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Criminal financesCriminal finances
Criminal Criminal conductconduct
Case of concern ?Case of concern ?
Sounding the tocsinSounding the tocsin 15 years of anti-laundering policy: measurable
results? Prices of most drugs have gone down. 15 years of suspicious transaction report: insights?
Effects on the organisation of crime-for-profit?** Modest at most, though some more heat** Drug market has its own, almost autonomous
momentum** Economic crime merely raised some eyebrows
and otherwise lip service as usual** Tax crime belatedly added
Crime-money: threat or Crime-money: threat or inconvenience?inconvenience?
The scale of threat: differentiate per economy Which sectors? From underground economy to upperworld
enterprises? Do criminals climb the long ladder? Where is the biggest impact? Banking? Real estate? Unfair competition? Economic and fiscal erosion effect! The case of
Greece, Spain and Iceland: laundering? Power concentration, but by whom and what level
The ‘terrifying’ extend of The ‘terrifying’ extend of crime-money crime-money (?)(?)
Utrecht School of Economics:
** € 18,5 billion in the Netherlands. Trillions world wide:
The crystal ball methodology of the FATF and UN UN: trillion + crime money per year Precipitation of crime-money: where does it come down for
spending and investment?
consumption: life style
assets: valuables ranging from cars to gadgets
real estate: criminals also hit by crisis
production factors: producing things and giving services?
Take-overs of production sectors?
The threat of crime-The threat of crime-money or managementmoney or management Basic: erosion of the integrity of the financial system (?)
However: “Who saws the branch on which he sits?” Dubious banks are dangerous . . . . for launderers!
Calvi, hanging from a London bridge;
Sidonia: a poisonous cup of coffee in prison;
Russian bankers murdered (too many for one slide)
Nugan Hand Bank (Australia, “suicides”)
European Union Bank (20 million disappeared) Threat to launderers: (ex) bank staff selling CDs with names Worse: banks and bankers cheating the whole system:
Goldman Sachs & the Greek budget fraud Credit crisis: deceptive creation of non-existing money
Threat to the Threat to the systemsystem??
The usual suspect: hectic The usual suspect: hectic but short lifebut short life
Does the threat come Does the threat come from below . . . from below . . .
Or from the smart and Or from the smart and slick guys in the slick guys in the
upperworld? upperworld?
The 200 million guy
The threat scale of the The threat scale of the criminal money criminal money managementmanagement
Corruptive penetration Sport and gambling Security industry? Real estate?
Criminal upperworld subsidy: political parties Once-only investment: defusion by integration Re-investment in own criminal enterprise Nest-egg or criminal pension (if one gets that old) Life style: bad role model
Wijzen van het verhullen van misdaadgelden: Wijzen van het verhullen van misdaadgelden: Aantal waarnemingenAantal waarnemingen
Vormen van verbergen
drugs Econ. misdaad
Andere misdrijven
totaal
Uitvoer 11 9 2 42
Eigendom verhulling
10 5 4 19
Rechtvaardigen
Terug-lenen
3 3 6
Loonrol 2
Speculatie
Boekhouding
7 4 2 13
Onnaspeurbaar
4 8 2 14
Obversations:54 € Obversations:54 € million + casesmillion + cases
Levels of penetration drugs Economic crime
Other crime for profit
Total
Corrupting permeation 3 3 6
Criminal subsidy 6 3 9
Once-only infusion 8 2 10
Investment in crime-enterprise
9 4 1 14
'Rainy day' 20 9 1 30
Life style 9 6 2 17
Same from another angleSame from another angleLevels of penetration observations persons value €
Corruptive penetration 3 3 919.000
Upperworld subsidy 6 7 560.000
Once only 8 9 6.979.000
Own crime firm 6 12 4.153.000
Nest egg 20 21 14.361.000
Life style 9 - -
Traces of spending of Traces of spending of crime-moneycrime-money
(52 million + cases)(52 million + cases) Total proceeds: € 101 million
Of which: Stored cash: € 7 Consumption/assets: € 9 Conventional investment/houses: € 62 Commercial investment: € 23
Of which: Reinvestment in criminal enterprise: € 4,5 million or
less than 5 %.
Nature of real estateNature of real estate
living place
parking/garage
Land(building/agr.)
business/enterpr.
other
Unequal division of Unequal division of propertyproperty
7% of the owners have > 10 properties:
Owns 31% of the confiscated real estate
67 % of the one-piece owners has 37% of the confiscated properties
Other assets:Other assets: Cash € 74 mj Dutch bank accounts € 42 mj Foreign accounts € 3,8
(Mainly Luxembourg, Island of Man, Barbados
and Spain) Shares/bonds € 0,46 Cars (missing prices 17 %) € 4 mj Juwelry and other gadgets € 0,4 Not including the buckets full with Swarovski crystal
Proportions bank and Proportions bank and cashcash 3 % had > € 100.000 in bankaccounts
50 % of crim. account holders < € 20.000 25 % had < 3.910 Confiscated cash
50 % had < € 3.910
25 % had < € 1.305 Proportion: bank money: cash = 1,2 : 1
Do criminals like banks? Not all of them
What criminals do like banks?
Criminal bankers
Thank you for your attention