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Rule 115

Rights of Accused at TrialDue Process In Criminal ProcedureBisnar - People vs. Dapitan 197 S 378

People v. DapitanFacts:

Benedicto Dapitan (Petitioner) was charged with robbery with homicide, together with Fred De Guzman whoremained at large.

o They were accused of robbing the house of Orencia E. Amil, and on that occasion, having killed RolandoAmil, Orencias adopted son.

When arraigned, Dapitan, with the assistance of counsel de officio, Atty. Magsanoc, entered the plea of not guilty.

During the hearing however, new counsel de officio for the accused, Atty. Gabriel Alberto, manifested thatDapitan expressed his desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Taking consideration of which, thecourt reset the hearing.

On various dates, hearings were had. Witnesses Orencia and Cpl. Rodolfo Rivera (who conducted theinvestigation) for the prosecution testified during the incumbency of Judge Francisco Rodriguez and the restestified before Judge Edilberto H. Noblejas.

The trial court convicted Dapitan, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Dapitan filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting that he was appealing the decision of the trial court.

However, the records of the cases were erroneously transmitted to the CA, which in turn transmitted it to the SC.o In the appeal, Dapitan argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion perpetual by the trial

court is tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a crueldegrading or inhuman punishment by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether Dapitan was denied due process of law?

Ruling: No. There was no denial of due process.

Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present:1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the property which is

the subject of the proceeding;3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

People v. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against underthe orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, withopportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has haddue process.

All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records disclose that Dapitan was given thefullest and unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesseroffense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing on that occasion, but also to confront the witnesses presentedagainst him and to present his own evidence.

Trial in Absentia (1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 19)Bombales - Parada v. Veneracion 269 S 371

Facts:

Danilo Parada (Petitioner) is the accused in a case for 4 counts of estafa presided by J. Ortile

PARADA was duly bonded with the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation. On October 23, 1993, PARADA notified the court and the manager of the bonding company of his change of

address.

On February 8, 1994, J. Ortile inhibited himself from trail the case hence the case was re-raffled to the sala ofrespondent J. Veneracion

J. Venerecion ordered to set the hearing on June 3, 6,7 and 8 1994 but apparently the notice of hearing was sentto petitioners old address hence PARADA failed to appear before the court.

And since, PARADA failed to appear before the court, J. Veneracion ordered the arrest of the petitioner, theJudge further ordered the confiscation of the bond and lastly, a trial in absentia to be conducted.

The court proceeded with the trial of absentia. J. Veneracion assigned a counsel de officio as counsel forPARADA

A motion to allow the defense to present evidence upon petitioners arrest was filed by the counsel de officio.

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J. Veneracion denied the motion and held that the failure of the accused to appear is a waiver of his right toadduce evidence.

In November 25, 1995, a decision was rendered convicting PARADA of the crime of estafa despite his absencePARADA was subsequently arrested and bought to Makati City Jail

Issue: W/N there was a valid trial in absentiaRuling: NO

Requisites for valid trial in absentia:o The accused has already been arraignedo He has been duly notified of the trialo His failure to appear is unjustifiable

*Clearly, the 2nd

and 3rd

requisite was absent in the case at bar. The court ruled that the sending of notice of hearing to Paradas former address cannot bind

PARADA. The Judge should have taken cognizance of the new address since the official addressin the record is the new address.

Hence, his failure to appear was justified

Parada was clearly denied of his constitutional right of due process.o The accused must be given an opportunity to be heard

The right to a hearing carries with it the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings incourt

Notice to a party is essential to enable him to adduce his own evidence and to meet and refutethe evidence submitted by the other party.

o He has the right to be present and defend in person in every stage of the proceedings

Presence Required- arraignment- promulgation- Prosecution will present witness to identify accused

Waiver of Right to CounselGuy - People vs. Nicandro 141 S 289

NATUREAppeal from judgment of CFI Manila

FACTS-Pursuant to information regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by Nicandro, the WPD conducted surveillance andorganized an entrapment with the confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana. With marked money, the

informant asked to buy marijuana from Nicandro, and upon delivery of 4 sticks of marijuana cigarettes, the police nabbedNicandro. The marked bills were recovered from her pockets, as well as marijuana flowering top.- Allegedly, upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, Nicandro orallyadmitted having sold the marijuana, but refused to reduce her confession to writing.The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of Patrolman Joves, one of the officers who conducted the entrapment.His testimony said when we saw the accused handed the 4 sticks of suspe cted marijuana cigarettes to our confidentiainformant and after a prearranged signal was given by the informant that the accused had already sold her the marijuana,we immediately nabbed said suspect and at the same time we identified ourselves as police officers.- When asked how he conducted the investigation, Pat. Joves testified that the first thing I did was I informed the accusedof her constitutional rights, then I questioned her about the marijuana that were confiscated xxx and she verbally admittedthat she sold the 4 sticks and possessed and owned the other marijuana leaves. CFI convicted her, relying mostly onNicandros confession as stated in the Joves testimony. She appealed.

ISSUES1. WON court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the officer2. WON rights of accused (vs self-incrimination and to confront witness vs her) were violated, thus any evidence obtainedtherefrom are inadmissible

HELD1. YESRatio The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is at best uncertain whether any prosecution witness reallysaw the alleged sale of marijuana.Reasoning- The court found the testimony of Pat. Joves unreliable as it appears that he himself was unsure of what he saw, firstsaying that he saw the marijuana being sold openly, but when the improbability of illegal drugs being sold openly waspointed out, he qualified his story by saying that the sale took place secretly.

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-it is probable that Joves did not really see either the alleged delivery of marijuana or the supposed payment therefor. Withhis testimony seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence.2. YESRatio the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of theinvestigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyedShort of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been informed of his rights. Reasoning- reliance on oral admission is assailed as violative of Sec20, Art.IV, 1973 Consti (No person shall be compelled to be awitness vs himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have right to remain silent andto counsel, and to be in. formed of each right. No force, violation, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiatesthe free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible inevidence).- above provision is an expanded version of the right vs self-incrimination, formally incorporating the doctrine in Miranda vArizona: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodialinterrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilegeagainst self- incrimination. xxx As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means aredevised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the ffmeasures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that anystatement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an atty, eitherretained or appointed. The defendant may waive those rights, provided such is made voluntarily, knowingly & intelligently.If, however, he indicates in any manner & at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an atty beforespeaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone & indicates in any manner that he does not wishto be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or

volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiriesuntil he has consulted with an attorney & thereafter consents to be questioned. (the court points out that the Mirandadoctrine rests on the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be a witness vs himself)- since right to be informed implies comprehension, degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending uponthe education, intelligence & other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. A simpler & morelucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered- Like other constitutional rights, the right vs self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remainsilent & to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver must not only bevoluntary; it must be made knowingly & intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is beingwaived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as towhether the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions,it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.- in this case, Joves did not say what specific rights he mentioned to Nicandro, neither did he state the manner he advised

her of her rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly impt because Nicandro was illiterate and cant beexpected to be able to grasp the significance of her rights merely by hearing an abstract statement thereof.- As it is the obligation of the investigator to inform a person under investigation of his rights, so is it the duty of theprosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigator with his said obligation. Absent such affirmativeshowing, admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.- Miranda v Arizona: we will not presume that defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilegevs self incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that doesnt show that any warnings have been givenor any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record Disposi t ive decision SET ASIDE. Acquitted for reasonable doubt

Witness vs. HimselfKung - Chavez vs. Court of Appeals 24 S 663

FACTS:

>this is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that he is entitled to be freedfrom imprisonment upon ground that trial which resulted his conviction, HE WAS DENIED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALRIGHT NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF.

>judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car together with accessories)

>an information was filed against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with intent to gain andabuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.

>all the accused plead not guilty.

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>during the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accusedopposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counselof accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal on the grounds that (1)the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there shouldbe any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustainhim if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has allthe assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him.

> prosecution version of what happened:Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird(car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee answered yes. Chavez met

Sumilang and informed about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of saleis signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavezknown to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling hisThunderbird. Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to Dy Sunk which is theregistered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilangwith a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that themoney should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to thenote bearer. The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez.They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported itsloss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang andAsistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan

There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction.On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and threedays later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.>sumilangs verson (one of the accused):

Sumilang saw Chavez at gas station and told about the Thunderbird. They raised the money. Chavez went toSumilang house and asked if he was ready for the rest of money. He affirmed. At Eugenes Sumilang saw Pascual andwarned Chavez was a smart agent and advised that Sumilang should be careful. Then the deed of sale was executed.Two or three days after, Asistio offered to buy the car of Sumilang and tendered the down payment.

>trial court gave credence to the testimony of Sumilang. As to Chavez, his testimony established his guilt beyondreasonable doubt and branded him Self confessed culprit.

>trial court decision: freed all other accused except Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

>chavez appealed to the Court of appeals but it was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated?

HELD:

>Petitioner claims that there was a violation of right against self incrimation.

>Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of

unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rationalchoice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient

>During the trial, the petitioner declined to be a witness but the judge had impliedly forced him by saying that theprosecution has the right and that his testimony will not be used against him.

>Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice. With allthese, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of hisconstitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take thestand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon beingcalled to testify.

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>There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,understandably, and willinglymade; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After aclaim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence

>The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.31

It is traditionally considered asan exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutionalrights are disregarded. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can beobtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless.

>Supreme Court decision: Petition granted. Accused must be discharge.

Ibid: contra as witnessMagsumbol - People vs. Judge Ayson 175 S 216

People v Judge AysonFACTS:Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of PAL, assigned at its Baguio City station. Allegedly, he was involved inirregularities in the sale of plane tickets. PAL management notified him of an investigation.The day before the investigation, Ramos gave a handwritten note stating that he is willing to settle irregularities allegedlycharged against him in the amount of P76k xxx Ramos was informed of the finding of the Audit team. His answers, in writing, were to the effect that he had not, indeed,made disclosure of the tickets, that the proceeds had been misused by him, that although he had planned on paying

back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, perhaps by shame, that he is willing to settle his obligation andproferred a compromise to pay on staggered basis, the amountTwo months later, an information was filed against him charging him with the crime of estafa.On arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty.During trial, private prosecutor used the note and his written admission as evidence.Judge Ayson rejected these pieces of evidence saying that they were inadmissible, it appearing that the written statemenwere done without the accused being reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel and thatwhen he waived those rights by giving his written statements, they were done without actual assistance of counselISSUE:W/N Judge Ayson acted with grave abuse of discretion for excluding such pieces of evidence?HELD:Yes. Basis: Sec. 20, Article IV, 1973 Constitution

- Right against self incrimination can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in nature is actually

put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. A judge is not duty-bound to advise the witness of suchright; a witness is presumed to know his right against self-incrimination

o The right against self-incrimination must be claimed; if not claimed, the protection does not come into play- Rights in custodial interrogation exist only when the accused is in custody interrogation

o Custodial interrogation: questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been takeninto custody

o If statement is not made under custodial interrogation, the statement is not protected.

In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission has the followingrights in the matter of testifying or producing evidence:

- Before a case is filed in court, but after taken into custody and on being interrogated by the police:o Right to remain silento Right to counselo Right to be informed thereofo Right to not be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free

willo Right to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected

- After the case is filed in court:o Right to refuse to be a witnesso Right not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusalo Right to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution

While testifying, right to refuse to answer questions which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that forwhich he is then prosecuted

Right to Counsel

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- during custodial investigation and even after filing of Information in court- of own choice

Manalaysay - People vs Serzo GR 118435 June 20, 19971. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for stabbing Alfredo Casabal after the latter

rescued minors being held by the former. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.2. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel, so

the court appointed a counsel de officio (Atty. Linaac). Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he canengage the services of his own counsel. However, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. Thearraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.

3. Come date of trial, it was again cancelled as appellant appeared without counsel. The presentation of evidence for thedefense was reset as appellant was not ready to testify and again he manifested his intention to secure the servicesof a counsel de parte. Atty. Linaac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of appellants refusal to cooperate.

4. Trial court appointed another counsel de oficio (Atty. Antonano). Hearing was reset for the last time as appellant wasstill looking.

5. For the 3rd

time, appellant appeared without counsel; thus, the trial court appointed (Atty. Garcia). Again, trial waspostponed.

6. Appellant refused to cooperate with Atty. Garcia by declining to take the witness stand, forcing the defense to rest itscase.

7. Appellant wrote Judge Angeles 3 times, seeking legal advice and the early resolution of the case. Branch Clerk oCourt replied to him twice, informing him that Judge Angeles was prohibited by law from giving legal advice to litigantsin cases pending in his court.

8. Appellant wrote Deputy Court Administrator Suarez, asking for the early resolution of his case. The latter referred said

letter to Judge Angeles for appropriate action.9. Thereafter, the assailed Decision convicting appellant of murder was promulgated (August 23, 1994).10. RTC: noted that appellant simply refused to secure the services of a counsel de parte and to present evidence in his

defense despite ample opportunity accorded to him. Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant on the basis othe evidence presented by the prosecution.

11. Not satisfied with the trial courts Decision, appellant through Counsel. Arcil la appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was denied of his right to counsel (Accused alleged he was not given ample time to look fora counsel of his choice thus preventing him from presenting evidence)

HELD: NO. The rightto counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules ofCourt. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the option to berepresented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during arraignment and

trial, the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the accuseds option tohire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle withthe Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the state and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

RATIO:1. The accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the proceedings. The option to

hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally importantright of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

2. The accused did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory.3. For almost 2 years since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find

one. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named lawyers.4. The accused was adequately represented by 3 court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty

Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are alsomandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice.

5. The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where anaccused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also recognition of the accused nothaving the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.

6. The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal.a. Article III of the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 12(1) and Sec 14(1) provides this right to an accused not only during

trial but even before an information is filed.b. Rules of Court grants an accused the right to counsel under the following provisions :Rule 112(Sec. 7), Rule

113 (Sec. 14), Rule 115 (Sec. 1c), Rule 116 (Sec. 6 and 7), Rule 122 (Sec. 13), Rule 124 (Sec. 2)c. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be

assisted by counsel.7. The right is however NOT ABSOLUTE and is WAIVABLE.

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a. While an accuseds right to be represented by counsel is absolute, his option to secure the services of counsede parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choiceagainst the statessand the offended partys equally important right to speedy and adequate justice . Thus, thecourt may restrict the accuseds option.

b. Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so long as (1) the waiver is notcontrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a rightrecognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made

8. Re Crime and Punishment: No cogent reason to reverse the conviction of appellant of murder under Article 248 of theRPC.

BACKGROUND: On August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were staying inside their housewatching television when at around 11:30 pm, Susana Serzo, mother of the accused, and one Bentilacion came knockingpleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son, the accused. Thecouple heeded their call. The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren. When returning to their house, AlfredoAlcantara was attacked by accused Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed Alfredo. Adelaida Alcantara shouted forhelp but was likewise attacked. However, Adelaida fortunately was able to hold the hand of the knifewielder andpersistently fought. The commotion caught the attention of the residents, causing the accused to flee. The victim Alfredoremained lying and motionless in the canal, was rushed to the hospital where he was confirmed dead. He sustained three(3) stab wounds, two at the back and one in his chest.

Right to Defend Oneself

Right vs. Self-incrimination: Not including examination of body when materialTabag - P v. Yatar 428 S 504FACTS:

- On automatic review since accused was sentenced to death for comitting a complex crime of Rape w homicide.- Accused: Joel Yatar alias Kawit- Victim: Kathlyn Uba- Yatar is actually Uba's uncle.- Yatar stabbed Uba with a bladed weapon in order to have carnal knowledge with her (June 1998 in Rizal, Kalinga).- Incident happened at Uba's grandmother Isabel's house. She was the same person who discovered her body. She hadto cut the rope tied on one of the doors in the house when she saw the naked and bloodied body. Police later on realizedshe had multiple stab wounds.- People claimed they saw Yatar going down the ladder of the house around the same time of the crime. They also found

the underwear and a white shirt with blood near Uba's body.- Yatar denied involvment when he was questioned but he was placed in custody.- While in custody, he claimed to need to use the comfort room but during this time, he attempted to escape. About 70meters from the station, he was captured and charged with Rape and Homicide. He was eventually convicted.- It must be noted that a blood sample was obtained from Yatar and this was material because investigators concludedthat a rape occurred due to DNA test of the semen found in the cadaver. The DNA in the blood and the DNA in the semenfound in the victim's vaginal canal was a match.

ISSUE:W/N the blood sample taken from Yatar as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silentas well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution?

HELD:NO. VALID test!

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. Theright against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admissionof guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from himand submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted inevidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in natureacquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is notestimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,where immediately after the incident, the police authorities

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took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in anoffense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open courton March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

The Right to Cross-ExamineNatureWaivableEffect of Death of Witness

Atienza - Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals 182 S 81RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINATIONFacts:Ruperto Fulgado, an old man, filed an action against defendants Custodia et al for the annulment of certain contracts ofsale and partition with accounting. The trial proceeded ex parte as the defendants failed to appear for pre-trial. Trial Courtrendered a decision favouring Fulgado. On appeal by the defendants, the Court of Appeals ruled that the defendants weredeprived of their day in court because of thee unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default (default because oftheir failure to appear on pre-trial).After the case was again heard before the trial Court, the two witnesses of the plaintiff were not presented for pre-triabecause Fulgado has already died and the other, Jose Fulgado is now abroad. Under the claim of not being able to cross-examine the witnesses, the defendants moved to strike out the testimonies of the witnesses. The trial court strike out the

testimonies and the case was eventually dismissed. The CA affirmed the dismissal, hence the appeal to SC.Issue: WON the lack of cross-examination warranted the striking out of the testimonies of the witnesses.Held:NO.According to the SC, the right to cross examine is not a right for an actual cross-examination to be conducted, but theright to have the opportunity to conduct it. The right to cross examine is a personal right. It can be waived expressly orimpliedly. It is impliedly waived if the person with right to cross examine had the opportunity to conduct it and yet, throughhis own fault, he failed to do so. In this case, the defendants had the opportunity to conduct the cross-examination whenthe CA remanded the case to the Trial Court but despite the knowledge of the failing health of Ruperto and the imminenttravel abroad of Jose Fulgado, the defendants delayed the hearing before the trial Court for more than a year from theruling of the CA. Because it was the defendants duty to ascertain that a cross examination is conducted before the TrialCourt and it is by their fault that the cross-examination was not made, it is construed by the SC that the defendants havewaived their right to cross-examine. The SC ordered that the civil case be reinstated and the testimonies of the witnesses

to remain in record.

Compulsory Processattendance of witnessesproduction of other evidence

Right to Speedy Trial(1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1)Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493)Re: Circular No. 38-98

Bisnar - Guerrero vs. Court of AppealsL-107211, June 28, 1996

Guerrero v. CAFacts:

Francis Guerrero (Petitioner) was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence.

Sept. 29, 1972: After several postponements filed by Guerrero, the prosecution was finally able to start presentingevidence after Guerrero entered his plea of not guilty.

Aug. 19, 1975: Prosecution finally rested its case.

Feb. 7, 1978: Defense rested its case.

Mar. 16, 1978: Hearin was terminated and parties were ordered Judge Argel to submit their respectivememoranda.

Jan. 19, 1979: Judge Bernardo P. Pardo took over as presiding judge vice Judge Argel, granted privateprosecutor's omnibus motion to file memorandum up to January 29, 1979.

Dec. 21, 1979, Guerrero filed his memorandum.

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From the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch XXXV, the case was subsequently assigned to Branch CXXV presidedover by Judge Alfredo Gorgonio who apparently did not take action thereon.

Jan. 30, 1989: Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro ordered the reraffling of the case from the RTC of CaloocanCity, Branch CXXV to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon.

o Raffled to presiding Judge Benjamin N. Aquino of the RTC, Navotas-Malabon, Branch 72.

Mar. 14, 1990: Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic noteswithin 30 days considering that the same was found to be incomplete.

Apr. 20, 1990: since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of stenographic notes, the court orderedthe retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.

May 15, 1990: the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals of the testimonies of some of thewitnesses. He manifested that he had communicated with one of the stenographers on record, Ms. Remedios S.Delfin, who promised to look into her files and hopefully complete the transcription of her stenographic notes.

Oct. 1, 1990: the presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses testimony on October 24, 1990.

Oct. 24, 1990: the retaking of the testimonies was reset to Nov. 9, 1990 due to Guerrero's failure to appear on thescheduled hearing.

Nov. 7, 1990, Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial has been violated. Denied.

Issue: Whether Guerreros right to speedy trial was violated?

Ruling: No.

Art. III, Sec. 16, Constitution: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all

judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.o Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in the disposition thereof, warranting

dismissals in case of violations thereof without the fault of the party concerned, not just the accused.

Right to speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without theparticipation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the trial forunreasonable lengths of time.

Caballero vs.Alfonso, Jr.,15

laid down the guidelines in determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition"formula:

o Speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon thecircumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays whichrender rights nugatory.

o In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain factors maybe considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delayassertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may alsobe considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with theadministration of justice has violated the "speedy disposition of cases" guarantee.

In the case before us, the Guerrero merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. Iwas only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to followup and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution ofthe case. More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November9, 1990 because of Guerrero's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenlybecame zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.

While it may be said that it was not Guerrero's fault that the stenographic notes of the testimonies of thewitnesses were not transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution's. The respondent trial judge can hardly befaulted either because he could not have rendered the decision without the transcripts in question. Let it beremembered that he was not the judge who conducted the trial and hence he would not have had sufficient basis

to make a disposition in the absence of the said transcripts.Guerrero raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset thecase for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right -- a situation amounting tolaches -- had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and ofordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension ifduring all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffledGuerrero showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or aleast made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribestenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.