1

CORRUPTION IN ADMINISTRATION

With special reference to India

Dr. Ashok Ranjan Basu1

Introduction

Corruption is generally defined as the exercise of official powers against public interest or

the abuse of public office for private gains. In view of the multitude of approaches and views on

corruption it is not easy to agree on an unanimous definition of the term. However, the shorter

definition includes “abuse of authority,bribery, favouritism, extortion, fraud, patronage, theft,

deceit, to Public sector corruption is a symptom of failed governance. Governance is defined as

the norms, traditions, and institutions by which power and authority in a country are exercised.

These norms, traditions, and institutions include the institutions of participation and

accountability in governance, mechanisms of citizen voice and exit, and norms and networks of

civic engagement; the constitutional-legal framework and the nature of accountability

relationships between citizens and government; the process by which governments are selected,

monitored, held accountable, and renewed or replaced; and the legitimacy, credibility, and

efficacy of the institutions that govern political, economic, cultural, and social interactions

among citizens and between citizens and their governments. It is not easy to define

corruption. But in a narrow sense, corruption is mostly concerned with ˜bribery” and it takes

several forms.

Concern about corruption is as old as the history of government. In350 BCE, Aristotle

suggested in The Politics,i “To protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money be

issued openly in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in various

wards.” Corruption is a global phenomenon and it is omnipresent. Corruption today has its roots

deep inside Indian society. It has now become an inseparable part of the country's cultural l

moorings. The general masses routinely fall prey to corruption in different shapes and forms. It

not only hampers economic growth, local and foreign investments are also discouraged in the

process. The availability of resources decrease, poverty rises and efforts for human development

are jeopardized.

Corruption has gradually evolved over time in this part of the world. But the incidence of

corruption has increased with the gradual flourishing of civilization. There was no scope for

corruption in primitive societies due to absence of complexities. The Greek and Roman

civilizations were known to have been afflicted with this malaise in different degrees. Corruption

was then political in nature. Some information on corruption in the Indian subcontinent in

1 Dr.Ashok Ranjan Basu, PhD, D.Litt , FIMA (Delhi) F.R.A.S ( London), is a former Member of

Central Administration Tribunal, Calcutta Bench and Financial Commissioner cum Principal Secretary,

Govt. of H.P. Shimla

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ancient times has also been found. In the 'Artha Shashtra'ii of Kautilya written more than two

millenniums ago, mention has been made of forty techniques of siphoning off money by the

government employees. Some evidences are also there about corruption in administration,

judiciary and commerce of ancient India.

During the Hindu era and later, six hundred years of Muslim rule, no large-scale corruption

was observed. It proliferated in the subcontinent mainly during the rule of the East India

Company. In order to make money through different means, the company at first established

itself as a commercial power, then as a political power. Although employees belonging to the

higher echelons did not indulge in corruption, as their salary was quite high, widespread

corruption was observed among lower level employees.

The economy of India was under socialist-inspired policies for an entire generation from

the 1950s until the late 1980s. The economy was characterized by extensive regulation,

protectionism, and public ownership, policies vulnerable to pervasive corruption and slow

growth. License Raj was often at the core of corruption.

The Vohra Committee Report, submitted by the former Indian Union Home

Secretary, N.N. Vohra, in October 1993, studied the problem of the criminalization of politics

and of the nexus among criminals, politicians and bureaucrats in India. The report contained

several observations made by official agencies on the criminal network which was virtually

running a parallel government. It also discussed criminal gangs who enjoyed the patronage of

politicians — of all political parties — and the protection of government functionaries. It

revealed that political leaders had become the leaders of gangs.iii

They were connected to the

military as well. Over the years criminals had been elected to local bodies, State Assemblies, and

even the Parliament. The unpublished annexure to the Vohra Report are believed to contain

highly explosive material.

Corruption has now become a global phenomenon. Although statistics on corruption are

often questionable, the data suggest that corruption accounts for a significant proportion of

economic activity. In Kenya, for example, “questionable” public expenditures noted by the

controller and auditor general in 1997 amounted to7.6 percent of GDP. In Latvia a recent World

Bank survey found that more than 40 percent of households and enterprises agreed that

“corruption is a natural part of our lives and helps solve many problems”.iv

Tanzania service

delivery survey data suggest that bribes paid to officials in the police, courts, tax services, and

land offices amounted to 62 percent of official public expenditures in these areas. In the

Philippines the Commission on Audit estimates that $4 billion is diverted annually because of

public sector corruption.v

A 2004 World Bank study of the ramifications of corruption for service delivery concludes

that an improvement of one standard deviation in the International Country Risk Guide

corruption index leads to a 29 percent decrease in infant mortality rates, a 52 percent

increase in satisfaction among recipients of public health care, and a 30–60 percent increase in

public satisfaction stemming from improved road conditions. Studies also show that corruption

slows growth, impair capital accumulation, and reduce the effectiveness of

development aid, and increases income inequality and poverty.vi

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Not surprisingly, there has been a growing global movement to condemn

corrupt practices—a movement that has resulted in the removal of some national leaders.

In addition, many governments and development agencies have devoted substantial resources

and energy to fighting corruption in recent years. Despite these efforts, however, it is not clear

that the incidence of corruption has declined perceptibly, especially in highly corrupt countries.

Concerns about corruption have mounted in recent years; in tandem with growing

evidence of its detrimental impact on development). Corruption slows GDP growth and

adversely affects capital accumulation); public infrastructure and health services. It lowers the

quality of education and reduces the effectiveness of development aid and increases income

inequality and poverty.vii

Bribery, often the most visible manifestation of public sector

corruption, harms the reputation of and erodes trust in the state.

Poor governance and corruption make it more difficult for the poor and other disadvantaged

groups, such as women and minorities, to obtain public services. Corruption may also affect

macroeconomic stability, when, for example, the allocation of debt guarantees based on

cronyism or fraud in financial institutions leads to a loss of confidence by savers, investors, and

foreign exchange markets. The Bank of Credit and Commerce

International (BCCI) scandal, uncovered in 1991, for example, led to the financial ruin of

Gabon’s pension system; the corrupt practices at Mehran Bank in the Sind Province of Pakistan

in the mid-1990s led to a loss of confidence in that country’s national banking system.viii

Indian administration also is tainted with scandals. India is among 55 of the 106 countries

where corruption is rampant, according to the Corruption Perception Index 2004 Report released

by Transparency International India. Corruption in India leads to promotion not prison. It is very

difficult to catch ˜big sharks. Corruption in India has wings not wheels. As nation grows, the

corrupt also grow to invent new methods of cheating the government and public. Political,

bureaucratic, corporate and individual corruptions in India are major concerns. A 2005 study

conducted by Transparency International in India found that more than 55% of Indians had first-

hand experience of paying bribes or influence peddling to get jobs done in public offices

successfully. Transparency International estimates that truckers pay US$5 billion in bribes

annually. In 2010 India was ranked 87th

out of 178 countries in Transparency International's

Corruption Perceptions Index.ix

Criminalization is also a serious problem in contemporary Indian

politics. In July 2008 The Washington Post reported that nearly a fourth of the 540 Indian

Parliament members faced criminal charges, "including human trafficking, immigration rackets,

embezzlement, rape and even murder.

India tops the list for black money in the entire world with almost US$1456 billion in Swiss

banks (approximately USD 1.4 trillion) in the form of black money. According to the data

provided by the Swiss Banking Association Report (2006), India has more black money than the

rest of the world combined. Indian-owned Swiss bank account assets are worth 13 times the

country’s national debtx.

“The recent scams involving unimaginably big amounts of money, such as the 2G spectrum

scam, are well known. It is estimated that more than trillion dollars are stashed away in foreign

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havens, while 80% of Indians earn less than 2$ per day and every second child is malnourished.

It seems as if only the honest people are poor in India and want to get rid of their poverty by

education, emigration to cities, and immigration, whereas all the corrupt ones, are getting rich

through scams and crime. It seems as if India is a rich country filled with poor people. Many of

the biggest scandals since 2010 have involved very high levels of government, including Cabinet

Ministers and Chief Ministers, such as in the 2G spectrum scam, the 2010 Commonwealth

Games scam and the Adarsh Housing Society scam, mining scandal in Karnataka and cash for

vote scam etc.

The chief economic consequences of corruption are the loss to the economy, an un healthy

climate for investment and an increase in the cost of government-subsidized services. The

Transparency International India study estimates the monetary value of petty corruption in 11

basic services provided by the government, like education, healthcare, judiciary, police, etc., to

be around 21,068 crore (US$4.7 billion). India still ranks in the bottom quartile of developing

nations in terms of the ease of doing business, and compared to China and other lower developed

Asian nations, the average time taken to secure the clearances for a startup or to invoke

bankruptcy is much greater.xi

The extent of corruption in India is visible in every walk of life.

The corruption is prevalent in politics, bureaucracy, judiciary and in armed forces as well.

Civil Service

Transparency International, a global watchdog body, ranked India at a low 73 out of the

102 countries in its Corruption Perception Index, later in the 2008 survey, it ranked 85th in a 128

country list. The World Economic Forum on the other hand, ranked India 44 among 49 countries

surveyed. A 2009 survey of the leading economies of Asia, revealed Indian bureaucracy to be

not just least efficient out of Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia,

Taiwan, Vietnam, China, Philippines and Indonesia; further it was also found that working with

the India's civil servants was a "slow and painful" process. This ranking, done by 1,274

expatriates working in 12 North and South Asian nations, ranked Asian bureaucracies in the

following order: Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan,

Vietnam, China, Philippines, Indonesia and Indiaxii

.

By the 1990s, the economic liberalization of the Indian economy and the end of the license

raj, gradually opened up the economic skies and the end to the regulatory regime which

flourished during previous era, loosened its hold over the resources. Though this brought to

surface the practices of kickbacks, both during disinvestment and offering government contracts,

and while setting up of industries by foreign businesses were soon employing same corrupt

practices used by Indian businesses for decades.

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Over the years, several reasons have been cited by various scholars regarding the sustained

existence of corrupt practices within the Indian bureaucratic system, leading among them is its

nexus with political corruption, lack of accountability and low regulatory controls. Others have

suggested a rigid bureaucracy with an exclusivist process of decision making in an overly-

centralized government as the reason its pervasiveness despite the passing years. In fact surveys

have found it to be most resistant to transformation in its ways of functioning, even after

repeated efforts by successive governments.xiii

Some experts believe that a fall out of the existing

corruption and red tapism can be detrimental to the Indian economy in the long run, as foreign

investors in a rapidly global, economies of the world still view entering into India as a challenge

and plagued as it remains both with political and bureaucratic corruption as well systematic

inefficiency which leads to long turn around period as project delays cause cost escalations in

volatile market economies. Also in the recent years, several corrupt economies of Asia have

faced setbacks, after the wave of economic upturn faded; this makes the urgency of corrective

measures more than evident, they make it an imperative.

Land and property

Government officials often steal state property. In cities and villages throughout India,

consisting of municipal and other government officials, elected politicians, judicial officers,

armed forces officers, real estate developers and law enforcement officials, acquire, develop and

sell land in illegal ways.

Tendering processes and awarding contracts

Government officials having discretionary powers in awarding contracts engage in

preferential treatment for selected bidders and display negligence in quality control processes.

Many state-funded construction activities in India, such as road building, are dominated by

construction mafias, which are groupings of corrupt public works officials, materials suppliers,

politicians and construction contractors. Shoddy construction and material substitution (e.g.

mixing sand in cement while submitting expenses for cement) result in roads and highways being

dangerous, and sometimes simply washed away when India's heavy monsoon season arrives.

Health Services

In Government Hospitals, corruption is associated with non availability of medicines (or

duplicate/fake medicines), getting admission, consultations with doctors and availing diagnostic

services. There have been cases of diversion of medical supplies from government hospitals and

clinics as well as supply and distribution of medicines of inferior quality. Moreover the medical

officers are quite often preoccupied with their private practice at the cost of public service.

Taxation Department

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There have been several cases of collusion of officials of the taxation departments

whether it is income tax department or sales tax department for a favorable tax treatment in

return for bribes.

Preferential award of public resources

The land in areas with short supply is relatively common with government entities

awarding public land to private concerns at negligible rates. Other examples include the award of

mining leases to private companies without a levy of taxes that is proportionate to the market

value of the ore.

Corporate Corruption

Less stressed, but no less important, is the supply side of corruption (in which the payer of

the bribe gets to evade regulation and taxation). Business owners often bribe public officials to

sabotage processes (while keeping most of the proceeds thereof with themselves), and at other

times to evade prosecution for illegal acts. Also noteworthy are stock market scams, fleecing of

consumers, adulterated and sub-standard products by businesses, fake medicines, environmental

damage by industries via evasion of environmental regulation, and so on.

Forged and Fake Papers

There is a widespread use of fake documents for getting privileges which are otherwise

unavailable to an individual or a business. Indian visa applications to foreign embassies are

routinely hauled up for using fake educational degrees, fake financial statements, etc. Indians

routinely lie about their date of birth to comply with school admission guidelines or to evade the

statutory retirement age.

Judiciary

According to Transparency International, judicial corruption in India is attributable to

factors such as "delays in the disposal of cases, shortage of judges and complex procedures, all

of which are exacerbated by a preponderance of new laws”.

Corruption is eating into the vitals of our polity. No institution is free of this menace. The

Supreme Court’s observations on the rot in the Allahabad High Court are disturbing. A Bench

consisting of Justice Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Misra said on November 26 that

most judges of this High Court are corrupt and collude with advocates. Sadly, many High Court

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judges are facing charges of corruption. The cases involving Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta

High Court, Chief Justice P.D. Dinakaran of the Sikkim High Court (formerly of the Karnataka

High Court) and Justice Nirmal Yadav of the Uttarakhand High Court (formerly of the Punjab

and Haryana High Court) are all at various stages. The charge that many former Chief Justices of

India were corrupt has given a new twist to judicial corruption. The Supreme Court is seized of

the matter.

There is also the Rs 23-crore Ghaziabad PF scam in which a Supreme Court judge

(since retired), seven Allahabad High Court judges, 12 judges of the subordinate courts and six

retired High Court judges are allegedly involved. The key accused, Ashutosh Asthana, died in

jail mysteriously in October, 2009. He had provided vital documents to the CBI that established

connivance of these judges.xiv

Defence Services

The Indian Armed Forces have frequently witnessed corruption involving senior armed

forces officers from the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. Many officers have

been caught for allegedly selling defence stores in the black market in the border districts of

Indian states and territories. Recent sukhna land scandal involving four Indian Lieutenant

Generals has shaken public faith in the country's growing military at a time when large sums are

being spent on modernising the armed forces. A string of eye-popping fraud cases has damaged

the institution in recent years. The latest Adarsh land scam is another example of the nexus

between the armed forces, bureaucracy and the politicians in the embezzlement of government

property.

Corruption, however, is not manifested in one single form. It typically takes at least four

broad forms:xv

1. Petty, administrative, or bureaucratic corruption. Many corrupt acts are isolated

transactions by individual public officials who abuse their office by demanding bribes and

kickbacks, diverting public funds, or awarding favours in return for personal considerations.

Such acts are often referred to as petty corruption, even though, in the aggregate, a substantial

amount of public resources may be involved.

2. Grand corruption. The theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by state

officials—usually members of, or people associated with, the political or administrative elite—

constitutes grand corruption.

3. State or regulatory capture and influence peddling. State capture is the collusion

by private actors with public officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit. In this form

of corruption, the private sector “captures” the state legislative, executive, and judicial apparatus

for its own purposes. State capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite)

view of corruption, in which public officials extort or otherwise exploit the private sector for

private ends.

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4. Patronage, paternalism, clientelism, and being a “team player.” Corruption occurs when

officials use their official position to provide assistance to clients or colleagues with the same

geographic, ethnic, or cultural origin so that they receive preferential treatment in their dealings

with the public sector, including public sector employment.

Measures to combat corruption

The factors that cause corruption are country specific. Approaches that apply common policies

and tools (that is, one-size-fits-all approaches) to countries in which acts of corruption and the

quality of governance vary widely are likely to fail. Policy makers need to understand the local

circumstances that encourage or permit public and private actors to be corrupt. Efforts to combat

corruption also demand strong local leadership and ownership if they are to be successful and

sustainable.

Public sector corruption, as a symptom of failed governance, depends on a multitude of

factors, such as the quality of public sector management, the nature of accountability relations

between the government and citizens, the legal framework, and the degree to which public sector

processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of information. Efforts to address

corruption that fail to adequately account for these underlying drivers are unlikely to generate

profound and sustainable results.

To understand these drivers, a conceptual and empirical perspective is

needed to understand why corruption persists and what can be done to stop it.

At the conceptual level, a number of interesting ideas have been put

forward. These ideas can be broadly grouped into three categories: (a) Principal Agent models,

(b) New Public Management perspectives, and (c) Neo Institutional economics

frameworks.xvi

Principal-Agent Models

The most widely used modelling strategy is the principal-agent model. A common thread in

these models is that the government is led by a benevolent dictator (the principal), who aims to

motivate government officials (agents) to act with integrity in the use of public resources.

One such view, the “crime and punishment” model of Gary Becker

(1968), states that self-interested public officials seek out or accept bribes as long as the expected

gains from corruption exceed the expected costs (detection and punishment) associated with

corrupt acts. According to this view, corruption could be mitigated by reducing the number of

transactions over which public officials have discretion, reducing the scope of gains from each

transaction, increasing the probability for detection, or increasing the penalty for corrupt

activities.xvii

Klitgaard restates this model to emphasize the unrestrained monopoly power

and discretionary authority of government officials .According to him, corruption equals

monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. Under this framework, corruption is curtailed by

establishing a rules-driven government that includes strong internal controls and leaves little

room for discretion by public officials. Such an approach is not appropriate in highly corrupt

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countries, however, where the rules enforcers themselves add an extra burden of corruption and

lack of discretion is thwarted by collusive behaviour by corruptors.xviii

Another variant of the principal-agent model integrates the role of legislators and elected

officials in the analysis. In these variant, high-level government officials—represented by

legislators or elected public officials—institute or manipulate policy and legislation in favour of

particular interest groups (representing private sector interests and entities or individual units of

public bureaucracy competing for higher budgets) in exchange for rents or side payments.

Legislators weigh the personal monetary gains from corrupt practices and improved chances of

re election against the chance of being caught, punished, and losing an election with a tarnished

reputation.

Factors affecting this decision include campaign financing mechanisms, information access by

voters, the ability of citizens to vote out corrupt legislators, the degree of political contestability,

the type of electoral system, the democratic institutions and traditions in place, and the

institutions of accountability in governance.

This conceptual framework is useful in analyzing political corruption or state capture.

A fine line divides theoretical models that focus on the effects of localization on corruption and

those that analyze the decentralization of corruption within a multitier hierarchy from an

industrial organization of corruption type of framework. In the multitier hierarchy approach, a

distinction is made between top-down corruptions (in which corrupt high-level officials buy

lower-level officials by sharing a portion of their gains) and bottom-up corruption (in which low-

level officials share the bribes they collect with higher-level officials in order to avoid detection

or punishment). Top-down corruption is more likely to exist in a federal system of governance,

where power may be shared by various orders of government. Bottom-up corruption is more

likely to prevail in unitary or centralized forms of governance

or in dictatorial regimes.xix

The impact of governance on corruption networks is an interesting topic that has not been

studied adequately. Tirole analyzes one aspect of this network by means of a three-tier principal-

supervisor-agent model. This extension of a conventional principal-agent model helps draw

inferences about the type of corrupt relations that could evolve under a three-tier unitary

government structure. These inferences are highly sensitive to underlying assumptions about

principal-agent relationships under a multitier system of governance.xx

In Guriev’s three-tier

hierarchy model, the mid-level bureaucrat supervises the agent and reports to the principal.

Gurievxxi

concludes that top-level corruption “is not efficient, as it redistributes rents in favour of

agents, and therefore makes it more attractive for potential entrants,” thereby leading to higher

total corruption. Shleifer and Vishny use a conventional industrial organization model to analyze

corruption. They conclude that decentralization is likely to increase corruption. In their model

government bureaucracies and agencies act as monopolists selling complementary government-

produced goods that are legally required for private sector activity. The main idea behind the

model is that under centralized corruption, bureaucracies act like a joint monopoly, whereas

under decentralized corruption bureaucracies behave as independent monopolies .When

bureaucracies act as independent monopolies, they ignore the effects of higher prices on the

overall demand for a good and hence drive up the cumulative bribe burden.xxii

Waller, Verdier, and Gardner define decentralized corruption as a system in which higher-

level officials collect a fixed amount of bribe income from each bureaucrat who takes bribes,

without mandating the bribe size the bureaucrats charge. In a centralized system, in contrast,

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bribe size is determined by the higher level of government, which collects the bribes from

bureaucrats and redistributes them after keeping a share. Waller, Verdier, and Gardner posit that

decentralized corruption leads to lower levels of total corruption in the economy (lower spread),

higher levels of bribe per entrepreneur (higher depth), and a smaller formal sector than does a

centralized corruption equilibrium. These results vary widely for specific “regimes” in the

model, however: if, for example, wages are high enough and monitoring systems effective

enough, centralized corruption may reduce total corruption and expand the formal economy.xxiii

Ahlin focuses on the effects of different types of decentralization, from a horizontal, as

opposed to a hierarchical, perspective. In his model a country is divided into regions, each with a

given number of independent power groups’ .Bureaucratic decentralization affects the political

organization in a region by increasing the number of power groups or bureaucracies; the number

of jurisdictions captures the degree of regional decentralization.

Ahlin’s theoretical results suggest that corruption is determined by mobility of

economic agents across regions. Under the assumption of no interregional mobility, corruption

increases with the degree of bureaucratic decentralization but is independent of the degree of

regional decentralization. For perfect interregional mobility, corruption decreases with regional

decentralization and is independent of bureaucratic decentralization. A key intuition of the model

is that corrupt bureaucrats fail to internalize the costs of increases in bribes imposed on other

bureaucrats.xxiv

Arikan (2004) uses a tax competition framework to examine localization corruption links. In his

model corruption is measured as the proportion of tax revenue appropriated by bureaucrats;

decentralization is captured by the number of jurisdictions competing for a mobile tax base.

Local governments decide on the levels of tax rates and corrupt earnings in order to maximize a

weighted sum of corrupt earnings and citizens’ utility. A higher degree of decentralization is

expected to lead to lower levels of corruption.xxv

Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) shed light on the determinants of capture of the

democratic process. They conclude that the extent of capture is ambiguous and context specific:

the extent of capture at the local level depends on the degree of voter awareness, interest group

cohesiveness, electoral uncertainty, electoral competition, and the heterogeneity of interdistrict

income inequality. A key assumption of this model is that the

degree of political awareness is correlated to education and socioeconomic position. In

particular, the model assumes that the fraction of informed voters in the middle income class is

lower than or equal to the fraction of rich voters and higher than the fraction of poor voters.

Uninformed voters are swayed by campaign financing, whereas informed voters favour the party

platform that maximizes the utility of their class. The outcome of local and national elections in

terms of policy platforms will coincide under four assumptions: (a) all districts have the same

socioeconomic composition, and swings among districts (district-specific preferences for one of

two political parties) are perfectly correlated; (b) national elections are majoritarian; (c) there is

an equal proportion of informed voters in local and national elections; and (d) the proportion of

the rich who contribute to their lobby is equal at the national and local levels (that is, the rich are

as well organized nationally as they are locally). Capture will be higher at the local level if the

proportion of informed voters is lower at the national level and the rich are less organized

nationally than they are locally. Greater electoral uncertainty at the local level as a result of

differences in electoral competition implies less capture at the local level. If, for example, swing

voters are not identical but are drawn from the same distribution across districts (assuming this

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distribution satisfies a regularity condition), heterogeneity of swing voters will favour different

parties, implying less capture of the nationally dominant party.xxvi

No definitive conclusions can be drawn about corruption and the centralization-

decentralization nexus from agency-type conceptual models. These models simply reaffirm that

the incidence of corruption is context dependent and therefore cannot be uncovered by

generalized models.

New Public Management Frameworks

The New Public Management (NPM) literature points to a more fundamental

discordance among the public sector mandate, its authorizing environment and the operational

culture and capacity. This discordance contributes to government acting like a runaway train and

government officials indulging in rent-seeking behaviours, with little opportunity for citizens to

constrain government behaviour. This viewpoint calls for fundamental civil service and political

reforms to create a government that is under contract and accountable for results. Under these

reforms, public officials would no longer have permanent rotating appointments but instead

would keep their jobs as long as they fulfilled their contractual obligations (Shah 1999,

2005).xxvii

The NPM paradigm has clear implications for the study of localization and corruption, as it

argues for contractual arrangements in the provision of public services. Such a contractual

framework may encourage competitive service delivery through outsourcing, strengthening the

role of local government as a purchaser but not necessarily a provider of local services.

The NPM goals are harmonious with localization, as greater accountability for results reinforces

government accountability to citizens through voice and exit mechanisms. Conceptually,

therefore, NPM is expected to reduce opportunities for corruption (see Shah 1999, 2005; Von

Maravic, Andrews and Shah (2005a)xxviii

integrate these ideas in a common frame work of

citizen-cantered governance. They argue that citizen empowerment holds the key to enhanced

accountability and reduced opportunities for corruption.

Others disagree with such conclusions and argue that NPM could lead to

higher corruption rather than greater accountability, because the tendering for service delivery

and separation of purchasers from providers may lead to increased rent-seeking behaviours and

enhanced possibilities for corruption .

. Of course, this viewpoint neglects potential gains from greater horizontal accountability.

Neoinstitutional Economics Frameworks

This approach argues that corruption results from the opportunistic behaviour of public

officials, as citizens either are not empowered to hold public officials accountable for their

corrupt acts or face high transaction costs in doing so. Neoinstitutional economics treats citizens

as principals and public officials as agents. Principals have bounded rationality—they act

rationally based on the incomplete information they have. They face high transaction costs in

acquiring and processing more information. In contrast, agents (public officials) are better

informed. This asymmetry of information allows agents to indulge in opportunistic behaviour

that goes unchecked because of the high transaction costs faced by principals and the lack of

adequate countervailing institutions to enforce accountable governance.

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Corrupt countries have inadequate mechanisms for contract enforcement and public

safety and weak judicial systems. These deficits raise the transaction costs in the economy,

increasing the cost of private capital as well as the cost of public service provision. The problem

is compounded by path dependency (the fact that a major break with the past is difficult to

achieve, because major reforms are likely to be blocked by influential interest groups); cultural

and historical factors; and attitudes, in which those who are victimized by corruption feel that

attempts to deal with corruption will lead to further victimization, with little hope of corrupt

actors being brought to justice. These considerations lead principals to the conclusion that any

attempt on their part to constrain corrupt behaviours will invite strong retaliation from powerful

interests. Therefore, citizen empowerment (through devolution, citizens’ charters, bills of rights,

elections, and other forms of civic engagement) assumes critical importance in combating

corruption, because it may have a significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials to

be responsive to public interest.

Lessons from Country Case Studies

The empirical literature on corruption lends support to the neo institutional economics

perspective. It identifies key drivers based on in-depth country studies (including a 2004 World

Bank look at Guatemala, Kenya, Latvia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Tanzania) and

econometric studies of developing, transition, and industrial countries (see Gurgur and Shah

2002;Huther and Shah 2000; Tomaszewska and Shah 2000).xxix

The six country case studies by the World Bank examined the root causes

of corruption and evaluated the impact of Bank efforts to reduce corruption in each country.

These studies identified the following drivers of corruption:

The legitimacy of the state as the guardian of the “public interest” is contested.

In highly corrupt countries, there is little public acceptance of the notion that the

role of the state is to rise above private interests to protect the broader public interest.

“Clientelism”—public officeholders focusing on serving particular client groups linked to them

by ethnic, geographic, or other ties—shape the public landscape, creating conditions that are ripe

for corruption. The line between what is public and what is private is blurred, so that abuse of

public office for private gain is a routine occurrence.

The rule of law is weakly embedded.

Public sector corruption thrives where laws apply to some but not others and where

enforcement of the law is often used as a device for furthering private interests rather than

protecting the public interest. A common symbol of the breakdown of the rule of law in highly

corrupt countries is the police acting as lawbreakers rather than law enforcers (stopping motorists

for invented traffic violations as an excuse for extracting bribes, for example). The independence

of the judiciary—a pillar of the rule of law—is also usually deeply compromised in highly

corrupt countries.

13

Institutions of participation and accountability are ineffective.

Societies in which the level of public sector corruption is relatively low usually have

strong institutions of participation and accountability that control abuses of power by public

officials. These institutions are either created by the state itself (for example, electoral process,

citizens’ charter, bills of rights, auditors general, the judiciary, the legislature) or arise outside of

formal state structures (for example, the news media and organized civic

groups). In highly corrupt countries, weaknesses in institutions of participation and

accountability are glaring.

The commitment of national leaders to combating corruption is weak.

Widespread corruption endures in the public sector when national

authorities are either unwilling or unable to address it forcefully. In societies in which public

sector corruption is endemic, it is reasonable to suspect that it touches the highest levels of

government and that many senior office holders will not be motivated to work against it.

Indian Context

A number of agencies have been created in India to tackle corruption. It is apparent that

the government has been keen to eradicate this malady. Even before Independence, the colonial

rulers had established the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) to control corruption

which surged during the Second World War. The Prevention of Corruption Act was passed in

1947, and an Administrative Vigilance Division (AVD) created in the Home ministry in 1955.

Vigilance officers were appointed in each ministry to enquire into charges of corruption against

employees in these organisations. Then, owing to mounting public criticism, a Committee on

Prevention of Corruption was appointed in 1962 under K. Santhanam to examine this issue in

depth and recommend remedial measures. As a result of its recommendations, the Central

Vigilance Commission (CVC), independent of ministerial control was set up in 1964. Another

important measure during the early decades was the creation of the Central Bureau of

Investigation (CBI) in 1963, which incorporated DSPE as the Investigation and Anti-Corruption

Division.

Some of the important anticorruption measures in India are as follows:-

Right to information act

The Right to Information Act (2005) and equivalent acts in the states, that require government

officials to furnish information requested by citizens or face punitive action, computerization of

services and various central and state government acts that established vigilance commissions

have considerably reduced corruption or at least have opened up avenues to redress grievances.

The 2006 report by Transparency International puts India at the 70th place and states that

significant improvements were made by India in reducing corruption.xxx

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Ombudsmen:

The Lokayukta is an anti- corruption organization in the Indian states.[31][32] These institutions

are based on the Ombudsman in Scandinavian countries. An amendment to the Constitution has

been proposed to implement the Lokayukta uniformly across Indian States as a three-member

body, headed by a retired Supreme Court judge or high court chief justice, and comprise of the

state vigilance commissioner and a jurist or an eminent administrator as other members.

However in many states are reluctant to fill up the vacant posts of Lokayukta. At the national

level the Lokpal bill is still pending.

Social welfare worker Anna Hazare has led a movement to compel the Indian

Government to notify the Committee for the implementation of the Lokayukta against corruption

as an independent body and also giving enough powers to the Lokayukta to also receive

corruption complaints against politicians, bureaucrats and even sitting judges. Anna Hazare is

currently pursuing an agenda to pass a bill called Jan Lokpal bill, and he has gathered the support

of many citizens residing in metropolitan cities of India. He was on an indefinite fast at the

Ramlila Grounds, Delhi, in order to campaign for the cause.[34]

Whistleblowers

Whistleblowers play a major role in the fight against corruption. India currently does not have

a law to protect whistleblowers, which was highlighted by the assassination of Satyendra Dubey.

Indian courts are regularly ordering probe in cases of murders or so-called suicide of several

whistle blowers. One of the latest case of such murder is of V Sasindran Company Secretary of

Palakkad based Malabar Cement Limited, a Government company in Kerala and his two minor

children, Kerala High Court ordered CBI probe on 18 February 2011.

Anti-corruption police and courts

The income tax department of India, Central Vigilance Commission and Central Bureau of

Investigation all deal with anti-corruption initiative. There have been calls for the Indian

government to create an anti-theft law enforcement agency that investigates and prosecutes

corruption in government at national, state and local levels. Special courts that are more efficient

than the traditional Indian courts with traveling judges and law enforcement agents are being

proposed. The proposal has not yet been acted upon by the Indian government. Certain states

such as Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Pradesh Anti-corruption Bureau) and Karnataka (Lokayukta)

have similar agencies and courts.

Anti-corruption organizations

A variety of organizations have been created in India to actively fight against corrupt

government and business practices. Notable organizations include:

5th Pillar is most known for the creation of the zero rupee note, a valueless note designed

to be given to corrupt officials when they request bribes.

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India Against Corruption is a movement created by a citizens from a variety of

professions and statuses to work against corruption in India. It is currently headed by Anna

Hazare.

Jaago Re! One Billion Votes is an organization originally founded by Tata Tea and Jana

agraha to increase youth voter registration. They have since expanded their work to include

other social issues, including corruption.

Association for Social Transparency, Rights and Action (ASTRA) is an NGO focused on

grass-roots work to fight corruption in Karnataka.

One organization, the Lok Satta Movement, has transformed itself from a civil organization to a

full-fledged political party, the Lok Satta Party. The party has fielded candidates in Andhra

Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Bangalore. In 2008, it obtained its first elected post, when Jayaprakash

Narayan won the election for the Kukatpally Assembly Constituency in Andrha Pradesh.

Judicial Reform

Corrupt judges in the higher judiciary can be removed only by impeachment. However, this

method is cumbersome. The problem is not just a question of devising proposals for removal.

The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, prefaces impeachment by judicial inquiry. In Supreme Court

Judge Justice V. Ramaswamy’s case, the inquiry indicted him but the impeachment motion fell

through in Parliament in 1992.

The need for an institutional mechanism to deal with cases of misconduct against a High Court

judge as also the question of interim arrangements on whether the judge be assigned work

pending investigation has long been felt. A beleaguered judge continuing in office smacks of

grave impropriety. Remember how Karnataka High Court Chief Justice P.D. Dinakaran

continued to attend court, took decisions on the administrative side and even delayed his

departure for Gangtok?

The government should fast-track all cases of moral turpitude, corruption and nepotism. The

process of impeachment of a judge should be speeded up with a time limit for obtaining the

President’s sanction and impeaching him/her.

The Centre’s decision to set up a National Judicial Oversight Committee (NJOC) to

look into complaints against Supreme Court and High Court judges and impose “minor

penalties” or recommend their removal is welcome. This has been provided for in the Judicial

Standards and Accountability Bill 2010 tabled in the Lok Sabha on December 1. Significantly,

the Bill is aimed at replacing the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The NJOC will consist of a former

Chief Justice of India, a Supreme Court judge, the High Court Chief Justice, an eminent person

to be nominated by the President and the Attorney-General of India (ex-officio).

Justice Katju and Justice Misra have directed the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court

to stem the rot. But can a Chief Justice alone help improve things without the force of law? They

also referred to the syndrome of “uncle judges”. The Union Law Ministry admits that this

menace has spread to many High Courts, including those in Chandigarh, Shimla and Jaipur. In its

16

230th Report (2009), the Law Commission has recommended that in order to eliminate the

practice of “uncle judges”, the judges, whose kith and kin are practicing in a High Court, should

not be posted in the same High Court.

Political Commitment

This elaborate and multi-layered apparatus to control corruption could hardly make a

dent on the situation because of lack of political commitment on the part of political leadership in

the states and at the center. It is more than clear all these institutional arrangements to combat

corruption can be useful only if correctives come from the political class which is the final

legislative and executive authority in a parliamentary democracy. Unless the politicians are made

to differentiate private conscience from public morality, and personal profit from national

interest, the ongoing unrestrained plunder of the exchequer cannot be stopped. The case of Bihar

during the past decade shows that all anti-corruption instruments and strategies come to naught

against a political leadership which has a vested interest in continuing corruption. Similarly, the

spate of criminal cases in which a former Chief Minister of Tamilnadu, Jayalalitha, was herself

involved shows that during her tenure political and administrative corruption could not have

been checked effectively primarily because of the political patronage she had given to corrupt

practices.

Administrative Accountability

Another essential component of anti-corruption strategy is the strict enforcement of

the principle of accountability at all levels. In India the government performs vast functions over

a wide range of areas of public concern. Decisions are taken at various levels of government in

which discretionary power may be involved. The present situation is that there is general lack of

accountability in administration. Almost everyone in the public

services is accountable to no one and is considered above the law. Respect for the rule of law is

woefully uncommon and it is often noticed that those who violate the law in the most blatant

fashion are the ones who get away the easiest.

The cases involving former chief ministers of Tamilnadu and Bihar are illustrative of judicial

activism that has come to the rescue of rule of law against the custodians of law themselves. The

recent action of the Central Vigilance Commissioner of putting the names of administrative and

police service officials on the internet against whom charges of corruption are pending has also

gone a long way in instilling the sense of responsibility and accountability among these officials.

Procedural Simplification

The administrative delay is one of the major causes of corruption. Therefore to reduce

or control corruption it is necessary to eliminate such delays. For that it is essential that office

procedures should be simplified and levels of hierarchy reduced. In the Indian situation the

persistence of archaic structures has played havoc with the developmental initiatives. After

Independence the country framed an entirely new political and economic agenda and this

required new, matching structures for effective implementation, as the old administrative and

17

legal systems clashed with the substance and spirit of the new agenda. And it is this mismatch

between politico-economic agenda on the one hand and the administrative and legal structures on

the other which is

primarily responsible for the poor performance of the government.

Civil Society Participation

Civil society is considered as the realm of association between the household and the state.

Typically this includes professional organizations as well as other formal and informal non-profit

associations. Such associations fulfill certain functions essential for aggregating and expressing

societal interests, including social integration, social participation in state governance, and

promoting the democratic values. Through its many functions, civil society can create pressure

for policy reform and improved governance, as well as explicitly monitor the state’s actions for

fighting corruption and abuse. In other words, the civil society addresses the will of the state to

operate in an accountable, transparent and responsive manner. Civil society organizations have a

key role to play in combating corruption. Countries that are supportive and hospitable to civil

society bodies-through hearing arrangements in their regulatory and legislative procedures,

involving them in oversight institutions, etc,- have in fact enabled the organic and internally

driven evolution of policies and institutions to changes in circumstances. In recent years a

growing number of structures, institutions and associations-outside state apparatus and profit-

making businesses-have evolved in India for the joint pursuit of shared interests. Chambers of

commerce, professional associations, various forms of non-governmental organisations have

become players, shaping opinions, building coalitions, providing testimonies, monitoring

government and enterprises. The Report Card methodology developed by the Public Affairs

Center in Bangalore is an innovative instrument to track down and expose corruption in public

services (Guhan and Paul 1997).xxxi

Similarly, the Common Cause in Delhi has done considerable work in the area of

public interest litigation which has served the purpose of dragging corrupt officials

to the courts. The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in Rajasthan has done

commendable work in making public information regarding development projects

in the state. Such information has served to expose instances of bureaucratic

corruption.

Another notable instance of citizen involvement in combating corruption is

the launching of Satyagrah (non-violent protest) by S.D. Sharma, an octogenarian freedom

fighter and Vice-Chairman of the Transparency International-India, against political corruption

and for honest and efficient governance. Established in 1997, the Transparency International-

India has been playing a significant role in fighting corruption through Gandhian methods of non

violent mass mobilization. It has now undertaken to organize 24 hour relay fast concurrently

with the sessions of the parliament, to remind the government and the parliament that they have

failed in their duty to the country to take effective steps for eliminating corruption from their

ranks (Sharma 2000).xxxii

The causes of corruption are many and complex. Following are some of the causes of

corruption:-

18

There are many myths about corruption, which have to be exploded if we really want

to combat it. Some of these myths are: Corruption is a way of life and nothing can be done about

it. Only people from underdeveloped or developing countries are prone to corruption. We will

have to guard against all these crude fallacies while planning measures to fight corruption.

Some important steps to combat and reduce corruption in administration are as follows:-

(i) Foolproof laws should be made so that there is no room for discretion for politicians and

bureaucrats. The role of the politician should be minimized. Application of the evolved

policies should be left in the hands of independent commission or authority in each area of

public interest. Decision of the commission or authority should be challengeable only in the

courts.

(ii) Cooperation of the people has to be obtained for successfully containing corruption.

People should have a right to recall the elected representatives if they see them becoming

indifferent to the electorate.

(iii)Funding of elections is at the core of political corruption. Electoral reforms are crucial in

this regard. Several reforms like: State funding of election expenses for candidates; strict

enforcement of statutory requirements like holding in-party elections, making political

parties get their accounts audited regularly and filing income-tax returns; denying persons

with criminal records a chance to contest elections, should be brought in.

(iv)Responsiveness, accountability and transparency are a must for a clean system.

Bureaucracy, the backbone of good governance, should be made more citizen friendly,

accountable, ethical and transparent.

(v)More and more courts should be opened for speedy & inexpensive justice so that cases do

not linger in courts for years and justice is delivered on time.

(vi) Local bodies, Independent of the government, like Lokpal, Lokadalats, CVCs and

Vigilance Commissions should be formed to provide speedy justice with low expenses.

(vii) A new Fundamental Right viz. Right to Information should be strengthened, which will

empower the citizens to ask for the information they want. Barring some confidential

information, which concerns national and international security, other information should be

made available to general public as and when required. Stringent actions against corrupt

officials will certainly have a deterrent impact.

Public sector corruption, as a symptom of failed governance, depends on a multitude of

factors, such as the quality of public sector management, the nature of accountability

relations between the government and citizens, the legal framework, and the degree to which

public sector processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of information.

Efforts to address corruption that fail to adequately account for these underlying drivers are

unlikely to generate profound and sustainable results. To understand these drivers, a

19

conceptual and empirical perspective is needed to understand why corruption persists and

what can be done to stop it. At the conceptual level, a number of interesting ideas have been

put forward. These ideas can be broadly grouped into three categories: principal agent

models, New Public Management perspectives, and neoinstitutional economics frameworks.

Anti corruption agencies are prone to being misused as tools of political victimization. These

types of interventions are more appropriate in a “low” corruption setting, where governance

fundamentals are reasonably sound and corruption is a relatively marginal phenomenon. The

model also suggests that where corruption is high (and the quality of governance

correspondingly low), it makes more sense to focus on the underlying drivers of

malfeasance in the public sector—by building the rule of law and strengthening institutions

of accountability, for example. Indeed, a lack of democratic institutions (a key component of

accountability) has been shown to be one of the most important determinants of corruption

(Gurgur and Shah 2002).xxxiii

Malaysia’s adoption of a “clients’ charter” in the early 1990s

that specified service standards and citizen recourse in the event of noncompliance by

government agencies helped reorient the public sector toward service delivery and transform

the culture of governance .

In societies in which the level of corruption is moderate, it may be advisable to attempt reforms

that assume a modicum of governance capacity. Such reforms include trying to make civil

servants more accountable for results, bringing government decision making closer to citizens

through decentralization, simplifying administrative procedures, and reducing discretion for

simple government tasks, such as the distribution of licenses and permits.

With this model in mind, it is not hard to understand why so many anticorruption

initiatives have met with so little success. Media awareness campaigns and workshops on

corruption targeted to government officials, parliamentarians, and journalists have almost

universally failed. As the model shows, this outcome would be expected in countries with weak

governance, where corruption is openly practiced but neither the general public nor honest public

officials feel empowered to take a stand against it and even fear being victimized. In contrast,

awareness campaigns would be expected to have a positive impact in countries where

governance is fair or good and the incidence of corruption is low.

Program Empirical evidence

Anticorruption agencies have been successful in Australia, Chile, agencies Hong Kong

(China), New South Wales, and Singapore (Klitgaard1997; Segal 1999)xxxiv

.The effectiveness of

“watchdog” agencies with a mandate to detect and prosecute corrupt acts —which most

developing countries have established—also depend on the governance-corruption nexus.

Watchdog agencies have achieved success only in countries where governance is generally good,

such as Australia and Chile. In weak governance environments, these agencies often lack

credibility and may even extort rents. In Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and

Uganda, for example, anticorruption agencies have been ineffective. In Tanzania the

government’s Prevention of Corruption Bureau produces only about six convictions a year,

mostly against low-level functionaries, in a public sector environment rife with corruption. In

Pakistan the National Accountability Bureau lacks a mandate to investigate corruption in the

powerful and influential military.

20

The corrupt practices flourish in systems where employees have high job security; where

the level of professionalism in the public service is low; and hence officials rather serve their

own interests than perform their duty to serve the public. However, low salaries are not a valid

reason for and do not justify corruption. A gift culture exists, particularly in Africa, in which it is

tradition that a small reward is paid for services rendered. Such a gratuity or tip becomes part of

the cultural environment and in certain countries the payment of such rewards is so embedded in

tradition that any attempt to rein in the practice would be seen as an attack on treasured cultural

values. In Africa, this was traditionally seen as awarding special honours to the Chief and, in this

light, it often regarded as acceptable and "normal" for politicians to accept such rewards. In some

countries it is common practice in the commercial arena for business transactions to be

accompanied by the giving of personal gifts or benefits. In essence, the root of corruption is

greed rather than culture, public life requires a standard of its own; and those entering public

office must be made aware of this from the outset.

All organisations, whether public or private sector, must have rules, regulations and policies

that guide management and other employees in terms of acceptable behaviour and conduct

within the organization. Rules, regulations and policies are instrumental in organizing people,

steering them towards a common goal and ensuring that everyone is treated fairly and equally. In

order to be effective, such rules and policies must be clearly communicated to all individuals in

order to be understood and applied objectively. Corruption is more likely to flourish in an

organization that does not have a wide range of rules, regulations or policies that guide

employees in their work. Similarly, a country must have clear policies and legislation that guide

the behavior of all citizens and residents within that country.

The factors that cause corruption are country specific. Approaches that apply common

policies and tools (that is, one-size-fits-all approaches) to countries in which acts of

corruption and the quality of governance vary widely are likely to fail. Policy makers need

to understand the local circumstances that encourage or permit public and private actors to

be corrupt .Efforts to combat corruption also demand strong local leadership and ownership

if they are to be successful and sustainable.

The year 2011 has proved to be a watershed in the public tolerance of political corruption in

India, with widespread public protests and movements led by social activists against corruption

and for the return of illegal wealth stashed by politicians and businessmen in foreign banks over

the six decades since independence.

CONCLUSION

There is a much better grasp today of the extent to which corruption is a symptom of

fundamental institutional weaknesses. Instead of tackling such a symptom with narrow

intervention designed to “eliminate” it, increasingly it is understood that the approach ought to

address a broad set of fundamental institutional determinants. However, the challenge of

integrating this understanding with participatory process has barely begun. The implementation

21

of institutional reforms can benefit significantly from the participatory process that is being

developed for anti-corruption activities. Equally important, any participatory process, however

sophisticated, ought to lead to concrete results beyond enhanced participation and heightened

awareness.

Thus, identifying key institutional reforms in India, and mobilizing support for such

reforms, needs to be fully integrated into the participatory process from very early on. Such early

convergence is likely to promote a better balance between prevention and enforcement measures

in addressing corruption. Until recently, the pendulum was firmly in the “enforcement” corner.

The gradual swing towards middle ground has taken place due to recognition of the limitations

of ex post legalistic enforcement measures, since rule of law institutions themselves are currently

part of the corruption problem in India.

Corruption is an intractable problem. Honest and dedicated persons in public life, control over

electoral expenses could be the most important prescriptions to combat corruption. Corruption

has a corrosive impact on our economy. It worsens our image in international market and leads

to loss of overseas opportunities. Corruption is a global problem that all countries of the world

have to confront, solutions, however, can only be home grown.

----------------------------------------------------

References:-

1. Aristotle, The Politics

2. Kautilya, Artha Shashtra

3. Vohra Committee Report

22

4. Shah Anwar and Mark Sachter, 2004, Combating Corruption: Look before you Leap.

Finance and Development (International Monetary Fund) 45(4) 40-43.

5. Tapales, Prosperpina. 2001.“An Evaluation of Anti-corruption Programs in

Philippines.” World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department. .

Washington, DC.

6. Gupta, Sanjeev, Hamid Davoodi, and Erwin Tiongson. 2000. “Corruption

and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services”.

Working Paper 00/116, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

7. Ibid.

8. Shah Anwar

9. Wax, Emily (2008-07-24). "With Indian Politics, the Bad Gets Worse".

Washington Times

10. Corruption in India from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

11. Ibid

12. Corruption Perceptions Index from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

13. Ibid

14. LAW RESOURCE INDIA, LEGAL RESOURCE CENTRE / COURT JUDGMENTS /

LEGAL in judiciary: Time for action, Image via Wikipedia. Eshwar Anand IN THE

TRIBUNE

15. Anwar Shah Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country .

Circumstances.

16. Ibid

17. Becker, Gary. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” .

Journal of Political Economy 76 (2): 169–217

18. Klitgaard, Robert E. 1988.Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of

California Pres.

1997, “Cleaning Up and Invigorating the Civil Service.”

Public Administration and Development 17 (5): 487–509

19. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline, and Beatrice Weder. 2001. “Bureaucratic

Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in Civil

Service Cause Corruption?” Journal of Development Economics 65 (2): 307–31.

20 Guriev, Sergei. 1999. “A Theory of Informative Red Tape with an Application to Top-

Level Corruption.”Working Paper 99/007, New Economic School, Moscow.

21. Ibid

22. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W.Vishny. 1993. “Corruption.” Quarterly

Journal of Economics108 (3): 599–617

23

23. Waller, Christopher J., Thierry A. Verdier, and Roy Gardner. 2002. “Corruption: top-

Down or Bottom-Up.” Economic Inquiry 40 (4): 688–703.

24. Ahlin, Christian. 2001. “Corruption: Political Determinants and Macroeconomic

Effects.” Working Paper 01–W26, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville,

TN.

25. Arikan, Gulsun; 2004.“Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?”

International Tax and Public Finance 11(2): 175–95.

26. Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee. 2005. “Decentralizing Anti-Poverty

Program Delivery in Developing Countries.” Journal of Public Economics 89 (4): 675–704.

27. Shah, Anwar. 1999. “Governing for Results in a Globalized and Localized

World.”Pakistan Development Review 38 (4): 385–431.

2005. “On Getting the Giant to Kneel: Approaches to a Change in the

Bureaucratic Culture.” In Fiscal Management, ed. Anwar Shah, 211–29. Washington, DC:

World Bank.

28. Ibid.

29. Gurgur, Tugrul, and Anwar Shah. 1999. “The Causes of Corruption.” Background

paper for Study on Anti-corruption and Governance, World Bank, Operations Evaluation

Department Washington, DC.

30. "Transparency International Press release". 2006

31. Guhan, S. and Samuel Paul, Eds. Corruption in India: Agenda for Action (New Delhi:

Vision Books, 1997

32. Sharma, S.D. Personal Interview. July 2000.

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