If a person cannot by his own efforts, in freedom, by willing the good, become a

world historical figurethen it is unethical to be concerned about it (CUP1,135 /

SKS7, 126).


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some people from the past are supposed to have world-historical im-portance, it is divine Governance which has added it to them.63World-historical importance has the character of a supplement, just like hap-

piness is a supplement to virtue in stoicism. Pursuing, desiring, hopingor expecting it is considered by Climacus to be a perversion of ethics.It replaces ethical categories with aesthetic ones. The basic ethical cat-egories of right and wrong are perverted into categories such asthe amazing [det forbavsende], the great [det store], the momen-tous [det betydningsfulde].64 Insofar as world-historical knowledgeintroduces these categories, it risks resulting in a demoralizing es-thetic diversion for the knowing subject [en demoraliserende sthe-tisk adspredelse].65It makes a person incompetent to act.66

Did Hegels philosophy of world history give cause for such a per-version of ethics? Was this the reason Kierkegaard thought he had noethics?

By way of conclusion, let us give Hegel a fair hearing. When dealingwith world history, Hegel did indeed refer to great individuals andto the greatness of their actions.67 But according to Hegel, theywere nothing but tools in the business of actuality. Individuals simplyparticipate in that business, they do not make it; what they get in re-

turn is glory or fame [Ruhm], sure, but this is only a formal universal-ity of subjective representation,68 nothing more. Everybody, so tospeak, (hence the universality) considers these individuals to be im-portant, but this view is nothing but public opinion. Instead of glorify-ing the glory, Hegel minimizes it as much as possible. It is only for-mally universal, but not universal insofar as the very content of thedeeds of the individuals is concerned. Therefore, I do not think thatHegel would disagree with Climacus thesis that they themselvesshould not seek to obtain glory or fame; they must do their duty, theymust do the substantial things that need to be done. If we look at thevirtues Hegel connects with the functions of kings, ministers, and ad-

63 CUP1,147-148 / SKS 7, 137-138.64 CUP1,134 / SKS 7, 125-126.65 CUP1,134 / SKS 7, 125. The good and the bad have equal access to world-histori-

cal categories (CUP1,134 / SKS 7, 126).66 CUP1,135 / SKS7, 126.67 It is evident that Hegel was inspired by ancient ethics and ancient history writings, in

which the greatness of ones deeds is indeed an important category. But it is clear as

well that this kind of ethics is not up to the mark of ethics in the sense that Climacus

wants it to be understood.68 Hegel Enzyklopdie(1830), 551, GW20, p. 529.


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ministrative people, it is not glory they must pursue, but rather patrio-tism, an identification of their lives with the life of the communitythey are serving. This is the kind of disposition [Gesinnung] they are

expected to have, not one that seeks glory. Glory is the reward onereceives as long as one does not seek it, just like happiness. And if,by chance, glory is ones share, then it is the base attitude of a valet[Kammerdiener] to resent anothers personal satisfaction.69With thisreference to a famous passage in his own Phenomenology, Hegeltakes up the defense of great individuals against envious people whoonly see a lust for power and a longing for fame and glory as great in-dividuals do their duty.70

It is most of all the polemical context of Hegels text that helps us tounderstand why he went so far in his defense of honor and fame. Hewanted to be polemical against a typical kind of harsh, post-Kantianpuritanism that kept moral intention separate from any form of per-sonal satisfaction. Hegel sympathized with Schillers condemnation ofthose who expect that moral duty should be fulfulled with repugnance[Abscheu] out of fear that it be confused with particular interests. Thisis why Hegel put so much emphasis on the fact that subjects can anddo find satisfaction in doing their duty, precisely because the content

of their duty belongs to their innermost subjectivity.I am not tempted to treat Climacus as a Kammerdiener.On the

contrary, the only thing he expects us to do is to distinguish betweensubjective ethics and world-historical importance. There is no reasonnot to admit that Hegel made this very same distinction. And, as amatter of fact, both interpreted world-history as the work of divineGovernance. Still, there is one basic difference between both thinkers.Whereas Climacus considered trying to read the ethical in world his-tory as a presumptuous and risky undertaking71for a finite spirit,definitely demoralizing72him, Hegel took the risk.

The difference between Climacus and Hegel is at least partly due tothe historical context of their texts. Just as Hegel, in the context of histreatment of morality, had to be polemical against the extreme subjec-tivism of modernity as well as against an extreme kind of puritanism,so also was he compelled to be polemical against a certain kind ofnegative theology that had the tendency to empty all divine predicates

69 Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,124A.70 Hegel Phnomenologie des Geistes,GW 9, pp. 358-359.71 CUP1, 141 / SKS7, 132.72 CUP1, 134, 143, 151 / SKS 7, 125, 134, 141.


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(like that of Governance and Providence), making the empty name ofGod into the sole object of religious veneration. It was one of Hegelsmain concerns to avoid this sort of emptied theology that is filled with

the most fantastic and, more importantly, fanatic forms of belief.For Climacus, the situation was quite different. His problem was

that in the name of speculative philosophy, people such as Adler andperhaps even Grundtvig proclaimed themselves to be the new proph-ets, confusing modern fashionable thought with genuine religious lan-guage. Over against this tendency, Climacus plead for a return to theelementary simplicity of the Christian religion without worryingabout its content or about bringing it up-to-date.

Did Hegel achieve his system without having an ethics? Yes and no.Of course he had an ethics; and in many respects he had an ethics inline with what Climacus expected an ethics to be: a philosophy of mo-rality. However, in spite of the fact that both thinkers appear to sharethe same basic convictions as far as morality is concerned, their posi-tions are quite divergent when we consider the polemical context oftheir texts. This context compelled Hegel to go beyond the position ofmorality in the direction of the state and world history. Climacus didnot follow Hegel in that risky undertaking. Instead of going beyond

morality, towards politics and world history, he moved downward intosomething he considered to be primordial, something he declared tobe simple and elementary, something understandable for both thewise and the simple-minded: a voice, the voice of God, that says: youshall, do you understand, you shall will the ethical, and you shall, doyou understand, you shall be enthusiastic, because this is the high-est.73Alas, I am not so sure it is so simple.

73 CUP1, 137 / SKS 7, 128.

Documents

Cruysberghs. Hegel Has No Ethics. Climacus Complaints Against Speculative Philosophy