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CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN VALDEZ,respondents.G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988

FACTS:VICAR filed with the RTC an application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. Heirs of Octaviano and Valdez filed their opposition thereto. RTC ruled in favor or VICAR.

Court of Appeals reversed the registration of Lots 2 and 3 claimed by the heirs-oppositors and found out that:

VICAR borrowed respondents house after the church and the convent was destroyed. Respondent never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors incommodatumand the VICAR the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter ofcommodatumto the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.

The predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906; that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee incommodatum; and that the adverse claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951.

Heirs filed for recovery of possession of Lots 2 and 3.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court touching on the ownership of Lot 2 and 3 which in effect declared the Heirs the owners of the land constitute res judicata.

HELD:YES. SC found no reason to disregard or reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R. Its findings of fact have become incontestible. This Court declined to review said decision, thereby in effect, affirming it. It has become final and executory a long time ago.

Respondent appellate court did not commit any reversible error, much less grave abuse of discretion, when it held that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R is governing, under the principle of res judicata, hence the rule, in the present cases CA-G.R. No. 05148 and CA-G.R. No. 05149. The facts as supported by evidence established in that decision may no longer be altered.

TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., ANTONIO I. MARTIN, and TERESITA SANTOS,petitioners,vs.THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, HON. JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, ASST. CITY FISCAL FELIZARDO N. LOTA and CLEMENT DAVID,respondents.G.R. No. L-60033 April 4, 1984FACTS:David, together with his sister, Denise Kuhne, invested with the Nation Savings and Loan Association the sum of P1,145,546.20 on time deposits covered by Bankers Acceptances and Certificates of Time Deposits and the sum of P13,531.94 on savings account deposits covered by passbook nos. 6-632 and 29-742, or a total of P1,159,078.14. It appears further that private respondent David, together with his sister, made investments in the aforesaid bank in the amount of US$75,000.00.

When the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership on March 21, 1981, petitioners Guingona and Martin, upon the request of private respondent David, assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David by executing on June 17, 1981 a joint promissory note in favor of private respondent acknowledging an indebtedness of Pl,336,614.02 and US$75,000.00. This promissory note was based on the statement of account as of June 30, 1981 prepared by the private respondent. The amount of indebtedness assumed appears to be bigger than the original claim because of the added interest and the inclusion of other deposits of private respondent's sister in the amount of P116,613.20.Thereafter, or on July 17, 1981, petitioners Guingona and Martin agreed to divide the said indebtedness, and petitioner Guingona executed another promissory note antedated to June 17, 1981 whereby he personally acknowledged an indebtedness of P668,307.01 (1/2 of P1,336,614.02) and US$37,500.00 (1/2 of US$75,000.00) in favor of private respondent.. The aforesaid promissory notes were executed as a result of deposits made by Clement David and Denise Kuhne with the Nation Savings and Loan Association.Thereafter, David charged petitioners with Estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related Central Bank regulations on foreign exchange transactions.

ISSUE:Whether or not public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges (estafa and violation of CB Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions) subject matter of I.S. No.81-31938.

HELD:YES. When private respondent David invested his money on nine. and savings deposits with the aforesaid bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan ormutuum and not a contract of deposit. Thus, Article 1980 of the New Civil Code provides that:Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of-money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really 'loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans.Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan Association is that of creditor anddebtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the obligation to return theamount deposited,it has, however, no obligation to return or deliver thesame moneythat was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no- jurisdiction.THERE IS NOVATIONBut even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent David would constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, nevertheless any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust relation between the bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and private respondent. Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of private respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a debtor.Moreover, while it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may however, prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank to private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for estafa was filed on December 23, 1981 with the Office of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear that novation occurred long before the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal.Consequently, as aforestated, any incipient criminal liability would be avoided but there will still be a civil liability on the part of petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the assumed obligation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.JOSE V. BAGTAS,defendant,FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left by the late Jose V. Bagtas,petitioner-appellant.G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962

FACTS:On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked for a renewal for another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and requested the return of the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose V. Bagtas wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls. On 17 October 1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General. On 19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry advised him that the book value of the three bulls could not be reduced and that they either be returned or their book value paid not later than 31 October 1950. Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book value of the three bulls or to return them.

On 20 December 1950 in the Court of First Instance of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an action against him praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or to pay their book value in the total sum of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee in the sum of P199.62, both with interests, and costs; and that other just and equitable relief be granted in (civil No. 12818).RTC (CFI) ruled in favor of the Republic ordering Bagtas to pay the total value of the three bulls plus the breeding fees. Republic moved for a writ of execution which was granted.Bagtas returned the two bulls during the pendency of the case. However, Bagtas stated that the third bull died from gunshot wound inflicted during a Huk raid on Hacienda Felicidad Intal, as such death was due toforce majeureshe is relieved from the duty of returning the bull or paying its value to the appellee. He prayed that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. ISSUE:Whether or not Bagtas is relieved from returning the bull or paying is value due to force majeure.

HELD:The loan by the appellee to the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another year as regards one bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract wascommodatumand that, for that reason, as the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due toforce majeure. A contract ofcommodatumis essentially gratuitous.If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract becommodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract ofcommodatum. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to Bagtas, the bulls had each an appraised book value. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event Bagtas would be exempt from liability.

CHERIE PALILEO,plaintiff-appellee,vs.BEATRIZ COSIO,defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-7667 November 28, 1955

FACTS:On December 18, 1951, plaintiff obtained from defendant a loan in the sum of P12,000 subject to the following conditions: (a) that plaintiff shall pay to defendant an interest in the amount of P250 a month; (b) that defendant shall deduct from the loan certain obligations of plaintiff to third persons amounting to P4,550, plus the sum of P250 as interest for the first month; and (c) that after making the above deductions, defendant shall deliver to plaintiff only the balance of the loan of P12,000.Pursuant to their agreement, plaintiff paid to defendant as interest on the loan a total of P2,250.00 corresponding to nine months from December 18, 1951, on the basis of P250.00 a month, which is more than the maximum interest authorized by law. To secure the payment of the aforesaid loan, defendant required plaintiff to sign a document known as "Conditional Sale of Residential Building", purporting to convey to defendant, with right to repurchase, a two-story building of strong materials belonging to plaintiff. This document did not express the true intention of the parties which was merely to place said property as security for the payment of the loan.After the execution of the aforesaid document, defendant insured the building against fire with the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. for the sum of P15,000, the insurance policy having been issued in the name of defendant. The building was partly destroyed by fire and, after proper demand, defendant collected from the insurance company an indemnity of P13,107.00. Plaintiff demanded from defendant that she be credited with the necessary amount to pay her obligation out of the insurance proceeds but defendant refused to do so. And on the strength of these facts, the court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads as follows:Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the transaction had between plaintiff and defendant, as shown in Exhibit A, an equitable mortgage to secure the payment of the sum of P12,000 loaned by the defendant to plaintiff; ordering the defendant to credit the sum of P13,107 received by the defendant from the Associated Insurance & surety Co., Inc. to the payment of plaintiff's obligation in the sum of P12,000.00 as stated in the complaint, thus considering the agreement of December 18, 1951 between the herein plaintiff and defendant completely paid and leaving still a balance in the sum of P1,107 from the insurance collected by defendant; that as plaintiff had paid to the defendant the sum of P2,250.00 for nine months as interest on the sum of P12,000 loaned to plaintiff and the legal interest allowed by law in this transaction does not exceed 12 per cent per annum, or the sum of P1,440 for one year, so the herein plaintiff and overpaid the sum of P810 to the defendant, which this Court hereby likewise orders the said defendant to refund to herein plaintiff, plus the balance of P1,107 representing the difference of the sum loan of P12,000 and the collected insurance of P13,107 from the insurance company abovementioned to which the herein plaintiff is entitled to receive, and to pay the costs.ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is justified in considering the obligation of plaintiff fully compensated by the insurance amount and in ordering defendant to refund to plaintiff the sum of P1,107 representing the difference of the loan of P12,000 and the sum of P13,107 collected by said defendant from the insurance company notwithstanding the fact that it was not proven that the insurance was taken for the benefit of the mortgagor?

HELD:NO. Where a mortgagee, independently of the mortgagor, insures the mortgaged property in his own name and for his own interest, he is entitled to the insurance proceeds in case of loss,but in such case, he is not allowed to retain his claim against the mortgagor,but is passed by subrogation to the insurer to the extent of the money paid.Considering the foregoing rules, it would appear that the lower court erred in declaring that the proceeds of the insurance taken out by the defendant on the property mortgaged inured to the benefit of the plaintiff and in ordering said defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the difference between her indebtedness and the amount of insurance received by the defendant, for, in the light of the majority rule we have above enunciated, the correct solution should be that the proceeds of the insurance should be delivered to the defendant but that her claim against the plaintiff should be considered assigned to the insurance company who is deemed subrogated to the rights of the defendant to the extent of the money paid as indemnity.Consistent with the foregoing pronouncement, we therefore modify the judgment of the lower court as follows:(1) the transaction had between the plaintiff and defendant as shown in Exhibit A is merely an equitable mortgage intended to secure the payment of the loan of P12,000;(2) that the proceeds of the insurance amounting to P13,107.00 was properly collected by defendant who is not required to account for it to the plaintiff; (3) that the collection of said insurance proceeds shall not be deemed to have compensated the obligation of the plaintiff to the defendant, but bars the latter from claiming its payment from the former; and (4) defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of P810.00 representing the overpayment made by plaintiff by way of interest on the loan. No pronouncement as to costs.

NICANOR B. PAGKALINAWAN, Supervising Agent, National Bureau of Investigation, East Visayan District Office, Cebu City,Petitioner, v. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch II, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Cebu City, and NORBERTO L. DAYRIT,Respondents.[G.R. No. L-22585. December 18, 1967.]

FACTS:Respondent Judge, the Hon. Amador E. Gomez, acting on a complaint for replevin filed by the other respondent Norberto L. Dayrit directed petitioner, Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the National Bureau of Investigation to turn over to the Sheriff of Cebu City an automobile which was seized under a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon. Guillermo Santos presiding, as a subject of the offense of theft or as stolen property.

ISSUE:Whether a court of first instance of one district in a replevin proceeding may ignore a search warrant issued by another court of first instance.

HELD:No. The moment a court of first instance has been informed through the filing of an appropriate pleading that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot, even if the literal language of the Rules of Court 7 yield a contrary impression which in this case demonstrated the good faith of respondent Judge for acting as he did, require a sheriff or any proper officer of the Court to take the property subject of the replevin action if theretofore it came into the custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant may order its release. Any other view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each others lawful orders.

No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.