Corruption Risks and the Management of the Ministerial Bureaucracy in PolandPaul Heywood, University of NottinghamJan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, University of Nottingham & European University Institute, Florence

June 2008

Page 212.06.2008

Question & Relevance

Question ► What has been the relation between the political management of the

ministerial bureaucracy and high-level corruption risks in Poland? Debates► Causes of corruption► Corruption in Poland ► Other, e.g. EU integration

Page 312.06.2008

Main argument

Argument► Risks of high-level corruption have increased in Poland► Link between ‘corruption risks’ and ‘actual corruption’ is uncertain► Personnel politicisation leads to the de-institutionalisation of the policy-

making processOverview► Our approach to the analysis of corruption risks ► Assessment of corruption risks in Poland

Personnel management Management of policy-making process

► Conclusion & implications

Page 412.06.2008

Analysing corruption

Problems of defining corruption► Generic: ‘misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (TI), distinguished

between ‘according to’ and ‘against’ the rule - but difficult to apply in practice.

Different types of corruption► High-level (political) versus low-level (petty, routine); ‘state capture’► ‘Corruption risks’ versus ‘actual corruption’

Our focus► Risks of high-level corruption & state capture – particularly as related to

the ministerial bureaucracy.

Page 512.06.2008

Analysing the management of the ministerial bureaucracy

Two dimensions of management► Personnel management► Management of the policy-making processIdentify ‘danger zones’ of corruption► Unpack each dimension along mechanisms that can create corruptionExamine causal relationships► Impact of personnel management on policy-making ► Impact of patterns of managing the ministerial bureaucracy on

► Corruption risks► Actual corruption

Page 612.06.2008

Danger zones of corruption: Personnel policy

►Practice of dismissals – time in office►Careers after departure from the ministries

Incentive to build reputation of honesty and competence

►Professional standards, examination system and competition for senior positions

Screening capacity of personnel system

►Career background of senior officials►Selection process

Multiple dependencies of senior officials

►Depth and degree of politicisation►Formal-legal basis and practice of personnel

policy

Personalisation of personnel policy

Evaluation strategyDanger zone of corruption

Page 712.06.2008

Danger zones of corruption: Policy-making process

►Officials’ access to expertise in policy-making ►Use of impact assessments

Insufficient access to expertise and use of quality management tools

►Relations of senior officials to private interests ► Approach of officials to transparency

Lack of ‘fire-alarms’ that could provide external monitoring

►Mechanisms of vertical and horizontal coordination within ministries

Personalised internal control and coordination of policy-making

►Governmental political coordination needs of officials

Multiple dependencies of senior officials in policy-making

► Formalisation and specification of officials’responsibilities

►Officials’ perception of autonomy

Vague formalisation of roles & broad autonomy of officials

Evaluation strategyDanger zone of corruption

Page 812.06.2008

Research Strategy

Poland as case study► ‘Most likely case’ among new member states from ECE► Reforms undertaken by PiS-led governmentsComparison over time► ‘2005 – 2007’ versus ‘pre-2005’Research methods► Documentary analysis to examine legal changes ► 50+ interviews to identify patterns of personnel management and policy-

making

Page 912.06.2008

Empirical findings: Overview

Persisted at high levels Access to expertise and use of quality management tools

Decreased slightly but still significant‘Fire-alarms’ to provide for external monitoring

Persisted at high levelsInternal control and coordination of policy-making

Persisted at high levelsMultiple dependencies of officials in policy-making

Persisted at high levels Formalisation of roles & autonomy of officials

Increased Incentive to build long-term reputation of honesty and competence

IncreasedScreening capacity of personnel system

Persisted at high levelMultiple loyalties of senior officials

IncreasedPersonalisation of personnel policy

Corruption risks in Poland: ‘2005-2007’vs. ‘pre-2005’

Danger zone

Page 1012.06.2008

1.1. Personalisation of personnel policy

Evaluation strategy► Examine depth and degree of politicisation► Examine formal-legal basis and practice of personnel managementFindings ► Since 2005, risks have increased due to growth of politicisation► Evident at the formal-legal level (esp. since 2006)► Evident in practice, as political intervention reaches down to director

position and beyond► But considerable differences across ministries► In practice, continuous re-politicisation since early 1990s

Page 1112.06.2008

Figure 2. Number of appointments to the position of Deputy Minister

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

All DM within 6 months after Government formation

All DM within 12 months afterGovernment formation

N BuzekMiller Marcinkiewicz

Page 1212.06.2008

1.2. Multiple dependencies of senior officials

Evaluation strategy ► Career background of senior officials► Selection processFindings ► Overall, potential for divided loyalties has largely persistedCareers► After reform of 2006, fewer formal-legal constraints on choice of recruitment

channels, but ► Growing recruitment from wider public sector► High proportion of promotions below the level of deputy minister► KSAP alumni as professional backbone of government operationsSelection process ► Selection of deputy ministers as part of coalition bargaining ► After reform of 2006, growing autonomy of deputy ministers and directors over

staff appointments

Page 1312.06.2008

1.3. Screening capacity of the personnel system

Evaluation strategy► Professional standards, examination system and competition for senior

positionsFindings ► After reform of 2006, virtual collapse of the screening system for senior

positions ► Very light screening before admission to state staffing pool (while in

operation), especially compared to 1999 competition procedure todirector posts

► Circumvention of screening system by the Kaczynski government in 2006But ► competition for senior positions and candidate screening has been under

pressure since 2001

Page 1412.06.2008

1.4. Reputation-building incentives

Evaluation strategy► Practice of dismissals – time in office► Careers after departure from the ministriesFindings ► After 2006 reform, increased risks due to growing insecurity of tenure for

senior officials► Before 2006 reform, tenure of directors could only be cut short by means

of re-organisations (but this led to structural instability) ► Problems created when directors without civil service status are

dismissed ► Difficult/uncertain career prospects for politicians

Page 1512.06.2008

2.1. Formalisation of roles & ‘perceptions of autonomy’

Evaluation strategy► Formalisation and specification of responsibilities► Officials’ perception of autonomy over their jobFindings ► Overall, risks persist from high levels of ‘perceived autonomy’ despite

existence of routine formalisation.Great elasticity of formal rules.

► Considerable variation/inconsistencies across government► Emphasis on ‘operational autonomy’► Policy activism at the top tends to crowd out policy initiatives at the

bottom

Page 1612.06.2008

2.2. Multiple dependencies in policy-making

Evaluation strategy► Governmental and political coordination needs of senior officials in the

policy-making processFindings ► Potential for government fragmentation has remained high due to:► Competing coordination centres inside government► Political imperatives of coalition government► (to lesser extent) constitutional semi-presidentialism

Page 1712.06.2008

2.3. Internal ministerial control and coordination

Evaluation strategy ► Mechanisms of vertical and horizontal coordination inside ministriesFindings ► Overall, large degree of inconsistency and structural instability across

government ► Risks persist from preference for personalised modes of control and

coordination and lack of effective horizontal coordination► Vertical coordination by means of small-group, open-door meetings with

direct subordinates► Many attempts to improve horizontal coordination and ‘joining-up’ inside

ministries, but few success stories► Staff (including lower ranking managers) tend to perceive a lack of

effective ‘steer’ from the political leadership of the ministries

Page 1812.06.2008

2.4. ‘Fire-alarms’ and external monitoring

Evaluation strategy ► Relations between senior officials and private interests ► Approach of officials towards transparency in policy-makingFindings ► Overall, persistence of significant risks due to ineffective legal frameworkBut ► Changing attitudes of officials towards lobbying and transparency provide

grounds for optimism ► Complex legal basis and several attempts to regulate the area ► But no basis for effective competition between groups

► Different ministerial approaches to dealing with private interests► Senior officials’ attitudes, effects of media coverage and government

policy

Page 1912.06.2008

2.5. Expertise and information management

Evaluation ► Basis of officials’ policy-making expertise ► Use of impact assessments in policy-makingFindings ► Overall, risks have largely persisted ► Emphasis on personal expertise or access to personal networks of

expertise► Few regulations for access to outside expertise► Regulations for the use of impact assessments are largely ineffective.

Little uptake of methodology

Page 2012.06.2008

Discussion & Conclusions

► Corruption risks have increased along most dimensions of personnel management and policy-making► Contradicts intention of PiS-led governments

► Impact of personnel management on policy-making► Personnel politicisation has prevented institutionalisation of ministerial policy-

making in Poland, including ► Creation of structural instability and inconsistency across government► Preference for personalised, ad hoc modes of control and coordination ► Loss of expertise for policy-making ► Inability to apply impact assessment methodologies

► Unintended consequence of anti-corruption strategy during PiS-led governments?

► Relation between patterns of managing the ministerial bureaucracy and actual corruption ► Impact on actual corruption is uncertain► But striking correlation between governance indicators and corruption record in

Poland

Page 2112.06.2008

Corruption & Civil Service Governance in Poland(Source: World Bank Governance Indicators)

50556065707580859095

100

1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

Wor

ld B

ank

Gov

erna

nce

Indi

cato

rs

Quality of the Civil Service Control of Corruption

Page 2212.06.2008

Implications & Outlook

Implications ► Analysis of ‘danger zones of corruption’ can be replicated for different

government levels and individual agencies► Obstacles for the development of government capacity► Current reform plansFuture research agenda

Thank you