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Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Critical Infrastructures – Interdependencies and consequences from a vulnerability perspective
LUND UNIVERSITY | FACULTY OF ENGINEERING | CENCIP & LUCRAM | SWEDEN DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND SOCIETAL SAFETY
JONAS JOHANSSON
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Critical Infrastructures (CIs)? • “…those assets or parts thereof which are essential for the maintenance of
critical societal functions, including the supply chain, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people” (EPCIP – COM, 2006)
• Brief history – From sector regulations towards holistic infrastructure protection – Starting point for the field; Executive Order 13010 (Executive Order, 1996), creating
PCCIP in the USA.
– 9/11 in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 illuminated the importance and vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Creation of DHS and intensified work. From terrorism towards all-hazard approaches.
– In Europe, the EPCIP program was initiated in 2006.
– Today most countries around the world have programs focused towards CIP, i.e. moving from earlier “sector-divided” approaches towards more holistic infrastructure protection approaches.
– A response to the interconnectedness of todays infrastructures – the backbone of society!
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Rationale
• Society heavily dependent on the services of critical infrastructures, widespread disruption entails large-scale societal impacts.
• Hence:
– Proactive risk and vulnerability approaches and long term planning fundamental
– Of essence is to increase our understanding CIs limits, their interdependencies and societal dependence on the services these provide
• However, there exist several research, policy, and practical challenges for a holistic understanding and a fundamental need for development of approaches and methods in this field.
Hurricane Gudrun, Sweden 2005
Ice storm, Canada 1998
Blackout, USA 2003
Auckland 1998
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Six challenges and examples of research at LU
I. Addressing high impact and low probability events
II. Empirical data for cascading effects in critical infrastructures
III. Modelling and simulation of interdependent technical critical infrastructures
IV. Recovery and resilience of technical critical infrastructures
V. Interdependencies between societal functions and dependence on technical infrastructures
VI. Risk governance of critical infrastructures
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 1 Addressing high impact and low probability events
• Due to the complexities of national critical infrastructures; the services they provide, the operation of them, and the environment in which they operate To address HILP use vulnerability as a complement to risk (?)
C
L
?
where 𝑅𝑝 ≈ 𝑅 𝑅𝑝 = {< 𝑆𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖 ,𝐶𝑖 >}𝑝
Environment
≈
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 1 Addressing high impact and low probability events
Vulnerability seen as a property of to the system states
and the consequences associated with these states
Risk = f(Hazard/Threat, Susceptability, System State, Consequence)
Models: E.g. Power flow AC/DC
Pressure models Traffic flow models Cascading models Stability models
Input-output models
Models: E.g. Fragility curves
Models: E.g. Aging models,
Climate models, Terrorism models…
Likelihood of an Hazard/Threat affecting the
system
Likelihood of an Hazard/Threat
occurring
Likelihood that an event/scenario affect the system, i.e. forcing it into a specific state
The consequences associated with a specific state of the system
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Initiating event
1. Power supply
13. Agriculture
19. Public
2. Telecommunication
3. Water supply
5. Oil and gas
7. Health care
8. Education
9. Road transportation
10. Rail transportation
13. Agriculture
14. Business & Industry
15. Media
16. Financial
19. Public
13. Agriculture
14. Business & Industry
17. Governmental
18. Emergency response
19. Public 19. Public
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
• To support the research in the field of critical infrastructures, one important aspect is the access to empirical data.
• In general, good quality data with respect to the cascading effects that arise when infrastructure collapses are lacking. For example traditional accident investigation methods do not focus on interdependencies.
• This type of data is essential to increase our understanding of society’s dependence, how this picture has changed and the mechanisms behind interdependencies leading to cascading effects.
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
Event Location Year IE type Total # Systems
Casc. order
Event duration
1 Auckland New Zealand 1998 Power outage 11 5 2m5d 2 Tieto Sweden 2011 IT-event 7 4 2m 3 UK floods UK 2007 Flooding 13 3 6m3d 4 Enschede Netherlands 2000 Explosion 6 3 3y7m 5 London bombing UK 2005 Terrorism 8 3 1y11m 6 Mont Blanc Switz. France 1999 Fire 4 2 3y3m 7 Sandy N. America 2012 Hurricane 18 5 2m1w 8 Eyjafjallagokull Island 2010 Volcano eruption 5 2 1m1w 9 Malmo floods Sweden 2014 Flooding 12 3 1d12h 10 Myyrmanni Finland 2002 Terrorism 4 3 2w4d 11 Kista blackout Sweden 2001 Power outage 9 3 1d16h 12 Östersund Sweden 2010 Contam. water 7 3 5m4w 13 Baltimore USA 2001 Tunnel Fire 10 4 2w2d 14 L'Aquila Italy 2009 Earthquake 11 2 5y
15 European blackout Europe 2006 Power outage 4 2 2h
16 Ice storm N. America 1998 Ice storm 15 4 1m1d …40
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
1. P
ower
sup
ply
2. T
elec
omm
unic
atio
n3.
Wat
er s
uppl
y4.
Sew
age
5. O
il an
d ga
s6.
Dis
trict
hea
ting
7. H
ealth
car
e8.
Edu
catio
n9.
Roa
d tra
nspo
rtatio
n10
. Rai
l tra
nspo
rtatio
n11
. Air
trans
porta
tion
12. S
ea tr
anpo
rtatio
n13
. Agr
icul
ture
14. B
usin
ess
& In
dust
ry15
. Med
ia16
. Fin
anci
al17
. Gov
ernm
enta
l18
. Em
erge
ncy
resp
onse
19. P
ublic
20. E
nviro
nmen
t21
. Pol
itica
l22
. Foo
d su
pply
1. Power supply2. Telecommunication3. Water supply4. Sewage5. Oil and gas6. District heating7. Health care8. Education9. Road transportation10. Rail transportation11. Air transportation12. Sea tranportation13. Agriculture14. Business & Industry15. Media16. Financial17. Governmental18. Emergency response19. Public20. Environment21. Political22. Food supply
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
801.
Pow
er s
uppl
y
2. T
elec
omm
unic
atio
n
3. W
ater
sup
ply
4. S
ewag
e
5. O
il an
d ga
s
6. D
istri
ct h
eatin
g
7. H
ealth
car
e
8. E
duca
tion
9. R
oad
trans
porta
tion
10. R
ail t
rans
porta
tion
11. A
ir tra
nspo
rtatio
n
12. S
ea tr
anpo
rtatio
n
13. A
gric
ultu
re
14. B
usin
ess
& In
dust
ry
15. M
edia
16. F
inan
cial
17. G
over
nmen
tal
18. E
mer
genc
y re
spon
se
19. P
ublic
20. E
nviro
nmen
t
21. P
oliti
cal
22. F
ood
supp
ly
Num
ber o
f tim
es o
rigin
ator
Num
ber o
f tim
es d
epen
dent
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
0 5 10 15 200
5
10
15
20
25
System
Num
ber t
imes
sys
tem
invo
lved Po
wer
sup
ply
Tele
com
mun
icat
ion
Wat
er s
uppl
ySe
wag
eO
il an
d ga
sDi
stric
t hea
ting
Heal
th c
are
Educ
atio
nRo
ad tr
ansp
orta
tion
Rail
trans
porta
tion
Air t
rans
porta
tion
Sea
tranp
orta
tion
Agric
ultu
reBu
sine
ss &
Indu
stry
Med
iaFi
nanc
ial
Gov
ernm
enta
lEm
erge
ncy
resp
onse
Publ
icEn
viro
nmen
tPo
litic
alFo
od s
uppl
y
10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
Sys
tem
Impa
ct D
urat
ion
(Day
s)
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 220
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100Po
wer
sup
ply
Tele
com
mun
icat
ion
Wat
er s
uppl
y
Sew
age
Oil
and
gas
Dist
rict h
eatin
g
Heal
th c
are
Educ
atio
n
Road
tran
spor
tatio
n
Rail
trans
porta
tion
Air t
rans
porta
tion
Sea
tranp
orta
tion
Agric
ultu
re
Busi
ness
& In
dust
ry
Med
ia
Fina
ncia
l
Gov
ernm
enta
l
Emer
genc
y re
spon
se
Publ
ic
Envi
ronm
ent
Polit
ical
Food
sup
ply
System
Dep
ende
ncy
Impa
ct (b
lue)
/ S
yste
m Im
pact
(bla
ck)
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 2 Empirical data for cascading effects between critical infrastructures
0
10
20
30
40
50
Col
dW
arm
Rai
nS
now
Win
dyS
umm
erW
inte
rS
prin
gFa
llW
eeke
ndW
eekd
ayM
orni
ngM
id-d
ayE
veni
ngN
ight
Urb
anR
ural
Met
ropo
litan
Coa
stN
atur
alA
ccid
enta
lIn
tent
iona
lA
bove
nor
mal
cap
acity
Bel
ow n
orm
al c
apac
ityB
uffe
rsP
repa
redn
ess
plan
sE
xter
nal r
esou
rces
Stru
ctur
al in
tegr
ityH
uman
vul
nera
bilit
y
Num
ber o
f tim
es c
ondi
tion
men
tione
d
Weather Timing Location
Initial Event
Operational State
Coping Capacity
MitigatingAggravating
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 3 Modelling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructures
• Technical infrastructures, such as power systems, railways, air transportation and telecommunication, form a subpart of critical infrastructures.
• Here data of individual systems exist to some extent, however data of their interdependencies and models of accounting for the “system-of-system” behaviour of interdependent technical infrastructures lacking.
• From a Swedish governance perspective adequate mechanisms for managing risk and vulnerabilities from “system-of-system” perspective lacking.
• Efforts needed to develop models and simulation methods to inform decisions from a more holistic perspective.
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 3 Modelling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructures
Computational effort vs fidelity: 1. Topological properties 2. Search algorithms 3. Flow Models 4. Dynamic simulation
Singel system representation ”System-of-system” representation
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 3 Modelling and simulation of interdependent CIs
Functional model Performance/consequence measures1 Label Topological static – components are not differentiated
Largest connected subgraph (Holme and Kim, 2002) LCSG Diameter (Newman, 2003) D Average efficiency (average inverse geodesic length) (Newman, 2003; Crucitti et al, 2004) E
Topological static – components are differentiated
Average efficiency only considering pairs of in-feed and load nodes EN Average efficiency only considering pairs of in-feed and load nodes and electrical distance ENE Connectivity loss (Albert et al., 2004) CL Power connection loss (Johansson et al., 2007) PCL
Simplistic capacity model Power not supplied (Jonsson et al., 2008) PNS
Physical flow models DC load flow – power not supplied DC AC load flow – power not supplied AC
Ran
dom
Nod
e R
emov
al
Ran
dom
Edg
e R
emov
al
IEE
E R
TS96
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 3 Modelling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructures
• Full scale models of Swedish
– Transmission (DC load flow)
– Railway (tracks & trains)
– Their interdependencies (geographical and functional)
• Vulnerability analyses from three perspectives:
– Global vulnerability (stress beyond “normal”)
– Critical components (important assets to protect)
– Geographical vulnerability (co-locations, hotspots)
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 4 Recovery and resilience of critical infrastructures
• Technical infrastructures are inherently socio-technical by nature - they are designed, operated, maintained and restored by humans.
• In general, research in this field tends to focus rather narrowly on “everyday” incidents (based on historical data) and technical aspects.
• To better grasp the resilience of infrastructures more work is necessary of their limits towards large-scale disruptions, e.g. their ability to recover functionality.
• Approaches needs to merge the pure technical parts of the infrastructures with models able to capture the capacity of the organisation in responding to disruptions beyond normal.
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 4 Recovery and resilience of critical infrastructures
Electric distribution system
Restoration system +
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
El
Fjärrvärme
Bränsle och drivmedel
Betalningssystem
Tillgång kontanter
Värdepappershandel
Forsäkringar
Tillverkningsindustri
Akutsjukvård
Primärvård
Läkemedel- & Materialforsorjning
Omsorg om barn
Funktionshindrade
Äldrevård
Socialtjänst
Smittskydd
Telefoni (fast)
Telefoni (mobil)
Elektronisk kommunikation
Internet
Radiokommunikation Satellit / GNSS
Dagstidningar
Webbaserad information
MedierTV
Radio
Dricksvattenforsorjning
Avloppshantering
Renhållning
Väghållning
Distribution livsmedel
Primärproduktion livsmedel
Tillverkning livsmedel
Kontroll av livsmedel
Lokal ledning
Regional ledning
Nationell ledning
Polis
Räddningstjänst
Alarmeringstjänst (t.ex. SOS)
Tullkontroll
Bevaknings & säkerhet
Militärt forsvar
Sjuk- & arbetsloshetsforsäkring
Flygtransport
Järnvägstransport
Sjotransport
Vägtransport
Kollektivtrafik
Kompetent personal/entreprenorer
Forskolor och skolor
Sjo
Liv och hälsa
Funktionalitet
Grundläggande värden
Samhällsviktig verksamhet
Teknisk infrastruktur
Allmänheten
Personal
Challenge 5 Capturing interdependencies between societal functions
• Dependencies between societal functions seems to be increasing
• The overall “societal system” more tightly interconnected
• Trends such as globalisation, urbanisation, and technological development drivers for efficiency but also introduces new vulnerabilities and changes the risk picture.
• The understanding of the interconnectedness of these functions and the mechanisms of how consequences can spread limited. Need for new approaches and empirical data.
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 5 Capturing interdependencies between societal functions
• Question? – How does the vulnerability of the Swedish
transmission system correlate to regional societal consequence of power outages?
• Power system – Representative DC-model of the Swedish
Transmission system – Configuration in accordance with 23rd of
September blackout in 2003
• Societal consequences – Economical Inoperability Input-Output model
(IIM) – a linear model with its deficiencies – National economical data of 55 sectors
make/use dependencies – Broken down to 21 regions (län) – Skåne, V.Gotaland, Stockholm: 57% of GRP
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 5 Capturing interdependencies between societal functions
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.60.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
12
3
45
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1819
20
21
Robustness of Power Supply (Fraction removed branches for a 10% power reduction)
Ele
ctric
Pow
er D
epen
denc
e (P
erce
ntag
e ec
onom
ic lo
ss)
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 5 Capturing interdependencies between societal functions
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
M1M2
M12M7M3M9M4
M11M10M6M5M8
Vulnerability reduction (%)0 5 10 15 20 25 30
M9M11M7M2M3M1
M12M10M4M5M6M8
Vulnerability reduction (%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
M9M1M2
M11M7
M12M3M4
M10M6M5M8
Vulnerability reduction (%)0 5 10 15 20 25 30
M1M12M4M7M2M3M9
M11M10M6M5M8
Vulnerability reduction (%)
Dark grey = Power supply improvement Light grey = Economical improvement
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Challenge 6 Risk governance of critical infrastructures
• The operation and management of many critical infrastructures has become divided between a larger set of stakeholders, resulting in a dispersion of responsibility.
• In this institutionally fragmented setting, traditional risk management tools are not always suitable to deal with risks in a feasible manner.
• No single stakeholder has the superior authority or overview to make and implement holistic risk-reducing decisions.
• Research needs are related to stakeholders’ diverse framings of risk, communication challenges, sub-contracting and cross-scale interactions.
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection Research (CenCIP) • Newly formed centre of excellence at Lund University, 2015-2020.
(8 seniors, 1 Postdoc, 2 PhD-students, 20 MSEK)
• Descriptive and normative research within three areas: – Interdependencies and societal consequences
– A holistic view on terms, concepts and methods
– Governance, measuring, monitoring, and learning
www.cencip.lu.se
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Please feel free to contact me
Associate Professor Jonas Johansson Division of Risk Management and Societal Safety Lund University, Faculty of Engineering
[email protected] ([email protected]) www.lucram.lu.se www.cencip.lu.se
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
International Scientific Journals (peer-reviewed) 1. LaRocca, S., Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Guikema, S., (2014). Topological Performance
Measures as Surrogates for Physical Flow Models for Risk and Vulnerability Analysis for Electric Power Systems, Risk Analysis, doi: 10.1111/risa.12281.
2. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Zio, E., (2013). Reliability and vulnerability analyses of critical infrastructures: Comparing two approaches in the context of power systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 120, pp. 27-38.
3. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Cedergren, A., (2011). Vulnerability analysis of interdependent critical infrastructures: case study of the Swedish railway system, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 289-315.
4. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., (2010). An Approach for Modelling Interdependent Infrastructures in the Context of Vulnerability Analysis, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 95, pp. 1335-1344.
5. Jonsson, H., Johansson, J., Johansson, H., (2008). Identifying Critical Components in Technical Infrastructure Networks, Journal of Risk and Reliability, Vol. 222, No. 2, pp. 235-243.
6. Johansson, J., Jonsson, H., Johansson, H., (2007). Analysing the Vulnerability of Electric Distribution Systems: A Step Towards Incorporating the Societal Consequences of Disruptions, Int. J. Emergency Management, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.4–17.
International Conferences 7. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Cedergren, A., Svegrup, L., Arvidsson, B., (2015). Method for
describing and analysing cascading effects in past events: Initial conclusions and findings, ESREL 2015, Zürich, Switzerland, September 7-10.
8. Svegrup, L., Johansson, J., (2015). Vulnerability Analyses of Interdependent Critical Infrastructures: Case study of the Swedish National Power transmission and Railway system, ESREL 2015, Zürich, Switzerland, September 7-10.
9. Arvidsson, B., Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Cedergren, A., (2015). Investigation method for cascading effects between critical infrastructures, ESREL 2015, Zürich, Switzerland, September 7-10.
10. Cedergren, A., Johansson, J., Svegrup, L, Hassel, H., (2015). Local Success, Global Failure: Challenges Facing the Recovery Operations of Critical Infrastructure Breakdowns, ESREL 2015, Zürich, Switzerland, September 7-10.
11. Hassel, H., Cedergren, A., Svegrup, L., Johansson, J., (2014). A method for identifying cascading effects in past events as an input to a decision support tool, ESREL 2014, Wroclaw, Poland, September 14-18.
12. Landegren, F., Johansson, J., Samuelsson, O., (2014). Comparing Societal Consequence: Measures of Outages in Electrical Distribution Systems, ESREL 2014, Wroclaw, Poland, September 14-18.
13. Johansson, J., Svegrup, L., Hassel, H., (2014). Contrasting vulnerability reduction measures for critical infrastructures: using power system and regional inoperability input-output models, PSAM 12, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, June 22-27.
14. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., (2014). Impact of Functional Models in a Decision Context of Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability, ASCE ICVRAM&ISUMA 2014, Liverpool, UK, July 13-16.
15. Johansson, J., Svegrup, L., Hassel, H., (2013). Societal consequences of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities: integrating power system and regional inoperability input-output models, ESREL2013, Amsterdam, Netherlands, September 29 - October 2, 2013.
16. Landegren, F., Johansson, J., Samuelsson, O., (2013). Review of Computer Based Methods for Modeling and Simulating Critical infrastructures as Socio-Technical Systems, ESREL2013, Amsterdam, Netherlands, September 29 - October 2, 2013.
17. Johansson, J., LaRocca, S., Hassel, H., Guikema, S., (2012). Comparing Topological Performance Measures and Physical Flow Models for Vulnerability Analysis of Power Systems. PSAM11 & ESREL2012, Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012.
18. Johansson, J., Hassel, H. (2011), Comparison of vulnerability and reliability analysis of technical infrastructures. ESREL2011, Troyes, France, September 18-22, 2011.
19. Johansson, J., Hassel, H. (2011), Geographical vulnerability analysis of interdependent critical infrastructures. ICASP11, Zurich, Switzerland, August 1-4, 2011.
20. Wilhelmsson, A., Johansson, J., (2009). Assessing Response System Capabilities of Socio-Technical Systems, TIEMS2009 Istanbul, Turkey, June 9-11.
21. Johansson, J., Jonsson, J., (2008). A Model for Vulnerability Analysis of Interdependent Infrastructure Networks, ESREL2008 & SRA 17th, Valencia, Spain, September 22-25.
22. Jonsson, H., Johansson, J., Johansson, H., (2007). Identifying Critical Components in Electric Power Systems: A Network Analytic Approach, ESREL2007, Stavanger, Norway, June 25-27.
23. Johansson, J., Lindahl, S., Samuelsson, O., Ottosson, H., (2006). The Storm Gudrun a Seven-Weeks Power Outage in Sweden, CRIS2006, Alexandria, VA, USA, September 25-27.
24. Johansson, J., Jonsson, J., Johansson, H., (2006). Analysing Societal Vulnerability to Perturbations in Electrical Distribution Systems. CNIP06, Rome, Italy, March 28-29.
25. Johansson, J., (2014). Discussion of a framework for interdependent critical infrastructure vulnerability analysis from a climate change perspective, Deltas in time of climate change II, Rotterdam, Netherlands, September 24-26.
26. Johansson, J., Kjølle, G., Gjerde, O., (2014). Methods for Vulnerability Analysis of Power Systems, NORDAC 2014, Stockholm, Sweden, September 8-9.
27. Hassel, H., Johansson, J., (2013). Developing a new method for mapping societal functions, flows and their dependencies – results from an initial study. SRA Annual Meeting, Baltimore, USA, December 8-11.
28. LaRocca, S., Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Guikema, S., (2012). Topological performance measures as surrogates for physical flow models for electric power systems. SRA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, USA, December 9-12.
29. Johansson, J., Svensson, S., (2008). Risk and Vulnerability Management of Electrical Distribution Grids, NORDAC 2008, Bergen, Norway, September 8-9.
30. Johansson, J., Willhelmsson, A., (2008), Vulnerability Analysis of Socio-Technical Systems: Addressing Railway System Vulnerabilities, Young Researches Seminar, Malmo, Sweden.
Monographs 31. Johansson, J., (2010). Risk and Vulnerability Analysis of Interdependent Technical
Infrastructures, Doctoral Thesis, Department of Measurement Technology and Industrial Electrical Engineering, Lund University, Lund.
32. Johansson, J., (2007). Risk and Vulnerability Analysis of Large-Scale Technical Infrastructures, Licentiate Thesis, Department of Industrial Electrical Engineering and Automation, Lund University, Lund.
Books and Book Chapters 33. Utne, I.B., Hassel, H., Johansson, J., (2012). A Brief Overview of Some Methods and
Approaches for Investigating Interdependencies in Critical Infrastructures. In Hokstad, P., Utne, IB., Vatn, J., (Eds), (2012). Risk and Interdependencies in Critical Infrastructures – A Guideline for Analysis (pp. 1-12). London, Springer-Verlag.
34. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., (2012). Modelling, Simulation and Vulnerability Analysis of Interdependent Technical Infrastructures. In Hokstad, P., Utne, IB., Vatn, J., (Eds), (2012). Risk and Interdependencies in Critical Infrastructures – A Guideline for Analysis (pp. 49-66). London, Springer-Verlag.
35. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., (2012). Vulnerability Analyses of Interdependent Technical Infrastructures. In Hokstad, P., Utne, IB., Vatn, J., (Eds), (2012). Risk and Interdependencies in Critical Infrastructures – A Guideline for Analysis (pp. 67-94). London, Springer-Verlag.
Seminar at University of Oxford | 20160120 | Jonas Johansson
Reports and other publications 36. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Cedergren, A., Svegrup, L., Arvidsson, B. (2015). Review of
previous incidents with cascading effects, Deliverable 2.2 in EU-project CascEff. 37. Cedergren, A., Johansson, J., Svegrup, L. and Hassel, H. (2015). Kritiska Funktionsområden:
Resultat från fas 2 – Inventering av aktörer involverade i hanteringen av störningar i järnvägssektorn (Critical societal functions: Results from phase 2 – Analysis of actors involved in the handling of railway disturbances), LUCRAM report 3001, LUCRAM, Lund University, Lund.
38. Johansson, J., Hassel, H., Petersen, K., Arvidsson, B., (2015). Konsekvensanalys på samhällsnivå (Analysis of societal consequence), LUCRAM report 3002, ISRN: LUTVDG/TVRH--3002—SE, Lund University,Lund University, Lund, Sweden. (On behalf of the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency)
39. Johansson, J., Svegrup, L., Arvidsson, B., Jangefelt, J., Hassel, H., Cedergren, A., (2014), Method to study cascading effects, Deliverable 2.1 in EU-project CascEff.
40. Johansson, J., Svegrup, L., Kihl, M., (2014). Studie avseende komplexa beroenden mellan telekommunikationsinfrastrukturer inom sektorn Information och Kommunikation (Study of complex dependencies of telecommunication-infrastructures with the sector information and communication), LUCRAM report 3186, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. (On behalf of the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency)
41. Hassel, H., Johansson, J., Petersen, K., Svegrup, L., (2014). Kunskapsöversikt – Skydd av samhällsviktig verksamhet (Systematic review – Critical infrastructure protection), LUCRAM report 3001, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. (On behalf of the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency)
42. Johansson, .J., Svegrup, L., Hassel, H. (2013). Studie och översiktlig utvärdering kring applicerbara metoder för komplex beroendeanalys på såväl sektoriell som tvärsektoriell nivå (Analysis and overview of applicable methods for complex interdependency analysis at sectorial and cross-sectorial level), LUCRAM report 3177, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. (On behalf of the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency)
43. Johansson, J., Samuelsson, O., Hassel, H., (2010). Tekniska infrastrukturers sårbarhet (Technical infrastructures vulnerability). Chapter in FRIVA – Risk, Sårbarhet, och Formåga - Samverkan inom krishantering, Final report for research project FRIVA2, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
44. Johansson, J., Jonsson, H., Johansson, H., (2008). Sårbarhetsanalys av tekniska infrastrukturer, (Vulnerability analysis of technical infrastructures) in Risk- och sårbarhetsanalys: Utgångspunkter for praktiskt arbete, FRIVA, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
45. Johansson, H., Jonsson, H., Johansson, J., (2007). Analys av sårbarhet med hjälp av nätverksmodeller (Analysis of vulnerability with network theoretical modelling), LUCRAM report 1011, Lund University Lund, Sweden.
46. Petersen, K., Johansson, H., Jonsson, H., Johansson, J., (2007). Utlåtande rorande Riksrevisionens dokument ”Aktivitet 7A: Bedöming av helhetsbild avseende risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser” och ”Aktivitet 7B: Risker och sårbarheter som kan vara bristfälligt analyserade/hanterade”, Reports to the Swedish National Audit Office, Department of Fire Safety and Engineering, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.