CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW CASE DOCTRINE

Atty. Garcia

BOOK ONE

ARTICLE 3: FELONIES De Guzman, Jr. vs PeopleThe essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestation, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault or immediately thereafter. The factors to determine the presence of intent to kill are: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the circumstances under which the crimes was committed and the motives of the accused. The Court have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.

In the case at bar, the intent to kill was present. The Court found that the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuff marks inflicted in the heat of anger or as a result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate that Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. The petitioner’s attach was unprovoked with the knife used causing such wounds thereby belying his submissions and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill.

Rivera vs. PeopleAn essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.

In People vs. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003), the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

The essential elements of the an attempted felony are as follows: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by over acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his won spontaneous desistance; 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

In People vs. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62 (2003), the Court elaborated the concept of an over act or external act, thus: An overt act or external is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular

crime, more than a mere planning or perpetration, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an over act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient If it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparation are made.” The act done need not constitute the last or proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a casual relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

In the case at bar, petitioners who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

Villareal vs. People In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the RPC, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer---injuria ex affect facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in physical injuries under the RPC, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily fucntions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the over act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.

Mere inflictions of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The RPC also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act from without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple prudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.

The collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that the organization owes to their initiates the duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. The Court ruled that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the inflictions of physical injuries.

U.S. vs. Ah Chong After the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door, and called out twice, “Who is there?” He received no answer fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again

called out: “If you enter the room I will kill you.” At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Defendant was charged with murder. While there can be no doubt of defendant’s exemption from liability if the intruder had really been a robber, under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a particular intent, which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where under the provisions of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to commit.

Loney vs. PeopleMala in se cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. What makes the former a felony is the criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) while what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

ARTICLE 4: PROXIMATE CAUSE THEORY AND IMPOSSIBLE CRIME DOCTRINE Garcia vs. PeopleCriminal liability is incurred by any person who commits a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of the provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. In the case at bar, it can reasonably inferred that the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.

In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. Where thedeath results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the wrongful act performed is different from the one he intended: “ el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado” (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the RPC. The Court appreciated as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s hear was in good condition.

Urbano vs. IACProximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under circumstances that the person responsible for the first even should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

People vs. Villacorta Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”

In the case at bar, There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. Severe tetanus infections has a short incubation period, less than 14 days. Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz’s death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

People vs. Noel Sales Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. In order that a person may criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the victim. In this case, the appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrist to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately cause his death.

Intod vs. CA The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove

inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. The rationale of Article (2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce and offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase “inherent impossibility” that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revise Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under article 4 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Jacinto vs. PeopleThe requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to an extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

The personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen.

ARTICLE 6: STAGES IN THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY People vs. Lizada

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3 . The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 4 . The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous

desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements:1. That there be an external acts 2 . Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity, or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparation was made. The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. The Supreme Court declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be known or established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the offense.

It is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to cause a particular injury.

The spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from the criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his desistance.

In the case at bar, the Court believed that the accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although the accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.

**Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape – it is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. The Court held that there could be a finding of rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury.

Baleros vs. PeopleUnder Article 6, in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense, that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator leading directly to its realization and consummation. Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal code. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case.

Whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape. Over or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Applying this to the fact of the case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner’s act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. There was not attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part.

People vs. Labiaga A felony is consummated when all the element necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In Serrano v. People, the Court distinguished a frustrated a frustrated felony from an attempted felony felony in this manner:

1. In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.

2. In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason, for the non- fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.

In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court the wound sustained would have caused the

victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. Thus, the Court hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted and not frustrated murder. Valenzuela vs. PeopleEach felony under the Revise Penal Code has a “subjective phase,” or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, “subjectively the crime is complete.”

An easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused against the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.

In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the RPC, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent.

“Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” supplies an important characteristic if a crime, that “ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime,” and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,” and “essential for criminal liability.” It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and the US SC held that “a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights.” The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be actus reus.

The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft – it finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. Theft is produce when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain, and viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft is able or unable to freely disposed of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. In theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. The most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will be noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of no slight importance. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage – theft can only be attempted or consummated. Unlawful taking is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the

felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft.

People vs. QuinanolaThe crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man’s penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the “mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act. In People vs. Orita, the Court explicitly pronounced that there is no such crime as frustrated rape. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also, all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.

People vs. OrandeIt was error for the trial court to convict appellant of frustrated rape. The Court finds that the rape was in fact consummated. Although appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis in her vagina, she felt his sex organ touch hers and she saw and felt semen come out of his penis and smear her vagina. The appellant was able to slightly penetrate her because she felt pain and her vagina bled. It has been held that, to be convicted of rape, there must be convincing and sufficient proof that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroke the external surface thereof. Nevertheless, the Court also ruled that where penetration is not established that the rape is deemed consummated if the victim felt pain, or the medico-legal examination finds discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora is already gaping with redness, or hymenal tags are no longer visible. In this case, the victim testified that she felt pain and her vagina bled, indisputable indications of slight penetration or, at the very least, that the penis touched the labia and not merely stroked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of consummated rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.

People vs. ParejaJurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Simply put, “rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most it can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. In People vs. Publico, the Court ruled that when the “touching” of the vagina by the penis is couples with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.

In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following over acts: kissing AAA’s nape and neck; undressing her, removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her, holder her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim’s loud cries and resistance. Thus, accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of attempted rape.

Cruz vs. People

Attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. . . . But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. . . . .

In offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."

The slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted.

This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation,"

We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was.

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. 30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.

ARTICLE 8: CONSPIRACY – KINDS AND DISTINCTIONSPeople vs. Pagalasan Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.” There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.

Settles as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the object is attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the effect that the conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirator’s arrest, on the presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other overt act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested conspirator is concerned. The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater the chances that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the possibility that as the conspiracy continues, they may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has not yet ended, then the hearsay acts and declaration of one conspirator will be admissible against the other conspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for substantive crimes committed by the others.

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.

Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy with necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.

People vs. LarranagaFrom the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in the commission of the crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint design and community of interest. Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Appellant’s actions showed that they have the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters.

Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the “conspiracy” as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.

People vs. GarchitorenaAccused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as “there was no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their criminal designs. We are not persuaded, in People v. Maldo, the Court stated: “Conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all.

In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellant were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The three accused-appellants’ prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of on is the act of all.

People vs. Carandang Milan’s and Chua’s arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they conspired with Carandang during the latter’s act of shooting the three victims. However, the Court held in People v. Sumalpong, conspiracy may also be proven by other means: “Conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirator’s showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is

sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Monteclavo and Milan’s following such instruction). Contrary to the supposition of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Monteclavo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principal by direct participation.Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.

People vs. Dadao, et.al. With regard to appellants' assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter two tested negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.

In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this manner: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.

People vs. Feliciano, Jr. et.al. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them

with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible.

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.

The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill. For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

People vs. Morilla The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla's turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor. His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit. Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

People vs. BokingcoConspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellant fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.

Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where passion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault. Based on these facts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuation can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellant before it was amended for murder. Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed. Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (1) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (2) the admission relates to the common object; and (3) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.

People vs. Castillo The prosecution contends that without Padayhag’s help, Castillo could not have abducted Rocky. The Court is not persuaded. There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely link the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.

Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common design.

Padayhag’s act of fetching Ricky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillo’s plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhag’s boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit Padayhag’s boyfriend that the two met. To impose criminal liability, the law requires that there be intentional participation in the criminal act, not the unwitting cooperation of a deceived individual.

In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

Fernan vs. PeopleThe burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary: After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely,: (1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in which there is single person or group (“hub”) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as the legitimate business operations between manufacturers and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. The Court finds that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the “wheel” conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate “spokes” of the conspiracy. Petitioners where among the many spokes of the wheel.

ARTICLE 11: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES People vs. RegalarioWhen self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily owns up to the killing but he may escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefore. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (b) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.

After he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From the moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People vs. Cajurao, the Court held: The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstances. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray.

People vs. Fontanilla An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted on unlawful aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstances.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. The character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows: “Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack.) Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an anger countenance or like aiming to throw a pot.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden of relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. The Court considered to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just defend himself.

Josue vs. PeoplePetitioner invoked self-defense, after he had admitted that he caused the victim’s wounds when he shot the latter several times using a deadly weapon, i.e., the .45 caliber pistol that he carried with him to the situs of the crime. In

People v. Mondigo, the Court explained: By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was charged albeit under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the crimes. Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended by the following circumstance: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

In order to be exonerated from the charge, the petitioner then assumed the burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt that he merely acted in self-defense. While the three elements must concur, self defense relies, first and foremost, on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. “Unlawful aggression” presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.

In the present case, particularly significant of this element of “unlawful aggression” is the trial court’s finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol. According to prosecution witness Villianueva, it was even the petitioner who confronted the victim, who was then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store, Granting that the victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal wound on his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no “real danger to his life or personal safety,” for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified him in inflicting the gunhshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end.

The weapon used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the nature and location of the victim’s wounds, further negate the claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-defense to prosper, the means employed by the person claiming the defense must be commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. Considering the petitioner’s use of a deadly weapon when his victim was unarmed, and his clear intention to cause a fatal wound by still firing his gun at the victim who had attempted to flee after already sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that the petitioner did not act merely in self-defense but was an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.

Toledo vs. PeopleThe petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in the Supreme Court two divergent theories–(1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, par.4. It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his acts is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, par. 4 is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits

a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

Self-defense and accident are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not in the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.

To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner, (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete: there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. He arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to aske appellant why he threw stones at Ricky’s house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky.

In People vs. Pletado, the Supreme Court held: for aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself or of a relative sought to be defended and not an imagined threat.

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.

Dela Cruz vs. PeopleThe essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. In other words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him. As such, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.

Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. In the case at bar, other than petitioner's testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner's questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus: In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (Peo vs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).

When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender. Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.

Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner. The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).

Guevarra vs. People By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with. Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

People vs. SevillanoBy invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that where an accused admits the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when corroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability:

1 . Unlawful Aggression;2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;3 . Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Appellant's version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court's conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

ARTICLE 12: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCESRA 9344 THE JUVENILE JUSTICE & WELFARE ACTMadali vs. PeopleAs to criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the CA, Raymond, who was only 14yrs of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Section 6 and 20 of RA 9344. Although the crime was committed on April 13, 1999 and RA 9344 took effect only on May 20, 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymond who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. While Raymond is criminally exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to Section 6 par. 2 of RA 9344.

As to Rodel’s situation, he was 16yrs old at the time of the commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of RA 9344.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequence of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. The CA found that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise they would kill him. Rodel, knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.

Under Article 68 of the Revise Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344 – xx xx instead of pronouncing the judgement of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without the need of application. Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already 18yrs old or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the SC Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.

People vs. SarciaThe SC finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. The Court cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When the accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24yrs old, which means that in 1996, he was 18yrs old. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place “in any month and date in the year 1996.” Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, the Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.

The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case.

Section 38 of RA 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. The provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike PD 603 and AM No. 02-1-18-SC. The said PD and SC Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of RA 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since RA 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

While Sec. 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21.

To date, accused-appellant is about 31yrs old and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of RA 9344. Thus, the application of Sec. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of RA 9344, which

provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction an upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.

People vs. MantalabaThe appellant was 17yrs old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC’s decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of PD 603 and Sec. 32 of AM No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law, the laws applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment because the impossible penalty for violation of Section 5 RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death. It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sec. 38 and 68 of RA 9344. However, the Court has ruled in People vs. Sarcia: that while Sec. 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18yrs old or more at the time of pronouncement of his/her guilt, sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Since the appellant is now beyond the age of 21 can no longer avail of the provisions on Sec. 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already mood and academic. The appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA 9344, which provides: A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR in coordination with the DSWD.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for the violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Sec. 98 of the same law. A violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code.

People vs. AgacerFranklin is entitled to the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority. Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16yrs old at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He was therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for the Court’s consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.

Ty vs. PeopleWhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability – has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisite must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a

real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

In this case, the fear, if any, harbored by ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks – a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged—for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. There was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. It is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands. Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. By her own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.

The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under the justifying circumstance of state of necessity: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.

Moreover, for the defense of sate of necessity to be available, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.

ARTICLE 13: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCESUrbano vs. PeoplePetitioner contents that the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim out to be appreciated in petitioner’s favor.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, the reference it to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should be immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD’s general manager. Such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have been possibly averted had he had the financial means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of “no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide.

People vs. IgnasWas the killing murder as found by the trial court or mere homicide? Not that the amended information under which the appellant stands charged does not, unlike the original information, charge appellant with murder but the mere “unlawful killing: albeit through the use of an unlicensed firearm. Not further that the amended information does not definitely categorically state that the “unlawful killing” was attended by the aggravating or qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity.

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retroactive application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information, it was error for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of Article of 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

As for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree with the trial court’s order to dismiss the information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Under RA 8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The Court has held that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated by RA 8294, is committed. Although RA 8294 took effect over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it was advantageous to the appellant insofar as it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus should be given retroactive application.

ARTICLE 14 AND 15: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES & ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCESPeople vs. NazarenoThe CA held that the killing of David should be characterized as one of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. The Court finds no fault in this ruling. There is abuse of superior strength when the aggressors purposely use excessive force rendering the victim unable to defend himself. The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the aggressor.

Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with a stick and Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him even as he fled from them. And when they caught up with him, aided by some unnamed barangay tanods, Nazareno and Saliendra exploited their superior advantage and knocked the defenseless David unconscious. He evidently died from head fracture caused by one of the blows on his head.

Fantastico vs. Malicse, Sr. Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery or any other qualifying circumstance.

In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.

The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, thus:In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered the house of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando “Rolly” Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. Salvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip, Medico Legal Certificate and Leg Sketch and the fracture sheet all prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple lacerations on his head. The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt instrument like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or axe. This was caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim. The multiple lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. T he victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and must be considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico and Salvador Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with. There is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

People vs. Bokingco

The Court agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.

Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.

The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into account the fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime. Appellants claim that they were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they worked in the construction of the victim’s apartment.

People vs. Tabarnero There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, method, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The Court held that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less evade, the assault. The swiftness and unexepectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured. In People v. Montejo, the Court held that there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when he was being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the accused’s purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim may offer. The Court therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not considered in the trial court as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked.

In People vs. Gemoya, the Court held: Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime. When four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was purposely sought and employed.

People vs. VilbarThe Court agree with the CA that accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The Court ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Thus, for treachery or aleviosa to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions; (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack and the means, method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the attack was impulsively done.

Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. The suddenness of an attack, does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of aleviosa, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim’s helpless position was accidental. The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of aleviosa necessary to raise the homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself.

In the case at bar, the prosecution merely showed that accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove that accused-appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The surrounding circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the victim’s families and the attending eyewitnesses, work against treachery. If accused-appellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have been chosen another time and place to stab the victim. Yet accused-appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a public market at 7pm. The place was well-lighted and teeming with people. He was indifferent to the presence of the victim’s family or of the other people who could easily identify him and point him out as the assailant. He showed no concern that the people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate in behalf of the victim. In fact, the attack appeared to have been impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger or extreme annoyance. There are no indications that accused-appellant deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and place. Thus, the court reasonably conclude that accused-appellant, who at the time was languishing in his alcoholic state, acted brashly and impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim. Treachery just cannot be appreciated.

People vs. Daniel MatibagThere is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan, the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he

was unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his assailant. The deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun. Based on these findings, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.

Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful aggression. The prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so sudden and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibag’s version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled his reaction), remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the victim. Hence, by these accounts, Matibag’s allegation of unlawful aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court upholds Matibag’s conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, as charged.

INSTIGATION VS. ENTRAPMENT People vs. Naelga The Court find no instigation in this case. The general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done upon the “decoy solicitation” of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. This is particularly true in that class of cases where the offense is of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.

Here, the law enforcers received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was engaged in illegal drug trade in the public market of Rosales. Poseur-buyer PO2 Sembran then pretended to be engaged in the drug trade himself and, with the help of his fellow buy-bust operatives, arrested accused-appellant in the act of delivering the shabu to him. In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offenses, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the idea of committing a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was formed by the police officers precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator.

While accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached and asked him to buy shabu for him, the same cannot be considered as an act of instigation, but an act of “feigned solicitation.” Instigation is resorted to for purposes of entrapment, based on the tip received from the police informant that accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs in the public market of Rosales. In fact, it was accused-appellant who suggested to PO2 Sembran to use shabu; and despite accused-appellant’s statement that he did not know anybody selling shabu, he still took the money from PO2 Sembran and directly went to Urdaneta, where he claimed to have bought the illegal drug. Then he returned to the Rosales public Market and gave the drug to PO2 Sembran.

ARTICLE 16-20: PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIESPD 1612 THE ANTI-FENCING LAW

PD 1829 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICEPeople vs. Dulay (2012)Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter’s services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by “Speed”

People vs. Gamboa, et.al. The Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime. Jurisprudence is instructive of the element required, in accordance with Article 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability. Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence she is only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People vs. Clemente, et.al., where it was stressed in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

Ong vs. PeopleFencing is defined in Section 2(a) of PD 612, as the “act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.”

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, or object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.

The elements of fencing are present in this case. (1) the owner of the tires corroborated by the caretaker of the warehouse where the tires were stolen testified that the crime of robbery was committed on February 17, 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales invoice and an inventory list; (2) although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that 13 tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but 13 out of 38 missing tires were found in his possession. Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of P45,000 where he was issued Sales Invoice; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was a businessman of buy and sell of tire for the past 24yrs ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the 13 tires and he did not even asked for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience from business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling 13 tires in the street. Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tire. Section 6 of PD 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearance from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell, but in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence. People vs. DimatThe elements of “fencing” are (1) robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, “buys, receives, possess, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken” during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.

Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis. Second, Dimat claims lack of criminal intent, as his main defense. But PD 1612 is a special law, and therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. The prosecution was able to prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtained some gain out of his acts. Evidently Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show that Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.

ARTICLES 21-88 RA 9346 PROHBITING THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSITIONACT 4103 THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAWPD 968 THE PROBATION LAW AS AMENDED People vs. Nelmida

People vs. Punzalan

People vs. Dulay (2014)

People vs. Quiachon

People vs. Salome

Colinares vs. People

Villareal vs. People (2014)

People vs. CA (2014)

Suyan vs. People

Almero vs. People

ARTICLE 89-113People vs. Bayot

People vs. Amistoso

People vs. Consorte

People vs. Bautista

Abellana vs. People

People vs. Pangilinan

Lumantas vs. Calapiz

Daluraya vs. Olivia

Solidum vs. People