Country Partnership Strategy Final Review

December 2015

Afghanistan (2009 to mid-2015)

ABBREVIATIONS ADB – Asian Development Bank ADF – Asian Development Fund AIB – Afghanistan International Bank AIGF – Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility AITF – Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund ANDS – Afghanistan National Development Strategy ANR – agriculture and natural resources APPF – Afghan Public Protection Force CAPE – country assistance program evaluation CAREC – Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation COBP – country operations business plan CPS – country partnership strategy CSPU – country strategy and program update DABS – Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (Afghanistan Electricity

Corporation) DMF – design and monitoring framework EIRR – economic internal rate of return FCAS

GDP – –

fragile and conflict-affected situation gross domestic product

GWh – gigawatt-hour ICSP – interim country strategy and program ICT – information and communication technology IWRM – integrated water resources management JFPR – Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction km – kilometer kWh – kilowatt hour MAIL – Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock MEW – Ministry of Energy and Water MFF – multitranche financing facility MW – megawatt MPW – Ministry of Public Works MRRD – Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NPP – National Priority Program O&M – operation and maintenance PMO – project management office PSM – public sector management TA – technical assistance

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 1

III. ASSESSMENT OF CPS PERFORMANCE 3

A. Relevance 3 B. Effectiveness 7 C. Efficiency 11 D. Sustainability 14 E. Development Impacts 15 F. Performance of Nonsovereign Operations 18 G. ADB and Borrower Performance 19 H. Overall Assessment 20

IV. LESSONS 21

V. RECOMMENDATIONS 22

A. Inclusive Economic Growth 22 B. Cross-Cutting Themes and Drivers of Change 23 C. Sector Selection 23 D. Enabling Environment for Private Sector 23 E. Addressing Security Risks 24 F. Enhance Monitoring and Reporting of Outcomes and Impacts 24

APPENDIXES 1. ADB Loans, Grants, and TAs Active During 2009 to mid-2015

2. Afghanistan Country Partnership Strategy 2009–2013: Objectives and Expected

Outcomes

3. Consistency of Country Partnership Strategy and Afghanistan National Development

Strategy Objectives and Priorities

4. Performance Ratings of Completed Sovereign Projects, 2009 to mid-2015

5. Performance Assessment of Physically Completed Projects and Technical Assistance,

2009 to mid-2015

6. Performance Assessment of Ongoing Projects and Technical Assistance, 2009 to mid-

2015

7. Progress Under Results Framework from Country Operations Business Plan 2013–2014

8. Performance Assessment of Nonsovereign Operations, 2009 to mid-2015

9. CPS Final Review Ratings Methodology

10. Comparison of CPS Final Review Ratings and CAPE Ratings

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) final review covers the Afghanistan CPS 2009–2013 and up until mid-2015. The purpose of the CPS final review is to assess the performance of ADB’s operations in the country and guide the development of the next CPS for Afghanistan. The criteria used in the final review entail relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and development impacts. The final review also assesses ADB’s and the government’s performances in the implementation of ADB-financed operations and offers lessons and recommendations for the next CPS. The CPS 2009–2013 followed ADB’s Initial Country Strategy and Program and the subsequent Country Strategy and Program Updates, and its strategic directions were extended to the Interim CPS 2014–2015. The objective of the CPS 2009–2013 was accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction. The priority sectors were energy, transport, and agriculture and natural resources (ANR). The CPS was closely aligned with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the government’s poverty reduction strategy. ADB has operated in an extremely challenging environment in Afghanistan. While it appeared that the conflict was ebbing in the mid-2000s, violence escalated substantially in 2009 and then again in 2015, demonstrating that the conflict is increasing in its intensity rather than winding down. Insecurity remains the largest constraint to development in Afghanistan. Other key challenges include a large illicit economy driven by narcotics, high poverty, low school enrollment rates, inequality for women and girls, and a substantial percentage of the population comprised of returned refugees. In the assessment of the CPS, the program is rated relevant. The CPS 2009–2013 was consistent with the needs of Afghanistan as defined under the ANDS priorities, aligned with ADB’s Strategy 2020, and the sector choices were focused and appropriate. The design of the CPS was relevant to supporting inclusive growth, with most of the operations supporting ADB’s inclusive growth pillars 1 and 2. Inclusiveness figured prominently in program and project designs, particularly for transport and ANR projects. ADB’s coordination with other development partners varied from sector to sector, but overall ADB performed fairly well in building partnerships and coordination. ADB’s Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund contributed in part to this result. A key shortcoming in the relevance criterion, however, was that security issues and the conflict situation were not factored adequately into ADB’s project designs and operations. ADB’s program is rated effective due to the progress made towards achieving outcomes during the review period, with the transport sector being given the most weight due to its large proportion of the overall portfolio. The transport sector is rated effective due to (i) the number of kilometers of roads constructed, (ii) a decrease in intercity travel time, (iii) increased access to public service facilities, (iv) increased traffic volume, (v) reduced transport costs, and (vi) vehicle operating costs savings. The energy sector is given a rating of effective because of a higher grid connected electrification rate, increased megawatts in the North East Power System, surpassing the target for reduced system losses, and other achievements. The ANR sector is rated less than effective as a result of some cancellations, reductions in project scope, and low project effectiveness ratings. Other sectors such as public sector management, finance, and multisector were all rated less than effective. However, important contributions have been made by ADB to policy dialogue, reforms, and sector planning and governance in the sectors that ADB has engaged.

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The efficiency rating is less than efficient. Most projects across all sectors have consistently experienced start up and implementation delays, cost overruns, and occasionally underutilization of funds. Most of the delays can be attributed to security conditions at project sites, limited capacities of government agencies, project design and recruitment issues, a changing legal environment, long customs clearances, and harsh weather. Contract award ratios and disbursement ratios were typically below the ADB average, but in some years they were as good or better. Overall, the program is assessed as less than likely sustainable, but developments in government actions and improved capacities to finance operations and maintenance indicated greater likelihood of sustainability in the near future. The energy and ANR sectors are rated as likely sustainable because, in the case of energy, the electricity utility DABS is able to cover all of its operations and maintenance costs, while in ANR communities and farmers groups are taking care of operations and maintenance for small irrigation infrastructures. The transport sector is rated less than likely sustainable because of a shortfall in necessary financing for operations and maintenance for roads despite the imposition of a fuel tax. The railway, however, is deemed sustainable as a result of the successful performance-based operations and maintenance contract. Finance, public sector management, and multisector are all assessed as less than likely sustainable. The rating for development impacts is less than satisfactory due to limited or inconclusive contributions to Afghanistan’s broader development results and inclusive growth, and only mixed results for cross-sector and thematic areas. However, sector level impacts are more notable, particularly in energy and transport. ADB had limited nonsovereign operations during the review period, but these operations are rated successful. Projects for the telecommunications firm Roshan and Afghanistan International Bank performed well, and both companies are leaders in their respective fields. The two downsides to ADB’s nonsovereign operations were that the nonsovereign political risk guarantee was not utilized and no new private sector operations were initiated during the CPS period. ADB’s performance is assessed as satisfactory based on close alignment with the government’s priorities, focused operations, attention to capacity building, and contributions to the preparation of sector road maps. Also, ADB mobilized over $375 million in official cofinancing during the review period. The government’s performance is rated as less than satisfactory due to issues about lack of ownership in some ministries, capacity weaknesses, governance concerns, and shortcomings on fulfilling project covenants. However, the government has shown improvements in financial and project management capacities, donor coordination, and delivering a consistent message to development partners about the country’s development priorities. The overall assessment for ADB’s operations during 2009 to mid-2015 is successful on the borderline with a rating of 1.64 (with successful on the borderline meaning a rating between 1.60 and 1.75 in ADB’s rating system, and a successful score ranging between 1.60 and 2.49). A successful rating is considered to be a remarkable and significant achievement given the challenging circumstances in which ADB’s operations take place in Afghanistan. Key lessons learned from the final review are the following:

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(i) Security issues and security risk management need to be more central in project design and implementation in conflict situations such as Afghanistan, even in areas of the country that are considered relatively secure.

(ii) A focused program concentrated in a few sectors eases the burden on governments with limited capacities.

(iii) Improving efficiency requires ensuring better quality at entry, strengthening capacities at startup, increasing supervision, and having realistic timeframes.

(iv) Improved results frameworks and monitoring systems can strengthen the results orientation of ADB support.

In preparing the next CPS, the final review offers several recommendations:

(i) ADB should focus on inclusive economic growth. This ought to include: a. Ensuring greater local participation in planning. b. Ensuring that project designs include explicit benefits for lower income groups. c. Developing synergies with other development partners to address a greater

totality of communities’ development needs. d. Achieving greater balance among the pillars of ADB’s inclusive economic growth

strategic agenda. (ii) Devote more attention to cross-cutting themes and drivers of change. (iii) ADB and the government should continue to partner on transport, energy, and

agriculture and natural resources sectors in the next CPS. (iv) Devote more efforts to developing an enabling environment to support prospective

nonsovereign opportunities. (v) Strengthen risk assessment and risk management approaches for ADB projects. Ways

to strengthen could entail: a. Training for ADB project officers and counterpart government officials on

assessing and managing security risks. b. Require security assessments, security plans, and risk mitigation for all projects. c. Give a greater role to the Afghanistan Resident Mission’s Security Unit in project

security matters. d. Apply conflict-sensitive approaches to ADB’s operations.

(vi) Enhance results orientation and measurement, and strengthen results tracking and reporting.

(vii) Discontinue the use of design-build contracts.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Afghanistan has been a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) since 1966. Cumulative assistance (lending, grants, and technical assistance [TA]) totals $4.03 billion.1 ADB is currently one of the leading development partners in Afghanistan in terms of level of assistance, and it is the largest on-budget supporter in the transport and energy sectors. 2. ADB’s Operations Manual Section A2/OP calls for an evaluation of a country partnership strategy (CPS) prior to preparing a new one. A Country Assistance Program Evaluation (CAPE) for Afghanistan was prepared in 2012 and covered operations from 2002 to 2011.2 Since the CAPE did not cover the whole CPS for Afghanistan during 2009–2013, a CPS final review is being conducted. This final review assesses ADB’s country operations in Afghanistan during the CPS 2009–2013 and up until June 2015 (see Appendix 1 for list of projects). It also considers the performance of loans, grants, and advisory TAs approved before 2009 that were ongoing during the CPS period. 3. The final review serves as an input to formulating the new CPS by assessing past performance and identifying lessons and recommendations for future operations. The final review follows the evaluation criteria contained in ADB’s 2015 Guidelines for the Preparation of Country Assistance Program Evaluations and Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validations.3 The criteria entail relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and development impacts. This review also considers ADB and the Afghanistan government’s performance in the implementation of ADB-financed operations, and concludes with lessons and recommendations for the new CPS.

II. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 4. Afghanistan is an extremely challenging environment for development assistance. The conflict in Afghanistan has continued since the Taliban were driven out of power in 2001. While it appeared that the conflict was ebbing in the mid-2000s, violence escalated substantially in 2009 and then again in 2015, demonstrating that the conflict is increasing in its intensity rather than winding down. Insecurity remains the largest constraint to development in Afghanistan. 5. Although the Afghanistan economy averaged over 8.0% annual growth during 2003-2014, much of the growth was attributed to the surge in foreign aid and security spending. Growth, however, has slowed considerably the last two years (2013 and 2014) due to the drawdown of the international security forces and the uncertainty during and after the presidential election in 2014, which was the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan. Into 2015, the escalating insurgency and the lengthy delay in appointing a complete government contributed to another year of relatively slow growth, with economic growth forecasted to reach only 2.5%.4 The prospects for growth are limited over the medium-term, as foreign assistance is expected to decline in the coming years. 6. Afghanistan faces extensive challenges in other realms. The illicit economy due to narcotics is large and exacerbates corruption and the insurgency. Poverty is estimated to be

1 Based on ADB’s Loan, TA, Grant and Equity Approvals database as of 10 July 2015.

2 Asian Development Bank. 2012. Country Assistance Program Evaluation: Afghanistan. Manila.

3 Asian Development Bank. 2015. 2015 Guidelines for the Preparation of Country Assistance Program Evaluations

and Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validations. Manila. 4 Asian Development Bank. 2015. Asian Development Outlook Update. Manila.

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36.5%, essentially unchanged from 2007-2008,5 which means the high growth rates between 2007 and 2012 had virtually no impact on poverty. Despite the impressive gains made in school enrollments for boys and especially girls since 2001, an estimated 30% of school age children are not enrolled in school. The situation for women and girls has improved considerably from the Taliban regime, but gender equality indicators are among the worst in Asia. Additionally, around one quarter of the population is made up of refugees who have returned to Afghanistan during the past decade. Many of these people are homeless and jobless living in temporary camps for returnees with no public services available to them such as schools, water and sanitation, and electricity. These and other problems pose extensive challenges and strains to the government beyond the critical security issues. However, the government’s ability to finance the numerous development priorities is extremely limited, with domestic revenue equivalent to a mere 8.5% of GDP in 2014. Due to these conditions, Afghanistan has relied heavily on development assistance from a number of multilateral and bilateral partners. 7. Since the resumption of ADB’s operations in Afghanistan in 2002, ADB and the government have had an Initial Country Strategy and Program (ICSP) 2002–2004, three Country Strategy and Program Updates (CSPUs) for 2003–2005, 2004–2006, and 2006–2008, the CPS 2009–2013, and an interim CPS 2014–2015. 8. The ICSP of 2002 included as priority sectors agriculture and natural resources (ANR), education, health, transport and communications, energy, finance, and water supply and sanitation. The three CSPUs dropped the social sectors and water supply and sanitation, leaving ANR, energy, transport and communications, and to a limited extent finance as the priority sectors. The reduction in priority sectors was in response to the government’s request for each development partner to prioritize three sectors. 9. The objective of the CPS 2009–2013, the focus of this final review, was accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction (Appendix 2).6 The priority sectors under the CPS were energy, transport and communications, and ANR. The thematic focus intended to cover counter-narcotics, gender, governance, private sector development, and regional cooperation.7 The interim CPS 2014–2015 extends the validity of the CPS 2009–2013 and continues ADB’s focus on the three priority sectors. 10. The key government strategy during this review period is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008–2013, the government’s poverty-reduction strategy.8 ANDS envisioned a stable Afghanistan by 2020 based on constitutional democracy with social equity, environmental sustainability, and a market economy led by the private sector. The three pillars of ANDS are (i) security; (ii) governance, rule of law, and human rights; and (iii) economic and social development. The third pillar, economic and social development, is most relevant to ADB’s operations and contains 13 “sector strategies”: (i) private sector development, (ii) energy, (iii) mining, (iv) water and irrigation, (v) transport, (vi) ICT, (vii) urban development, (viii) education, (ix) culture, media, and youth, (x) health and nutrition, (xi) agriculture and rural development, (xii) social protection, and (xiii) refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons. In addition, ANDS includes six crosscutting issues covering (i) regional cooperation, (ii)

5 Central Statistical Office. 2014. National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-2012. Kabul.

6 Asian Development Bank. 2008. Country Partnership Strategy: Afghanistan, 2009-2013. Manila.

7 It is not clear if capacity development was intended to be a thematic focus in the CPS or not. It is included in the

main text in para. 73, but it was excluded from the CPS thematic focus shown in Figure 1 of the main text and from Appendix 6 on Country Sector and Theme Road Maps.

8 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2008. Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–2013): A

Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction.

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environment, (iii) gender equity, (iv) anticorruption, (v) capacity development, and (vi) counter-narcotics. To attain this vision, ANDS set goals to be achieved by 2013 through 22 national priority programs (NPPs).9 The programs have been continued by the government beyond 2013 in order to achieve the goals and vision by 2020. 11. The government has also prepared an economic development strategy, Towards Self-Reliance,10 which covers the transition period (2012–2014) and the transformation decade (2015–2024). It contains three pillars: infrastructure development, private sector development, and agriculture and rural development. The cross-cutting themes are gender, counter-narcotics, and environment. Additionally, the government put out Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership in December 2014 for the London Conference on Afghanistan. The document serves as a statement of commitment to the reform agenda that can help Afghanistan move towards peace, recovery, productivity, and growth. 12. The key challenge in Afghanistan is to overcome the widespread insecurity that the country currently faces. An improved security environment would lead to significant improvements in economic growth and the effectiveness and efficiency of development programs and projects. ADB’s operations in the country would also benefit from lower costs, higher efficiency, enhanced monitoring, and greater development impacts.

III. ASSESSMENT OF CPS PERFORMANCE A. Relevance

13. The formulation and implementation of the CPS is rated relevant given its (i) consistency with country needs, (ii) alignment with ADB’s Strategy 2020, (iii) appropriateness of sector focus, (iv) mix of lending modalities including grants and TA, (v) design for inclusive growth, (vi) inclusiveness of program and project designs, and (vii) enhanced partnerships. 14. Consistency with country needs. The CPS 2009–2013 was consistent with the needs of Afghanistan as defined under the ANDS 2008‒2013 priorities (Appendix 3). To achieve social and economic development, ANDS called for strategic interventions in, among other sectors, energy, transport, agriculture and rural development, and water and irrigation—main areas which the CPS focused on. Specific sector programs and interventions were also aligned with those identified in ANDS and its respective sector plans/road maps. Government ministries as well as development partners have confirmed the proper matching of ADB priority sectors to the country’s needs.11 Thematic priorities identified in the CPS were also consistent with ANDS which include counter-narcotics, capacity development, gender mainstreaming, regional cooperation, and governance. 15. Alignment with the ADB strategy. The CPS was aligned with ADB’s Strategy 2020 in moving towards inclusive growth and regional integration.12 The CPS aimed to support the country’s economic and social development and poverty reduction. In particular, the CPS and

9 NPPs were grouped in six clusters: (i) peace, (ii) human resources development), (iii) infrastructure development,

(iv) private sector development, (v) agriculture and rural development, and (vi) governance. 10

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2012. Towards Self-Reliance: Strategic Vision for the Transformation Decade. Kabul.

11 Central and West Asia Department, ADB. July 2015. Back to Office Report on the Country Partnership and Strategy Final Review.

12 ADB. 2008. Strategy 2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008–2020. Manila.

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the accompanying country operations business plans (COBPs) intended to enhance inclusive growth through infrastructure investments resulting in higher economic growth, connecting poor people to markets, and increasing access of the poor to basic productive assets and social services. Programmed interventions were also directed at regional integration, particularly in transport and energy, to boost mobility, trade, and access to services among countries. The CPS was also in sync with the ADB strategy as it placed importance on the role of good governance, capacity development, gender equity, private sector development and partnerships in achieving development outcomes. 16. Sector selectivity. Sector choices in the CPS were appropriate, focusing on three priority sectors that are in line with ADB’s strengths. ADB also ensured continuity in its choice of priority sectors going back to the earlier CSPUs. During 2009 to mid-2015, approved sovereign operations amounting to $2.2 billion largely went to the transport sector (59%), energy (29%), and ANR (12%) (Figure 1). Transport ($1.3 billion) comprised mostly the Ring Road and other corridors. Projects in energy ($641 million) and ANR ($266 million) were mostly in electricity transmission and distribution and irrigation, respectively. The sector selections and spread were strategic in terms of the synergies of their results towards the country’s socio-economic development. 17. Less than 1% of the total sovereign portfolio approved during the CPS was allocated to finance, public sector management (PSM), and multisector operations. These were mostly TAs which complemented operations of the three core sectors.13 18. In terms of all projects ongoing during the CPS review period (i.e., those approved before 2009 but active during the CPS period and those approved between 2009 and mid-2015), the portfolio totaled $3.7 billion. The sector breakdown was similar to approvals during 2009 to mid-2015 with transport: 51.9%, energy: 23.9%, ANR: 12.3%, multisector: 8.4%, finance: 1.8%, and PSM: 1.7%. 19. Selection of modalities. As proposed in the CPS, Afghanistan was provided with 100% grant support through the Asian Development Fund (ADF), Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR), Clean Energy Fund, and Water Financing Partnership Facility. This is consistent with the debt sustainability analysis which placed the country at high risk of debt distress. The use of the multitranche financing facility (MFF) was also seen as appropriate given its flexibility, predictability, and frontloading of analytical work which facilitated project execution. The use of MFFs also helped to execute

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Technical assistance focused on strengthening government capacity to coordinate financing of infrastructure projects (multisector), strengthening capacity of microfinance institutions and commercial banks (finance), and preparation of the security plans for project implementation (public sector management).

ANR 12%

ENE 29%

FIN 0.02%

MULTI 0.09%

PSM 0.05%

TRANS 59%

Figure 1. Sovereign Portfolio: Percentage Share of Grants and TA

Approved in 2009 to mid-2015

ANR=agriculture and natural resources, ENE=energy, FIN=finance, MULTI=multisector, PSM=public sector management, TRANS=transport Source: ADB database.

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sector priorities that aimed to address gaps in infrastructure, policy, and capacity within the transport, energy, and ANR sectors.14 However, there were instances when tranche releases were used to augment financing of other projects outside of the scope of the MFF.15 20. The CAPE critiques the frequent use of design-build contracts by ADB in Afghanistan. While there are downsides to these contracts as noted in the CAPE, there are also some benefits to them and their applicability to Afghanistan’s circumstances, such as the difficulty in getting qualified contractors to work in the country. However, this final review concurs with the CAPE that design-build contracts have been overall unsuccessful. Rather than shortening implementation periods and achieving savings as expected from design-build contracts, their use has caused extensive cost overruns and delays. Moreover, as noted in the CAPE, the design-build contracts have not enabled government ministries to build their capacities in planning and design, contract management, and construction oversight. 21. Relevance of CPS design for inclusive growth. The design of the CPS is assessed as relevant to support inclusive growth. The selection of the three priority sectors intended to support pillar 1 (growth and expansion of opportunities) and pillar 2 (access to jobs and opportunities) of ADB’s inclusive economic growth strategic agenda. The transport and energy sectors supported pillar 1, and the agriculture and irrigation initiatives supported pillar 2. Although no sectors were selected in the CPS to directly support pillar 3 on social protection, the Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons project16 helped to address pillar 3 by providing livelihood and employment opportunities to returning refugees and displaced persons. Additionally, most of the transport initiatives and all of the agriculture and irrigation initiatives can be seen as pro-poor because they took place in rural areas where a higher proportion of the poor live. 22. Inclusiveness of program and project designs. Inclusiveness figured prominently in transport and ANR projects. Investment projects and TAs in transport incorporated inclusive growth strategies that provided livelihood and employment opportunities and increased access to social services among vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, including poor farmers and women. In ANR projects, while designs were mainly inclusive, baselines and targets were formulated with ambiguity (i.e., no data disaggregation between poor and nonpoor, women and men) and obtaining reliable data has been problematic. In more recent projects, improved results frameworks for gender mainstreaming were observed. 23. Enhanced partnerships. The strength of ADB’s coordination with other development partners has varied from sector to sector. In some sectors, such as transport and energy, strong donor coordination has occurred. The Interministerial Commission for Energy, financed through ADB TA, was noted by some donors as making important coordination contributions to the sector. But in other sectors such as PSM ADB has not been very active in coordination, partly because no one at the Afghanistan Resident Mission is assigned to cover the sector. Also, in ANR one ministry noted the lack of coordination among donors, many of whom are interested in working in the Panj-Amu basin.

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While delays in project start up and implementation were experienced in most MFFs, these issues were not inherent in the use of the modality. Most operations in the country were constrained by security and capacity issues which negatively affected project duration and cost.

15 In the case of Andkhoy-Qaisar Road Project (37075-013), an MFF tranche (42095-022) was used to finance the

counterpart contribution ($18.6 million) that the government failed to provide. Total civil works contract cost was $76.6 million.

16 Asian Development Bank. 2002. Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees

and Displaced Persons. Manila. First approved in 2002 but also supplementary financing approved in 2007.

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24. Division of support among development partners has worked well within some sectors. For example, in the transport sector ADB has been focused on road construction and rehabilitation while USAID has focused on institutional development of the road authority and road fund. Working within each sector’s road map created synergies on the development partners’ efforts in supporting government priorities.17 25. Additionally, the establishment of the ADB’s AITF in 2010 has helped to harmonize aid and build partnerships in key infrastructure sectors, but the number of contributors has remained limited to only three. As of 30 June 2015, the total amount committed by AITF donors was $490.5 million and the total amount received was $350.65 million from the governments of Japan (Embassy of Japan, $126.0 million), United States (USAID, $105.0 million), and United Kingdom (DFID, $119.6 million out of a total commitment of $259.5 million). AITF has been seen by some donors as lacking flexibility, particularly in the early years. As a result, AITF’s implementation arrangements were revised and approved by the ADB’s Board of Directors in May 2012 to make AITF operationally more flexible and more responsive to contributors’ own requirements. The AITF’s Implementation Guidelines were accordingly revised to reflect these changes. 26. Feedback from the government and other development partners indicates that ADB has done fairly well overall in building partnerships and coordination, but more efforts could be done in some sectors. One concern from development partners is that ADB needs to improve the quality and frequency of its reporting to cofinanciers. Furthermore, enhancing intersectoral linkages is an area where coordination can be improved (footnote 11). 27. Addressing security risks. Security is deteriorating in many parts of the country that were previously identified as relatively safe, thereby affecting ongoing ADB projects. ADB is also now implementing projects in higher risk areas such as Helmand province. While security risks have been recognized as a major constraint in program and project implementation in Afghanistan, measures to mitigate these risks were often not well thought out or made specific to the project context and location. In some cases, general statements on mitigating security risks were mentioned in project documents (often copied from other projects) instead of specific fragility and security measures tailored to the project, and their cost implications were often not well integrated in the design, or the security budgets are often unrealistic in order to lower the bid proposal. In most cases, project designs have been similar to what would be done in non-conflict settings. Also, some projects became reactive as security risks emerged, often as a result of unanticipated changing security conditions in project sites. Failure to properly forecast risks and actual security costs as well as to integrate and implement appropriate detailed measures to address security concerns have led to costly delays and contributed to some projects (or their components) being suspended or cancelled altogether. This has affected the amount of benefits to local communities. Despite these ongoing issues, the security unit at the Afghanistan Resident Mission has not been adequately harnessed to advise on security issues, review proposed security measures in projects, or assist in monitoring or assessing security conditions at project sites.18

17

In the energy sector, particularly MFF Energy Sector Development Investment Program (42094), components that were cancelled or dropped were picked up by other development partners.

18 The current Field Security Advisor’s terms of reference is to provide security advice on AITF projects, but he has been used almost exclusively for managing security at the Afghanistan Resident Mission.

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28. Interviews with government ministries highlighted the need to consistently include security as part of project design. The security arrangements, usually provided through the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) for larger projects, have often not adequately secured project sites, but it is currently a requirement from the government when security is needed for a project. 29. Afghanistan continues to be regarded as a post-conflict country despite the difficult security environment. Overall, it is deemed that security issues and the conflict situation were not adequately factored into ADB’s project designs and operations during the CPS period. This is the key shortcoming under the relevance criterion. 30. Quality of CPS results framework. The CPS results framework needed improvement. Some outcome statements could have been better used as indicators, and some indicators could have been appropriately used as outputs or intermediate outcomes. More critically, there was a lack of consistency between the CPS period and the target years in which outcomes were to be achieved. Much of the results framework adopted the target year set forth in the Afghanistan Compact and ANDS which was set for 2010, while the CPS coverage was up to 2013. The COBP for 2013–2014 updated the 2009 results framework. Furthermore, many indicators in the CPS results framework lacked baselines. The quality of the design and monitoring frameworks (DMFs) of projects was also often lacking. Outcomes were often actually outputs, and frequently DMFs needed more realistic and monitorable targets. This also applies to the preparation of overall MFF and tranche results frameworks. 31. Relevance ratings of completed and ongoing projects. Of the 32 projects completed during the CPS period, 27 had a relevance rating. Out of these 27, 96% (N=26) were rated relevant or highly relevant (Appendix 4).19 All projects in energy, transport, finance, multisector, public health, and PSM have been assessed with positive relevance ratings. Relevance of operations in ANR is 83% (1 project out of 6 with a rating was less than relevant). The high percentage of relevant projects reflects the appropriateness of the CPS objectives and the focus on addressing country needs and alignment with ADB’s strategies (paras. 10‒12). Appendices 5 and 6 provide matrices of the assessment of relevance and the other evaluation criteria for completed and ongoing projects. B. Effectiveness

32. Progress towards achieving outcomes during the CPS period is assessed as effective. This assessment is based on the (i) measure of outcomes identified under the COBP 2013–2014’s results framework which provides updated targets for the CPS under review (Appendix 7),20 (ii) overall effective rating of the projects completed during the CPS period (Table 2 in Appendix 5), and (iii) likelihood of ongoing projects in achieving outputs and outcomes (Table 2 in Appendix 6). ADB support in Afghanistan has yielded encouraging outcomes in transport and energy but less so in other sectors. 33. Transport. The transport sector is rated effective. The objective of ADB operations in transport is to provide improved low cost, reliable transport connectivity for goods and people within Afghanistan and cross-border. There have been some consistency issues with regard to what was targeted and what has been measured. For example, one indicator in the results

19

Eight projects (29.6%) were rated highly relevant. 20

COBP 2013–2014 indicators and targets are seen as more appropriate than the CPS results framework because of the inherent weaknesses in the results framework and an inability to measure many of its indicators for lack of data.

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framework was increased connectivity, but the actual measured result is kilometers of roads.21 Despite differences in measuring progress against the target indicators, measures of results have indicated (i) 643 km of roads constructed/rehabilitated,22 (ii) a decrease in intercity travel time (65-75%), (iii) an increase in access to the nearest health, primary education and other essential services given the reduction in travel time, (iv) an increase in traffic volume, (v) 40-50% reduction in public transportation costs on selected routes, (vi) 25-41% savings on vehicle operating costs, and (vii) freight transport via railway increased by 41 million tons with 45% cost reduction. Despite delays in implementation, most ongoing projects are likely to contribute to these outcomes. 34. Other achievements that were not targeted in the sector results framework include (i) 50% increase in the number of flights and passengers with the rehabilitation of airports, (ii) at least 10,000 refugees and displaced persons obtained opportunities for livelihood, and (iii) enhanced capacities of the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation. In response to the potential for undesired outcomes of improved transport networks, mitigating interventions under transport projects have achieved positive results in sensitizing people on HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Most of the completed transport projects were rated effective (88%). 35. ADB has engaged in extensive policy dialogue on a wide variety of issues in the transport sector. Among the policy issues progressing with the Afghan transport sector authorities are:

Making a more coherent institutional landscape: helping with reforms to streamline sector responsibilities across multiple transport ministries and agencies, and make sector governance more effective. This includes assisting in the establishment of new institutions such as a road authority and road fund (both pending), a railway authority (established), and an autonomous civil aviation agency (pending).

Maintenance management of road assets: engaging with the government to address to backlog of maintenance needed for road assets in order to break the cycle of build-neglect-rebuild.

O&M financing needs: through the ADB-financed Transport Master Plan Update, ADB has helped the government to estimate the total annual maintenance requirements at $251 million.

Road asset management system: engaging in discussions to develop a rational and systematic O&M regime for the road sector that would create and maintain transport infrastructure in a cost-effective manner.

Sustainable asset financing: conducting dialogue on the user-pays (cost recovery) principle in which users should be charged in accordance with the wear-and-tear they inflict on infrastructure assets.

21

Another example is the indicator for average speed in kilometers per hour but actual measurement in average travel time.

22 An additional 707 km of road improvements are in progress.

9

Road contracting industry: promoting the development of the local road contracting industry to ensure that national contractors are assigned a greater share of the road works performed in Afghanistan.

Trade logistics: assisting the country to reduce its trade transaction costs and improve its transport logistics.

Transport and climate change: working with the government to build resilient transport infrastructure systems to significantly reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to climate change.

36. Energy. The energy sector is rated effective. The objective of the energy sector is to improve access to affordable and reliable energy to most households. Despite mixed results in the effectiveness of completed projects (2 out of 3 were rated effective), ADB support has generally yielded positive outcomes. Progress has been made in increasing the grid connected electrification rate to 30% in 2015 which is ahead of meeting the 30% target in 2017. The North East Power System was capable of supplying 658 MW as of 2014 (from 150 MW in 2009) to make progress towards the target of 1,000 MW of connected load in 2017. The sector has already surpassed the 2017 target of 30% systems loss reduction, as it went down to 25% in 2014. However, the enactment of the Electricity Law is progressing much slower than expected.23 While the Cabinet has already approved the Electricity Law, it has yet to be passed by the Parliament. This legislation would give full financial and operational autonomy to the electricity company DABS, ensure appropriate tariff setting, and establish the electricity regulatory authority. 37. Other achievements cited in project completion reports that are not targeted in the CPS results framework include the reduction in electricity cost and increased electricity consumption. Connection targets for households, however, are not likely to be achieved as this component has sometimes been scrapped when the need to reduce project scope becomes necessary.24 For completed projects, the overall effectiveness rating is at 67% (N=3). As for ongoing projects, despite a difficult start, these will likely contribute to the achievement of sector outcomes as most projects are on track in terms of disbursements and contract awards as well as progress in completing outputs. 38. The government is implementing the energy sector road map, policy framework, and the envisaged investment plan as confirmed in the ADB-assisted power sector master plan, 2012–2032 and the gas development master plan, 2015–2035, which have been integrated into the National Energy Supply Program. Vital achievements on the policy and institutional side were the (i) signing of power purchase sales agreements with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan that enhanced regional cooperation, (ii) creation of an autonomous power utility and formulation of tariffs for its operation—making progress towards unbundling, (iii) implementation of an Operations and Maintenance Program to ensure sustainability of operations and the Disconnection and Anti-theft Policy in various sector projects which addresses non-technical systems loss, (iv) revitalizing the Interministerial Commission for Energy that has proven to be an effective mechanism for programming investments and governance support, (v) updating of

23

Although the Electricity Law should be considered an output, it is listed as an outcome under the TA for Supporting the Interministerial Commission for Energy (46347).

24 The reduced household connections have occurred under the Power Transmission and Distribution Project (37078) and the MFF Energy Sector Development Investment Program tranches 1 and 2 (42094-012/022 and 42094-032).

10

the power sector master plan, (vi) formulation of the first ever gas development master plan, and (vii) a roadmap for renewable energy development.25 39. Agriculture and Natural Resources. The ANR sector is rated less than effective. ADB’s objective in agriculture and natural resources is to improve food self-sufficiency and increase agricultural exports. Projects in the ANR sector have experienced cancellations, reductions in project scope, and an effectiveness percentage of 20% of completed projects (N=5), and so the effectiveness in ANR is not as strong as in transport and energy. However, operations in the sector have exceeded the CPS target on irrigation coverage. Irrigation facilities from three ongoing projects are so far serving 60,389 hectares of agricultural land, which is more than the expected coverage by 2019.26 Furthermore, progress has been made in the operationalization of water users associations and community development councils as most are capable of undertaking operations and maintenance work on small-scale irrigation systems. 40. Other project achievements that contributed positively to the sector include, among others, 185,000 households that benefitted from agriculture-based livelihood activities in the provinces of Faryab, Sari Pul, and Jawzjan;27 and increased income of 10,000 producers and processors in Balkh, Bamyan and Nangarhar.28 Ongoing projects, despite initial delays, are likely to achieve their expected outputs and outcomes. 41. For policy and planning dialogue, ADB has led with the preparation of the Afghanistan Water Resource Sector Development Plan. The draft plan was developed in close cooperation with the Ministry of Energy and Water as the lead agency, plus seven other water related ministries, agencies, and entities. There are over 30 policy and regulatory recommendations in the plan. In addition, detailed water resource development master plans were prepared for the Helmand and Harirud river basins. There is also an ongoing TA on the economics of climate change that contains policy advice on climate change mitigation. 42. Contributing to a less than effective rating of some operations in the sector are lack of interest from implementing agencies (particularly during the introduction of integrated water resources management (IWRM) approach where the implementing agency requested changes in project activities to focus more on physical investments), and delays that led to reduced project scope and relevance as projects were affected by developments from other national programs (i.e., subprojects selected were no longer in demand, were seen as redundant, or had diminished linkages to the project they were supposed to support). 43. Public Sector Management. This assessment finds the PSM operations to be less than effective. ADB support focused on strengthening fiscal management, public administration, and statistical capacity of government offices. Most of these operations were characterized by extensions, cost overruns, and cancellation. While crucial building blocks for stronger PSM have been put in place, some targets have only been partly achieved or are still ongoing, suggesting

25

Future interventions under discussion include (i) development of a tariff model and framework, and (ii) development of a business plan for the power utility.

26 Actual coverage may be much higher as actual command areas served by some irrigation subprojects were not monitored and reported. Also of note is that the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction project (36673-013) achieved 100,000 ha of irrigated farm land in the Lower Balkh river basin. Asian Development Bank. 2009. Afghanistan: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project. Technical Assistance Completion Report. Manila.

27 Asian Development Bank. 2013. Implementation Completion Memorandum: Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. Manila (JFPR 9039).

28 Asian Development Bank. 2013. Implementation Completion Memorandum: Rural Business Support Project in Afghanistan. Manila (JFPR 9100).

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the need for more time to overcome capacity constraints. Support was also provided to enhance capacity to address security of ADB assets and investments. Even with the successful completion of the first TA on addressing security risks, integration of mitigation measures and corresponding costs have yet to be consistently reflected in project designs across sectors. Positive outcomes were evident on the statistical capacity building TA specifically for poverty monitoring and assessment to support ANDS. Also, ADB has provided policy advisory support to the Ministry of Finance, specifically the Minister of Finance and two Deputy Ministers of Finance. Advisors support the Ministry in making critical decisions on economic reforms, macroeconomic policy, fiscal policy, and the effective operation of government. By ensuring that these decisions are undertaken with as much information as possible, the costs and benefits are known, and sound analysis supports policy decisions that are more effective and contribute to the development of the country. The Ministry requested that this support from ADB continue, and ensure that capacity continues to be built more broadly in the Ministry. 44. Finance. Sector operations are assessed as less than effective. Completion reports of key sector programs confirmed that some targets were only partially achieved. Long gestation periods needed by institutional reform interventions in order to produce results as well as the need for complementary reforms account for this performance. There is also a difficulty in obtaining relevant statistics to compare with baseline data. However, ADB has been making contributions to policy development in the financial sector. ADB has supported financial sector development through specialist legal support to grow the nascent Islamic finance market. With many people not accessing formal finance and international investors looking for opportunities to invest in Shariah compliant ways, Islamic finance is seen as a significant growth opportunity. Quality regulation and financial oversight is critical to this growth and to ensure confidence in Islamic finance. ADB has therefore supported the Islamic Finance Division in Afghanistan's Central Bank as the regulator of Islamic banking in terms of the development of regulatory rules and guidelines, and building capacity of the division. 45. Multisector. Completion reports of sector operations have indicated mixed results for effectiveness. While most institutional and policy reform targets for the energy and transport sectors were achieved, physical targets under the emergency infrastructure operations were not.29 Sector operations are therefore assessed as less than effective. C. Efficiency

46. ADB operations have been less than efficient in achieving results given project efficiency ratings, startup and implementation delays, slow disbursements, and cost adjustments. These have led to the reductions in project scope and inputs including project cancellations—reducing effectiveness of ADB support. On average, loans, grants and TAs have been extended by about 28.7 months before closing, with 16 projects having closing delays of more than 40 months. 47. Efficiency ratings. Out of 17 completed projects with an efficiency rating, 2 (11.8%) were rated highly efficient, 4 (23.5%) efficient, and 11 (64.7%) less than efficient. One project, the Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway Project, was rated highly efficient in the completion report as a result of having exceeded its expected economic internal rate of return (EIRR) as well as thorough planning and management of construction, complemented with enhanced ADB project supervision, and expeditious approvals and release of payments.30 Two other transport

29

Asian Development Bank. 2009. Project Completion Report: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. Manila.

30 Asian Development Bank. 2013. Project Completion Report: Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway. Manila.

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projects that have high internal rates of return were noted to have suffered from significant cost overruns and delays.31 One of these projects, the North-South Corridor Project, received a less than efficient rating, while the other was rated highly efficient. 48. Most interventions across sectors have consistently experienced implementation delays (time extensions), cost adjustment due to cost overruns, and underutilization of funds in some cases. Start up and implementation delays have been attributed to deteriorating security situations in the project sites, capacity constraints of and lack of initiative among executing and implementing agencies, poor absorptive capacity of target institutions, changes in the legal environment,32 design and recruitment issues,33 delays in customs clearance for equipment, and harsh weather conditions in project areas. 49. EIRRs. Despite these common efficiency issues, the EIRRs for completed projects are overall efficient. In six completed infrastructure projects for which there were eight EIRRs (some projects have multiple EIRRs for separate components), only one (Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project Phase 1) was below the standard 12% discount rate. However, only 50% of these eight EIRRs at completion were above the original EIRR estimates. 50. Portfolio performance. ADB’s portfolio performance during the review period is less than efficient. Contract award ratios for sovereign projects in Afghanistan exceeded the ADB-wide average for three of the six years covered in this review (see Figure 2). The disbursement ratios showed only two years better than or about equal to the ADB average (see Figure 3). This low disbursement was mainly on account of the active projects approved since 2005 which experienced delays and had their completion dates extended. Most projects during the CPS period are still ongoing and initially experienced slow progress given start up delays.

13.4

27.431.6

41.0

19.1

12.0

30.024.5 26.1 24.9

19.823.9

0

10

20

30

40

50

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Pe

rce

nta

ge

Figure 2: Contract Award Ratios for Sovereign Projects

AFG ADB

31

Asian Development Bank. 2010. Project Completion Report: Andkhoy-Qaisar Road in Afghanistan. Manila. Asian Development Bank. 2013. Project Completion Report: North-South Corridor Project in Afghanistan. Manila.

32 Particularly for PSM projects.

33 Including, among others, issues on protracted contract negotiations, difficulty to get interested consultants, poor

quality of proposals, long duration to secure approval for design changes, and delayed compliance with implementation arrangements.

13

Note: Contract award ratio = contract awarded or the actual commitment (for financial intermediation loans) during the year over the value available for contract or commitment awards at the beginning of the year. Source: Contract Award/Commitment Ratio Reports, Operations Services and Financial Management Department.

5.7

21.1

9.8

17.5

11.3

5.9

19.9 20.2 20.4

17.6 17.8 18.3

0

5

10

15

20

25

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Pe

rce

nta

ge

Figure 3: Disbursement Ratio for Sovereign Loans and Grantsa

AFG ADB

a Excludes policy-based lending disbursements. Note: Disbursement Ratio is computed as the ratio of year-to-date disbursements to the undisbursed balance of loan/grant (net approved amount undisbursed less cancellations) at the beginning of the year. Source: Disbursement Ratio Reports, Controller’s Department.

51. Annual portfolio reviews reveal five key factors that account for the weaknesses in contract awards and disbursements:

(i) Contractor and consultant selection delays and capacities: Issues include (a) unwillingness of contractors and consultants to bid on projects because of security concerns, (b) repeated tendering due to weak bidders or lack of qualified bidders, (c) ADB requests for clarifications of bid evaluation reports, (d) inexperienced supervision consultants, and (e) non-performing contractors.

(ii) Insecurity in Afghanistan: The poor security conditions in Afghanistan lead to (a) unwillingness of qualified firms to bid on projects, (b) delays in implementation and construction, and (c) requests for cost variations to cover additional security measures. Also, some projects have had poor security arrangements and security management practices that lead to delays.

(iii) Lengthy procurement processes: Procurement delays result from (a) inexperience and weak procurement capacities of line ministries, (b) limited capacities of procurement committees, (c) disagreements between executing agencies’ procurement committees and ADB, and (d) long approval time by ADB for procurement packages and changes in scope.

(iv) Safeguards: Safeguard issues include (a) land acquisition and resettlement delays, (b) insufficient budgeting for land acquisition by the government, (c) delays in government disbursement of funds for land acquisition, and (d) resettlement and gender action plans failing to meet ADB safeguard requirements.

(v) Capacities of executing agencies and implementing agencies: Overall, government ministries and agencies have limited capacities, particularly in contract administration, project management, and financial management.

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D. Sustainability

52. Overall, the stream of benefits from ADB support is assessed as less than likely sustainable. While the sustainability percentage of completed projects across sectors is 44% (N=18), more recent developments in government actions and improvements in capacities to finance operations and maintenance (O&M) provide positive indications of the improved sustainability of outcomes, particularly of ADB operations in energy and ANR. 53. Transport. Transport sector operations are rated less than likely sustainable, but prospects for sustainability are improving. Completion reports have noted that financing and O&M of ADB projects are dependent on government allocation and donor commitments, particularly for road infrastructure. According to MPW, the government currently generates around $50 million per year from the fuel tax34 and earmarks an additional $17 million from its national budget for road maintenance. However, the government needs an estimated $100-120 million a year for O&M. To finance the gap, the government plans to increase the fuel tax from AF1 to AF1.5-2.0 per liter and introduce tolls for bridges and tunnels (footnote 9). However, the introduction of an off-budget revenue system requires the Ministry of Finance and MPW to agree on the salient features of a toll policy. This was an issue left unresolved when the toll policy was dropped in 2010. In contrast, the adoption of user charges in air transport and appropriate civil works design (which took into account longer life cycles of the airport’s physical infrastructure) points to a positive contribution in ensuring sustainability of outcomes. For railways, the Hairatan railway project’s sustained operational achievement is largely attributed to the outsourced performance-based O&M contract.35 54. In terms of institutional capacity, MPW has yet to build its capacity in road surveys and designs, including the ability to analyze connectivity and prioritize corridors for trade. In railways, the establishment and strengthening of the Afghanistan Railway Authority is expected to increase the government’s capacity for planning, development, and management of the railway subsector. Furthermore, under the outsourced performance-based O&M contract for the railway, 32 government staff members have already been trained, and additional training is planned for about 100 staff members over 2 years. Existing capacity of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation is seen as adequate in managing the country’s civil aviation.36 55. Energy. Sector operations are likely sustainable. A vital institution in the unbundling of the power sector in the country is the electricity authority, the Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS). DABS has gained financial autonomy, institutionalized its financial systems, and established a strong board of directors that is independent of regular government systems and protocols. DABS operates without government subsidies as it receives onlent donor funds from the Ministry of Finance, imposes tariff at cost recovery, currently achieves a 90% collection rate across the country, and covers all of its O&M costs (currently allocates about $10 million annually in O&M expenditures). Its project management office has full staff complement being supported by ADB through an MFF. Coordination of sector priorities is achieved through the Interministerial Commission for Energy. While the body ceased to exist in 2012 due to lack of

34

In 2012, the government issued the Transitional Law on Toll which allowed the collection of AF1 from the price of each liter of imported fuel.

35 Asian Development Bank. 2014. Unstoppable: The Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway Project Performance-Based Operation and Maintenance Contract. Manila.

36 The Civil Aviation Law passed in 2012 established the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority, an independent authority (reporting to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation) to manage civil aviation activities in the country.

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financing, a second TA is currently being implemented and ensures capacity support beyond 2016. 56. An area to focus on within DABS is its internal audit system, as transparency in financial management remains a concern.37 Within the sector, the enactment of the electricity law by the Parliament would strengthen the regulatory side as it provides for the rationalization of tariffs and establishment of the electricity regulatory authority. 57. Agriculture and Natural Resources. Sector operations are likely sustainable, particularly for community-based projects. Local communities have adequate capacity to undertake O&M activities on small irrigation infrastructures. Farmers groups (producers) also have sufficient capacity to financially and operationally maintain their respective cooperatives. Community participation has ensured a high level of ownership. Institutional strengthening through the establishment of river basin authorities and development of master plans that set out directions and priorities in the river basins point to a likely sustainable implementation of IWRM. The Agriculture Sector Program had an important impact on key ministries and institutions in the sector and stimulated ongoing changes in institutional and organizational arrangements that are leading to more effective and efficient agencies. A conducive policy environment for environmental protection and agricultural development has also been established through ADB support. 58. Among the issues related to sustainability include (i) the lack of an equitable water allocation system; (ii) the need for water delivery service fees; (iii) lack of exit strategies for phasing out donor support; and (iv) the need to improve on the climate resilience of infrastructure (i.e., flooding destroyed some of the small irrigation facilities due to low quality construction). 59. Other sectors. Outcomes of ADB support in PSM and the finance sector are less than likely sustainable. While capacity constraints were aptly recognized in various PSM interventions, assessment of sector operations indicates the need for new approaches to capacity development (i.e., balance local absorptive capacity against the skills needed by government agencies to effectively implement reforms and improve retention of trained staff within their respective government institutions). Policy reforms initiated under the finance sector programs generated new implementation challenges and problems for which new capacity has to be developed. Sustainability therefore depends on continued assistance to (i) implement complementary reforms, and (ii) provide capacity development in the new institutions created. A stable political and security situation is also crucial. 60. Multisector sector operations are rated less than likely sustainable. While sustainability pertaining to policy reforms is likely sustainable, infrastructure-related operations require continued government and donor allocations for O&M in some sectors. Recent developments, however, point to positive indications of sustainability in energy and ANR components. E. Development Impacts

61. ADB’s overall contribution to development impacts is assessed as less than satisfactory based on limited or inconclusive contributions to Afghanistan’s development results and

37

A series of independent audit reports could not obtain sufficient evidence to be able to provide an audit opinion to DABS financial reports 2009–2012. Back to Office Report for MFF 0026-Tranche 5 (Dashte Alwan 500kV substation) dated July 24, 2013.

16

inclusive growth, and only mixed results for cross-sector and thematic areas. However, the sector level impacts are notable, and completed projects across sectors have a 70% satisfactory rating (N=10). 62. ADB’s contribution to the country’s development results and inclusive growth. It is inconclusive whether ADB support contributed to the economic and social objectives of ANDS which are to reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development, improve human development indicators, and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Economic growth during 2008/09–2014 averaged 8.2% annually, only slightly higher than the average of 8.0% prior to the CPS from 2003/04 to 2007/08. While the growth rates during the CPS period can be considered relatively high, the CPS objective of attaining accelerated economic growth was not attained. However, there have been improvements in GDP per capita ($489.1 per capita in 2009–2010 and $753.4 in 2014) and higher average per capita consumption between 2007–2008 and 2011–2012.38 More importantly, a conclusion is made that economic growth during the CPS period was not inclusive, based on available indicators. At the national level, poverty data from the last two National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment household surveys show no improvement in the poverty headcount, but because of different methodologies the two survey’s results must be compared with caution (see Table 1). Hence, no conclusion can be reached about ADB’s contribution to poverty reduction at the national level. Regionally, the north, where most of ADB’s projects have been focused, experienced a decline in poverty from 39.4% in 2007–2008 to 31.7% in 2011–2012, indicating possible contributions of ADB to poverty reduction in that region.

Table 1: Afghanistan Poverty Headcount (%)

National Urban Rural

2007-2008 2011-2012 2007-2008 2011-2012 2007-2008 2011-2012

36.3 36.5 29.1 28.9 38.2 38.8 Source: Central Statistical Organization. 2014. National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-2012.

63. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, worsened during the CPS period from 29.7 in 2007–2008 to 31.6 in 2011–2012, suggesting that growth has not been inclusive. Furthermore, labor indicators on employment to population ratio and labor force participation rates (for men and women) remained virtually unchanged from 2009 to 2013, thereby indicating that job creation (under ADB’s inclusive growth pillar 1) and access to jobs (inclusive growth pillar 2) did not improve.39 Indicators on access to education and health (also for pillar 2) did improve during the CPS period, but ADB had no direct initiatives in education that would have contributed to those improvements. Finally, only limited progress or contributions were made to inclusive growth pillar 3 on social protection. Some livelihood and employment training was provided to returning refugees and displaced persons, but otherwise ADB did not conduct any initiatives for improved social protection. 64. Cross-sector and themes under the CPS. The CPS 2009–2013 contained five themes (para. 6). The objectives of these themes are shown in Appendix 2. The five themes are assessed overall as less than satisfactory, as the achievements varied greatly among the themes. The theme of regional cooperation saw very good progress as key road and rail connections were made with neighboring countries; Afghanistan now receives vital supplies of

38

Improved consumption is shown in Central Statistical Organization. 2014. National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-2012. Kabul.

39 Based on World Bank. 2015. World Development Indicators database.

17

electricity from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; and some progress has been made on trade facilitation through the CAREC Customs Cooperation Committee, Time Release Study training, and Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring. On the other hand, the theme of counter-narcotics did not achieve its objective of mainstreaming counter-narcotics in the design and monitoring of programs and projects.40 Some progress was seen in the other three themes.41 For example, improved sector governance has been achieved in transport and energy, and some gains in foreign investment were made for private sector development.42 Only a few contributions to gender were realized on older projects (e.g., women beneficiaries in the wool and carpet value chain),43 but more recent projects are making greater contributions by including more women participants.44 In particular, in one project site (Bamyan) for the Enhanced Agricultural Value Chains for Sustainable Livelihoods project (45259-001), an estimated 70% of the agriculture workers are women in 2015. However, more impact could likely have been achieved if greater attention had been given to these three themes throughout the CPS period. 65. Sector level impacts. ADB’s contributions to development impacts at the sector level are rated satisfactory. In the transport sector, positive indications of impact-level socio-economic benefits are intermittently noted in completion reports, resulting in a satisfactory rating.45 These include strong prospects for intraregional and cross-border trade opened by transport corridors. However, until a lasting solution to the sustainability of attained outcomes is reached, the impacts of transport projects may decline in time. ADB’s transport initiatives are also generating local development impacts through the community-based development projects that accompany newer MFF tranches for the Ring Road.46 Villages around project sites are able to choose what type of small-scale infrastructure project they would like, such as sanitation infrastructure or community centers. 66. In energy, ADB’s contribution to sector impact is satisfactory. Continuing expansion and rehabilitation of transmission and distribution networks, construction of substations and development of a hydropower plant contributed to greater access to electricity (760,000 households and 15,000 new industrial and commercial users in Kabul), increased electricity consumption (from 21kWh per year in 2002 to 185kWh in 2015),47 and regional power trade (with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Recent signing of the power purchase sales agreement with Turkmenistan is expected to contribute to a further increase of 1,000 GWh of power imports. 67. In 2013, DABS reported 24-hour power supply access for more than 75% of the population in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz and Pul-e Khumri to which ADB support has

40

The 2009 completion report of the Agriculture Sector Program claimed poppy cultivation was reduced as a result of removing restrictions in agriculture commodity markets. However, since 2009 cultivation has risen sharply, likely indicating that the Program had no effect on the drop in cultivation that occurred between 2007 and 2009.

41 If capacity development is included (see footnote 5), it is evident that extensive capacity building has featured in all three priority sectors, such as training for O&M, planning, project design, safeguards, financial management, procurement, and project management. Additionally, 30 officials from the Ministry of Energy and Water have been supported for master’s degrees in Thailand.

42 Asian Development Bank. 2006. Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (37393) and Asian Development Bank. 2004. Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (38912).

43 Asian Development Bank. 2006. Rural Business Support (40586).

44 Due to the successful participation of women and their performance under the project, ADB is considering standalone subprojects for the women in 2016.

45 To provide clearer measures of its contribution to sector development impacts, ADB needs to improve on monitoring and reporting of impact-level indicators.

46 This is a more recent approach by ADB in the latter tranches of the MFF Transport Network Development Investment Program (44482-012).

47 Figures provided by DABS in August 2015.

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significantly contributed. However, recent reports have indicated scheduled blackouts (load shedding) as power supply could not keep up with the requirements of increasing grid connections. Ongoing projects are geared towards synchronizing power systems to satisfy not only Afghanistan’s increasing demand for energy but also to serve as energy transit to Pakistan. 68. Completed operations in the ANR sector point to a less than satisfactory rating given the limited effectiveness of outcomes and the inconclusive data about the impact of ADB support on poverty reduction. Impact on women in completed projects was limited, as most project designs were not explicit about gender mainstreaming, but ongoing projects such as the Agriculture Market Infrastructure Project are more explicit on the inclusion of women (including women's producer associations and having gender disaggregated targets) and should achieve positive impacts for women such as reduced poverty. Moreover, it is evident that even with the reductions of scope, some projects can generate high impact in terms of the magnitude of beneficiaries they reach (e.g., Rural Business Support Project). 69. Support to PSM had less than satisfactory development impact given the changing political, security, and socio-economic conditions in Afghanistan which may derail the limited achievements in the sector. ADB’s contribution to the finance sector’s development impact is rated less than satisfactory in view of the declining GDP growth rates after 2010, higher unemployment since 2005,48 but with the mobilization of $108.6 million in foreign direct investment and creation of 850 jobs.49 Multisector operations, assessed with satisfactory development impacts, have contributed to various institutional and policy reforms that have set the platform for subsequent actions of other development partners, decreased travel times, improved irrigation and incomes for thousands of people, the provision of uninterrupted electricity supply, enhanced regional and national linkages, and positive performances in GDP per capita, inflation rates, budget deficit, and social indicators. 70. Unintended and unplanned impacts. Few unintended and unplanned impacts are noted in the project completion documents, but those that are recorded are positive developments and therefore the rating is satisfactory. Among these are 225,000 new households in Kabul with electrical service, 15,000 new nondomestic (i.e., industrial and commercial) electricity users, improved IWRM framework, and greater awareness of security, communications, improvised explosive devices and mines, and first aid.50 F. Performance of Nonsovereign Operations

71. ADB’s nonsovereign operations are rated successful based primarily on the highly successful ratings for projects in telecommunications and banking (Appendix 8). ADB support to the Telecom Development Company of Afghanistan (Roshan) was vital in the development and expansion of Afghanistan’s mobile telecommunication sector and infrastructure. Roshan’s subscriber base grew from 158,000 in 2004 to 5 million in 2011 (covering 230 cities and towns across 34 provinces). Roshan also promoted innovative services such as mobile money transfer and payment system, and mobile agricultural trade data service (i.e., farmers, input suppliers, traders and wholesalers have access to commodity information in 13 provincial wholesale markets through text messaging).

48

Expected impacts in the Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (37393-032) and Supporting Private Sector and Financial Market Reforms Capacity Building (37393-042).

49 Achievements from the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (38912-014).

50 Impacts from the following projects: Regional Power Transmission Interconnection (40043), Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources (38252-012), and Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan (37561-012).

19

72. Support to Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) catalyzed the entry of more local and international financial institutions in the financial market, and it has become the country’s largest private bank. As of August 2015 ADB had received $8.2 million through divestment of its shareholding and $2.9 million through dividend payouts by AIB. 73. The nonsovereign political risk guarantee of the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (AIGF), as part of a crisis response that included a sovereign loan, was not utilized due to political and economic developments that were not foreseen at the time of approval.51 The nonsovereign development impact was evaluated as below expectations and the political risk guarantee did not lead to profitability or income for ADB. However, AIGF’s development contribution overall was evaluated as a success, and the nonsovereign component was given some credit for this success based on its contributions to setting up AIGF and at minimal expense. 74. No new private sector operations were initiated during the CPS period due to a number of reasons, including the change of government in 2014 whose uncertainty led to delays in many businesses making investment decisions. One project, Sungas LLC, was approved in 2010 but subsequently cancelled, although this was related to commercial reasons and not government or macro factors. Despite the lack of new deals being finalized, ADB’s Private Sector Operations Department engaged with numerous sponsors during the CPS period, demonstrating the potential for private sector deals in Afghanistan. There are viable projects in Afghanistan, but internal and external challenges (e.g., the quality of the enabling environment; investors expecting a risk premium from their investments; difficulty in integrating Afghanistan-based companies with international markets; and government endorsement obstacles) made it difficult to conclude deals. G. ADB and Borrower Performance

75. Overall, ADB performance is assessed as satisfactory. ADB has aligned well with the government’s priorities and focused its operations on three core sectors to maximize effectiveness and reduce coordination issues for the government. Government ministries and development partners have confirmed the appropriateness of ADB’s strategic approach in transport, energy, and ANR, and they have recognized the role of ADB in prioritizing investments through its support in preparing sector road maps. For the most part, ADB has coordinated adequately with other development partners and attracted a significant amount of cofinancing, especially through AITF. During 2009 to mid-2015, ADB approved $375.36 million worth of projects with official cofinancing.52 Although ADB has mobilized cofinancing, the government expected AITF to have more contributors and higher levels of commitments, especially as other development partners started winding down operations to coincide with the withdrawal of international security forces. Another issue regarding AITF is some miscommunication to prospective contributors about the precise implementation guidelines during the initial years. 76. ADB has given attention to capacity building and strengthening government ownership as well as improving sector governance. ADB has also made progress in addressing contract management issues and been able to ensure adequate monitoring and supervision in difficult

51

Asian Development Bank. 2014. Extended Annual Review Report: Political Risk Guarantee. Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility. Manila.

52 For grants, it is 10 projects worth $368.86 million, and for TAs it is $6.5 million for 5 projects.

20

conditions (and to take decisive actions to improve project performance). ADB’s performance has been enhanced given the joint venture approach and delegation of more responsibility to the resident mission in Kabul.53 However, some projects reflected a less than satisfactory performance from ADB due to high staff turnover, the need for more frequent review missions (particularly for projects approved in 2003‒2005), and long delays in issuing no objections to project scope changes and approving contract variations. 77. Borrower performance has shown mixed results. Government capacities are gradually improving and resulting in better performance, including improved capacity for financial and project management, procurement, and the timely provision of administrative support. The National Procurement Authority established in 2014 is an important step forward and is making progress. The Capacity Building for Results initiative has similarly shown encouraging initial results. The government has also delivered a consistent message to ADB and other development partners about the country’s development agenda and priorities. Progress has been made on improving donor coordination, with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the Heads of Agencies Meeting, the Aid Policy Implementation Committee, and other mechanisms. On the other hand, the government’s occasional failure to finance counterpart requirements, a lack of strong ownership in certain ministries, ongoing capacity and governance concerns, a lack of security for some projects, and some inability to comply with project covenants contribute to a less than satisfactory rating. 78. A weakness of both ADB and government ministries is the lack of attention to results monitoring. This stems from the quality of designs at the onset and permeates during implementation when a monitoring system is not established and evaluation fails to fully capture measures of outcomes. H. Overall Assessment

79. ADB operations during 2009 to mid-2015 are assessed as successful with relevant, effective, less than efficient, less than likely sustainable, and less than satisfactory development impacts ratings.54 The weighting methodology is explained in Appendix 9 and is based on the sector share of the portfolio. Due to rounding of the criteria scores, the overall weighted score is 1.64 (Table 2). The overall rating is successful on the borderline. A successful score in ADB’s rating system ranges between 1.60 and 2.49, with the successful on the borderline rating ranging between 1.60 and 1.75. This successful rating is considered to be a remarkable and significant achievement given the challenging environment (particularly security and human and institutional capacities) in Afghanistan in which operations take place. A comparison of the CPS final review ratings and CAPE ratings is found in Appendix 10.

53

Increasing the responsibility of Kabul resident mission was coupled with a 50% increase in staff complement from 2008 to 2014.

54 Given the small amount of nonsovereign operations during the review period, nonsovereign operations have been factored into the overall sector assessments.

21

Table 2: Overall CPS and Sector Ratings

Source: ADB staff.

IV. LESSONS

80. Project and sector experiences in Afghanistan highlight security, a focused country program, improvements in efficiency, and better results orientation as some of the important lessons in improving development effectiveness of ADB’s country program assistance. The following lessons are meant to supplement the earlier lessons identified in the Afghanistan Country Assistance Program Evaluation.55 81. Security issues and security risk management need to be more central in project design and implementation in conflict situations such as Afghanistan, even in areas of the country that are considered relatively secure. Experience in Afghanistan has shown that insufficient consideration of security conditions leads to delays that have resulted in the reduction of scope, extensive cost overruns, and in some cases cancellations of ADB support. Project design and implementation require more detailed and ongoing security assessments and risk management plans, taking into account local conditions at project sites. More appropriate assessment and more tailored mitigation measures are needed for each project rather than generic, one-size-fits-all security approaches. This would facilitate the readiness of ADB support in conflict-affected countries. 82. A focused program concentrated in a few sectors eases the burden on governments with limited capacities. Afghanistan’s capacity limitations are recognized, and the practice of having development partners limit the number of sectors they are involved in aids the government in donor coordination, preparing and implementing sector road maps, and to avoid overstretching the government’s human resource capacities. ADB’s experience in prioritizing only a few sectors also indicates that this concentration helps to generate deeper sector achievements. Furthermore, ADB’s on-budget assistance enhances government predictability of aid, increases ownership, and builds government financial management capacity. 83. Improving efficiency requires ensuring better quality at entry, strengthening capacities at startup, increasing supervision, and having realistic timeframes. Specifically, there is a need for technical designs consistent with expected project outcomes, sound capacity assessment of executing and implementing agencies, timeliness of actions to address recruitment and other administrative issues, and adequate review missions. Realistic

55

Asian Development Bank. 2012. Country Assistance Program Evaluation: Afghanistan. Manila.

Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability

Development

Impacts Overall

Agriculture and Natural Resources 2 1 1 2 1 1.4

Energy 2 2 1 2 1 1.6

Transport 3 2 1 1 2 1.8

Finance 2 1 1 1 1 1.2

Multisector 2 1 2 1 2 1.6

Public Sector Management 2 1 1 1 1 1.2

Cross-Cutting Objectives 2 1 1.5

Weighted Score 2.47 1.76 1.08 1.36 1.54 1.64

22

implementation timeframes are crucial in avoiding cost overruns and time extensions. Given the fragile and conflict conditions in Afghanistan, imminent delays from security threats, limited government capacity, including procurement, and contractors’ willingness to bid and abilities to implement projects in insecure conditions need to be adequately factored into project implementation schedules. 84. Improved results frameworks and monitoring systems can strengthen the results orientation of ADB support. Difficulty in the monitoring and assessment of support were related to often poor quality results frameworks and the lack of established systems for tracking results, particularly outcomes and impact. When done well, these can help to better identify ADB’s contribution to development results and areas that ADB needs to improve on.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS 85. In preparing the next CPS, consideration should be given to the following: A. Inclusive Economic Growth

86. Recommendation: ADB should focus on inclusive economic growth. Greater attention to inclusive economic growth is needed in the next CPS, as revealed in this CPS final review and in line with ADB’s Midterm Review of Strategy 2020.56 To this end, a number of recommendations are given to sharpen the focus on inclusive growth:

(i) Ensure greater local participation in planning. Current processes for project planning are centralized in the ministries in Kabul. More local level participation would strengthen local voices, increase the inclusiveness of ADB interventions, and better ensure more localized benefits.

(ii) Ensure that project designs include explicit benefits for lower income groups.57 There is scope to include explicit benefits for lower income groups in ADB infrastructure projects, particularly in energy. ADB energy projects have focused on supplying grid electricity, but more components should be directed to connections for lower income households. Furthermore, off-grid initiatives should be included to provide benefits to rural populations that have grid electricity infrastructure passing through their villages but without accruing any of the benefits. In transport, ADB should continue with its recent practice of including community-based development in MFF tranches, whereby villages along the Ring Road project sites can select small-scale infrastructure projects in order to develop more community buy in and offer local benefits.

(iii) Develop synergies with other development partners. Greater efforts should be made to develop synergies with other development partners’ initiatives to complement ADB infrastructure and address a greater totality of development needs in local communities. For example, ADB-financed roads could be planned in conjunction with other development partners’ education (schools) or health (health centers) interventions 58 so that explicit linkages are made across sectors in which ADB is not engaged, thereby generating greater inclusive growth impacts. Also, greater coordination between ADB and World Bank and USAID would be beneficial so that ADB’s Ring Road sections are linked with the feeder or local roads constructed by the latter two agencies.

56

Asian Development Bank. 2014. Midterm Review of Strategy 2020: Meeting the Challenges of a Transforming Asia and Pacific. Manila.

57 Drawn from Asian Development Bank. 2014. ADB Support for Inclusive Growth. Manila.

58 This example is cited in Asian Development Bank. 2014. ADB Support for Inclusive Growth. Manila.

23

(iv) Achieve greater balance among the pillars of ADB’s inclusive economic growth strategic agenda. As noted earlier, most of ADB’s contributions to inclusive growth in Afghanistan have been in pillar 1 (economic opportunities, including jobs, created and expanded) because of the focus on infrastructure. ADB should strive in the next CPS to have more initiatives that would support pillar 2 (access to economic opportunities broadened) and pillar 3 (extreme deprivation prevented and vulnerability to risks reduced), as progress in all three pillars is needed to achieve inclusive economic growth.

B. Cross-Cutting Themes and Drivers of Change

87. Recommendation: Devote more attention to cross-cutting themes and drivers of change. Many of the ADB projects during the CPS period related to reconstruction of infrastructure that had been damaged by years of war. While this reconstruction was vital to Afghanistan’s resumption of economic growth, cross-cutting themes did not feature prominently in ADB’s efforts with the exception of regional cooperation and integration. The next CPS should strive to give more emphasis to cross-cutting themes and cross-sector linkages that would strengthen ADB’s development contributions and impact. Investment projects should include more components or activities that directly support cross-cutting themes and ADB’s drivers of change. Two areas in particular would be gender and environment and climate change. C. Sector Selection 88. Recommendation: ADB and the government should continue to partner on transport, energy, and agriculture and natural resources sectors in the next CPS. The sector selection has been assessed as highly appropriate given the country’s priorities and needs and ADB’s core competencies. Furthermore, ADB’s value addition is significant in regional integration through transport and energy infrastructure support under the CAREC Program. Continuing assistance to the ANR sector can have a high and lasting impact on incomes and poverty reduction. As noted in lessons learned, focusing on a limited number of priority sectors has been beneficial and ADB should avoid spreading its resources across too many sectors. D. Enabling Environment for Private Sector

89. Recommendation: Devote more efforts to developing an enabling environment to support prospective nonsovereign opportunities. Inclusive growth requires the creation of jobs, but these opportunities must emanate from the private sector. Private sector development will be needed to accomplish this. A better enabling environment for the private sector is vital to this process and should be given more attention by ADB in the next CPS. In particular, ADB should focus on working closely with the government to ensure delivery on agreements that are committed to, for example a Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement that would secure national fuel supplies for uninterrupted business operations in the manufacturing and independent power producer sectors, fair and predictable tax treatment for companies, impartial regulation of the private sector, and stronger titling systems for property and assets. These measures would enable ADB and other investors to make more significant contributions to private sector development, job creation, and sustainable, private sector-led economic growth. ADB’s nonsovereign operations for AIB and Roshan have shown that the right private sector projects in Afghanistan can have a high impact, but subsequent nonsovereign operations have not emerged because of a number of obstacles, including the enabling environment.

24

E. Addressing Security Risks 90. Recommendation: Strengthen risk assessment and risk management approaches for ADB projects. As discussed in ADB’s operational plan for enhancing effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected situations, risk management approaches need to be country specific.59 ADB needs an improved country-specific security framework in Afghanistan that provides, among others, better structures and processes on how security risk is assessed and managed at the various phases of the project cycle. Security costs can be as high as 35% of overall project costs in Afghanistan, yet numerous delays and cost overruns are occurring due to security issues. ADB’s approach to security for projects in Afghanistan can be strengthened by:

(i) Training for ADB project officers and counterpart government officials. Training should be provided to all project officers on assessing and managing security risks in order to strengthen security risk management in project preparation and implementation.

(ii) Require security assessments, security plans, and risk mitigation for all projects. Even in “secure” areas of Afghanistan, all projects should have a security assessment and a detailed security plan that is tailored to the specific project and location.

(iii) Greater role for the Resident Mission’s Security Unit in project security matters. The Afghanistan Resident Mission’s Security Unit should be more integrated into project design and implementation to ensure that appropriate security measures are planned and implemented, quality assurance is given to proposed security measures, and to verify that what ADB is paying for (security services and assets) is actually being implemented on the ground. Key roles performed by the Security Unit could entail: (a) conducting initial risk assessments for proposed projects; (b) reviewing bid proposals’ security components and costs; (c) review security-related contract variation requests and advise ADB project officers; and (d) participate in monitoring of security measures taken during project implementation.

(iv) Apply conflict-sensitive approaches to ADB’s operations. Afghanistan is classified by ADB as a fragile and conflict-affected situation (FCAS), and the current security and political conditions give rise to great uncertainty in the future. In many instances, however, project design and implementation in Afghanistan have been conducted in a “business as usual” manner ill-suited to the country’s FCAS conditions. ADB should be more diligent in applying FCAS approaches because of the security conditions, weak institutions and governance, and other causes of fragility. In particular, ADB could (a) ensure that conflict-sensitivity is used throughout the entire project cycle; (b) thorough risk assessments and mitigation strategies are prepared for each project up front, including an examination of internal and external factors underlying fragility and the drivers of conflict; (c) that local conditions related to potential or actual conflict in a project area are clearly understood by ADB staff, government officials, and project management units; (d) ensure close collaboration with civil society; and (e) apply appropriate flexibilities allowed under ADB’s FCAS approaches to project appraisal requirements, project processing, procurement, and disbursement.

F. Enhance Monitoring and Reporting of Outcomes and Impacts 91. Recommendation: Enhance results orientation and measurement, and strengthen results tracking and reporting. ADB operations have been adequate in monitoring outputs but need to vastly improve the system of tracking outcomes and impacts. In some cases, even with

59

Asian Development Bank. 2013. Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB’s Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations. Manila.

25

the budgeting of monitoring and evaluation specialists, measures of the targeted indicators are not included in progress reports and final reports. ADB and the government need to improve on the following at the country, sector, and project level: ensuring the appropriateness of a hierarchy of results, consistency of outcome and impact statements and indicators, availability of baseline information, and a clear implementation arrangement for monitoring and reporting ongoing results.60 Additional attention also needs to be placed on monitoring local benefits generated by ADB projects, such as the number of local people hired at project construction sites, and monitoring of inclusive growth aspects in infrastructure projects. G. Discontinue Use of Design-Build Contracts

92. Recommendation: The use of design-build contracts should be discontinued by ADB. As noted in paragraph 20, the expected benefits of design-build contracts have generally not been realized and, in fact, their use has been problematic in terms of potential conflicts of interest by the winning contractors, extensive cost overruns, and forgone capacity development of ministries. Instead, the design-build approach should be replaced by the traditional civil works procurement method of design-bid-build, whereby engineering and design specifications are handled by the relevant ministries, and prospective contractors then prepare their tender documents based on these details. The traditional procurement approach of developing the design before tendering will provide the government and ADB more certainty about design quality and cost.

60

In discussions with government ministries it was revealed that some project management offices (PMOs) thought it was ADB’s responsibility to track results despite this task being assigned to the PMO in the project documents.

26 Appendix 1

ADB LOANS, GRANTS, AND TAs ACTIVE DURING 2009 TO MID-2015

Project No.

Loan/ Grant/ TA No.

Project Name Fund Type

Amount ($ million)

Date Approved

Date Closed

Original Revised

Agriculture and Natural Resources 38096 9060 Balkh River Basin Water Resources

Management JFPR 10.0 10.0 15-Dec-04 10-Jul-12

39370 0126 Agriculture Market Infrastructure Project (formerly Commercial Agriculture Development Project)

ADF grant 30.0 30.0 21-Nov-08 Active

40586 9100 Rural Business Support JFPR 18.0 18.0 12-Dec-06 30-Aug-13 36222-012 9039 Rural Recovery through Community-Based

Irrigation Rehabilitation JFPR 5.0 5.0 26-Dec-03 12-Apr-12

36252-013 0033 Western Basins Water Resources Management

ADF grant 14.5 14.5 20-Dec-05 Active

36252-013 2227 Western Basins Water Resources Management

ADF loan 60.5 51.05 20-Dec-05 Active

36252-013 0052 Western Basins Water Resources Management

Canada grant

13.2 8.35 25-Aug-06 Active

37046-013 2083 Agriculture Sector Program ADF loan 55.0 55.6 04-May-04 16-Apr-14 37713-012 9038 Integrated Community Development in

Northern Afghanistan JFPR 3.0 3.0 26-Dec-03 05-Mar-13

38221-012 4483 Capacity Building for Land Policy and Administration Reform

TASF/UK 0.8 0.8 15-Dec-04 31-Jan-09

38252-012 4716 Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources

TASF 0.755 0.755 07-Dec-05 18-Jun-09

4209101 7088 Water Resources Development JSF 1.8 1.8 10-Jun-08 31-Aug-10 36222-013 9165 Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation

and Development JFPR 10.0 10.0 06-Jul-12 Active

42091-032 0167 Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 1

ADF grant 86.6 86.6 06-Oct-09 Active

42091-032 0170 Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 1

UK grant 3.3 3.3 06-Oct-09 Active

42091-043 0362 Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 2

ADF grant 100.0 100.0 08-Oct-13 Active

45259-001 9167 Enhanced Agricultural Value Chains for Sustainable Livelihoods

JFPR 18.5 18.5 19-Sep-12 Active

48326-001 0411 Northern Flood-Damaged Infrastructure Emergency Rehabilitation Project

ADF grant 40.0 40.0 16-Oct-14 Active

48326-001 0412 Northern Flood-Damaged Infrastructure Emergency Rehabilitation Project

AITF 16.6 16.6 16-Oct-14 Active

44411-022 7994 Supporting Natural Resources Operations WFPF 1.5 1.5 14-Dec-11 Active

Appendix 1 27

Project No.

Loan/ Grant/ TA No.

Project Name Fund Type

Amount ($ million)

Date Approved

Date Closed

Original Revised

Energy 40043 2304 Regional Power Transmission

Interconnection (Regional) ADF loan 35.0 35.0 19-Dec-06 05-Mar-14

37078-013 0004 Power Transmission and Distribution Project

ADF grant 23.5 22.8 14-Apr-05 31-Jul-14

37078-013 2165 Power Transmission and Distribution Project

ADF loan 26.5 25.7 14-Ape-05 31-Jul-14

42094-022 0134 Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 1

ADF grant 164.0 164.0 02-Dec-08 Active

42094-062 9128 Development of Mini Hydropower Plants in Badakhshan and Bamyan Provinces

JFPR 12.0 12.0 28-Nov-08 30-Oct-14

40622 4909 Improving Capacity of Da Afghanistan Breshna Moassessa

TASF 1.2 1.2 19-Dec-06 25-May-10

39402-012 4918 Support to the Interministerial Commission for Energy

TASF 2.0 2.0 31-Jan-07 31-Dec-09

42472-012 7168 Development of Wind Energy TASF 0.16 0.16 06-Nov-08 31-May-10 40043-013 0230 Regional Power Transmission

Interconnection ADF grant 12.0 12.0 18-Nov-10 29-Oct-13

42094-032 0184 MFF - Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 2

ADF grant 81.5 81.5 03-Dec-09 Active

42094-042 0280 Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 3

ADF grant 43.0 43.0 22-Dec-11 Active

42094-042 0281 Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 3

UK 20.0 20.0 22-Dec-11 Active

42094-042 0282 Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 3

Denmark 12.4 12.4 22-Dec-11 Active

42094-052 0332 Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 4

ADF grant 200.0 200.0 18-Dec-12 Active

42094-075 0377 Energy Sector Development Investment Program - Tranche 5

ADF grant 49.1 49.1 04-Dec-13 Active

46392-001 0374 North-South Power Transmission Enhancement Project (formerly Power Distribution Project)

ADF grant 99.0 99.0 25-Nov-13 Active

46392-001 0375 North-South Power Transmission Enhancement Project (formerly Power Distribution Project)

AITF 117.0 117.0 25-Nov-13 Active

42094-072 7289 Kabul Distribution Network Rehabilitation TASF 0.225 0.225 27-May-09 25-Feb-10 43497-012 7637 Power Sector Master Plan JFPR 1.5 1.5 06-Nov-10 31-Jan-14 46347 8328 Supporting the Inter-Ministerial

Commission for Energy AITF 1.5 1.5 22-Feb-13 Active

47018-001 8401 Gas Development Master Plan TASF and AITF

1.5 1.5 11-Jul-13 Active

43497-013 8475 Addendum to the Afghanistan Power Sector Master Plan

TASF 0.225 0.225 04-Oct-13 28-Feb-15

47282-002 8509 Energy Development 2014-2023 TASF 1.5 1.5 19-Nov-13 Active 47266 8508 Renewable Energy Development CEF 1.0 1.0 12-Dec-14 Active

28 Appendix 1

Project No.

Loan/ Grant/ TA No.

Project Name Fund Type

Amount ($ million)

Date Approved

Date Closed

Original Revised

Finance 37393-032 0067 Private Sector and Financial Market

Development Program ADF grant 56.0 56.0 14-Dec-06 13-Apr-09

37393-042 0068 Supporting Private Sector and Financial Market Reforms Capacity Building

ADF grant 4.0 4.0 14-Dec-06 28-Jan-11

38912-014 2091 Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

ADF loan 5.0 5.0 24-Sep-04 28-Sep-10

44457-012 7983 Rural Finance Expansion TASF 1.5 1.5 14-Dec-11 30-Jun-15

Health 36628 9030 Primary Health Care Partnership for the

Poor (formerly Piloting Health Care Partnership)

JFPR 3.0 3.0 19-Dec-02 20-Nov-11

Industry and Trade

39571-012 4699 Building the Capacity of the Ministry of Commerce for Trade and Transit Facilitation

TASF 0.4 0.4 24-Nov-05 31-Jan-09

40577-012 4906 Capacity Building for Customs and Trade Facilitation

TASF 1.2 1.2 18-Dec-06 13-May-09

Multisector 36231-013 1954 Postconflict Multisector Program ADF loan

173.5 171.2 04-Dec-02 01-Oct-12

36673-013 1997 Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

ADF loan 150.0 142.6 03-Jun-03 01-Jul-13

37102-012 4415 Kabul Air Quality Management Denmark 0.45 0.45 15-Oct-04 31-Jul-09 47263-001 8470 Support for Infrastructure Investments

and Policy TASF 1.2 1.2 01-Oct-13 Active

47263-001 8470 Support for Infrastructure Investments and Policy (Supplementary)

TASF 0.75 0.75 25-Mar-14 Active

Private Sector

38912-014 7201 Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

Guarantee 10.0 10.0 24-Sep-04 Cancelled

42919 7281/ 2431

Telecom Development Company of Afghanistan (Roshan)

OCR 60.0 60.0 29-Jul-08 28-Feb-10

37903-014 7199 Afghanistan International Bank Equity Facility

2.6 2.6 13-May-04 Active

40921-014 7307 Sungas LLC Equity Facility

8.0 8.0 25-Mar-10 Cancelled

Public Sector Management

38122-013 0030 Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform Program)

ADF grant 7.0 7.0 14-Dec-05 31-Dec-10

38122-013 2215 Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform Program)

ADF loan 48.0 48.0 14-Dec-05 Active

37047-012 4313 Poverty Assessment and Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Statistical Capacity Building

TASF 1.75 1.75 26-Dec-03 31-Oct-12

37561-012 4345 Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan

TASF 0.99 0.99 01-Jun-04 31-May-12

40580-012 4897 Support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

TASF and GCF

2.7 2.7 14-Dec-06 28-Sep-12

40280 4964 Support for Economic Policy Management (formerly Capacity Building for Ministry of Finance)

TASF and cofinancing

2.5 2.5 04-Sep-07 Active

40280 4964 Support for Economic Policy Management (formerly Capacity Building for Ministry of Finance) [Supplementary]

TASF and cofinancing

0.225 0.225 15-Apr-14 Active

Appendix 1 29

ADF = Asian Development Fund, AITF = Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund, EU = European Union, GCF = Green Climate Fund, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, JSF = Japan Special Fund, CEF = Clean Energy Fund, TASF = Technical Assistance Special Fund, OCR = ordinary capital resources, UK = United Kingdom, WFPF = Water Financing Partnership Facility.

Project No.

Loan/ Grant/ TA No.

Project Name Fund Type

Amount ($ million)

Date Approved

Date Closed

Original Revised 42089-012 7090 Security Plan for Project Implementation TASF 0.995 0.995 25-Jun08 17-Dec-14 42089-012 7090 Security Plan for Project Implementation

(Supplementary) TASF 0.225 0.225 16-Sep-10 17-Dec-14

42089-012 7090 Security Plan for Project Implementation (Supplementary)

TASF 0.75 0.75 02-May-12 17-Dec-14

Transport

36553 9024 Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons

JFPR 15.0 15.0 03-Oct-02 16-Nov-09

36553 9024 Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons (Supplementary)

Kuwait 15.0 15.0 03-Oct-02 16-Nov-09

36587-032 0076 Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons (Supplementary)

Canada 12.8 12.8 28-Mar-07 30-Jun-11

37075-013 2140 Andkhoy-Qaisar Road ADF loan 80.0 66.7 15-Dec-04 30-Jun-14 37075-022 0012 Qaisar-Bala Murghab Road ADF grant 55.0 55.0 12-Jul-05 Active 37136-013 2105 Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project

Phase 1 ADF loan 30.0 27.0 23-Nov-04 18-Dec-14

37728-012 9037 Emergency Road Rehabilitation JFPR 20.0 20.0 19-Dec-03 29-Apr-11 39467-013 9097 North-South Corridor Project JFPR 20.0 20.0 26-Sep-06 25-Jun-10 39467-013 0054 North-South Corridor Project ADF grant 40.0 40.0 26-Sep-06 19-Aug-13 39467-013 2257 North-South Corridor Project ADF loan 78.2 78.2 26-Sep-06 Active 40333-022 0081 Road Network Development Project I

(Bala Murghab to Leman) ADF grant 176.0 176.0 28-Sep-07 Active

42095-022 0135 MFF - Road Network Development Investment Program, Tranche 1

ADF grant 60.0 60.0 02-Dec-08 04-Sep-13

37083-012 4675 Capacity Building for Road Sector Institutions

TASF 1.0 1.0 31-Oct-05 30-Apr-10

37326-012 4828 Road Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Cluster

TASF 2.7 2.7 21-Aug-06 31-Mar-09

42095-032 0244 Road Network Development Investment Program, Tranche 2

ADF grant 340.0 310.0 21-Dec-10 Active

42095-032 0291 Road Network Development Investment Program, Tranche 2

AITF 30.0 30.0 29-May-12 25-Sep-13

42533-022 0161 Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway ADF grant 165.0 165.0 30-Sep-09 05-Apr-13 44482-022 0261 Transport Network Development

Investment Program - Tranche 1 ADF grant 189.0 189.0 12-Oct-11 Active

44482-022 0262 Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 1

AITF 33.0 33.0 12-Oct-11 Active

44482-023 0327 Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 2

ADF grant 176.0 149.0 10-Dec-12 Active

44482-023 0328 Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 2

AITF 60.0 87.0 10-Dec-12 Active

44482-024 0355 Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 3

ADF grant 220.0 220.0 11-Sep-13 Active

44482-025 0422 Transport Network Development Investment Program - 4

ADF grant 109.0 109.0 15-Dec-14 Active

44482-025 0423 Transport Network Development Investment Program - 4

EU 21.0 21.0 15-Dec-14 Active

42533-012 7259 Railway Development Study TASF 1.9 1.9 27-Mar-09 12-Aug-11 44482-029 8069 MFF for Transport Network Development

Investment Program, Tranche 2 TASF 0.225 0.225 02-Apr-12 15-Jan-13

47210-001 8687 Transport Sector Master Plan Update TASF 1.0 1.0 22-Jul-14 Active

30 Appendix 2

AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY 2009–2013: OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES

Overall CPS objective: Accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction. Sector level objectives (expected outcomes) and links to CPS objectives: Agriculture: Improved food self-sufficiency and increased agriculture exports. Energy: Improved access to affordable and reliable energy to most households. Transport: Improved low cost, reliable transport connectivity for goods and people within Afghanistan and cross-border. Objectives (expected outcomes) related to themes: Counter-narcotics: Counter-narcotics effectively mainstreamed in the design and monitoring of programs/projects. Gender and development: Women and men experienced equal benefits from ADB interventions including access to public service delivery. Governance: Improved efficiency and accountability in public investment and expenditure. Private sector development: Increased private sector investments, improved business enabling environment, and increased subregional trade. Regional cooperation: Improved cross border connectivity infrastructure; harmonization of standards and regulations and customs cooperation; and increased subregional and transit trade.

Appendix 3 31

CONSISTENCY OF COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

Country Partnership Strategy Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Objective

Accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction.

Objective

Economic and social development (Pillar 3): Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Sectoral focus

Energy

Power generation, transmission, and distribution; development of indigenous energy resources such as micro-, small, and medium-sized hydropower; and regional trade in energy.

Transport and communications

Rehabilitation and construction of national roads and railways, including links to neighboring countries.

Agriculture and natural resources

Irrigation and water resource management and agriculture market infrastructure.

Private sector operations

Banking, telecommunications, energy, and mining sectors.

Enabling environment for a vigorous private sector.

Strategic investments that catalyze additional private sector investment.

Priorities

Energy

Implementation of key power infrastructure projects; energy sector governance; legal reform and regulatory standards; expanded public power grid; increased access to rural energy services (mini-hydro and solar, among others); increased regional cooperation and trade in energy products.

Transport

Regional, national highways and provincial roads; rural roads; urban transport; civil aviation; transport sector maintenance; public transport; and railway program.

Agriculture and rural development

National food security, national area based development, horticulture, livestock, national rural access, rural water supply and sanitation, irrigation, national resources, national surveillance system, rural electrification program, rural enterprise program, research and extension system, emergency response system, and capacity building programs; geographic priorities for commercial agriculture through Agriculture and Rural Development Zones.

Thematic areas included local governance, agricultural production, agricultural and rural infrastructure, economic regeneration, and disaster and emergency preparedness.

Water and irrigation

Effective integrated water resources management; institution building and capacity development program; national water resources development program; and irrigation rehabilitation program.

Private sector development

Strengthening the enabling environment; expand opportunities for private investment in infrastructure and natural resources development; concerted private sector investment promotion.

32 Appendix 3

Country Partnership Strategy Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Thematic focus

Counter-narcotics

Increase access to markets and provide income-generating opportunities.

Capacity development

Efforts focus on priority sectors.

Substantive medium-term advisory technical assistance (TA), with a focus on capacity development (including mobilizing support for long-term training), to be included in all ADB-financed projects.

Sustained TA support is required to (a) substitute for the lack of skilled staff in ministries, (b) compensate for institutional weaknesses and human capacity gaps during planning and implementation, and (c) provide longer-term capacity development support.

Gender

Mainstream gender in its activities by identifying suitable entry-points.

Targeted gender TA support to promote gender in key sectors (and related agencies) or for other activities that add a gender dimension to other ADB-supported activities.

Governance (including anticorruption activities)

Better public expenditure planning, management, and accountability as key elements in sector support and contribute to improved portfolio management and project implementation.

Systems to reduce opportunities for corruption through corruption risk management plans in key sectors of engagement.

Regional cooperation

Focus on activities supported through the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program.

Scope for regional cooperation interventions to be assessed in planning support to selected sectors of engagement.

Cross-cutting issues

Counter-narcotics

Strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods (e.g., alternative livelihood opportunities in districts where poppy is grown).

Capacity building

Build on regional human resource capacity; develop skills needed to effectively implement programs and projects.

Gender equality

Gender equality in employment, promotion, policy making and budgetary allocations; improvement in women’s status (e.g., literacy, enrollment, wages, etc.); and social acceptance of gender equality.

Anti-corruption

Enhance government anti-corruption commitment and leadership; raise awareness of corruption and evaluating the effectiveness of anticorruption measures; mainstream anticorruption into government reforms and national development; and strengthen the legal framework for fighting corruption and building an institutional capacity for effective implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

Governance

Policy framework covers national assembly empowerment, public administration reform, anti-corruption measures, land administration, governance administration, effective system of disaster preparedness and response.

Environmental management

Community-based natural resource management, prevention and/or abatement of pollution; environmental management, education and awareness; and accounting of environmental costs of proposed programs or projects.

Regional cooperation

Increase access to power; generate revenues through transit trade; reduce impediments to trade and expand both import and export opportunities; increase investment and contribute to improved employment and business opportunities; facilitate the free flow of goods, services, and technology; allow the costs or benefits of development of common resources to be shared; reduce regional tensions and facilitate regional efforts to reduce cross border crime and terrorism; and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees.

Sources: Asian Development Bank. 2008. Country Partnership Strategy: Afghanistan, 2009-2013. Manila. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2008. Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–2013): A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction. Kabul.

Appendix 4 33

PERFORMANCE RATINGS OF COMPLETED SOVEREIGN PROJECTS, 2009 TO MID-2015

Table A4.1: Relevance

Sector HR/R LR/I Not

Rated Total HR/R%

Agriculture and Natural Resources

5 1 1 7 83%

Energy 3 0 0 3 100%

Transport 9 0 0 9 100%

Finance 2 0 0 2 100%

Multisector 3 0 0 3 100%

Public Sector Management 3 0 1 4 100%

25 1 2 28 96%

HR=highly relevant, R=relevant, LR=less than relevant, I=irrelevant

Table A4.2: Effectiveness

Sector HE/E LE/I Not

Rated Total HE/E%

Agriculture and Natural Resources

1 4 2 7 20%

Energy 2 1 0 3 67%

Transport 7 1 1 9 88%

Finance 1 1 0 2 50%

Multisector 1 1 1 3 50%

Public Sector Management 1 2 1 4 33%

Total 13 10 5 28 57%

HE=highly effective, E=effective, LE=less than effective, I=ineffective

Table A4.3: Efficiency

Sector HE/E LE/I Not

Rated Total HE/E%

Agriculture and Natural Resources

1 4 2 7 20%

Energy 1 0 2 3 100%

Transport 2 4 3 9 33%

Finance 1 1 0 2 50%

Multisector 1 0 2 3 100%

Public Sector Management 0 1 3 4 0%

Total 6 10 12 28 38%

HE=highly efficient, E=efficient, LE=less than efficient, I=inefficient

34 Appendix 4

Table A4.4: Sustainability

Sector MS/S LS/US Not

Rated Total MS/S%

Agriculture and Natural Resources

4 1 2 7 80%

Energy 0 1 2 3 0%

Transport 3 4 3 10a 43%

Finance 0 2 0 2 0%

Multisector 1 1 1 3 50%

Public Sector Management 0 1 3 4 0%

Total 8 10 11 29 44%

MS=most likely sustainable, S=likely sustainable, LS=less than likely sustainable, US=unlikely sustainable

a One transport project provided two sustainability ratings (Loan 2140, Andkhoy-

Qaisar Road Project).

Table A4.5: Development Impacts

Sector HS/S LS/U Not

Rated Total %

Agriculture and Natural Resources

1 3 3 7 25%

Energy 1 0 2 3 100%

Transport 5 0 4 9 100%

Finance 0 0 2 2 0%

Multisector 0 0 3 3 0%

Public Sector Management 0 0 4 4 0%

Total 7 3 18 28 73%

HS=high satisfactory, S=satisfactory, LS=less than satisfactory, U=unsatisfactory

35 Appendix 5

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICALLY COMPLETED PROJECTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, 2009 TO MID-2015

Table A5.1: Project Performance: Relevance Rating Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

Sector: Energy

40043 (L2304/G0230/ TA4909)

Regional Power Transmission Interconnection

Relevant Power supply and demand issues in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan led to a mutually and economically beneficial approach in resolving their power issues.

Design was appropriate and responsive to the country's development issues.

Variations during implementation appropriate and ensured project remained relevant even after implementation.

None. At design, the local villagers were to serve as guarantors for the security of the line; however, PCR did not report on this.

Design included component for demining and costs for security during construction. During construction, the contractors and government provided services related to security.

43497 (TA 7637/8475)

Power Sector Master Plan/ Addendum to the Power Sector Master Plan

Relevant Energy sector has consistently been a priority in the national development plan. An updated power master plan was meant to facilitate strategic prioritization of the required infrastructure to achieve energy security.

Design adequate and TA financing sufficient for desired outcome.

No major changes made during implementation.

Design had adequate flexibility to meet requests from Afghanistan.

None. None.

39402 (TA 4918)

Support to the Interministerial Commission for Energy

Relevant Interministerial Commission for Energy is a key point of contact for energy reform—providing accurate information, facilitating market relationships, coordinating energy project development, and building regional linkages.

Impact statement and indicators were not appropriate for the level of TA intervention. Impact statement and indicators were too optimistic given TA scope.

Not identified as an issue at the onset, constraints in data availability proved to be a challenge which affected delivery of results.

None None

Sector: Transport

36553 (J9024/G0076)

Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons

Relevant Project assisted government in reintegrating, settling, and providing livelihood and employment opportunities for returning refugees and displaced persons.

Project design relevant and appropriate in achieving the development objectives of poverty reduction through beneficiaries' engagement in road construction activities, complemented with a comprehensive package for developing labor skills and improving educational and health services in targeted communities.

Yes. Livelihood and employment opportunities provided to returning refugees/displaced persons.

Identified security as a concern but JFPR relied heavily on government and UN agencies to provide security to the project. Insufficient mitigating measures or contingency were identified or implemented, e.g., conflict situation not fully factored in project implementation schedule. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in JFPR.

37075-013 (L2140)

Andkhoy-Qaisar Road

Highly relevant

Project was consistent and aligned with government’s 2002 National Development Framework and later ANDS, and ADB’s CSPU 2004-2006.

Design benefited from PPTA that provided a feasibility study of the project road. Implementation period of 36 months proved to be

Yes. Primary beneficiaries, estimated at about 800,000 and mostly engaged in agriculture, 50% live under the

Recognized that political and security situation were volatile. Several mitigation measures were identified. A more comprehensive

Appendix 5

36

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

unrealistic. Toll road concept was abandoned, and given the state of security in Afghanistan, should not have been included in the design. During implementation, civil works design was changed to improve safety features.

poverty line. assessment of the situation could have identified other issues and corresponding mitigating measures. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP.

37136-013 (L2105)

Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project Phase 1

Relevant Project promoted the integration of remote regions and facilitated more rapid economic growth in those areas; responds to the ANDS vision.

Project design weak; insufficient measures to mitigate identified risks which contributed to major change in scope of a component.

None. Discussed indirect benefits to regional and local communities from promoting tourism; direct benefits to poor households in terms of employment during construction of airports only.

Political and volatility of security situation were recognized and discussed in the design. Mitigating measures insufficient. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP.

37728-012 (J9037)

Emergency Road Rehabilitation

Relevant Project helped the government restore the primary road transport network in northern Afghanistan.

Project was consistent with: (i) Afghanistan's National Development Framework and Budget; (ii) ADB’s CSPU for Afghanistan, 2003-2005; (iii) ADB’s policy on rehabilitation assistance of 1989; and (iv) Japan's Regional Comprehensive Development Assistance to Afghanistan (The Ogata Initiative of 2002)..

Design was inadequate, resulted in cost overrun of $28 million. No price escalation clause in the contract that prolonged negotiations on the increase in contract price.

Yes. Road rehabilitation was expected to increase access to social services and increase income to rural poor in the area.

Conflict situation and political instability were recognized in the design but insufficient mitigation measures identified and implemented. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in the RRP.

39467-013 (L2257/G0054/ G0135/J9097)

North-South Corridor Project

Highly relevant

Project was consistent with Government’s overarching objective of ensuring economic growth by rebuilding and rehabilitating the country’s national roads, i.e., aligned with ANDS and with ADB’s CSPU 2004-2006.

Some project goal, outcome, and output indicators were not clearly defined in the initial project design and monitoring framework.

Yes. Project was expected to lead both direct and indirect poverty reduction impacts. Since the project connected most of the main agricultural regions to Kabul, the project goal of promoting economic and social development and reducing poverty is likely to be reached.

Government committed to exert best effort to provide adequate security for the smooth and uninterrupted implementation of the project. Although identified as a risk, adequate security was not provided during implementation. Serious security challenges delayed project implementation. Security issues were eventually resolved by the government and ADB through additional security arrangements. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP. PCR noted as a lesson that extensive security measures should be planned and budgeted from the start.

42533-022 (G0161)

Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway

Highly relevant

Project was consistent with the government’s objectives and policies

Project was designed to address Afghanistan's incomplete and

Yes. Project was located in Balkh Province and the main

Security was identified as a major risk to the project. Government

Appendix 5 37

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

for developing the transport sector, as set out in ANDS and CPS 2009-2013.

inadequate transport network which constrains socio-economic development. The development of the rail infrastructure was a logical step after the road network was improved.

beneficiaries are local companies, local communities, shippers, and freight forwarders, including women. Railways generate social benefits and will likely attract considerable economic activity into the area, thus generating job opportunities, including for women.

planned strong measures and arrangements to mitigate the risks. A budgetary provision for security arrangements was included in the project's contingency budget.

42533-012 (TA7259)

Railway Development Study

Relevant TA was requested by the government to study the development of a railway system in the northern part of the country.

TA was closely linked to ADB’s CPS 2009-2013 and supported the government in developing the railway network to supplement Afghanistan’s road network.

TA was appropriately designed to support the government in developing the railway network to supplement Afghanistan’s road network.

None. Inclusive growth not directly discussed but study had implications on transport infrastructure that will eventually benefit the poor.

Deteriorating security situation in the project area was duly noted in the DMF. Insufficient discussion on mitigating measures. Allocation for armored vehicles with anti-explosives noted in the TA budget.

37083-012 (TA4675)

Capacity Building for Road Sector Institutions

Relevant TA was requested by the Government to further strengthen the MPW’s capacity in its core functions.

TA was included in CSPU 2004–2006.

At the request of the Government, the scope of the TA was revised to include capacity building of MPW staff in financial management and technical audit of road construction.

None. Not discussed in the TAR.

Not discussed in the TAR or DMF. Cost estimates in the TAR include a budget for security assurance.

37326-012 (TA4828)

Road Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Cluster

Highly relevant

TA was requested by the Government to (i) prepare national highway rehabilitation projects, (ii) strengthen MPW’s capacity to carry out its core functions; and (iii) restructure MOT and strengthen its capability and role as sector regulator.

TA request was consistent with CSPU 2004–2006.

TA outputs were too ambitious and the TA implementation period was too short.

None. Not directly discussed in TAR and TCR, but study has implications on transport infrastructure that was expected to eventually benefit the poor.

DMF identified the possible effect of poor security to mobilizing feasibility consultants in project sites. No mitigating measures discussed in the TAR. Cost estimates in the TAR included a budget for security assurance.

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

38096 (9060) Balkh River Basin Water Resources Management

Relevant Consistent with government strategy to rebuild the national economy, achieve food self-sufficiency and reduce rural poverty.

Project formulation was based on a combination of physical and non-physical components, providing a balanced and innovative approach to improving water management.

Yes. Project targets rural farmers.

Security risks and related mitigating measures were discussed at the onset.

40586 (9100) Rural Business Support Project

Less than relevant

Consistent with government’s strategy to address rural poverty.

Project adopted a value chain based approach (as opposed to piece meal approach).

There were major changes in scope (geographic expansion, type of

Yes. Financial assistance was to be provided to extremely poor households so they can generate income and use the full range of

Volatile security situation recognized in the design and this called for engagement with NGOs and adherence to ADB security rules and regulations as well as

Appendix 5

38

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

agricultural commodity value chains, credit modality) and implementation arrangement.

services provided by the rural business support centers.

security situation monitoring.

36222-012 (9039) Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation

Highly relevant

Aligned with the country's National Development Framework (2002) and National Solidarity Program (strengthening local governance and laying a foundation for community managed subprojects), and ADB's Afghanistan CSPU which recognized national reconstruction as the main objective including revitalizing agriculture and natural resource for rural poverty reduction and economic growth.

Implementation arrangements recognized capacity constraints of various government levels and were in line with the implementing arrangements of the national development framework.

Yes. Primary beneficiaries are rural population depending on agriculture based activities for livelihood.

Given the general insecurity and weak central government administrative control, the Project was implemented by provincial DRRD and NGOs already working in the project area.

37046-013 (2083) Agriculture Sector Program

Relevant Consistent with the strategies of ADB and the government to increase agriculture sector investment and to reduce poverty in Afghanistan, and remained relevant to an ongoing reform program that will lead to an effective agriculture sector and improved livelihoods.

Project was based on extensive consultations with the government, work of consultative group, comprehensive needs assessment, and lessons learned from similar programs, particularly with respect to building on government initiated reform processes; however, time frames for meeting conditions for fund release were too optimistic and performance indicators were inadequate.

Yes. While the design cites the rural poor, small and marginal farmers, nomadic pastoralists and other livestock herders, returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and demobilized combatants as part of the beneficiaries of the program, the design did not adequately acknowledge the poor in the rural nonfarm sector, and the importance of community organizations.

Political and security situations were a concern; hence, increased funding was mobilized to finance reforms in the security sector.

On weak institutional capacity, ADB’s support for capacity building as well as development partners were mobilized to help build capacity in the relevant government agencies. Reforms initiated under the Program will help build implementation capacity within the public sector.

37713-012 (9038) Integrated Community Development in Northern Afghanistan

Relevant Consistent with Afghanistan's development priorities and ADB's country and sector strategies.

Complements road investments under the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project as it focused on improving socioeconomic condition of communities within the vicinity of project's road component

Consistent with the National Solidarity Program that aims to develop capacity of local communities on project development and management.

The project was not supported by appropriate analysis. Implementation arrangements were not appropriate and adequately estimated, which resulted in start-up delays. Baseline and arrangements for monitoring were lacking and key performance indicators were formulated with a degree of ambiguity or required sophisticated assessment methodologies that were not appropriate given the size of the project.

Yes. Project was designed keeping in view a multitude of the needs of the poor, the marginalized, and the vulnerable through broad participatory decision making organizations (assisted by NGOs), ensuring participation of women in decision-making process and access to resources, and access of the poorest in the community to microcredit.

Security concerns were raised at design level, and project personnel were expected to closely coordinate with UN agencies, Afghanistan Resident Mission, and MRRD that monitor the security situation.

38221-012 (TA 4483)

Capacity Building for Land Policy and Administration Reform

Not rated Consistent with government's sector program.

Included in CSPU 2004-2006.

TA restricted to rural land tenure/common land/pastures issues to avoid overlapping with a new USAID multi-year funded project

None Security cited as a risk but no mitigating measures mentioned.

Appendix 5 39

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

Recognized strong linkages between insecurity and land tenure.

(dedicated to urban land/private land titling) and given significant progress on the land policy, the revision of the land legal framework was also added to the TA focus.

38252-012

(TA 4716)

Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources

Relevant Responded to the need for capacity development of MEW.

Developed within and supported the framework of ADB's agriculture sector program loan that underpinned ADB's strategy for agriculture and natural resource management in Afghanistan.

Outcomes and outputs were realistic, and targets were appropriate to TA objectives.

None Risks were identified but no mitigating measures provided.

Sector: Public Sector Management

38122-013 (L2215/G0030)

Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform Program)

Relevant Program aligned with the Interim ANDS. Consistent with CSPU 2006-2008.

Program was crucial to enable government policy and planning efforts to achieve the country‘s development objectives.

Approaches taken by development partner assistance to fiscal management and public financial management should have been rethought in view of the complexity of capacity development challenges in Afghanistan. Program‘s design and formulation process underestimated these challenges. DMF impact and outcome statements lacked clarity and were very difficult to measure.

None. Recognized that political situation was not stable but insufficient mitigating measures identified. No budget allocation to address security-related concerns noted in the RRP.

37047-012 (TA4313)

Poverty Assessment and Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Statistical Capacity Building

Highly relevant

Scope and objectives of TA were unanimously endorsed by the joint mission which includes IMF, DFID and the World Bank.

TA to strengthen the country's capacity to produce and disseminate socioeconomic and macroeconomic data, and conduct comprehensive poverty assessment expressed commitment from Afghanistan government and ADB.

Design was based on the recommendations of the joint mission. Modifications in scope and content extended the 3-year project life by 2 years.

Yes. TA in itself enabled selected line ministries to produce and disseminate socioeconomic and macroeconomic data and to assess the poverty situation.

Security was identified as a risk in the TA framework. TAR did not discuss any mitigating measures or allocate funds to address the security issues. Some implementation delays were attributed to security issues.

37561-012 (TA4345)

Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan

Not rated TA was a response to address effectively the security environment and provision of security for ADB projects in Afghanistan.

TA was confirmed by the ADB mission in September 2003.

TA was supposed to help ADB comply with UN security guidelines.

TA completion date was revised from 2006 to 2008.

None. Constraints caused by the political and security situation were recognized in the DMF. While mitigating measures were discussed in the TAR/DMF, guidance and security briefings were provided on a regular basis to ensure minimal impact of security issues in project

Appendix 5

40

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

implementation. Budget allocation for UN Minimum Operating Security Standards -compliant vehicles and communications equipment noted in the TA budget.

40580-012 (TA4897)

Support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Highly relevant

TA was a response to a request by the Government of Afghanistan from ADB in support of the ANDS and the Afghanistan Compact.

Scope, objectives, and activities of the components were widely discussed with Government agencies and development partners.

Partitioning of TA to three components was an enabling factor in implementation. However, TA timeframe was optimistic.

Yes. Component 3 aimed to improve national capacity to analyze the scope and nature of poverty.

Recognized that security situation affected the conduct of survey in all provinces. No discussion on mitigation measures in the TCR. No budget allocation to address security-related concerns noted in the TAR.

42089-012 (TA7090)

Security Plan for Project Implementation

TCR pending

With the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, TA assists the Government to plan and implement appropriate mitigation measures to protect staff and assets involved in reconstruction and development projects.

TA completion date was extended 4 times until June 2014 and finally closed in December 2014. TA costs also increased.

None TA directly addresses the issue on security in the Afghanistan. Allocation for equipment such as armored vehicle, trauma kits, and helmets and vests was included in the TA budget. Allocation for supplemental security for VIPs and missions was also noted in the TA budget.

Sector: Finance

37393 (G0067/G0068)

Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (G0067) and Supporting Private Sector and Financial Market Reforms Capacity Building (G0068)

Relevant Program was consistent with country’s development objectives and ADB’s initial CSP 2002-2004 and CSPU 2006–2008.

I-ANDS acknowledged private sector development as key outcome and prioritized reform programs to strengthen the financial sector.

PCR noted that the design was sound and included a number of outputs to address constraints: Program outputs were in line with recent trends in the international aid assistance.

None. DMF and RRP recognized security as a risk. Delays due to security situation were noted indicating that mitigation measures may have been insufficient. No budget allocation to address security-related concerns noted in the RRP.

38912-014 (L2091)

Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

Relevant Project was relevant to the country’s development objectives, the National Development Framework (2002) and CSP 2002–2004.

ADB acknowledged the need for investment insurance or guarantees to help catalyze private investments.

Because of the chosen modality PRG cover for noncommercial risks that were or ought to have been within the power of the government to mitigate, project design became less attractive. Project design also did not address (i) the inability of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency to translate initial investor interest into foreign direct investment or to promote PRGs to support such investment. (ii) MIGA’s limited marketing of PRGs, and (iii) local investors’ lack of interest in PRGs.

None. Security was identified as a risk to the project. Deteriorating security greatly affected the project but the PCR has no discussion on how this was addressed or mitigated. No budget allocation to address security-related concerns noted in RRP.

Appendix 5 41

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

Sector: Multisector

36231-013 (L1954)

Post Conflict Multisector Program

Highly relevant

ADB’s program support for policy and institutional reform in Afghanistan complemented and in many ways strengthened World Bank and IMF programs in the country.

Formulated in response to Government’s weak fiscal situation and need to support efforts to meet its ordinary budget deficit.

Stands out as major accomplishment of development assistance to Afghanistan, for without this foundation additional donor assistance would not have been channeled.

Program adopted a realistic approach to policy and institutional reform in post-conflict Afghanistan, keeping in view the government’s National Development Framework objective of promoting economic growth and poverty reduction while developing the private sector and creating a modern Afghan state. Design introduced the first generation of policy and institutional reforms that laid the foundation of a market-driven economy.

None. Volatile political situation and unpredictable security situation were recognized as risks to project implementation. Quantification of risk and development of risk mitigation mechanisms were mentioned in the PCR (Appendix 5). PCR noted that Afghanistan's difficult security environment posed challenges in implementation. The mitigation measures were not discussed or assessed in the PCR. No budget allocation to address security-related concerns noted in the RRP.

36673-013 (L1997)

Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Relevant Consistent with (i) the Government’s strategy to improve infrastructure; (ii) CSP 2002–2004; and (iii) ADB’s policy on rehabilitation assistance after disasters.

The emergency nature of the Project meant only a short time used in design preparation and thus an inherent weakness which resulted in some cost overruns and time extensions. The amount saved from the road component was quickly processed (from September to December 2003) into an irrigation component and subsequently added to the Project in January 2004.

None. Not directly discussed in the RRP but project had implications on infrastructure that eventually benefitted the poor.

Volatile political situation was recognized as a risk to project implementation. RRP mitigation statement that ADB would closely monitor and coordinate with local and central authorities and the UN agencies to ensure adequate protection appears to be inadequate. No budget allocation to address security-related concerns noted in the RRP.

37102-012 (TA4415)

Kabul Air Quality Management

Relevant TA was a response to the Government's request to ADB and concern over the increasing levels of air pollution in Kabul.

TCR indicated that TA design was adequate, terms of reference for consultants were appropriate, and TA was completed within the budget. However, it implied in the lesson section that the TA could have benefited from a flexible approach, longer implementation period, and realistic implementation arrangements given the ongoing transition of Afghanistan from conflict to peace and development as well as Afghanistan's limited human and institutional capacity.

None. Not discussed in TAR.

Sector: Industry and Trade

(39571-012) 4699 Building the Capacity Not rated Consistent with ANDS. Well-formulated given that it was None. None indicated in the TAR.

Appendix 5

42

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance Rating

Strategic Justification Project Design Inclusive Growth integration in design

FCAS Considerations

of the Ministry of Commerce for Trade and Transit Facilitation

Consistent with CSPU 2006-2008.

Supports regional development agenda under the framework of the Central and South Asia Trade and Transport Forum initiative.

Builds on preliminary findings of TA 4536-AFG: Cross-Border Trade and Transport Facilitation.

Complements ongoing assistance provided by other development partners.

based on recommendations of the TA on Cross-Border Trade and Transport Facilitation (4536-AFG).

TA had clear but unrealistic objectives.

International consultant’s terms of reference were well-structured and comprehensive, albeit quite broad and ambitious.

40577-012 (4906) Capacity Building for Customs and Trade Facilitation

Not rated Consistent with CSPU 2006-2008.

Supports the implementation of recommendations from meetings of the Central and South Asia Trade and Transport Forum and CAREC.

Builds on the findings of other recent and ongoing TA to facilitate trade (TA 4699 and TA 4536-AFG).

Complements assistance provided by other development partners, particularly the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

The terms of reference for each consultant were clearly defined.

None.

Sector: Health

36628 (9030) Primary Health Care Partnership for the Poor

Relevant Consistent with Afghanistan’s National Development Framework.

Linked to ADB’s proposed social sector program and World Bank’s Health Sector Emergency Reconstruction and Development Project.

Project’s design, objectives, components, implementation arrangements and schedule were appropriate and relevant.

Highly participatory from planning to implementation.

Yes. Design had gender equity objectives and focused on cost-effective interventions for the poor (i.e., about $3/person/year).

Project will help create income opportunities for the poor.

Governance and capacity identified as risks but no mitigation measures provided at design.

Project ensured community involvement not only in site selection and provision of land and labor, but also in assurance of security.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, AFG = Afghanistan, ANDS = Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ANR = agriculture and natural resources, CPS = country partnership strategy, CSP = country strategy and program, CSPU = country strategy and program update, DFID = Department for International Development, DMF = design and monitoring framework, DRRD = Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, IMF = International Monetary Fund, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, MEW = Ministry of Energy and Water, MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MOT = Ministry of Transport, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, MRRD = Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, NGO = nongovernment organization, PCR = project completion report, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, PRG = political risk guarantee, RRP = Report and Recommendation of the President, TA = technical assistance, TAR = technical assistance report, TCR = technical assistance completion report, UN = United Nations, USAID= United States Agency for International Development. Sources: Project Completion Reports (PCR), Technical Assistance Completion Reports, Implementation Completion Memorandum, PCR Validation Reports and Project Completion Report, Back to Office Reports, and eOps.

Appendix 5 43

Table A5.2: Project Performance: Effectiveness Rating

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

Sector: Energy

40043 (L2304/G0230/ TA4909)

Regional Power Transmission Interconnection

Effective 163 km 220 kV transmission line, demining of 4.5 km section (completion of substations delayed).

Restoration of power supply.

Reduction of electricity costs (consumption per capita from 21 to 35kWh/year).

100% replacement of diesel gas turbine power.

Satisfy 300 MW demand in Kabul.

Increase collection rates.

Decrease power cost by $25 million/year).

Consumption increased from 21 kWh/yrea to 106kWh in 2011.

1,274 diesel generators were discontinued (100% replacement target was not achieved).

Power supply to Kabul was only at 200.6 MW.

Collection rate was reported to be about 80% (but no baseline was provided).

Electricity cost decreased by $11.8 million in 2012 and $20 million in 2013.

Improved capacity in utility operations, and commercial operations.

Technical capacity building provided to trainers on protection and substation operations but no institutional and management training provided due to reorganization of utility operator; lacked commitment on the part of the executing agency to strengthen its institutional and management capacity.

43497 (TA 7637/8475)

Power Sector Master Plan/Addendum to the Power Sector Master Plan

Effective Updated power sector master plan (with a 20-year demand forecast presented, recommended generation and transmission development set out, and investment projects justified on economic, financial, safeguard, and technical grounds).

None None Improved MEW ability to analyze and program investments in the power sector as indicated by the use of the master plan in investment programming.

The outcome was achieved by (i) ensuring MEW’s active involvement in all stages of the TA, (ii) enhancing MEW’s planning capacity, and (iii) delivering a populated software system model and detailed investment road map.

MEW’s ability further enhanced by the need for detailed assessment of domestic and regional solutions with the trade-off of

Appendix 5

44

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

reduced energy security against increased low-cost supply fed by imports.

ADB investment programming (North-South Transmission and MFF Energy Sector Development Investment Program tranche 5) are based on the power sector master plan.

39402 (TA 4918)

Support to the Interministerial Commission for Energy

Less than effective

Establishment Interministerial Commission for Energy (ICE) secretariat. The commercial advisory team facilitated formulation of monthly and quarterly progress reports, paperwork for DABS incorporation, power purchase agreements for power import from neighboring countries, baseline for sector governance and regulation, corporate financial statements and training, proposal for upgrading of power master plan, and draft Afghanistan National Development Strategy (energy component).

None None ICE staff able to assess data, synthesize and develop energy strategy, prepare planning and policy for review.

Improved implementation of ongoing projects.

National energy sector strategic plan, regional and provincial energy strategies, line ministry energy sector strategies drafted within 6 months of startup.

Improved communication systems in place to keep key decision makers informed of sector developments, facilitate market relationships, coordinate energy

The full implementation of the envisioned ICE mandate was never realized (i.e., prioritizing and costing of energy sector programs for short- and medium- term, and general capacity development of key line ministries in technical, managerial and administrative functions).

Performance is contingent on resolving major structural, technical, fiscal and governance issues on the part of government, where institutions are in nascent stages.

Appendix 5 45

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

project development, and build regional linkages.

Energy sector investments identified that will facilitate reshaping the sector to become market-based and sustainable.

Greater ability of the Government to interact with donors and potential investors through regular meetings and reviews of energy sector portfolios.

Consultation process that will assess the social, environmental, and other impacts of energy restructuring to promote sound regulation of the sector.

Sector: Transport

36553 (J9024/ G0076)

Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons

Effective (a) 100+ km of Kandahar-Spin Boldak rehabilitated, 2 bridges replaced, 1 bridge repaired, local gravel roads not constructed, 10,000 refugees/DPs employed in construction activities, and several local contractors trained in project construction activities;

(b) 10,000 refugees/ DPs trained in construction, 3,900 refugees trained on income generating activities;

(c) 2 education facilities rehabilitated,

161,500 individuals provided with health services. On average, about 8,000 patients received health services per month.

At least 10,000 refugees and displaced persons obtained opportunities for sustainable livelihood.

None identified Synergy impacts to the poor facilitated with the (i) improved secondary roads, and (ii) rehabilitation of primary road network.

Appendix 5

46

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

16 schools received educational support, 6 schools constructed, and 1,500 refugees benefited from literacy and basic education support; and

(d) 4 health facilities constructed.

37075-013 (L2140)

Andkhoy-Qaisar Road Effective (a) Improvement of 210 km Andkhoy to Qaisar road completed as required but with delays as roads fully opened to traffic only in 2010;

(b) Facility for road tolling and axle load control not achieved;

(c) A total of four trainee engineers, three project implementation engineers and two project managers were heavily involved in the project and gained valuable project experience.

(a) 50% decrease in travel time per trip;

(b) 50% decrease in VOC or freight and passenger transport fares;

(c) average 50% reduction in travel time to nearest health, primary education, and other essential services.

(a) Approximately 65% decrease in travel time per trip;

(b) VOC savings range from 25% to 41%, and 40%-49% decrease in taxi and bus fares;

(c) Assessed reduction in travel time to nearest health, primary education, and other essential services.

Enhanced capacity of MPW to manage project.

MPW capacity to manage project enhanced.

37136-013 (L2105)

Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project Phase 1

Effective (a) 4 of 7 airports rehabilitated;

(b) Precision approach path indicators meeting International Civil Aviation Organization standards provided in 4 airports;

(c) 72 staff from 4 airports and MOTCA trained on flight safety, air traffic control, and post-construction operation management.

(a) 50% increase in number of flights and passengers in rehabilitated airports;

(b) Zero incidence of trespassing into airports;

(c) 50% decrease in accidents; and

(d) 50% decrease in flight cancellations.

(a) Over 100% increase in number of flights and passengers in 3 airports and remained same in 1 airport;

(b) No data on number of trespassing;

(c) No accidents reported from 2007-2011; and

(d) No incidences of cancellations reported.

Capacity in MOTCA for civil aviation sector management strengthened.

Capacity in MOTCA for civil aviation sector management strengthened.

37728-012 (J9037)

Emergency Road Rehabilitation

Effective 112 km national road rehabilitated, as targeted.

Increase in road traffic. Road traffic volume increased with reduced travel time.

Increase in social services and income of rural poor in the project

No data confirming increase of new social services along rehabilitated road,

Appendix 5 47

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

area. but access provided to existing nearby schools and clinics. No statistical data on increased income of rural poor but benefits were generated during and after construction in terms of direct employment.

39467-013 (L2257/G0054/G0135/J9097)

North-South Corridor Project

Highly effective

(a) Target of 220.65 km improved national highway sections (Mazar-e-Sharif to Dar-i-suf and Bamyan to Yakawlang) achieved with some delays;

(b) Target installation of cross-border facilities achieved; and

(c) 6,000 (target of 5,000) people reached by public awareness campaign on HIV/AIDS.

(a) 50% decrease in travel time on the project roads for all types of vehicles immediately after project completion;

(b) 10% increase per year in freight and passenger traffic on the project roads for 3 years after project completion;

(c) 20% decrease in freight and passenger transport fares passing through the project roads within 1 year of project completion; and

(d) Average 30% reduction in travel time to nearest health and social services areas within 3 months of completion.

(a) Average of 75% decrease in travel time per trip;

(b) Traffic volumes more than four times higher in 2012 than in 2005;

(c) Freight transport fares reduced to 45% in the Bamyan to Yakawlang region; Bus fares decreased by 80%;and

(d) Travel times in the project area reduced by 75% by project completion.

5,000 people sensitized or with improved awareness on HIV/AIDS.

6,000 people sensitized on HIV/AIDS.

42533-022 (G0161)

Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway

Highly effective

(a) 75 km railway line and stations (with line meeting specifications, upgraded marshalling yard, and signaling and telecommunication system installed) between Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif constructed and operated); and

(b) long-term railway development plan (2013-2025) drafted, legal and regulatory framework drafted and

By 2012:

(a) Freight transported by trains reaches 6,000 tons per day from 4,500 tons per day in 2008;

(b) Composition of heavy vehicle traffic on Hairatan–Mazar-e-Sharif road reduced to 35% from 50% in

(a) Freight transported by trains reached about 6,500 tons per day in 2012;

(b) Composition of heavy vehicle traffic is about 40%, at current volumes of freight

(a) Increased job opportunities for women in the rail service and local businesses, including logistics services at all stations and at Mazar-e-Sharif airport; and

(a) Employment in the project area has an overall growth of 10–11% per year, but due to cultural restrictions, the number of women employed is insignificant; and

(b) No suspected

Appendix 5

48

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

reviewed by government, O&M agreement signed between Uzbekistan Temir Yullari and government, and 32 staff trained in railway O&M.

2008;

(c) Travel time for freight traffic between Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif reduced to 1 hour from 2 hours in 2008;

(d) CO2 emissions reduced from 2.3 million tons per year (2008) to 1.7 million tons ; and

(e) Around 5 million people will benefit from the project and railway operations.

traffic, composition was less than 35% in 2008;

(c) Travel time for freight transportation by rail between Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif has been reduced to about 1 hour;

(d) CO2 emissions are about 1.9 million tons per year at current volumes of freight traffic; and

(e) Over 7 million people have benefited from the project.

(b) Reduced incidence of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections in the project area.

cases of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections reported in the Hairatan– Mazar-e-Sharif project area.

42533-012 (TA7259)

Railway Development Study

Effective Study on railway development in the northern part of the country completed in 2011 after its scope was expanded. Input for transport projects, e.g., Grant 0161.

Development of an affordable, safe, environmentally friendly, energy-efficient, and reliable transport system in Afghanistan.

Outcome achieved through Grant 0161.

Recommended approach for the government on railway development in the northern part of Afghanistan.

Outcome achieved through Grant 0161.

37083-012 (TA4675)

Capacity Building for Road Sector Institutions

Not rated (a) Curricula for road database management and quality control for road works were provided to the road construction department of KPU;

(b) Training courses for road database management and quality control for road works in the MPW retraining scheme, and also for faculty members of RCD of KPU were provided;

(c) Testing equipment in the material testing laboratory, the quality control and database management unit of the Survey and Design Department in MPW and RCD of KPU to be upgraded;

— — (a) MPW's capacity to develop a road database, carry out road surveys, and operate a material testing laboratory equipped with appropriate testing equipment and quality control of road works strengthened;

(b) MPW's financial management of road projects strengthened; and

(a) Road database management and quality control ineffective due to lack of information/ data, implementation delays, and unsatisfactory performance of the consultants;

(b) Measures to strengthen internal controls; keeping records, and establishing appropriate systems and procedures

Appendix 5 49

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

(d) Assistance to improve financial management systems and procedures including financial management manuals provided; and

(e) Construction practices to be improved through the provided technical audit manuals and methodologies.

(c) Best practices implemented through technical audits of road construction projects.

suggested; and

(c) Conducted technical audits revealed inconsistencies in project execution and suggested measures to improve contract administration and quality controls.

37326-012 (TA4828)

Road Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Cluster

Less effective

(a) Feasibility studies on 2 priority roads (i) Kabul-Jalalabad, and (ii) Salang completed;

(b) MPW staff trained on project management, procurement and administration;

(c) Institutional and road sector assessments and restructuring plans prepared for MPW and MOT;

(d) Development of legal and regulatory framework for road transport services (no information on completion).

Agreed loan projects for improvement of high priority roads.

A road investment project did not receive funding.

MPW’s capacity for project management and procurement strengthened, and MOT’s capacity for regulations on transport services improved.

Capacities of MPW and MOT in effectively undertaking their respective tasks improved but sustainability may prove elusive without further support

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

38096 (9060)

Balkh River Basin Water Resources Management

Less than effective

Various consultant reports in accordance with the TOR.

Improved infrastructure for irrigation and water management in the Balkh River Basin, and improved operation and maintenance of irrigation facilities.

This was not accomplished due to changed emphasis in project activities, delays in approval of changed activity schedule, and delays in implementation of essential preparatory work.

Improved livelihood opportunities, water management, agricultural productivity, and reduced poverty in the Balkh River Basin.

Reduced conflicts over water allocation in the Balkh River Basin and developed mechanisms for water allocation, planning and

The non-achievement of the activities was mainly due to MEW having little interest and understanding of the importance of planned activities (not fully committed to IWRM).

Appendix 5

50

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

monitoring.

Strengthened capacity of government officials, mirabs (traditional water managers), and other stakeholders in the Balkh River Basin.

Institutional development for water resources management in the Balkh River Basin.

40586 (9100)

Rural Business Support Project

Not rated Potato value chain- Extension assistance (demonstrations, field days and outreach activities) to over 5,000 producers. Focused multiyear technical assistance, training and equity investment on 1,411 potato producers and members of 8 potato producer cooperatives.

5,000 farmers and 36 edible oil processors and over 2,000 wool spinners, carpet weavers and carpet traders received technical assistance, training and equity investment (Recipients of farm implements and processing machines).

None None Four RBSC operating profitably.

Annually, 5,000 farm families benefiting from new long-term income-generating opportunities, and 3,600 from short-term ones, with an average increase of 40% of family income by the Project’s end.

9,000 farm families indirectly benefiting from the Project.

40 producer and marketing associations and 4 cooperatives established and operating at a profit.

Half of the producer

No RBSCs were established due to change in project scope.

Project investments assisted 10,000 value chain stakeholders increasing their income by about $6 million during project period.

39 producer cooperatives and two processing cooperatives established (14 in the oil value chain, 8 in potato and 17 in carpet).

20 producer's cooperatives for potato and oil crops were able to generate income from renting RBSP-supplied equipment to members and non-members.

40 trainers were

Appendix 5 51

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

beneficiaries engaged at least once in training and capacity development.

75% of beneficiaries “satisfied” with the Project.

trained (comprised government and project staff).

5,795 potato producers received training (potato production, harvesting best practices, sorting and grading, and marketing seed and ware potatoes.

373 benefited from training of trainers in wool processing and weaving best practices.

1,895 carpet weavers trained on best practices, 327 recipients of spinning wheels trained.

3 carpet designers were trained in website design, and 4,352 oil producers trained in oil crop production, post-harvest and marketing best practices.

No satisfaction survey conducted but the high demand for project activities is indicative of high level of satisfaction with project interventions and resulted in a follow on project.

36222-012 (9039)

Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation

Less than effective

74 subprojects (out of the targeted 120 small scale irrigation) were completed in 3 provinces in northern Afghanistan (average command area has not been

Short-term employment opportunities for 40,000 to 45,000

Approximately 38,600 households benefitted from short-term employment.

Improved knowledge and skills of communities, community-based

Every village and provincial authority involved in implementation benefitted from a12-

Appendix 5

52

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

recorded in the M&E system).

Regular reporting established for each subproject. M&E system was not adequate to monitor all key performance indicators.

members.

Long-term benefits accruing to approximately 150,000 households involved in agriculture based livelihood activities.

185,000 directly and indirectly benefited from the project.

organizations and local governments.

module training.

37046-013 (2083)

Agriculture Sector Program

Less than effective

Sector policy and planning framework (rationalized functions of MAIL, MEW, and MRRD; sector development strategy master plan).

Natural Resource Management (passage of water, land management, and environmental protection laws); Cabinet approved land, forest, rangeland and land policies including a national environmental impact assessment policy; national environment protection agency and land authority established.

Policy and institutional reforms in support services received little attention (rural credit, certification and assurance systems agricultural research and technology transfer system).

Agricultural commodity markets (reduced poppy cultivation and increased private investment in agriculture; studies on import fees, access to quality seeds, removal of price controls, and strengthening of quality assurance systems undertaken).

State-owned enterprises (23 out of 64 SOEs and 3 banks are under liquidation committees; ongoing divestment of 3 SOEs).

None None Increased participation of private sector in agricultural production, marketing, and service provision.

Restructuring/ divestment of all agricultural SOEs.

Government capacity for sustainable natural resource management.

Government capacity for rational sector policy making and planning.

Improved food security for all rural households.

Valuable progress was made as opportunities are being provided for the private sector to invest in and provide more efficient services in the agriculture sector. As a result of the program, the government prepared procedures for restructuring and divesting all SOEs. However, only one- third of the SOEs are under liquidation committees, and the divestments of the Afghan Fertilizer Trading Company and Improved Seed Enterprise are still ongoing.

Commitment to continuing capacity development is strong in MRRD and MAIL. However, only MAIL was able to reduce its number of departments and an increase in MEW and MRRD.

Food security worsened in 2008 because of the poor

Appendix 5 53

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

harvest, very high international wheat prices and a ban on export of wheat from Pakistan.

37713-012 (9038)

Integrated Community Development in Northern Afghanistan

Less than effective

40 out of the targeted 72 CDCs mobilized.

None None 90% of communities achieving 70% of objectives within their community development plan for 3 years by June 2007.

Key performance indicator not measured at project completion.

Community development plans for 50% of the villages were prepared by April 2008.

Achieved infrastructure construction in only 50% of target villages due to reduced effective project implementation period and delays in fund flow mechanism.

Microcredit development was not implemented.

Appendix 5

54

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

38221-012 (TA 4483)

Capacity Building for Land Policy and Administration Reform

Effective Feasibility of community-based pasture land administration and model for administration of community range land agreements by village shuras.

Capacity assessments of institutions and proposed capacity building recommendations to be implemented together with institutional reform.

Civil servants, NGOs and communities trained on ADAMAP.

Program could be presented by Government to potential donors (analysis of problems, discussion of possible solutions, and nationwide vision for a better land administration and management). This program was supported by a new land policy.

None None Comprehensive land policy promulgated within 2 years.

An appropriate land titling and registration system in place within 3 years.

Outcome achieved based on the full delivery of outputs.

38252-012

(TA 4716)

Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources

Not rated Due to delayed start, some of the proposed activities and associated outputs identified in the TA had been taken up under government initiatives.

TA coincided with start of a major government-funded water sector development program, yet MEW had no capacity to tender and manage the feasibility studies and civil works contracts. TA supported a new Project Implementation Unit under the General Director of Planning to identify potential schemes, prepare bidding documents for feasibility and civil works, evaluate proposals, administer and monitor contracts, and evaluate the outputs.

Inputs resulted in quality outputs that were used on a day-to-day basis by MEW to further their program of work and standardize procedures.

None None Senior officials able to direct all TA- developed activities by the end of the TA.

Defined procedures for core organizational functions in place and Irrigation Department staff able to execute 50% of all procedures by the end of the TA and 100% within 4 years.

Capacity for managing shared water resources with Central Asian riparian neighbors by the end of the TA.

Outcomes largely achieved.

Improved decision making capacity for senior officials, Improved capacity for MEW staff improving and institutionalizing core organizational process, especially for project development and management manifested through the establishment and training of the Project Implementation Unit.

Outcome related to transboundary water management was not realized.

Sector: Public Sector Management

Appendix 5 55

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

38122-013 (L2215/ G0030)

Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform Program)

Less effective

(a) Budgeting framework enhanced through approved budget law, chart of accounts, inventory of government-owned and controlled entities, restructured moustufiats (i.e., MOF provincial offices), created fiscal policy unit;

(b) A more results-oriented public investment program partially achieved;

(c) Resource mobilization enhanced through amended revenue law and tax codes;

(d) More effective and responsive civil service administration partially achieved;

(e) More functional and development-oriented provincial administrations partially achieved;

(f) Greater transparency and accountability of public finances achieved through issuance of financial budgeting and audit manuals; and

(g) No update on final output.

— — Building blocks for improved public finances are in place and functioning as intended, i.e., (i) tax and non-tax yields meet targets; (ii) timely and effective fiscal framework implementation; (iii) effective articulation of the budget for National Development Framework; and (iv) audited statements of the national budget and other government-controlled entities.

Building blocks for improved public finances are only partly achieved, i.e., (i) tax and non-tax yields meet targets not achieved; (ii) timely and effective fiscal framework implementation partly achieved; (iii) effective articulation of the budget for National Development Framework is still a work in progress; and (iv) audited statements of the national budget and other government-controlled entities substantially achieved.

37047-012 (TA4313)

Poverty Assessment and Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Statistical Capacity Building

Less effective

(a) CSO CPI was expanded to include six more provinces;

(b) No update on the expected poverty assessment report;

(c) National accounts estimates improved;

(d) Trade, balance-of-payment, fiscal and monetary data improved;

(e) No update on the review of legal and institutional framework and current statistical system

— — (a) Higher capacity at CSO and selected line ministries to compile improved and updated key socioeconomic indicators, i.e., ability to design and implement sample surveys with minimum assistance at completion of technical

(a) Not fully achieved;

(b) Integrated Business Enterprise Survey developed and released/ disseminated.

Appendix 5

56

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

adjustments;

(f) Trained CSO staff and line ministries conducted field visits to monitor collection, tabulation and quality;

(g) No update on upgrading of physical infrastructure at CSO and selected ministries; and

(h) Integrated Business Enterprise survey results released in December 2010 and ran publicity campaigns.

assistance; and

(b) Economic statistics produced regularly with limited external support.

37561-012 (TA4345)

Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan

Not rated (a) Emergency Management Plan (which include security measures) and project security plans tailored to the specific requirements of individual projects completed;

(b) Ongoing risk assessments of ADB projects in various regions of Afghanistan and expected to provide security implementation advice and mitigation measures; and

(c) Ongoing participation in the UN and other pertinent security coordination bodies, such as the Government of Afghanistan ministries and security forces, International Security Assistance Force, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, etc.

— — (a) Master Emergency Management Plan completed by the end of December 2004 and individual project security plans completed by October 2004;

(b) Identification of requirements for developing and enabling the implementation of the security plans; facilitation and advice on the acquisition of necessary equipment, recruitment of security personnel, design and construction of security reinforcement measures for work camps and other physical assets; implemented security plans by

(a) Both sub-outcome targets were achieved;

(b and c) both outcome targets were ongoing as of TCR writing in 2010.

Appendix 5 57

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

the end of April 2005; and

(c) Active participation with identified agencies present in Afghanistan in security-related matters.

40580-012 (TA4897)

Support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Effective Component 1: Target outputs achieved but with considerable delays and cost overruns.

Component 2: Vulnerabilities to corruption risk assessments on the road and energy sectors completed and incorporated into ANDS and were inputs to the government in the development of an overall anti-corruption strategy.

Component 3: Outputs were delivered in time to serve as inputs to ANDS.

— — Component 1: Capacity of CSO enhanced to collect, analyze, and manage ANDS/PRSP-related data, and poverty assessment completed by early 2007.

Component 2: Government adopted a multipronged, strategic, and coordinated approach to curbing corruption, and new reconstruction and investment funded by ADB explicitly builds in accountability and transparency measures in the project cycle.

Component 3: Civil society organizations and ANDS Unit develop and implement a pilot methodology to

Component 1: CSO staff acquired skills and knowledge in conducting surveys from experts, which are useful in producing official statistics, filling statistical skills gap and monitoring the ANDS, and poverty assessment completed but with considerable delay and cost overrun.

Component 2: National accountability and transparency strategy/action plan developed incorporates outputs from TA and adopted by government.

Component 3: Afghanistan pilot participatory poverty assessment demonstrated, and CSO and ANDS unit capacity to analyze the scope and nature of poverty improved.

Appendix 5

58

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

collect and analyze qualitative data on poverty in selected target areas, and results of analysis reflected in the ANDS.

42089-012 (TA7090)

Security Plan for Project Implementation

TCR pending (a) Security risk assessment and needs identification report prepared by August 2008.

(b) Guidelines and crisis management plans submitted to and approved October 2008.

(c) Guidelines and security plans submitted to and approved by October 2008.

(d) Needs assessment and security measures implementation guidelines report submitted and approved by EA by 2008.

(e) Establishment of a regular information-sharing scheme between relevant agencies by November 2008.

(f) Procurement of equipment in year 1 of the TA.

— — (a) Less disruption to TA and projects due to improved security measures at time of implementation.

(b) Positive trends should be seen within 1–2 years with outcomes achieved by May 2010.

TCR pending

Sector: Finance

Appendix 5 59

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

37393 (G0067/G0068)

Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (G0067) and Supporting Private Sector and Financial Market Reforms Capacity Building (G0068)

Less effective

(a) Targeted commercial arbitration and immovable property formalization laws were achieved while the targeted out-of-court business dispute resolution system and land titling and management system were still ongoing as of project completion; (b) Targeted municipal price controls and business registration and permit system were achieved; (c) Targeted bidding invitations for SOE assets and social safety net program for redundant workers were achieved while the target mechanism for SOE liquidation was ongoing as of project completion; (d) Targeted agreement on cross border supervision, detailed risk management regulations and guidelines, policies and procedures on conservatorship, receivership and forced liquidation of banks, regulations on banks’ external audit, and training on internal control, risk management, enforcement actions and back-office operations were achieved while the targeted system for managing enforcement actions was partially achieved; and (e) Targeted accounting and auditing laws were ongoing while the targeted accounting and auditing board and accreditation and training programs were not achieved.

— — (a) Increased private sector share in industrial production (from 26% in 2005 to approximately 40% in 2009), increased private investment rate (from 8.5% in 2005 to approximately 14% in 2011), increased private savings rate (from 2.3% in 2005 to approximately 8% in 2011), and increased number of registered private enterprises; (b) Increased access to bank credit (from 1.2% of GDP in 2005 to approximately 5% of GDP in 2009), higher deposit mobilization (from 3.6% of GDP in 2005 to approximately 11% of GDP in 2009), longer maturity of bank loans and deposits (from a maximum of 6 months in 2005 to at least 1 year in 2009), and lower borrowing costs.

(a) Data for targets on private sector share, private saving rate and registered private enterprises were not available while the targeted private investment rate was not achieved; (b) Targeted access to bank credit, deposit mobilization and bank loans and deposits maturity were achieved while data for the target on borrowing costs were not available.

38912-014 (L2091)

Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

Effective (a) 6 PRGs issued amounting to $80.4 million supporting 5 enterprises;

— — (a) Increase in private sector investment and employment

(a) Foreign direct investment of $108.6 million and 850 jobs

Appendix 5

60

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

(b) Response time did not directly contribute to the output statement; hence, was excluded in assessing the project output.

indicator;

(b) Amount and number (10-20) of PRGs issued.

created;

(b) 6 PRGs issued with value of $80.4 million.

Sector: Multisector

36231-013 (L1954)

Postconflict Multisector Program

Effective (a) All governance and financial sector reforms were achieved but with delays on some expected reforms;

(b) At time of second tranche release, all reforms were complied with, except for three that were fully achieved during the PCR mission;

(c) All energy sector reforms were achieved but with slight delays on some reforms.

— — (a) Government capacity for policy making and planning improved;

(b) Efficient and effective concerned ministries and agencies improved.

(a) Program helped improve governance and finance by creating an enabling framework for financial sector reform and improving working of the financial system, fiscal management and transparency, and personnel management;

(b) Progress was made in improving efficiency in the transport and energy sectors, and opportunities were created for investment and development of these sectors.

36673-013 (L1997)

Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Less effective

(a) Of the 392 km of road, 284 km were reconstructed including 80 km upgraded to a higher standard, and Naibabad-Hairatan 55 km road was reconstructed to a higher standard than designed overlay only;

(b) First sub-output was on target, except 50 cct-km of 110 kV transmission lines, but second sub-output was not

(a) Improved access;

(b) Improved power supply in Kabul;

(c) Reduction in power distribution losses;

(d) Enhanced availability of gas in Mazar-e-Sharif and

(a) Access improved;

(b) Improved power supply in Kabul on target as of PCR;

(c) Reduction in power distribution losses not achieved, component not implemented;

— —

Appendix 5 61

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

implemented;

c) Rehabilitation of gas production and distribution facilities in Sheberghan and 13 km transmission line to Mazar-e-Sharif were either cancelled or not implemented;

(d) Creation of database of the rehabilitated Kabul distribution network was not implemented;

(e) Metering and billing of 30,000 more electricity consumers, increase in collection rate to 60%, and improving metering and collection for gas were either cancelled or not implemented; and

(f) Provision of adequate O&M budget not achieved.

Sheberghan;

(e) Reduction in gas losses because of leakage; and

(f) Increased share of natural gas in overall energy consumption.

(d) Enhanced availability of gas in Mazar-e-Sharif and Sheberghan not achieved, component cancelled;

(e) Reduction in gas losses because of leakage not achieved, component cancelled; and

(f) Increased share of natural gas in overall energy consumption not achieved, component cancelled.

37102-012 (TA4415)

Kabul Air Quality Management

Not rated The TA delivered the following outputs: (a) An AGM Strategy for air quality improvement in Kabul was developed, with the policy on vehicular emission reduction;

(b) National Environmental Protection Agency's capacity for data collection, installation, operation and maintenance of monitoring systems was built through four workshops, seminars, and trainings on air quality;

(c) Air quality monitoring systems (equipment) were procured and installed in eight locations in Kabul;

(d) Public awareness about air quality was raised through audio-visual and print media, as well as distribution of materials;

(e) Baseline data on air quality were established;

(f) An inventory of pollutant sources at the city level and related pollution corridors was assessed and reported. Data were collected on hazardous

— — (a) An air quality management strategy is adopted by the Government after completion;

(b) Government officials trained during TA completion; and

(c) Public awareness on air quality management is raised.

(a) Government has yet to formulate an implementation plan for the air quality management strategy;

(b) No institutional arrangements have been made for the use of data collected under the TA;

(c) No adequate systems have been established for the post-TA campaign on public awareness about air quality.

Appendix 5

62

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

pollutants NO2, SO2, and PM-10 and analyzed.

(g) Two fountains powered through solar panels were constructed. As of September 2008, however, neither of the fountains was operational due to inadequate operation and maintenance by local authorities.

Sector: Industry and Trade

4699 Building the Capacity of the Ministry of Commerce for Trade and Transit Facilitation

Not rated but TA partly successful with respect to its capacity development objectives and successful with agreements, principles and definitions related to border trade.

Capacity Building: (a) Basic capacity-building road map and initial training needs assessment for Ministry of Commerce; (b) Appropriate seminars and training events; (c) General Directorate of Transit & Trade Facilitation under the Ministry of Commerce established in 2007, with the subsequent creation of a Division of Transit Agreements and a Division of Border Posts and Freight Logistics (not targeted in the design and monitoring framework); Transit Facilitation: (d) Revision of Afghan Trade and Transit Agreement drafted (but yet to be endorsed by the Joint Economic Commission between Afghanistan and Pakistan governments); (e) Protocol on Cross Border Traffic between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of Tajikistan signed in 2008; (f) Preparation of the transit and trade facilitation component of the Ministry of Commerce’s contribution to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (not targeted in the design and monitoring framework); (f) Initiation of negotiations for new agreements; Cross Border Facilitation: (g) Joint ADB-World Bank agreement on cross-border transit facilitation priorities reached and presented to Government (not achieved but TA recommendations to simplify and

Trade and transit agreements (re) negotiated and implementation strengthened, in partnership with Ministry of Finance

(i) Preparation of a new agreement to regulate transit between Afghanistan and Pakistan; (ii) promotion of principles behind a functional regional transit system facilitating cross border trade, including delineation of responsibilities among different agencies at the border in line with international good practice; and (iii) definition of new border functions for the Ministry of Commerce. Capacity building was less than successful as the Directorate of Transit and Trade were newly established, leaving little time for training.

Appendix 5 63

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

streamline transit border crossing facilities customs procedures and documentation were adopted by Ministry of Commerce, developed Integrated Border Management defining responsibilities of agencies as well as layout of infrastructure facilities, and undertook survey to create baseline for ANDS); Private Sector Participation: (h) Draft report on preliminary road map for clarifying institutional roles and role of private sector at border posts as input to 2006 ADB TA prepared (also produced a draft Border Port Services Act as a framework for private sector participation); Interministerial Cooperation: (i) Reactivation of the Afghan Interministerial Technical Committee on Cross Border Facilitation, or providing this function within an Afghanistan Trade and Transport Facilitation Committee (target was not achieved; drafted Afghan Transit Transport Act to clarify the delineation of responsibilities among ministries in line with the Government’s Integrated Transit Transport Policy). Promotion of Regional Cooperation: (j) Active Afghan participation in Central and South Asia Trade and Transport Forum meetings (not mentioned in the TCR; but TA supported the Government’s preparation for different working groups and meetings organized by ADB under CAREC Program.

40577-012 (4906)

Capacity Building for Customs and Trade Facilitation

Not rated but overall rating is unsuccessful

Accomplished outputs not targeted in the TA:

(i) a background paper on the role of customs, challenges facing Afghan Customs, and possible solutions explaining main challenges Afghanistan Customs Department faced and how the five-year strategic plan coped with those challenges; (ii) a study of Afghanistan’s external trade to identify

Customs revenue increases at a rate that at least meets projected Government revenue targets.

Leakage decreases (no quantitative baseline data available).

TA outcomes were not achieved because the TA was not implemented as designed and consequently did not produce all expected outputs.

Consultant carried

Appendix 5

64

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

measures for export expansion; (iii) papers regarding (a) the creation of a Tariff Research Unit for the purpose of monitoring trends in revenue collection and the adoption of appropriate tariff policy, (b) a plan for surveys of customs offices for human resource planning, (c) customs tariff policy advice on ad-hoc duty exemption to raw material imported for industries; (d) policy framework for granting of duty exemption to Government imports; and (e) provision of incentives to customs officers for good performance in enforcement work by creating a fund from the proceeds of sale of confiscated goods; and (iv) technical specifications of cargo handling equipment needed in different customs clearance stations procured on ADB loan.

out ad hoc tasks requested by the Afghanistan Customs Department not within the terms of reference.

Sector: Health

36628 (9030) Primary Health Care Partnership for the Poor

Effective Community organization and support: Performance-based contracts with NGOs issued by Ministry of Health; NGOs performed their responsibilities despite political and security conditions. Community Health Workers Program: 193 community health workers trained (of which 50% are women) and community health committees established and functional. Health Center Development: Building construction, furnishing, staffing and provision of drugs were achieved. Clients reported satisfaction on quality of health services received. Drug supply systems: Pooled drug procurement system was not established; NGOs are providing drugs of standard quality.

Coverage of health services.

Proportion of women and children attended by health center and community health workers.

Community share of drug funds reaches 60%.

Standardized procedures for contracting NGOs.

Achievement of outcome was not properly reported in the ICM.

Badakhshan Province: 3 community health centers and 2 basic health centers constructed. 37 health posts established. Mobile health team operated in remote areas. Community Health Committees established.

Ghor Province: 2 community and 2 basic health centers constructed/ rehabilitated; 60 health posts constructed and 120 community

Appendix 5 65

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Effectiveness

Rating Physical Output

Physical Outcomes Non-Physical Outcomes

Expected Actual/Emerging Expected Actual/Emerging

health workers were trained.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ANDS = Afghanistan National Development Strategy, CCT-KM = circuit kilometer; CO2 = carbon dioxide, CPI = consumer price index, CPS = country partnership strategy, CSO = Central Statistics Organization, CSP = country strategy and program, CSPU = country strategy and program update, DABS = Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, CDC = community development council, DMF = design and monitoring framework, DP = displaced person, DRRD = Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, GDP = gross domestic product, HIV/AIDS = human immunodeficiency virus /acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, ICE = Interministerial Commission for Energy, ICM = implementation completion memorandum, IMF = International Monetary Fund, IWRM = integrated water resource management, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, km = kilometer, KPU = Kabul Polytechnic University, kV = kilovolt, kWh = kilowatt per hour, MAIL = Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, M&E = monitoring and evaluation, MEW = Ministry of Energy and Water, MFF = multitranche financing facility, MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MOT = Ministry of Transport, MOTCA = Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, MRRD = Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, MW = megawatt, NGO = nongovernment organization, NO2 = nitrogen dioxide, O&M = operation and maintenance, PCR = project completion report, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, PRG = political risk guarantee, PRSP = poverty reduction strategy paper, RBSC = Rural Business Support Centers, RCD = Road Construction Department, RRP = Report and Recommendation of President, SO2 = sulfur dioxide, SOE = state-owned enterprises, TA = technical assistance, TAR = technical assistance report, TCR = technical assistance completion report, TOR = terms of reference, UN = United Nations, VOC=vehicle operating cost. Sources: Project Completion Reports (PCR), Technical Assistance Completion Reports, Implementation Completion Memorandum, PCR Validation Reports and Project Completion Report, Back to Office Reports, and eOps.

Appendix 5

66

Table A5.3: Project Performance: Efficiency Rating

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

Sector: Energy

40043 (L2304/G0230/ TA4909)

Regional Power Transmission Interconnection

Efficient 32.3% (would have been

substantially higher if environmental benefits were included).

67.90 57.90 Loan closing was extended due to failure to agree with terms of the intergovernmental power purchase agreement (condition for contract awards) and resettlement issues.

Project closed more than 2 years later than expected.

Loan required supplementary grant funding to be completed.

No issues mentioned on ADB’s business process.

43497 (TA 7637/8475)

Power Sector Master Plan/Addendum to the Power Sector Master Plan

Not rated — 1.72 1.41 Implementation delay of over a year due to recruitment issues (i.e., lack of qualified proposals and unsuccessful contract negotiation) reduced consultant’s field time.

No issues mentioned on ADB’s business process.

39402 (TA 4918)

Support to the Interministerial Commission for Energy

Not rated — 2.00 1.36 Delays in recruiting the energy commercial expert resulted in lack of coordination among team members.

Instead of procuring individual consultants, recruitment of a firm would have facilitated better coordination and curtailed administrative delays.

Unaddressed gaps in TA outputs and outcomes, coupled with employment of lesser man-months of consulting services due to delayed recruitment resulted in some 32% of unutilized funds.

No issues mentioned on ADB’s business process.

Appendix 5 67

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

Sector: Transport

36553 (J9024/G0076)

Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons

Less than efficient Not computed 27.8 25.11 Project faced substantial costs adjustments and time extensions.

—

37075-013 (L2140)

Andkhoy-Qaisar Road Highly efficient Target: 19.1%

Actual: 23.6

81.63 82.50 Government committed (but failed to provide) $18.6 million as counterpart contribution to total civil works contract cost of $76.6 million. Gap was augmented through an MFF (Grant 0135). Government insistence, despite ADB repeated advice, on reducing the construction unit rate, which resulted in cost overruns. Difficult security conditions resulted in a delay of 2.5 years.

—

37136-013 (L2105)

Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project Phase 1

Less than efficient Target: 22.5%

Target after scope change: 10.1%

Actual: 11%

31.24 27.03 Cost of the incremental administration and consulting services sufficient. Securing of additional grant funds enabled completion of runways to international standards. 3 years delay in airport completion.

Use of International Civil Aviation Organization standards and specifications saved considerable time and effort, and enabled designs and tendering to proceed without the often laborious and time-consuming design and approval processes.

Appendix 5

68

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

37728-012 (J9037)

Emergency Road Rehabilitation

Less than efficient None computed 28.71 56.25 Original budget breakdown: (i) JFPR to provide $20 million, and (ii) ADB to provide $8.707 million. Cost overrun of $28 million financed by ADB using reallocated funds from Loan 1997-AFG and 2-year time extensions reported. Cost overrun is due to design defects and significant price increases of oil and construction materials during project implementation.

Thorough planning still needed even in emergency projects.

39467-013 (L2257/G0054/ G0135/J9097)

North-South Corridor Project

Less than efficient Mazar-e-Sharif--Dar-i-Suf road Target: 29.8%, Actual: 26.55%

Bamyan-Yakawlang road Target: 20.7%, Actual: 17.79%

140.90 175.13 Completion delayed due to: harsh weather in the project area, design changes, poor security, and issues in administration, approval, and disbursement processes.

—

42533-022 (G0161)

Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway

Highly efficient Target: 14.5%

Actual: 15.89%

165.00 155.54 Efficient planning and management of construction, together with enhanced ADB project supervision, expeditious approvals and release of payments resulted in the completion of project ahead of schedule.

—

42533-012 (TA7259)

Railway Development Study

Not rated Not applicable 1.90 1.58 — —

37083-012 (TA4675)

Capacity Building for Road Sector Institutions

Not rated Not applicable 1.00 0.86 Experienced delay in implementation due to lack of capacity and initiatives of Ministry of Public Works.

—

37326-012 (TA4828)

Road Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Cluster

Not rated Not applicable 2.70 2.07 Experienced delays in implementation due to security situation in Afghanistan.

—

Appendix 5 69

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

38096 (9060)

Balkh River Basin Water Resources Management

Less than efficient Not applicable 12.00 2.22 Undisbursed amount was 78% (of $10 million grant).

No infrastructure improvements were undertaken by the Project. This was not accomplished due to changed emphasis in project activities, delays in approval of changed activity schedule, and delays in implementation of essential preparatory work.

Delays in releasing grant funds affected performance.

40586 (9100)

Rural Business Support Project

Efficient Not applicable 19.30 21.92 The economy of input provision has been rated as efficient as 26% of grant proceeds were used on administrative and consultancy purposes as compared to the original allocation of 35%.

The productivity of inputs is considered high as the total impact of the project's value chain activities on net income of the Project beneficiaries was estimated at $7.3 million (with an 83% disbursement rate).

The value added by the value chain activities will last for decades and continue to generate returns on investment.

Initial implementation delays were caused by poor performance of consultant firm, weak capacity of Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock and Project Implementation Unit.

The approval process for core budget expense items needs to be streamlined to allow the implementation to be timely, procurement to be done efficiently, and subcontractors to be paid based on their contract.

Appendix 5

70

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

36222-012 (9039)

Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation

Less than efficient Not applicable 5.60 5.60 More than 2 years delayed during the initial phase of project as there were concerns about recruitment of consultants, deteriorating security conditions, and underestimation of operational challenges.

Startup delays and price escalation between the time of approval and implementation resulted in the reduction of subprojects from 120 to 75 (63%).

None indicated in the report.

37046-013 (2083)

Agriculture Sector Program

Less than efficient Not applicable 55.00 56.50 Second tranche was delayed for 3.5 years, because the release conditions had not been complied with.

Delays experienced may have been reduced if implementation arrangements as given in RRP had been put in place on time (i.e., appointment of program officers from each implementing agencies, appointment of program coordinator by Ministry of Finance (EA) and establishment of steering committee).

None indicated in the report.

37713-012 (9038)

Integrated Community Development in Northern Afghanistan

Less than efficient Not applicable 3.46 1.65 Disbursement at completion was 48%. Administrative and consultancy costs increased by 12% from $347,760 to $412,285. Significant delays during project start up led to change in design and scope. Startup delays had reduced relevance of the link to road project, experienced significant price escalation and cost increases, and shortened effective

Delay in approval of consultant’s contract variation contributed to the delay in grant closing.

Appendix 5 71

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

implementation period. Implementation delays were due to recruitment issues, lack of an efficient financial management system, and absence of appropriate protocols for project fund flow and approvals, and changes in administrative procedures in 2007.

38221-012 (TA 4483)

Capacity Building for Land Policy and Administration Reform

Not rated Not applicable 0.85 0.79 TA started nearly 1.5 years after its approval due to delays in consultants' recruitment caused in part by the resignation and frequent changes of project officers.

Minor changes on TA focus were necessary to adjust to the changes that had taken place during that period.

38252-012 (TA 4716)

Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources

Not rated Not applicable 0.76 0.72 Start-up delay was 1.3 years due to consultant recruitment issues.

Sector: Public Sector Management

38122-013 (L2215/G0030)

Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform Program)

Less efficient Not applicable 55.00 51.39 Encountered delays due to unexpected change to the legal framework for civil service reform and capacity constraints.

—

37047-012 (TA4313)

Poverty Assessment and Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Statistical Capacity Building

Not rated Not applicable 1.75 1.35 TA was extended by 41 months because of security issues, difficulties in recruiting consultants, and time needed to close lapsed contracts.

—

37561-012 (TA4345)

Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan

Not rated Not applicable 0.99 0.91 Emergency Management Plan prepared in timely manner and disseminated to ADB, AFRM, Government and contractors. Risk assessment missions

—

Appendix 5

72

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

regularly carried out. Weekly participation in the UN Security Management Team meetings provided critical information to understand the dynamic security environment and to ensure that contractors were informed of any potential threats to their projects.

40580-012 (TA4897)

Support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Not rated Not applicable 2.70 1.75 Delays and cost overrun encountered in implementing Component 1 due to mismatch between training level and absorptive capacity of Central Statistics Organization staff and the limited capacity of AFRM on statistical activities and to realign and better focus on operational activities.

TA’s pilot approaches on new initiatives ensured success in the long run.

TA’s failure to assess absorptive capacity of target institutions at appraisal resulted in delays and cost overruns.

42089-012 (TA7090)

Security Plan for Project Implementation

TCR pending Not applicable 0.995 Pending TCR TA completion date extended 4 times until June 2014. TA cost estimates increased.

—

Sector: Finance

37393 (G0067/G0068)

Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (G0067) and Supporting Private Sector and Financial Market Reforms Capacity Building (G0068)

Less efficient Not applicable 60.00 58.30 Grant 0067 was fully released without the need for extensions. There was less ADB support to Grant 0068 notwithstanding that funding was still available and key program outputs and the two outcomes had yet to be fully achieved by completion date.

—

38912-014 (L2091)

Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

Efficient Not applicable 5.00 2.50 $80.4 million, $20 million more than expected.

—

Sector: Multisector

36231-013 (L1954)

Postconflict Multisector Program

Efficient Not applicable 173.53 171.20 ADB support to the program was both flexible and highly

Program was rapidly prepared,

Appendix 5 73

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

responsive. approved, signed and made effective, which suited Afghanistan’s post-conflict situation and demonstrated a highly flexible response on the part of ADB.

36673-013 (L1997)

Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Not rated Road component: RRP = 31.5% PCR = 24% Power component: RRP = 26.8% PCR = 16.07%

Gas component: Cancelled

Irrigation component: Not computed

165.74 142.64 Road component incurred cost increases and delays.

Power component’s output was allowed to operate with defects.

Implementation of associated components financed by other donors was significantly delayed.

—

37102-012 (TA4415)

Kabul Air Quality Management

Not rated Not applicable 0.45 0.38 ADB Controller’s Department wrote off the net amount of $33,362.72 on 24 July 2009 as a supplier refused to refund the amount equivalent to undelivered equipment.

—

Sector: Trade and Industry

4699 Building the Capacity of the Ministry of Commerce for Trade and Transit Facilitation

Not rated — 0.40 0.30 Closing was delayed by more than a year due to the delay in submission of consultant’s final report. Trade, transit, and customs are somewhat specialized areas, with Afghanistan Resident Mission and Central and West Asia Regional Department having no such expertise. As such, it was somewhat difficult to provide effective supervision and guidance to the TA consultants.

None mentioned in the report.

Appendix 5

74

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Efficiency Rating EIRR

Project Cost

Project Implementation Issues ADB’s Business

Processes Planned ($million)

Actual ($million)

40577-012 (4906)

Capacity Building for Customs and Trade Facilitation

Not rated but overall rating is unsuccessful

— $1.20 $0.17 Due to poor security situation, only 1 out of the 4 international experts was mobilized (i.e., customs and trade facilitation expert). Although outputs were provided at the request of the implementing agency with satisfactory quality, and to a degree, contributed to strengthening capacity of Afghanistan Customs Department, they were out of the original TA design, difficult to be integrated into an intended deliverable, and thus weakened the rationale of the TA.

None mentioned in the report.

Sector: Health

36628 (9030) Primary Health Care Partnership for the Poor

Less than efficient — 3.0 2.8 Cost per capita was lower than similar projects financed by other donors.

The project faced cost adjustments and time extensions.

None mentioned in the report

ADB = Asian Development Bank, AFG = Afghanistan, AFRM = Afghanistan Resident Mission, EA = executing agency, EIRR = Economic Internal Rate of Return, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, MFF = multitranche financing facility, PCR = Project Completion Report, RRP = Report and Recommendation of the President, TA = technical assistance, UN = United Nations. Sources: Project Completion Reports, Technical Assistance Completion Reports, Implementation Completion Memorandum, PCR Validation Reports and Project Completion Report, Back to Office Reports, and eOps.

Appendix 5 75

Table A5.4: Project Performance: Sustainability Rating

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

Sector: Energy

40043 (L2304/G0230/ TA4909)

Regional Power Transmission Interconnection

Less than likely sustainable

Inadequate O&M financing. As of PCR, DABS remained institutionally weak and required extensive external support in every aspect of the power business.

As of PCR, government support is required to allow DABS to maintain electricity tariff at levels that provide adequate O&M funding.

42.1% (but should have considered distribution costs)

Sustainability will also depend on the protection of asset given the security situation.

43497 (TA 7637/8475)

Power Sector Master Plan/Addendum to the Power Sector Master Plan

Not rated Investment programming based on both the sector plan and its addendum.

— Afghanistan Government officials and parliamentarians endorsed the Master Plan at the high-level inter-governmental presentation.

— —

39402 (TA 4918)

Support to the Interministerial Commission for Energy

Not rated ICE was not functional in June 2012 due to financing constraints but resumed meetings in 2013 through ADB support. The ongoing TA 8328 will ensure capacity support to sustain ICE beyond 2014.

Institutional capacity is developing.

ICE and its sectoral sub-committees provide an adequate forum for coordination and discussions to map out sector priorities.

— —

Sector: Transport

36553 (J9024/G0076)

Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons

Less likely sustainable

Health care and education services need continued government support. In addition, the sustainability of road rehabilitation investments depends on timely development and implementation of proper road network maintenance strategy and programs.

— Sustainability of project impacts remains volatile to overall economic development and security in the project area.

Not computed.

No specific mitigation measures for identified risks.

37075-013 (L2140)

Andkhoy-Qaisar Road Less likely sustainable for road component

Likely sustainable for capacity building component

ADB and other donors agreed to maintain the constructed roads. In the long term, creation of off-budget revenue system (toll collection, user charges, etc.) for road maintenance is critical.

Given the government’s financial constraints, continued earmarking of government funds for maintenance may not be possible.

As of PCR, government needs to set up appropriate operating policies for independent road fund for road maintenance.

Not computed.

A more comprehensive assessment of risks could have led to appropriate mitigating measures.

Appendix 5

76

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

37136-013 (L2105)

Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project Phase 1

Likely sustainable

User charges are collected. Designs for civil works ensured longer life cycles of physical structures.

MOTCA has capacity to manage the civil aviation sector.

To ensure sustainability, close monitoring and preventive maintenance require continuous funding and technical backing. Government must continue to charge users and support the project outputs, as agreed. However, the government is facing severe shortage in funding for O&M and has no concrete plan to negotiate the problem.

Target: 5%

Target after major scope change: 3.4%

Actual: 4.49%

Political situation remained stable during project period.

37728-012 (J9037)

Emergency Road Rehabilitation

Less likely sustainable

Dependent on Government allocation.

— Government must continue allocating sufficient funds for routine and periodic maintenance and axle load controls, as indicated in the project design and Loan Agreement.

Not computed.

Project implemented on account of conflict and security.

39467-013 (L2257/G0054/ G0135/J9097)

North-South Corridor Project

Less likely sustainable

Fuel tax and government allocation on O&M not sufficient.

MOF and MPW could not agree on how to collect the toll. Ongoing work to establish an Afghanistan road authority.

Government cancelled tolling policy in 2010. Instead, collected tax on fuel imports (through the Transitional Law on Toll).

Not computed.

Mitigation measures appear to be insufficient even if at onset project recognized the volatile political and security situation.

42533-022 (G0161)

Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway

Likely sustainable

Outsourced the O&M of the railway facility through a performance-based O&M contract.

Establishment and strengthening of the Afghanistan Railway Authority. This will increase the government’s capacity for planning, development, and management of the railway sector.

Steps taken to deepen corporatization and privatization in the road and rail subsectors, and improve sector performance in O&M, safety, and project management.

Target: 4.5%

Actual: 8.05%

Government established the Afghan Public Protection Force to serve as an independent and dedicated security force to safeguard infrastructure projects, including road and rail assets.

Appendix 5 77

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

42533-012 (TA7259)

Railway Development Study

Not rated Not applicable — Recommended approach of study adopted by government.

Not applicable

Risks were noted in DMF but no adequate mitigation measures identified.

37083-012 (TA4675)

Capacity Building for Road Sector Institutions

Not rated Not applicable Lack of capacity and initiatives of MPW indicate that improvements in financial management areas are unlikely to be sustainable.

— Not applicable

Not discussed in TAR; TCR, however, noted unforeseen project delay risks due to insecurity and limited capacity of MPW.

37326-012 (TA4828)

Road Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Cluster

Not rated Not applicable Without further support, strengthened capacities of MPW and MOT may not be sustainable.

— Not applicable

Risks were noted in DMF but no adequate mitigation measures identified in TAR or implemented.

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

38096 (9060)

Balkh River Basin Water Resources Management

Unsustainable — Implementation of a proper exit strategy was not achieved due to further delays in implementation of activities, non-availability of counterparts, and low interest and involvement of the water management department.

Important ongoing programs (pilot program for WUA development) could not be completed because requested extension of 11 months was not granted.

Sustainability of project activities has been adversely affected by the reluctance of implementing agency and its provincial departments to appreciate the need for capacity and institution building.

Within pilot irrigation areas for WUA development, enforcement of water allocations has been inconsistent, with influential and strong individuals threatening or paying to keep the status quo, while government agencies were too weak to enforce rules.

— —

Appendix 5

78

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

40586 (9100)

Rural Business Support Project

Not rated All value chains deemed financially sustainable.

Producer cooperatives generated income by renting out farm implements and this was used to sustain operations and invest in other income generating activities.

Capacity building exceeded targets and cooperatives are deemed sustainable in terms of financial and organization management.

Participation of cooperatives in the implementation of the equity scheme facilitated their empowerment and improved transparency of the scheme.

Stakeholder ownership and participation is high and rated relevant.

Constraints in the growth in oil and wool/carpet value chain: fragmented carpet industry and the low market coordination in the value chain; lack of integration of technology and market development to improve oilseed and edible oil production.

— Focused on areas with fewer security risks (Balkh, Bamyan, Nangarhar).

Activities in Kandahar were put on hold due to security concerns.

36222-012 (9039)

Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation

Likely sustainable

2 years after project completion, local CDCs were able to undertake O&M of the 74 subprojects (i.e., minor infrastructure maintenance).

Capacity of local institutions was strengthened as villagers, local CDCs and provincial and district rural rehabilitation and development officials were involved in subproject identification and implementation.

CDCs receive continued support in the wider decentralization process in Afghanistan.

Community participation (identification, selection and implementation of subprojects were executed at the local level) ensured a high level of ownership.

— 2009 flooding to damaged infrastructure in 6 sites.

37046-013 (2083)

Agriculture Sector Program

Likely sustainable

— Program had an important impact on key ministries and institutions in the sector and stimulated ongoing changes in institutional and organizational arrangements that are leading to more effective and efficient agencies.

Private sector has been supported with training for business planning, management, and marketing.

Program established a conducive environment that has the commitment of the ministries involved (demonstrated by their willingness to put in place the necessary legislation for implementation of policies and institutional arrangements).

Sustainability dependent on continued investment in the sector and the continuation of an open and free economy that encourages private sector investment.

— —

Appendix 5 79

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

37713-012 (9038)

Integrated Community Development in Northern Afghanistan

Likely sustainable

MRRD provided government funds to complete subprojects under the project.

There was no clear exit strategy.

Some activities remained unfinished without a clear roadmap on how to secure project investments and achievements.

While the staff were capable of implementing the project, they only worked part time as they lacked salary support and were committed to nonproject tasks at MRRD.

Project ownership was relatively strong at MRRD.

— —

38221-012 (TA 4483)

Capacity Building for Land Policy and Administration Reform

Not rated No donors could be formally identified to finance the program proposed by the TA and replicate the community-based land administration approach on a broader scale to ensure that the TA results will be fully exploited.

Government training of trainers were available to scale up the ADAMAP.

The TA undertook capacity assessments of concerned institutions and proposed capacity building recommendations to be implemented together with institutional reform. Yet, the inputs required to achieve the proposed changes in mandate and approach were clearly beyond the TA capacity.

This programs identified through the TA is supported by a land policy approved by the Cabinet in 2007.

— —

38252-012 (TA 4716)

Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources

Likely sustainable

MEW secured additional funding from the World Bank to sustain the work of the Project Implementation Unit started by the TA.

Project Implementation Unit became high profile and an important section in MEW. By end of 2008, it was responsible for monitoring and administering 18 consultancy and civil works contracts with a combined value of about $50 million.

Assessed as sustainable due to Government’s continued support for the Project Implementation Unit.

— —

Sector: Public Sector Management

38122-013 (L2215/G0030)

Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform

Less likely sustainable

Not applicable Recognized capacity constraints. New approaches to capacity development needed.

Local absorptive capacity needs to be balanced against the skills transfer needed in government agencies to effectively

Not applicable

Risks were identified but mitigation measures appear to be insufficient.

Appendix 5

80

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

Program) implement reform.

37047-012 (TA4313)

Poverty Assessment and Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Statistical Capacity Building

Not rated Not applicable Sustainability hinged on trained staff remaining at the CSO. There have been instances where trained staff have been lost to international organizations operating in Kabul.

— Not applicable

—

37561-012 (TA4345)

Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan

Not rated Not applicable Master emergency management plan available to government.

TCR indicated ongoing risk assessments in regions where ADB projects are being implemented and ongoing participation in UN and other pertinent security coordination bodies.

Not applicable

Mitigation efforts were noted in the PCR, e.g., training of staff from ADB, government, and contractors on security in the field, communications, first aid, IED and mine awareness, surviving hostage situation, among others; and continuous/ regular coordination with development partners in the field.

40580-012 (TA4897)

Support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Not rated Future or long term (follow-up) support to capacity development not in place but recommended as follow-up action.

Outcome achieved will be sustainable as long as trained staff remain at CSO.

— Not applicable

Not explicitly discussed in TCR.

42089-012 (TA7090)

Security Plan for Project Implementation

TCR pending Not applicable Proper funding of Security Unit at ADB resident mission in Afghanistan and continued cooperation with United Nations security staff.

Depends in great part on proper security environment.

Not applicable

TCR pending

Sector: Finance

37393 (G0067/G0068)

Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (G0067) and Supporting Private Sector and Financial Market

Less likely sustainable

Not applicable — Policy reforms initiated under the program generate new implementation challenges and problems for which new capacity

Not applicable

Possible risks to implementation were discussed in the DMF/RRP. Insufficient discussion in the PCR to establish the

Appendix 5 81

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

Reforms Capacity Building (G0068)

has to be developed. Therefore, sustainability depends on further development partner assistance to (i) implement complementary reforms, and (ii) provide capacity development in the new institutions created.

adequacy of mitigation measures.

38912-014 (L2091)

Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

Less likely sustainable

Not applicable — Sustainability is contingent with stable security in Afghanistan.

Not applicable

Possible risks to implementation were discussed in the DMF/RRP. Insufficient discussion in the PCR to establish the adequacy of mitigation measures.

Sector: Multisector

36231-013 (L1954)

Postconflict Multisector Program

Sustainable Not applicable The Government exhibited leadership and a deep commitment at the outset, and continued to pursue its reform agenda during the design and implementation of the Postconflict Multisector Program.

The Government has undertaken many subsequent measures to widen and deepen its overall reform agenda, with continued support by multilateral and bilateral development partners. Program promoted sustainability by supporting cost recovery and O&M in the transport and energy sectors.

Not applicable

—

36673-013 (L1997)

Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Not rated Road component: Government allocates funds but plans to establish an independent road fund for maintenance.

Power component: DA Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) under MEW is responsible for O&M, but with few staff and inadequate capacity.

— Road component: Government will need to continue allocating funds for maintenance unless it establishes the independent road fund.

Power component: Profitability not ensured; O&M still highly reliant on donor assistance and government subsidies.

Road component: None computed.

Power component: RRP = 15%; PCR = 3.32%.

Gas

Appears to be inadequate as evidenced by cancelled or not implemented components and subcomponents.

Appendix 5

82

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Sustainability

Rating Financing and Operation and

Maintenance Institutional Policy and Political FIRR

Adequacy of Risk Mitigation

Gas component: Cancelled.

Irrigation component: O&M is the responsibility of water users.

Gas component: Cancelled.

Irrigation component: Assumes that irrigation structures will be sustained as these are important to farmers and the long tradition of communities to maintain these facilities.

component: Cancelled.

Irrigation component: None computed

37102-012 (TA4415)

Kabul Air Quality Management

Less sustainable

To implement the AGM strategy and policy recommendations provided under the TA, Government needs to seek financial support.

— While satisfied with the TA's results and their usefulness, Government has yet to fully adopt or apply them.

Not applicable

Risk assessment did not anticipate factors that delayed the adoption or application of TA results.

Sector: Industry and Trade

4699 Building the Capacity of the Ministry of Commerce for Trade and Transit Facilitation

Not rated Completion of the TA was facilitated by an agreement between ADB and the World Bank through the latter’s Emergency Customs Modernization and Trade Facilitation Project in Afghanistan.

TA was inadequately integrated into ADB’s regional/sub-regional program per 2009 project completion report.

— — —

40577-012 (4906)

Capacity Building for Customs and Trade Facilitation

Not rated but overall rating is unsuccessful

— — — — —

Sector: Health

36628 (9030) Primary Health Care Partnership for the Poor

Not rated USAID and EC to finance recurrent costs including salaries of health workers after ADB ceased project financing.

Communities agreed to contribute to recurrent costs to maintain some project activities.

Project’s exit strategy was satisfactory.

Community members trained under the project; continued support for community-based activities.

— — Although security risk was not explicitly discussed at design, high level of community involvement assured security of project infrastructure and continuing services.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, CDC = community development council, CSO = Central Statistics Organization, DABS = Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, DMF = design and monitoring framework, EC = European Commission, FIRR = Financial Internal Rate of Return, ICE = Interministerial Commission for Energy, IED = improvised explosive device, MEW = Ministry of Energy and Water, MOF = Ministry of Finance, MOT = Ministry of Transport, MOTCA = Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, MRRD = Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, O&M = operation and maintenance, PCR = project completion report, RRP = Report and Recommendation of the President, TA = technical assistance, TAR = technical assistance report, TCR = technical assistance completion report, UN = United Nations, USAID = United States Agency for International Development, WUA = water user association. Sources: Project Completion Reports (PCR), Technical Assistance Completion Reports, Implementation Completion Memorandum, PCR Validation Reports and Project Completion Report, Back to Office Reports, and eOps.

Appendix 5 83

Table A5.5: Project Performance: Development Impact

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

Sector: Energy

40043 (L2304/G0230/ TA4909)

Regional Power Transmission Interconnection

1

Highly satisfactory Mutually beneficial power trade between Tajikistan and Afghanistan by June 2009.

Electricity trade with Tajikistan provided more reliable electricity to 760,000 household in Kabul (of which 225,000 are new consumers).

Regional trade and cooperation.

Connection of 15,000 new industrial and commercial users.

43497 (TA 7637/8475)

Power Sector Master Plan/Addendum to the Power Sector Master Plan

Not rated Increase in indigenous generation from about 500 MW in 2009 to 1,000 MW in 2014.

Increase in regional electricity trade from 300 GWh in 2009 to 1,000 GWh in 2013.

The power sector master plan currently facilitates investment programming to achieve the impact.

A significant benefit of the proposed transmission development is that Afghanistan will be able to take value from its strategic location and transfer power from energy-rich Central Asia to power- poor Pakistan.

—

39402 (TA 4918)

Support to the Interministerial Commission for Energy

Not rated Progress toward or achievement of ANDS goals: By 2010, access to electricity in at least 65% of households in major urban areas, at least 90% of nonresidential establishments in major urban areas, and at least 25% of households in rural areas.

Developed strategy for the development and use of renewable energies by end 2007.

By 2010, at least 75% of the costs recovered from users connected to the national power grid.

Indicators are too ambitious given the TA scope.

Limited achievement of outcomes would reduce its impact on the ANDS goals for the sector.

Sector: Transport

36553 (J9024/G0076)

Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons

Likely significant Percentage of population below poverty line decreased from 80% to at least 70% by 2007.

ICM reported that project outcomes in terms of poverty reduction and settlement of returning refugees were very positive, but cannot be wholly attributable to project.

— —

Appendix 5

84

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

37075-013 (L2140) Andkhoy-Qaisar Road

Not rated 15% increase in per capita income in the project area over 3 years; 10% reduction in poverty incidence in the project area.

Progress made but no evidence of achievement as of PCR.

— —

37136-013 (L2105) Regional Airports Rehabilitation Project Phase 1

Likely significant Within 3 years of project completion:

(a) 50% decrease in narcotics cultivation in the project area;

(b) completion of disarmament of regional warlords; and

(c) reintegration of war combatants, refugees, and internally displaced persons in the project area.

While the PCR noted the project’s likely contribution to impact in view of achieved outcome results, this CPSFR finds weak connection between the measures of impact and the project.

Positive social impact by facilitating year-round air travel services to 2 million beneficiaries.

Helps connect regions to main cities and economic centers, and improve government service delivery to remote, neglected, conflict-affected regions.

—

37728-012 (J9037) Emergency Road Rehabilitation

Likely significant (a) Reduction of travel time and transportation costs of agricultural and industrial products;

(b) Increased economic activities.

(a) Reduced travel time and cost of transporting products;

(b) Opened up trade and commerce opportunities.

Indications of economic activities; no data on social impacts (access to social services).

Has potential to promote international trade and transit.

39467-013 (L2257/G0054/ G0135/J9097)

North-South Corridor Project

Likely significant (a) 10% decrease in poverty incidence;

(b) 50% increase in production and trade;

(c) 50% increase in use of transport services.

Although still early to arrive at conclusive assessment at time of PCR:

(a) 10% decrease in poverty incidence is less likely to be achieved;

(b) 50% increase in production and trade is likely to be achieved; and

(c) 50% increase in use of transport services is likely to be achieved.

Positive socio-economic impact is expected as almost 90% of people in the project area are farmers.

May enhance region's national and international trade and economic opportunities.

42533-022 (G0161) Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway

Likely significant (a) Increase in trade between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan to $300 million in 2015 from $170 million in 2008;

(b) Increase in Afghanistan's total trade to $5 billion in 2015 from $3.5 billion in 2008.

(a) Value of trade between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan was $732 million in 2011–2012;

(b) Value of Afghanistan’s total trade was $6.77 billion in 2011–2012.

Project has positive socioeconomic impacts, e.g., provided boost to regional trade; promoted better access to markets, economic centers, and social services; and improved the movement of humanitarian

.—

Appendix 5 85

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

assistance.

42533-012 (TA7259)

Railway Development Study

Not rated (a) Contribute to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in Afghanistan;

(b) promote regional cooperation through intra- and interregional trade along Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation corridors 3 and 6; and

(c) boost Afghanistan’s economic competitiveness and all -year accessibility to its neighbors.

Expected impacts were achieved.

— —

37083-012 (TA4675)

Capacity Building for Road Sector Institutions

Not rated (a) Establishment and maintenance of a road database of regional and national highways including road conditions;

(b) Zero road defects within the period of defects liability stated by contractor.

(a) Assessed to be ineffective;

(b) No update on second impact.

— —

37326-012 (TA4828)

Road Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Cluster

Not rated (a) Economic and social development promoted and poverty reduced;

(b) Road project management and procurement improved; and

(c) Transport service operations improved.

Not discussed in TCR. — —

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

38096 (9060)

Balkh River Basin Water Resources Management

Unsatisfactory Reduced poverty in the Balkh river basin.

Not likely to make any contribution to sector improvement since envisaged activities were not implemented.

— —

Appendix 5

86

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

40586 (9100)

Rural Business Support Project

Likely satisfactory Reduce rural poverty by creating sustainable income generating opportunities for rural and farm families.

Impact evaluation at completion did not measure performance against the key performance indicators.

Impact is most significant in potato value chain: increased potato productivity, storage efficiency, and income, organized 8 producers cooperative that generated income and was sustainable, and increased net income of producers of over $5 million in 2011.

Edible oil value chain: Increased area planted with oil crops (mostly cotton) and crop yields, linked producers with edible oil processors and organized 12 oil crop producer cooperatives that generated income and were sustainable, increased net income of producers by $1.8 million in 2011.

Wool and carpet value chain: increased productivity and net income from wool spinning, improved carpet designs and increased profitability of carpet weaving, increased net income of spinners and weavers by $400,000 during project implementation.

Improved livelihood participation of women as they comprise most weavers in the wool and carpet value chain.

—

36222-012 (9039) Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation

Not rated Contribute to the reduction of widespread poverty in more vulnerable, low food security areas in the north of Afghanistan.

Not reported in the ICM. — —

37046-013 (2083) Agriculture Sector Program

Less than satisfactory

Per capita incomes reach levels of neighboring countries within 5 years.

Agricultural exports restored to levels of 20 years ago as percentage of GDP within 10 years.

Irrigation efficiency levels reach 40%

It is unlikely that per capita incomes will reach the levels of neighboring countries within target period.

While agricultural growth has taken place, it varied from year to year, and it is

Structural improvements in environmental protection have been established.

—

Appendix 5 87

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

within 10 years. not possible to attribute growth directly to the program. Exports (including carpets) decreased from 5.3% in 2004 (as a % of GDP) to 4.7% in 2008. Without addressing irrigation, which is not part of the program, it is difficult to see how agricultural growth will be achieved.

37713-012 (9038) Integrated Community Development in Northern Afghanistan

Less than satisfactory

15% increase in income of the poorest households in the project area by June 2015.

10% decrease in the incidence of diseases due to malnutrition and unsafe drinking water by June 2007.

Measurement of achievement is challenging as no baseline was established during project implementation.

Key performance indicator not established at completion.

More than 60% increase in the consumption of nutritious vegetables in 5 CDC Joint Agriculture subprojects and about 15-20% increase in 2 villages in Hazrat-e-Sultan.

— —

38221-012 (TA 4483)

Capacity Building for Land Policy and Administration Reform

Not rated Foreign direct investment (stock) reaching 5% of GDP within 10 years.

Effective resolution mechanisms for land disputes established within 5 years.

Violent land disputes virtually eliminated within 7 years.

All farm households obtaining titles to their land within 10 years.

None reported in the ICM. — —

38252-012 (TA 4716)

Capacity Development for Irrigation and Water Resources

Not rated Increase in number and timely implementation of irrigation and water resources projects with less reliance on contracted project management support by the end of the TA.

PIU is an important section in the ministry and is administering contracts amounting to $50 million.

Improved donor coordination.

TA had an indirect although important contribution to improving the Integrated Water Resource Management framework.

Sector: Public Sector Management

Appendix 5

88

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

38122-013 (L2215/G0030)

Fiscal Management and Public Administration Reform Program (formerly Public Service Delivery Reform Program)

Not rated Strengthen public finances through targeted assistance to improve budget programming, resource mobilization, develop the civil service, and strengthen monitoring of public finances.

Not measured during completion.

— —

37047-012 (TA4313)

Poverty Assessment and Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Statistical Capacity Building

Not rated Government, international, and non-government agencies, increasingly use statistical data for planning and monitoring purposes.

No evidence of progress on impact in the TCR.

— A new statistical law was drafted and embodied best practice and emphasized the autonomy of CSO.

37561-012 (TA4345)

Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan

Not rated Assist the Government in enabling the necessary security to the contractors, consulting firms, and personnel working in the projects financed by ADB.

Expertise provided to the Government for planning and improving the security measures under ADB-financed projects.

— Critical awareness and knowledge to assist project implementation under the difficult and changing conditions in Afghanistan provided through training of staff from ADB, government, and contractors on security in the field, communications, first aid, IED and mine awareness, surviving hostage situation, among others.

40580-012 (TA4897)

Support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

Not rated (a) ANDS has a strong poverty reduction focus;

(b) Anticorruption is mainstreamed into ANDS and a stand-alone anticorruption policy implemented.

Not discussed in TCR. — —

42089-012 (TA7090)

Security Plan for Project Implementation

TCR pending Establish a framework for security that

(a) addresses the challenges of working in the difficult environment of Afghanistan, and

(b) enables projects of the relevant organizations to be implemented in as safe a manner as possible.

TCR pending — —

Sector: Finance

37393 (G0067/G0068)

Private Sector and Financial Market Development Program (G0067) and Supporting Private Sector and

Not rated (a) Sustainable and stable GDP growth (from 8% in 2005 to 10% per annum until 2011); and

(b) Lower unemployment rate (3.6% in 2005).

(a) Target achieved. GDP growth between 2006 and 2010 averaged around 10.9%;

(b) Data were not available at completion; recent figures

— —

Appendix 5 89

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

Financial Market Reforms Capacity Building (G0068)

however, reflected increase in unemployment between 2010-2013.

38912-014 (L2091)

Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility

Not rated (a) Increase in private sector investment and employment;

(b) Medium-term fiscal and socioeconomic planning targets.

Project mobilized $108.6 million in foreign direct investment and created 850 jobs.

— —

Sector: Multisector

36231-013 (L1954)

Postconflict Multisector Program

Not rated Well-defined public sector role, policy and planning capacity, and institutional capability.

Program was part of an overall reform agenda so it may be difficult to fully isolate and quantify its impact. Program may have contributed to several key achievements in GDP, inflation rate, budget deficit, and social indicators.

A study was completed to prepare procedures to enforce agreed-on standards that create efficient and reliable energy systems and incorporates gender, environmental, and involuntary resettlement objectives.

—

36673-013 (L1997)

Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Not rated (a) Increase in GDP per capita;

(b) Percentage of population below poverty line decreased.

(a) Directly improved the lives of about 9 million people living within and around the project areas in seven provinces, including Kabul—2 million people in provinces along the road, 60,000 electricity contracts with 0.5 million users, and 240,000 electricity contracts in Kabul with more than 2 million users;

(b) Substantial poverty reduction impacts reported on farmers in the downstream areas of the irrigation canals.

— —

37102-012 (TA4415)

Kabul Air Quality Management

Not rated Ambient air quality meets World Health Organization standards.

Not discussed in TCR. — —

Sector: Industry and Trade

4699 Building the Capacity of the Ministry of

Increased trade with neighboring countries.

Not reported in TCR — —

Appendix 5

90

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Development Impact Rating

Development Impact Contribution to Cross-Cutting Results

Unintended Impacts Expected Actual

Commerce for Trade and Transit Facilitation

Increased transit trade via Afghanistan.

40577-012 (4906) Capacity Building for Customs and Trade Facilitation

Not rated but overall rating is unsuccessful

Trade in licit commodities with neighboring countries increases.

Transit trade via Afghanistan increases.

Not likely to be achieved as outputs and outcomes were not achieved.

— —

Sector: Health

36628 (9030) Primary Health Care Partnership for the Poor

Child mortality reduced by 30% in 3 years.

80% of the poor have access to quality care.

Not reported in ICM. Women participation in the provision of health services was ensured through selection and training of female community health workers; 50% of community health workers trained were female.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ANDS = Afghanistan National Development Strategy, CPSFR = country partnership strategy final review, CSO = Central Statistics Organization, GDP = gross domestic product, ICM = Implementation Completion Memorandum, IED = improvised explosive device, PCR = project completion report, PIU = project implementation unit, TA = technical assistance. Sources: Project Completion Reports, Technical Assistance Completion Reports, Implementation Completion Memorandum, PCR Validation Reports and Project Completion Report, Back to Office Reports, and eOps.

Appendix 6 91

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF ONGOING PROJECTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, 2009 TO MID-2015

Table A6.1: Project Performance: Relevance Rating

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

Sector: Energy

37078-013 (2165/G0004)

Power Transmission and Distribution Project

Likely relevant

Responded to sector needs and country demands, formed part of the Government’s power master plan, and was consistent with the Government’s policy of providing reliable power supply to all Afghans.

Technical design was not consistent with the expected outcome of the project (design capacity of distribution lines are inadequate to support 74,200 customer service connections).

Yes. Intended to benefit about 1.2 million people who are largely poor (90,700 households). Provision of electrification kits to poor households. Kit users were to have immediate access to electricity, with a flexible payment option levied through the kit tariff (repayment over a period rather than up front).

Design considered risks in security, implementation capacity, investment requirements, and institutions.

42094-062 (9128) Development of Mini-Hydropower in Badakhshan and Bamyan Provinces

Likely relevant

1

Consistent with Government’s priorities and ADB's country programs.

Complements with other ADB supported energy operations as this would supply electricity to isolated population that could not be reached by the northeast power system.

Design appropriately considered institutional capacity development both at the national and community levels.

Complemented infrastructure investment with economic opportunities for the poor.

Project timeline did not consider difficulty in accessing site during winter months and DMF failed to provide the baseline from which target indicators could be measured.

Yes. Included a component on alternative livelihood activities during the day-time (i.e., off-peak hours).

Provision of cheap energy for the poor.

Security costs included in the appropriate project components.

46392-001 (0374/0375)

North-South Power Transmission Enhancement Project

Likely relevant

Identified in the Afghanistan Power Sector Master Plan and in the National Energy Supply Program as central to the envisaged regional power trade and Afghanistan’s important future role in it as an energy resource corridor connecting Central Asia’s power systems with its own and those of South Asia.

Designed to connect upstream power generation and power transmission and downstream power transmission and distribution projects.

DMF shows clarity of the results link (i.e., statements and indicators).

None. Has built in security provisions in project design and financing.

42094-012/022 (MFF 0026/G0134)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 1

Likely relevant

Consistent with national and sector strategies and finances medium-term investment programs of the sector.

Consistent with ADB’s strategy for the

Programmatic approach deemed appropriate as it provides flexibility, lowers cost, provides for well-defined subsequent tranches, focuses more

Yes. Baharak hydropower (off grid) will service isolated rural population.

External monitoring will be

Design considered the following risks: delay in DABS restructuring, insufficient power imports, and reversal of policy

Appendix 6

92

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

country articulated in CSPU 2006-2008 and CPS 2009-2013.

Consistent with national and sector strategies and finances medium-term investment programs of the sector.

on execution, capacity and reforms (since analytical work is front loaded), complements physical investments with advisory, and closely links actions among development partners.

carried out twice a year and will assess the status of vulnerable groups affected by the project, such as households headed by women, disabled and/or elderly and poor families.

directions, inadequate project management and continued security risk.

42094-032 (0184/PPTA 7289)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 2 (Kabul Distribution Network Rehabilitation Project)

Likely relevant

Consistent with national and sector strategies and finances medium-term investment programs of the sector.

Consistent with ADB’s strategy for the country articulated in CSPU 2006-2008 and CPS 2009-2013.

Variation on the location of substation prevented significant impact on resettlement.

Yes. Pro-poor strategies identified at the onset.

Despite recognizing the security risks, project failed to consider security costs in the project design at the onset.

Later on added as a response to deteriorating security situation. Security plan updated and discussed with APPF and local government.

42094-042 (0280/0281/ 0282)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 3 (Gereshk Electricity Services Improvement Project)

Likely relevant

Consistent with national and sector strategies for 2008-2020.

Consistent with ADB’s CPS 2009-2013 which identifies the rehabilitation and upgrading of existing infrastructure as priority in the energy sector.

Consistent with ADB’s Strategy 2020 and Energy Policy (2009) in promoting inclusive growth, energy security, and supporting energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Includes components to improve and expand Gereshk distribution system (Helmand) and strengthen DABS operational capacity.

DMF hierarchy of results appropriate and baseline figures from which to measure achievement provided.

None. While there is no component or indicator directly related to inclusion, PFR indicated that project expects to reduce load of women and girls traditionally responsible for collecting firewood and provide them with opportunity to become more involved in social and productive activities. Female family members could have access for more information and children will be able to study at longer hour at home.

Engaged security services for project implementation. But agreement with APPF could not be made operational until July 2015.

42094-052 (0332)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 4 (Grid Development & Distribution Expansion Project)

Likely relevant

Consistent with Afghanistan Power Sector Master Plan.

In line with ADB's CPS 2009–2013 for Afghanistan that prioritizes infrastructure development and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) strategy, which promotes regional cooperation and energy trade.

Complements with USAID financed substations in Pul-e-Alam and

Comprises a transmission subproject allowing Turkmenistan to supply the North West of Afghanistan while a distribution subproject allows two regions south of Kabul to be electrified and connected to the Afghanistan grid.

DMF results and indicators are mixed up particularly for outcomes and impact.

Yes. Adopted pro poor strategies at the onset. In order to specifically address the needs of the poor, the project includes a distribution component with new connections to 20,000 households in Pul-e-Alam and Gardez. This will bring electrification rates in these cities to approximately 90%, which will provide the access to

Demining and security costs integrated in design.

Appendix 6 93

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

Gardez. electricity for many poor residents in these two cities.

42094-075 (0377)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 5 (Dashte Alwan 500kV substation)

Likely relevant

Identified as part of the top priority investment by Afghanistan's power master plan study, as well as the country's national energy supply program.

In line with ADB's CPS 2009–2013.

Included in Afghanistan’s COBP, 2013–2014 that prioritizes infrastructure development and the CAREC strategy which promotes regional cooperation and energy trade.

Has upward and downward transmission and distribution system linkages with a number of projects assisted by ADB and other development partners.

Project is the first step to cater to expanded power imports and synchronization. The proposed substation will house the future converter station hub and the expansion plan envisaged under four stages to include in-feeds from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and installation of additional convertor stations during 2020-2032.

None. Security and demining included in the project cost.

A conflict sensitive approach will be adopted in implementing the project.

Although the financial management and governance risks are substantial, DABS is addressing these weaknesses by implementing extensive programs and wide ranging interventions, funded by development partners including ADB, USAID, and World Bank.

43497 (TA 7637/ TA 8475)

Power Sector Master Plan/ Addendum to the Power Sector Master Plan

Likely relevant

Energy sector has consistently been a priority in the national development plan. An updated power master plan will facilitate strategic prioritization of the required infrastructure to achieve energy security.

Design was adequate and financing was sufficient for desired outcome.

No major changes made during implementation.

TA design had adequate flexibility to meet requests from Afghanistan.

None. None.

46347 (TA 8328)

Supporting the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy

Likely relevant

In the past, the Interministerial Commission for Energy (ICE) proved to be the most effective and coherent mechanism to brainstorm and agree on an investment and governance agenda.

TA reestablished ICE secretariat to coordinate energy reforms, investments, and plans to unify Afghanistan’s energy sector.

None. Deterioration of political stability and security identified as risks at the onset. Government counterpart support includes the provision of security services.

47282 (TA 8509)

Multitranche Financing Facility II Energy Development 2014-2023

Likely relevant

The preparation of MFF 2 further addresses the gaps in energy demand and supply in the country and enhances regional power trade.

Investment program will finance portion of the 10-year generation and transmission investment plan and will build on transmission and distribution investments made under the first Energy MFF; aims to develop a unified grid connecting NEPS with SEPS.

Yes. Increase connection rate by expanding grid-based distribution systems and bring renewable energy supply to off grid communities.

Project security and demining built in design of proposed Tranche 1.

Appendix 6

94

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

47018 (TA 8401)

Gas Development Master Plan

Likely relevant

For Afghanistan, a sound energy policy mandates supply diversification in order to achieve energy security. Afghanistan is highly reliant on imported energy in the form of electricity and oil, resulting in significant exposure to energy price volatility; because potential domestic gas fields have not yet been fully explored and developed, the dependency of the energy sector on imported power and fuels is likely to increase.

The master plan would cover a 20-year horizon (2013-2033) and would entail (i) preparation of gas demand and supply outlook and scenarios; (ii) development of market assessments and netback analysis; (iii) review current policies and plans in the context of gas development; (iv) assessment of the financial requirements and needs; (v) evaluation of pricing options for various segments vis-a-vis domestic sales and transit/exports; (vi) develop a planning model and train MoMP staff on its use; (vii) assessment of environmental, socioeconomic, and non-monetary impacts; (viii) review of other countries' experiences with gas supply chain development including compressed natural gas (CNG) sector; and (ix) formulation of an Afghanistan Gas Sector Master Plan and Implementation Strategy (with sequencing of priority investment projects).

Areas that the plan would also look at: environmental and poverty-combating priorities and how these may be influenced by gas development options and alternatives, and assess the country’s related institutional and economic capacity to address the negative consequences of gas development.

There is a risk that political stability and security may deteriorate after the 2014 withdrawal of foreign troops, which may dissuade contractors and consultants from bidding for and implementing power projects in Afghanistan. The government will provide counterpart support in the form of security.

47266 (TA 8808)

Renewable Energy Development

Likely relevant

Included in the COBP 2014–2015 and is fully aligned with the National Priority Program and the Power Sector Master Plan of the Government of Afghanistan, approved in 2013, which call for the development of the energy sector through expansion of the electricity network to reduce poverty to one-third of the total population by 2015.

Builds on outputs of previous ADB TA projects and development partners' efforts on renewable energy resource assessment (in solar, wind, micro hydro, and biomass). Proposed TA interventions will help remove these barriers and catalyze the widespread adoption of renewable energy systems.

Yes. Complements the objective of ADB’s ICPS, 2014–2015 for inclusive economic growth through the development of physical infrastructure such as power transmission, distribution, and rural electrification.

TA will work closely with the United Nations security agencies and the ADB security team to identify provincial capitals that are less volatile.

Sector: Transport

40333-022 (G0081/ G0244/G0291)

Road Network Development Project I (Bala Murghab to Leman)

Likely relevant

The project will enable the ring road to fully perform its intended role as the backbone of the national transportation system and principal conduit for national and international passenger and freight traffic.

DMF retrofitted in 2011 - remains valid in the midterm review of 2013.

Yes. Project is expected to contribute to poverty reduction by providing access to urban markets for agricultural products as well as improve rural peoples’ access to education and health facilities.

Project recognized that continuing conflict may affect costs. Mitigation measures were identified in the RRP but must be assessed at project completion. Budget allocation for demining noted in RRP.

Appendix 6 95

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

37075-022 (G0012/ G0244/G0291)

Qaisar-Bala Murghab Road

Likely relevant

Project will help the Government promote economic and social development and reduce poverty by rehabilitating the conflict-damaged primary road network.

Project was likewise in line with ADB’s assistance strategy outlined in the CSPU 2004-2006, which included a focus on rehabilitation of key infrastructure.

DMF retrofitted in 2011 - remained valid in the midterm review of 2013.

Yes. Project is expected to reduce poverty by increasing production and trade in the area of major farm products.

RRP noted that overall political and security situation remains volatile. While some mitigation measures were identified, prevailing conditions cannot be mitigated completely. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP.

44482-023 (MFF0063: G0261/G0262)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 1 (O&M Support for the railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif, and Reconstruction and widening of 50 km Bagramy to Sapary Road)

Likely relevant

MFF aims to improve domestic and regional connectivity while widening access to social and economic opportunities.

MFF is aligned with Afghanistan’s observed transport sector deficiencies, the Government’s strategies, plans, programs, and initiatives as described by ANDS, ANDS– Prioritization and Implementation Plan, and National Regional Integrated Resources Corridor Initiative, and will assist in closing the funding gap of the Government’s roadmap for transport sector development.

Also aligned with the CPS 2009-2013.

This MFF succeeds an old MFF approved in 2008 which has been fully utilized. The strategy and roadmap underpinning the 2008 MFF remains valid for this new MFF. The roadmap for the sector identifies short-, medium-,and long-term investments covering roads, rail, and airports.

Lessons from past MFF implementation were adopted in the design of this new MFF.

Monitoring reports noted that: (i) poor or outdated construction designs resulted to contract variations; and (ii) capacity of MPW not fully addressed in design.

Yes. Project has implications on transport infrastructure that will eventually impact and benefit the poor through increased movement of goods and services and better connectivity.

Recognized security as an underlying concern in original RRP. The Ministry of Interior is expected to provide security to all projects. A methodology has been established from past projects, with successful results. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP or other succeeding project documents.

44482-023 (MFF0063: G0327/G0328/ TA8069)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 2 (Transport Infrastructure Development Component, and Transport Network Management Capacity Development Component)

Likely relevant

MFF aims to improve domestic and regional connectivity while widening access to social and economic opportunities.

MFF is aligned with Afghanistan’s observed transport sector deficiencies, the Government’s strategies, plans, programs, and initiatives as described by ANDS, ANDS– Prioritization and Implementation Plan, and National Regional Integrated Resources Corridor Initiative, and will assist in closing the funding gap of the Government’s roadmap for transport sector development.

This MFF succeeds an old MFF approved in 2008 which has been fully utilized. The strategy and roadmap underpinning the 2008 MFF remains valid for this new MFF. The roadmap for the sector identifies short, medium, and long term investments covering roads, rail, and airports.

Lessons from past MFF implementation were adopted in the design of this new MFF.

.

Yes. Project has implications on transport infrastructure that will eventually impact and benefit the poor through increased movement of goods and services and better connectivity.

Recognized security as an underlying concern in original RRP. The Ministry of Interior is expected to provide security to all projects. A methodology has been established from past projects, with successful results. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP or other succeeding project documents.

Appendix 6

96

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

Also aligned with the CPS 2009-2013.

44482-024 (MFF0063: G0355)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 3 (Reconstruction of 178 km section of Dar-i-Suf to Yakawlang, provision of design and construction supervision services, feasibility studies for the Investment Program, and provision of support for MPW project implementation)

Likely relevant

MFF aims to improve domestic and regional connectivity while widening access to social and economic opportunities.

MFF is aligned with Afghanistan’s observed transport sector deficiencies, the Government’s strategies, plans, programs, and initiatives as described by ANDS, ANDS–Prioritization and Implementation Plan, and National Regional Integrated Resources Corridor Initiative, and will assist in closing the funding gap of the Government’s roadmap for transport sector development.

Also aligned with the CPS 2009-2013.

This MFF succeeds an old MFF approved in 2008 which has been fully utilized. The strategy and roadmap underpinning the 2008 MFF remains valid for this new MFF. The roadmap for the sector identifies short, medium, and long term investments covering roads, rail, and airports.

Lessons from past MFF implementation were adopted in the design of this new MFF.

Yes. Project has implications on transport infrastructure that will eventually impact and benefit the poor through increased movement of goods and services and better connectivity.

Recognized security as an underlying concern in original RRP. The Ministry of Interior is expected to provide security to all projects. A methodology has been established from past projects, with successful results. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP or other succeeding project documents.

44482-025 (MFF0063: G0422/G0423)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 4 (Reconstruction of 108 km Baharak to Eshkashim road, provision of construction supervision services, provision of support for the Investment Program, capacity development of AfRA, and improvement of the efficiency of the traffic along CAREC Corridors 5 and 6)

Likely relevant

MFF aims to improve domestic and regional connectivity while widening access to social and economic opportunities.

MFF is aligned with Afghanistan’s observed transport sector deficiencies, the Government’s strategies, plans, programs, and initiatives as described by ANDS, ANDS–Prioritization and Implementation Plan, and Prioritization and Implementation Plan, and will assist in closing the funding gap of the Government’s roadmap for transport sector development.

Also aligned with the CPS 2009-2013.

This MFF succeeds an old MFF approved in 2008 which has been fully utilized. The strategy and roadmap underpinning the 2008 MFF remains valid for this new MFF. The roadmap for the sector identifies short, medium, and long term investments covering roads, rail, and airports.

Lessons from past MFF implementation were adopted in the design of this new MFF.

Yes. Project has implications on transport infrastructure that will eventually impact and benefit the poor through increased movement of goods and services and better connectivity.

Recognized security as an underlying concern in original RRP. The Ministry of Interior is expected to provide security to all projects. A methodology has been established from past projects, with successful results. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in RRP or other succeeding project documents.

47210-001 (TA8687)

Transport Sector Master Plan Update

Likely relevant

TA was requested by Government to update its national transport sector plan, which takes into account progress made to date, gaps yet to be filled, as well as emerging

The study follows the generic approach to master planning: i.e., (i) formulation of vision, goals and objectives; (ii) design of alternative courses of action; (iii) comparative

None. Not directly discussed but study has implications on transport infrastructure that will eventually benefit the poor.

The TAR notes that the transition in 2014 brings considerable uncertainty in security. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues

Appendix 6 97

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

priorities and resource scenarios.

TA is consistent with ADB's CPS 2009-2013 and COBP 2014-2015, and government's national priority programs.

evaluation of consequences; (iv) choice among alternatives; and (v) implementation of the chosen alternative.

noted in the TAR.

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

39370-022 (0126) Agriculture Market Infrastructure Project

Likely relevant

Consistent with Government’s agriculture sector master plan and the ANDS that detail opportunities for growth and value adding in core agricultural commodities in the horticulture and livestock subsector, including the need to develop a market-based regulatory environment with access to inputs, services, and markets. Consistent with CPS 2009-2013 and ADB strategies.

An oversight during project design is the lack of government's policy framework on public private partnership considering that the operation of slaughterhouses was designed using public funds for investments and contracting private sector for management and operations.

Yes. Project will undertake agricultural market infrastructure investments, which will generate inclusive economic growth.

Majority of the work will be undertaken in major cities and urban areas; therefore, there is no perceived threat of security (during project preparation).

However, during implementation, security conditions remain a challenge in Kunduz and to an extent in Herat slaughterhouse areas.

36222-013 (9165) Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation and Development

Likely relevant

Consistent with Afghanistan National Development Strategy and CPS 2009-2013.

Complements the activities of the Water Resources Development Investment Program—an MFF project that focuses on large-scale system interventions.

Builds on the outcomes achieved by Rural Recovery through Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. The project considered lessons from previous ADB operations such as the importance of ensuring direct involvement of stakeholders in subproject design, construction, and management; training community organizations in rehabilitating and operating systems; improving on-farm water management through training and capacity building; improving the engineering design, quality of materials, and construction techniques used in physical works. Project worked with existing community development council.

Yes. Project included women’s interests in skills development and decision making; an outreach to women, especially women community leaders, as part of the participation process and the capacity development component. Beneficiaries include rural populations of Baghlan, Balkh, Ghor and Samangan provinces.

Risks cited include general insecurity, weak central government administrative control in the project area, and fighting between rival warlords. Mitigating measures mentioned adoption of a participatory approach involving communities and provincial DRRDs will minimize the risk posed by poor security and conflict to the safety of project personnel.

36252-013 (2227/0033/ 0052)

Western Basins Water Resources Management

Likely relevant

Consistent with ADB’s CSPU 2004-2006 as it supported natural resource management and relied on building capacity, establishing appropriate policy and institutional frameworks, and rehabilitating essential

Noted the change in financing but this had no impact on project implementation arrangement (i.e., additional grant financing from the Government of Canada to replace financing from the Government of the

Yes. About 400,000 persons (about 20% of the western basin’s population) were expected to benefit from the Project, of which about 80% were classified

Security costs not included in the design.

Appendix 6

98

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

infrastructure. United Arab Emirates, significantly benefits the Government of Afghanistan’s fiscal position in augmenting the pure grant component of the Project).

as poor or very poor. In addition, many project participants were landless sharecroppers. Design also included gender disaggregated targets.

42091-022/032 (0167/0170/ PPTA 7088)

MFF 0033 Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 1

Likely relevant

Consistent with the ANDS and constitutes the country’s strategic platform for development for 2008–2020. MFF finances medium-term portion of a broader investment program.

Consistent with CPS 2009–2013, ADB’s Strategy 2020, and water policy on “Water for All”.

Design benefited from a project preparatory technical assistance. MFF modality is appropriate as it provides flexibility to the authorities and ADB, financing is aligned with project readiness, allows ADB to enter into a long-term partnership, thereby creating a stable financing plan and platform for sector development (providing for physical and nonphysical investments), and shifts time and resources away from repetitive processing tasks into implementation work.

Yes. In an effort to address gender-related concerns associated with the Investment Program, Project will improve access sites at irrigation canals where women traditionally gather to wash clothes and collect water. DMF reflected gender related target.

Project implementation will be supported by adequate security resources, including for communications, transport and physical reinforcement of facilities. Security plans will be developed for each activity with support from the Afghanistan Resident Mission security team. Private and government security personnel will be engaged as required.

Security costs integrated in the design.

2013 heavy rainfall caused flooding that destroyed embankment in main canal, causing slight delay in the implementation of original scope of work.

42091-043 (0362) Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 2

Likely relevant

CPS 2009-2013 prioritizes development of agriculture and natural resources through improved irrigation and water resource management.

Overriding objective of ANDS is to substantially reduce poverty, improve the lives of the people, and create the foundation of a secure and stable country. To achieve this objective, one of strategy’s pillars is economic and social development, which includes water and irrigation development.

Comprise infrastructure and nonphysical support for Lower Kokcha Irrigation Project.

Introduces the concept of an irrigation service fee to ensure sufficient funds for operations and maintenance (i.e., scheme tied to equity and reliability of water supply and incremental benefits).

Project will contribute to reduce vulnerability to climate change in the target area.

None. Entrenched gender roles and strict controls on women’s movement outside the house in this remote area make women’s substantial participation in project activities very unlikely.

Unstable security conditions delay construction activities. Adequate security resources are included in the budget for communication, transportation and security facilities. A security plan will be developed for each set of activities. Continuous consultations will take place with district governments, shura elders and communities.

45259-001 (9167) Enhanced Agricultural Value Chains for Sustainable Livelihoods

Likely relevant

Supports the principles of ADB’s Strategy 2020, which designates infrastructure—including rural infrastructure—one of ADB’s five core areas of operations.

Complies with ADB priority to

Built on the successes of Rural Business Support Project.

Approach focuses on community based contracting—engaging local support and ownership.

Yes. Project will collaborate closely with mature community development councils.

Local and village-level vegetable storage facilities

Adoption of a participatory approach involving communities and government is expected to minimize risk of poor security and conflict to the safety of project personnel.

Appendix 6 99

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

provide rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in post-disaster and post-conflict situations.

Consistent with the CPS 2009-2013 with support to agriculture being one of the priority sectors for Afghanistan.

By improving agricultural productivity, it is also in line with the activities outlined in ADB’s Operational Plan for Sustainable Food Security in Asia and the Pacific.

Complements the activities of ADB’s Agriculture Market Infrastructure Project.

will have a pro-poor design that minimizes operation and maintenance costs and ensures that the project’s benefits continue well beyond its completion.

Addresses gender equity—needs of women farmers will be analyzed and the project will support groups working on behalf of women, such as women farmer groups and by women shuras, to allow women to access higher levels in the value chain and build capacity.

Use of predominantly national personnel will allow project operations without considerable security overheads necessary to ensure safety of international experts.

Focus on areas that have comparatively better security conditions.

The project will demonstrate clear improvements in local incomes, increase employment opportunities, and raise living standards and consequently will likely have strong community support.

48326-001 (0411/0412)

Northern Flood-Damaged Infrastructure Emergency Rehabilitation Project

Likely relevant

Project contributes to the achievement of government and ADB development outcomes, as outlined in the ICPS 2014‒2015 for Afghanistan.

ADB investments to repair village economic infrastructure and rural connectivity complement large humanitarian efforts of the government and its development partners.

3-year project implementation period seen more appropriate (instead of 2) given security issues.

Yes. Utilizes an inclusive design for community engagement to encourage peace building in a post-conflict environment.

Gender roles in the project area are unlikely to change; project will have a limited gender impact.

Will use farmers and local laborers to undertake the construction under the guidance of MRRD engineers-benefiting local communities from both infrastructure and construction income and cope with damaged housing and economic assets.

Discussions with local security agencies, particularly the police and the Afghanistan National Army on a regular basis to address security concerns.

Communication links will be established with every community development council, which will provide early warning of any security issue.

Adequate security to allow subproject implementation is a selection criterion.

Budget provided to meet security needs.

Utilizes an inclusive design for community engagement to encourage peace building in a post-conflict environment.

44411-022 (TA 7994)

Supporting Natural Resources Operations

Likely relevant

Complements capacity requirement for ongoing and future ANR projects.

Includes an assessment of long-term implementing agency capacity and development needs that will identify components and activities for external support.

Generates short-, medium-, and long-term strategic plans to define

None. Security identified as risks but no measures were mentioned in the design except the inclusion of miscellaneous administration and support costs (i.e., minimum operating security standards).

Appendix 6

100

Project No. (Loan/Grant No.)

Project Name Relevance

Rating Strategic Justification Project Design

Inclusive Growth Description in Design

FCAS Considerations

and achieve sector objectives and implement sector policies, including an aid coordination plan.

Results and targets in the design frame are appropriate for this TA.

Sector: Finance

44457-012 (TA7983)

Rural Finance Expansion

Likely relevant

TA was requested by the Government of Afghanistan during the Kabul Conference to strengthen rural finance appraisal skills of commercial banks and microfinance institutions. Expansion of rural finance is critical to sustain ongoing reconstruction efforts.

Some targets lack benchmark figures. There has been a major change in scope.

None Identified security as a concern when mobilizing consultants. TA budget includes a $150,000 allocation for security solution for field work in component 1.

Sector: Public Sector Management

40280 (TA4964)

Support for Economic Policy Management (formerly Capacity Building for Ministry of Finance)

Likely relevant

With the decline in donor support and reduction in foreign military presence, the continuity and support provided by the TA is required to further contribute to a stronger Ministry of Finance.

TA completion date has been extended thrice. Additional TA funds were requested to cover costs for additional consultancy services.

None Security was aptly recognized in the design and monitoring framework. No discussion on mitigating measures in the TAR. No explicit budget allocation for mitigating security-related issues noted in TAR.

Sector: Multisector

47263-001 (TA8470)

Support for Infrastructure Investments and Policy

Likely relevant

TA supports the development of the infrastructure sector which is reflected in ANDS and national priority programs. TA will specifically enhance the capacity of government to coordinate the financing of infrastructure projects. Government and ADB agreed on the scope, implementation arrangements, cost, financing arrangements, and terms of reference for consultants for the capacity development TA.

Implementation arrangements, TA amount, and completion date have been modified/extended to enhance TA outcome and impact.

None. But indirectly supports energy and transport projects that promote inclusive growth.

Aptly identified (in the TAR and DMF) the deteriorating security condition as a risk that may delay project implementation. No mitigation measures are identified except that Government is expected to provide security and security-related resources to the project.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADF = Asian Development Fund, AfRA = Afghanistan Railway Authority, ANDS = Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ANR = agriculture and natural resources, APPF = Afghanistan Public Protection Force, CAREC = Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, COBP = country operations business plan, CNG = compressed natural gas, CPS = country partnership strategy, CSPU = country strategy and program update, DMF = design and monitoring framework, DDRD = Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, ICE = Interministerial Commission for Energy, ICPS = interim county partnership strategy, MFF = multitranche financing facility, MOMP = Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, MRRD = Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, NEPS = North East Power System, NVDA = Nangarhar Valley Development Authority, O&M = operations and maintenance, PFR = periodic financing request, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, RRP = Report and Recommendation of the President, SEPS = South East Power System, TA = technical assistance, TAR = technical assistance report, USAID = United States Agency for International Development.

Appendix 6 101

Table A6.2: Project Performance: Progress of Outputs and Outcomes

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

Sector: Energy

37078-013 (2165/G0004)

Power Transmission and Distribution Project

Increased transmission network of 114.1 km (54 km double circuit and 60 km single circuit) in project area by 2013.

Increased number of 8 grid substations in project area by 2013.

Grid supply available in additional 8 rural towns by 2013.

114.1 km transmission network.

6 out of 8 substations.

Grid supply in additional 8 rural towns.

Increase number of consumers connected to grid power supply in project area from 28% (2005) to more than 31% by 2013.

74,200 new connections of poor households to grid power supply by 2013.

Transmission and distribution network losses reduced in project areas from the estimate of 35%-40% (2005) to 30% by 2013.

Improve capacity of executing agencies (strengthen institutions to accelerate project implementation and improve sector efficiency).

10,320 out of 74,200 (14%) new connections completed in 2013.

System losses curtailed from more than 70% in 2002 to around 40% in 2014.

Less likely to achieve target for poor household connections given the cancellation of the provision of connection kits in March 2012.

Capacity building component through a TA was less than effective given the delay in implementation (i.e., ascribed to unclear scope, security concerns, difficulty in identifying suitable participants and unclear counterpart arrangements).

Substantial cost overrun.

Project cost increased due to delays (completion should have been in Mar. 2008) which led to the reduction of project scope.

Delays caused by deteriorating security situation.

.42094-062 (9128) Development of Mini-Hydropower in Badakhshan and Bamyan Provinces

Construction of 4 mini hydro plants with aggregate installed capacity of up to 2MW.

No physical work commenced 4 years after effectiveness.

Detailed design completed for 4 mini hydro plants (Topchi, Taqab, Baharaq, Panjab) and associated minigrids.

Bidding documents prepared for the 4 mini hydro plants.

Up to 5,000 households electrified.

Day-time load is about 30% of peak load or higher (as a proxy for the level of income-generating activities supported).

Improve capacity of the executing and implementing agencies; strengthening of community based organizations.

Not likely to achieve outcomes given the cancellation of the project.

Delays increased cost, and funding for a mini hydroplant could not be covered by the grant. Security in the project area was also deteriorating which contributed to project cancellation.

The Project was consistently rated as actual problem project since Q2 2013 due to low contract award and disbursement figures.

12-month delay in the issuance of variation order to the consultant's contract contributed to the slow progress in project implementation.

Weak capacity of the executing agency and its frequent management turnover remained an issue.

46392-001 (0374/0375)

North-South Power Transmission Enhancement Project

(a) New 500-kV

transmission line of 225

km from Baghlan to

Kabul installed by 2018.

Technical bids under review and contracts expected to be awarded by end of 2015.

NEPS transmission capacity increases from 150 MW in 2009 to 1,000 MW of connected load by 2018.

Power shortfall in Kabul reduced

To be assessed at completion. Q1 2015 validated project rating is on track.

Slow procurement required extension of project completion by 1.5 years.

Appendix 6

102

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

(b) New 500-kV/220-kV

substation in Arghundy

operational by 2018.

(c) Transmission flow capacity between north and south Afghanistan increased from 300 MW in 2012 to 1,300 MW by 2018.

from 100 MW in 2013 to 50 MW in 2018.

42094-012/022 (MFF 0026/G0134)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 1

(a) An additional 4 MW of offgrid hydropower capacity developed by 2014.

(b) 3,500 terajoules of additional gas supply from Sheberghan gas fields by 2013.

(c) Kunduz-Tologan transmission line, and Kunduz and Baghlan distribution networks.

(d) O&M: technical losses reduced from 30% to 15% by 2017.

(e) Project management: DABS manages projects without consultant support by 2013.

(f) Tranche 2 projects identified.

(a) Offgrid hydropower dropped in 2011.

(b) 6 gas wells in Sheberghan rehabilitated and increased production to about 1.3 million cubic meters per day.

(c) Kunduz-Toloqan transmission line completed and operational: 20% completion of distribution networks in Kunduz and Baghlan.

(d) NEPS O&M contract have been cancelled and picked up by USAID.

(e) DABS PMO comprise of DABS permanent staff supported under ADB MFF.

(f) Achieved

(a) Power system capable to supply 1,450 MW of connected load from NEPS by 2017.

(b1) 20kv and low voltage networks for 59,000 households and 3,500 small businesses in Kunduz and Baghlan cities.

(b2) 81% of urban and 12% rural population connected in Taloqan region by 2013.

(b3) 54% of urban and 4% rural population in Kunduz, and 8% of urban and 2% of rural population in Baghlan connected to the grid by 2013.

(c) Reduction of network losses from 50% to 30% by 2017.

(d) Project management office staffed solely by DABS personnel 2015; DABS performs O&M functions independently by 2015.

(a) To be assessed upon completion.

(b) Connections can only be made for 45,000 households.

(c) NEPS losses currently stand at 39%. Commercial losses have been reduced by more than 50% in major load centers.

(d) DABS PMO comprised of DABS permanent staff supported under ADB MFF. Substantial donor support for DABS operations confirmed throughout 2016.

Q1 2015 validated project rating is on track.

Suffered from delays due to weak interest of consultants and contractors, deteriorating security, weak capacity in project administration. This resulted in 30-40% cost escalation prompting EA to request for the cancellation of 2 subprojects (now being financed by other development partners).

Capacity of EA/DABS in project administration remains weak.

DABS has improved its financial management but is still considered a high financial management risk.

42094-032 (0184/PPTA 7289)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 2

(Kabul Distribution Network Rehabilitation Project)

30 km of double circuit 220 kV transmission line from existing Chimtala substation to new Kabul Southwest substation.

New Kabul Southwest substation (220/110/20 kV).

Distribution network in southwest Kabul comprising approximately 65 km of

400km grid extension in south west Kabul Darchi-e-Bashi only commenced in March 2015.

Ongoing works for the new Kabul southwest substation.

Customer consumption to increase by 60,000 households by 2013.

Electricity inputs from Tajikistan will reach 150 MW by 2013 (current load is 0).

Electricity inputs from Uzbekistan will increase from 70 MW in 2009 to 300 MW in 2013.

By 2013, grid in Southwest Kabul Darchi-e-Bashi area expanded by 400 km (currently approximately 40

To be assessed at completion.

Physical contracts for the distribution network will only be able to provide 45,000 connections.

Q1 2015 project rating was on track.

40% cost overrun led to cancellation of nonphysical subprojects.

Startup delays were related to consultant recruitment and land acquisition issues.

Appendix 6 103

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

medium voltage (MV - 20 kV) lines and 500 km low voltage (LV – 0.4 kV) lines.

Supply of 100 distribution transformers for the Kabul distribution network.

Improved system planning and project management capacities in DABS.

km).

Planned power supply maintained at 24/7.

Improved power reliability (96% availability) in Darchi-e-Bashi area by December 2013.

Improved institutional effectiveness and efficiency.

42094-042 (0280/0281/0282)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 3 (Gereshk Electricity Services Improvement Project)

Rehabilitation and upgrading of hydropower plant from 3.0 MW to 4.8 MW by 2014 (installed capacity).

Replacement of 3.3 kV distribution line to 20 kV line by 2013.

100 DABS staff will gain experience in the installation works of the distribution system by 2013.

The civil works contract to replace three turbine generators (1.62 MW each) in the power house started and target achievable by March 2016.

Rebidding for procurement of transmission and distribution equipment underway.

Construction of distribution network will be done in parallel with rehabilitation of generation facilities by the end of 2016.

DABS operational staff receiving on the job training by ADB- financed consultants and contractors working on distribution rehabilitation projects.

Offsite training of DABS officials on going.

Activities are ongoing and target is achievable by end December 2015.

Available power supply load increased from 1.2 MW (2009) to 4.5 MW by 2014.

To be assessed upon project completion.

Rated as 'potential problem' as disbursement is at 37%, as of Q1 2015.

Delays in the achievement of outcomes were due to contract management issues and continued tense security situation on site.

Engaged security services for project implementation. But agreement with Afghan Public Protection Force could not be made operational until July 2015.

Outcome might be achievable by end 2015.

42094-052 (0332)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 4

Additional 108 km of 500 kV transmission line by 2016.

Additional 142 km of 220

Civil works have yet to start.

Financial bid evaluation for two turnkey packages are in progress.

Turkmenistan power import increased from 175 GWh in 2011 to 1,000 GWh in 2018.

No load shedding and blackouts in

To be assessed at project completion.

There has been a 12-month delay in signing of the power purchase and sales agreement between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. Signing of the agreement is a

Appendix 6

104

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

(Grid Development & Distribution Expansion Project)

kV transmission line by 2016.

New 220/20 kV sub-stations at Mazar-e-Sharif and Sheberghan by 2016.

Two new substations in installed in south east Afghanistan by 2017.

500 km of new distribution lines installed.

Grid supply available to an additional 20,000 customers by 2020 (baseline in 2011 is 850,000 customers).

The bidding documents for distribution component in south-east Afghanistan is under preparation and contract is expected to be awarded in Q4 2015.

Kabul from 2018 onwards. (baseline in 2011 was 2-3 hrs/day).

prerequisite for contract awarding.

Project is considered “actual problem” based on validated project rating. As of Q1 2015, no disbursement had been made.

42094-075 (0377)

MFF Energy Sector Development Investment- Tranche 5 (Dashte Alwan 500kV substation)

Commissioning of a 500-kV substation at Dashte Alwan (Transmission flow capacity between north and south Afghanistan increased from 300 MW in 2012 to 1,300 MW by 2018).

Contracts have yet to be awarded.

NEPS capable to supply 150 MW in 2009 to 1,000 MW of connected load by 2017.

To be assessed at project completion.

Project is rated as 'actual problem' with 0% disbursement.

46347 (TA 8328)

Supporting the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy

By 2014, ICE database established, comprehensive energy sector strategies prepared, and working groups for energy planning established.

ICE Energy Sector database consisting of project plans and implementation progress from major development partners (ADB, USAID, KfW, GiZ, DFID, World Bank) and ministries (MEW, DABS, MoMP, MRRD) has been developed and has undergone periodic updates.

Annual updating of power sector master plan and 20-year Afghanistan energy investment program beginning in 2014.

Approval of the Electricity Law (including clear definition of roles of stakeholders, private sector participation and regulatory regime) by December 2014.

Approval by the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board of the Afghanistan National Energy Supply Program (Energy National Priority Program) by December 2014.

Power sector master plan institutionalized and secretariat established in the Ministry of Energy and Water by December

To be assessed at TA completion.

Appendix 6 105

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

2014.

47282 (TA 8509)

Multitranche Financing Facility II Energy Development 2014-2023

Socio-economic data, demand forecasts for the selected areas in Afghanistan, assessment of appropriate renewable energy options, sustainable business model, and economic and financial evaluations.

In progress and expected to be completed in November 2015.

The PPTA aims to assist DABS in conducting due diligence for the ensuing MFF and its tranche 1.

In progress and expected to be completed in November 2015.

47018 (TA 8401)

Gas Development Master Plan

Gas development master plan.

By December 2014, completed the following:

Gas production, transmission and distribution database.

Gas sector data analyses and investment designs.

List of priority gas allocations sectors, investment programs (2015–2035).

5 staff members of MoMP trained to update and sustain the Gas Development Master Plan.

TA has summarized other countries’ experience on gas sector development master plan; held additional workshop in November 2014 in Kabul, Afghanistan where results were presented on the reserve assessments and the preliminary potential demand assessments; and submitted second quarter progress report on 22 January 2015. Interim report was submitted in April 2015.

Gas resource potential estimated and investment programming prioritized in accordance with projects identified and sequenced in gas development master plan by December 2014.

Gas development master plan approved by the Cabinet and the Parliament by December 2014.

Gas development master plan institutionalized and department established in the MoMP by December 2014.

TA completion was extended for the preparation of a demand study (additional activity requested by the government).

Delays were encountered in 2014 - related to Afghan elections and delayed appointment of a new MoMP minister.

47266 (TA 8808)

Renewable Energy Development

Renewable energy road map, report on renewable energy resource and technology assessment in identified areas, improved capacity to plan and implement renewable energy projects.

Activities started in 2015. Improved capacity to mobilize investment for three or four renewable energy projects in 2015–2019.

To be assessed after completion in 2017.

None

Appendix 6

106

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

By 2017, at least 25% of staff in MEW, Renewable Energy Department, and provincial governments completed the training, of which 20% are female.

Sector: Transport

40333-022 (G0081/ MFF0025: G0244, G0291)

Road Network Development Project I (Bala Murghab to Leman)

(a) 143 km road which is part of the last missing link of the regional Ring Road constructed.

(b) Emergency and ancillary works on Andkhoy–Qaisar road completed.

(c) Roads maintained according to pre-established performance criteria.

(d) Management information system installed at MPW.

Off track. Project was re-packaged. Construction ongoing but has not progressed as planned.

(a) Higher level of mobility and increase in freight volumes and passenger transport services (i.e., increase speed from 35 km/h to 50 km/h by 2011, increase number of registered bus operators from 165 in 2007 to 400 in 2016, increase number of registered goods vehicle operators from 400 in 2007 to 600 in 2016).

(b) Increase reliability and level of service on section of regional road network in northern Afghanistan (i.e., emergency response time to road failures lowered from 18 months to 3 months by 2011, undisrupted winter travel on at least 1,000 km).

To be assessed at project completion.

Encountered delays due to security issues, inefficient coordination of construction, cost cutting measures by contractor, and unsatisfactory performance of contractor and engineer.

37075-022 (G0012/ MFF0025: G0244, G0291)

Qaisar-Bala Murghab Road

(a) 90 km primary road section from Qaisar-Bala to Murghab improved and equipped with facility for road tolling and axle-load control.

(b) Public awareness about HIV/AIDS improved by sensitizing 5,000 persons.

(c) Capacity in MOT for

Off track. Project was re-packaged. Construction ongoing but has not progressed as planned.

Improved road transport services in the project area through:

(a) 50% decrease in travel time for all types of vehicles immediately after project completion.

(b) 100% increase in freight and passenger traffic on the project road within 1-year of project completion.

To be assessed at project completion.

Implementation affected by security situation, resulting in delays.

Appendix 6 107

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

road sector management strengthened.

(c) 50% decrease in freight and passenger transport fares on the project road within 1-year of project completion.

(d) average 50% reduction in travel time to nearest health, primary education, and other essential services from the project area within 3 months of project completion.

44482-023 (MFF0063: G0261/G0262)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 1 (Operation and Maintenance Support for the railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif, and Reconstruction and widening of 50 km Bagramy to Sapary Road)

(a) Operation and maintenance for the railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif supported.

(b) Approximately 50 km Bagramy to Sapary Road reconstructed and widened.

Off track. Implementation behind schedule.

By 2019:

(a) Increased connectivity: Percent of project areas connected to the regional highway network by paved roads increased to 90% from 70% in 2010.

(b) Increased average intercity travel speed: On national highway network average speed increased from 35 km/h in 2010 to at least 50 km/h in program areas.

(c) Increased availability of inter-city freight and passenger services: Volumes of traffic along project roads increased by 30% from 2011, and travel time to the nearest primary school, healthcare facility, or other essential service in target areas decreased by 25% or 15 minutes from the existing average of 1 hour in 2011.

Not yet due. Capacity development issues (management, procurement) hampering implementation. Under resourced and unprepared consultants and contractors have been hired. Improved project administration by ADB recommended.

44482-023 (MFF0063: G0327/G0328)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 2 (Transport

(a) Approximately 106 km Sapary to Jalalabad Road reconstructed and widened.

(b) Approximately 32 km Chah-e-Anjir to Gereshk

Off track. Implementation behind schedule.

Same as above. Not yet due. Initial physical progress has been slow due to problems associated with the government granting of business licenses, corruption issues in bidding, and security.

Appendix 6

108

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

Infrastructure Development Component, and Transport Network Management Capacity Development Component)

Road rehabilitated.

(c) Approximately 50 km of the Sharan to Angoor Ada Road reconstructed.

(d) Capacity of MPW developed: (i) pre-feasibility study for Bamyan to Kandahar Road prepared, (ii) business plan revised, and (iii) support for project implementation by MPW provided.

44482-024 (MFF0063: G0355)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 3 (Reconstruction of 178 km section of Dar-i-Suf to Yakawlang, provision of design and construction supervision services, feasibility studies for the investment program, and provision of support for MPW project implementation)

(a) Approximately 178 km section of road from Dar-i-Suf to Yakawlang (the missing section of the North-South Corridor) reconstructed, including construction of related community development infrastructure.

(b) Design and construction supervision services provided.

(c) Project feasibility studies prepared.

(d) Support for project implementation by MPW provided.

Off track. Implementation behind schedule.

Same as above. Not yet due. Bidding issues being encountered. Given time delays in procurement, an extension of time to the grant agreements for Tranche 3 is required.

Appendix 6 109

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

44482-025 (MFF0063: G0422/G0423)

MFF - Transport Network Development Investment Program - Tranche 4 (Reconstruction of 108 km Baharak to Eshkashim section of the Faizabad to Eshkashim road, provision of construction supervision services, provision of support for the investment program, capacity development of AfRA, and improvement of the efficiency of the traffic along CAREC Corridors 5 and 6)

(a) Approximately 108 km Baharak to Eshkashim section of the Faizabad to Eshkashim road reconstructed, including the construction of related community development infrastructure.

(b) Construction supervision services provided.

(c) Support for project implementation by MPW provided.

(d) Capacity of AfRA developed.

(e) Efficiency of traffic traversing the territory of the recipient along CAREC Corridors 5 and 6 improved.

On track. Grant agreements for Tranche 4 signed. Tranche 4 became effective 28 March 2015.

Same as above. Not yet due. —

47210-001 (TA8687)

Transport Sector Master Plan Update

(a) Transport sector assessment and road map produced.

(b) Final national transport master plan produced.

On track. Team of consultants visited Afghanistan in Q1 2015.

Government of Afghanistan endorsement of updated master plan, including list of physical transport interventions to be implemented in medium- to long-term, and required reforms to transport sector.

Not yet due. Full mobilization has yet to be achieved.

Sector: Agriculture and Natural Resources

39370-022 (0126) Agriculture Market Infrastructure Project

(a) Five slaughterhouses constructed—2 in Kabul and 3 in provincial cities—by 2012.

(b) Management contracts with private entities signed and implemented by 2011.

(a, c & d) Slaughterhouse construction ongoing. As of 31 March 2015, cumulative progress of the slaughter-houses package was 57%.

(b) Government has yet to finalize a PPP policy to guide engagement with private sector. Although progress was made on

(a) Increased value of horticulture commodities (export and domestic) by 7% by 2013.

(b) 7% increase in domestic consumption of horticulture products by 2013.

(c) Increased consumption of

(a &b) Farm level collection centers contracts being awarded and works ongoing.

(c & d) Slaughterhouse construction work ongoing; progress significantly slow since start of Q4 2014 due to financial constraints of contractor (request for contract price increase and extension of deadline for

Q1 2015 performance rating was ‘on track’.

Only able to fully mobilize more than 3 years than scheduled; closing date extended from June 2014 to December 2015.

Slow progress has been due to weak capacity and financial

Appendix 6

110

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

(c) Throughput of at least 3,000 head of large ruminants and 15,000 head of small ruminants per slaughterhouse realized at full capacity by 2013.

(d) Reduced urban waste from animal slaughter by at least 20% by 2012.

(e) About 200 farmer market facilities constructed and operational by 2013.

(f) Farmers’ associations and groups, including women’s producer associations, manage the facilities efficiently.

(g) MOCI dried fruit and nut testing laboratories internationally accredited by 2012.

development of the slaughterhouse operational manual, management modality, and compliance with the health and hygiene standards.

(e) Land for all 19 centers has been officially transferred and handed over to the contractor for establishment of the farm level collection centers. Current progress of the package (as of 31 March 2015) is 55%.

(f) A total of 113 cooperatives are surveyed and 19 of them (including women cooperatives) selected for intervention. Training will commence when facilities are operational.

(g) Proposed to be dropped given the uncertainty on legal status of the nuts and raisins institute. Under ADB review and discussion with MAIL/PMO.

hygienically slaughtered meat in Kabul and major provincial cities by at least 15% by 2013.

(d) Increased value of livestock by-products (hides and casings) by 7% by 2013.

completing construction work under review by MAIL.)

problem of slaughterhouses contractor and delays in finalizing contract award packages and shipment of construction supplies through Pakistan (i.e., inability to get required documents from tax and customs departments).

36222-013 (9165)

Community-Based Irrigation Rehabilitation and Development

(a) By 2016, farmers served by all 120 rehabilitated irrigation systems are receiving sufficient water.

(b) All CDCs have issued completion certificates for the irrigation system rehabilitation subprojects in their communities.

(c) Completed training of 500 community members (both men and at least 20 women).

(d) By 2014, 2 of 27 DRRD-based project-funded positions are filled by women.

(e) All required reports are completed and submitted

(a) 51 out of 120 subprojects awarded in Balkh, Baghlan, Ghor and Samangan Provinces completed and handed over to communities (while the rest are at different stages of implementation).

Additional 18 subprojects approved for implementation.

(b) CDCs have confirmed completion of 51 sub-projects and issuance of completion certificates will be completed by 31 May 2015.

(c) Ongoing. 195 members from 39 CDCs have received training in agricultural management, watershed management and conservation, program management, construction project and quality control, and conflict management; 12 women from 39 CDCs have participated in the training program.

By 2016, (a) the total area irrigated by rehabilitated systems has increased by 20% compared to 2013 baseline.

(b) Crop area irrigated by each rehabilitated system has increased by at least 10% from the 2013 baseline.

(c) Irrigated crop yields in areas served by rehabilitated systems have increased by 10% from the 2013 baseline.

To be assessed at completion. Assessed as ‘on track’ in terms of disbursements and awards and in terms of achievement of outputs.

(Project expected to close in March 2017.)

Appendix 6 111

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

as scheduled.

(f) Contract award and disbursement projections are met as scheduled throughout the implementation period.

(g) Monitoring and evaluation action plan is implemented as scheduled.

(d) Achieved.

(e) Ongoing. Quarterly reports for 2013 and 2014 submitted and annual report for 2014 submitted on 4 April 2015.

(f) Contract award and disbursement projection achieved and Project is on track.

(g) Achieved.

36252-013 (2227/0033/ 0052)

Western Basins Water Resources Management

By end of project, (a) an RBA consistent with Government policy in place.

(b) Entitlement registry in place and basin irrigation scheduling procedures in place.

(c) Groundwater permitting and management information system in place.

(d) Groundwater policy drafted and enforcement mechanisms in place.

(e) Community 95% satisfied with rehabilitation and upgrading activities, contributions to rehabilitation and upgrading resources in all subprojects, and consultation and confirmation with women over non-irrigation infrastructure in all subprojects community.

(f) 45,000 ha of irrigation rehabilitated and upgraded in the Hari Rud River Basin and 10,000 ha in the Murghab River

(a) RBA established but respective councils have yet to be established as required by law.

(b) Work is ongoing.

(c) Completed.

(d) Draft policy submitted to Ministry of Energy and Water.

(e) Not quantified, although completion report of the Government indicated farmers are pleased with the upgraded systems providing more water and requiring less maintenance work. WUAs were also seen as more efficient and participatory.

(f) Project resulted in improving 49,197 ha of irrigated land. Work in Murghab was not feasible due to security issues.

(g) Achieved. 5 core and 1 main canal project implemented in Sia Sang, and 9 office buildings constructed.

(h) No resettlement issues and revised IR category is C with no impact.

(i) Completed. Zinda Jan, Kohsan, Ghoryan, Jui Nau, Sia Sang and Yahya Abad surveys completed.

(j) OFWM training materials have

(a) Planned surface water allocation and basin management processes institutionalized by end of Project. Sustainable development of irrigated agriculture with groundwater starting by end of Project in the Hari Rud River Basin.

(b) Increased equity and efficiency of water distribution (especially at tail end), expanded spring irrigation area by 25%, and summer or perennial irrigation area to be at least 30% of irrigable area in subprojects.

(c) Field application efficiency of water at farm level increases by 15% in areas that received OFWM training by end of Project.

(d) Consistent average wheat yields of at least 2.8 tons/ha in subprojects within 2 years after rehabilitation and upgrading.

(e) Cropping intensities increase by average of 300% and yields by 20% for summer season horticulture crops.

(f) Over 2,000 women and landless have improved livelihoods from income generating activities.

(g) At least 20 professional and

(a) River Basin Master Plan drafted and for MEW review.

(b) Project command area increased from 15,775 ha to 36,889 ha, 82% of the Hari Rud target of 45,000 ha; 46% increase in spring irrigation area.

(c) Water use efficiency in Afghanistan is 35%.

(d) Average wheat yield in irrigated condition increased from 3.3 MT/ha in 2009 to 4.8 MT/ha at project completion.

(e) The baseline cropping intensity of the project area was 74% in 2009. As of December 2014, 2,887 farmers (1,687 men and 1,200 women) have been trained on horticultural crops (vegetables and fruits) with the purpose of increasing cropping intensity in the project areas.

(f) Achieved. As of December 2014, a total of 2,015 women including 350 poor and landless (sharecroppers) had been trained on agriculture and livelihood

(g) As of December 2014, see progress on outputs item (l)

Q1 2015 performance rating was ‘on track’ in terms of disbursement and contract awards.

Problems in disbursement were due to delays in contract awards, weak administrative performance of contractors, slow progress in physical works, lengthy processing of invoices and overambitious disbursement and contract award targets during midterm review.

Border issues also contributed to delays (i.e., custom clearance certification for heavy equipment).

Appendix 6

112

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

Basin; 100% of targeted R&U completed (by year 7 of the Project).

(f) At least 15 water resources development projects implemented by Project end or equivalent amount of additional rehabilitation and upgrading.

(g) At least 90% of mirabs in all subprojects involved in capacity development activities.

(h) Resettlement plans as needed that are fully compliant with ADB guidelines.

(i) Statistically valid stratified sample for lower Hari Rud River Basin with report and recommendations after 1.5 years.

(j) Training materials, trainers, delivery strategies, and M&E in place for OFWM and enhanced cropping opportunities subcomponent activities by year 2.5 of Project.

(k) Training materials, trainers, delivery strategies, and M&E in place for livelihoods subcomponent activities by year 2.5 of Project.

(l) Detailed capacity development program with materials and delivery mechanisms in place by year 2 and international training completed by year 5 of

been prepared and training conducted to 200 farmers. 100% target of farmer training on OFWM has been completed.

(k) 5,516 farmers (3,501 men and 2,015 women) have been trained. Of them, 724 men and 350 women are poor and landless (share croppers). 100% target of farmer training has been achieved.

(l) Trained 563 professional, technical and support staff (HMRBA-PMU-MEW, MAIL, and Herat University). Provided orientations to 30 technical staff of PMU on basin management, irrigation engineering, and agriculture and livelihood. Contract management and administration is ongoing. Candidates for Master Degree training finalized and signing of agreement with AIT is underway.

(m) Achieved.

(n) 95% completed; further work is ongoing to fully transfer the knowledge established under PMU to MEW.

technical people trained for various river basin management tasks, 30 professional and technical people trained for various irrigation engineering tasks, at least 12 professional and technical people trained for agriculture and livelihood services, at least 400 mirabs trained for water management, and at least 3,500 farmers to receive training for improved water management and agricultural practices.

(h) Self-sustaining mirab/ community irrigation organization maintaining and upgrading irrigation systems in all subprojects by end of Project; increase resource flows to mirabs by 33% by end of Project.

Provided orientations to 30 technical staff of PMU on basin management, irrigation engineering, and agriculture and livelihood. 420 WUA office holders were trained on water management. 5,516 farmers were trained on improvement of water management and agricultural practices. Of these, 1,074 are poor and landless (share croppers). 105% target of WUA training and 100% target of farmer training have been achieved.

(h) 6 WUAs trained and registered, additional 12 WUAs have been established and trained, of which 10 are in the process of registration.

Appendix 6 113

Project Number/ Loan Number

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Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

the Project.

(m) All PMU reporting and financial management activities on schedule and satisfactory to ADB by year 1 of the Project.

(n) MEW fully staffed and capable of managing project activities by year 6 of the Project.

42091-022/032 (0167/0170/ PPTA 7088)

MFF 0033 Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 1

(a) Construction of Bangala Weir and rehabilitation of Samarkandian and Nari Shahi Weirs by 2014.

(b) Rehabilitation and upgrading completed for 85% of main canal structures (70,000 ha) by 2014.

(c) Improvement completed for 15% of secondary and tertiary structures (12,000 ha) by 2014.

(d) The NVDA irrigation system is providing water with design discharge in 100% of the command areas (20,000 ha) in Nangahar province by 2013.

(e) At least 150 improved water access points in the lower Balkh Basin and NVDA irrigation system by 2014.

(f) Completed flood embankment in Yangi Qala and head regulator for Yetim Tapa irrigation system in Takhar

(a) Contractor has completed the excavation of the main structure and has started the excavation of river trenches. Concrete pours are underway (since May 2015 and ongoing).

(b) 207 structures of the original scope of 250 were completed. A request to reduce the scope of the project was submitted for ADB’s consideration in order to close the contract.

(c) Contract awarding completed in February 2015.

(d) For national competitive bidding, bid evaluation report under review, international competitive bidding contract has been awarded

(e,n) Progress slowed down as consultant firm moved out of Afghanistan. Need to address NGO subcontracting issues.

(f-g) Work in progress. Contractor has started making of pre-cast concrete blocks for bank protection. Construction of intake depends on the amount of the flow in the river and may not start until late September 2015.

(h) Capacity development plan was approved by ADB on 20 May 2014 and capacity building program is

(a) Rehabilitation and upgrading of irrigation systems serving at least 100,000 ha by 2015.

(b) At least 5,000 ha and Yangi Qala town have significantly reduced flood risk by 2014.

(c) WUAs and Northern Basin RBA sustainably managing irrigation and water resources according to the National Water Law, with declining external assistance and providing O&M with sustainable financial arrangements by 2014.

(d) Women's time spent collecting water reduced by 20%.

(a) Rehabilitation and upgrading for approximately 23,100 ha completed; target for completion extended to 2018.

(b) To be assessed upon completion. Detailed design is being finalized. ADB no objection has been granted, and contract being awarded and contractor mobilized to site.

(c) 28 irrigation associations were formed in early 2014.

(Withdrawal of consultant firm affected validity of NGO sub-contracting for WUA and Irrigation Association support; still pending as of mid-2015).

(d) To be assessed upon completion.

Project rated ‘on track’ as of June 2015.

Project has been extended from 2015 to 2018.

Project issues: (a) Continued delay in response to ICB no objection letter, (b) contracting issues with NGO as firm no longer wants to be in Afghanistan beyond December 2014, and (c) political changes.

Reasons for startup and implementation delays: (a) poor quality of RFP for the on-farm water management activity, (b) reorganization of the management structure and the redefining of program roles and responsibilities, (c) security situation continues to deter many reputable international consultancy firms from bidding for work, (d) difficulty to attract and retain quality staff, (e) limited capacity of implementing agencies to manage both consultant and civil work contracts, and (f) 2013 flooding which destroyed an embankment in project site.

Appendix 6

114

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

Province by 2013.

(g) Gabions and other quick gestation works constructed to protect 3 km of banks from erosion where interventions are in place in Kundoz and Takhar provinces by 2013.

(h) Capacity development program based on the mandate of the Water Law for the Northern Basin RBA completed by 2014.

(i) Sustainable management and financial plan for RBA O&M drafted by 2014

(j) Operational rules for the Balkh river weirs adopted by 2014.

(k) Water resources management strategy and a master plan for the Northern Basins RBA prepared by 2013.

(l) WUA program delivered that (i) legally registers WUAs, (ii) provides training for management and O&M of the irrigation system, and (iii) develops plans and procedures for financial sustainability of the WUAs in the Lower Balkh River Basin and NVDA irrigation by 2014.

(m) National Flood Management Program in MEW initiated with a 5-year plan for its development, by 2013.

expected to be completed by Q4 2016.

(i-k) Ongoing.

(l) 28 irrigation associations had been registered with MAIL by Dec. 2013.

(m) Program approved by MEW in 2014.

(o) NVDA Charter approved in 2014; however, business plan has yet to be prepared.

(p) PMOs and project coordination office established.

(q) Suffered from delays.

(r) Ongoing.

(s) Complied with from 2010 to 2012. Audit reports for 2013-2015 have yet to be completed.

(t) Achieved. Implementation of Tranche 2 currently ongoing.

Appendix 6 115

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

(n) Plan adopted for an irrigation service delivery agency that sustainably manages and provides O&M for the NVDA irrigation system by 2013.

(o) NVDA institutional reform and business plan prepared by 2011.

(p) Establishment of PMOs for MEW and MAIL, and PIOs for MEW to support project activities. PMOs and PIOs operational with minimal support from the consultants prior to 2013.

(q) Tranche 1 executed following the proposed implementation schedule.

(r) A PPMS established within 6 months of grant effectiveness.

(s) Audit reports submitted within 6 months for each fiscal year.

(t) Program Development Facility in MEW to prepare new projects and MFF tranches. Feasibility studies, safeguards and detailed design prepared by the Program Development Facility to support tranche 2 (by year 3 of the Program), and to support tranche 3 (by year 5 of the

Appendix 6

116

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

Program).

42091-043 (0362)

Water Resources Development Investment Program - Tranche 2

(a) Shahrawan intake supplies water according to the original discharge for 100% of the time during critical crop periods in 2018.

(b) Shahrawan canal rehabilitated to equitably discharge the original 60 m3/s 100% of time in critical growth periods in entire command area in 2018.

(c) Archi intake supplies water according to the original discharge for 90% of the time during critical crop periods in 2018.

(d) Archi canal capacity reverts to original 36m3/sec in 2018 (2013 =30 m3/sec)

(e) Improved capacity of water management and agricultural extension institutions: 22 WUAs are operational in 2018 (2013 = 0).

(f) 40 IAs are operational in 2018 (2013 = 0).

(g) 150 river basin authority and sub basin agency staff trained in water management in 2018 (2013 = 0).

(h) 50 DAIL staff trained in irrigation extension and OFWM in 2018 (2013 =0).

(i) 1,500 farmers per year received training on climate-resilient practices

(a-d) Advertisement of tender documents.

(e-k) Activities have yet to commence.

(l) Still at the stage of advertising tender documents.

(m) PMU establishment was delayed due to government decree on holding the recruitment process; PPMS under the Tranche 1 developed; however, further work will be done to improve the system and linked it to Tranche 2 activities.

In 2019, 74,300 ha in LKIS received sanctioned irrigation supplies;

Cropping intensity in 2019 in LKIS is 155% (2013 = 122%);

Cropping intensity in 2019 in LKIS Zone I is 170% (2013 = 142%);

Cropping intensity in 2019 in LKIS Zone II is 117% (2013 = 85%);

Area of annual crops in 2019 is 115,311 ha (2013 = 90,446 ha)

To be assessed at project completion. Q1 2015 performance rating was ‘on track’.

Project effectiveness was delayed due to grant agreement conditions requiring compliance with Tranche 1 covenants for recruitment of audit firm and appointment of project coordination office coordinator.

Appendix 6 117

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

in 2018 (2013= 0).

(j) From 2015, 25 participatory technology development demonstrations are conducted across LKIS each year (2013 = 0).

(k) An irrigation service fee applied across all of the LKIS in 2017.

(l) Contracts are awarded and completed on time and within contingencies.

(m) Quarterly progress reports, annual reports, audit reports, are submitted within four weeks of due date.

45259-001 (9167)

Enhanced Agricultural Value Chains for Sustainable Livelihoods

(a) 10,000 community members (10% women) trained in improved agricultural practices by 2016.

(b) (i) Average potato storage losses reduced from 40% in 2013 to 2% in 2016, and (ii) Average onion storage losses reduced from 40% in 2013 to 2% in 2016 [Construct 1,316 on-farm and 75 community potato storage facilities and make operational (36 months) (ii) Construct 818 on-farm and 80 community onion storage facilities and make operational (27 months)].

(c) Market price of edible oil produced from Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif facilities increases from AF70 per

(a) 2,180 farmers (21.8%) have been trained from a total of 10,000.

(b.i) Ongoing. Baseline surveys completed Q1 2014 and the feasibility study report shows that the losses in potato storages reduced from 42% to 1.3%.

(b.ii) Baseline surveys completed Q1 2014, while reduction in loses of onion storage will be determined in 2015 when the stored onions are transported to market.

(c) Contracts for supply of equipment and civil works awarded in March and May 2014,

(a) Potato (marketed) yield increased from 14 t/ha in 2013 to 20 t/ha in 2016.

(b) Onion (marketed) yield is increased from 15 t/ha in 2013 to 20 t/ha in 2016.

(c) Area planted to oilseed crops by farmers supplying oil processing facilities in Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif increased by 10% by 2016 compared to 2013 baseline survey.

Works are ongoing for the community-level and on-farm pilot storage for both onions and potatoes. All on-farm demonstration sites have been established: 20 in Bamyan; 10 in Kabul Province; and 11 in Parwan Province.

Edible oil refinery buildings in Nangarhar and Balkh have been completed and turned over to farmer cooperatives, with current status being operational with refined oil produced to market.

407 (31%) on-farm potato storage facilities completed (58% ongoing), 24 (32%) community storage facilities, 205 (25%) on-farm onion storages -ongoing and completed, and 36 (45%) community storages completed, 12 (15%) ongoing.

Q1 2015 Performance rating was ‘on track’.

Project had a slow start given the delay in awarding contracts, initial lack of understanding in ADB's requirements for disbursement, and restrictive policies of the government (on annual budget allocation for the project).

Appendix 6

118

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

liter in 2013 to AF110 per liter in 2016.

(d) (i) Contract awards and disbursements carried out on schedule throughout the implementation period, (ii) Monitoring and evaluation action plan implemented as scheduled, (iii) All required reports (technical and administrative) completed and submitted as scheduled.

respectively. Civil works and equipment installation being completed, an assessment of the price impact to be done soon.

(d) Achieved. M&E plan established in Q2 2014, quarterly reports for 2014 submitted.

48326-001 (0411/0412)

Northern Flood-Damaged Infrastructure Emergency Rehabilitation Project

(a) By 2018, in MRRD project areas: 500 km of canals of traditional schemes reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 6 km of retaining walls of traditional schemes reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 700 intakes of traditional schemes reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 20 small dams reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 946 km of rural roads reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 128 bridges reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0).

(b) By 2018, in MEW project areas 154 culverts of formal schemes reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 22 km of canals of formal schemes reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0); 6 intakes and/or weirs of formal schemes reconstructed (2014 baseline = 0).

(c) By 2018, contracts are awarded and completed on time and within contingencies; and quarterly progress, annual, and audit reports are submitted within 4 weeks of due date.

Activities have yet to commence.

By 2018, (a) 48,280 ha of flood affected irrigable area of traditional schemes brought back to production (2014 baseline = 0 ha).

(b) 16,500 ha of flood affected irrigable area of formal schemes brought back to production (2014 baseline = 0 ha).

Activities have yet to commence. Project performance rated as ‘potential problem’.

Contract award was delayed due to PMO staff recruitment (as per new presidential decree staff recruitment was on hold until appointment of new ministers). New minister for MRRD was appointed in March 2015 while for MEW in April 2015. MRRD has progressed with staff recruitment and about 60% are on board.

Appendix 6 119

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

44411-022 (TA 7994)

Supporting Natural Resources Operations

(a) Project and financial management systems and procedures developed by end of 2012 and immediately used by project staff.

(b) High-level staff of implementing agencies attended capacity building workshops by end of 2012.

(c) Implementing agency project implementation staff trained in project management by 2013.

(d) Priority investment strategies developed: water resources sector plan is prepared by 2013.

(a,b) Ongoing.

(c,d) Achieved.

(a) All projects in the ADB natural resources portfolio implemented on schedule, starting 2013.

(b) Annual contract awards of each project meet projections, starting 2013.

(c) Annual disbursements of each project meet projections, starting 2013.

(a) Achieved.

(b-c) 6 out of 7 ongoing operations in the sector are currently assessed as ‘on track’ in terms of contract awards and disbursements.

Sector: Finance

44457-012 (TA7983)

Rural Finance Expansion

(a) Timely adoption of action plans by financial institution and 72 loan officers trained in rural finance risk management (25% are women) by mid-2013.

(b) Sharia governance system and processes in place, template of Sharia legal contracts available, and enactment of legislation enabling Islamic finance by mid-2013.

(c) AIBF rural finance training programs implemented and 300 people trained (25% are women), and number of female loan officers at participating financial institutions doubles from 2010 to mid-2013.

Off track. Major change in scope.

(a) Number of financial institutions that provide rural finance doubles from 2010 to 2013 (benchmark to be established).

(b) Number of financial institutions’ service points (branches or mobile facilities) in rural areas doubles from 2010 to 2013 (benchmark to be established).

(c) Number of rural residents’ deposit accounts in banks or microfinance institutions increases by 20% from 2010 to 2013 (benchmark to be established).

Target outcomes have been changed to: (a) At least 10 financial institutions offer some form of Islamic banking by 2020 (7 by 2013).

Implementation proven more difficult because the security situation has deterred many potential firms. As TA requires work in rural areas, where the security situation is even more volatile, expressions of interest did not meet minimum qualifications. This has also led to a major change in scope, with TA's focus now on Islamic finance and capacity building to be undertaken outside of Afghanistan.

Appendix 6

120

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

(d) Regulations supporting rural finance, including Islamic finance adopted by 2013, and policy papers supporting rural finance, including Islamic finance, endorsed by Sharia board by mid-2013.

Sector: Public Sector Management

40280 (TA4964)

Support for Economic Policy Management (formerly Capacity Building for Ministry of Finance)

(a) MOF effectively manages various reform programs.

(b) Achievement of benchmarks of capacity building road maps.

(c) Fiscal implications of government policies and priorities of ANDS are considered.

(d) Improved human resource management and MOF budget preparation.

Off track. TA implementation has been extended several times to 15 November 2015. Change in implementation arrangement has also been effected -- instead of recruiting individual consultants, consultants are hired through a firm. Despite a difficult and challenging year in 2014 (protracted election process and the security transition), direct support through technical advisory to the MOF played a key role in tackling challenges to rebuild the country’s economic and fiscal policy. TA already has tangible and visible accomplishments.

(a) Effective delivery of a fiscally sustainable budget to achieve national priorities and reform objectives as outlined in MOF’s strategic plan.

(b) National advisors can effectively provide advisory services to minister’s and deputy ministers’ offices.

With the economic and fiscal crisis that Afghanistan faced in 2014, TA played a key role in providing advice and support to authorities and MOF as well as leadership of the country. Outcome accomplishment of TA to be discussed in the TCR.

TA completion date has been extended thrice. Additional TA funds were requested to cover costs for additional consultancy services.

Sector: Multisector

47263-001 (TA8470)

Support for Infrastructure Investments and Policy

(a) Capacity building workshops on project design and implementation

Off track. In March 2014, implementation arrangements, TA amount (from $1.2 million to $1.95 million), and completion date (from

(a) New projects approvals increase to $450 million in April 2015 (baseline: $320

Not yet due under revised timeline. Uncertainty in the overall security situation during the latter part of 2014 affected TA implementation.

Appendix 6 121

Project Number/ Loan Number

Project Title

Output Outcome Issues

Planned Progress Expected Progress

completed by 2015.

(b) Policy for improved operation of road and railway authorities, and operation and maintenance approved by March 2014.

(c) Demand-driven communication tools (technical reports, brochures) published by 2015.

(d) Quarterly technical working group meetings convened starting October 2013.

(e) Government’s request for AITF financing submitted in a timely manner starting in 2014.

26 April 2015 to 31 October 2015) were modified/ extended to enhance TA outcome and impact.

million in 2013).

(b) Contract awards from AITF-funded projects increase to $110 million by April 2015 (baseline: $62 million in 2013).

(c) Disbursements for AITF-funded projects increase to $120 million by April 2015 (from $65 million in 2013).

ADB = Asian Development Bank, AfRA = Afghanistan Railway Authority, AIBF = Afghanistan Institute of Banking and Finance, AIT = Asian Institute of Technology, AITF = Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund, ANDS = Afghanistan National Development Strategy, CAREC = Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, CDC = community development council, DABS = Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, DAIL = Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, DFID = Department for International Development, DRRD = Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, EA = executing agency, GiZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GWh = giga watt hour, ha = hectare, HIV/AIDS = human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, ICB = international competitive bidding, ICE = Interministerial Commission for Energy, IA = implementing agency, IR = involuntary resettlement, KfW = Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, km = kilometer, kV = kilovolt, LKIS = Lower Kokcha Irrigation System, M&E = monitoring and evaluation, MAIL = Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, MEW = Ministry of Energy and Water, MFF = multitranche financing facility, MOCI = Ministry of Commerce and Industries, MOF = Ministry of Finance, MOMP = Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, MOT = Ministry of Transport, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, MRRD = Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, MT = metric ton, MW = megawatt, NEPS = North East Power System, NGO = nongovernment organization, NVDA = Nangarhar Valley Development Authority, OFWM = off-farm water management, O&M = operation and maintenance, PIO = project implementation office, PMO = project management office, PMU = project management unit, PPMS = project performance monitoring system, PPP = public-private partnership, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, RBA = river basin authority, RFP = request for proposal, TA = technical assistance, TCR = technical assistance completion report, t/ha = tons per hectare, USAID = United States Agency for International Development, USFOR-A = US Forces for Afghanistan, WUA = water user association.

122 Appendix 7

PROGRESS UNDER RESULTS FRAMEWORK FROM COUNTRY OPERATIONS BUSINESS PLAN 2013–2014 The results framework of the Country Operations Business Plan (COBP) 2013–2014 was deemed to be more appropriate to assess under this CPS final review because of the weaknesses inherent in the CPS 2009–2013 results framework (see paras. 26 and 28 of the main report).1 Progress towards the achievement of targets is shown below.

Government Sector Objectives

ADB Contribution

CPS Sector Outcome2 Indicators

3 Progress

Transport

Increased movement of goods and services and better connectivity for people and businesses.

Improved low cost, reliable transport connectivity for goods and people within Afghanistan and cross-border.

(a) By 2017, increased connectivity; percentage of project areas connected to the regional highway network by paved roads increased to 90% from 70% in 2010.

(b) Increased average intercity travel speed. On national highway network average speed increased from 35 km/h in 2010 to at least 50 km/h in program areas by 2017.

(c) Increased availability of intercity freight and passenger services—

Volumes of traffic along project roads increased by 30% from 2011.

(d) Travel time to the nearest primary school, health care facility, or other essential service in target areas decreased by 25% or 15 minutes from the existing average of 1 hour in 2011.

(e) Increase in freight transported by

(a) 642.65 km of road constructed/improved/rehabilitated; construction/ reconstruction/rehabilitation/ improvement of additional 707 km of road in progress.

(b) 65%-75% decrease in travel time.

(c) Traffic volume increased four times in 2012 compared to 2005; 40%-49% decrease in taxi and bus fares; vehicle operating cost savings range between 25%-41%.

(d) No clear data but reports of reduced travel time to nearest health, primary education, and other essential services.

(e) 6,500 tons per day (2012); freight transport fares reduced by 45%; travel time reduced to about 1 hour.

Other achievements:

• 50% increase in number of flights and passengers in rehabilitated airports.

• At least 10,000 refugees and displaced

1 The Country Operations Business Plan 2009–2013 was also the first COBP for Afghanistan.

2 As agreed with the Independent Evaluation Department.

3 Based on the Country Operations and Business Plan 2013-2014.

Appendix 7 123

railway to 65 million tons per year. persons obtained opportunities for livelihood.

• Capacities of Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Tourism, and Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation enhanced.

Energy

Sustainable and reliable grid-connected power supply in northern, eastern, and southern Afghanistan.

Improved access to affordable and reliable energy to most households.

(a) Grid-connected electrification ratio increased from less than 10% in 2007 to 30% in 2017.

(b) North East Power System capable of supplying 150 MW in 2009 increased to 1,000 MW of connected load in 2017.

(c) Reduction in system losses from 50% in 2007 to 30% by 2017.

(d) Electricity Law enacted giving full financial and operational autonomy to DABS by 2014.

(a) Electrification rate is 30% in 2015.

(b) Power supply increased to 658 MW in 2014.

(c) According to DABS, systems loss stands at 25% in 2015.

(d) Electricity law approved by Cabinet and awaiting passage by Parliament.

Agriculture and Natural Resources

Improve agricultural production and reduce poverty.

Improved food self-sufficiency and increased agriculture exports.

(a) Rehabilitation and upgrade of irrigation systems serving at least 50,000 ha by 2019.

(b) At least 15,000 ha of new irrigated area.

(c) Water user associations and river basin agencies in project area by investment program managing irrigation and water resources according to the National Water Law, and (with minimal external assistance) providing O&M through sustainable financial arrangements, ongoing through 2019.

(d) By December 2015, the total area

(a) Command area serving 60,389 ha.

(b) Not available during review.

(c) 74 community development councils are able to undertake small scale operations and maintenance; 51 subprojects have been handed over to their respective community development councils; 4 water users associations have been trained and registered.

River Basin Authority established but still required to organize a Council; technical expertise has yet to be enhanced.

(d) Not all subprojects have measured command areas; but available information

Appendix 7

124

irrigated by rehabilitated systems increased by 20% compared to 2012 baseline.

(e) By December 2015, the crop area and yields irrigated by each rehabilitated system increased by at least 10% compared to 2012 baseline.

shows that irrigated areas increased by more than 100% by project completion (compared to pre-project condition).

(e) Project information available shows wheat yield increase by 45% (compared to 2009 baseline).

Appendix 8 125

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF NONSOVEREIGN OPERATIONS, 2009 TO MID-2015

Table A8.1: Development Impact

Project Title/Loan Number

Overall Evaluation

Rating

Development Impact

Private Sector Development Business Success Economic Sustainability Environmental, Social, Health, and

Safety performance.

Telecom Development Company of Afghanistan (Roshan) (Phase 3: 7281/2431)

Highly successful Excellent. Roshan has become the largest private investor and taxpayer in Afghanistan, accounting for about 5% of the Afghan government's overall revenue in 2010.

Satisfactory. Roshan’s subscriber base grew from 158,000 in 2004 to 5 million in 2011. In 2011, coverage reached 230 cities and towns across 34 provinces, covering 60% of the population; Promoted innovative services, including M-Paisa (mobile money transfer) and Malomat (mobile agricultural trade data service). As of March 2011, M-Paisa had 181,311 subscribers.

Excellent. Contributed to job creation (97% of Roshan’s staff are Afghan nationals and 20% are women) and setting of industry standards.

Satisfactory.

Afghanistan International Bank (7199)

Highly Successful Excellent. ADB’s presence in Afghanistan’s finance sector has catalyzed the entry of more financial institutions (i.e., 5 local banks and 6 international financial institutions entered financial market in the last 5 years).

Excellent. Profitability from a net loss in 2007 to a net profit in 2008. Financial internal rate of return yielded a result of 154%.

Excellent. Afghanistan International Bank contributes to job creation and taxes to the government. Real economic return on invested capital after adjustment for inflation computed at 56%

Excellent. Afghanistan International Bank has complied with these policies and no breach has occurred. It also has environmental due diligence policies and procedures that are embedded in its documents, specifically in its articles of association and credit policy. The bank’s environmental management system revolves around the exclusion list of prohibited industries, which is an integral part of its credit risk management. Afghanistan International Bank conducts environmental due diligence and applies the equator principles in relation to its environmental management system. It has complied with ADB’s social safeguard policies and no involuntary resettlement or impact on indigenous peoples resulted from its activities.

Political Risk Guarantee for the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (2091)

Successful Below expectations. The assessment attempted to strike a balance between giving ADB’s nonsovereign component credit for bringing about the overall success of Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility and the lower than expected contribution of ADB’s second loss political risk guarantees.

Note: The nonsovereign investment for Sungas LLC was cancelled.

Appendix 8

126 Table A8.2: ADB Investment Profitability, Work Quality, and Additionality

Project Title/Loan Number

ADB Investment Profitability ADB Work Quality

ADB's Additionality Screening, appraisal, and structuring of the project

Monitoring and Supervision Role and contribution

Telecom Development Company of Afghanistan (Roshan) (Phase 3: 7281/2431)

Satisfactory. Satisfactory. The ADB appraisal team clearly identified the key strengths of the company. In addition, ADB closely tracked Roshan’s progress, highlighting developments, and monitoring actions, key project milestones, key risks, and development impact assessment.

Excellent. In terms of political risk mitigation and financial additionality: Catalyzed commercial financing through the provision of direct loan and political risk guarantee. ADB used many of its financing instruments to aid Roshan’s growth. Without ADB participation, the expansion program would likely have been scaled down and/or delayed. ADB's added value, particularly in loan processing for phases 2 and 3, stems from its experience and expertise in the country, which gave other lenders the confidence to participate in the transaction.

Afghanistan International Bank (7199)

Excellent. Real net equity financial internal rate of return exceeded the minimum return requirements defined at approval of 1.3 times. As of mid-2015, ADB has received $8.2 million through divestment of its shareholding and $2.9 million through dividend payouts by the Afghanistan International Bank.

Satisfactory. ADB opted to make an equity investment in Afghanistan International Bank instead of granting a loan for the following reasons: (i) an equity investment will show ADB’s commitment to reconstruct Afghanistan, (ii) it will make ADB’s presence more significant in Afghanistan, and (iii) a direct participation of ADB will encourage foreign investors to take more risk and invest in Afghanistan for its further development.

Excellent. ADB’s Capital Markets and Financial Sectors Division monitors Afghanistan International Bank’s operational and financial performance through monthly conference calls and quarterly board meetings. ADB’s shareholder’s representative has regularly attended the annual general meeting in Kabul for the last 5 years. Additionally, the project administration unit prepares the periodic private sector semi-annual report and an annual monitoring report on AIB’s performance.

Satisfactory. ADB had significant role in the establishment of Afghanistan International Bank’s corporate governance policies and procedures, and adoption of international best practices, and ensured that these were adhered to; ADB helped Afghanistan International Bank establish a reputable name in Afghanistan's finance sector.

Satisfactory. Afghanistan International Bank was able to include Citibank as one of its correspondent banks. This welcome addition has increased Afghanistan International Bank’s exposure to the international financial market and potentially fosters international banking relationships with notable international financial institutions. ADB’s presence has given the US Army confidence in banking with Afghanistan International Bank, and this partnership was renewed for another year.

Political Risk Guarantee Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (2091)

ADB’s investment could not generate profitability (ADB’s nonsovereign component incurred administrative expense without generating income).

Met internal parameters. Less than optimal. Additionality of ADB’s participation after Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility’s successful establishment phase was limited (i.e., demand for ADB’s second loss political

Appendix 8 127

Project Title/Loan Number

ADB Investment Profitability ADB Work Quality

ADB's Additionality Screening, appraisal, and structuring of the project

Monitoring and Supervision Role and contribution

risk guarantee did not materialize given actual development of Afghanistan’s investment climate, which was not foreseen at the outset).

Sources: Extended Annual Evaluation Reports and ADB staff.

Appendix 9

128

CPS FINAL REVIEW RATINGS METHODOLOGY 1. Each of the five evaluation criteria is given a weight of 20%. A rating between 0 and 3 is given for each criterion in each sector, whereby 0 is the lowest and 3 is the highest. Each sector was given a weight based on its share (in dollar value) of the ongoing portfolio during 2009–2014, including projects that were approved before but ongoing during that period. Transport has the highest share at 51% and therefore the most weight in the ratings table. Each criterion rating score was then multiplied by the sector weight, and all of the sector weighted scores determine the overall criterion weighted score.

2. Health and social protection and industry and trade sectors were a fraction of a percentage in the overall portfolio and therefore were excluded in the ratings table. Excluding them does not affect the other sector percentages except for hundredths of a percentage point. Also, In line with the 2015 Guidelines for the Preparation of CAPEs and CPS Final Reviews, nonsovereign operations in Afghanistan have been factored into the sector assessments along with sovereign operations because of the small nonsovereign portfolio.

3. Cross-cutting objectives were included for the relevance and development impacts criteria following the 2015 Guidelines for the Preparation of CAPEs and CPS Final Reviews. A 10% weight was assigned to cross-cutting objectives. For the two criteria, the respective sector shares were adjusted by 10% to accommodate the share of the cross-cutting objectives.

4. The overall weighted score is obtained by multiplying each criterion weighted score by 20% and adding the individual criterion scores. The criteria scores shown below are rounded, but the actual overall weighted score is 1.64.

Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability

Development

Impacts Overall

Agriculture and Natural Resources 2 1 1 2 1 1.4

Energy 2 2 1 2 1 1.6

Transport 3 2 1 1 2 1.8

Finance 2 1 1 1 1 1.2

Multisector 2 1 2 1 2 1.6

Public Sector Management 2 1 1 1 1 1.2

Cross-Cutting Objectives 2 1 1.5

Weighted Score 2.5 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.64

100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

Agriculture and Natural Resources 11.25% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 11.25% 12.50%

Energy 21.87% 24.30% 24.30% 24.30% 21.87% 24.30%

Transport 46.07% 51.19% 51.19% 51.19% 46.07% 51.19%

Finance 1.58% 1.76% 1.76% 1.76% 1.58% 1.76%

Multisector 7.65% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50% 7.65% 8.50%

Public Sector Management 1.57% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.57% 1.75%

Cross-Cutting Objectives 10.00% 10.00%

Appendix 10 129

COMPARISON OF CPS FINAL REVIEW RATINGS AND CAPE RATINGS 1. The tables below compare the ratings between the Afghanistan Country Assistance Program Evaluation (CAPE)64 which covered 2002–2011 and the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) final review which covers 2009 to mid-2015. The CPS final review does not use the criterion of strategic positioning due to changes in the criteria under the 2015 Guidelines for the Preparation of CAPEs and CPS Final Reviews. Other differences between the CAPE and CPS final review rating methodology are noted below.

Table A10.1: Agriculture and Natural Resources Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011 Final review 2009 to mid-2015

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Strategic positioning Satisfactory

Relevance Relevant Relevance Relevant

Effectiveness Less than effective Effectiveness Less than effective

Efficiency Less than efficient Efficiency Less than efficient

Sustainability Less than likely Sustainability Likely sustainable

Development impact Less than satisfactory Development impacts Less than satisfactory

Overall Less than successful Overall Less than successful

Table A10.2: Energy Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011 Final review 2009 to mid-2015

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Strategic positioning Satisfactory

Relevance Relevant Relevance Relevant

Effectiveness Effective Effectiveness Effective

Efficiency Less than efficient Efficiency Less than efficient

Sustainability Less than likely Sustainability Likely sustainable

Development impact Satisfactory Development impacts Less than satisfactory

Overall Successful Overall Successful

Table A10.3: Finance Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011 Final review 2009 to mid-2015

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Strategic positioning Satisfactory

Relevance Less than relevant Relevance Relevant

Effectiveness Less than effective Effectiveness Less than effective

Efficiency Less than efficient Efficiency Less than efficient

Sustainability Less than likely Sustainability Less than likely

Development impact Less than satisfactory Development impacts Less than satisfactory

Overall Less than successful Overall Less than successful

64

Asian Development Bank. 2012. Country Assistance Program Evaluation: Afghanistan. Manila.

Appendix 10

130

Table A10.4: Multisector Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011* Final review 2009 to mid-2015

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Strategic positioning No rating

Relevance No rating Relevance Relevant

Effectiveness No rating Effectiveness Less than effective

Efficiency No rating Efficiency Efficient

Sustainability No rating Sustainability Less than likely

Development impact No rating Development impacts Satisfactory

Overall No rating Overall Successful

* The CAPE allocated multisector components to other sectors.

Table A10.5: Nonsovereign Operations Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011 Final review 2009 to mid-2015*

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Development impact Satisfactory Development results No rating

ADB investment profitability

Satisfactory ADB investment profitability

No rating

ADB work quality Satisfactory ADB work quality No rating

ADB additionality Satisfactory ADB additionality No rating

Overall Successful Overall Successful

* Nonsovereign operations were factored into other sector assessments because of the small amount of nonsovereign operations. Only an overall rating is given.

Table A10.6: Public Sector Management Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011 Final review 2009 to mid-2015

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Strategic positioning Satisfactory

Relevance Relevant Relevance Relevant

Effectiveness Less than effective Effectiveness Less than effective

Efficiency Less than efficient Efficiency Less than efficient

Sustainability Less than likely Sustainability Less than likely

Development impact Less than satisfactory Development impacts Less than satisfactory

Overall Less than successful Overall Less than successful

Table A10.7: Transport Ratings

CAPE 2002–2011 Final review 2009 to mid-2015

Criteria Rating Criteria Rating

Strategic positioning Satisfactory

Relevance Relevant Relevance Highly relevant

Effectiveness Effective Effectiveness Effective

Efficiency Less than efficient Efficiency Less than efficient

Sustainability Less than likely Sustainability Less than likely

Development impact Satisfactory Development impacts Satisfactory

Overall Successful Overall Successful

2. The overall rating from the CPS final review is 1.64, which is successful on the borderline. The CAPE gave an overall rating of 1.53, which is less than successful.