Crisis, democracy and the left in Peru (Rochabrún, 1988)

8/13/2019 Crisis, democracy and the left in Peru (Rochabrn, 1988)

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DOI: 10.1177/0094582X8801500306

1988 15: 77Latin American PerspectivesGuillermo Rochabrn Silva and Anbal YaezCrisis, Democracy, and the Left in Peru

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Crisis, Democracy,and the Left in Peru

byGuillermo Rochabrn Silva*

Translated byAnbal Yaez

In Peru, as in most of LatinAmerica, almost the entire left has

replaced the themes ofclass struggle, revolution, and socialism with thatof

democracy,with all its

virtues, problems,and

possibilities.How can

this shift be explained in the Peruvian case, and how should it beevaluated?

In our view, this transition must be understood fundamentally as theresult of the ideological depletion that the reforms carried out by the

military government produced in most of the Marxist left, in particularthat which today makes up the legal left, the Izquierda Unida (UnitedLeft, or IU). To this must be added the disenchantment with &dquo;existingsocialisms.&dquo; The

ideological weakeningthat

followedboth these

processes facilitated the acceptance of various themes and values of

liberal democracy that at that time were being put into circulation by theexiles from the Southern Cone and by the Carter government. Uponreturning in 1980 to a political system based on elections and parliament,Peru experienced-and is still experiencing-the broadest politicaldemocracy in its history. But this is not a symptom of greater stability;rather, it is part of a very profound crisis. The present article is an

attempt to support that statement.

THE PERUVIAN LEFT:

FROM REVOLUTION TO DEMOCRACY

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT (1968-1980)

As in the countries of the SouthernCone,

this theoretical and

political turn toward democracy has taken place after a military

*Guillermo Rochabrdn Silva, a Peruvian sociologist, isAssociate Professor in the

Department of Social Sciences at the Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica del Peru and a

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 58, Vol. 15 No. 3, Summer 1988 77-96

@ 1988 LatinAmerican Perspectives

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dictatorship. But the cases are not the same. In those countries the armyoverthrew governments that were trying to carry out a second cycle of

transformations, ofa

populist or socialist character. In Lechners words,this time the military sought to found anew order imposing &dquo;a new normand order by means corresponding to the logic of war: the annihilationof the adversary and the abolition of differences&dquo; (1985: 59). There the

revolutionary and socialist forces suffered a historic crushing thatmarked the end of an era. Itwas from that situation that these left forces

began their current reevaluation of democracy.In Peru, however, the military government of General Juan Velasco

Alvarado ( 1968-1975) marked the beginning of a very different process.After they overthrew Fernando Belaunde Terry, invoking nationalistreasons, the military set in motion a series of structural reforms that

helped in a decisive way to eradicate a large part ofthe social order that,accordingto reformism and revolutionarythought, had to be eradicated.Let us look at some of the most outstanding features.

The Peruvian agrarian reform, generally considered to be the mostradical in theAmericas except for that in Cuba, eliminated the archaic

landowners ofthe sierra and, above all, the big agrarian capitalists ofthenorth coast; in their place associated enterprises were forcibly createdand controlled by the state. The state took control of petroleum, paper,cement, an important part of copper, and banking, as well as thecommercialization offood and supplies, and became the main economic

agent. With these resources it tried to plan the entire economy and to

renegotiate relations with the capitalist world. There were strong clasheswith the U.S. government, while at the same time commercial,

diplomatic, and military relations were established with countries in thesocialist orbit. Industrialproduction was highly protected and facilitatedwith tariffs and credits; there was an attempt to enlarge the domesticmarket. In the main branches of production, &dquo;labor communities&dquo; wereinstituted as a way for workers to participate in ownership, management,and profits, which was intensely combated by business.All of this was carried out in the middle of an intense campaign that

called for the elimination of

exploitation(&dquo;the boss shall no longer eat

yourpoverty and that laid claim to complete ideological originality (&dquo;arevolution that is neither capitalist nor communist.An intense

member of the editorial board ofEl Zorro deAbajo, Revista de Politica y Cultura. In 1986he published the book Las ideas socialistas en el Peru.Anibal Yanez is in the doctoral

program at the Center for LatinAmerican Studies, University of California, Berkeley.



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ideologization of society then took place by means of educationalreform and increased governmental control of the mass media-the

stated purpose of whichwas

to transfer the media to the new workersorganizations that the state was setting up in the course of its reforms.

With the exception of the Partido Comunista Peruano (PeruvianCommunist Party, or PCP), the Marxist left criticized and combatedthis government and these reforms, mostly in ideological terms, tryingto prevent the popular classes from being attracted by the rhetoric ofthe generals. The countless parties of the left that appeared then soughtto demonstrate that such policies were reactionary, or a hoax, or not

sufficiently revolutionary. In any case, the greatest efforts on the part ofthe left were exerted trying to differentiate themselves from the militarygovernment. In other words, confusion was possible.

Our first thesis is that the military government depleted the ideas ofthe Peruvian left, since both acted in the framework of the same

paradigm: the development of the country following the model ofindustrial societies and their productive forces. The Marxists usedanother language: they added the role of the proletariat and the

peasantry, although they equated socialism with state control of theeconomy. But their affinity with the military government is shown not

only by their efforts to distinguish themselves from it, but by the factthat when the reforms began to slow down or be dismantled, the leftcould not but defend them, following and channeling popular protests.It was not able to present an alternative for which to struggle. More

recently, important Marxist leaders have held up the figure of Velascoand have more or less explicitly carried out self-criticism for havingopposed him.All of this indicates that the left and military reformismtraveled along paths that to a large extent were superimposed and thattheir clashes are to be explained more by political competition than byideological differences.

The fact is that the structural transformations were carried out, and

they were not followed by an economic boom, but rather a crisis that haslasted for no less than 13 years; as to the nature of this crisis, there is no

agreement. This crisis put an end to a quarter century of almost

uninterrupted economic growth and made key themes such as in-dustrialization and growth lose much of their power of seduction. Theeconomic difficulties could not be attributed to the survival of an

archaic order that had already been removed, nor could measures thathad demonstrated that they were ineffective or counterproductive beinvoked as a solution. In other words, to the economic and political



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crisis was added a cultural crisis: the exhaustion of the &dquo;development&dquo;paradigm that had given meaning to the world. In the following years

the tune would be called, by economic orthodoxy, &dquo;stability.&dquo;

NEW POLITICAL CLIMATEAND ENTRY TO LEGALITY

The period between 1976 and 1978 witnessed social and politicalagitation of such magnitude that it led several left parties to diagnose the

proximity of a prerevolutionary situation. Powerful movements ofwageworkers, independents, urban slum dwellers, and regional fronts grewand achieved relative unity in those years, and their demands convergedon and against the state. Of particular importance were the nationalstrikes of 1977 and 1978.

The political result of the strikes was the retreat of the generals totheir barracks and the return of civilians to the government by means ofdemocratic elections, which had been a demand of the right. Theworkers had not sought these goals, but rather a change in the

governments economic policy and in its wage and trade-union policy.In that regard its accomplishments were minimal, but the citizenryshopes were raised by the imminent new political course. The call to electa new ConstituentAssembly and then to have general elections openedthe political system; liderazgo [power and influence of political leaders)]and clientelism reappeared. In other words, real and symbolic mechan-isms were created to channel demands and expectations, mechanismswere different than the direct confrontation that had characterized the

period of &dquo;class-struggle. &dquo;2In the midst of these circumstances, a distancing began to develop

between the popular organizations and the left parties. Little by little theunions adopted negotiation tactics, while most of the left prepared to

participate in the recently announced elections and &dquo;to use theConstituentAssembly as a platform for propaganda and denunciation.&dquo;In practice the clandestine left would become, with few exceptions, a

legal left.

THE DISTANCING FROM INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

The Peruvian left has always viewed the revolution from one oranother pole of the international socialist movement. The most

important cases are the Peruvian Communist Party, linked to the Soviet



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orbit, and diverse Pekingese parties that split from the PCP in thesixties. The so-called &dquo;new left&dquo; of the decade of the seventies had a

fundamentallyLeninist

orientation, although graduallyMaoism

gainedvery great acceptance. But after Maos death came the Chinese crisis, thewar with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Solidarity. In LatinAmerica wewitnessed the crushing of diverse left groups in the Southern Cone thatwere geographically and politically closer than the Sandinista guerrillas.Those years left a taste of the failure of socialism and of the

revolutionary ideal, while the popular movements became less radical.Almost at the same time (1979-1980), a debate took place on the

question ofa

&dquo;national left,&dquo; that is,on

the dialectics between Peruvianleft autonomy and the Peruvian revolutions links with the world

revolutionary socialist experience. The figure ofJose Carlos Maridteguiwas invoked to uphold the different positions in the polemic, but theterm Mariateguismo has been coined as a sort of shield againstinternational &dquo;isms.&dquo;A good portion of the Maoist left assumed a

position in favor of autonomization. Undoubtedly, Maoism was afertile ground for this position because of its emphasis on the peasantry,

the nation, and culture-themes that in those years began to be intenselystudied and discussed.

Mariateguis phrase, so often repeated, of building a Peruviansocialism that would be &dquo;neither a tracing nor a copy, but rather a heroiccreation&dquo; is still a long-term historical task waiting to be accomplished.But the construction of a socialist project cannot be done overnight, norcan it be a voluntarist creation. Meanwhile, there is the question ofhowto fill the ideological void left by having taken ones distance from the

international socialistframework? Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, orSL) filled it by creating a world movement based on itself: &dquo;Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalism.&dquo;3 The legal left, on the other hand, wasinfluenced by the discourse on democracy and human rights that at thattime was current in LatinAmerica, promoted by the political exiles fromthe Southern Cone and the Carter government in the United States. Itwound up recognizing the legitimacy of various concerns and values ofliberal democracy, and trying to place them within socialist thought.4

So it was in the absence of a program for the transformation ofPeruvian society-once the militarys reform program had been ac-

complished-that the reduction of the radicalness of the popularmovements, the arousal of expectations due to the opening of thechannels of political democracy, and the disenchantment with differentsocialist experiences were able to come together. For the left, the



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acceptance of democracy was not the only road allowed by savagerepression, as in the Southern Cone, nor was it the result of a theoretical

development that freed it of sterilizing dogmas and led to the achieve-ment of new political frontiers, as would have been desirable and assome would like to pretend. The left did not conquer the field of

democracy; rather, it was captured by it.After 1982, once Sendero Luminoso had to be taken seriously, the

Izquierda Unidas need to differentiate itself from Sendero pushed itwith additional force into the framework ofthe established order. But isthis a shameful defeat, or a healthy opening? In other words, what is the

validity of democracy as a political option in Peru?

DEMOCRACY IN PERU:

THE UNFINISHED EVOLUTION

Historically, the roots of Peruvian society are quite alien to liberaldemocracy. The pre-Hispanic kingdoms and empires were constitutedalong the lines of relationships and loyalties of a &dquo;clanish&dquo;type, definedby a hierarchy the bases of which were superhuman. The Spanishconquerors built upon these political, cultural, and psychologicalstructures to constitute a patrimonial society along rigid estate and

corporate lines by means of the &dquo;two republics&dquo;-the &dquo;republic of theSpaniards&dquo; and the &dquo;republic of the natives.&dquo; Following the wars ofindependence, Peruvian society maintained colonial segregation, while

politicallyit assumed the form of a

republic designed accordingto

liberal principles having no relation to and even opposed to an economybased on tribute, precapitalist rents, and the commercial profit ofmercantile capital. That is, there was no link whatsoever to the relationsofproduction and the social forms ofthe surplus. In other words, it wasnot a &dquo;superstructure&dquo; that corresponded to its &dquo;base&dquo; (Rochabrun,1979). Nevertheless the persistence of republican forms and principlesand their having gradually taken root merits an explanation. Might notthe last 160

yearsofPeruvian

historybe understood as a still-unfinished

advance toward a democracy that now is entering a new stage?

CAPITALISMAND SOCIETY

The evolution ofdemocracy in Peru cannot be understood outside ofthe course that capitalism and its most &dquo;simple&dquo; determinants, such as

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commodities and money, have taken in this country. Far from adheringto an &dquo;economist&dquo; view, we underscore that insofar as they are

specifically capitalist phenomena,these

categoriesinclude social rela-

tions and cultural and ideological contents such as liberty and equality,which at the same time are basic to liberalism and democracy(Rochabrun, 1982). In Europe all these dimensions developed simul-

taneously, since capitalism, liberalism, and democracy (we would add

socialism) have been part of a single, endogenously generated historical

process. In Peru, as in most of LatinAmerica, things occurred in quiteanother way.

This is not themoment

to discuss howsome

basic propositions ofhistorical materialism should be understood on the subject of &dquo;de-pendent&dquo; societies, or to clarify what we mean here by &dquo;dependency.&dquo;We will note only that in the last 80 or 90 years there has been a relative

development and articulation and taking root of capitalist socio-economic phenomena and of fragments of liberal democracy in a

contradictory relationship with &dquo;serflike&dquo; ties of reciprocity and unde-

veloped value relations along with seigniories and estate loyalties. Let us

examine the scope of this complex process in a very schematic way.5As Maritegui (1971) pointed out, capitalism was developing onfeudal grounds. The debates of the past decade on the &dquo;character ofPeruvian society&dquo; centered on the relative magnitude of capitalism and

precapitalism, trying to evaluate them by comparing the respectivevalue of their product or comparing the magnitude of wage andnonwage relations. The study of the respective connections did not gobeyond asserting their reciprocal functionality or dysfunctionality for

the survival of each. But no one went so far as to raise the question thatwe wish to formulate here: how well rooted was capitalism? To whatextent was the undeniable capitalist expansion accompanied by its

deepening?Whathappened in those places where precapitalist activities,practices, and relations were reduced? Was it possible to establish aninternal circuit of accumulation that would tend to homogenize theeconomic structure? Lastly, what was happening with capitalism as asocial phenomenon?

Today it is clear that the development of capitalism in Peru has beenfragmentary and uneven. It took place first through the export of rawmaterials, which permitted an initial urban growth. Then it expandedthrough &dquo;import-substitution&dquo;industrialization, constrained by (a) the

foreign exchange that exports could provide, and (b) the so-called&dquo;narrowness&dquo; of the internal market. However, the size of the market

depends upon the division oflabor and the dynamic ofproduction, and



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not the other way around (Rochabrun, 1977: 10-12). In this case,capitalist expansion in its different forms increased the inequality

between capitalist productive forces and those of the rural world,especially theAndean countryside.

The result was a town-country relationship that eroded the economicactivities of an archaic and stagnant countryside, turning these spacesinto a marginal increment of the capitalist market but making thelatters thorough-going development impossible. In this sense thereforms of the military government after 1968 &dquo;stretched&dquo; the markets,but the attempts to deepen them failed, as they left the productive

relations between town and country unaltered. The labor force as awhole went on to reproduce itself increasingly in contact with thiscapitalism, but it did not fundamentally grow as a productive laborforce. The magnitude of the phenomenon-which has later been called&dquo;underemployment,&dquo; &dquo;marginality,&dquo; and &dquo;the informal sector&dquo;-ispertinent evidence of this. The most visible consequence has been urban

growth without urbanization.If, according to Schumpeter, capitalist accumulation is &dquo;creative

destruction,&dquo; then in a case such as Peru, the destructive effect isqualitatively superior, for it does not capitalistically recreate the spacethat it destroys. In this way, one arrived at a block to domesticaccumulation. But the corresponding forms of political control are alsoundermined. It is therefore of interest to evaluate what has happenedmeanwhile with capitalisms social, political, and ideologicaldimension,and to what extent it has affected the generation of democratic

possibilities and spaces. Capitalist development in Peru cannot beunderstood without examining its &dquo;extraeconomic&dquo; dimensions.

CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICS,AND THE STATE

For lack of a better term, we shall call Peruvian society as it emergedin republican life after 1821 &dquo;estate-based.&dquo; Viewed from a democratic

society, estates seem to be defined by relationships of hierarchy and

loyalty, by ties ofpersonal dependence, or, put negatively, by the lack ofautonomy of the social actors. In the case of Peru it would be necessaryto add social and political domination over the indigenous world. Todemocratize such a society required at least creating autonomous social

subjects-citizens-and extending this citizenship to the peasant world.Well, there is no doubt that all of this has been happening in the



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course of this century. The last 90 years evidence not only the

appearance of an important labor contingent, but the development of

labors autonomy, first from the dominant classes-as organized laborleft behind the mutual aid societies and adopted trade unionism. Laterlabor became independent of the middle layers when, in a historicallyrare change of political identity, the trade-union movement abandonedtheAPRA and its doctrine of &dquo;free trade unionism&dquo; to accept Marxistleaders and &dquo;class-struggle trade unionism.&dquo; The middle layers havelikewise developed a social, cultural, and political profile autonomousofthe old oligarchy, first through theAPRA, then in the fifties through

Acci6n Popular and Christian Democracy, and currently moving to theUnited Left. Correspondingly, the &dquo;oligarchic&dquo; parties have dis-

appeared-the Partido Civil, the Movimiento Democratico Peruano

(Peruvian Democratic Movement), and the Union Nacional Odriista

(Odriista National Union). Although with difficulty, the peasantmovements have ended up fighting for the eradication of all bosses andnot just the &dquo;bad boss.&dquo; In the same way, the movements of poor, urbanslum dwellers, which initially were clientelized by oligarchic groups,have, since the seventies, consolidated their independence from thedominant classes and the state.66

The state in turn has changed decisively.At the start ofthe century itwas no more than &dquo;the extension in the political field of the corporativeeconomic interests&dquo; of the dominant classes. &dquo;Toward the end of the last

decade, on the contrary, the specificities of politics-understood as

hegemony, leadership, consensus-take shape within a state that is not

merely a prolongation of economic interests but which puts itself

forward as a regulator of conflicts&dquo; (El Zorro deAbajo, 1985: 6).Citizenship, the exercise of rights and the mechanisms ofthe political

and judicial system, has been extended, and the proportion of the

population that voted, even before the 1979 Constitution grantedilliterates the right to vote, has grown. The provision of certain servicessuch as education not only has been broadened, but has already been

recognized as a right. Culturally, &dquo;Spanishification&dquo; (castellanizaci6n)has advanced, and monolingualism in native languages has beenreduced. The means ofmass communication have amuch greaterreach,and &dquo;public opinion,&dquo; as ambiguous as this term is, is more in effect thanbefore.

The reforms and the processes that took place during the militarygovernment-formally speaking, a dictatorship-resulted in unprec-edented conditions for democraticfunctioning, in terms ofthe incorpora-



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tion into political life of new, broad, organized, and autonomous

contingents. In summary:

(A) In Peru, as part of a social expansion of capitalism, a broadsubstratum of &dquo;protodemocratic&dquo; social relations has taken shape, ifwe may use that expression, which has been gradually replacing or in

any case superposing itselfupon estate-type and corporative relationsin retreat. While democracy may have entered Peruvian societyaccidentally, it has taken root. It is no longer an exotic import. That isour second thesis.

Of course, democracy is, has been, and will be a conflictive reality.As

anywhere, the freedoms, rights, and guarantees have been won and areexercised only by means of bloody struggles. Frequently, the develop-ment of democracy is more in the objective effects of the struggles thanin the formation of a democratic culture.And what the philosopherAbugattas observes about interpersonal relations, anchored in a

corporate backdrop, is very true:

A Peruvian thinks ofhimself and thinks of his relations with his fellowman in terms of bi- and tripolar oppositions, such as &dquo;the rightpeople/ordinarypeople/Indians, &dquo;orprovincials/Lima-dwellers, or moun-tain people/coast people, or military/civilian, etc.... The individual,then, upon closer inspection, is, above all, a member of a sort ofminicorporation. From this self-perception isderivedapeculiarmorality,which allows anything in relation to the &dquo;others&dquo;... in such a way that

relations[with themJcannot be ruled other than by mutual distrust[1986:54-SSJ.

But what this reveals is the undermining of a set of particularismswithout a universality having been constituted in its place.

(B) The aforementioned democratic expansion is the result of strugglesby the popular classes and the middle layers that were carried outwithout the agreement and even in face of the opposition of the

bourgeoisie. The latter, culturally heir to many aspects of oligarchicdomination, avoided confrontation with the oligarchy-otherclassesdid its work.

In summary, this democracy contains at bottom genuine achieve-ments with apopular content. But how does it function politically in thecontext of a crisis such as we have presented?



12/21

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(C) While the development of capitalism is blocked by the uneven

development ofthe productive forces in town and country, this is notthe case with its

sociopoliticaland

ideological aspects (freedom,equality). We could say that a contradiction arises between theeconomic dynamic of capitalism and its &dquo;superstructural&dquo; dimension;potentially there could be &dquo;excess&dquo; democracy with regard to what

capitalism could tolerate. This is our third thesis.

POLITICSAND DEMOCRACY

INA CONTEXT OF CRISIS

Since 1980 Peru has lived not only under a formally democratic

regime, but with the broadest political democracy in its history. Thereare free elections; a constitution drafted by a freely elected assembly is in

effect, and the separation ofpowers works. The only ones outside oftheofficial political scene are the parties that have excluded themselves. Itcan be said that for the first time all the social classes have organizations

and parties that represent them socially and politically, and they have attheir disposal various means of communication that function withalmost unrestricted freedom.Apparently everything would work in thebest possible way were it not for the armed subversion and the economiccrisis.And yet,

the representatives cannot faithfully express the interests, the aspirations,the sentiments, and the passions ofthose whom they represent.... The~e ~M~/Me~~, a~J~cp~M.HO/M q/~!


13/21

88

left to place itself there, the growth of an &dquo;independent&dquo; electorate thatdecides who to vote for at the last moment, the fragile relations with the

social classes.7The reason is clear. We have maintained that the reforms of the

militarygovernment exhausted the possibilities of the different develop-mentalisms. From a capitalist perspective one ofthe few &dquo;recipes&dquo;still tobe tried is the &dquo;Taiwanization&dquo; of the economy, which could not be

carried out in a formally democratic regime. The exhaustion is equallyclear with regard to the left, despite the Izquierda Unidas very elaborategovernmental plan.Although the latter has attracted some attention,the fact is that it does not contain any ideas that can conquer the

imagination of its supporters.Citizens enthusiasm for the electoral processes has not diminished,

but this is a passing sentiment that later gives way to pessimism and

insecurity. The most popular politicians-Belaunde,Alfonso Barrantes,Alan Garcia-are more collective symbols than representativefigures oftheir respective political organizations. By inspiring personal ratherthan programmatic support, their characters as caudillos is reinforced.

THE SOCIALATMOSPHERE

This lack of projects is not simply a fact that is faced by the partiesand their intellectuals. To try to find away out ofthe economic crisis is a

&dquo;public issue&dquo; that is translated into &dquo;personal trouble&dquo; in each personslife-to put it in the terms of C. Wright Mills (1959: 8). But if the crisis

does not seem to have a collective solution, the only option left is theanomic search for individual escapes. After 25 years of almost

uninterrupted economic growth, the economic restrictions have reducedthe aspirations of the large majorities down to simple survival. In this

general context of pauperization, the opposite phenomenon appears:the sudden enrichment that the drug trade provides. Therein lies areasonable explanation of the current levels of demoralization and

corruption, beyond what contemporary Peruvians can remember

(Durkheim, 1957: 252-254).Peru is experiencing an increasingly agitated social and political

climate, even without taking into account the actions of armed groupssuch as Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac

Amaru (MRTA), the actions of which, combined with the response ofthe police and the armed forces, have shaken large areas of the countryin the sierra and jungle. It is not simply a matter of the unresolved



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demands of wage-workers, small producers, or regional fronts, whichare translated into prolonged strikes and violent methods of struggle.

Institutions lose credibility in the face ofdaily accusations ofcorruptionand crooked dealings, or ofpolitical promises that are not kept. There isa generalized malaise, a &dquo;collective fatigue,&dquo; to use the expression of thejournalist Cesar Levant, which can be clearly perceived in the aggressive-ness of daily life, in the increase ofcommon delinquency on a small andlarge scale

The youth-especially among the popular classes-is going througha critical period: without many possibilities or even a desire to study due

to the scant practical value of formal knowledge, without resources toget married, with no idea of the future; as in many other countries ittakes a pragmatic attitude and reaches the age ofits political initiation ina depoliticized, deideologized, and amoral world. Its choices arebetween nihilism, delinquency, drug addition, or Sendero Luminoso.The latter becomes one of the few possibilities to give meaning to life,aside from the foreign and domestic millenarian sects that have

expanded at the same rate as the crisis.9

The cumulative effect of the crisis and the mass lay-offs of 1977weakened and demoralized the working class. The latter had been partof several crucial experiences that took place in that decade. On the one

hand, it had confronted aprista trade unionism, which was dominant upuntil the early seventies. The left played a very important role there; theworking class, subjected to talks and pamphlets on capitalism and

surplus value, lost its fear of the word &dquo;socialism.&dquo; On the other hand,through the experience of the comunidad obrera, to workers began tothink for the first time about the ownership and the management ofenterprises, even though the workers sometimes said that &dquo;productionwas the bosses affair, not the workers.&dquo; Third, production became a

political goal of the government: it would be the way its reforms wouldbe judged. This led the government to seek control over the trade unionsand the labor communities. The workers reaction made these attemptsfail, transforming class autonomy into part of their basic demand.

What is left ofthis experience? The labor communities were graduallydismantled and apparently left few traces among the workers. When

production was no longer a political goal, the working class ceased tohave the political importance that circumstances had given it. Under theblows of the crisis the trade unions considerably reduced their activity;their relations with the political parties became weakened or took theform of technical consultancy by left professionals. But the class



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90

autonomy remained. In 1987 agricultural producers, the trade unions,white-collar workers, and even professionals such as doctors employed

by the state have resumed very intense strike activities, including a workstoppage in the countryside and a national strike.

If to this picture we add the action of the armed groups, what is

preventing a social, ifnot a revolutionary, explosion?As sociologist andhistorian Nelson Manrique has written,

Contemporary Peru offers one ofthe most complexpolitical panoramasof the continent. In our country today there coexist in a single space the

~ro~~ ~MC/r~ /MOVC/Me~~ M ~OM~A ~/M~C~, ~ ~a/ /~ ~/!zstrongest guerrilla movement in SouthAmerica, the legal left with thegreatest political presence (Izquierda Unida), and the historically most

important reformist political party of the continent in power: theAPRA.The situation is made even more singular by the fact that this does not7?!~ ~~Ma~OM M wa~ cvcM /more ~!~M~r ~ ~c~ac~ ~a~ ~M ~o~ zooseem to be a precarious equilibrium, likely to break apart in the short run

[1986: 5J

It may be that the last point is no longer so true, but the equilibrium

doesnot

haveto be

eternalto

requirean

explanation. One possibleanswer, sketchily presented, is the following: (a) Unlike it was duringthe

previous decade, this time the parties that make up Izquierda Unidahave not placed themselves &dquo;at the head of the popular struggles.&dquo; (b)The survival practices known as &dquo;new social movements&dquo; tend to dilutethe conflictive character ofthe problems they face: food for children andadults, health, vigilance against delinquency, and so forth. Let usexamine both points.

IZQUIERDA UNIDA

Since the mid-sixties, and particularly in the decade of the seventies,the Peruvian left grew constantly despite its permanent fragmentation.Literally, dozens of mutually hostile &dquo;parties&dquo; were formed, but theywere able to win the trust of the popular classes and ended up providingleadership in the trade unions and political field. In LatinAmerica thisleft is today a singular phenomenon, because of its mass presence, thebreadth and diversity of its actions, its relative unity, and the level of itsintellectual reflections. Since its first attempt at unification during theelections to the ConstituentAssembly, it has formed several electoralfronts with a troubled existence, but it has never again been atomized.



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91

The longest lasting and most important attempt to date is IU, formed in

September 1980.

IU includes most of the Marxist left, the Social Democratic left,Christians linked to liberation theology, and independent figures. It also

enjoys the support ofmost left intellectuals, as well as of a good portionof the two hundred nongovernmental organizations that they havecreated. This front concentrates the accumulated fruits of 20 years of

political, ideological, scientific, and cultural advances.&dquo;l

In the different elections that have taken place since 1978, the left haswon between one-third and one-fourth of the votes, becoming the

second most important electoral force. However, politically IU hasevidenced great limitations. These limitations derive, on the one hand,from its precarious unity, and on the other from the seduction that the

political powers have exercised over the party leadership. There is noquestion but that the left must be present in parliament, in the

municipalities, or at any other level of power, by means of the best

possible representation. But that presence should not define its activity,much less be its primary goal.

Nevertheless, with some exceptions, the candidates to parliamenthave been the top national leaders of the parties. The result is not that

they have won anew field of action, but that they have tended to become

parliamentarized; that is, they have adapted to the functioning of the

powers of the state. The representative becomes a negotiator of varioussectoral demands, not by virtue of his belonging to the left but due to his

political position. He easily ends up becoming part ofwhat Jorge Parodicalls &dquo;a system of elitized power&dquo;:

7b ~CCO/MC MCO~pOra~ !~0~ p0/!~ca/ gWMC M ~M~ MO~ ~0 &CCO/MCTo become incorporated into the political game is thus not to becomeincorporatedinto a system of representation ofsocial interests, but ratherinto a political class that shares a system of elitized power. Democraticelections legitimize that system while at the same time they are an accessroute to the elite.As Izquierda Unida knows, the weakening of the ties tothe socialbases then becomes a cost that is compensatedby the benefits ofthat power [1987.- 80-91J.

We have argued that the left adopted democracy as a result of itsideological weakening. It did not appraise it in a Marxist way, as theresult ofthe class struggle, but from triumphant liberalism under whosebanners it entered into the state. But we must say that some importantdebates have taken place between different positions on subjects such as



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92

democracy, what stance to take towards theAPRA, violence, the roadsout of the politicalcrisis-although the intellectualshave participated in

these debates more than the political leaders. There is a clear awarenessof the shortcomings and of their seriousness. The first congress of IUshould take place in September 1988. History goes on.

THE &dquo;NUEVOS MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES&dquo;

(NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, OR NMS)

Since the early eighties an extraordinary organizational ferment hasbeen spreadingthroughout the squatter settlements and poor neighbor-hoods of Lima.An immense number of spontaneous organizations areappearing through which residents are dealing with the difficulties of

daily survival: food, health, child-care, urban services, protectionagainst delinquency, and so forth.A widely accepted perspective today insists that these organizationshave created new organizational forms and democratic habits, whichtaken as a whole are

creatinga new field of culture. What is

specificallyhighlighted is their tenacious defense of their autonomy vis-a-vis thestate and the political parties, and the consciousness oftheir dignity and

citizenship that goes along with it. Lastly, it is said that the NMS

develop &dquo;new forms of making politics,&dquo; politicizing daily life. It haseven been said that together with the &dquo;informal economy&dquo; theyconstitute a &dquo;popular upwelling&dquo; that is part of the crisis of the state(Matos Mar, 1984).

For ourpart,

we

agreein

largemeasure

with these appraisals, butwith different nuances and some discrepancies of a greater scope. Thus,for example, it has become &dquo;common sense&dquo; among social scientists to

prefer the study of theNMS to the study of social classes, and thereforeto value one and another theory in an analogous manner. However, theNMS are more a continuation of, than a break with, the struggle for&dquo;class political autonomy&dquo; ofthe previous decade. The deepening oftheeconomic crisis made the defense of wages based on the trade unions

insufficient or inoperable, while wages themselves dropped below thevalue of labor power. This made it necessary to extend the efforts ofsurvival to other economic activities (self-employment) and otherarenas (in particular, the neighborhood) in which the struggle to obtainwhat is necessary takes other forms. Situated outside of the arena of

work, in general they face &dquo;circumstances&dquo; and not a personalized&dquo;enemy.&dquo; This forces them to create solutions that they can carry out



18/21

93

themselves, ratherthan to demand them in a conflictwith the capitalistsor the state. In fact, they draw on welfare programs or charity, and they

go beyond confrontationand

negotiationas

they seekto

buildalternative life-styles.But, having become assimilated into liberal democracy to a greater or

lesser extent, analysts and politicians, when they observe theNMS, havetended to forget that the capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and imperialismstill exist and that the NMS are simply facing some of their conse-

quences. Dazzled by the democratic practices that they observe within

them, they infer that they are a step forward in the democratization of

society. They lose sight of the fact that the greatest obstacle to thatdemocratization is the ruling class and not the &dquo;authoritarian tendenciesof the popular classes.&dquo; They do not perceive that the NMS does notseek to alter the distribution ofsocial power, and that up to this point thestate has not felt threatened by their existence: they substitute for thestate at a time when it is seeking to transfermany of its social obligationsto municipalities and regional governments.

In that sense we differ with those who see in the NMS &dquo;new forms of

making politics based on everyday life.&dquo; That requires assuming thatpolitics can be based on partial social relations, which is a theoreticallyerroneous position. While they do constitute a &dquo;popular upwelling,&dquo;more than contributing to a crisis of the state they express a crisis that

already existed. None of this diminishes their value as an experience todefine alternative ways of life, but by relieving potentially explosiveproblems they function more as a safety valve than as a source ofunrestfor the established order.

The popular classes increasingly live in a culturally peculiar world. Itis not shared with the other social classes. Today, as opposed to 20 yearsago, there are fewer common symbols for Peruvian society as a wholethat can act as a means of &dquo;social control. &dquo;Today &dquo;popular culture&dquo;-amuch-abused term-is a melting pot, the results of which have multiplefaces in the midst of transition. In this scenario, legality and illegality,hope and despair, moderation and messianism,Alfonso Barrantes (IUsmost important national figure) andAbimael Guzmn (the mythicalleader of Sendero) are combined and reconciled.

In part, the equilibrium has been maintained not by virtue of its

components, but because the disruptive elements have been keptseparate. But as this article is being completed, the greatest attempt atcentralization of the popular organizations in the countrys history is

unfolding: theAsamblea Nacional Popular. Everyone is present in it:



19/21


20/21

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negotiations are taking place with the World Bank.8. In 1986 and 1987, the GNP has grown by more than 8 percent, while inflation has

been lower than in previous years. However, this growth is not reflected in an

improvement in the living conditions of the population, and nobody is confident that itcan be maintained in the coming years.

9. This has not prevented the increase of youth membership in most parties of IU andinAPRA. It is a new generation that did not live through the experience of the decade ofthe seventies; therefore its cultural and ideologicalconformation is very different than thatof the members of only 10 years ago.

10. The comunidad obrera refers to workers partial share of profits and partialownership and participation in management in factories and business enterprisesestablished by law under the VelazcoAlvarado regime and phased out under Morales

Bermdez.11. Outside of IU there is a bloc made up of the Unidad Democrtico Popular

(Popular Democratic Unity, or UDP) and Pueblo en Marcha (People on the March),which express the style of struggle of the seventies, centered on confrontation.Althoughthey are legal, unlike IU they have not participated in the various elections and usually areconsidered to have ties to the MRTA (TupacAmaru Revolutionary Movement).

REFERENCES

Abugatts, Juan1986 "Ideologa y ciudadana en el Peru actual." Quehacer (Lima) 42 (August-September).

Durkheim, Emile1957 Suicide.A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press.

El Zorro deAbajo. Revista de Poltica y Culture1985 "APRA: pasado ambiguo, futuro diferente? (Lima) 2 (September-October).

Lechner, Norbert1985 "De la revolucin a la democracia. El debate intelectual enAmrica del Sur."

Opciones (Santiago, Chile) 6.

Lpez, Sinesio1980 "Resumen de undebate."Amauta 250 (April 10). Summary ofEl debate sobre la

izquierda nacional. Lima: Ediciones Guillermo Lobatn, October 1980.

Manrique, Nelson1986 "Democracia y campesinado indigena en el Peru contemporneo," inA. Flores-

Galindo and N. Manrique, Violencia y campesinado. Lima: Instituto deApoyoAgrario.

Maritegui, Jos Carlos1971 Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality.Austin: University of TexasPress.

Marx, Karl1970A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: ProgressPublishers.



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1976 Elementos fundamentales para la crtica de la economa poltica (Borrador)1857-1858 (Vol. 1, 8th ed.). Mexico City: Siglo XXI.

MatosMar, Jos1984 Desborde popular y crisis del estado. El nuevo rostro del Per en la dcada de

1980. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Mills, C. Wright1959 The Sociological Imagination. London: Oxford University Press.

Montero, Edith1987 "Encuentros populares: una base sin vrtice," in Cuesti6n de estado. Temas deanlisis politico (No. 1). Lima: Democracia y Socialismo, Instituto de Poltica

Popular.Parodi, Jorge

1987 "Los sindicatos en la democracia vacia." (unpublished)Rochabrn S., Guillermo

1977 "Apuntes para la comprensin del capitalismo en el Per."An&a acut e;li sis. Cuadernosde Investigaci6n (Lima) 1.1979 "Base y superestructuraen el Prefacioy en El Capital." Anlisis. Cuadernos de

Investigacin 7.1982 "Economa y poltica en el anlisis de capitalismo y de la sociedad enAmricaLatina," in H. Pease et al.,Amrica Latina 80: democracia y movimiento popular.Lima: DESCO.
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Documents

Crisis, democracy and the left in Peru (Rochabrún, 1988)