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Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes

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EditorsPietro Grilli di Cortona

Barbara PisciottaEric R. Terzuolo

Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes:Lessons from the Third Wave

Washington DC

Copyright © 2016 by Pietro Grilli di Cortona, Barbara Pisciotta, Eric Terzuolo

New Academia Publishing, 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmit-ted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho-tocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system.

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Library of Congress Control Number: 2016938346 ISBN 978-0-9966484-9-3 paperback (alk. paper)

4401-A Connecticut Ave., NW #236 - Washington DC [email protected] - www.newacademia.com

To Pietro Grilli di CortonaEsteemed colleague, teacher, and friend

Acknowledgments ix

IntroductionBarbara Pisciotta and Eric R. Terzuolo

1

Why Do Autocracies Fall? Internal Political FactorsPietro Grilli di Cortona

21

Social and Economic Factors in Regime Change During the Third Wave of DemocratizationLuca Germano

57

Weak Stateness and Political Change in Non-Democratic Regimes in the Third WavePietro Grilli di Cortona and Nicoletta Di Sotto

105

International Sources of Regime Change: A Framework for AnalysisBarbara Pisciotta

137

The Proactive International Dimension and the Break-down of Authoritarian RegimesAntonino Castaldo

165

An Alternative Geopolitics of DemocratizationEric R. Terzuolo

209

Contributors 237Index 239

Contents

There is international consensus among scholars that democratic transitions are multicausal processes in which both internal and in-ternational variables are involved (Pridham 1991, 1995; Whitehead 1996; Schmitter 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Carothers 1999; Morli-no and Magen 2008; Grilli di Cortona 2009). This chapter is limited, on the one hand, to the dependent variable consisting solely of the crisis/breakdown/transformation of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave of democratization, and, on the other hand, to an in-dependent variable identified solely with the international dimen-sion of democratic transition. This factor, which can be termed the Proactive International Dimension (PID), specifically concerns that combination of actions or processes, produced by one or more in-ternational actors, that, intentionally or not, cause or contribute to the crisis/breakdown/transformation of a non-democratic regime.

This is not exclusively tied to the concept of intentionality. Ac-tions that do not aim at destabilizing a regime, but in any case con-tribute directly to that result, are included in the analysis. The defi-nition, however, excludes democratic “emulation” (Huntington 1995), as well as anything belonging to the international dimension that is not linked to an actor’s explicit action, e.g. the effects of glo-balization or international economic crises.

Which international actors work to promote/cause the fall of non-democratic regimes? What are the motivations that drive them to act? What instruments or kinds of actions are employed? How effective have these instruments been in the cases under consider-ation? The answer to these questions will help us to understand the role of the PID in the breakdown of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington 1995).

The Proactive International Dimensionand the Breakdown of

Non-Democratic Regimes

Antonino Castaldo

166 Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes

The Proactive International Dimension:Actors, Types of Actions, Capacity for Influence

It would be misleading to interpret the PID as a unitary actor or a collection of actors who work in unison. The only common charac-teristic is that they originate and are located outside the borders of the target state (Pridham 2000, 195). The range of possible actors includes: individual states (e.g. US), coalitions of states (e.g. the Al-lies during World War II), international and supranational organi-zations (e.g. UN, EU, IMF), political parties, unions, churches, and NGOs, among others. The underlying motivations for actions that promote/cause the fall of an autocracy include: interests linked to the security of the international actors; the need to preserve peace and the stability of the international system; the actual intention to encourage the spread of democracy (Castaldo 2014, 33-34). It is important to underline that the first two are fundamental, while the third often appears more like a public justification of actions that are, in fact, motivated by international security and stability objec-tives, rather than being a real motivation in itself.

It is important to make distinctions among the various actions of the PID, separating those that can temporarily undermine/sus-pend the formal sovereignty of the target state from those that do not threaten formal sovereignty, even though they have actual in-fluence on it. Although there is no deterministic connection, it is likely that the kinds of actions that undermine the formal sover-eignty of a state have a greater chance of playing a prominent role in an autocracy’s breakdown. Actions that can limit/suspend the formal sovereignty of a target state can include: a) military inter-vention and b) inter-state conflict and its internal effects.

Intervention is a coercive action that officially makes recourse to military force. According to Tillema, interventions can be con-sidered “military operations undertaken openly by a state’s regular military forces within a specific foreign land in such a manner as to risk immediate combat” (1994, 251). In this optic, intervention con-stitutes a distinct category of “militarized international behavior” that: a) requires the use of force; b) often foresees a limited number of soldiers falling in battle; c) is described by the target state as a hostile act (Kegley and Hermann 1996, 311). A broad interpretation

The Proactive International Dimension 167

of this concept envisions the intervention resulting in a full-fledged military conflict, either brief or of medium-long duration, between the target state and the international actor, including consideration of a military occupation. What distinguishes it from a generic inter-state conflict is the intention, even if not overriding, to influence the internal order of the target state, promoting/causing the autocra-cy’s fall. Interesting examples are Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003).

Inter-state conflict and its internal effects represent a coercive ac-tion with official recourse to military force that does not include the breakdown of the non-democratic regime among its stated goals. The target state is involved in an inter-state war from which it will emerge defeated or extremely weakened. This is a classic reference to the scapegoat theory: an autocracy, delegitimized internally, at-tempts to stimulate a rally-around-the-flag effect by embarking on an external military adventure (Panebianco 1997, 76ff.). The failure of this strategy, whether by military defeat or the conflict’s pro-found political and socio-economic consequences, exhausts the re-gime’s residual legitimacy and causes its fall (Schmitter 1996, 35). In these cases, there is not a clear intention to influence the type of regime in the target state. Although the war’s consequences are partly responsible for the regime’s breakdown, these are unintend-ed consequences of intentional actions (Grilli di Cortona 2014, 32). The classic examples are Portugal (1960s and ‘70s), Greece (1974), Argentina (1982), Uganda (1979) and the USSR (1979-89).


The second group of actions, which do not formally undermine the target state’s sovereignty, include: a) covert operations; b) neg-ative conditionality (sanctions); c) positive conditionality; d) dip-lomatic pressure; e) democratic assistance. Covert operations are a type of coercive action, including possible use of military force, intentional in nature, but unofficial. These are often clandestine military actions, conducted by the special forces of the internation-al actor or via the recruitment/training/support of guerillas affili-ated with opposition groups. It is important to make a distinction between this type of action, characterized by military goals, and peaceful assistance given to internal opposition groups. The classic case is Nicaragua (1980s).

Sanctions are political, economic and diplomatic measures of a coercive nature that do not envisage the use of military force, and aim to provoke a change in one or more policies of a given country (Smith 1995). These can consist of financial restrictions, arms em-bargoes, cuts in assistance, commercial sanctions, non-issuance of visas, etc. Sanctions can run from “comprehensive” to “targeted” or “smart” (Drezner 2011). The first type is based on the “punishment theory” (Lektzian and Souva 2007, 850), which assumes that socio-economic problems inflicted on the population will translate into a loss of legitimacy for the regime and political pressure to conform to international demands (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). Smart sanc-tions are more recent, and aim to resolve some potential problems with comprehensive sanctions, such as the emergence of a rally-around-the-flag effect3 (Allen 2005; Galtung 1967). Smart sanctions directly strike the regime’s leaders, oligarchs, and socioeconomic elites (Giumelli 2011; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Major and McGann 2005). According to Brooks (2002) comprehensive sanctions should be more effective against democracies while smart sanctions should work better against non-democratic regimes. In any case, if the ob-jective is regime change, then Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997) and Elliott (2002, 171) maintain that comprehensive sanc-tions have a major chance for success. Some cases include: South Africa (1970s and 1980s), Cambodia (1997), Haiti (1991, 1994), and Peru (1992).

If sanctions represent the stick in the process of promoting de-mocracy, positive conditionality (Schmitter 1986; Pridham 1991),


devoid of coercive elements and deriving its ability to influence from the concession of advantages in exchange for internal political decisions, plays the role of the carrot. A regime can secure advan-tages, including diplomatic recognition, the promise to be included in a supranational community, economic aid, development pro-grams, or commercial contracts (Horng 2003; Piccone 2004). On the other hand, they are obliged to make progress in the development of democratic institutions (Murphy 1999), e.g. respect for political and civil rights, protection of internal minorities, and respect for the principles of liberal democracy. There are numerous examples of positive conditionality from Africa and Latin America.

Diplomatic pressure is often the first kind of action employed to promote the crisis/breakdown/transformation of an autocracy. This can take many different forms and often can overlap with the types of actions already discussed (Diamond 2011) but certain as-pects merit highlighting. First of all is so-called “quiet diplomacy”: confidential diplomatic contacts, conducted by ambassadors or emissaries of international organizations, with the objective of con-vincing regimes to liberalize and democratize. Various examples of the positive application of quiet diplomacy can be found in Africa,4

as well as in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, especially on the part of the US, thanks to the ambassadors (“freedom pushers”) appointed with a mandate to push regimes to democratize (Hun-tington 1995, 116). Particularly important is an international actor’s withdrawal of political approval or support for an autocracy, even if not necessarily reflecting the desire to promote its fall. The more crucial the support of an external actor for a regime’s economic/military survival, and from the ideological point of view, the more the withdrawal of that support can play an essential role in the re-gime’s fall. Good examples are the change in Soviet foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, as well as Africa, in the 1980s, and the US withdrawal of support for South American regimes in the 1970s (Dix 1982, 567; Sikkink 1996).

A final mention should be made of “democratic assistance” ac-tivities: advice and consultation on drafting constitutions and es-tablishing democratic judicial systems, training for state employ-ees, monitoring elections, financial assistance, support for political parties and training for party officials, professional training for


members of NGOs and interest groups and their socialization to-ward democratic norms, etc. Particularly in the crisis/breakdown/transformation phase, it is important to highlight the role of peace-ful external support for internal opposition groups. Classic exam-ples are the democratic development programs carried out by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in Latin America, but also in Poland in the 1980s (Carothers 1996).

Which factors influence the efficacy of such external actions in promoting/causing the fall of an autocratic regime? Answering this question is complicated due to the wide variation in the cases and the number of variables that have to be considered. The following is an attempt to catalog these factors.

The first group of factors concerns the strength of the institu-tions and economy of the target state. One must consider the

• size of the economy;• state’s coercive capability;• strength of the regime’s dominant political party;• state’s discretionary control of the economy;• dependence on foreign assistance and raw materials;• strategic importance, including geographic location and

wealth in raw materials, especially petroleum.The PID’s influence potentially will be most important in weak

states with small economies that are heavily dependent on foreign assistance and raw materials, e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41; Schmitter 1996, 48).

The second factor to consider are “black knights” (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 12) which, by providing economic, mili-tary and diplomatic support to target states, can condition and/or impair the PID’s ability to exert influence. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia, China, Japan, and France have played this role at times (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41).

A third element concerns linkage to the West (Levitsky and Way 2010, 43-4). This concept identifies the density of economic, politi-cal, diplomatic, social, and organizational ties, as well as the flow of capital, goods and services, people, and information between the target state and the major pro-democratic international actors (US, EU, IMF, World Bank, etc.). A high level of linkage will amplify the influence of external pressure.


The fourth and final factor refers to the congruity between the type of actions employed and the kind of legitimacy that the au-tocracy enjoys (e.g. theocratic or hereditary factors; political ide-ology; electoral autocracy; performance legitimacy; external legiti-mization) (Burnell 2006, 548-49). Understanding the predominant sources of legitimacy is important for determining which kind of action to employ: the congruity between these and the target state’s type of legitimacy will amplify the PID’s efficacy. For example, eco-nomic sanctions will be more effective than diplomatic pressure if applied to a regime based on performance legitimacy, while diplo-matic pressure will be more effective in cases of external legitimiza-tion.

In relation to other variables, the PID can assume a principal, concurrent or marginal role. The PID constitutes the principal vari-able when it comes close to being the sufficient condition for the fall of an autocracy. Even if other variables are present, the interna-tional variable is crucial to producing the result; without the PID, the regime’s fall would not occur in a given limited time period. The concurrent role is something very close to being a necessary condition. In this case, the PID is not, by itself, sufficient to provoke the regime’s fall, even if in certain cases it represents the detona-tor. It still has considerable weigh, however. The explanation for the breakdown can be found in the interactions between the PID and the other variables involved. Lastly, a marginal role indicates that the international variable represents a condition that is neither necessary nor sufficient. The PID is present, but the effect it pro-duces on the regime’s fall is residual, and subordinated to the role played by the other variables. The PID effect is often indirect, at most amplifying the role of the crucial variables. The objective in the following pages is to identify the principal actors, the kinds of actions, and in particular the role (principal, concurrent, marginal) of the PID in some of the most important national cases in each world region during the Third Wave of democratization, focusing our attention on the interaction between this variable and the oth-ers involved.


Southern Europe

The “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal on April 25, 1974 launched the Third Wave of democratization. In Portugal and Greece, un-like in Spain, the PID had a significant concurrent role, along with inter-state conflict and its internal effects. At the time of its fall, the Portuguese regime was in a state of obsolescence, Caetano hav-ing succeeded Salazar only a few years before. Although the state was fairly strong, thanks to its pervasive penetration of society,5 Portugal had a weak economy, was dependent on foreign energy sources, and was severely damaged by the weight of colonial wars. Beginning in the 1960s, the military was engaged in the repression of independence movements in Portugal’s African colonies. The economic unsustainability of these conflicts, which consumed large portions of the state budget, and the inability to secure a military victory had seriously undermined the regime’s legitimacy in sec-tors crucial for its stability. The middle ranks of the army, directly involved in the colonial wars, were especially receptive to the influ-ence of anticolonial ideology (Morlino 1986). The oil crisis of 1973 exacerbated the economic crisis (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 48). Interaction among all these factors led to the coup that ended the Portuguese regime. While the role of the colonial wars appeared to be central, it did not by itself produce the end re-sult (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 47-48; Huntington 1995, 75, 77; Pridham 2000, 289-90; Schmitter 1996, 35).

The Greek military regime had been in power only a few years (beginning in 1967) when the transition began. Its legitimacy based on anti-Communism, the Greek regime was born as a temporary solution and never succeeded in consolidating itself (Contogeor-gis 2003, 17). With a weak economy dependent on foreign energy sources, the regime was poorly institutionalized and had a frag-mented elite. The oil crisis of 1973 further damaged the country’s already exhausted economy and weakened the regime (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 43). To try to stimulate a rally-around-the-flag effect by procuring an external enemy, the 1974 at-tempt to overthrow President Makarios III of Cyprus created the conditions for a military conflict. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus. The Greek army’s refusal to embark on a war they would


have lost put an end to the regime’s residual legitimacy, and ended with its replacement by a transition government (Huntington 1995, 78; Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 43-44). The Cyprus crisis was the detonator for the regime’s fall (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 44; Schmitter 1996, 35), but it might not have produced this result without the regime’s already serious loss of legitimacy, and the disastrous state of the country’s economy (Pridham 2000, 289).

Latin America

In evaluating the PID’s importance in Latin America, we must prin-cipally highlight the role of the United States of America. US policy toward this continent changed radically from the 1960s to the 1980s (Grilli di Cortona 2014, 31). The “geopolitical dependency hypothe-sis” (Muller 1985, 451, 466) maintains that the bipolar confrontation and the need to contain Communist expansion in the 1960s led the US to undermine certain Latin American democratic experiences, facilitating the emergence of, or at least supporting, solidly anti-Communist military regimes (Sanchez 2003, 238). US economic, military (including covert operations), ideological (development of the “national security doctrine”) and diplomatic support was often fundamental for the stability of these regimes (Sanchez 2003, 238). The American attitude changed with the emergence of a new hu-man rights policy developed by Congress beginning in 1973 (Smith 1994, 241; Huntington 1995, 114). This was further accelerated with the election of Carter, who made human rights one of the corner-stones of his foreign policy (Smith 1994, 245). Carter pulled support from a good number of South American military regimes, remov-ing one of their principal sources of legitimacy (Sikkink 1996, 107). In addition, Carter promoted policies of pressure and conditional-ity to combat systematic violations of human rights. Even if not its explicit goal, this policy contributed to weakening these regimes (Smith 1994, 241). For a brief period in the 1980s, Reagan pushed back the hands of the clock, giving priority to fighting Communism. However, thanks in part to the diminished perception of the Soviet threat, in his second term Reagan also placed human rights and democracy promotion at the center of his foreign policy (Carothers 1991, 150, 255; Smith 1994, 286-87; Huntington 1995, 114).


Grenada was the most straightforward case of democratic tran-sition in Latin America and the Caribbean. In power for only a few years, the New Jewel Movement (NJM) was facing a crisis due to the failure of its economic policy and a conflict within its authoritar-ian elite that led to the assassination of Maurice Bishop, charismatic leader of the NJM, by the most orthodox Marxist-Leninist faction of the movement, led by Bernard Coard (Connaughton 2008; Williams 1997). Still, absent the 1983 US military intervention (Operation Ur-gent Fury), the regime’s structure (Henfrey 1984) and the absence of a strong internal opposition probably would have permitted the NJM to survive. Therefore, the PID was the sufficient cause for the fall of the non-democratic regime.

In Panama, even conflict within the authoritarian elite did not prevent Noriega from firmly holding on to power for most of the 1980s, surviving attempts to remove or politically weaken him (Levitsky and Way 2010, 173). Proof of the regime’s strength was its ability to resist the internal and international pressure applied prior to the military intervention. Demonstrations by the internal opposition never succeeded in making a dent in Noriega’s hold on power, or the popular support he enjoyed (Levitsky and Way 2010, 171, 178). Diplomatic pressure, withdrawal of economic and military assistance, and economic and commercial sanctions did not have the desired effect, in part thanks to the assistance Noriega received from other states such as Libya, which acted as a sort of black knight (Levitsky and Way 2010, 173-75, 178; Carothers 1991, 255). The military operation Just Cause (1989) represented, by itself, the cause of the Panamanian regime’s fall.

Haiti’s case is more complex, since at least four regimes fell dur-ing the period under consideration. The PID had an important role in all of these, but had its greatest influence in the fall of the Cedras regime (1994). Only seven months after the Aristide government came to power in the first-ever democratic elections in Haiti’s his-tory (1990), the army seized power, placing Cédras at the head of a military junta. Condemnation by the international community (UN, OAS, and the US in particular) was immediate (Diamond 2011, 139; Mobekk 2001, 174). In the following three years, many PID actions were employed (diplomatic pressure, economic and commercial sanctions, a naval blockade), not only to restore the legitimate,


democratically elected government, but also because of the brutal methods the regime used to suppress the opposition. Despite the state’s extreme weakness, its socioeconomic structure, and its de-pendence on international aid (Levitsky and Way 2010, 173), the inability of these PID instruments to bring about the regime’s fall (Giumelli 2011, 58; Von Hippel 2000, 98-99) almost led to a military intervention (Operation Uphold Democracy, 1994). The US mili-tary was already deployed and waiting for the order to move into action when, because of this pressure, Cédras relinquished power (Diamond 2011, 122, 140; Von Einsiedel and Malone 2006; Mobekk 2001, 174-75; Schmitter 1996, 45; Gros 1997). The military interven-tion was transformed into a peacekeeping mission conducted un-der UN aegis. This action was the sufficient cause for the Haitian regime’s fall (Levitsky and Way 2010, 171-74).

In the case of Guyana, the PID (with the US in the lead) ad-opted a package of actions aimed at destabilizing the regime of the People’s National Congress (PNC), a party of the country’s Black minority that came into power in the 1960s. Supported initially by the US and Britain, it was led by Forbes Burnham until his death in 1985, and then by Desmond Hoyte. With the Cold War winding down, the US under Carter withdrew support from the Guyanese regime. Reagan increased the pressure, USAID offices in Guyana were closed and international loans blocked. These measures pro-duced a rapid decline in the Guyanese economy, already extremely fragile and dependent on foreign assistance, indicating that inter-national conditionality had decisive influence. At the end of the 1980s, free elections became the prerequisite for aid. Thanks to this pressure, elections were called in 1992. The Carter Center largely ran the elections, which removed the regime’s ability to manipulate them (Levitsky and Way 2010, 148). Regime repression had under-mined the opposition’s ability to exercise influence (Premdas 1993, 48), but the PID actions created the economic crisis that weakened the regime to the point of forcing it to give in to international condi-tionality, which constituted the principal variable in its fall.

The US ability to influence the Dominican Republic was so great that it was able to bring down the Balaguer regime in 1978 using only diplomatic pressure (Diamond 2011, 121; Levitsky and Way 2010, 134-35). This derived from: a tradition of direct US in-


terference (i.e. the 1916-1924 occupation and the 1965-1966 military intervention); the state’s weakness in the face of migratory waves from Haiti; severe poverty; a weak economy totally dependent on foreign energy sources and on commercial relations with the Unit-ed States; enormous quantities of economic and military aid from the US (Levitsky and Way 2010, 133). The non-democratic Domini-can regime established after the American military intervention that ended the 1965-1966 civil war enjoyed full US support (Prince 1996; Conaghan and Espinal 1990). This situation changed, how-ever, during the 1970s, with Carter’s human rights policy (Sikkink 1996). After the effective repression of opposition groups, in partic-ular the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), which boycotted elections in 1970 and 1974, it was American pressure (Hartlyn 1991) that forced the regime to cease its repressive policies and allow op-position parties to participate in more open and fair elections in 1978 (Arthur 2011; Conaghan and Espinal 1990). The regime’s loss of popular consensus led to the PRD candidate’s landslide victory (Conaghan and Espinal 1990). After it became apparent that the PRD would win, the US role emerged even more clearly when it withheld support for a coup organized by soldiers loyal to Balaguer (Arthur 2011). In this context, the PID was sufficient to explain why the regime fell.

Nicaragua’s case is particularly interesting, as the interaction of various international actors brought about regime change. The fall of the Somoza regime in 1979 was principally due to ever more effective military actions by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Na-cional (FSLN). This is not to underestimate the consequences for the regime’s legitimacy and military capacity of the US withdraw-al of support, sanctions, and cutoff of assistance (Smith 1994, 245, 247, 250-51). Because the Sandinista regime, established in 1979, effectively repressed internal opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010, 145), the process that led to the Sandinistas’ fall originated in the international dimension (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141, 145), with prominent roles for the US, USSR and President Arias of Costa Rica. There were several different PID actions: covert operations, sanctions, positive conditionality, diplomatic pressure, and dem-ocratic assistance. The principal US instrument of pressure was a covert operation, long an open secret, that included economic,


military, logistic, and diplomatic support for the Contras gueril-las ($19 million in 1981; $24 million in 1983; $1 million a month via Saudi Arabia beginning in mid-1984; $27 million in 1985; $100 million in 1986) (Carothers 1991, 83, 89). Added to this during the 1980s were: economic sanctions and the 1985 commercial embargo (Carothers 1991, 84-85, 90-91); diplomatic pressure, including fre-quent bilateral contacts aimed at promoting the peace process; joint US-Honduras military exercises on the Nicaraguan border (Caroth-ers 1991, 84-87); non-lethal assistance to opposition groups in the 1990 elections ($12.7 million), as well as international monitoring of those elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 142-44; Whitehead 1996, 80; Carothers 1991, 95; Lean 2007).

In this period, the USSR played the role of the black knight, fur-nishing the Sandinistas with 4.5 billion dollars between 1981 and 1989 (Orozco 2002, 54). The diplomatic efforts of Costa Rican presi-dent Arias generated two agreements (Esquipulas II, 1987; Tesoro Beach, 1989)6 that led to the 1990 elections, won by the opposition. The interaction of these factors was responsible for the Sandinista regime’s fall (Diamond 2011, 122). The enormous amount of mon-ey supplied by the USSR had countered the effects of the embargo and the Contras’ military operations, but the cutoff of these funds beginning in 1986 made the economic consequences of American pressure and guerilla operations unsustainable7 (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141; Roberts 1990). It forced the Sandinistas to participate in the peace process promoted by Arias, which they saw as a way to block increased assistance to the Contras by the American Con-gress (Carothers 1991, 105-107). To make this succeed, the Sand-inistas had to ensure an impeccable electoral process, by definition out of their control, which led to their defeat in the 1990 elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141, 145; Whitehead 1996, 84-85). The PID, therefore, was the sufficient cause for the regime’s fall (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141).

In Argentina the PID played a concurrent role. The Argentine military regime was subject to sanctions and diplomatic pressure, as well as being involved in an inter-state conflict. Following the es-tablishment of Carter’s human rights policy, in 1978 the US blocked military assistance to Argentina (Sikkink 1996, 97; Smith 1994, 245), voted down or abstained on 23 out of 25 Argentine requests for in-


ternational loans, and clearly expressed its concerns about respect for human rights to all three Argentine military juntas (Sikkink 1996, 97, 115). If in 1980 sanctions were loosened, with the aim of obtaining Argentine cooperation for the grain embargo against the USSR, sanctions on arms sales remained in force until 1983 (Sik-kink 1996, 97). Although they did not have a decisive impact, these actions exacerbated the legitimacy crisis (Diamond 2011, 121) stem-ming from the following factors: the regime’s failed attempt to re-vive an economy seriously scarred by the 1973 oil crisis; the “dirty war” to suppress internal opposition; divisions within the military elite; loss of support from the Catholic Church and entrepreneurs; and the growing activism of internal opposition groups, despite repression. This, along with a lack of options, led Galtieri to bet on a rally-around-the-flag effect in 1982 by invading the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, which Great Britain controls but Argentina claims (Grilli di Cortona 2009, 47). The British intervention and Argenti-na’s consequent military defeat cancelled out any residual legiti-macy the regime still possessed, bringing it to an end (Huntington 1995, 78; Whitehead 1996, 63; Schmitter 1996, 35). As this was the result of interaction between internal and international factors, the role of the PID was concurrent.

In most of the other cases in Latin America, the PID’s role ap-pears marginal. This is not to suggest that it had no role or no ef-fect, but only that it was not a necessary and/or sufficient condition. In most cases, the PID reinforced key variables explaining regime change, even without an important direct impact. For example, in Chile, withdrawal of support from the Pinochet regime, pressure not to annul the 1988 referendum on renewing its mandate, and economic and diplomatic support for internal opposition groups did not represent necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the re-gime’s fall. However, they contributed to reinforcing those internal variables that were directly responsible for the transition, especial-ly the opposition (Carothers 1991, 162, 163; Diamond 2011, 122). In the same manner, in Uruguay the PID (American pressure dur-ing the Carter Administration) had a considerable indirect effect in strengthening the pro-democratic faction of the military and inter-nal opposition (Sikkink 1996, 106, 107, 115), but did not contribute directly to the regime’s fall.


Asia

In the Asian Third Wave the PID’s role was rather limited. There is only one identifiable case where it had a principal role, i.e. Afghani-stan. In other cases, the role was marginal. The fall of non-demo-cratic regimes on this continent is principally the result of internal factors and international factors not linked to explicit actions by an external actor. For example, the transformation of the Mongolian regime stemmed in good part from the authoritarian elite’s percep-tion of the breakdown of Soviet Communism and the necessity of a rapprochement with the West in order to obtain enough assistance to replace the economic relationship with the USSR (Fish 1998).

In Afghanistan, PID actions were primarily sanctions applied when the Taliban seized power in 1996, and then military interven-tion after Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks. In resolution 1076 of 1996, the UN had asked all member states to cease arms shipments to both the Taliban govern-ment and internal opposition groups, followed on December 17, 1996 by EU common position 746 (Giumelli 2011, 70). These and other measures adopted in subsequent years had little effect either in moderating the Taliban’s policies on human rights or bringing about the regime’s fall. The most important armed opposition, the Northern Alliance, made up of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and ethnic Pashtun minorities, financed by Iran, Russia and India, only rep-resented a limited threat to the regime and succeeded in gaining control of only a small and poor part of territory (Dobbins et al. 2003, 129). In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), with the goal of eradicating Al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. The operation included strong military and economic support for the Northern Alliance, enabling them to obtain early and unexpected military successes, conquering Kabul in mid-November 2001 (Dob-bins et al. 2003, 129-30). The successes of the Northern Alliance, so ineffectual in previous years despite funding from Iran, Russia and India, were attributable to the support from OEF. Consequently, the PID (OEF) was the variable sufficient to explain the fall of the Taliban regime (Suhrke 2008).

In most of the other Asian cases, the PID played a marginal role.


South Korea is one example. The PID actions, mostly by the US, were diplomatic pressure and democratic assistance. Because of in-tense protests by opposition forces, American support for President Chun Doo Hwan was replaced by cautious but ever more constant pressure by Reagan and the Department of State for an opening to the opposition, increased moderation in dealing with public protests, and for Chun to keep his promise to leave office peace-fully at the end of his term in 1988, along with a stern warning to the military not to attempt a coup (Saxer 2002, 63; Smith 1994, 280-81; Huntington 1995, 118; Diamond 2011, 122). In addition, via the National Endowment for Democracy, the Americans provided economic and political support for the opposition. By and large, at the origin of the South Korean transition were the internal opposi-tion’s intense pressure and the authoritarian leadership’s aware-ness that it could not prolong its permanence in power (Smith 1994, 280-81). The PID actions reinforced a trend already in motion that, predictably, would have arrived at the same result. In the Philip-pines, American diplomatic pressure contributed to convincing Marcos to leave power after the electoral defeat of 1986 (Diamond 2011, 121-22; Haynes 2001). In any case, this pressure was applied when the crisis was already underway, thanks to the opposition’s mobilization and the regime’s inability to combat the Communist guerillas, resulting in divisions in the army and a weakening of the regime, along with a serious economic crisis and the opposition of the Catholic Church (Pei 1998; Huntington 1995, 77).

Post-Communist Europe

Although marked by nationally specific courses of action and geo-graphical differences, the PID’s role in this region has been impor-tant. The following analysis focuses not on the countries created with the break-up of the USSR, as the dissolution of a state is not considered a PID factor, but rather on East Central Europe and the Balkans.

Although there were cases of military intervention and sanc-tions (Serbia) and of inter-state war (USSR in Afghanistan), diplo-matic pressure, in the form of withdrawal of support and stimuli to adopt a particular set of reforms, was the action that most influ-


enced the breakdown of non-democratic regimes in East Central Europe. The principal actor was the Soviet Union. In the context of bipolar confrontation, relations between Eastern European coun-tries and the USSR were based on the Brezhnev Doctrine, mak-ing the countries of the Soviet Bloc penetrated political systems. Such control8 prevented any political evolution not approved by Moscow. The cases of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1956, 1970, 1980-81) demonstrate how prepared the USSR was to intervene to block unwanted reform (Batt 1997, 155; Niklas-son 1994, 202).

A series of actions by the reformist leadership that came into power in the USSR in the second half of the 1980s made a substan-tial contribution to regime change in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely that the objective was to promote the fall of these regimes (Light 1997, 134). The “Gorbachëv Effect” can be summarized as the with-drawal of Soviet willingness to intervene, including militarily, in the internal affairs of satellite states to preserve the status quo9 and the application of pressure to implement reforms that Gorbachëv himself was carrying out in the USSR (Light 1997, 133; Niklasson 1994, 203). These were not, however, obligatory, as in the past, since in 1985 Gorbachëv had renounced the so-called principle of “So-cialist Internationalism,” under which the USSR had supervised internal policies and approved changes in leadership in East Euro-pean countries (Light 1997, 140, 142).

The Polish case featured a long tradition of strong internal op-position. There were important protests in 1956, 1968, 1970-71, and 1976, ending with the imposition of martial law after protests led by Solidarity in 1980-81.10 These demonstrations were repressed, sometimes violently, thanks to USSR support. The emergence of Gorbachëv’s leadership had several consequences. It reactivated in-ternal pressure for reform both by the opposition and regime mod-erates. Also, it convinced the Communist leadership that change was inevitable (Niklasson 1994, 210-211, 212). The Polish regime received Gorbachëv’s pressure positively (Light 1997, 140), relax-ing its repressive policies, allowing Solidarity to reconstitute, and conceding limited reforms in the system. The telephone call of Au-gust 22, 1989, in which Gorbachëv pressured Jaruzelski to enter a non-Communist government, is only one example of the role the


PID had in the Polish transition (Light 1997, 141; Niklasson 1994, 211). Gorbachëv’s withdrawal of support, including military sup-port, took away the regime’s principal source of legitimacy, and the instruments it needed to deter or repress internal opposition, indicating the concurrent nature of the PID’s role.

In Hungary as well, Gorbachëv’s reforms met a positive recep-tion (Light 1997, 140). The principal difference with Poland resid-ed in the long-standing moderation of the Hungarian leadership, thanks to which it was able to take the initiative and control the transition. Since the 1960s, the Communist leadership had under-taken a gradual reform process aimed at reacquiring popular con-sensus lost after the 1956 Soviet intervention. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of the 1970s was intended to enlarge the pri-vate sector. In 1983, an electoral reform was adopted that, within a single-party system, allowed non-Communists to be elected to parliament. The economic and political crises of the 1980s, how-ever, increased internal pressure for change, even within the Com-munist Party (Batt 1997, 161). It was also thanks to Gorbachëv’s re-forms that in May 1988, János Kádar was replaced as party leader by a moderate directorate. In addition, Moscow’s non-intervention when the Hungarian leadership dismantled the Iron Curtain on the Austrian-Hungarian border (May 1989) and thus made it possible for East Germans to reach West Germany (September 1989), con-vinced the Hungarians that there would be no external opposition to a regime change (Light 1997, 140). In essence, as in Poland, Gor-bachëv’s reforms had convinced the Communist leadership that change was inevitable (Niklasson 1994, 212). In this transition as well the PID played a concurrent role.

The leadership of the German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, stubbornly refused to accept the reforms promoted by the USSR (Light 1997, 140). Since 1986, Honecker had made it clear the German regime had no need for change (Niklasson 1994, 212). Mass protests, suppressed by the regime, began in summer 1987 at the same time the Soviets were pressuring East European regimes to reform. These were repeated in January 1988 on the anniversary of the death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Added to Gorbachëv’s pressure was the decision by the Hungarian govern-ment in May 1989 to open the frontier with Austria and allow free


passage of East Germans to West Germany, further weakening the Honecker regime (Light 1997, 142; Niklasson 1994, 211; Pridham 2000, 285). Beginning in October 1989, there were enormous popu-lar demonstrations in Leipzig and Berlin. In the same month, during a visit marking the anniversary of the birth of the German Demo-cratic Republic, Gorbachëv pressured Honecker to make conces-sions and refused to supply troops to suppress the demonstrations (Light 1997, 142; Whitehead 1996, 371). Faced with public pressure, and absent Soviet support, the Communist leader had no choice but to resign, triggering the regime change that occurred only a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Without the support and legitimacy provided by the USSR, a regime like that of East Ger-many, with no internal legitimacy, could not last. This withdrawal of support, along with the popular protest, was the principal factor in the regime’s fall. The PID’s role therefore was concurrent.

The Czechoslovak leadership also refused to accept the reforms promoted by Gorbachëv (Light 1997, 140). Miloš Jakeš, who re-placed Gustáv Husák in 1987, was also profoundly conservative, and responded to the failure of his reform initiative with increased repression. The purges following the 1968 Soviet intervention had excluded reformers from the Czechoslovak leadership (Niklasson 1994, 213). In addition, repression had limited the emergence of a strong internal opposition (Batt 1997, 161). The Czechoslovak rul-ing class, therefore, was dominated by orthodox factions, complete-ly dependent on Moscow for their legitimacy (Niklasson 1994, 213). In this country the Gorbachëv effect was clearly the origin of the re-gime’s fall (Batt 1997, 161), removing any legitimacy that remained to the regime11 and indirectly encouraging the emergence of an op-position that, beginning in March 1988, was capable of organizing protests much larger than those in Poland and Hungary. Therefore, the 1989 “Velvet Revolution” was an excellent example of the PID’s concurrent role.

A heavy dependency on Moscow, both for legitimacy and ec-onomically because of its chronic budget deficits, made Bulgaria one of the regimes most loyal to the USSR (Niklasson 1994, 213). Živkov, therefore, officially embraced perestroika, announcing re-forms in 1987 that were, however, barely implemented (Light 1997, 140; Niklasson 1994, 213). The centralization of power in Živkov’s


hands, and the control guaranteed by the secret police, limited the socio-political importance of opposition to the regime. This situa-tion changed in 1987 with the proliferation of protests both within and without the party. The serious economic crisis and pressure from Moscow were the reasons for this change. In 1987 Gorbachëv openly admonished the Bulgarian leader to speed up reforms (Light 1997, 142). Because of the opposition’s weakness, change originated within the single party. In November 1989, Mladenov, leader of the reformist faction, obtained Živkov’s resignation, thereby initiat-ing the regime’s transformation under the control of the reformist Communist leadership (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996). It is certain that Mladenov consulted with Gorbachëv: returning from a visit to China shortly before Živkov’s resignation, the reformist leader stopped in Moscow (Light 1997, 142). It is likely that he got Gor-bachëv’s green light for his succession (Niklasson 1994, 213). In this case the PID played a particularly important concurrent role in the transition.

In conclusion, abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine and dip-lomatic pressure for reform, especially in 1987-1989 (Light 1997, 138), left East European leaders helpless before their populations, orphaned of the principal source of their legitimacy. It gave Com-munist party reformist factions and opposition groups a greater awareness of the possibilities for reforming or overthrowing their respective regimes (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 29; Sanford 1997, 176-77; Whitehead 1996, 371). Although the Gorbachëv ef-fect cannot be considered a sufficient condition for the fall of the Eastern European regimes, it did represent a necessary condition (Light 1997, 133; Batt 1997, 155; Schmitter 1996, 27; Niklasson 1994, 206; Pridham 2000, 285). Maintaining the Brezhnev Doctrine would have altered both the time and character (certainly more violent) of regime change in Eastern Europe (Light 1997, 149; Whitehead 1996, 372).

Serbia, on the other hand, is a case of a principal role for the PID. The PID worked against the Milošević regime by employing democratic assistance, diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and a mili-tary intervention. Beginning in 1992, the international community imposed sanctions with the goal of persuading Milošević to end support for Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Croatia. The most


important of these were exclusion from the World Bank and de-nial of access to IMF financing (Levitsky and Way 2010, 107). The necessity of having Milošević’s support for the peace process in Bosnia obliged international actors to moderate the sanctions’ ac-tual effects (Levitsky and Way 2010, 104). In combination with the regime’s coercive capability, it permitted Milošević to survive this phase, but not without difficulty.

The Dayton Accords (1995), which ended the Yugoslav conflict, enabled the West to intensify diplomatic pressure and make the sanctions more effective. The US and EU froze the overseas assets of the regime’s elite, prohibited new foreign investment, blocked the Serbian airline from flying to western countries, and banned issuance of visas to the regime’s most important figures (Levitsky and Way 2010, 105, 109, 110). Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, visible to the world’s media, obliged the PID to intervene militarily in 1999 (Levitsky and Way 2010, 109). Sanctions and 78 days of NATO bombing12 devastated the Serbian economy, forcing Milošević13 to withdraw from Kosovo and call early elections for October 2000 (Diamond 2011, 122-23; Levitsky and Way 2010, 109). The interna-tional community intervened heavily on the side of the opposition, furnishing financing of between $40 and $70 million, creating a united anti-Milošević front (Levitsky and Way 2010, 111). His elec-toral defeat led to the fall of the regime.

A fragmented opposition, although active during all of the 1990s, would never have been able to bring down a regime like that of Milošević, which had popular consensus and a consider-able capacity for repression. In addition to international financing, the victory of the opposition in the 2000 election resulted, above all, from the devastating effects on the economy of the sanctions and the military intervention, and the consequent weakening of the regime’s coercive ability and consensus (Diamond 2011, 122; Lev-itsky and Way 2010, 104, 109-10). The loss of Kosovo was a severe blow to Milošević’s image (Levitsky and Way 2010, 109-110). All of these factors demonstrate that the PID was the sufficient condition for the regime’s fall.

It is worth noting the PID’s role also in the breakdown of the Communist regime in the USSR. The PID actions in this case were inter-state warfare and its internal effects, plus diplomatic pressure.


The arms race triggered by Reagan, which should be considered a form of diplomatic pressure, worsened the Soviet economy’s crisis (Pridham 2000, 290). The consequences of the war in Afghanistan were especially important (1979-89), in particular the Red Army’s inability to win the war (Huntington 1995, 77). There were various internal effects, linked, for example, to the Communist leadership’s perception of the Red Army and of its potential effectiveness for use internally to control the non-Russian republics and abroad to preserve the Soviet empire (Reuveny and Prakash 1999). It is diffi-cult, however, to judge the weight of these factors against the others involved in the fall of the USSR, such as the failure of the planned economy and the consequent economic crisis (Kort 1992), the emer-gence of a reformist leadership, (Adomeit 1994), the breakdown of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the increasingly loud demands by many Soviet republics for more autonomy or total in-dependence (Carrère d’Encausse 1993).

Africa

About a third of the countries involved in the Third Wave were located in Africa. With this large number of cases, all possible types of PID action were present, playing all possible roles (principal, concurrent, marginal), with the full range of international actors involved. For this area as well, the analysis here is limited to cases where the PID’s role was principal or concurrent.

Mozambique is among the cases where the PID played the principal role. Different international actors employed assistance, diplomatic pressure, conditionality, covert operations and military interventions (a peace-keeping operation). With independence, Mozambique became the theater of a civil war that to a large extent reflected the bipolar confrontation (Levitsky and Way 2010, 246; Gomes Cravinho 1998). Set against the Resistência Nacional Moçam-bicana (RENAMO), which had covert support from South Africa and Rhodesia (Moran and Pitcher 2004), was the Frente de Liberta-ção de Moçambique (FRELIMO), a single party heading a Marxist-Leninist-inspired regime (Pitcher 2002), supported by the USSR with ideological cover, arms, and petroleum, $150 million a year in the 1980s (Alden 2001, 94). Withdrawal of external support by both


sides in the 1980s compromised the ability of the two parties to con-tinue the conflict and, unintentionally, amplified the effectiveness of international conditionality, especially important because, at the beginning of the 1990s, international assistance constituted 75% of the country’s GDP (Levitsky and Way 2010, 247; Peiffer and Engle-bert 2012, 362-64). The indispensable nature of this aid drove FRE-LIMO to abandon its Marxist-Leninist orientation, concede some forms of political liberalization (Alden 2001), and enter into peace negotiations, sponsored by the international community, which led to the deployment of a multinational force of 7,500 men, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (Levitsky and Way 2010, 248; Manning and Malbrough 2010; Alden 2001; Gomes Gravinho 1998). Finally, different types of assistance were provided for the 1994 elections. RENAMO received several million dollars to pro-vide some balance to the electoral competition, as FRELIMO had control of the state’s resources. In addition, 2,500 international ob-servers monitored the elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 249). The timing was particularly important. During the 1970s and 1980s, internal factors such as the economic crisis14 and the presence of an armed opposition did not produce regime change. International conditionality, supported by ONUMOZ and amplified by Soviet and South African withdrawal of support (Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 362-64), therefore constituted, albeit in a weak form, the suf-ficient cause of the regime’s transformation (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 182).

There are numerous other cases where the PID played a concur-rent role. South Africa is an interesting, if complicated, example. The principal actions of the US, UN, and European Economic Com-munity were sanctions and diplomatic pressure, although it is nec-essary to carefully consider the withdrawal of Soviet support from the African National Congress and actions set in motion by foreign private financial institutions. In 1973 the UN declared apartheid a “crime against humanity” and in 1977 encouraged the adoption of an embargo on arms sales to South Africa. Beginning in 1985, after the declaration of a state of emergency by the Botha government, the European Economic Community, the Commonwealth, US, and other states and international institutions adopted increasingly stringent financial and commercial sanctions (Omer-Cooper 1998;


Huntington 1995, 120; Smith 1994, 278). Although the estimates fix the direct impact of the sanctions on South Africa’s GDP at 0.5% (Levy 1999, 7) the psychological effect on the White political and socio-economic elite should not be underestimated (Diamond 2011, 123; Von Hippel 2000, 98). In addition, the sanctions also should be evaluated on the basis of their importance for the protagonists in the transition. At the beginning of negotiations, for example, Mandela and the ANC asked that the sanctions be maintained un-til the regime had been effectively dismantled (Levy 1999, 10). The psychological effect was amplified by diplomatic pressure and the unanimous international condemnation of apartheid. In 1989, in-formal meetings were held in Great Britain among representatives of the ANC, the National Party, various African states, the US and the USSR. In September the US stressed that, if Mandela was not released within six months, President Bush would approve an ex-tension of the sanctions.

The economic dimension was crucial in launching the transi-tion. In the mid-1980s the South African public debt was $24 bil-lion, two-thirds of which was short-term. This situation made the South African economy vulnerable, dependent on the readiness of foreign investors to refinance the public debt (Levy 1999, 5). Before financial sanctions, which exacerbated the situation, it was foreign banks that suspended investment in South African debt. After the state of emergency was declared, Chase Manhattan Bank, followed by other banks, announced that it would not extend further credit to South Africa (Levy 1999, 5). The impact was extremely impor-tant, even though not generated by a desire to bring about regime change. Socio-political instability made investment in South Afri-can sovereign debt risky (Levy 1999, 6). Another crucial element that inadvertently favored the South African regime’s transforma-tion was the withdrawal of Soviet support from the ANC (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Smith 1994, 279). This had a dual effect. On one hand, it undercut the ANC’s ability to continue its armed resistance, making it more open to negotiations. On the other, it reassured the White political and socio-economic elite that regime change would not mean the adoption of a planned economy (Levy 1999, 11). The most important factors in the internal dimension were the crisis of the South African economic model and the robust


activism of the internal opposition and civil society, e.g. church-es, unions, and business associations (Wood 2001). Underpinning regime change, therefore, were interactions between internal and international factors, most especially those linked to the PID, high-lighting its concurrent role in the transition.

In Malawi the PID worked via conditionality and diplomatic pressure. In the context of the bipolar confrontation, the West had long supported the Hastings Banda regime. This support ended with the end of the Cold War, and when Western democratic condi-tionality took hold (Levitsky and Way 2010, 283). With the Vatican’s encouragement, on March 8, 1992 eight Catholic prelates published an open letter criticizing the regime (Levitsky and Way 2010, 284). The arrest on April 6 of Chihana, one of the principal internal oppo-sition leaders, and the popular demonstrations of May 6-7, brutally repressed by the regime, convinced international donors (Paris Conference, May 11-13) to suspend all non-humanitarian assis-tance15 until democratic reforms had been implemented (Levitsky and Way 2010, 284; Venter 1995). The country’s extreme poverty, enormous public debt ($1.5 billion) and growing difficulty in mak-ing interest payments (Venter 1995), its chronic dependence on in-ternational assistance,16 the absence of black knights (Levitsky and Way 2010, 282), as well as Banda’s advanced age, which provoked an intense succession struggle with a lack of military support for the designated heir (Levitsky and Way 2010, 283), combined to make it impossible for the regime to resist international pressure for long. Only a few months after the interruption of assistance, Banda allowed a referendum on the introduction of a multi-party system (October 18, 1992), marking the beginning of the democratic transition (Diamond 2011, 124; Levitsky and Way 2010, 283; Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 182; Venter 1995). Although elements of re-gime crisis were already present due to internal factors, the PID, in particular conditionality expressed via freezing international aid, was a necessary condition for the regime’s fall.

Uganda’s path toward a multi-party democracy has been a tor-tured one, characterized by civil wars and coups. The major non-democratic regimes have been those of Milton Obote (1966-71), Idi Amin (1971-79), again Obote (1980-85), Okello (1985-86) and, be-ginning in 1986, Museveni. PID actions have influenced the fate of


these regimes to varying degrees. The democratic transition, inter-rupted many times, began with multi-party elections after the fall of the Amin regime in 1979. The principal PID actions in this case were diplomatic pressure, inter-state conflict, and its internal ef-fects, which then evolved into a military intervention. The immedi-ate recognition of Amin’s regime in 1971, and the Western support he briefly enjoyed, already had been withdrawn by 1972 because of the regime’s brutality and Amin’s rapprochement with the USSR and Libya (Rake 1998). The atrocities and the ethnic strife the re-gime incited, especially to the detriment of the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups, leaving 300,000 dead in 1971-79, compromised the regime’s internal legitimacy (Jennings 2010; Carbone 2003). In Oc-tober 1978, Amin tried to divert the attention of the armed forces from their internal divisions, which had generated several coup at-tempts, by acquiring an external enemy, specifically by invading Tanzania. This backfired, leading the Tanzanian regime to encour-age formation of a united political front among Ugandan dissidents and exiles to depose Amin. In January 1979, the Tanzanian army and the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) invaded Ugan-da and met with little resistance, taking the capital by April 1979 (Rake 1998; Hansen and Twaddle 1995, 139). Although the detona-tor was military defeat, the speed with which this happened, along with repeated attempted coups (Rake 1998), demonstrate how little legitimacy the regime had because of internal factors. However, the lack of international support and military defeat represented the necessary conditions for the fall of the Amin regime. On the other hand, in Museveni’s slow transition to democracy, still in progress today, diplomatic pressure and conditionality are more subtle, the PID having a marginal role (Keating 2011; Hansen and Twaddle 1995, 150).

Liberia’s case is particularly complex. Since 1980 there have been a succession of coups, non-democratic regimes, and civil wars. Focusing strictly on the process that led to the fall of Liberian president Charles Taylor (2003), the principal international actors were the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in which Nigeria played the key role, the US, UN, and neighbor-ing countries like Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Practically all PID instruments were present, although only some of these effec-


tively influenced the regime’s fall. In 1999, a new armed opposi-tion formed, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), which, thanks to support from Guinea (Outram 2004, 625), opened the door to another civil war. At the beginning of 2003, an-other armed opposition emerged, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), supported by the Ivory Coast (Moran and Pitch-er 2004, 506). As the civil war deepened, it attracted the attention of the international community. In September 2002, the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) was created, consisting of the UN, African Union, ECOWAS, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, EU, France, Great Britain and the US (Outram 2004, 626). The objective was to bring the belligerent parties to the table to negotiate a cease-fire agreement. Only in April 2003 did the LURD agree to negotiate with the regime, and on June 4 peace negotiations began in Accra, Ghana (Outram 2004, 627).

It is possible that the renewal and extension of sanctions (in-cluding commercial) and the arms embargo (May 2003) contrib-uted to this increased inclination toward negotiation. During the negotiations, the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone issued an arrest warrant for Taylor, charging him with war crimes, crimes against humanity and grave violations of international law (McGovern 2008). This was taken as a clear signal, and was followed by a coup attempt by Vice-President Blah, allegedly with US backing, foiled, however, by Taylor on June 5 (Outram 2004, 627). The LURD in the north and MODEL in the south had at this point taken control of most of the country (MacQueen 2006, 223; Moran and Pitcher 2004, 506). Also on June 5, the opposition launched an attack on the capital, Monrovia, the only area still under Taylor’s control. Despite the cease-fire agreement signed a few days before, they attacked the capital again at the end of the month. The humanitarian crisis increased international pressure on Taylor. US president Bush for-mally asked for his ouster at the end of June; the Nigerian president offered him asylum on the condition that he remain out of Liberian politics; the UN peacekeeping mission was preceded by 1,300 Ni-gerian soldiers sent as ECOWAS peacekeepers (Moran and Pitcher 2004, 506; Outram 2004, 627). In exchange for some concessions, on June 6 Taylor accepted the Nigerian offer and, after the deployment of the UN mission at the beginning of August, left power in the


hands of Vice President Blah (MacQueen 2006, 223; Outram 2004, 627; McGovern 2008). International pressure was without a doubt very strong, including the threat of a direct military intervention by units of the US Navy that were positioned off the coast, and deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission. However, these fac-tors cannot be considered sufficient for Taylor’s fall. We must re-member that the armed opposition at that point controlled most of the country and was laying siege to Taylor’s last stronghold, the capital Monrovia. In conclusion, the regime’s breakdown was due to the coordinated contributions of LURD and MODEL’s military victories and pressure by the international community (Moran and Pitcher 2004, 516), making the PID’s role concurrent.

The Central African Republic also has experienced a succession of non-democratic regimes, coups and a transition process never fully completed. As the principal former colonial power, France has on many occasions played a fundamental role in the country’s po-litical life. Most PID instruments were employed at varying times, with varying levels of effectiveness. The regime established by Bo-kassa in 1966 broke down in 1979, thanks to a coup supported by the French army (MacQueen 2006, 207). The change in the French presidency in 1981 led to withdrawal of support for the Dacko re-gime, which was persuaded to cede power to the military, giving birth to the Kolingba regime (Englebert 1998, 288). The actions by France were very close to being the sufficient condition for the fall of these regimes, making the PID role almost the principal one. The fall of the Kolingba regime formally occurred with multi-party elections in 1993. The PID played a crucial role on more than one occasion (MacQueen 2006, 207). The legalization of political parties, for example, granted in 1991 was, even by Kolingba’s own admis-sion, the result of pressure by international donors, together with the activism of the domestic opposition, which had a role in influ-encing the international community’s policy (Englebert 1998, 289). Elections, originally set for the end of 1992, were postponed several times. Thanks to French pressure, these finally took place in August 1993. In the same vein, it was the French threat to suspend bilat-eral cooperation that convinced Kolingba to withdraw the decrees by which he intended to subvert the elections that were not going his way (Englebert 1998, 290). The extreme weakness of institutions


and of the socio-economic dimension, combined with strong pres-sure from the internal opposition, prevented the regime from hold-ing out against international conditionality, and were necessary for the fall of the regime, which indicates a concurrent role for the PID.

In Mali the PID involved diplomatic pressure, conditionality and democratic assistance. For historical reasons, France, the ex co-lonial power, played an important role in the political life of the country, and specifically in the fall of the Moussa Traoré regime in 1991, which launched the transition (Diamond 2011, 124). After months of opposition demonstrations and popular protests, vio-lently repressed, the regime’s fall occurred via a coup carried out by Amadou Touré. The precarious economic conditions and nega-tive social effects of World Bank and IMF restructuring in the 1980s had undermined the Traoré regime’s popular consensus. In partic-ular, the necessity for drastic cuts in public administration had se-rious repercussions for employment and swelled the opposition’s ranks (Vengroff and Kone 1995, 46). International assistance took on a crucial role for the regime. At the beginning of the 1990s, it constituted 30% of GDP (Levitsky and Way 2010, 297; Vengroff and Kone 1995, 46). France provided significant funding for both the army and the salaries of civil servants (Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 363; Turrittin 1991, 99). Mitterrand’s change in policy towards Af-rica at the 1990 Franco-African Summit in La Baule made France’s aid distribution dependent on the implementation of democratic reforms, leaving the Traoré regime only the option of repression (Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 363). In addition, it seems that, in the weeks before the Traoré regime’s fall, Amadou Touré made a trip to France, leading to the belief that there may have been French involvement in the coup (Turrittin 1991, 102). Finally, various in-ternational actors had provided important financing to opposition groups, which quickly transformed into political parties between the 1980s and 1990s (Vengroff and Kone 1995, 47). Without a doubt, popular mobilization, the economic crisis and the winds of change generated by the fall of the Communist regimes also had a crucial role in the Traoré regime’s fall. Conditionality and pressure from donor nations, especially France, were equally vital in arriving at this result. The withdrawal of international aid at that particular historical moment denied the Traoré regime the resources it need-


ed to remain in power. The PID’s role nonetheless should be con-sidered concurrent.

There are also many cases in which the PID played a marginal role in the fall of African regimes. Nigeria’s case is particularly in-teresting. After having annulled the results of the 1993 elections, judged by international observers to have been free and fair, and to the general condemnation of the international community, Aba-cha took power (Giumelli 2011, 69). The US, Great Britain, and the EU imposed sanctions and strengthened them several times, but excluded the regime’s fundamental resource, petroleum (Giumelli 2011, 70). In addition, many of the measures had no significant ef-fect, because of defections by France, Germany, and Japan in the implementation phase (Diamond 2011, 125; King 1999; Osaghae 1998). The regime fell in 1998 when the dictator died. It is rumored that Abacha did not die of a heart attack but rather was poisoned by his military colleagues, tired of the country’s international iso-lation (Diamond 2011, 126). In fact, right after Abacha’s death, the military began the democratic transition. This unsubstantiated in-terpretation could upend negative opinions on the effectiveness of sanctions in the fall of the Abacha regime. In any case, there is no concrete proof, and the failure of some states to implement sanc-tions, sparing at least some key economic sectors, leads us to be-lieve that the PID’s impact was marginal.

Conclusions

The general objective of this chapter is to evaluate the PID’s role in the crisis/breakdown/transformation of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave. In analyzing some of the most important cases (about 30 out of more than 80) in all the geographic areas involved, considerable challenges derived from the extraordinary variation in terms of time period, geographical location, socio-economics, culture, etc. and the number of variables involved. Nonetheless, taking into account both the overall analytical framework and the idiosyncrasies of variables and cases, it is possible to suggest con-clusions specific to each geographic area. These conclusions take into account the interactions between the PID and the other vari-ables involved.


In both Southern European cases considered here, the PID played a concurrent role through the same type of action, i.e. inter-state conflict and its internal effects. The similarities were deter-mined in part by the same international context (effects of the Cold War on the European chessboard and the 1973 oil crisis) and in part by the economic and political weakness of the Portuguese and Greek regimes, both with legitimacy crises and deeply dependent on foreign energy sources. These weaknesses, in the absence of black knights, interacted with the actions taken by the PID, which was enough to undermine the already weak legitimacy of the two regimes and contributed to their fall.

In evaluating the weight of the PID in Latin America, two fac-tors are especially important: 1) there was an international actor (the US) with the ability and will to act as the hegemonic power in the region; 2) changes in the international context had considerable influence on the international actors involved. In Latin America, one can see all PID instruments in action and the PID playing prin-cipal, concurrent, and marginal roles. Comparative analysis of the Latin American cases shows that the PID has a greater capacity for influence in countries where:

• dimensions are small;• the economy is weak;• dependency on international assistance is strong;• geostrategic importance is accentuated, e.g. in terms of bi-

polar confrontation, but black knights are absent;• there is a tradition of external interference.Due also to these factors, the capacity of the principal external

international actor, the United States, to exercise influence varies significantly. It is more pronounced, in fact, in Central America and the Caribbean, with a concentration of cases of the PID having the principal role and of more invasive actions.17 In South America, on the other hand, there is a preponderance of cases in which the PID plays a marginal role in the fall of non-democratic regimes (Caroth-ers 1991, 249-53; Whitehead 1996, 63).

The PID’s role in Asia, on the other hand, has been extremely limited. The fall of non-democratic regimes in Asia is principally the result of internal factors and international factors not linked to explicit actions by an external actor. The only case of a principal


role was Afghanistan, in which a military intervention was effec-tive, given the country’s severely compromised socio-economic and institutional situation, with an absence of black knights able to counterbalance PID pressures. Although in certain cases (South Korea, the Philippines) there was a certain linkage to the West, in particular to the US, the PID involved little more than diplomatic pressure, playing a marginal role in the fall of those regimes. Im-portantly, however, in both cases strong internal oppositions were present.

In evaluating the PID’s role in East Central Europe and the Bal-kans the two primary factors worth mentioning are: 1) the presence of a dominant international actor (USSR) whose actions, even unin-tentionally (Light 1997, 134) contributed heavily to regime change; 2) the extreme importance of change in the international context. Despite the presence of military interventions (Serbia) and inter-state conflicts (USSR) the most frequent PID action was diplomatic pressure, specifically withdrawal of support and stimulus to adopt a particular set of reforms, the so-called “Gorbachëv effect” (Light 1997, 133; Niklasson 1994, 203). In most cases in this region, the PID played a concurrent role.

The factors that contributed to the ability of the PID to influence outcomes in East Central Europe were:

• economic weakness due to the failure of planned econo-mies;

• dependence on the USSR’s economy, due to inclusion in the Soviet Bloc;

• dependence on the USSR for instruments of repression of last resort to contain internal opposition;

• the end of the antidemocratic black knight role played by the USSR until the end of the 1980s;

• extreme dependence on the USSR for legitimacy; • the change in the Soviet attitude under Gorbachëv in the

second half of the 1980s, which led to the explosion of the legitimacy crises that hit practically all the East European regimes.

The concurrent nature of the PID’s role originated in the inter-actions between the pressures it exercised, the action of internal op-position, and a potent emulation effect after the explosion of the first cases.


The non-democratic African regimes fell primarily in the de-cade between 1980 and 1990, which demonstrated the weight of a new Soviet foreign policy (Light 1997, 44; Herbst 1990) and the changed policy of Western conditionality (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 135), as well as the role of ex-colonial powers, France in par-ticular. Thanks to the large number of cases in this region, about a third of the total, they run the full gamut in terms of both actions and the role of the Proactive International Dimension. In general, the PID’s influence on the fall of African regimes was amplified by:

• the presence of problems of stateness;• civil wars;• weak economies, especially where valuable natural resourc-

es were absent;• a strong dependence on international assistance;• little geostrategic importance;• the absence or withdrawal of black knights;• maintenance of close ties to ex-colonial powers.The interaction of the PID with the economic variable was de-

cidedly strong, not only in crises that augmented dependence on international aid, but also in states possessing rare natural resourc-es where international actors were less willing to intervene to bring about a regime’s fall (Nigeria). We should note the important role in many cases, e.g. South Africa, of internal oppositions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997) that were able to connect with and benefit from assistance from international actors .

Both the analysis of individual cases and the conclusions re-garding each geographic region demonstrate the utility and the effectiveness of the framework adopted. Albeit in specific, case-by-case fashion, the strength of the state and the economy, the pres-ence or absence of black knights, linkage to the West, and the types of sources of legitimacy in a given state can be used to explain the role (principal, concurrent, marginal) of the PID in the transition processes of the Third Wave.

Another generalization emerging from this analysis is that PID actions that do not undermine the formal sovereignty of the target state are more likely to be ineffective if, despite even extreme weak-ness, e.g. economic, the target state retains one or more of the fol-lowing attributes:


• a strong coercive ability;• a very weak opposition;• the presence of black knights;• geostrategic importance.Under these conditions, it is probable that necessity and emer-

gencies (genocide, threats to the international actor’s security, etc.) will lead to direct interventions. Actions that undermine the sov-ereignty of a target state are more likely to succeed in causing a regime to fall, implying a more important role for the PID. But does this effectiveness of the PID necessarily persist in the subsequent democratization process?

All things being equal, and regardless of the specific instru-ments it employs, it is likely that the PID’s influence will be greater if there is a hegemonic power in the region that has the means and the political will to act, whether or not it intends to promote the fall of a regime. This observation finds confirmation, for example, in the US role in Central America and the Caribbean, the USSR’s role in East Central Europe, and the generally small role of the PID in Asia.

One hesitates to identify a hegemonic international power in the case of the so-called Arab Spring, even though the countries of the region, and everyone else for that matter, has kept a constant watch for signs of Washington’s intentions. Without underestimating the domestic drivers, both economic and political, of attempted change in the Middle East and North Africa, it is clear that the international dimension has been vitally important. This perhaps goes back to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which at least may have demonstrated to the Arab publics that even the most brutally efficient dictatorships need not last forever (Husain 2013; Makiya 2013).

But what about a Proactive International Dimension, defined above as “that combination of actions or processes, produced by one or more international actors, that, intentionally or not, cause or contribute to the crisis/breakdown/transformation of a non-dem-ocratic regime”? One may quibble that the US and Europe have not always been “proactive” with respect to the Arab Spring, if we exclude the Libyan case. It may have been precisely US and/or Eu-ropean decisions not to take certain actions that established a per-missive environment for, or helped stimulate, regime crisis/break-


down (Hollis 2012). Kivimäki (2013), for example, argues that the US, notably under the Obama Administration, relaxed its support for repression by Middle Eastern autocracies, opening the way to regime change. Kissinger in 2012 noted that the US administration had been “successful in avoiding placing America as an obstacle to the revolutionary transformations” in the Arab world, terming this “not a minor achievement.”18 One can argue, in fact, that decisions not to act are very much a type of action, perhaps especially for the US in the Middle East (Hamid 2015).

The Arab Spring may be a good illustration, however, of why including “intentionally or not” when defining the PID is a good idea. Unintentional consequences of international action, both posi-tive and negative, have abounded. The success of reform in Tuni-sia frankly seems to owe little to international efforts, and a great deal to the Tunisians themselves. An Islamist government came to power in Egypt via elections that the Western powers precipitously demanded, only then to welcome a return to military authoritari-anism. The Libyan case illustrated once again the difficulty outside powers have in foreseeing the longer-term effects of military inter-ventions in unfamiliar territory.

Concerns about further unintended consequences, notably in Syria, have been increasingly evident. The vigorous Syria debate in the US as 2015 was ending pointed out, among other things, the dif-ficulty of reliably connecting the Proactive International Dimension to positive, long-term transformation of autocratic regimes, and the need for better insight into such connections.

Endnotes

1 More recent cases have been excluded (for example, Libya) as they oc-curred after the conventional time frame of the Third Wave of democra-tization (1974-2004).

2 Southern African Development Community3 See Amuzergar (1997) on Iran and Schreiber (1973) on Cuba.4 “Notably, international donors remained important players in African

transitions, though they were more effective at inducing political liber-alization through quiet diplomatic persuasion than through highly pub-licized suspensions of aid” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 186).

200 Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes5 The Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado – PIDE (International Police

and State Defense), the secret political police, had an extensive network of informers and was very efficient in repressing dissent. It is no sur-prise then that the revolution was the work of actors inside the domi-nant coalition (army), and not of the opposition (Morlino 1986).

6 See Whitehead (1996, 91-93, 104-107) and Carothers (1991, 91-94).7 30,000 dead and 9 billion dollars in destruction (Orozco 2002, 68).8 The leaders of Communist parties were appointed and supervised by

Moscow; the security forces were run by the Soviet secret services; mili-tary structures were merged in the Warsaw Pact Organization, econo-mies were linked to and dependent on that of the USSR via the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Batt 1997, 155).

9 In his speech of November 2, 1987 in commemoration of the 70th an-niversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbachëv emphasized the in-dependence of all the Communist parties and their sovereignty in re-solving their own internal problems. The same message was repeated in Prague (April 1987), Belgrade (March 1988) and Warsaw (July 1988) (Niklasson 1994, 202).

10 Note the Western economic sanctions in response to implementation of martial law (Sanford 1997).

11 Besides pressure for opening, in 1989 Gorbachëv made it understood that he did not support Jakeš (Light 1997, 141-42).

12 The NATO bombing inflicted between $30 and $40 billion in damage to the Serbian economy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 109).

13 With its decision not to play the black knight and to provide only mea-ger support, Russia contributed to Milošević’s choice to give in to West-ern pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010, 105).

14 From 1980 to 1986 the GDP dropped 9% annually (Manning and Mal-brough 2010).

15 For example, a loan for $74 million was frozen in May 1992 (Diamond 2011, 124).

16 The blocking of international loans denied the regime the resources needed to pay the salaries of public servants (Levitsky and Way 2010, 284).

17 In three out of six cases (Grenada, Panama and Haiti) the US directly intervened militarily.

18 “A New Doctrine of Intervention?” Washington Post, March 30, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-doctrine-of-inter-vention/2012/03/30/gIQAcZL6lS_story.html.


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Antonino Castaldo is Post-Doctoral Research Fellow (FCT grant SFRH/BPD/101442/2014) at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Uni-versidade de Lisboa, Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9, 1600-189, Lisbon, Portugal, with a research project on external democ-ratization after war in comparative perspective. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Florence (2008). Over the past years, he mainly has focused on political parties and party systems, the analysis of democratization processes, and the break-down of non-democratic regimes, publishing numerous journal ar-ticles, book chapters, and a book.

Nicoletta Di Sotto is adjunct professor at the American University of Rome and at the University of Rome 3. She holds a PhD in com-parative and European politics from the University of Siena (2006). Her main research interests are ethnonationalism and ethnoregion-alist parties, local politics, stateness problems, and democratization processes. She has published several journal articles, book chapters, and two books, including a 2009 study of ethnoregionalist party at-titudes toward the European Union.

Luca Germano is adjunct professor of public policy at the Depart-ment of Political Sciences, University of Rome 3. He is author of nu-merous studies on interest groups, democratization processes, and public policy, including books on federalism in Italy (2002) and on Italian auto giant Fiat’s transformation into a global player (2009).

Contributors

238 Contributors

Pietro Grilli di Cortona was professor of political science at the Uni-versity of Rome 3 and, until shortly before his untimely death in July 2015, president of the Italian Political Science Association. His numerous books included a prescient study (in 1989) of the crisis of Communist regimes in Europe, and he maintained a scholarly focus on democratic political change throughout the rest of his life. He was also the author of important works on political party and electoral systems, and on Italian politics, and a respected leader in his university’s academic community.

Barbara Pisciotta is associate professor of political science at the Uni-versity of Rome 3, where she teaches international relations, inter-national politics, and democratization processes. She is author of three books and several articles, focusing in particular on consoli-dation of the party system in Eastern Europe, including Alle origini dei partiti post-comunisti: La frattura di classe nell’Europa centro-orien-tale (At the origins of the post-Communist parties: the class fracture in East Central Europe) of 2007.

Eric R. Terzuolo taught political and economy geography at the University of Rome 3 from 2006 to 2010, and since then has been responsible for West European area studies at the Foreign Service Institute, the professional development and training branch of the US Department of State. As a US Foreign Service Officer from 1982 to 2003, he focused on international security issues, and is the au-thor of two books and numerous articles and book chapters on pro-liferation of weapons of mass destruction. He holds a doctorate in history from Stanford University.

Index

Abacha, Sani 44, 194Abkhazia 116, 218Accra 191Aceh 125Acholi (people) 190Afar (people) 127Afghanistan 14, 112, 130, 147-148,

151, 157, 159, 179-180, 186, 196, 225

Africa 1, 13-14, 21, 30, 37-39, 43, 50, 61, 91, 112, 127, 129, 132, 138, 143-144, 146, 149, 153, 157, 169, 186, 188, 193, 197, 215, 220, 225

African National Congress (ANC) 37, 44, 80, 128, 187

African Union (AU) 146-147, 158, 191, 216

Agnew, John 229Ahmed, Amel 3al-Shabaab 129Alawite (people) 130Albania 212Algeria 30, 159, 216, 221, 229Aliyev, Heydar 116, 221Amin, Idi 39, 189-190Amuzergar, Jahangir 199ANC (African National Congress)

80, 188Anderson, Leslie E. 4Angola 38, 128, 148apartheid 12, 37-38, 44, 79-80, 88,

94, 128, 148, 187-188Aquino, Benigno 35, 77

Aquino, Corazon 36, 77Arab Spring 2-4, 13, 22-23, 57, 91,

129, 138, 149, 198-199, 209, 218, 227

Argentina 21, 25, 31, 34, 36, 42, 91, 143, 147, 157, 177-178

Arias, Óscar 176-177Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 174Armenia 116, 216, 218ASEAN (Association of Southeast

Asian Nations) 146Asia 6, 12, 14, 39, 91, 123, 138, 143-

144, 149, 158, 179, 195, 198, 215, 220, 231

Asia-Pacific (region) 231Association of Southeast Asian Na-

tions (ASEAN) 146AU (African Union) 146-147Australasia 6Australia 224Austria 153, 182Aydin-Düzgit, Senem 114 Aymara (language) 121Azerbaijan 44, 116, 216, 218, 221,

223, 227

Baby, Sophie 5Balaguer, Joaquín 175-176Balladur, Edouard 153Baltic region 31-33, 36, 48, 91, 155Banda, Hastings 44, 189Bangladesh 39, 124-125, 134, 222Barro, Robert J. 220

240 Index

Belarus 140, 147, 156, 218Belgium 109, 154Belgrade 200Benin 38, 50, 91, 216, 221, 223Berlin Wall 139, 143, 156, 183, 209-

210Bignone, Reynaldo 42Biko, Stephen 94Bishop, Maurice 83, 174black knight 15, 170, 174, 177, 189,

195-198, 200Black Sea 140Blah, Moses 191-192Bohaden, Adu 84Bokassa, Jean-Bédel 192Bolivia 36, 40, 91, 119-120, 215, 221Bosnia 105, 117, 184-185Botha, P. W. 187Botswana 30, 129Bouterse, Dési 122Bratton, Michael 43Brazil 25, 31-32, 38, 41, 50, 92, 217Brezhnev Doctrine 181, 184Britain 6, 81, 175, 178, 214. See also

Great Britain, United Kingdom, UK.

British colonies 29Brouwer, Imco 149-150Bulgaria 143, 145, 154-155, 183Burkina Faso 50, 129Burma 126Burnham, Forbes 175Burundi 38, 128, 154Bush, George H. W. 188Bush, George W. 191Busia, Kofi Abrefa 82

Caetano, Marcelo 23, 45, 172Cama, Giampiero 92Cambodia 48, 105, 126, 148, 168Cameroon 128, 153-154, 221Campaoré, Blaise 44

Cape Verde 31Capoccia, Giovanni 3Carbone, Giovanni 38, 43, 107Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 92Caribbean 13-15, 119-120, 123, 132,

153, 174, 195, 198, 217, 220Carnation Revolution 2, 21, 30,

106, 112, 138, 172Carothers, Thomas 1, 159, 200Carter, Jimmy 152, 173, 175-178Castaldo, Antonino 14, 21, 147, 165Catholic Action 67, 71Catholic Bishops Conference 83Catholic Church 25, 35-36, 38, 67-

70, 120, 178, 180Caucasus 215-216, 221, 223, 225Cédras, Raoul 174-175Central African Republic 192Central America 15, 38, 195, 198Central Asia 215-216Ceyhan 229Chaco War 119Chad 128, 232Chavez, Hugo 218Chiang Ching-kuo 45-46Chiang Kai-shek 44, 46, 124Chile 31, 34, 36-39, 89, 91, 119, 143,

178, 227China 47-48, 124, 144, 153, 156,

170, 184, 215, 224, 227. See also PRC.

Chinese diaspora 123Chun Doo Hwan 73-74, 180civic committee 82civil disobedience 36, 77, 80civil rights 24, 33, 169civil servants 193civil society 10-12, 24, 27-28, 33,

35-38, 45, 48-50, 57-59, 61-64, 66-69, 71-74, 76-81, 83-85, 88-93, 126, 139-140, 143, 150, 189

civil war 22-23, 109, 124, 176, 186, 189-191, 197

Index 241

clan 44, 116, 221Coard, Bernard 174coercion 29, 147, 149, 154-155Cold War 13, 15, 138-140, 143, 148,

151, 153, 157, 170, 175, 189, 195, 225

Collier, David 92Collier, Ruth Berins 93Colombia 138, 217-218Colonels (Greece) 26, 28, 32, 42,

113, 217colonial experience, impact on

regime change and democrati-zation 10, 27-30, 71, 73-76, 138, 213

color revolutions 4, 13Communism 4, 25, 172-173, 179Communist Party of the Philip-

pines 35, 76Comoros Islands 38, 91, 147Concordat 70conditionality 13-14, 151-155, 158,

168-169, 173, 175-176, 186-187, 189-190, 193, 197

Congo 105, 128, 148, 153Congress (Brazil) 41Congress (US) 173, 177Congress of Filippino Citizens 77Congress of South African Stu-

dents 80Congress of South African Trade

Unions 37. 80Congress Party (Nepal) 36constitution, 30, 32, 36, 41-42, 69,

84, 95, 113-114, 126, 129, 169, 229

constitutional monarchy 24-25contagion 13-14, 137, 140, 151, 155-

156, 158Continental Europe 5-6Contras 177Cooley, Alexander 1

corporatism 25, 68-70corruption 25, 39, 72, 76, 78, 81-82,

116, 119, 122, 125Cortes (Spain) 45Costa Rica 176Côte d’Ivoire 128Council for Mutual Economic As-

sistance (CMEA) 200Council of Europe 216Crimea 115, 218Croatia 44, 46, 117, 146, 184, 212,

217Croce, Benedetto 7Cuba 48, 143, 199, 218, 223Cutright, Phillips 58Cyprus 21, 43, 113, 172-173, 217-

218Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

12, 131Czech Republic 119, 145, 158Czechoslovakia 23, 26, 31-32, 34,

36, 91, 118, 143, 181

Daalder, Hans 5Dacko, David 192Dahl, Robert A. 58-59, 106Dalton, Russell J. 224Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh 168Davis, Patricia 168Dayton Accords, 117, 185de Klerk, F. W. 38, 44decolonization 30, 120, 127democracy promotion 138, 146,

150-151, 173, 211-212democratic assistance 151, 168-

169, 176, 180, 184, 193Democratic Republic of the Congo

128, 148, 153Denmark, 154Deutsch, Karl 159development, economic 11-12, 25,

33, 57-61, 64, 66-72, 74, 78-79, 85,

242 Index

88-90, 92, 95, 138, 144, 146, 157, 226

Di Sotto, Nicoletta 12, 21, 28, 105, 133, 220

Diamond, Larry 2, 17, 29-30, 58-59, 61, 227

diamonds 81diplomatic pressure 14, 168-169,

171, 174-177, 180, 184-190, 193, 196

Djibouti 127Dominican Republic 44, 119, 123,

175 Dubček, Alexander 36Duvalier, François 123dyad (of countries) 16, 214, 217-

218, 230

East Asia 215East Central Europe 14-15, 36, 50,

143, 152, 155, 158, 180-181, 196, 198

East Germany 31, 36, 91-92, 183. See also German Democratic Republic.

East Timor 31, 38, 91, 105, 125, 154Eastern Bloc 152Eastern Europe 9, 12, 28, 112, 131,

140, 144-146, 149, 152, 154, 157-158, 169, 181, 184, 186, 215, 220

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 190

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 190-191

Ecuador 31, 42, 50, 121, 229EEC (European Economic Com-

munity) 154Egypt 3, 22, 130, 156, 199, 216, 222,

227Elchibey, Abulfaz 116Elliott, Kimberley 168embargo 177-178, 187, 191

emigration 69, 153energy 49, 66, 172, 176, 195, 223Ennahda 222Eritrea 127Esquipulas II 177Estado Novo (Brazil) 25, 69-70Estonia 32Estrada, Joseph 78Ethiopia 48, 127ethnic cleansing 185ethnic homogeneity 213, 219ethnicity 131, 220-221, 223, 230ethnolinguistic fractionalization

16, 219-221EU (European Union) 17, 146, 152,

154-155, 158, 166, 170, 179, 185, 191, 194, 216, 232

Eurasia 1, 112, 215-216, 231Europe 4-6, 25, 39, 48, 112, 113,

114, 143, 146-147, 215-216, 226, 231

European Consortium for Political Research 6

European Economic Community (EEC) 153-154, 187

European Political Science 6, 18-19European Union (EU) 48, 97, 107,

118, 140, 146, 153-154, 203, 216, 237

Ewe (people) 127, 129, 225

failed states 105, 109, 111Failed States Index 111, 133Falkland Islands 21, 34, 178. See

also Malvinas.Fascism 7, 25Finland 153First Republic (Portugal) 69-71First World War 138fragility (of states) 12, 108-109, 111-

112, 131France 6, 114, 153, 159, 170, 191-

194, 197, 219

Index 243

Franco, Francisco 44-45, 67-68, 77-78, 94, 113, 124, 143, 193, 217

Freedom House 1-2, 85, 111, 114, 116, 118-119, 122-123, 130, 133-134, 209, 215-218, 222-223, 231

FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) 186-187

Frente de Libertação de Moçambi-que (FRELIMO) 186

Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) 176

FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Libera-ción Nacional) 176

Fujimori, Alberto 153

Gabon 129, 221, 229Galtieri, Leopoldo 42, 178Gambia, 129GATT (General Agreement on

Trade and Tariffs) 153Gaza Strip 219Gebremedhin, Tesfaye A. 226Geddes, Barbara 40gender 211geocultural regions 223geography, human 211, 226, 234,

236geography, physical 214geography, political 52, 128-129,

224, 234, 236geopolitics 15, 209-215, 217, 219,

221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 231, 233-235

Georgia, 33, 115-116, 147, 156, 216, 218, 221, 225, 232

German Democratic Republic 182-183. See also East Germany.

Germano, Luca 11, 17, 21, 57, 133, 232

Germany 25, 147, 151, 154, 194Ghana 11-12, 30, 43-44, 64, 78, 81-

83, 85, 88-89, 95, 127-129, 143, 191, 216, 221, 223, 225, 231

Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene 229Gleditsch, Nils Petter 6Gorbachëv, Mikhail 36, 43-44, 181-

184, 196, 200Graziano, Manlio 212Great Britain 153, 178, 188, 191,

194. See also Britain, UK, United Kingdom.

great power politics 15, 210-211, 231

Greece 10, 21, 26, 28, 31-32, 34, 39, 42, 66-67, 85, 112-113, 118, 138, 143, 145, 172, 217

Grenada 48, 143, 151, 174, 200Grilli di Cortona, Pietro 8-12, 14,

16-17, 21, 105, 133, 220Guantanamo 218guerilla 35, 41, 76, 168, 177, 180Guinea 31, 129, 190-191Gürsoy, Yaprak 114Guyana 121-122, 132, 134, 175, 217

Hadenius, Axel 40, 217, 222, 224, 226, 228

Haiti 44, 105, 119, 122, 147, 153, 168, 174, 176, 200

Hale, Henry E. 4Havel, Václav 36Herbst, Jeffrey 127-129Hintze, Otto 159Honduras 147, 177Honecker, Erich 182-183Hong Kong 144Horowitz, Donald L. 2, 220Hoyte, Desmond 175Humala, Ollanta 120human rights 33, 83, 94, 108, 118,

146-150, 152-155, 159, 173, 176-179

Human Rights Watch 127Hungary 23, 26, 31-32, 37, 50, 91,

119, 145, 158, 181-183, 209, 213, 217

244 Index

Huntington, Samuel 1-2, 31-32, 38, 60, 66, 92, 107, 155

Husák, Gustáv 36-37, 183Hutu (people) 128hybrid regime 22, 24

Iberian Peninsula 26illiberal democracy 209IMF (International Monetary

Fund) 81-83, 152, 166, 170, 185, 193

imperialism 211, 224income inequality 21, 220, 227India 92, 138, 179Indonesia 91-92, 124-125, 132, 144,

154, 209, 222-223, 229industrialization 58, 60, 69, 72, 93,

214, 230inflation 57, 81, 92integralism, Catholic 25inter-state war 167, 180interest group 32, 150, 170International Monetary Fund

(IMF) 41, 82, 158Ioannidis, Dimitrios 43Iran 49, 156, 179, 199, 222, 227Iraq 112, 130, 133, 148-149, 151,

158-159, 198, 219, 222, 229, 232Irian Jaya 125Iron Curtain 182Islam 128, 222-223Islamic State 105, 130, 133, 158,

209, 219, 229Islamists 159Israelis 148Italian Political Science Association

8, 92Italy 7-9, 25, 147, 153, 227Ivory Coast 190-191. See also Côte

d’Ivoire.

Jackson-Vanik amendment 153

Jakeš, Miloš 183, 200Japan 151, 170, 194, 224Jaruzelski, Wojciech 181Jesuits 94Juan Carlos, King 45

Kabul 179Kailitz, Steffen 40Kalenjin (people) 46, 129Karen (people) 126Kashmir 218Kathmandu 36Kazakhstan 215Kenya 44, 46, 128-129Kenyatta, Jomo 44, 46Khi Ro (organization) 94Khrushchev, Nikita 46Kikuyu people 46, 129Kolingba, André 192Koo, Hagen 72Kosovo 105, 117-118, 146-148, 185Kuomintang 46, 124Kurdistan 114, 209, 219, 229, 232Kurds 130, 222Kuwait 148Kyrgyzstan 156, 216

Lacoste, Yves 15, 212-214, 219, 230-231

Lakasdiwa (organization) 94Langi (people) 190Latin America 4, 13-14, 21, 25, 36-

37, 39, 50, 89-91, 111-112, 119-120, 123, 132, 138, 140, 143, 146, 149, 151-153, 156, 158, 169-170, 173-174, 178, 195, 215, 223, 228

Latvia 32Lebensraum 230Leipzig 183Lesotho 38, 43, 91, 129Levitsky, Steven 2, 22, 48, 95, 137,

216, 230

Index 245

Li, Quan 217Liberia 105, 190-191Libya 22, 44, 129-130, 147, 151, 156,

158-159, 174, 190, 199, 216, 221Limann, Hilla 82Limongi, Fernando 58-59Linz, Juan J. 25-26, 37, 39-41, 49,

61-62, 106, 111, 114, 139, 149, 159, 165

Liou, Yu-Ming 229Lipset, Seymour M. 16, 58, 60, 106,

226Lisbon 30-31Lodge, Tom 94Lomé conventions 153Londregan, John B. 58Lukashenko, Alexander 218Luo (people) 129Lynch, Marc 3

Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 78Mackinder, Halford 230Magen, Amichai 22Mahuad, Jamil 121Mainwaring, Scott 90, 215Makarios 113, 172Malawi 38, 44, 91, 189Malay (people) 123, 125-126Malaysia 123, 126, 222Mali 38, 91, 128, 193Malvinas 143, 147, 178Mandela, Nelson 38, 44, 188Maoists 126, 228Marcos, Ferdinand 35-36, 75-77,

88, 125, 156, 180Maroon (people) 122Marshall Plan 138Marxism-Leninism 26, 28Mata, Javier Fabra 111Mauritania 128, 147, 216Mavisakalyan, Astghik 226Maya Ixil (people) 121

McFaul, Michael 22, 137, 212, 231 Megawati 125

Mexico 36, 50, 91, 119, 229middle class 11, 25, 33, 35, 41, 59,

63, 68-69, 72, 77-78, 88-90, 95, 138, 144

Middle East 1, 6, 15, 48, 129-130, 132, 138, 140, 145, 158, 198-199, 215-216, 220, 228, 231

military assistance 174, 177military regime 21, 27, 39-40, 43,

47, 63, 90, 120, 122, 126, 147, 153, 172-173, 177

Milošević, Slobodan 46, 117-118, 146, 184-185, 200, 222

Mindanao 35, 76Mitterrand, François 193Mladenov, Petar 184modernization 58-60, 68-69, 71,

74-75, 81, 89, 213Moi, Daniel arap 46Moldova 33, 218, 226, 232Møller, Jørgen 215monarchy 24-25, 36, 42, 45, 47, 70,

126Mongolia 48, 50, 91, 143, 215Monrovia 191-192Morales, Evo 120Morales Bermúdez, Francisco 35,

42 Morlino, Leonardo 22Morocco 191, 209, 216, 221Moro National Liberation Front

125Moscow 36, 115-116, 148, 181-184,

200Mozambique 31, 128, 186-187Munck, Gerardo L. 3Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta 189-190Musgrave, Paul 229Muslims, 76, 125-126, 132, 134, 209,

222-223

246 Index

Muslim Brotherhood 91, 222Mussolini, Benito 107

Nagorno-Karabakh 116, 218Namibia 30, 143, 148Napoleonic Wars 107Nasr, Vali 222, 232Nasson, Bill 94nation building 133, 213National Democratic Congress

(Ghana) 84National Endowment for Democ-

racy (NED) 159, 170, 180National Liberation Front (Algeria)

30National Liberation Front (Ugan-

da) 190national security 41, 173NATO (North Atlantic Treaty

Organization) 117-118, 146-148, 185, 200

natural gas 231natural resources 15-16, 197, 210,

231NED (National Endowment for

Democracy) 170Nepal 24, 34, 36, 124-126, 132, 228Neves, Tancredo 41New Jewel Movement (NJM) 174Nicaragua 23, 36, 38, 44, 48, 91,

119, 143, 168, 176Niger 38, 91, 128, 232Nigeria, 43-44, 128, 153, 190-191,

194, 197, 221, 229NJM (New Jewel Movement) 174Nordlinger, Eric A. 40North Africa 1, 15, 129, 132, 138,

156, 158, 198, 215-216, 221, 228, 231

North Korea 44, 47-48, 71, 124, 156Northern Cyprus 113, 217-218Northern Europe 5, 145

Nun, José 89

O’Donnell, Guillermo 22, 32 O’Loughlin John 212OAS (Organization of American

States) 146-147, 174Obote, Milton 189OECD (Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development) 108, 136, 228

oil 11, 16-17, 49, 67, 70-71, 85, 90, 92, 116, 122, 145, 172, 178, 195, 228-229, 232. See also petroleum.

oil crisis 67, 70-71, 85, 90, 172, 178, 195

oil wealth 49, 228Okello, Tito 189oligarchy 31, 47, 93Ong, Nhu-Ngoc T. 224Operation Just Cause 174Orbán, Viktor 213, 217Organization for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) 108

Organization of African Unity (OAU) 147

Organization of American States (OAS) 146, 158, 216

Oslo Accords 148***

Pakistan 125, 222, 225, 232Palestinians 148Pan Africanist Congress (South

Africa) 80Panama 143, 151, 174, 200Papadopoulos, Georgios 43Papua 125Paraguay 36, 91, 119, 147, 215Pashtuns 179, 225People’s National Congress (Guy-

ana) 121, 175

Index 247

perestroika 183Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal 90, 215Peronism 25Peru 31, 34, 36, 42, 91, 120-121,

132, 147, 153, 168petroleum 42, 49, 170, 186, 194,

231. See also oil.Pew Research Center 223Pfutze, Tobias 226Philippines 11, 34-35, 38, 64, 71,

74-76, 91, 94, 124-125, 132, 144, 156, 180, 196

PID (Proactive International Dimension) 14-15, 165-166, 170-180, 182-187, 189-190, 192-199

Pinochet, Augusto 26, 37, 39, 178Pisciotta, Barbara 1, 13-14, 21, 137,

159Plurinational State of Bolivia 120Poland 26, 31-32, 34, 36-38, 91, 115,

145, 158, 170, 181-183, 227police training 150political culture 24, 157political science 5-9, 92, 106-107,

209, 211, 230, 232Poole, Keith T. 58Portugal 2, 11, 13, 21, 23, 28, 30-31,

34, 44, 64, 66-70, 85, 88, 106, 112-113, 125, 138, 143, 156, 167, 172, 217

poverty 79, 105, 108, 176, 189, 227praetorian regime 40Prague 26, 32, 36, 200PRC (People’s Republic of China)

224privatization 82, 206Proactive International Dimension

(PID) 14, 165-166 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197-199

Przeworski, Adam 58-59, 102punishment theory 1

Qaddafi, Muammar el 44, 130Quechua (language) 121

Radcliff, Benjamin 168Ratzel, Friedrich 230Rawlings, Jerry 12, 39, 44, 81-84,

89, 95Reagan, Ronald 173, 175, 180, 186Realpolitik 211Red Army 148, 186religion 16, 70, 120, 125, 220-223,

231Religious Diversity Index 223Remmer, Karen 90Reuveny, Rafael 217reverse wave 215Rhee Syngman 72Rhodesia 186Rio de la Plata 119Rios Montt, Efraín 121Robbins, Michael 3Roh Tae Woo 74, 124Rokkan, Stein 145Romania 36, 44, 91, 143, 145, 155Rosenau, James 159Ross, Michael 16, 228 Russett, Bruce 58Russia 2, 48, 50, 115-116, 137, 144-

145, 147-148, 156, 158, 170, 179, 200, 215, 218-219, 225, 232

Rwanda 105, 128, 147-148, 154

Saakashvili, Mikheil 116, 225Salazar, António de Oliveira 44-45,

69-70, 172sanctions 14, 37, 80, 147, 150, 152-

155, 159, 168, 171, 174, 176-180, 184-185, 187-188, 191, 194, 200

Sandinista regime 176-177Saudi Arabia 177scapegoat theory 167Schreiber, Anna P. 199

248 Index

Schmitter, Philippe 22, 32, 149-150 secessionism 16, 109, 227second try pattern 32Second Wave 50Second World War 25, 107, 119,

126, 147, 151, 232. See also World War II.

secret police 69, 184Security Council 148Senegal 30-31, 191, 216, 221, 223Serbia 46, 117-118, 146, 151, 156,

158, 180, 184, 196, 217Serbian Orthodox Church 222Serrano, Jorge 153Sherpa (people) 126Shiite (Muslims) 130, 209, 222Shinawatra, Thaksin 126-127Shining Path 120, 132Sierra Leone 105, 191Singapore 44, 123, 144, 224single-party regime 40, 47Slovakia 119, 131, 145, 155Slovenia 50, 117, 145Smith, Peter H. 90Solidarity 91, 181. See also

Solidarnošč.Solidarnošč 32Somalia 105, 129, 148, 154Somaliland 219Somoza, Anastasio 23, 176South Africa 11-12, 30, 34, 37-38,

44, 50, 64, 78-80, 85, 88, 91, 128, 143, 148, 168, 186-188, 197

South African Congress of Trade Unions 94

South America 15, 119, 195, 217, 221. See also Latin America.

South Korea 11-12, 31, 38-39, 64, 71, 74, 88, 91, 94, 124, 132, 144, 156, 180, 196, 224

South Ossetia 116, 218Southeast Asia 123, 144, 158

Southeastern Europe 215Southern Africa 216-217Southern African Development

Community 199Southern Cone (South America)

89, 215Southern Europe 14, 50, 112, 131,

138, 143, 149, 156, 158, 172, 215, 217

Soviet Bloc 181, 196Soviet republics 23-24, 115, 186,

225Soviet Union 8, 14-15, 25, 92, 112,

114-115, 131, 143, 157, 181, 220, 225. See also USSR.

Soweto 94Spain 5, 10-11, 13, 23, 28, 31, 34,

44-45, 50, 64, 66-67, 69, 74, 85, 88, 107, 111-113, 124, 131, 138, 153, 172, 217

spatial turn 210Stalin, Joseph 46standard of living 66-67, 77, 79,

81-82stateness 3, 8, 12-13, 15, 21, 105-

109, 111-136, 197Stepan, Alfred 25, 41, 49, 61, 149Stoner, Kathryn 22, 137, 231strike (by labor organization) 33-

36, 41, 63, 67, 70-71, 80, 93Sub-Saharan Africa 38, 43, 79, 127,

132, 170, 215-216, 228succession 10-11, 27, 38-39, 44-46,

50, 184, 189-190, 192Sudan 147-148, 153, 159Suharto 125Sunni (Muslims) 130, 222Suriname 91, 122, 132Swaziland 129Sweden 153Syria 22, 44, 112, 129-130, 133, 148,

158, 199, 220, 2

Index 249

Taiwan 12, 44-45, 124, 132, 134, 143-144, 156, 224

Taliban 179, 225Tanzania 38, 91, 190Taylor, Charles 190-192Teorell, Jan 40, 217, 220, 222, 224,

226-228Terzuolo, Eric R. 1, 15, 21, 145, 209Tesoro Beach 177Thailand 39, 91, 124, 126-127, 132,

143-144, 153Tiananmen Square 153Tibet 219Togo 38, 43-44, 91, 127, 129, 147,

154, 225Toledo, Alejandro 120Tolstrup, Jakob 159, 213Touré, Amodou 193Trade Union Congress (Ghana) 83transition paradigm 1-2, 159Transnistria 218Traoré, Moussa 193Trinidad and Tobago 229Tuareg (people) 128Tunisia 13, 22, 91, 130, 132, 156,

199, 209, 216, 218, 221-222, 227Túpac Amaru 120Turkey 31, 39, 114, 134, 145, 172,

218, 222, 227, 233Turkmenistan 216Tutsi (people) 128Tuđman, Franjo 44, 46, 117, 146

Uganda 39, 167, 189-190UK 6. See also Britain, Great Brit-

ain, and United Kingdom.Ukraine 2, 12, 33, 48, 115, 131, 137,

145, 147, 156, 158, 209, 218, 225, 227

UN (United Nations) 148, 152, 166, 174-175, 179, 187, 190-192

United Kingdom 30, 107

United Nations (UN) 135United States (US) 35, 48, 151, 173,

176, 195, 214, 218Uruguay 31, 36-37, 41, 50, 89, 91,

178US (United States) 5-6, 15, 23, 36,

47-48, 59, 74-75, 94, 114, 119, 121-122, 138, 140, 143, 146, 149, 151-153, 157-158, 165-166, 169-170, 173-177, 179-180, 185, 187-188, 190-192, 194-196, 198-200, 218-219, 224, 226, 229, 232

USAID (US Agency for Interna-tional Development) 175

USSR 12, 28, 46, 107, 109, 112, 115, 124, 148, 157, 176-183, 185-186, 188, 190, 196, 198, 200. See also Soviet Union.

Uzbekistan 216

van de Walle, Nicholas 43Vargas, Getulio 25Vatican 189Vatican II, 25, 67Velasco Alvarado, Juan 34-35, 42Velvet Revolution 183Venezuela 138, 147, 217-218Videla, Jorge Rafael 42Vietnam 48, 224Viola, Roberto Eduardo 42

War of the Pacific 119Warsaw Pact 200water 16, 229, 231-232Way, Lucan A. 2, 22, 48, 95, 137,

216, 230West Africa 30, 216, 221, 223West Bank 219West Germany 182-183Western Europe 68, 111, 210, 216,

232Western Hemisphere 218

250 Index

Western Sahara 219Westphalia, Treaty of 107Whitehead, Laurence 22, 52, 200,

210-212Widodo, Joko 92Wilson, Woodrow 138women 61, 80, 94-95, 226Wooden, Amanda E. 229workers 70, 80, 83, 93-95, 114World Bank (WB) 72, 74-75, 78-79,

81-83, 94-95, 170, 185, 193World Trade Organization (WTO)

153World Values Survey 224World War II 25, 32, 71-72, 74, 120,

166. See also Second World War

Yanukovych, Viktor 115Yemen, 22Yugoslavia, 12, 109, 112, 114, 117-

118, 131, 145, 148, 155, 219, 227

Zaire 154Zakaria, Fareed 227Zambia 38, 91, 129Zeitgeist 13, 25, 137, 147, 149, 156,

158Ziaja, Sebastian 111Zimbabwe 147-148, 217Živkov, Todor 183-184Zulu (people) 128

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