The North Atlantic Treaty Organization isbeginning to fracture. Its members, sharing thetriumphalism that underpinned U.S. foreign pol-icy after the Cold War, took on burdens that haveproved more difficult than expected. Increasingly,they are failing to meet the challenges confrontingthem.

The principal problem is Afghanistan. Afterthe United States was attacked on September 11,2001, NATO for the first time invoked Article V,its pledge that an attack against one membercountry would be considered an attack against all.But NATO’s forces are being relentlessly attackedby the Taliban, and among NATO countries pop-ular support for maintaining troops there is fad-ing. If NATO fails in Afghanistan, the conse-quences could be as damaging for its survival asthe Vietnam War was for the now defunctSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization.

There are a number of other problems, whichmay not reach the importance of Afghanistan, butwhich nevertheless pose serious complications.These include the proposed deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic;a potential flashpoint in Kosovo, where theAlbanian majority’s insistence on independencecould divide alliance members; and the growingtension between Russia and some of its neighbors.NATO’s inability to deter a cyber attack that virtu-ally paralyzed NATO member Estonia’s access tothe internet—an attack evidently launched fromRussia but without any clear link to the Russiangovernment—raises questions about the alliance’sability to protect its newest members.

In short, NATO is facing new challenges, andthe future of the alliance is unclear. The UnitedStates should begin discussions with our alliesabout what a post-NATO world would look like.

Cracks in the FoundationNATO’s New Troubles

by Stanley Kober

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Stanley Kober is a research fellow in foreign policy at the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary

No. 608 January 15, 2008�������

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Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,the bedrock of American foreign policy sincethe Second World War, is showing signs ofsevere stress. The members of the alliance,sharing the triumphalism that underpinnedU.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, havetaken on an assortment of problematic oblig-ations, and increasingly they are failing tomeet the resulting challenges.

This situation is a result of lessons drawnfrom the end of the Cold War, which was wide-ly thought to be a product of the West’s supe-rior strength. To be sure, that was part of thestory, but only part. The Cold War ended whenthe Soviets concluded that Communism did-n’t work. “The U.S. did not win a Cold Waragainst the USSR,” explains Russian commen-tator Pyotr Romanov. “The USSR lost it to theU.S.” Communism didn’t bury us because itcouldn’t, since it was a system of economicmismanagement. “Decay and inefficiency weregenetically programmed into the Communistsystem. For this reason, its disintegration start-ed at birth.”1

Nevertheless, the dominant view in theWest is that we won the Cold War through oursuperior strength, especially military strength.That assumption has had three importantconsequences. First, NATO assumed addi-tional burdens by taking in new membersfrom the former Soviet bloc. The idea was toprovide them the protection the Europeanmembers of NATO had enjoyed during theCold War. “Anxieties among Russia’s neigh-bors about how Moscow will handle its rela-tions with them have only grown in the lastseveral months,” Deputy Secretary of StateStrobe Talbott told a conference at StanfordUniversity in November 1998. He urgedRussia to reject “a sphere of influence” policy.2

But all countries have more influence intheir own neighborhood than in remoteareas of the world, and as long as power pre-vails over law in international relations, greatpowers will have spheres of influence. “PoorMexico,” a popular saying goes. “So far from

God; so close to the United States.” Russia’sneighbors have even more cause to lament.Geography is a reality, and as NATO getscloser geographically to Russia, its powerwanes while Russia’s increases. In the 1990s,when Russia was prostrate, the disparity inpower was so great that this factor was notappreciated, but with Russia regaining itsstrength while NATO’s power is focused inother regions, one wonders how NATO couldmake good on its guarantees if challenged.

Second, NATO’s expansion antagonizedRussia, which thought its goodwill in endingthe Cold War had not been reciprocated.Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov referredto this sentiment when he wrote that “variousattempts are being made to contain Russia,including through the eastward expansion ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization in vio-lation of previous assurances given toMoscow.”3

What were these assurances? Russians, withsome American support, insist that when theCold War ended and they agreed to the reuni-fication of Germany within NATO, theyreceived verbal assurances that NATO wouldnot expand further. “Any extension of the zoneof NATO is unacceptable,” Soviet presidentMikhail Gorbachev told Secretary of StateJames Baker in 1990. “I agree,” Baker replied.4

But there is some confusion about what thediscussions actually meant, especially sincepositions changed over time. The Russianswere furious they had been careless or, worse,misled. “The current collision between Russiaand NATO could have been avoided if theSoviet leadership had at that time . . . codified[American and German] intentions not toexpand NATO,” observed foreign affairs ana-lyst Alexei Pushkov. “The Russian leadership issaying that it will not be fooled again.”5

Third, by focusing on consolidating itsCold War victory, NATO neglected the newthreats that were emerging. NATO is livingwith the consequences of that attitude, as itsforces fight in Afghanistan. If NATO does notsucceed, it is possible that Afghanistan will beits undoing just as failure in Vietnamdestroyed another American-led alliance, the

2

The NorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization,

the bedrock ofAmerican foreign

policy since theSecond World

War, is showingsigns of severe

stress.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).When the Cold War ended, that failure was

largely forgotten. The idea that NATO coulddisappear, like SEATO before it, was not evenconsidered. NATO, Secretary of StateMadeleine Albright told the Senate ForeignRelations Committee during her January 1997confirmation hearings, is “a permanentalliance.”6 And so NATO expanded and tookon new missions, most notably in Afghanistan.But the victory in that country that appearedimminent at the end of 2001 now is increas-ingly in jeopardy, and now other tensions arebeginning to weigh on alliance unity. Is it pos-sible that NATO could go the way of SEATO?

The Mounting Troublesin Afghanistan

When the United States was attacked onSeptember 11, 2001, NATO invoked ArticleV—its pledge that an attack against one is anattack against all—for the first time in its his-tory. The U.S. government decided, however,that the military response should be primarilyan American, rather than an alliance, matter.Quite simply, the U.S. ability to project powerto remote Afghanistan far surpassed the capa-bilities of other members of the alliance. Inaddition, coordination is essential; if troopshave not trained together for their missions inpeacetime, the danger of friendly fire incidentsis vastly increased if they fight together in war.

The extraordinary success of the initialmilitary operation in Afghanistan justifiedthat decision, but in retrospect, it appearsthat success led to overconfidence. The mas-termind of the September 11 attack, Osamabin Laden, escaped with a core of supporters,which led to questions of whether sufficientforces were devoted to capturing him. Evenworse, the Bush administration, evidentlyconvinced that the situation in Afghanistanwas under control, diverted resources to Iraq.

After a Promising Start, the AllianceStumbles

For years, as the situation in Iraq deterio-

rated, Afghanistan was regarded as the suc-cess story. “We are in the south to help andprotect the Afghan people [as they] constructtheir own democracy,” British defense secre-tary John Reid said in April 2006. “We wouldbe perfectly happy to leave in three years andwithout firing one shot because our job is toprotect the reconstruction.”7

To be sure, Reid did acknowledge the pos-sibility that force might have to be used, forthat was the reason soldiers were being sent.It is evident, however, that the British govern-ment failed to anticipate the intensity ofcombat its troops would encounter. Indeed,in testimony before the House of Commonsdefense committee, the chief of the defensestaff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup,admitted the battle in Afghanistan “wouldhave been lost” in 2006 in the absence ofeffective close air support.8

Reliance on air support comes at a cost,however, since there is a heightened risk ofinnocent casualties, which in turn promptsincreased Afghan resentment of NATOforces. After U.S. special forces called in airstrikes in a valley in western Afghanistan inlate April 2007, Afghan officials claimed thatapproximately 100 civilians had been killedand wounded. “Five years on, it is very diffi-cult for us to continue accepting civiliancasualties,” President Hamid Karzai told anews conference. “It is becoming heavy forus; it is not understandable anymore.”9

“Caveats” and Other ProblemsIdeally, NATO members could provide

more ground forces, but for the most part theyhave been reluctant to do so. In August 2003,NATO took command of the InternationalSecurity Assistance Force, which had beenestablished pursuant to a UN Security Councilpeace-enforcement mandate. ISAF has neverseen itself as a war-fighting force; rather, it wasdesigned to provide assistance to the develop-ing Afghan army and to facilitate the recon-struction of Afghanistan following what wasthought to be the defeat of the Taliban. “To selltheir new missions at home, British, Dutchand Canadian officials portrayed deployments

3

The extraordinarysuccess of the initial militaryoperation inAfghanistanappears to have led to overconfidence.

to Afghanistan as safe, and better than sendingtroops to Iraq,” the New York Times reported insummarizing the history of the conflict.“Germany and Italy prevented their forcesfrom being sent on combat missions in volatileareas. Those regions were to be left to theAmericans, Canadians, British and Dutch.”10

Those limits on deployments are amongthe many “caveats” complicating the war-fight-ing capability of NATO in Afghanistan andelsewhere. Other caveats include different rulesof engagement, restrictions on how aircraft canbe used, and even operational limitations onthe use of riot control agents.11 In October2006, NATO’s Supreme Commander, Gen.James Jones, criticized Turkey for not allowingits forces to operate outside of Kabul.12 And inMarch 2007, the German Defense Minister,Franz-Josef Jung, bluntly stated that “there willbe no shifting of our troops from north tosouth,” where most of the fighting is takingplace in Afghanistan.13 As then–secretary ofdefense Donald Rumsfeld told a NATO meet-ing in September 2005, “Clearly, if you’re aNATO commander in command of an opera-tion where there are different rules of engage-ment and different restrictions on nationalforces, it makes it enormously difficult for himto command that force.”14

Calls for additional troops or for lifting the“caveats” have met with modest responses,provoking complaints of unfair burden shar-ing. “When you go on an operation as com-plex and dangerous as this, where someNATO nations are not playing a full part,”there is “huge resentment” among troopsputting their lives on the line while “others arenot,” complained Lord Inge, commander ofthe British armed forces in the 1990s.15

Indeed, the House of Commons SelectCommittee on Defense has bluntly stated thatit “remain[s] deeply concerned that the reluc-tance of some NATO members to providetroops for the ISAF mission is underminingNATO’s credibility and ISAF operations.”16

The Resurgence of the TalibanOn this side of the Atlantic, Secretary of

State Condoleezza Rice has warned that

Afghanistan “could come back to haunt us” ifNATO failed and the Taliban came to poweragain.17 That possibility, which seemedunthinkable six years ago, can no longer beexcluded. Even Kabul is now experiencingbombings. “Every month there’s a 20 to 25percent increase in offensive activity,” reportsNic Lee, director of the Afghanistan NGOsafety office, a project funded by the EuropeanCommission. Lee claimed that attacks in Juneand July 2007 were 80–90 percent higher thanin the same period last year.18 A suicide attackin November killed six legislators—a sign thatthe Taliban is adopting tactics such as road-side bombs and suicide bombers that haveproved so effective and difficult to counter inIraq.19 Poppy cultivation has soared, providingthe Taliban with a lucrative source of incomeand presenting NATO with a terrible dilem-ma: attempt to eradicate the poppy and there-by alienate the farmers who grow it, or allowthe poppy to flourish and the Taliban to prof-it. Efforts to find alternative crops have so farproved of limited success, so the dilemma con-tinues. And as Lord Inge told the House ofLords last July, “if we fail in Afghanistan thenPakistan goes down.”20

But if Afghanistan affects the stability ofPakistan, the situation in Pakistan, especiallyin its border areas, also affects the security situ-ation in Afghanistan. As the United States dis-covered in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, insur-gencies with secure sanctuaries are extraordi-narily difficult, if not impossible, to defeat. Theexistence of such a sanctuary in Pakistan is thefocus of NATO’s concern. In testimony beforethe Senate Foreign Relations Committee,General Jones called Quetta, the capital ofPakistan’s Balochistan province, the headquar-ters of the Taliban.21 Pakistani President PervezMusharraf has acknowledged the threat.“There is no doubt Afghan militants are sup-ported from Pakistan soil,” he admitted whilevisiting Kabul in August 2007. “The problemthat you have in your region is because supportis provided from our side.”22

The question now is what the Pakistanigovernment can do. Deals made with theTaliban appear to be backfiring, and “far

4

Limits on deployments are

among the many “caveats”

complicating thewar-fighting capability of

NATO inAfghanistan

and elsewhere.

from achieving peace in the tribal areas or inAfghanistan, it seems these deals now threat-en peace in Pakistan itself.”23 Pakistani com-mentators wonder aloud about the ability ofthe state to impose control, as religiousextremists defy government authority even inthe capital, Islamabad. On November 3,2007, President Pervez Musharraf declaredan emergency and suspended the constitu-tion. “Pakistan is on the verge of destabiliza-tion,” he warned. “Inaction at this moment issuicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow thiscountry to commit suicide.”24

The deteriorating situation in Pakistanrepresents a grave threat to NATO operationsin Afghanistan. Supply lines in Pakistan arecoming under attack: in one incident in May2007, as many as 10 trucks transporting fuelto coalition forces were destroyed. Accordingto a report in the Frontier Post (Peshawar), theseattacks are becoming “a routine business.”25 Ifsuch a situation continues, NATO will have tolook for other supply routes. Given the poorrelations with Iran, that means looking toAfghanistan’s northern border, which meansincreased reliance on Russia.

Ironically, the success of NATO’s missionin Afghanistan could thus rest in Moscow’shands. After September 11, Vladimir Putin’sgovernment cooperated with the UnitedStates against the Taliban, but the relativelygood relations that prevailed at that time havefrayed significantly. Although Russia stillwould have an incentive to cooperate, becauseit also views the Taliban as an enemy, it pre-sumably would exact a price related to some ofits other disputes with the United States andNATO. Unfortunately, the relationship hasnow become burdened with a number ofissues, of which the most important are mis-sile defense, Kosovo, and Estonia.26

Missile Defense CreatesNew Tensions

In December 2001, President Bush an-nounced that the United States was withdraw-ing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that

had been in effect for almost 30 years. Heargued that the treaty was a relic of the ColdWar and that missile defenses were now neces-sary to deal with threats from terrorists androgue states. In reply, President Putin acknowl-edged that the U.S. withdrawal from the treatydid not threaten Russia’s security, but he nev-ertheless regarded the decision as a “mis-take.”27

That judgment has hardened since theUnited States announced it wanted to deployanti-missile facilities in the Czech Republicand Poland to provide protection againstIranian missiles. The Russian governmenthas ridiculed that rationale, denouncing theproposed deployment as designed to counterRussian missiles and rejecting proposals forcooperation. According to Russian foreignminister Lavrov, “any unilateral steps, espe-cially those taken in haste, are effectively set-ting the stage for a new division of Europe.”28

The warning about a new division ofEurope evokes images of a return to the ColdWar. Moscow has warned that it will increaseits offensive missile capabilities to offset anydefensive deployments, and it has suspendedparticipation in the treaty on conventionalforces in Europe. “Some European countriesare flagrantly violating CFE [ConventionalForces in Europe] provisions, whereas Russiahas fewer weapons in its treaty zone than it isallowed to have,” claims Russian commenta-tor Pyotr Goncharov. Linking the two dis-putes, he adds that “it would make sense forEuropean countries to heed Russia’s griev-ances over the ABM issue.”29

Intra-Alliance TensionsRussia is not alone in voicing concerns.

NATO’s secretary general has warned that byapproaching Poland and the Czech Republicto safeguard its own security, the United Statesrisks creating two levels of security withinNATO itself. “For me the indivisibility of secu-rity is key,” Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stressed.“When it comes to missile defense, thereshouldn’t be an A-league and a B-league with-in NATO.”30 Some NATO members, notablyin “old” Europe, have also voiced objections.

5

Ironically, the success ofNATO’s missionin Afghanistancould rest inMoscow’s hands.

German officials, in particular, have expressednervousness about where the U.S. policy mightlead. “Our top priority remains disarmamentand not an arms buildup,” Foreign MinisterFrank-Walter Steinmeier has written. “Wedon’t want a new arms race in Europe.”31

In addition, although the top leaders of theCzech Republic and Poland have expressedsupport for the ABM system, uneasiness isbubbling beneath the surface. “Almost everypublic survey conducted in recent months hasshown around 60 percent of Czechs opposedto the radar base,” the BBC reports.“According to the country’s leading pollingagency STEM, those ‘strongly against’ far out-weigh those ‘strongly in favor.’”32 Similarly, amajority of respondents to a poll in Polandopposed the deployment.33 The manner inwhich the U.S. government pushed the ABMsystem provoked an outraged reaction fromthe Polish defense minister, who resigned.“Some genius at the State Department or thePentagon sent the first official note describingpossible placement of the facility with a draftreply attached,” Radek Sikorski wrote in astinging article in the Washington Post. “If theBush administration expects Poles and Czechsto jump for joy and agree to whatever is pro-posed, it’s going to face a mighty crash withreality.”34

In short, the ABM proposal is alreadydividing NATO, and Putin is exploiting thosedivisions with his proposal to base the ABMradar in Azerbaijan rather than the CzechRepublic. As a report in the Hindu stressed,Putin’s proposal, which also included basinginterceptor missiles closer to Iran, wasdesigned to facilitate a cooperative Europeanapproach to European security. “A missileshield built near the Iranian borders wouldcover all of Europe, rather than just a part ofit as would be the case with missiles deployedin Poland under the U.S. plan,” VladimirRadyuhin wrote from Moscow. “The wreck-age of missiles intercepted in the early stagesafter launch from Iran would fall into the sea,rather than on the heads of Europeans.”35

In other words, Putin is telling theEuropeans, “The Americans are designing a

system for themselves, not for you, but myplan would protect you.” The question iswhether the United States will be able to holdits allies in line, or whether Putin will be suc-cessful in sowing division.

The New Kosovo Crisis

In 1999, following NATO’s war againstSerbia (Yugoslavia), the UN Security Counciladopted a resolution authorizing the establish-ment of an international civil and security pres-ence under UN auspices in Kosovo. “Reaffirm-ing the commitment of all Member States tothe sovereignty and territorial integrity of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia,” Resolution1244 specified that the UN presence wasintended “to provide an interim administrationfor Kosovo under which the people of Kosovocan enjoy substantial autonomy within theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia.”36

Reneging on a CommitmentNevertheless, in March 2007 Marti Ahtisaari,

the UN secretary general’s special envoy forKosovo, recommended that Kosovo be put on apath for supervised independence. Furthernegotiation, he had concluded, was pointless.“Both parties have reaffirmed their categorical,diametrically opposed positions,” he explained,and the Kosovars would not agree to remainwithin Serbia. “This is a reality one cannot deny;it is irreversible.”37

The proposal immediately ran into oppo-sition from Russia, which urged furthernegotiation to achieve an outcome agreeableto both sides. Commenting on the Ahtisaariplan, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesmanMikhail Kamynin said in March 2007 that “itis important to continue impartial consulta-tions and to steadily expand the sphere ofagreement between the negotiating parties inthe interests of finding solutions to the prob-lems on the basis of Resolution No. 1244 ofthe U.N. Security Council and principles ofinternational law.”38

Two questions arise here. First, what doesinternational law require? According to

6

The proposal to deploy anti-

ballistic missilefacilities in the

Czech Republicand Poland is

already dividingNATO, and Putin

is exploitingthose divisions.

Kosovo’s prime minister, Agim Ceku, “theUN Charter and all other relevant statementsof international law underline the pre-emi-nence of self-determination.”39 But if that isthe case, how can self-determination bedenied to other peoples who might demandit? Already, Russia is arguing that Kosovowould set a precedent for other indepen-dence movements, and Ceku’s interpretationof international law would appear to rein-force that contention.

Second, who decides what internationallaw is relevant in such a matter? The Russiansare saying that the United Nations, and espe-cially the Security Council, decide on theseissues. It would appear the United Statesagreed with that view, for otherwise why didit turn to the Security Council following thewar in Kosovo? But now the U.S. governmentis arguing that if the Security Council cannotreach agreement, it can be ignored. “Whendoes the process end?” President Bush askedrhetorically during a visit to Albania lastJune, answering, “The time is now. . . .We’regoing to have to move. Independence is thegoal, and that’s what the people of Kosovoneed to know.”40

Thus, the question here concerns a funda-mental issue of the post–Cold War order.“We’re now in sight of a United Nations thatperforms as envisioned by its founders,”President George H. W. Bush famously toldCongress on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War.41

The hope was that the end of the Cold Wardivisions would lead to a world based on therule of law. The corresponding fear was thata failure of the rule of law could lead to newdivisions and tensions, including some thatAmericans did not expect.

Russia—and Others—Cite InternationalLaw

The Russian emphasis on law mightappear to some as insincere, but it defines afundamental issue: if we are not governed bythe rule of law, in which all are equal before thelaw, then might makes right. When NATOignored the requirement for a UN SecurityCouncil Resolution authorizing its bombing

campaign in Kosovo, arguing that the moralimperative to prevent genocide overrode thelanguage of the UN Charter, the Russianswere unhappy, but they agreed to supportResolution 1244. If that resolution is now dis-regarded, they will likely conclude that theWestern countries follow the law when it suitstheir interests, and ignore it when it doesn’t.

And they will not be the only ones. LastFebruary, as Ahtisaari was preparing to pre-sent his plan, the foreign ministers of Russia,China, and India met in New Delhi. They“expressed their conviction that democrati-zation of international relations is the key tobuilding an increasingly multi-polar worldorder that would be based on principles ofequality of nations—big or small, respect forsovereignty and territorial integrity of coun-tries, international law and mutual respect,”according to the official communiqué. “TheMinisters acknowledged that the UN is anappropriate instrument for promoting andattaining such a world order.”42

Although that communiqué was all butignored in the West, its language suggests thatChina and India share Russia’s concerns.Indeed, in China’s case, that is to be expected.Just as Resolution 1244 is the test of Americansincerity regarding Kosovo, the Shanghaicommuniqué negotiated between U.S. andChinese leaders on the occasion of PresidentRichard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 is thetest of American sincerity regarding theambiguous relationship between China andTaiwan.43 It would hardly be surprising if theChinese were watching this issue and thinkingto themselves: If the Americans disregard aSecurity Council resolution, why should webelieve they won’t disregard the Shanghaicommuniqué?

The Indian perspective is more surprisinggiven the upturn in U.S.-India relations, a pri-ority of the Bush administration. The keyhere may be found in the term “mutualrespect.” Although the Indians are keen toimprove their relationship with the UnitedStates, they are sensitive to any action thatappears disrespectful: for example, they havesharply rejected Washington’s objections to

7

Kosovo could set a precedentfor other independencemovements.

New Delhi’s plans for a pipeline with Iran.44

Consequently, they might be watchingKosovo and thinking: If this is the lack ofrespect the United States shows Russia, a per-manent member of the Security Council,how will Washington treat us if it becomestoo powerful?

In short, the New Delhi communiqué sug-gests that the repercussions of bypassingResolution 1244 could reverberate wellbeyond the Balkans. Moscow could argue thatby disregarding the UN Charter and theHelsinki Final Act, which both set forth prin-ciples concerning state sovereignty and respectfor human rights, the United States and itsallies have shown they consider themselves tobe too powerful to be restrained by mere legalconstraints.45

NATO and the Prospect of New Violencein the Balkans

Would NATO members line up behind theUnited States in the face of this challenge? Theanswer is not clear, especially if violence breaksout in Kosovo. NATO is caught in the middleof a dilemma between the possibility ofAlbanian violence if independence is notgranted, or Serbian violence if it is. It is ques-tionable whether Serbia would meekly acceptKosovo’s independence. “If this plan happens,it will only give the Albanian terrorists achance to finish the ethnic cleansing jobagainst Serbs in Kosovo that has been goingon for the past seven years,” Bishop Artemije,the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church inKosovo, warned in Washington last February.“Serbia will react as any democratic countrywould do to the loss of its territory, and Serbsin Kosovo will react as any occupied peoplewould do.”46

NATO, it should be remembered, is not theforce it was in 1999; it is now heavily involvedelsewhere. Would it be capable of handlingrenewed violence? Leaders may give assur-ances that the alliance can and would do so,but the major question concerns the willing-ness of the populations of the member statesto become engaged in the Balkans once again.Already facing foreign challenges beyond what

they expected, the outbreak of violence in theBalkans—in a conflict thought to be all butsettled—could make them wonder about thecompetence of their leaders. If so, the pros-pects for effective action—indeed, for thefuture of the alliance itself—could be bleak.

Estonia and the Perils ofSecurity Guarantees

Another issue that is challenging NATO isthe tense relationship between alliance mem-ber Estonia and Russia. Earlier this year, theEstonian government moved a Soviet-era warmemorial, which included the interred bodiesof Russian soldiers who had died in the SecondWorld War, from the center of Tallinn to a mil-itary cemetery. That action provoked outragein Russia. The Estonian ambassador inMoscow had to flee a gang of young thugs whointerrupted a press briefing she was giving. Inaddition, computer networks in Estonia soonwere besieged by “denial of service” attacks,which Estonia (and others) claimed were origi-nating in Russia. “Russian Web forums postedexplicit instructions on how to overloadEstonian Web sites,” the Chicago Tribune report-ed. “Let Estonia know that Russia will neverleave its compatriots in trouble,” it quotedfrom one Russian site. “Take revenge at theseEstonian government addresses.”47

The attacks provoked a response fromNATO, which sent a team to investigate. “Thisis an operational security issue, somethingwe’re taking very seriously,” an official at itsheadquarters in Brussels said. “It goes to theheart of the alliance’s modus operandi.”48

There are two issues to be considered here.The first is the issue of cyber warfare. Estonia,it turns out, is especially vulnerable because somuch of its business activity is connected tothe internet. According to the Estonian defenseminister, the effect of the attacks was like hav-ing ports blockaded.49 Yet it is difficult to proveresponsibility. Even if the attacks are traced toRussia, that does not by itself prove govern-ment responsibility. “None of the sources wehave analyzed from around the world show a

8

NATO is caughtin the middle of adilemma betweenthe possibility of

Albanian violenceif independence

is not granted, or Serbian

violence if it is.

clear line from Moscow to Tallinn,” observedJose Nazario, a senior security engineer withArbor Networks. “We see signs of Russiannationalism at work here, but no Russian gov-ernment connection.”50

The second is what NATO can do. Thatissue goes beyond the specifics of cyber war-fare. Supposedly, once Estonia was includedin NATO, its security would be assured. Thecyber attacks indicate that argument mustnow be questioned. At the very least, the cyberattacks suggest there are ways of indirectlychallenging NATO. In other words, the logicof deterrence must now be reexamined. As theEconomist has succinctly put it, “though [theBaltic states] shelter in theory under thealliance’s nuclear umbrella, in practice NATOoffers little more than moral support.”51

Athens and AmericaThe predicament confronting Estonia,

and other small states that are located near amuch larger power, is a recurring theme inhistory. Perhaps its most famous expressionis the Melian dialogue from Thucydides’sHistory of the Peloponnesian War. The Melians,confronted by the might of Athens, hopedtheir position as a colony of Lacedaemon(Sparta) would protect them. Their hopeswere in vain, as the Athenians knew the reali-ties of the balance of power. In their ultima-tum, the Athenians bluntly told the Meliansthat “the strong do what they can and theweak suffer what they must.”52

During the Cold War, both sides largely rec-ognized these realities. The United States letthe Soviet Union build the Berlin Wall. It neverrecognized the incorporation of the BalticStates into the Soviet Union, but it also neverconsidered using military force to free them.

But empires do not last forever; theAthenian empire crumbled, and so did theSoviet. It is understandable that the Estonians,and others, who suffered terribly during the20th century should seek assurances of securi-ty, and Americans can only be flattered by thetrust they repose in us. It would be wonderfulif we could be worthy of that trust. But ulti-mately the question must be asked, whether

the security of small states is guaranteed betterby alliances than by a respected system ofinternational law. Both have their risks, butthe history of the 20th century underlines thedanger small states assume by placing theirhopes for security in the promises of largercountries.

The Balance of Power

In a speech to the 2002 graduating class ofWest Point, President Bush unveiled a vision ofAmerican military hegemony that would, heargued, lead to a more peaceful world.“America has, and intends to keep, militarystrengths beyond challenge,” he proclaimed,“thereby, making the destabilizing arms racesof other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries totrade and other pursuits of peace.”53 Elaborat-ing on this idea, then–national security adviserCondoleezza Rice derided the idea of multi-polarity. “Multi-polarity is a theory of rivalry;of competing interests—and at its worst—com-peting values,” she told the InternationalInstitute of Strategic Studies in June 2003.“Power in the service of freedom is to be wel-comed, and powers that share a commitmentto freedom can—and must—make commoncause against freedom’s enemies.”54

However beguiling this idea, it runscounter to the founding principle of theUnited States that unchecked power is boundto be abused. Our system of checks and bal-ances is simply the domestic application of theinternational concept of the balance of power.Just as Americans would not feel safe if theirrights were guaranteed by a dictator, so peoplein other countries will not trust their rightsand freedoms to the protection of a single,unchallenged hegemon. In such a situation,the world will divide between those who seetheir protection in alignment with the super-power, and those who feel that whatever pro-tection might be offered in the short run islikely to be sacrificed in the long run.

Alliances Lead to CounteralliancesAt the beginning of the last century, the

9

The history of the 20th centuryunderlines thedanger smallstates assume byplacing theirhopes for securityin the promisesof larger countries.

Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italyprovoked the formation of the countervailingTriple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia.As Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s foreign secretaryat the time, explained in his memoirs:

It seemed incredible that [the Germans]should not realize that, if Germany hadalliances, other countries must havethem too. . . . After the Triple Alliancewas formed Russia was isolated, Francewas isolated, Britain was not only isolat-ed, but in constant danger of war withFrance or Russia. German statesmencannot seriously have thought that thissituation could last. France and Russiafound some comfort in an Alliance, andat last Britain found it in an Entente.55

But it appears the Germans did not realizethe obligations the members of the Ententefelt toward each other. Concerned that Berlinhad misconstrued a statement he gave inanswer to a parliamentary inquiry, Grey “gavethe [German] Ambassador a warning that myreply in the House of Commons must betaken as meaning just what it said, and that itdid not preclude some intimacy on our partwith France and Russia that was like that ofAllies.”56 The warning was not heeded, andwithin a few months the Triple Entente was atwar with the Triple Alliance.

History may not repeat itself exactly, butthe parallel with the post-Cold War world pro-vides an opportunity for reflection. When theCold War ended and the Warsaw Pact dis-solved, Russia agreed to live with NATO—evenwith a NATO that expanded to include a unit-ed Germany. But a triumphant alliance decid-ed it should expand and take in new members.Incredibly, like Germany’s leaders a centurybefore, American leaders (and their foreignallies) did not appreciate that alliances pro-voke the formation of counter-alliances.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organizationas a Response to NATO

But as NATO has expanded, Russia’s rela-tions with China, in particular, have grown

apace, leading initially to the formation of theShanghai Five and then to the ShanghaiCooperation Organization, which includes—in addition to Russia and China—Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as fullmembers, and India, Iran, Mongolia, andPakistan as observer members.

In other words, just as the Triple Ententegradually emerged in opposition to the TripleAlliance, so the SCO seems to be emerging inresponse to NATO expansion. And just as theTriple Entente insisted, at least in public, thatit was not an alliance, so do the members ofthe SCO. But the membership of the SCOdoes not overlap with NATO, just as the mem-bership of the Triple Alliance did not overlapwith the Triple Entente, and SCO membersconduct military exercises together just asNATO countries do.57 In short, the world is indanger of dividing just as Europe divided acentury ago—a process that should have beenforeseen by those who naively thought othercountries would not respond to NATO expan-sion by taking their own corresponding mea-sures.

The Guarantor’sResponsibility

In his memoirs, Secretary of State DeanRusk described how uneasy he felt about thecreation of SEATO. “I was amazed, even dis-mayed, by the casual way the Senate ratifiedthe SEATO Treaty,” he recalled. “With mas-sive retaliation backing up our treaty obliga-tions, we may have entered SEATO ‘on thecheap,’ without fully recognizing the price wemight have to pay to back up our treatypledges.”58

SEATO was a precursor to the post-ColdWar efforts to expand NATO, since it wasbased on the same premise that an Americansecurity guarantee would provide protection.“SEATO was a comprehensive pledge, accept-ing responsibility for the security of the pro-tocol states,” Rusk explained. “When theUnited States signed that treaty, SEATObecame the law of the land and linked South

10

The ShanghaiCooperation

Organizationseems to be

emerging inresponse to

NATO expansion.

Vietnam to the general structure of collectivesecurity.”59

The parallels with the situation today aretroubling. When NATO’s members invokedArticle 5 following the September 11 attack,they could hardly have imagined their mili-tary operations would encounter so muchdifficulty. After all, the greatest militarypower the world had ever seen headed theiralliance, and Afghanistan was a poor andweak country.

But the war was not taken seriously, andnow NATO is in difficulty. “The situation inAfghanistan is much worse than many peoplerecognize,” Lord Inge told the House of Lordson July 11, 2007. “We need to face up to thatissue, the consequences of strategic failure inAfghanistan and what that would mean forNATO.” Another member of the Houseagreed. “When I was at NATO 18 months ago,I found myself talking to a succession of peoplein SHAPE who said that the future of NATOnow depends on success in Afghanistan,”stressed Lord Wallace of Saltaire. “If that is thecase, we have some real questions to ask aboutthe future of NATO.”60

Nor are such warnings confined toBritain. “NATO has now had to face an exis-tential crisis of sorts,” Undersecretary ofState Nicholas Burns told the AtlanticCouncil last February, accusing some NATOmembers of shirking their obligations. “Toomany of our allies have said that they’re quitewilling to be garrison troops in the northernand western parts of the country that are rel-atively quiet and peaceful, but not willing tocome down to where the Taliban is crossingthe border in great numbers and where alQaeda is also taking on the American,Afghan, and those NATO allied forces” fromBritain, Canada, Estonia, the Netherlands,and Romania. “We need to see that effortfrom the Europeans. We need to see moreEuropean soldiers in Afghanistan, moreEuropean money devoted to the task ofrebuilding the country.” At the same time,however, he insisted that “NATO will contin-ue to grow. We will continue to add membersto the NATO Alliance.”61

But is it responsible to add new members ifthe fate of the alliance itself has come intoquestion? Our experience with SEATOdemonstrates why we must ask hard ques-tions before, not after, we have extended secu-rity guarantees. The fate of the Vietnameseand the Cambodians is on our conscience, andthe Iraqis and Afghans may soon be, as well.This is a moral issue of the highest order: weshould not make promises of protection we might notbe able to honor.

And what kind of alliance are we askingthese countries to enter? As Secretary Burnsmade clear, it is an alliance that will ask itsmembers to send their soldiers to Afghanistan.But that is not why the new members wantedto join the alliance. A poll by the Pew researchgroup released last June revealed that 45 per-cent of Czech respondents and 63 percent ofPolish respondents favored removing troopsfrom Afghanistan. Indeed, in seven of twelveNATO members surveyed, majorities “saytroops should be withdrawn from Afghanistanas soon as possible.”62

In short, the alliance is fraying, a develop-ment that should have been foreseen. To besure, the demise of NATO has been predictedalmost from its inception. But the moral ofthe story of the boy who cries wolf is thatpeople become complacent and therefore arecaught off guard when the wolf eventuallyappears.

Just such complacency has been evidentsince the Cold War ended. The triumphalismthat characterized American diplomacy wasnot only unrealistic; it was a contradiction ofthe guidance of this country’s Founders. “Therulers of the most powerful nation in theworld,” Alexander Hamilton warned, “will for-ever aim at an undue empire over othernations.” Power unconstrained would lead toexcess, arousing the suspicion and oppositionof other countries. “The spirit of moderationin a state of overbearing power is a phenome-non which has not yet appeared, and which nowise man will ever expect to see,” Hamiltonexplained, referring to France. “’Twere there-fore contrary to our true interest to assist inbuilding up this colossus to the enormous size

11

The demise of NATO hasbeen predictedalmost from itsinception. But themoral of the storyof the boy whocries wolf is thatpeople becomecomplacent andtherefore arecaught off guardwhen the wolfeventuallyappears.

at which she aims. ’Twere a policy as short-sighted as mean to seek safety in a sub-servience to her views as the price of herclemency.”63

What was true for the United States vis-à-vis France is now true of other countries vis-à-vis the United States. And again, this was pre-dicted by our Founders. No less a figure thanGeorge Washington advised the Americanpeople in his Farewell Address to avoid thetemptation of permanent alliances, noting thelikelihood that they would lead to permanentconfrontation. Now we wonder whether theCold War is returning and note with concernthe support of the Russian people for Presi-dent Putin’s more confrontational policy. It isnot the world we expected when the BerlinWall fell; and it remains to be seen whether thechallenges confronting NATO, includingKosovo, missile defense, and especially Af-ghanistan, can be surmounted.

If they are not, then NATO will, indeed,confront an existential crisis. Failure inAfghanistan, in particular, is likely to bringrecriminations as members of the allianceattempt to shift the blame. Weakeningalliance solidarity will be reinforced by prob-lems in staffing the armed forces: the U.S.Army, for example, began the current recruit-ing year with the fewest number of candidatessigned up for basic training since the incep-tion of the all-volunteer force in 1973.64 Thereality of American overstretch is already beingrecognized in NATO members who looked tothe U.S. as their protector. “Our American col-leagues say not to worry, that NATO will pro-tect us, but rhetorical assurances are too easy,”Poland’s former defense minister Sikorskiexplained in the Washington Post. “Poland ishaunted by the memory of fighting Hitleralone in 1939 while our allies stood by.”65

The tragedy of Poland in 1939 occurredwhen Britain and France casually extendeddefense guarantees without taking seriouslythe accompanying responsibilities. Describingthe security arrangements reached at theOctober 1925 Locarno conference, WinstonChurchill wrote that “although the proposalseemed dangerous in theory—pledging us in

fact to take part on one side or the other in anyFranco-German war that might arise—therewas little likelihood of such a disaster evercoming to pass; and this was the best means ofpreventing it.”66 Churchill at the time washimself so confident of the stability of peace inEurope that when he was Chancellor of theExchequer in 1928, he advised his colleagues“that it should now be laid down as a standingassumption that at any given date there will beno major war for ten years from that date.”67

The Locarno arrangements did not pre-vent the Second World War, and they did notsurvive it. That is the typical fate of securityguarantees that prove ineffective. If NATOfails to meet its current challenges, its sur-vival should not be taken for granted. Giventhe difficulties the alliance is confronting, itis not too early to begin discussions with ourallies about what a post-NATO world wouldlook like. They have put their trust in us, andwe have an obligation to them, and to our-selves, to face the world honestly.

Notes1. Pyotr Romanov, “New Medal for American Uni-form,” RIA Novosti, May 19, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20060519/48366913.html.

2. Strobe Talbott, “Gogol’s Troika: The Case forStrategic Patience in a Time of Troubles,” Stan-ford University, November 6, 1998, p. 12, http://www.stanford.edu/group/Russia20/volumepdf/talbott.pdf.

3. Sergey Lavrov, “Containing Russia: Back to theFuture?” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs web-site, July 17, 2007, http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/8F8005F0C5CA3710C325731D0022E227?OpenDocument. Putin also referred to theseassurances in his speech in Munich in February2007. Vladimir W. Putin, Speech at the 43rd Mun-ich Conference on Security Policy, February 10,2007, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179.

4. Quoted in Michael R. Gordon, “The Anatomyof a Misunderstanding,” New York Times, May 25,1997.

5. Quoted in Alan Philps, “Russians Find ‘Proof’that West Misled Them,” Times (London), March21, 1997, and cited in Stanley Kober, “Russia’s

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No less a figurethan GeorgeWashingtonadvised the

American peoplein his Farewell

Address to avoidthe temptation

of permanentalliances.

Search for Identity,” in NATO Enlargement: Illusionsand Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and BarbaraConry (Washington: Cato Institute, 1998), p. 132.

6. Madeleine Albright, “Building a New WorldFramework for Democracy,” Testimony beforethe Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January1997, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0397/ijpe/pj1albr.htm.

7. Quoted in BBC News, “UK Troops ‘To TargetTerrorists,’” April 24, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4935532.stm.

8. Quoted in Thomas Harding, “My Troops HaveLittle Left to Give, Says Sir Jock,” Daily Telegraph,March 7, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/07/ntroops07.xml.

9. Quoted in Abdul Waheed Wafa and CarlottaGall, “Afghans Say U.S. Bombing Killed 42Civilians,” New York Times, May 3, 2007.

10. David Rhode and David E. Sanger, “How a‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New YorkTimes, August 12, 2007.

11. Kathleen T. Rhem, “NATO Transforming toMeet 21st Century Threats,” Armed Forces PressService, September 14, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17304.

12. Umit Enginsoy, “NATO Urges Nations to LiftCaveats on Forces in Afghanistan,” DefenseNews.com, October 24, 2006, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2308519&C=europe.

13. Quoted in “Interview with Defense MinisterJung,” Spiegel, March 9, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,470674,00.html.

14. Rhem.

15. Quoted in Thomas Harding, “Do Your FairShare in Afghanistan, NATO Told,” Daily Telegraph,March 10, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/10/wafg10.xml.

16. UK Parliament, House of Commons, SelectCommittee on Defense, “Thirteenth Report,” July18, 2007, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/408/40804.htm.

17. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks withCanadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay at theMuseum of Industry,” Department of State, Sep-tember 12, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/72072.htm.

18. Quoted in John Ward Anderson, “Emboldened

Taliban Reflected in More Attacks, Greater Reach,”Washington Post, September 25, 2007.

19. Jason Straziuso and Fisnik Abrashi, “28 Killedin Afghan Blast,” Associated Press, November 6,2007.

20. Quoted in Nicholas Watt and Ned Temko,“Failure in Afghanistan Risks Rise in Terror, SayGenerals,” Observer (London), July 15, 2007, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2126817,00.html.

21. Carlotta Gall, “At Border, Signs of PakistaniRole in Taliban Surge,” New York Times, January21, 2007.

22. Quoted in Taimoor Shah and Carlotta Gall,“Afghan Rebels Find Aid in Pakistan, MusharrafAdmits,” New York Times, August 13, 2007.

23. M. Ilyas Khan, “Taleban Spread Wings inPakistan,” BBC, March 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6409089.stm.

24. Quoted in “Musharraf Imposes EmergencyRule,” BBC, November 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7076670.stm.

25. Sudhir Ahmad Afridi, “Attack Destroys 10 OilTankers at Torkham, Frontier Post (Peshawar,Pakistan), May 22, 2007, http://www.thefrontierpost.com/News.aspx?ncat=ts&nid=81&ad=22-05-2007.

26. For more on the U.S.-Russia relationship, seeNikolas Gvosdev, “Parting with Illusions: Develop-ing a Realistic Approach to Relations with Russia,”Cato Institute Policy Analysis, forthcoming.

27. Quoted in Manuel Perez-Rivas, “U.S. QuitsABM Treaty,” CNN.com, December 14, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec.bush.abm/.

28. Quoted in “U.S. Missile Shield in Europe PutsRussia at Risk—FM Lavrov,” RIA Novosti, May 22,2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070522/65891780.html.

29. Pyotr Goncharov, “Europe Torn between ABMand CFE,” RIA Novosti, May 7, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070507/65040931.html.

30. Quoted in Daniel Dombey and FideliusSchmid, “FT Interview—Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,”Financial Times, March 11, 2007.

31. Quoted in “Merkel Urges U.S. to ConsultAllies,” Spiegel, March 19, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,472508,00.html. Steinmeier’s article originally appeared in the

13

Frankfurter Allgemeine Soontagszitung.

32. Rob Cameron, “US Missile Shield AlarmsCzechs,” BBC, May 28, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6697757.stm.

33. “Majority of Poles against U.S. Shield Plan:Poll,” Reuters, July 17, 2007.

34. Radek Sikorski, “Don’t Take Poland for Grant-ed,” Washington Post,” March 21, 2007. Immediatelyafter becoming foreign minister in November2007, Sikorski proposed a dialogue with Russia onthe missile shield issue. See “Poland Offers RussiaTalks on U.S. Missile Shield,” Reuters, November22, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL2229063020071122?sp=true.

35. Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russian President CallsBush’s Bluff,” Hindu, June 12, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/12/stories/2007061203051100.htm.

36. NATO Resolution 1244 (1999), http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm.

37. Quoted in Julia Preston, “United NationsReport Urges Independence for Kosovo,” Inter-national Herald Tribune, March 26, 2007.

38. Quoted in Itar-Tass, “Russia Has Reasons forUsing Right of Veto over Kosovo,” Illyria (Balkans)Forums, March 19, 2007, http://p083.ezboard.com/Russia-has-reasons-for-using-right-of-veto-over-Kosovo/fbalkansfrm191.showMessage?topicID=159.topic.

39. Agim Ceku, “Kosovo Is Looking Forward,”International Herald Tribune, September 26, 2007.

40. White House, “President Bush Participates inJoint Press Availability with Prime Minister ofAlbania, Sali Berisha,” Press Release, June 10, 2007,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070610-1.html.

41. George H. W. Bush, “Confrontation in theGulf; Transcript of President’s Address to JointSession of Congress,” New York Times, September12, 1990.

42. Department of Information and Press, Ministryof Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “JointCommuniqué on the Results of the TrilateralMeeting of the Foreign Ministers of India, Russia,and China,” February 14, 2007, http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/2007/trilateral-meeting-20070214-1.html.

43. The U.S. government position with respect toTaiwan, as set forth in the document, acknowl-edged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan

Strait maintain there is but one China and thatTaiwan is a part of China,” and that “the UnitedStates Government does not challenge that posi-tion.” Further, the communiqué reaffirmed theU.S. government’s “interest in a peaceful settle-ment of the Taiwan question by the Chinese them-selves.” Joint Communiqué of the United States ofAmerica and the People’s Republic of China,February 28, 1972, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/joint_communique_1972.html.

44. See, for example, Jo Johnson, “India ‘Commit-ted’ to Iran Pipeline,” Financial Times, October 23,2007.

45. The Final Act of the Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki,Finland, in December 1975, was a key factor inreducing Cold War tensions between East andWest, but also outlined international standardsconcerning human rights and civil liberties thatremain in effect to this day. Full text available athttp://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf.

46. Quoted in David R. Sands, “‘Occupied’ SerbsWould Resist,” Washington Times, February 9, 2007.

47. Alex Rodriguez, “Attacks on Estonia Move toNew Front,” Chicago Tribune, May 29, 2007.

48. Quoted in Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused ofCyber War to Disable Estonia,” Guardian, May 17,2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html.

49. Valentinas Mite, “Estonia: Attacks Seen as FirstCase of ‘Cyberwar,’” Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty, May 30, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/05/595FF9A7-B58E-4C63-B68D-9606C6D805F7.html.

50. Quoted in Jeremy Kirk, “Russian Gov’t Notbehind Estonia DDOS Attacks,” Computerworld,June 4, 2007.

51. “Facing a Cold Wind,” Economist, June 28,2007.

52. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War,431 BC, chap. 17, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm.

53. White House, “President Bush Delivers Grad-uation Speech at West Point,” press release, June1, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

54. White House, “Remarks by Dr. CondoleezzaRice,” press release, June 26, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626.html.

14

55. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years,vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), p.196.

56. Ibid., pp. 285–86. Emphasis added.

57. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “‘PeaceMission 2007’ Not Targeted against Third Coun-try,” http://www.sectsco.org/html/01517.html.That disclaimer might be viewed in light of an arti-cle that appeared in China’s People’s Daily more thanfive years ago: “China-Russian Relations RemainBetter than Russian-US Ties,” People’s Daily, Novem-ber 28, 2002, http://english.people.com.cn/200211/28/eng20021128_107614.shtml. An American re-quest to observe these exercises was rejected. AdrianBloomfield, “Putin Praises Strength of ‘Warsaw Pact2,” Telegraph, August 17, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/08/17/wputin117.xml. A Russian commentator hasbluntly observed that “Russia and China are equallyinterested in creating a geopolitical counterbalanceto the United States and in building a multi-polarworld order.” Jibek Syzdykova , “Shanghai Cooper-ation Organization: Territory of Partnership,” RIANovosti, August 15, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/2007081.

58. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, ed. Daniel S. Papp(New York: Penguin, 1991), pp. 427–28.

59. Ibid., p. 427.

60. Lord Inge, Address to House of Lords, July 11,2007, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/newhtml_hl?DB=semsimple&STEMMER=en&WORDS=inge&ALL=&ANY=&PHRASE=&CATEGORIES=&SIMPLE=&SPEAKER=Inge&COLOUR=red&STYLE=s&ANCHOR=70711-0013.htm_spnew0&URL=/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/70711-0013.htm#70711-0013.htm_spnew0.

61. R. Nicholas Burns, “U.S.-European Alliance,”U.S. Department of State, February 21, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/81231.htm. In tes-timony before Congress, Secretary of DefenseRobert Gates emphasized U.S. disappointmentwith NATO. “The numbers [of troops and equip-ment, especially helicopters] are not that big, which,frankly, is one of the sources of frustration for me interms of our allies not being able to step up to theplate and meet these needs,’” he told the HouseArmed Services Committee last December. “I amnot ready to let NATO off the hook.” Quoted in EdBrown, “Gates Wants NATO to Reorganize AfghanMission (Update 1),” Bloomberg, December 13,2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aOgd3_WiFGoY&refer=home.

62. Pew Research Center, “The Pew GlobalAttitudes Project,” June 27, 2007, p. 28, http://pew-global.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf.

63. Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of AlexanderHamilton, vol. 6 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1904),pp. 234–36.

64. Robert Burns, “Record Low Level of Enlisteeson the Books,” Associated Press, November 1,2007. Meanwhile, military recruiters have increas-ingly relied on physical and other waivers to meettheir goals, see Lolita C. Baldor, “More RecruitsEnter Military on Waivers,” Associated Press,November 8, 2007.

65. Sikorski.

66. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (NewYork: Bantam, 1961), p. 27.

67. Quoted in N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy: Volume 1,Rearmament Policy (London: Her Majesty’s Station-ery Office, 1976), p. 57.

15

OTHER STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

607. The Connection between Wage Growth and Social Security’s FinancialCondition by Jagadeesh Gokhale (December 10, 2007)

606. The Planning Tax: The Case against Regional Growth-Management Planning by Randal O’Toole (December 6, 2007)

605. The Public Education Tax Credit by Adam B. Schaeffer (December 5, 2007)

604. A Gift of Life Deserves Compensation: How to Increase Living KidneyDonation with Realistic Incentives by Arthur J. Matas (November 7, 2007)

603. What Can the United States Learn from the Nordic Model? by Daniel J. Mitchell (November 5, 2007)

602. Do You Know the Way to L.A.? San Jose Shows How to Turn an UrbanArea into Los Angeles in Three Stressful Decades by Randal O’Toole (October 17, 2007)

601. The Freedom to Spend Your Own Money on Medical Care: A Common Casualty of Universal Coverage by Kent Masterson Brown (October 15, 2007)

600. Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War by Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter (September 13, 2007)

599. End It, Don’t Mend It: What to Do with No Child Left Behind by Neal McCluskey and Andrew J. Coulson (September 5, 2007)

598. Don’t Increase Federal Gasoline Taxes—Abolish Them by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren (August 7, 2007)

597. Medicaid’s Soaring Cost: Time to Step on the Brakes by Jagadeesh Gokhale (July 19, 2007)

596. Debunking Portland: The City That Doesn’t Work by Randal O’Toole (July 9, 2007)

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