Critical Areas in Criminal Law - I (1)

1 - CRITICAL AREAS IN CRIMINAL LAW | ATTY. JUMAMIL | AUF SOL 2014 Page 1 | Bantay

CRITICAL AREAS IN CRIMINAL LAW

ATTY. JUMAMIL

PRELIMINARIES: As the title of the Revised Penal Code suggests, its

just a revision of the old Penal Code of Spain (1870).

- Effective from July 14, 1887 to Jan. 01, 1931.

- From Jan. 01, 1932, the RPC took effect.

- US VS. TAMPARONG.

- FIRST QUESTION IN THE BAR EXAM: what is criminal law?

Give its cardinal principles or principal characteristics and the

exceptions therefrom.

o CRIMINAL LAW is that branch of public substantive

law that defines crimes, breach of their nature, and

provides for their punishment.

There are TWO THEORIES of penology:

1. JURISTIC/CLASSICAL THEORY: the basis of criminal liability

is the offenders free will. The purpose of the penalty is

retribution.

2. POSITIVIST/REALISTIC THEORY: the basis of criminal

liability is the sum of the social and economic phenomena to

which the actor has been exposed, and therefore the purpose

of the penalty is for correction or reformation.

NOTE: The RPC was based on the old RPC of Spain, and the latter

was based on the French Penal Code of 1810, which was CLASSICAL

in orientation.

- RPC is basically CLASSICAL in orientation with few trappings

of the POSITIVIST SCHOOL, namely, the provision on

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME (Art. 4, PAR. 2), and the provision on

HABITUAL DELINQUENCY (Art. 62, PAR. 5).

- NOTE: the classical orientation of the RPC invariably touches

base with the MENS REA or the criminal intent/animo felonico.

What are the CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW/RPC?

1. GENERALITY: refers to persons. Penal laws and those of

public security and safety are obligatory on all those who live or

sojourn in Philippine territory, regardless of nationality, gender,

age or personal circumstances. So when you talk of

GENERALITY, you refer to the persons who commit violations

of the RPC.

o Such that civil courts have jurisdiction over the accused

regardless of his military character.

o VALDEZ VS. LUCERO.

o Even in times of war, where civil courts are functioning.

o EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERALITY:

1) Persons exempted from criminal jurisdiction by

treaties and stipulations.

Treaties and executive agreements are

placed on the same footing.

ART. 13 of the former US Military Bases

Agreement which exempted from

criminal jurisdiction of Philippine courts

certain crimes or felonies committed by

US servicemen in the Philippines.

EXAMPLE of an executive agreement

that exempts US troops from criminal

jurisdiction of Philippine courts: Visiting

Forces Agreement of 1990.

2) Laws of preferential application.

SEC. 11, of ART. 6 of the Constitution

that exempts from arrest and therefore

from criminal prosecution congressmen

while the Congress is in session from

crimes or offenses penalized by not

more than 6 years of imprisonment. So

when the penalty imposable for the

crime committed is more than 6 years

(prison mayor), they are not exempted

from arrest and from prosecution.

EXAMPLE: RA 75, which guarantees

the observance of the RP of the

immunities, privileges and rights of duly

accredited diplomats, domestics, and

domestic servants. It prohibits the

procurement and enforcement of

criminal processes against diplomats,

their domestics, and diplomatic

servants.

DOMESTICS

DOMESTIC SERVANTS

Those who live under the same household as a diplomat.

One who ministers to the personal comfort of a diplomat.

EXCEPTIONS: conditions under which the privilege inures are: 1. The domestic must have

been registered with the DFA.

2. If the action is based on a contract or an obligation arising from a contract executed prior to the domestics entry into the service of the diplomat. And provided further that the domestic is a Filipino citizen.

EXCEPTIONS: conditions under which the privilege inures are: 1. The domestic must have

been registered with the DFA.

SEC. 07 of RA 75: the bass of the

exemption from criminal liability is the

principle of RECIPROCITY. The country

of the diplomat must accord the same

benefits to Filipino diplomats, their

domestics, and domestic servants.

3) Principles of public international law.

Who are exempt from the criminal

jurisdiction of Philippine courts pursuant

to PIL? Sovereigns, or heads of states,

or persons with diplomatic immunity.

NOTE: Consuls are not so exempt. SCHNECKENBURGER VS.

MORAN: Consuls may be exempted from criminal jurisdiction only

through treaty stipulations.

2. TERRITORIALITY: applies to all crimes committed within

Philippine territory. The RP territory is now well defined in Art. 1

of the Constitution, which consists of the Phil. Archipelago, with

all the islands and waters embraced therein consisting of its

territorial, fluvial, or maritime zone, including the territorial sea,

the seabed, etc.


o The RP Archipelago was that ceded by Spain to the US

on Dec. 10, 1898, pursuant to the Treaty of Paris, as

modified by the Treaty of Washington on Jan. 2, 1930.

o Insofar as the jurisdiction over the territorial sea, it is 12

miles measured from the low water mark Philippine

courts have jurisdiction.

o RULES ON CRIMES COMMITTED ABOARD

FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS:

FRENCH or NATIONALITY

RULE

ENGLISH or TERRTORIALITY

RULE

Philippine courts do NOT have jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard foreign merchant vessels, EXCEPT only when they affect the public security of the order of the RP.

Philippine courts have jurisdiction, EXCEPT if the act refers to the internal management of the vessel.

NOTE: there is no difference between these rules. The difference lies

in the emphasis. So whether under the French or English rules,

Philippine courts have jurisdiction of the act affects the public order or

safety of the RP. So the RP applies or adopts the TERRITORIALITY

PRINCIPLE and that is why crimes committed aboard foreign

merchants vessel in transit only in Phil. Waters, Phil. Courts DO NOT

HAVE jurisdiction (US VS. AH SING).

o Recognized EXCEPTIONS on the territoriality principle

(ART. 2, PAR. 1 5).

3. PROPECTIVITY: covered by ART. 21, 22 and 366 of the Code.

o ART. 21: not prescribed by law prior to its

commission, nulla poena sine lege.

o ART. 366: committed before the effectivity of this

Code will be punished by laws then enforced.

o ART. 22: shall have retroactive effect only if they are

favourable to the accused who is not a habitual

criminal.

o Penal laws do not have retroactive effect EXCEPT

when favourable to the accused.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: even when

favourable to the accused, [1] if the law says it

will not have retroactive effect and [2] when the

offender is a habitual criminal (ART. 62, PAR.

5).

RULES ON CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS:

- US VS. ABAD SANTOS: penal laws as strictly construed

against the state and liberally against the accused. Loss or

derogation of rights are strictly construed against the state.

- In case of conflict between the English and the Spanish text,

the Spanish text prevails because the Code was enacted and

approved in Spanish.

- PEOPLE VS. MANABA, PEOPLE VS. ABILONG, PEOPLE VS.

MANGULABNAN, PEOPLE VS. GERONIMO.

- Insofar as the effects of REPEAL OF PENAL LAWS, it depends

on the kind of effect of repeal.

EXPRESS REPEAL

The act ceases to be criminal. The court loses jurisdiction over the case (PEOPLE VS. TAMAYO).

EXCEPT when there is a SAVING CLAUSE to the effect that acts or omissions committed before the enactment of this law shall be punished in accordance with existing laws (LAGRIMAS VS. DIRECTOR OR PRISONS).

FAILS TO PUNISH THE ACT PENALIZED UNDER THE REPEALED LAW

If the repealing law fails to punish the act penalized under the repealed law, then the court loses jurisdiction (PEOPLE VS. PASTOR).

BY REENACTMENT

If the repeal is by re-enactment, then the court does not lose jurisdiction.

ART. 2:

Embodies both the territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction of

Philippine courts.

- Generic word of OFFENSE is used: applies to both to felonies

and crimes.

- SHIP OR AIRSHIP without distinction: whether public or

private.

o What determines a Philippine ship or airship is its

registration with Philippine authorities, meaning the

Bureau of Customs, insofar as vessels are concerned

and in the Civil Aeronautics Administration, insofar as

airships are concerned.

o The ownership is not considered.

If a vessel or an airship is 100% Filipino-owned but registered outside the Philippines.

It is NOT a Philippine ship or airship.

Even if owned 100% by aliens, if registered in the Philippines.

It is a Philippines ship or airship.

o So the Philippines will have jurisdiction over crimes

committed aboard Philippine ships or airships in

international waters or open seas, or on air, applying

this extraterritorial application of Philippine law.

If the Philippine ship or airship is in a foreign country.

Its within the jurisdiction of the foreign country. It is subject to the locus delicti, the law of the place where the crime was committed.

If the Philippine ship or airship is within Philippine jurisdiction.

Do not apply PAR. 1; apply the territoriality principle.

PAR 2 and 3: refer to crimes committed abroad involving counterfeiting

of Philippine coins or currency notes, or forgery of obligation or

securities issued by the RP.


- These counterfeit coins or forged treasury or bank notes, or

other obligations and securities, are sought to be introduced in

the Philippines.

- The acts of forgery or counterfeiting or mutilation where

committed abroad where these coins or currency notes or

obligations are being introduced into the Philippines.

- So the Philippines is given extraterritorial jurisdiction because

these acts affect the economic security of the State, as

opposed to PAR. 5, which acts addressed or are against the

national security of the Philippines.

PAR. 4: on crimes committed by public officials or employees abroad

in the discharge of their duties.

- These are crimes referred to under ART. 7, Title 7 of this Code:

Crimes Committed by Public Officers.

- These crimes must have been committed virtute officii,

meaning, in their official capacity.

A and B are part of the Philippine Trade Mission in the US. They were given a cash advance of P1M for expenses. A and B malversed the P1M while in the US.

- Applying PAR. 4, Philippine courts will have jurisdiction.

While in the US, A raped B.

- While it may be said that they were in the discharge of official duties, the act involves a discharge that is not official and Philippine courts would NOT have jurisdiction.

The territoriality principle is of UNIVERSAL APPLICATION on the

basis of the pragmatic consideration that sovereign powers are more

effectively exercised within the limits of a countrys territory.

- The state has the strongest motivation, the strongest interest

and the most powerful instruments of repressing crimes within

their jurisdictions.

- But on account of the advances in transportation and

communications, the possibility of transnational crimes pose

constituent elements transcend the boundaries of two or more

states impel states to adopt AUXILLIARY MEASURES to

address transnational crimes.

o Thus, the purely territorial principle of criminal law has

been expanded by adapting other auxiliary principles.

ART. 3:

Answers the HOW: How is criminal liability incurred?

- Provides for the ELEMENTS of felonies.

1) An act or omission imputable to the accused.

2) By dolo or cupla.

3) Which is punishable by law.

- Jurisprudence has clarified certain defects in the formulation of

ART. 3:

1. The LAW referred to is the RPC because felonies are

specified in PAR. 1.

2. DECEIT, not an accurate manner of describing

commission of intentional crimes because while the

Spanish word dolo translates to deceit or fraud, not

all felonies are committed by that means.

Dolo here refers to the mens rea or criminal

intent, or animo felonico.

Connotes guilty mind, guilty knowledge or

criminal intent and when used in an indictment

to signify an allegation setting out the

defendants knowledge of the crime charged.

Dolo refers to mens rea.

CRIMINAL LAW is concerned on what is and what is not a crime. It

does not concern itself with the procedure for convicting a person, for

arresting him, for penalizing him.

- A guilty mind alone, no matter how wrong (an evil thought

alone) cannot make a person criminal.

- Conversely, an act or an omission alone does not make a

person criminal.

- Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea: an act does not make

the doer guilty unless his mind is guilty.

- COMPONENTS BEFORE A PERSON BECOMES

CRIMINALLY LIABLE:

1) There must be actus reus: the act or the omission or

the state of affairs which a penal law penalizes.

2) Must be coupled by the mental state required by law as

an element.

MENTAL STATE: either by dolo or by culpa

when the person made the act or made the

omission or brought forth the state of affairs.

To be criminally liable: ACTUS REUS + MENS REA.

- In the doing of the act, or the failing of doing the act, or the

bringing about a state of affairs, the mental state required by

law as an element of the act or the omission, or state of affairs

must be present.

- A wrongful mind, no matter how wrong, is not penalized.

- An act, no matter how wrong, when there is no law when it is

done, does not make a person criminally liable.

- But there has to be confluence between the actus reus, or

complementation, and the mens rea to be criminally liable.

Insofar as the actus reus, the actus reus of felonies under the Code

are specified under Book II.

- But the mens rea is committed either by dolo or culpa. Or when

you talk of state of affairs that is penalized by law, you are

referring actually to acts MALA PROHIBITA.

o Regardless of your state of mind, the mere

performance or perpetration of the act, and that at itself

is penalized by law, already constitutes a crime

regardless of criminal intent.

o FUNDAMENTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: Dolo or culpa, or

without dolo or culpa, as long as it is made mala

prohibita.

o The actus reus may vary from crime to crime, but the

mens rea also must be present.

FELONIES COMMITED BY DOLO:

- ELEMENTS:

1) Criminal intent: the mental state required by law as an

element of a felony.

Criminal intent is negated by/it is not present by

justifying circumstances, or valid mistake of fact.


JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTACES

VALID MISTAKE OF FACT

The act of the person is said to be in accord with law, and therefore he does not incur criminal liability. Justifying circumstances are based on law of criminal intent.

Elements (the act would have been lawful): 1. Had the fact been as the

accused believed them to be.

2. There must be no unlawful intent, negligence or bad faith on the part of the offender.

A general criminal intent suffices EXCEPT in

specific intent crimes (that state of mind where

circumstances indicate that a person desired a

particular or a specific result to follow from his

act or failure to act).

Particular consequence.

When a specific criminal intent is

required for conviction, it must be

alleged in the information and proven by

the prosecution.

Intent being an INTERNAL state of mind is

determined from the external acts of a person.

PEOPLE VS. MABUGAT, PEOPLE VS.

SANTOS-RENEGADO.

Implied from the commission presume rather

from the commission of an unlawful act (SEC.

3B, Rule 131, Rules of Court).

MOTIVE is NOT an element of a felony. MOTIVE is simply defined as the reasons why the accused committed the act complained of while intent is his adaption of the particular means of committing the crime. While motive is not an element of the crime, a void in the evidence thereof may prove a weakness on the prosecutions case. That is why proof of motive in some instances provides the judicial perspective needed for conviction. In the following instances, proof of motive is essential:

1. When there is doubt as to the identity of the offender. PEOPLE VS. MCMANN.

2. To prove the voluntariness of the act. PEOPLE VS. TANEO, PEOPLE VS. BASCOS.

3. In case of self defense, unlawful aggression being an element, the motive of the attack must be established. US VS. LAUREL.

4. To determine whether the shooting was intentional or accidental because if the accused had personal motives, then that would militate against his claim of unintentional shooting.

5. ART. 11, SEC. 3: in defense of strangers, the third requisite for defense of strangers is the offender must not have been motived by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

6. To determine the true nature of the crime. o For instance, common crimes committed in furtherance

of rebellion are absorbed in rebellion. o Therefore, there is no complex crime of rebellion with

murder or rebellion with homicide. o An attack against a person in authority who is not in the

actual discharge of his duties, because if the act whereby reason of his past performance of official duties, then it will be direct assault. Otherwise, it will only be physical injuries or any other appropriate crimes, assuming the elements are present.

7. When the evidence is circumstantial or there is doubt whether

the crime has been committed, or that the accused committed it.

Insofar as crimes committed by culpa, intent is

substituted by FAULT.

It is required however that the omission

itself must be punishable by law. Thus,

mere failure to report a crime generally

not punishable. US VS. CABALLEROS.

PEOPLE VS. SILVESTRE AND

ATIENZA.

The only exception is when the omission

itself is declared a crime, such as in

misprision of treason under ART. 116.

As noted correctly by some commentators,

there is some redundancy in the definition of

IMPRUDENCE and NEGLIGENCE on culpa.

IMPRUDENCE

NEGLIGENCE

Failure to avoid an impending injury due to lack of skill.

Failure to perceive an impending injury by reason of lack of foresight.

Crimes committed by culpa: Intent is supplanted

by culpa. That is why two or more persons who

are not in conspiracy with each other may be

held criminally liable for different crimes. One is

for intentional killing, and the other for killing

through negligence.

PEOPLE VS. PUGAY, 1988

- The accused, Pugay, doused gasoline on the victim. When Samson saw what Pugay did to the victim as part of their fun-making, he set on fire the deceased.

- So Samson, knowing that the clothes of the victim are soaked with gasoline, knew the danger of setting the victim on fire. He was convicted intentional homicide, while Pugay, who did nothing more that pour gasoline on the victim, was convicted of homicide, through reckless imprudence.

2) Intelligence: negated by insanity, imbecility and

minority.

3) Freedom: negated by force, or fear.

Actus me invito factus, non est meus actus. An

act against my will is not my act.

It is required that the actor acts not only without

will, but against his will.

Why is it against his will? Because by

compulsion or force, or impulse of irresistible

fear, he is required to do something against his

will. And therefore, he is not only acting without

a will, but against his will. He is literally an

automaton who dances to the tune of

whomsoever is using the force or causing the

fear.


CRIMES MAY BE FURTHER CLASSIFIED INTO [1] MALA IN SE AND

[2] MALA PROHIBTA.

- The traditional concept of these crimes is borrowed from the

American law.

MALA IN SE

MALA PROHIBITA

Wrong in themselves. Wrong at their very nature and requires criminal intent.

Not wrong by their very nature, but are made wrong only because positive law prohibits them for reason of public order, policy or convenience.

Require criminal intent.

Do not require criminal intent.

Refer to felonies. INACCURATE: there are felonies under the Code that are declared to be so regardless of the intent of the offender. Example: Attempted flight to enemy country, correspondence with the enemy (ART. 120, 121), illegal possession of picklocks (ART. 304).

Refer to crimes. There also special laws that require criminal intent for conviction. RA 7610 of the Child Abuse Law, Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294 on legal possession of firearms.

When we were still in San Beda, we were asked by the monks to

lecture to the community about Sexual Harassment, in light of the

many cases filed against the clergy. I said that insofar as 7877 is

concerned, when the relationship subsists, you call it romance. When

the relationship ends, its called harassment. So the moral of the story,

is do not end the relationship.

ISSUE: Whether reckless imprudence is a crime in itself, or only a

modality on the commission of the crime, the decisions of the SC

initially were vacillating, or flip-flopping.

- 1955, QUIZON VS. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR,

PAMPANGA: the SC ruled that reckless imprudence is a crime

in itself and therefore the charge should be reckless

imprudence, resulting in homicide or whatever.

- 1958, SAMSON VS. CA: the SC said it was only a modality in

the commission of the crime and therefore a person charged

with intentional falsification may be convicted of falsification

through negligence.

- 1966, PEOPLE VS. CANO: the SC reverted to the Quizon

doctrine.

- From 1983, MADEJA VS. CARO: the SC consistently ruled that

reckless imprudence is only a modality in the commission of a

crime.

CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES: If you are asked to classify crimes,

answer on the basis of ART. 3, 6 and 9.

- ART. 3 classifies crimes into manner of commission, ART. 6,

according to the stage of execution, and ART. 9, according to

gravity (determined by the penalty attached to it).

- Alternative answer: Titles 1 to 14 (from crimes against national

security up to quasi-offenses).

ART. 4

Answers the WHO: Who incurs criminal liability?

- EMPHASIS: this is one of two fulcrums of a lot of questions in

Criminal Law.

- Criminal liability is incurred by (two persons who incur criminal

liability):

1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the

wrongful act done be different from that which he

intended.

Requisites:

1. He must be committing a felony. There

is no point talking of the second

requisite if the first element is not

present. US VS. VILLANUEVA,

PEOPLE VS. BINDOY (Reyes).

A intends to commit suicide. He went to the top floor of this building, jumped over then hits B, killing B while A survived.

- What is the criminal liability of A? - There is no law that penalizes committing suicide. There is a

law that defines and penalizes lending assisting to suicide, but there is no law that penalizes committing suicide. So what happens if A is not criminal liability because he did not commit a felony? Why did he not commit a felony? Because it is nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.

- What happens to the death of B, the bystander? It is damnum absque injuria. Tama lang sa kanya, tatanga tanga siya.

- The first instance when the first element of PAR. 1 is lacking is when a person is merely performing an act, not committing a felony. o In this case, when A attempted to commit suicide, he

was not committing a felony. He was performing an act. o Why was he performing an act, only not a felony?

Because there is no law that penalizes that act as a felony.

A and B were sweethearts. They decided to commit suicide because their relationship was imposed by their parents as they were first cousins. They decided to commit suicide by shooting each other. A shot B, B shot A. B died, A survived. That is the criminal liability of A?

- First inquiry: was A committing a felony? The answer is YES. o It would have been different if A shot himself, B shot

himself; so they were committing suicide. o But in this particular instance, they were lending

assistance to the suicide of the other so each was committing a felony.

- Because they were committing a felony, they are liable. - That is the only time that you look at the sequel, although the

crime committed is committed from that which the offender intended to commit.

- That is highlighted by the fact that after A shot B, B shot A, the bullet that was fired by A hit the adjoining room, hitting the couple C and D, killing both. o Criminal liability of A: for lending assistance to the

suicide of B, and liable to the unintended consequences because he was committing a felony.

o Proximate cause of the unintended consequence: the performance by A of the intended felony (lending assistance to suicide).


2. Because the word felonies is used,

that does apply to crimes.

The first element is not

applicable to crimes because

felonies are specified.

3. That element is also wanting if the

felony is culpable felony because even if

it were a culpable felony, there is no

room of application of the next phrase

although the crime committed is

different from that which the offender

intended to commit.

Intent is inconsistent with fault.

So in culpable felonies, there is

no occasion although the crime

committed is different from that

of the offender intended to

commit.

4. When the act is justified.

A attacks B. B, in self defense, shoots A. Then, the bullets that were fired from the gun of B in defending himself also hit C and D.

- B is not criminal liable for the killing of B. He was not committing a felony.

- Always, your inquiry is were you committing a felony, or was a felony committed before you talk of the second phrase.

On your way out of this school this evening, you saw your car being opened by A. Then he hastily entered, after opening the door, drove away with your car. You are armed with a licensed firearm, with the permit to carry. You drew your firearm, aimed very carefully at the tires of your car, fired at the tires, hitting the tires. Then, as a result of the explosion of the tires, your car swerved to the right, hitting a tricycle, killing the passengers, wounding seriously the driver of the tricycle. What is your criminal liability?

- ART. 4, PAR. 1: were you committing a felony? NO, because there is no need for a simultaneous attack on the person defending his property rights.

- In light of the recognition of the SC of the independent rights of the owner, or lawful possessor of a thing, to use reasonable means to defend these possessions.

- ART. 429, 536, 539 of the Civil Code. - Will the killing of the passenger of the tricycle and the serious

injury of the driver be damnum absque injuria? NO. The carnapper of the vehicle is criminally liable for the unintended consequences of his unlawful act. o He committed a crime of carnapping, under 6539,

before it used to be qualified theft under ART. 310.

5. When there is valid mistake of fact.

Elements of a valid mistake of

fact: [1] the act would have been

lawful had the facts been as the

accused believe them to be [2]

there must be no bad faith,

negligence or unlawful intent on

the part of the offender.

By reason of the first element,

aberratio ictus, error in

personae, and praeter

intentionem DO NOT exempt a

person from criminal liability.

A, intending to shoot B, hit C due to poor sight.

- Here, it is a case of mistake of the blow. - Whatever it is, he was already committing a felony. His act

would not have been lawful even if the facts turned out to be as he believed them: his act is still unlawful.

- Whether it is the intended victim or the unintended victim, the act is still unlawful.

A saw B, who bore a strong resemblance with his wife, entering a motel with C. Then after 10 minutes, he barges into the room occupied by the couple, saw the couple in carnal knowledge, shoots the couple, killing both. The bullets piercing the wall of the room, hitting an adjoining couple.

- Its a case of mistake of identity. - Was he committing a felony? YES because even if it was his

wife, he would still be liable for parricide or murder under exemptional (?) circumstances. The penalty is destierro.

PEOPLE VS. CAGOCO (error in personae, praeter intentionem).

- A intended to hit B at the back of his head, inflict only injuries. Unfortunately, the victim fell on the pavement, his head hitting hard the pavement, killing him. So he had no intent to kill, but just the same, he is liable for the unintended consequences of his unlawful act.

- What was the unlawful act? Inflicting physical injuries on the victim.

- The unintended consequences: the death. - But he will be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack

of intent to commit so grave a wrong under ART. 13, PAR. 3.

2) By any person performing an act which would be an

offense against persons or property, were it not for the

inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an

account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual

means.

Absent when there is bad faith, unlawful intent,

or negligence.

PEOPLE VS. OANIS

- A policeman was under instruction to arrest an escapee. When upon reaching a hut, the policeman saw a man whose back towards the door, sleeping. Believing the man was the escapee, shot the man to death, who turned out to be an innocent person.

- There is here, lacking of the second element, because there is negligence: the policeman as not under imminent threat of attack. o He had the opportunity to verify the identity of the

victim. - The same ruling was made in PEOPLE VS. DE FERNANDO.


US VS. AH CHONG

- All the elements for valid self-defense were present, although acting pursuant to mistake of fact.

- There was a lawful aggression on the part of the companion of Ah Chong, who barged in into the room despite the warnings made by Ah Chong. And there was no reasonable opportunity for Ah Chong to verify the identity of his companion.

When a person is committing a felony, he is

liable for the unintended consequences of his

unlawful act.

It is HOWEVER, required for the application of

the second part, of ART. 4, PAR. 1, the

unintended consequences must be the

DIRECT, NATURAL, and LOGICAL

consequence of the performance by the

accused of the intended crime.

The proximate cause of the unintended

consequences was the performance or

execution of the intended crime.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

- BATACLAN VS. MEDINA, ET AL: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

- The relationship of cause and effect: o CAUSE: intended crime. o EFFECT: the unintended consequences; must not be

broken by an efficient intervening cause. o INTERVENING CAUSE: maybe attributable to the

offended party himself or herself to a third person, or an extraneous factor.

US VS. MARASIGAN

- A stabs B, inflicting serious injuries on B. B, the victim, refuses to submit to medical attention.

- A, the accused, cannot argue that the refusal of B to submit to medical attention is an efficient intervening cause.

- The offended party is not required to submit to medical attention.

- Lets say that B, the offended party, submits to medical attention, but due to unskilful medical attention, he dies. o That unskilful medical attention is NOT an efficient

intervening cause. o So even if the offended party refuses to submit to

medical attention, or dies as a consequence of unskilful medical attention, that fact does not constitute an efficient intervening cause.

Lets say that A inflicted less serious physical injuries on B. There was no intent to kill so it was only a case of less serious physical injuries. In the desire of B, the victim, to exacerbate the legal problems of A, he deliberately immerses his wounds in a contaminated pool, transforming the less serious injuries into serious physical injuries.

- That independent act of the victim in deliberately immersing his wounds in a contaminated pool constituted an efficient intervening cause attributable to the victim.

- What would be the liability, because the intended crime is this less serious physical injuries? The unintended consequence is the serious physical injuries. o But the serious physical injuries were brought about by

the deliberate act of the offended party. o There was no a break, an efficient intervening cause

that broke the chain of causation of the intended crime and the effect.

o A will only respond to the less serious physical injuries. - The same is if the aggravation was due to an independent act

of a third person: pouring contaminated water on the wounds of B to exacerbate/transform it to less serious to serious.

- EXAMPLE OF AN EXTRANEOUS FACTOR THAT BREAKS THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION: PEOPLE VS. CAGOCO. o A hit the back of Bs head, intended only to injure B. B

fell on the pavement. His head, hitting the pavement hard, he died. So there was no break in the chain of causation between the crime, the physical injuries, and the unintended consequence (death).

PEOPLE VS. ROCKWELL

- Almost identical preliminary facts: A hit the back of the head of B, with intent only to inflict injuries. B fell then as a consequence of the fright brought about by the falling of B, a horse nearby jumped and on its way down, hit the head of B, killing him.

- That independent act constituted an extraneous factor that broke the chain of causation.

- A is only liable to physical injuries inflicted.

A and B boarded a passenger bus along Recto. While the bus was traversing the length of Recto, A and B announced a hold-up, frightened, the passengers jumped over. Some were killed, some were seriously injured. So A and B now claimed that they are not liable to the death and serious injuries to the passengers.

- They CANNOT because the death and injuries were the direct, natural and direct consequences of their unlawful act (robbery).

- Were they committing a felony? YES. - What was the unintended consequence? The homicide and

serious injuries. - So it will be a case of robbery with homicide (used in its generic

sense) as special complex crime.

PEOPLE VS. TOLING

- The principle cited or applied to this case was adopted from US VS. VALDEZ, and that principle says: he who creates on another persons mind an immediate sense of danger, which impels that person to avoid the danger, and in the process kills or seriously injures himself, the person causing that state of mind is criminally liable for the unintended consequences.

US VS. VALDEZ

- Valdez was pursuing A. Valdez, armed with a knife, intended to kill A. He pursued A. When A was cornered by the bank of the river, with nowhere else to go, and that not knowing how to swim, he jumped over. He died drowning.

- The claim of Valdez was that he cannot be held liable for the


death of the victim. - That principle was applied: he who creates on another persons

mind an immediate sense of danger, which impels this person to avoid the danger by escaping, and in the process he kills or injures himself, then the person causing that state of mind is criminally liable.

Take not of the phraseology of any person

performing an act.

So hes not committing a crime. He is

merely performing an act which would

have constituted a crime against

persons or property.

The accused technically did not commit

a crime, but because had exhibited his

evident criminal tendencies, the law

imposes a penalty to supress his

evident criminal tendencies.

The court considers the nature of the

crime and the injury caused thereby.

PRINCIPLE 1: The rule is if the act of a person,

which would have constituted an impossible

crime, also constitutes a felony punishable

under the code, or would subject him to a

criminal liability of a different kind, then he will

not be liable for the impossible crime, but for

such other crimes.

APPLICATION NO. 1: A is armed with a homemade gun with a maximum range of 20 meters. He sees his enemy, B, standing some 50 meters away. He aims at B, fires at B.

- Obviously, it would be impossible for A to inflict any injury on B because of physical impossibility of doing: the gun had a range of only 20 meters.

- While his act would have constituted an impossible crime, his act constitutes also a felony under the Code, and that is the crime of illegal discharge of firearms under ART. 254.

APPLICATION NO. 2: A intends to commit theft in the house of B. He enters the house of B, sees a watch by the table, takes the watch and leaves. To his dismay, he discovered that that was the watch he lost two weeks ago.

- So here he CANNOT commit theft of his own property. - But what did he commit? He committed trespass.

o So while his act may be legally impossible of being committed, his act also constituted a crime punishable under the Code.

PRINCIPLE 2: It would not also constitute an

impossible crime if the act would subject the

offender to a different criminal liability under the

Code.

For instance, the warden, after killing the prisoner, A, shoots the cadaver of the prisoner aimed at the back of the cadaver to make it appear that when the warden killed the prisoner, he was escaping.

- It was impossible to A to kill the victim because he was already dead.

- But he is criminally liable for being an accessory to the crime of murder.

- So his act here, while impossible of accomplice-ment, would subject him to a criminal liability of a different kind under the Code.

ART. 6

Provides for the second classification of felonies: according to STAGE

OF EXECUTION.

CONSUMMATED

ATTEMPTED

FRUSTRATED

When all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.

When the offender commences the commission of the crime directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

When the offenders performs all acts of execution, which would produce the felony as a consequence, but which nevertheless does not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

PENALTY: ART. 46.

ART. 50 and 51*

- One of the determinants of the penalty that is imposable on the

accused, according to stage of execution.

* The penalty of frustrated is one degree lower for the consummated.

And according to ART. 51, that for the attempted, the principal for an

attempted felony is two degrees lower than that of the principal of the

consummated felony.

PAR. 2 and 3: providing for the statute of definition of those three.

US VS. EDUAVE (defined the subjective phase of the offense)

- The SUBJECTIVE PHASE marks the beginning of the commission of the crime and the end thereof is the OBJECTIVE PHASE.

INTERNAL ACTS: not punishable by law.

EXTERNAL ACTS: punishable by law.

A. PREPARATORY ACTS: as a rule, not punishable, EXCEPT

only in those instance where the law especially provides a

penalty therefore, such as conspiracy and proposal to commit

treason, rebellion, sedition.

o Devising ways and means of effecting a particular

criminal objective.

o A person who merely performs a preparatory act does

not commit an attempted felony because to constitute

an attempted felony, the act must be such that it shows


the crime intended to be committed or that the act itself

must constitute a consummated felony.

o A person who merely performs a preparatory act is not

criminally liable unless that preparatory act is made

especially punishable by law.

o Commission of mere preparatory acts does not amount

to an attempt to commit a crime.

An attempt to commit a crime marks the

beginning of the subjective phase of the

offense.

SUBJECTIVE PHASE OF THE OFFENSE is

that portion occupied by the acts of the

offender, starting from the point where he

begins its commission up to the point where he

performs the last act, which would prior acts

would constitute the consummated felony.

That portion of the act of the offender

commencing from the point where he

begins, up to the point where he is still

has control over his acts and their

consequences.

WHEN MERE ATTEMPT: If between

those two points, the offender is stopped

by any cause other than his own

spontaneous desistance, the crime is a

mere attempt.

WHEN ABSOLVED: If he is stopped by

a spontaneous desistance, then he is

absolved from criminal liability.

WHEN CONSUMMATED OR

FRUSTRATED: If he is not so stopped,

then the subjective phase is passed, the

objective phase sets in (then the crime

is either CONSUMMATED or

FRUSTRATED).

A intends to kill B by poisoning.

- So that is an internal state. No matter how wrong, that is not punishable.

- As long as the offender does not externalize his evil thoughts, he is not criminally liable.

- In furtherance of his thoughts, of his intention to kill B, A procures poison from the store. That is NOT an attempt. o It is merely a preparatory act. o WHY? For the preparatory act to constitute an attempt,

the intended felony must be proven, or must be shown. - Suppose now, after procuring the poison because he could

have used the poison for industrial uses, he mixes the poison with the food of B. o That is now commencing the commission of a felony,

directly by overt acts. o That is now the start of the subjective phase.

- If A is stopped by any cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, it is a MERE ATTEMPT. o After mixing the food of B, B places the food on his

mouth. For unknown reason, B spits out the food. o That is a cause due to an accident other than the

spontaneous desistance of the offender. o That is mere attempt, because here, the overt acts, the

intention now concur. o When B placed the food on his mouth: that is the last

point where A has still control over his acts and their consequences.

o If B spits out the food, that is a cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the offender, so that is a mere attempt.

o If C bumps B and as a consequence, he throws out the

food, then that is an accident that places the situation to only attempted.

- If after B puts the food in his mouth out of remorse, A tells B to throw out the food, to spit out the food, then he VOLUNTARILY desisted at the attempted stage, then he is ABSOLVED from criminal liability.

- The ATTEMPTED STAGE is that portion of the act, commencing from the point where the offender begins, up to the point when he still has control of his acts and their consequences.

- The moment B swallows the food, A has no more control over his acts.

- If B dies, then the crime is CONSUMMATED. - If B does not die because of timely medical assistance, then it

is FRUSTRATED.

ART. 6 only provides for the general concept of attempted, frustrated,

or consummated felonies. The actus reus of the different felonies in

Book II must be considered.

- ART. 6 is only a general categorization.

- EXAMPLE: BRIBERY always consummated.

o No attempted or frustrated bribery.

o Bribery, either direct or indirect, or qualified, is always

consummated, or there is no crime at all.

A offers B, a public officer, P1M to commit the act of falsification so that the tax liabilities of A will be obliterated.

- Remember that bribery is committed by a public officer, who accepts a promise, gift, or present in consideration of his performance of an act, whether constituting a crime or not, or in consideration for refraining from performing his acts. And the penalty depends on whether the act agreed upon was consummated or not consummated.

- B agreed to As offer. - So the liability of B consummated bribery. - The liability of A is not bribery. The liability of A is corruption of

public officials under ART. 212. He incurs the same penalty (as B).

- Suppose B rejects As offer. Then B does not incur liability. o A, on the other hand, the bribe offeror, is liable for

attempted corruption of public officials. o So corruption of public officials is either ATTEMPTED

or CONSUMMATED. o While bribery is always consummated. o Frustrated bribery (PEOPLE VS. DIEGO QUING

LEE): the public officer returned the bribe money after accepting it. Resolving the doubt in favour of the accused, the SC ruled that it is mere frustrated, when it should have been consummated (the return of the amount only affects his civil liability).

o In conflict with US VS. TE TONG, where the SC ruled it was mere attempted bribery.

- The basic doctrine is if the crime requires the participation of two persons to consummate it, if the offer of one is rejected by the other, it is a MERE ATTEMPT. o In bribery, however, if the offer s rejected by the public

official, he incurs no criminal liability. The bribe offeror is liable for attempted corruption of public officials.

- In arson, when part of the building is burned or is charred, the

crime is CONSUMMATED (PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ).

o Our basic law in arson is PD 1613, minus SEC. 2,

because SEC. 2, dwelling on destructive arson, has

been transposed back to the RPC, as ART. 320, as

amended now by 7659.


o While all other forms of arson are covered by PD 1613.

o If rugs were set on fire, but no part of the building was

burned, it is FRUSTRATED arson (US VS. VALDEZ).

o If gasoline was poured on the rugs, but the act was

discovered, it is ATTEMPTED arson.

o There are aberrant cases: when hospital linens, or the

contents of the hospital were set on fire, but no part of

the hospital was burned, the ruling of the SC was

CONSUMMATED arson.

With almost identical facts in PEOPLE VS.

GARCIA, the hospital linens were burned but no

part of the building was burned, it was

ATTEMPTED.

Both of the cases were WRONG: there should

be CONSUMMATED arson of the personal

properties.

o Fire is still a qualifying, aggravating circumstance for

murder. You can commit murder, by fire, without

committing arson.

For instance, you brought your victim into an

open pit, poured gasoline on him, set him on

fire. You commit murder by fire, but you did not

commit arson.

- Insofar as theft is concerned, the prevailing rule now is

VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE, there is no frustrated theft (there

is no crime of frustrated theft).

VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE

- The SC took note of actus reus for the crime of theft. - Theft is committed is the following requisites are present:

1) Bienes muebles as the subject matter of the crime or personal property.

2) There must be animus lucrandi, or intent to gain. 3) Asportation or unlawful taking, or apoderamiento. 4) The means of committing is through strategy or stealth,

meaning without the consent of the owner. - The accused here was a merchandise man of SM City, in North

EDSA. He was able to extract 3 cartloads of unknown brand detergent, which was brought out of the Department Store and loaded in a taxi cab. When the taxi cab was about to leave the post of the security guard, on its way out, the cartons were discovered, so he was charged with and convicted of consummated theft.

- In his appeal, Valenzuela argued, citing the case of PEOPLE VS. DINO and US VS. DOMINGUEZ, that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, because in DINO, considering the subject matter (3 boxes of rifles), which was discovered when the vehicle was about to leave the checkpoint, he should only be held guilty of frustrated theft because he has no freedom of disposition.

- IN DINO, ESPIRITU, DOMINGUEZ: the SC ruled that what determines the consummation of theft is whether the offender had the capacity to freely dispose of the property, even is his possession thereof was more or less temporary. o So freedom of disposition was used as the determining

factor. o Applying that rule, Valuenzuela argued that he had no

freedom of disposition when the cartons were discovered shortly after he had loaded them in the taxi cab and before he left the guardhouse of the security guard.

- The SC said in revisiting the previous rulings that there is no frustrated theft because the actus reus, once the asportation is complete, the law does not require freedom of disposition on the part of the offender.

- The decision was CONSUMMATED THEFT.

- HOMICIDE:

PEOPLE VS. BORINAGA (aberrant case)

- The decision is frustrated homicide, relying in the belief of the accused that he had inflicted a mortal wound on the victim.

- When the knife that he used in stabbing the victim got stuck at the back of the chair, Borinaga was not able to perform all acts of execution because when he stabbed the victim who was sitting in the chair, he thought what he hit was the back of the victim when it is fact the back of the chair.

- So in fact, the chair prevented Borinaga from performing all acts of execution.

- But his professed belief that he was able to inflict a mortal wound on the victim became the basis of the SCs decision that it was frustrated.

PEOPLE VS. CALALO

- Corrected PEOPLE VS. BORINAGA. - That the offender in crimes involving intentional killing must be

able to inflict a mortal wound on the victim as a matter of fact, not as a matter of belief, for the crime to be either frustrated or consummated.

- In the crime of rape, rape in its traditional sense is either

attempted or consummated.

o In its traditional case, the offender is a man, the

offended party is a woman.

PEOPLE VS. ERINIA

- Involving a victim of 3 years, 11 months old. - The doubt was resolved in favour of the accused because

according to the SC, there was physical impossibility of penetration, considering the tender age of the offended party, disregarding the fact that mere contact of the labia majora with the male organ already consummates the crime.

o The judicial misstep in ERINIA was elevated by the

sacramental wordings of the law, crafted by lawmakers,

by providing for frustrated rape, with homicide.

o So the succeeding ART. 335 (original law on rape) was

successively amended by RA 2632 and 4111, which

both provided for the crime of frustrated rape with

homicide.

o Even ART. 7659 carried that judicial misstep.

o It was only when RA 8353, the Rape Law of 1997, that

frustrated rape was abolished from the statute books.

The SC never again came up a decision

involving frustrated rape.

o Insofar as the expanded law on rape, PAR. 2, ART.

266-A, on acts of sexual assaults that are defined and

penalized as rape.

The first act thereupon, any person who puts his

penis in the mouth or anal orifice of the other;

obviously the offender is only a man, and the

offended party may be a man or a woman.

The second part of sexual assault: by inserting

any instrument or object into the genital or anal


orifice of another. The offender here may be a

man or a woman. The offended party may be a

man or a woman.

PEOPLE VS. FLORES

- ISSUE: WON inserting a finger/s into the genital of the woman would constitute an object or instrument within the meaning of the expanded rape law.

- CA: answered the issue on the affirmative. - Not yet resolved by the SC. - The finger was considered as an instrument or object. - To Professors mind, an instrument or object, common sense

dictates, is something that is foreign to the body of a person because it would have provided putting the penis of the mouth or anal orifice of another, it could have clearly states also, putting the finger into the genital or anal orifice of another. o But it said instrument or object.

- Anyway, the CA has decided already.

B. ACTS OF EXECUTION

- END -

Documents

Critical Areas in Criminal Law - I (1)