PRESIDENTIAL DECREES No. 532 August 8, 1974

MALACAÑANG

M a n i l a

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 August 8, 1974

ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby distributing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the

Constitution and pursuant to proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973 and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the following:

Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be understood, as follows:

a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.

b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine Waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing.

c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles, or property or both.

d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,

equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.

e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things of other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.

Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competents court be punished by:

a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.

Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno

20 SCRA 283 (1967)

Concepcion, CJ

Facts:

1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.  Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2013/02/stonehill-v-diokno-digest.html#sthash.rwSv5pyz.dpuf

People vs. Geronimo; Rebellion  

G.R. No. L-8936.  October 23, 1956

Facts:  Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. The accused are ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy and ending  where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. In sum the information harges Geronimo of the crime of rebellion complexed with the crime kidnapping, murder and robbery. Geronimo pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The case was appealed the SC via automatic review, raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.

Issue: Whether or not kidnapping, murder. and robbery can be complexed with rebellion.

Held: No 

As a rule, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to article 134. It follows, therefore that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in article 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under article 48 of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.

However, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But even then, the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other; and the individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should commit rape; certainly the latter felony could not be said to have been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its commission in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be merged into a juridical whole.

In this case, while a majority of seven justices agreed that if the overt acts detailed in the information against the Appellant had been duly proved to have been committed “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof”, then the accused could only be convicted of simple rebellion. there was no proof that the acts of the accused was in furtherance of overthrowing the government which is the purpose of rebellion.

However the opinions differ as to whether his plea of guilty renders the accused amenable to punishment

not only for rebellion but also for murder or other crimes.The view of the six justices was adopted in resolving this issue. These justices believe that conceding the absence of a complex crime, still, by his plea of guilty the accused-Appellant has admitted all the acts described in the five separate counts of the information; that if any of such counts constituted an independent crime committed within the jurisdiction of the lower court as seems to be the case under the facts alleged in Count No. 5 (the killing of Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in the information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to Appellant’s conviction and punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Hence, the acts charged in Counts 1 to 4 cannot be taken into consideration in this case, either because they were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court below (Count 1), or because the allegations do not charge the Appellant’s participation (Count 3), or else the acts charged are essentially acts of rebellion, with out private motives (Counts 2 and 4).

The accused was convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder.

Note that the acts of the accused does not constitute rebellion. The allegations in the information that said acts of accused are mere conclusions as acts done in furtherance of  rebellion. It is  the failure of the counsel of accused to object on the information that made the latter liable for rebellion when he pleaded guilty to the crime charged against him. Since there was no showing that the acts of the accused was in furtherance of rebellion he is liable for the crimes of robbery, kidnapping and murder separate from rebellion.

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 May 1993]

People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 May 1993]First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur

Facts: At about 6:30 p.m. of 25 October 1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer. On that occasion the policemen saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned 10 minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams. Upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal. At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession. Enrile refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer. Antonio Enrile y Villaroman and Rogelio Abugatal y Marquez were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The RTC, after trial and on 14 February 1986, found Enrile and Abugatal guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00. Both appealed. Abugatal, however, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and thus the appeal is dismissed as to him.

Issue: Whether the mark money found in Enrile’s possession, pursuant to a warrantless arrest, search and seizure, provide for his criminal culpability.

Held: It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile’s house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile’s warrantless arrest and search. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana. According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile’s house and immediately arrested him. What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information supplied by Abugatal and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto. The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORUPUS. ENRILE V. SALAZAR

GR No. 92163 (1990)

By RIVERA

FACTS:This case, together with the case filed by the Spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio (GR No. 92164), was consolidated and decided with the equally applicable principles because they are virtually identical in factual milieu.

Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile, spouses Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan were arrested by the team of NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the strength of a warrant by Hon. Jaime Salazar. The warrant issued was based on the information signed and filed by the respondent prosecutors, charging those arrested persons with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders. Senator Enrile was held overnight at NBI Headquarters on Taft, without bail, none recommended in the information and fixed in the warrant of arrest. The following day, he was brought to Camp Karingal and the same time, he filed a petition for habeas corpus for alleged deprivation of constitutional rights: (a) held

to answer for criminal offenses which does not exist in the statue books; (b) chared with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; (c) denied his right to bail; and (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. The Supreme Court has maintained that People v. Hernandez (as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in his course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof) and is applicable in the said case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is the proper course of action to invoke the right to bail

RULING: No, since the offense to which Enrile and the other were charged is the crime of simple rebellion (punishable by not exceeding with twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000, therefore, it is bailable), the correct course was for the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court to file a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. If denied, the Supreme Court is not the immediate remedy, but applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief is available there. Even if the theory that the information charges a non-existent crime or, charges more than one offense, it would not excuse or justify improper choice of remedies, because the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. Therefore, the petitioner is charged with simple rebellion, entitled with bail before final conviction as a matter of right, the Supreme Court’s resolution (giving petitioner provisional liberty) is remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.

PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ

FACTS:

Defendants were charged with, and have been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies. The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

Under the information filed, said murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of rebellion can be complexed with with murders, arsons and robberies.

HELD: No. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. Being within the purview of “engaging in war” and “committing serious violence”, said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime — that of rebellion plain and simple.