Counterfactual Conditionals by B. J. DiggsReview by: Alan Ross AndersonThe Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 1954), p. 68Published by: Association for Symbolic LogicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2267677 .

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68 REVIEWS

(4561), using the results and the terminology of VII 1 18, XIII 171(2), and XVI 272(2). In accordance with the paper of Halld6n, the author calls a system unreasonable if there exist two formulas a and fi such that a and fi contain no variable in common, neither a nor fi is provable, and a v fi is provable. (In Halld6n's paper the further con- dition is imposed that a and fi shall each contain only one variable.) It was shown by Halld6n that, if C is SI, or S3, or any system intermediate between these two, or if C is stronger than S3 and weaker than both S4 and S7, then C is unreasonable (in the sense of Halld6n - hence also in that of McKinsey).

In the present paper, the author proves that this defect does not occur in S4, or in S5, or in any quasi-normal extension of S5, and gives an example, on the other hand, of an unreasonable system which lies between S4 and S5.

Erratum. On page 110, line 7 from the bottom, for a. read -a. NAOTO YONEMITSU

ERNA F. SCHNEIDER. Recent discussion of subjunctive conditionals. The review of metaphysics, vol. 6 no. 4 (1953), pp. 623-649.

This critical summary of recent literature on subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals provides an excellent introduction to the subject, and should also be of use to those familiar with its difficulties. The survey is intended to include all proposed analyses of any consequence since Carnap's II 49, together with an account of the principal difficulties encountered by each; the reviewer knows of no notable omissions. There are also comments on the views of Philo, Diodorus, Peirce, W. E. Johnson, Bradley, and Broad. Detailed discussion of disposition terms and formal theories of confirmation is not within the scope of the article, but the connections between counter- factuals, disposition terms, and natural laws, are explained clearly. Various attempts to characterize the latter (notably those of Reichenbach XIV 50 and Sellars XIV 59) are summarized with critical comments. The author concludes with the observation that "these varied efforts, though they fail in many ways, nevertheless define the problems to be faced more clearly, and illustrate pitfalls to be avoided." A compre- hensive bibliography is appended.

Errata. For "J. D. O'Connor," read "D. J. O'Connor" throughout. For "1950" in the fifth item of the bibliography, read "1952." In the sentence Ia on page 643 (a badly misprinted quotation from Sellars XIV 59), for "poorly" read "properly," and for "interpretations" read "implications." ALAN Ross ANDERSON

B. J. DIGGS. Counterfactual conditionals. Mind, n. s. vol. 61 (1952), pp. 513-527. After a preliminary discussion of various difficulties in the analysis of counterfactual

conditionals, the author offers roughly the following novel interpretation of "If

any one had jumped out of this window, he'd have been hurt": (EF)[F(this window)

. (Ex)(Ey)[Persdn(x) . F(y) . x jumps out of y] . (x)(y)[(Person(x) . F(y) . x jumps out

of y) D (x is hurt)]]. (For a similar suggestion by Storer, see following review.) The

author points out that his proposal has several advantages over previous suggestions:

certain difficulties connected with false or vacuous antecedents are avoided; the denial

of his formula accords reasonably well with our presumed intent in denying the counter- factual; several examples from previous literature, damaging to other proposals, do

not affect this one. On the other hand, further examples show that it is necessary to

restrict the range of F to something like Goodman's "projectible predicates" (XI 81).

Following Goodman (XII 139) and others, the author concludes that, whether or not

his proposal is adequate, the problem of counterfactual conditionals is reducible to

that of "lawlike statements"; to which the reviewer would add that the author's proposal can probably not be evaluated very conclusively until more light is shed on

the latter question. Much of this article covers familiar ground, but the discussion is

illuminating. ALAN Ross ANDERSON

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