Counter-Bidding:Antinomies of Party Competition and Ethnic Outbidding in Divided Societies

ABSTRACT

Ethnic outbidding in divided societies can have potentially dire political

consequences, from the derailment of peace processes to inter-ethnic warfare.

The article draws from the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus to

establish the conditions contributing to successful outbidding within the

framework of protracted peace negotiations. It demonstrates that outbidding is

particularly successful when ethnic parties are able to exploit the fears of their

communities over inter-ethnic compromise without taking extreme positions on

practical issues that would otherwise undermine the gains of conciliation and

alienate voters. The study of ethnic outbidding has important implications for

research on democratization and intra-group conflict since it suggests mechanisms

through which policymakers can minimise risks for already vulnerable peace

processes. By specifying the conditions of successful outbidding this study fills an

important gap in the literature.

1

Introduction

The study of intra-group relationships in the context of ethnic conflict, peace

processes, and peace accords, remains under-theorized especially when compared

to the attention devoted to the dynamics of inter-group relationships (Gormley-

Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 43). This relative neglect of intra-group dynamics

misses a crucial dimension in the perpetuation and resolution of ethnic conflict. A

potentially problematic in-group mechanism for peacemaking is that of ethnic

outbidding. Ethnic outbidding occurs in the context of competitive electoral

politics when parties identified with the same ethnic group compete for support,

neither having an incentive to cultivate the support of other ethnicities. Each

ethnic party seeks to demonstrate that it is more nationalistic than its competitors1

by raising its ‘bid’, protecting itself from claims by the other that it is ‘soft’ on

ethnic issues (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 434). Once this auction-like scenario

begins, the ethnic outbidding thesis predicts a contagion of extremist politics

which destabilises and ultimately prevents conflict regulation within a democratic

framework (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009: 397).

The destructive effect of ethnic outbidding is demonstrated in the cases of

Israel (Migdalovitz, 2009), Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2005), and Sudan (Horowitz,

1985), among others. The consequences of outbidding can range from

modifications of peace processes to the outbreak of civil war. Despite this

seemingly inexorable process in divided societies, it is rarely acknowledged that

ethnic outbidding does not always succeed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we

see cases of ‘outbidding failure’ in Croatia (Hislope, 1996), India (Chandra, 2005)

and Serbia (Gagnon, 1994). Why is ethnic outbidding not always successful for

ethnic parties in ethnic party systems? This puzzle is important, because if the

necessary conditions for effective outbidding are better understood, then the

chances of its success can be diminished, and its most devastating consequences

when it succeeds can be managed (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 434).

This article hypothesises that ethnic outbidding is particularly successful

when ethnic parties exploit the fears of their ethnic group over inter-ethnic

compromise, without taking extreme positions on practical issues that would 1 By competitors we refer to groups and parties from the same ethnicity

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undermine the gains of rapprochement and scare away voters. Alternatively stated,

moderate parties could prevent ethnic outbidding by presenting themselves as the

most credible advocate of national interests while targeting the impracticality of

their hardliner competitors’ extremist agendas; a process defined in this article as

‘counter-bidding’. Using Mill’s method of difference, a set of related hypotheses

are tested through the cases of the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) successful

outbidding of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in Northern Ireland after the 1998

Good Friday Agreement, and the European Party’s (EUROKO) unsuccessful

attempts to outbid Democratic Rally (DISY) in Cyprus after the failure of the

Annan Plan in the 2004 referendum. This article also considers a number of

possible alternative hypotheses for the outbidding outcomes in each case.

The effects of outbidding are usually associated with the conflict

escalation phase of civil war, but are generally under-conceptualised within the

context of inter-ethnic compromise (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 44).

Whether outbidding succeeds or fails is particularly important in this context, not

only for the compromise itself, but also for moderate parties that support peace

arrangements and thus become increasingly vulnerable to outbidding by their

nationalistic competitors (Horowitz, 1985: 354). The article draws from elite

framing, socialisation, and rational choice theories (Gray, 2004; Horowitz, 1985;

1989; Brubaker & Laitin, 1998) and it proposes two hypotheses:

H1 Effective outbidders exploit ethnic grievances and fears resulting from

the (prospect of a) peace process.

H2 Effective outbidding and counter-bidding require parties not only to

address grievances but also to identify appropriate strategies and opportunities for

redressing the current situation.

Ethnic outbidding in literature

Despite its well-established place in ethnic conflict literature (Horowitz, 1985;

Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972; Rothschild, 1981), ethnic outbidding still lacks any

precise or ubiquitously used definition (Rose, 1991). This article utilizes the

formulation devised by Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty (2008: 44), in which ethnic

outbidding is defined as the process “through which parties within the same ethno-

national bloc seek to portray themselves as the true defenders of the group

position while simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of in-group rivals”.

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Whether constructed by ambitious politicians or a natural result of the

make-up of society, ethnicity is the most salient cleavage in party systems, making

other cleavages redundant (Horowitz, 1985: 340). Ethnic parties represent the

interests of, and receive support solely from, their ethnic group rather than

competing for a plurality of votes in the centre-ground. This absolute nature of

support contrasts with the graduated ‘more/less’ nature of party support in non-

ethnic party systems (ibid: 291 and 345). Operating in a segmented electoral

market, an ethnic party X1 representing ethnic X will compete intra-ethnically

with parties (X2) also claiming to represent ethnic X, rather than ethnic parties

representing another ethnicity, Y.

Insert Figure A about here.

Ethnic parties thus have few incentives to cultivate support from the ethnic

‘other’ (Mitchell & Evans, 2009: 148). This lack of incentives may also be

supplemented by institutional structures or majority-minority group

demographics, where ethnic parties that represent the majority are often

guaranteed representation without having to appeal to minority groups. For

Horowitz (1985: 342), the conflict-promoting character of ethnic party systems

stems from the absence of inter-ethnic competition. It is this absence above all

else that leads to ethnic outbidding. The only way for ethnic parties X1 and Y1 to

gain votes is to outbid their rivals, X2 and Y2 in an auction-like scenario

(DeVotta, 2005: 141). According to both Horowitz and Rabushka and Shepsle,

ethnic outbidding occurs when it is the most rational and electorally profitable

choice, yet ethnic party systems have an innate propensity to produce competitive

incentives to outbid. Parties play the ‘ethnic card’ in an attempt to portray

themselves as the most authentic defenders of the ethnic group’s interests and

security, raising their bids to trump competitors (Hislope, 1996). Intra-ethnic

competition can be very intense, with intransigent rhetoric resonating due to the

cohabitation of the same socio-cultural space (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty,

2008: 47-48). Furthermore, the inability of ethnic parties to diversify their support

means ethnic leaders see such competition as a genuine threat to the survival of

the party.

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For Horowitz (1985: 345), the costs of being outbid are so high that parties

X2 and Y2 are incentivised to raise their bids (they may do so pre-emptively) in

order to cover their ‘flanks’ from competitors X1 and Y1, knowing they cannot

rely on support from other ethnic groups to compensate their losses. The Croatian

Democratic Union (HDZ) did both, protecting its flank from the Croatian Party of

Rights (HSP) whilst outbidding the moderate Coalition of People’s Accord (KNS)

(Hislope, 1996). The process repeats itself, as ethnic parties X1 and Y1 counter

this with a higher bid, pushing electoral competition centrifugally from the

moderate centre towards the extremes (see Figure A), contrasting with the logic of

the non-ethnic party system (Chandra, 2005: 237; Reilly, 2001: 9). This shift

worsens both intra- and inter-ethnic relations. Movement to the extremes is often

replicated in the other ethnic groups, fearing their moderate parties will not be

able to defend their interests from the extremist ethnic party of the ethnic other.

Ethnic outbidding can thus exacerbate ethnic conflict. The centrifugal

character of competition radicalises ethnic groups, undermines multi-ethnic

alliances, and leads to violent outcomes. Of particular concern here is the effect of

outbidding on already vulnerable inter-ethnic compromises. While this article

largely agrees with the assumptions of the ethnic outbidding thesis, several cases

across divided societies also demonstrate that ethnic outbidding is not always

successful. Horowitz and Rabushka and Shepsle do not explicitly specify this

variation in outcomes, and are thus overly pessimistic about outbidding’s

consequences. Indeed, this determinism led several scholars to question the social

scientific nature of the outbidding thesis (Chandra, 2005; Giuliano, 2000). Elise

Giuliano (2000: 296), for example, states that “a convincing theory of ethnic

mobilization should be able to account for variation in outcomes, for cases of

frustrated as well as successful mobilization along ethnic lines”. Such variation in

the outcomes of ethnic outbidding is the source of the puzzle this article deals

with.

(Dis)contents of Outbidding: Politics of Identity and Framing

Seldom considered within the ethnic outbidding literature are the contents of

outbidding appeals. Attacks on inter-ethnic compromise may prove fruitful for

outbidding parties, but on what basis these appeals are made is equally important.

In line with the first hypothesis, successful outbidding appeals are expected to be

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the ones that contain identity-based frames that are of symbolic relevance to the

target ethnic group. Using identity-based issues for outbidding is a low-cost tool

for popular mobilisation, given their relevance in ethnic conflict and because

attachments to ethnic identity ensure such messages are easily understood (Brown

& MacGinty, 2003: 86). Symbols are utilized in conflict to assert superiority,

legitimacy and add moral weight to a group’s claims (Horowitz, 1985: 217).

These symbols can also be used in outbidding. For example in Moldova, moderate

nationalist Petru Lucinschi was outflanked by the Mircea Druc in 1990, the

Moldovan Popular Front leader, over the Moldovan language issue, which had

been ‘degraded’ by Russophones (Kaufman, 1996: 122-123). Outbidding on

identity is especially effective during periods of political stress such as

compromise, where identity issues become more acute (Brown & MacGinty,

2003: 87). Ethnic outbidding models are often criticised for their primordialist

perspectives on identity issues, implicitly assuming that political preferences on

symbolic issues are polarised along a single dimension defined by ethnicity

(Chandra, 2005: 236; Giuliano, 2000: 296). Instead, responses to outbidding on

symbolism are likely to be diverse rather than uniform (Brown & MacGinty,

2003: 87).

Literature on ‘framing’, a process where actors jointly interpret, define and

redefine states of affairs, becomes relevant in identity construction within the

context of outbidding. Frames build on pre-existing cultural stock drawn from the

symbolic politics of a community, which forms the base for the claims of the

outbidders. Frames involve agency in the construction of the shared meanings of a

situation, whether a problem exists and what solutions are possible (Gray, 2004:

167). Relating to our second hypothesis (H2) successful outbidding appeals are

those that are framed effectively not only in terms of grievances, but also in terms

of appropriate solutions. Parties use ‘diagnostic frames’ (H1) which identify the

source of a problematic situation and attribute blame, in an attempt to exploit the

group’s fears of compromise. In addition to a diagnostic frame, what is often

missing among ethnic outbidders is a 'prognostic frame' (H2) establishing that an

alternative source of action is viable and effective. Such party frames are expected

to be shaped by political learning and their response to incentives including the

identification of appropriate opportunities and strategies for redressing the

problem as well as an assessment of the degree of efficacy of alternative strategies

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(Snow & Benford, 1988; Kovras & Loizides, 2009). For Rabushka and Shepsle

(1972: 69), ethnicity provides a ‘perceptual consensus’, where alternatives are

viewed according to a frame common to all actors. However, Giuliano (2000:

299) argues that voters’ preferences are instead constructed through multilayered

interactions among politicians’ framings of issues rather than any standardised

understanding, a position this article largely agrees with.

Party adaption and outbidding strategies

The second hypothesis further diverges from traditional ethnic outbidding

perspectives, allowing for the seemingly counter-intuitive suggestion that

successful ethnic outbidding appeals are those that feature a degree of moderation.

Outbidding parties moderate on practical issues, such as governance or resource

allocation, in order not to undermine the gains of inter-ethnic rapprochement and

alienate potential voters.

Why do parties adapt their outbidding strategies in this way? Our second

hypothesis is inspired by the recent argument put forward by Mitchell, Evans and

O’Leary (2009). They found that voters endorse ‘ethnic tribune’ parties (in their

case study the DUP and Sinn Féin); those deemed to be the most robust defenders

of their group’s ethnic identity, and yet they may also expect these parties to act in

a more conciliatory way. Like our second hypothesis effective outbidding does

not necessarily eliminate the prospect of mutually advantageous inter-ethnic

cooperation. Ethnic groups may want their ‘strongest voice’, but they may want

this ethnic champion to engage more cooperatively with the ethnic other, which

parties must respond and adapt to (ibid: 403).

Contrary to the assumptions of the outbidding thesis, increased social

polarisation is not always a given (Lake & Rothchild, 1996: 54). Depending on

the electoral system, potential voters may even come from another ethnicity e.g.

in Malaysia, moderate behaviour by the United Malays National Organization

(UMNO) appealed to the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and its voters

(Horowitz, 1989: 28). Voting for ethnic tribune parties implies some intransigence

in advocating the ethnic group’s core identity interests but does not necessarily

entail increased overall social polarisation (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009:

417).

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Although Sandal and Loizides (2009) do not touch upon the mechanisms

of outbidding, they suggest that parties are socialised through interaction with

peace-promoting elites and allies, moderating on issues with international-level

importance. Nevertheless, socialisation is ‘punctuated’ so that outbidding parties

remain obdurate on other issues. Partial socialisation could be applied to

outbidding strategies so that intransigence on identity-based issues in the context

of peace processes is combined with, and can compensate party constituencies for,

moderation on practical issues. Ethnic parties may also adapt if rational cost-

benefit calculations on the electoral viability of such shifts permit it.

As the cases below suggest, that ethnic parties adapt undermines the

assumption that ethnic parties are somehow ‘anti-modern’ (Gormley-Heenan &

MacGinty, 2008: 53). While too much moderation will leave ethnic parties

vulnerable to their flanks, the second hypothesis implies that ethnic outbidding is

not “necessarily a blunt instrument of total opposition” (ibid: 44).

Ethnic Outbidding: The Democratic Unionist Party

In the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

lost its position as the leader of the unionist community to its main competitor, the

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has solidified this dominant position

in subsequent elections, leading to suggestions of realignment within Unionism

(Tonge, 2005: 60). The DUP’s success provides a case for ‘the ethnic outbidding

puzzle’. Varying outcomes in other cases suggest ethnic outbidding is not a

uniformly successful strategy, so what explains its success in this case? We argue

that successful ethnic outbidding occurred because the DUP were able to exploit

Unionist fears and disappointment with the Good Friday Agreement, without

taking extreme positions on practical issues which would undermine the gains of

the peace process and lose Unionist voters.

Intra-Unionist competition features numerous cleavages on questions of

ideology, identity and attitudes towards inter-ethnic compromise. Since its

beginnings in 1905 from the Ulster Unionist Council, the UUP has been self-

described centre-right party.2 In contrast, the DUP is considered right-wing in

2At the time of the writing, UUP along with their UK conservative allies abandoned EPP-DP and became members of the new European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Members of UUP would normally be aligned with the much larger EPP-DP and they currently see themselves as ‘good neighbours rather than opponents of the former’. Jim Nicholson is one of the five Quaestors

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terms of social issues, but leftist in its economic policies (Evans & Duffy, 1997:

53). Both the UUP and the DUP are staunchly pro-union3 and derive cultural

resonance from the ‘motherland’ as in the Cypriot cases. Religious identification

is less salient intra-ethnically, though since its establishment in 1971 the DUP has

maintained strong links with the minority Protestant Free Presbyterian church,

which then leader Ian Paisley himself founded. While the UUP were not affiliated

with any particular church (the party wished to encompass most shades of

Unionism), the party did have a strong association with the Orange Order, an

exclusively Protestant cultural-religious organisation (Evans & Tonge, 2005: 320).

Since the UUP began to advocate devolution instead of integration (a

source of fissure in the party), the UUP and the DUP have been divided over the

best means to achieve it, either through pragmatism or dogmatism (Farrington,

2001: 56-57). The DUP acquired a reputation as hardliners, the party that “most

eloquently articulates the siege mentality of absolute opposition to a united

Ireland under all circumstances” (Mitchell in Evans & Duffy, 1997: 57). The DUP

and particularly Paisley have constantly attempted to outbid the UUP e.g.

denouncing then-leader Brian Faulkner’s ‘betrayal’ by signing up to the

Sunningdale Agreement 1973 with Irish Nationalists. The UUP were

comparatively moderate, though they could also be intransigent. Indeed, a large

section of the party were anti-Sunningdale themselves, polling 10.5% in the 1973

Assembly election. The party was able to protect its flank from the DUP

challenge in the 1980s and early 1990s and maintain its electoral superiority

largely by not risking inter-ethnic compromise and appearing more rational than

their hardline counterparts (Cochrane, 2001: 323).

Insert Figure B about here

The UUP and DUP briefly put aside intra-ethnic party competition to show unity

in opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985, which granted the Irish

in the European Parliament and has strong connections with European People’s Party see http://www.jimnicholson.eu/ (accessed November 28, 2010). See also interviews with Jim Nicholson & Brian Crowe, 2009.3 Both DUP and UUP are in favour of maintaining Northern Ireland’s current status in union with the United Kingdom (hence ‘Unionist’), as opposed to the reunification of Ireland, North and South. The other main protagonists in the Northern Irish conflict desire the latter and are known as (Irish) ‘Nationalists’ (not be confused with nationalism/nationalist).

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government a greater say in Northern Irish affairs. However, the ‘Ulster Says No’

campaign stunted DUP growth, with the 1987 Westminster election a particularly

poor showing (Walker, 2004: 234-239). Nevertheless, the 1990s saw DUP

outbidding and hardline positioning resume over the UUP’s involvement in the

peace process. Paisley argued at the time UUP leader David Trimble was going to

‘sell out the union’ (Cochrane, 2001: 371). The agreement that emerged from the

peace process fundamentally altered the dynamics of Unionist rivalry as

evidenced in Figure B, providing a new cleavage on the Northern Ireland

question, between the anti-agreement DUP and the pro-agreement, UUP.

According to Evans and Tonge (2005: 324), the agreement witnessed the

concretisation of intra-Unionist competition, with the parties now clearly divided.

Insert Table A about here

Years of outbidding had only delivered modest growth for the DUP as

demonstrated by the electoral trends in Table A, yet in the post-Belfast Agreement

atmosphere the party’s outbidding allowed it to surge past the UUP with 18% of

UUP voters switching to the DUP in the 1998 to 2003 period (Mitchell, Evans &

O’Leary, 2009: 407).

Why did ethnic outbidding yield success for the DUP?

As discussed previously, inter-ethnic compromise can render political parties

vulnerable to counter-mobilisations from persistent outbidding competitors. This

is precisely the fate that befell the UUP once it signed up to the Good Friday

Agreement. The agreement provided a catalyst for ethnic outbidding, with DUP

representative Clive McFarland suggesting in an interview with the authors that

without the UUP signing up to the agreement, it would have been more difficult

for the DUP to achieve its electoral success.4 Although inter-ethnic compromise

often features in successful ethnic outbidding, it is not the only factor. This article

argues that the DUP was able to exploit the fears and disappointments of the

Unionist community with the agreement, without taking an extreme position on

practical issues, such as power-sharing with Nationalist parties.

4 Interview with Clive McFarland, DUP Representative, 2010

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The 1998 referendum on the agreement demonstrated Unionist

apprehension, with a slim 55% Protestant majority backing the agreement that

was to become a minority only three years later as confidence eroded (MacGinty,

2004: 90). Indeed, Unionist fears were multiplied as the Ulster Unionists were

confronted with an agreement that put Sinn Féin in government with no guarantee

of decommissioning5, with prisoners being released, doubts about the future of the

RUC6, a new relationship with Dublin, with Irish Nationalist vetoes in the

Assembly over major issues (Powell, 2008: 104). As the main pro-agreement

force in Unionism, the UUP took the responsibility for these problems. By

rejecting the agreement, the DUP could outbid the UUP and exploit Unionist

fears, especially among Unionists who gave a ‘soft’ yes in 1998.7 The DUP

argued that the agreement signalled the end of the union, a diagnostic frame

aiming to reshape Unionist perceptions on the acceptability of this compromise.

Unionists were also facing an existential threat, whereby the agreement

legitimated a change in the status of Northern Ireland if a majority wished this to

be the case.8 These compromises overshadowed many apparent “victories” for

Unionism such as the de facto acceptance of the legitimacy of the Northern Irish

state by the Nationalists. Nevertheless, Paisley denounced the UUP for their

compromise, labelling them as “office seekers who are prepared to sell their souls

for office” (Farrington, 2001: 51). This ethnic outbidding discourse of betrayal

resonated with Unionist fears over the agreement to the UUP’s expense.

Moreover, the DUP was able to exploit Unionist fears over compromise by

outbidding UUP on identity-based issues. Through punctuated socialisation, actors

can feel comfortable stressing traditional positions on issues that are not

significant parts of intercommunity agreements on an international level (Sandal

& Loizides, 2009). Since endemic violence has stopped, antagonisms have

manifested themselves into symbolic arenas, with identity becoming an

increasingly important way of ‘pursuing the conflict by other means’ (Hill &

White, 2008: 44). For Unionists, symbols bestow legitimacy on Northern Ireland’s

current status as part of the union. Alteration of these symbols were the source of

5 Decommissioning refers to the handing over of weapons by paramilitary groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (which has links with Sinn Féin) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (Unionist militants)6 The Royal Ulster Constabulary currently renamed to Police Service of Northern Ireland 7 Interview with Graham Walker, 20108 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, of Index Cyprus, 2010

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many of the most deeply felt Unionist grievances surrounding the agreement

(MacGinty, 2004: 88). The controversy over policing reform is one such example.

Unionists had always considered the police ‘their’ force, with Nationalists largely

distrustful due to its majority Protestant membership and accusations of bias and

brutality (McGarry, 2000). The agreement provided for a commission to look into

reforms necessary to create a police force for both communities. Unionists were

incensed by the recommendations of the subsequent Patten Report of 1999, due to

the report’s focus on reforms that were deemed as threats to the symbols of

Unionism such as the emblem and name change from the RUC to the Police

Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), rather than its overall impact on police

operations (ibid: 180). For instance, the DUP’s Ian Paisley Jr. said at the time that

the removal of the RUC symbols constitutes a complete ruination of anything

British or anything which links the police service to the British connection (BBC,

2001).

By exploiting Unionist fears, the DUP could portray itself as Unionist’s

ethnic tribune, crucial to successful ethnic outbidding. Even 40% of UUP

supporters perceived the DUP to be the more effective defenders of Unionism’s

interests (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009: 412). Although the UUP were also

intransigent on policing, the DUP’s more vigorous opposition resonated with

Unionist fears. Ian Paisley Sr went so far as to claim that “Patten’s programme is

that Protestants have to be ethnically cleansed” (Farrington, 2001: 52). Even four

years after the report, 58% Protestants believed reform had gone too far.9 The

2001 Westminster election saw the UUP losing support due to police reform as

the DUP were able to associate the UUP with responsibility for the report as part

of the wider agreement package (Mitchell, O’Leary & Evans, 2001: 730).

Crucial to the DUP’s successful outbidding was that it exploited Unionist

fears without taking an extreme position. Outbidding had only produced modest

electoral growth pre-1998. The party adapted its hardline positioning to the post-

1998 environment, cannily pointing to the agreement’s most sensitive issues yet

participating in the executive, thereby offering a viable alternative and

demonstrating they were not wholly rejectionist.10 This adaption was most evident

on power-sharing with Sinn Féin, in which the party’s position changed from one 9 2003 NI Life and Times Survey, available from: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2003/Political_Attitudes/REFORMOK.html 10 Interview with Graham Walker, 2010; Interview with Peter Weir, DUP MLA, 2009

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of total resistance to laying out conditions Sinn Féin would have to meet to form

government, which the party did under the St. Andrews Agreement 2006. Indeed,

the party’s position on policing moderated, accepting the PSNI and the devolution

of policing powers under the Hillsborough Agreement 2010. This adaption led to

accusations that it had ‘stolen the clothes’ from the UUP. The party’s post-1998

moderation stemmed from its desire not to undermine the gains of the peace

process. Local politicians had gained control of Northern Ireland’s own affairs

after 26 years, Unionism was experiencing international credibility, and inter-

communal violence had substantially decreased (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009: 51).

Furthermore, despite the unpopularity of some aspects of the agreement, social

polarisation predicted by the outbidding thesis did not occur. The devolved

institutions were generally popular, with support for the establishment of the

Assembly rising from 57% to 70% amongst DUP own supporters between 1998

and 2003, and only 13% of Protestants rejecting power-sharing in 2007 (McGarry

& O’Leary, 2009: 56). Unionists wanted their ethnic tribune but they wanted the

DUP to act in a more conciliatory way, thus had incentives not to undermine these

gains (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009).

The DUP’s success demonstrates that party agency is important to

outbidding. Unionists were disappointed with the agreement and the DUP was

able to in McFarland’s words, “tap into the mood, and press the case against the

agreement”.11 The success of DUP stemmed from exploiting Unionist fears by

outbidding the UUP, crucially without taking an extreme position on practical

issues which would undermine the gains of the peace process and scare away

voters. This case corroborates with the outbidding hypotheses H1 and H2 laid out

in the introduction.

“Rally” Around the Flag: EUROKO’s failed attempt at Outbidding Having explored successful ethnic outbidding in Northern Ireland, this section

examines the unsuccessful attempt by the European Party (Europaiko Komma,

EUROKO) to outbid Democratic Rally (Demokratikos Sinagermos, DISY) in

11Interview with Clive McFarland, 2010

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Cyprus. This failure is puzzling given DISY’s support for the Annan Plan12 in the

24 April 2004 referendum which was rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots, and

EUROKO’s staunch denunciation of this inter-ethnic compromise (Christophorou,

2005: 85). EUROKO has been unable to exploit the apprehensions of Greek

Cypriots towards Annan, taking extremist positions and alienating potential voters

that fear EUROKO’s positions may lead to the entrenchment of partition, the

worst possible outcome for Greek Cypriots.

Cyprus bears remarkable similarities to the Northern Irish case; both

feature competing ethno-national claims on status ever since their respective

territories were granted independence from British colonial rule (Kitromilides,

1979; Anastasiou, 2008). Moreover, similar to the Northern Irish case, Greek

Cypriot politics features numerous interlinked cleavages of identity, ideology,

attitudes to reunification and positions toward a peace plan, again demonstrating

fluid rather than fixed notions of ethnic identity (Vural & Peristianis, 2008;

Loizides, 2009: 164). With independence, there was only a limited sense of

‘Cypriot’ identity, with Greek motherland identity, its myths and symbols, and the

Greek Orthodox Church becoming more significant (Fisher, 2001: 309).

However, ideological dependence on motherland nationalism decreased after

1974, with divisions over Greek involvement in an attempted coup, and the

‘Greek Cypriot’ component of identity increasingly stressed. Nevertheless the

influence of Hellenism persists, with both DISY and EUROKO asserting

‘Greek/European’ heritage (Papadakis, 1998). Cyprus’s accession to the European

Union in 2004 has created a new dimension to identity, with both parties

emphasising their pro-European credentials. The left-right cleavage is also salient,

signified by the defeat of DIKO’s centre-right incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos by

the self-identified communist AKEL’s Demetris Christofias for the Presidency in

2008. Both EUROKO and DISY compete on the right of the ideological spectrum,

with the former more hard-right having emerged from the nationalist wing of

DISY in 2005. Since its establishment in 1976 by Glafcos Clerides, DISY is self-

identified as a centre-right party, although it draws support from all segments of

society, including nationalists with sympathies for EOKA, the enosis13 movement,

12 The 2002-4 reunification plan drafted by the United Nations and put forward in simultaneous referendums in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. A 65 percent majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Plan during the April 2004 referendum.

14

and liberals supporting compromise. DISY’s absorption of EOKA-B14

sympathisers marginalised the party in its formative years, with the pro-Makarios

Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou,

AKEL), the United Democratic Union of the Centre (Eniea Demokratiki Enosis

Kentrou, EDEK) and the Democratic Party (Demokratiko Komma, DIKO)

establishing an alliance to exclude DISY (Christophorou, 2006: 517).

DISY emerged as a viable alternative becoming the largest party in the

1985 parliamentary elections. Significantly, DISY had been capable of

emphasising both of its “two faces”, both nationalist and moderate with Clerides

playing the nationalist card in his Presidential victories in 1993, in his criticism of

UN Secretary Boutros Ghali’s ‘Set of Ideas’, and his tough line on defence issues

in 1998. Despite this, DISY has transformed in recent years taking a pro-

reconciliation, progressive line.15 The party has been moderate in its attitudes

towards reunification, a position that has at times caused rifts within the party. In

their attitudes to reunification EUROKO and DISY are at polar opposites (see

Figure C). EUROKO are seen as hardliners, one of the few anti-federal parties in

the south of Cyprus, whereas DISY have supported the ‘bi-zonal, bi-communal

federation’ and power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots proposed under the Annan

plans (Kasoulides, 1999; Trimikliniotis, 2006: 21). DISY’s more compromising

approach may have contributed to Clerides’ downfall in the 2003 Presidential

election, where Papadopoulos was seen as tougher on the Annan plan negotiations

and the Cyprus Problem (Christophorou, 2005: 89).

Insert Figure C about here

Indeed, the impact of the Annan plan on Greek Cypriot party competition was

profound, creating a new cleavage and complicating the existing ones (Vural &

Peristianis, 2008: 39-40). The left-wing has usually been considered more

13 The Enosis (Union) movement represented an aspiration among Greek Cypriots to unite with the Greek “motherland,” categorically opposed by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (Kitromilides, 1979)14 The EOKA B organization was one of the main sides in the internal fighting among Greek Cypriots before 1974. It campaigned against then President Makarios and for the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus aiming for immediate unification with Greece (Papadakis, 1998)15 Interviews with DISY MPs Keti Clerides, Christos Pourgourides, Christos Stylianides and presidents of the Party Glafcos Clerides and Nicos Anastasiades.

15

conciliatory yet AKEL delivered a ‘soft no’ to the plan. Although its right-wing

rivals had reverted to type, DISY undermined traditional perceptions of the right-

wing attitude to compromise by endorsing the plan. DISY’s decision caused splits

within and from the party, with hardliners defecting to form EUROKO under ex-

DISY parliamentary spokesperson Demetis Syllouris’ leadership. EUROKO also

features members from New Horizons (Neoi Orizontes, NEO). The fears of Greek

Cypriots surrounding inter-ethnic compromise were emphatically demonstrated by

the 76% rejection in the 2004 referendum. DISY’s endorsement of Annan seemed

to position EUROKO perfectly to engage in ethnic outbidding.

However, EUROKO has been unable to exploit Greek Cypriot fears of the

plan. Table B shows that while DISY have been seemingly losing ground in recent

elections there have been mitigating factors. The 2008 presidential election

featured a three-way split with DIKO and AKEL, with the latter entering a

candidate for the first time.

Insert Table B about here

The loss of 3.7% of their 2001 vote in the 2006 parliamentary elections was

actually seen as a victory for the party given divisions and the referendum

outcome (Christophorou, 2007: 121-122). Although EUROKO’s polling of 5.8%

in 2006 is respectable for a year old party16, the 2009 European elections were

more troublesome. DISY increased its vote by 7.47%, winning the most votes of

any parties. In contrast, EUROKO lost 8.35% from the combined votes of its

founding parties. The Cyprus case is counter-intuitive to the predictions of

traditional ethnic outbidding theory, in which engaging in inter-ethnic

compromise increases the risk to the ethnic party (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka &

Shepsle, 1972). The results are particularly puzzling in light of the outcomes of

the Northern Irish case; UUP won the 1998 referendum but lost support to the

DUP, whereas DISY lost the 2004 peace referendum but has held off the

EUROKO challenge.

16A justified criticism of the EUROKO case is comparison of a newly emerged party with a well-established one. However in Israel, Yisrael Beiteinu (‘Israel is Our Home’, founded in 1999) has performed well in elections with its hard-line tone, emerging as the third largest party in the Knesset with 15 seats in 2009. The party emerged from the well-established Likud party, in response to concessions granted to Palestinians in the 1997 Wye River Memorandum.

16

Why has EUROKO’s outbidding of DISY been unsuccessful?

We argue that EUROKO has been unsuccessful in its attempts to outbid DISY due

to its inability to exploit Greek Cypriot fears over Annan. Instead it has worsened

Greek Cypriots’ fears that EUROKO’s extreme positions on practical issues

would further entrench the partition of the island.

That Greek Cypriots were apprehensive about the Annan plan is clearly

demonstrated by the 76% rejection in 2004 (Christophorou, 2005: 85). In

hindsight, DISY’s decision to say ‘yes’ was electorally risky as polls preceding

the referendum demonstrated little public sympathy for the plan. Similar to

Northern Ireland, negotiations were elite-led, with Greek Cypriots feeling their

concerns were not being addressed.17 Greek Cypriots were concerned that there

were not enough security guarantees dealing with the Turkish military presence,

and that refugee return and property issues were insufficiently addressed. The Όχι’

(No) campaign had support from large sections of the media, bishops, civil society

and President Papadopoulos himself (Yakinthou, 2009: 152-154). Amidst the

climate of hysteria during the campaign, there was also a belief that compromise

was unnecessary, since Cyprus’ accession to the EU was guaranteed (Loizides &

Keskiner, 2004: 159). Nevertheless, DISY voted ‘yes’ by a 78% margin at its

party congress in a tense atmosphere between opposing factions. 65% of DISY

supporters would ultimately vote against the party (Christophorou, 2005: 91 and

96). Much like Trimble, DISY leader Nicos Anastasiades favoured solution but

did not secure a comfortable majority.18 The level of opposition to the plan would

seemingly make Greek Cypriots more receptive to outbidding appeals. EUROKO

were thus established in environment conducive to taking over disenchanted DISY

voters.

However, EUROKO has largely been unable to exploit the fears of Greek

Cypriots over Annan, chief among which was that unlike the UUP, DISY did not

have to deal with the implementation difficulties of inter-ethnic compromise.19

Furthermore, whilst Greek Cypriots were clearly apprehensive of Annan, they did

not totally endorse EUROKO’s rejectionist positions, or diagnostic frames,

17 Interview with Alexandros Sinka, DISY’s International Secretary, 2010; Eleni Theocharous. DISY European Parliament MP. 18 Interview with Nikos Anastasiades, 200919 Interview with Yiouli Taki and David Officer, 2010

17

towards compromise and reunification. EUROKO did not moderate their position

on practical issues, maintaining a staunch anti-federalist position (Trimikliniotis,

2006: 21), which has repelled Greek Cypriot voters. DISY representative Keti

Clerides argues that the party respected the no vote, whereas the rejectionists may

have been undermined by the negativity of their arguments.20 The federal issue

itself is a complicated one. Whilst a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation may not be

the optimal solution for Greek Cypriots, it is deemed both acceptable and realistic.

Federalism is seen as a ‘historic compromise’, transcending both a majority-

minority relationship and the current partition. The ‘no’ vote was not necessarily a

‘no to federation’ (Trimikliniotis, 2009: 114), but ‘not under these conditions’ or

‘not now’. A 65% majority have deemed the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation

‘tolerable’ or ‘satisfactory’21, thus EUROKO’s anti-federalist position is a

minority one. In a sense, DISY may have won this ‘battle of ideas’ over the

reunification of Cyprus.22 DISY has covered its flanks by effectively framing the

argument that continuation of the island’s current status, as EUROKO’s

rejectionist stances would ensure, would lead to the worst possible outcome, the

entrenchment of partition.23 The continued influx of Turkish settlers and Greek

Cypriot international isolation after the referendum has strengthened the argument

(Anastasiou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2009). Additionally, EUROKO’s prognostic

framing, the vague ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus problem undermines the

outbidding party as an alternative (Christophorou, 2007: 117). In contrast, the

DUP’s prognostic frames and operation of the agreement’s institutions offered a

viable alternative to the UUP.

This article contends that identity issues may be important to successful

outbidding in order to appear as an ethnic tribune party (Mitchell, Evans &

O’Leary, 2009). Appearing more robust contributes to a party’s ability to exploit

the ethnic community’s fears over inter-ethnic compromise. Both Cyprus and

Northern Ireland have emerged from periods of violent struggle into an

environment where cultural and symbolic issues have become much more

strategically important in the continuation these conflicts. David Officer, a

20 Interview with Keti Clerides, 200921 From UNFICYP Survey (2007): http://www.cypruspolls.org/SurveyUNFICYP.pdf 22 Interview Glafcos Clerides 2009; Nicos Anastasiades, 2009; Alexandros Sinka, 2010; 23 63% deemed continuation of this status quo as ‘entirely unacceptable’ in 2009 survey. Available from: http://www.cyprus2015.org/

18

Northern Ireland trained scholar working in Cyprus, compared Nicosia and

Belfast in terms of this cultural battle.24 EUROKO has attempted to outbid DISY

on identity issues; EUROKO deputy Nicos Koutsou accused DISY deputy

Christos Pourgourides of “providing ammunition to the enemies of Hellenism” by

signing the PACE agreement which looked into alleged abuses of Muslim human

rights on Greek islands (Cyprus Mail, 2009). However, in line with H1 and H2,

DISY has been able to outmanoeuvre its competitors on identity issues through a

carefully balanced oppositional framing, compensating for its socialised

moderation on issues with international-level importance by maintaining stringent

positions on identity-based issues. For instance, the party regularly asserts that

“Cyprus is Greek”, and during the Annan negotiations it suggested the Greek flag

should be the official one of the Greek Cypriot constituent state (Sandal &

Loizides, 2009). More important however, was the party’s counter-bidding

strategy and image as the most credible advocate of Greek Cypriot interests

following accession to the European Union, the referendum and international

isolation after 2004. DISY appeared much more capable than EUROKO in

adapting its identity messages and framing of available scenarios of action in the

post-accession period. EUROKO’s outbidding appeals have not sufficiently

adapted to new political realities to the degree the DUP were able to after the

Good Friday Agreement.

Alternative Hypotheses

There are alternative hypothesis’ regarding the role of outbidding in divided

societies. One of which relates to ‘design choices’ and the role of competitive

incentives in such societies. Electoral systems can heavily influence party

behaviour. PR is criticised in both cases for causing in-group fragmentation, as

low seat quotas allow extreme parties some measure of representation. PR may

have encouraged the formation of new parties and outbidding, yet differing

outcomes in each case suggest that PR as the cause of successful ethnic

outbidding is an unconvincing argument. Another design choice facing

policymakers wishing to exert exogenous influences on party behaviour is that of

institutional architecture. The institutionalisation of ethnic identity, through

separate electoral rolls in Cyprus and ethnic designations under power-sharing in 24 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, 2010

19

Northern Ireland, is criticised because it reifies ethnicity cleavages and thus

encourages outbidding. However, the differing outcomes again suggest caution on

the salience of institutions in explanations of outbidding success, though poorly

designed certain institutions can certainly encourage centrifugal behaviour.

Furthermore, the DUP’s moderation on practical issues stems in part from

institutional incentives which are also arguably present in Cyprus for EUROKO.

The parties themselves could also be examined in terms of organisation,

leadership and reputation. Both cases demonstrated that these factors do play a

part in the success of ethnic outbidding which our hypothesis does not sufficiently

take into account, even if they may be secondary causes. This is most evident in

the comparative abilities of the UUP and DISY to manage dissention and

fragmentation once they agreed to compromise. Although DISY had to face ex-

members under new party labels it did so whilst retaining its support, something

the UUP was unable to do, despite its reputation and linkages to Northern Irish

institutions. Although organizational factors are quite important, they also confirm

our own hypothesis that effective outbidding requires a careful balancing between

symbolic and pragmatic concerns.

Although significant ‘outlier’ cases our hypotheses are not limited to

Northern Ireland and Cyprus. The prospect of European integration has offered

incentives both for ethnic outbidding and counter-bidding strategies particularly

among centre-right and conservative parties. The center-right is currently in power

in the three candidate countries of the European Union, Croatia (HDZ), Turkey

(AKP) and the Republic of Macedonia/FYROM (VMRO-DPMNE). Within the

context of the country’s accession to the EU, the traditionally Islamist AK Party in

Turkey has changed in a short time from a confrontational Islamist position to a

moderate reform-oriented mode (Turam, 2008: 6). Although pro-Islamist parties

in the 1990s attempted to outbid ethnic rivals on national issues, since 2002 AK

party the adopted a pragmatic approach to EU issues followed by a zero-problem

doctrine towards the country’s neighbors including Iran, Greece and Syria. As

predicted by our hypotheses the party maintains an attachment to symbolic and

identity issues recently manifested in confrontations with Israel however, it

refrains from confrontations that will jeopardize the country’s gains from EU

accession. Besides Europe, there have been comparable contradictions in party

competition in other continents. In Sri Lanka, both the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom

20

Party) and the UNP (United National Party) exploited Sinhalese ethnic grievances

over the language issue, both outbidding the other in their promise of ‘Sinhala-

only’, to the anger of the minority Tamils. Despite vociferous outbidding in the

1950s and 1960s, this did not eliminate inter-ethnic cooperation by both parties.

After leader S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s assassination in 1959, the SLFP reverted

to anti-Tamil policies after moderate cooperation (DeVotta, 2002: 88). The UNP

moderated so not to alienate Tamil voters, culminating in its 1965 election victory

and the formation of a multi-ethnic Sinhalese-Tamil government (Horowitz, 1985:

384). Electoral logic at this time justified both ethnic outbidding on the road to

capturing power and accommodation with the Tamils. The examples from Sri

Lanka also poses a warning that party moderation in divided societies might be

temporal and ineffective in influencing peace processes especially in the absence

of enduring incentives and norms favouring cooperation.

Conclusion

Inspired by the call from Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 434) to specify the

conditions in which ethnic outbidding was “more or less likely to pay off”, this

article hypothesised that ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when ethnic

parties are able to exploit the fears of their ethnic group over inter-ethnic

compromise, without taking extreme positions on practical issues that would

undermine the gains of rapprochement. In both cases inter-ethnic compromise

provoked new rounds of ethnic outbidding and an opportunity to exploit each

ethnic group’s fears and grievances with effective adversarial framing. DISY’s

decision to endorse the Annan Plan, resoundingly rejected by the Greek Cypriot

public enabled the formation of rival anti-Annan EUROKO. Likewise, the

problems the agreement created for the UUP afforded the DUP plenty of scope to

exploit Unionist fears. Nevertheless, the 1998 and 2004 referendums meant

compromise was only ever initiated in the Northern Irish case. The overall effect

was that unlike DISY, the UUP had to deal with its problematic implementation,

leaving the party vulnerable. However, placing too much emphasis on

implementation unfairly downplays the role of party agency in outbidding and

their ability to exploit the fears of their ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic compromise

alone is not ultimately responsible for outbidding success or failure, even though

it often provides the spark.

21

Outbidding appeals are rarely limited to one facet of ethnic division;

nonetheless identity does provide a particularly useful outbidding resource

(especially pre- and post-compromise) when these issues are framed effectively,

allowing parties to assume the ethnic tribune role. The UUP was unable to portray

itself as the staunch defenders of Unionist identity, particularly faced with an

effective DUP adversarial framing. In contrast, EUROKO’s accusations that

DISY was ‘aiding the enemies of Hellenism’ represented ineffectual framing,

particularly given DISY’s capacity to protect its flank by stressing the importance

of Greek identity in Cyprus. Outbidding on identity can compensate for the

second hypothesis, where ethnic parties moderate on practical issues such as

power-sharing or resource allocation so as not to alienate voters and undermine

the gains of compromise. EUROKO remains on the political fringes in spite of its

seemingly populous position on the Annan Plan, because it did not offer Greek

Cypriots a viable alternative, or prognostic frames, like the DUP were offering to

Unionists disappointed with the agreement. EUROKO’s anti-federalist and

uncompromising stances have scared off potential voters and allowed DISY to

argue that the rejectionist’s position would entrench the status quo. The DUP’s

adaption to the post-agreement environment through moderation on practical

issues, allowed the party to attain respectability and voters that previously

neglected the party. Indeed, ethnic parties’ ability to adapt dispels the idea that

outbidding is simply a blunt instrument of total opposition (Gormley-Heenan &

MacGinty, 2008: 44).

For policymakers, the findings of this research indicate that particular

attention ought to be paid to intra-ethnic dynamics in the periods pre- and post-

implementation of compromise, suggesting these dynamics can be as equally

volatile. More importantly, our article suggests the importance in drawing a

distinction between symbolic issues and the core practical aspects of a peace

process. Moderate political parties often have to appear intransigent on symbolic

issues to overcome domestic challenges something that external mediators might

miss in their reading of domestic actors’ overall intentions in the mediation. If

mediators misread the domestic political dynamics of divided societies, they

might unnecessarily antagonize moderates offering new opportunities for effective

outbidders in peace negotiations. Furthermore, this research has found that

preventing or curtailing episodes of ethnic outbidding is difficult, as while

22

democracy offers the requisite structural mechanisms to promote accommodation,

its attendant electoral politics may encourage opportunistic elites to exploit ethnic

cleavages (DeVotta, 2002: 96-97). Policymakers need to strike a balance between

in-group cohesion that prevents fragmentation and centrifugalism, and in-group

cohesion that reifies ethnic identities and stands groups in opposition to one

another. They must also be wary of competitive incentives that promote

uncompromising behaviour. Electoral and institutional design choices in both

cases may not have necessarily promoted outbidding, but they did not overtly

encourage moderation either. In post-conflict situations, emphasis should not be

exclusively on electoral and institutional factors but maintain incentives and

disincentives to avoid ethnic outbidding, or to make it more benign as witnessed

in Northern Ireland. Given that inter-ethnic compromise is desirable, and reducing

the salience of ethnic identity unfeasible in the short-term, this research suggests

that explicitly incentivising moderation on practical issues provides the best way

of curbing the severity of outbidding consequences.

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Figures and Tables

27

Figure B: Cleavages over status in Unionist politics

28

Centrifugal

X2 Y2

Figure A: Electoral competition in an ethnic party system

Y1X1

X Y

Softline

Anti - GFA

UUP

DUP

PUP

TUV

Hardline

Pro - GFA

Figure C: Cleavages over the Cyprus Problem in Greek Cypriot politics

Election Type

Year UUP (%) Change since last result

DUP (%) Change since last result

Assembly 1973 25.3 __ 10.8 __

1982 29.7 +4.4 23.0 +12.2

1998 21.25 -8.45 18.14 -4.86

2003 22.7 +1.45 25.6 +7.46

2007 14.9 -7.8 30.1 +4.5

Westminster 1974 I 36.5 __ 8.5 __

1979 36.6 +0.1 10.2 +1.7

1983 34.0 -1.6 20.0 +9.8

1987 37.8 +3.8 11.7 -8.3

1992 34.5 -3.3 13.1 +1.4

1997 32.7 -1.8 13.6 +0.5

2001 26.8 -5.9 22.5 +8.9

2005 17.7 -9.1 33.7 +11.2

2010 II 15.2 -2.5 25.0 -8.7

European 1979 10.0 __ 29.8 __

29

Pro -Annan

SoftlineHardline

Anti - Annan

DISY

AKEL

EUROKO

DIKO

EDEK

1984 21.5 +11.5 33.6 +3.8

1989 22.2 +0.7 29.9 -3.7

1994 23.8 +1.6 29.2 -0.7

1999 17.6 -6.2 28.4 -0.8

2004 16.6 -1.0 32.0 +3.6

2009 III 17.1 +0.5 18.2 -13.8

Table A: Selected Unionist election results in Northern IrelandNotes: I UUP and DUP in United Ulster Unionist Council, a body of Unionists opposing the Sunningdale Agreement; II UUP in electoral alliance with UK Conservative Party; DUP backed two Unionist independent candidates to avoid splitting Unionist vote; III Ex-DUP MEP Jim Allister, leader of Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) won 13.7%, significantly reducing the DUP’s totalSource: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/

Election Type

Year DISY (%) Change since last

result

EUROKO (%)

Change since last

result

Parliamentary 1976 26 __ n/a n/a

1981 31.92 +5.92 n/a n/a

1985 33.56 +1.64 n/a n/a

1991 35.8 +2.24 n/a n/a

1996 34.5 -1.3 n/a n/a

2001 34 -0.5 3 n/a

2006 30.3 -3.7 5.8* +2.8

Presidential

1st/2nd round

1993 36.74 /

50.31

__ n/a n/a

1998 40.1 /

50.8

+3.36 I 0.91* n/a

2003 38.8 / II -1.3 2.12* +1.21

2008 33.51 /

46.63

-5.29 n/a n/a

European 2004 28.23 n/a 1.65* ; 10.8** n/a

2009 35.7 +7.47 4.1 -8.35

Table B: Selected election results in the Republic of Cyprus

Notes: I First round % change only; II Papadopoulos won 51.5% in the first round with support of AKEL; * NEO’s results; **EURODI resultSources: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/c/cyprus/ and http://www.kypros.org/Elections/index.html

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