G.R. No. 108670 September 21, 1994LBC EXPRESS, INC.,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO M. CARLOTO, and RURAL BANK OF LABASON, INC.,respondents.Emmanuel D. Agustin for petitioner.Bernardo P. Concha for private respondents.PUNO,J.:In this Petition for Review onCertiorari, petitioner LBC questions the decision1of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8, awarding moral and exemplary damages, reimbursement of P32,000.00, and costs of suit; but deleting the amount of attorney's fees.Private respondent Adolfo Carloto, incumbent President-Manager of private respondent Rural Bank of Labason, alleged that on November 12, 1984, he was in Cebu City transacting business with the Central Bank Regional Office. He was instructed to proceed to Manila on or before November 21, 1984 to follow-up the Rural Bank's plan of payment of rediscounting obligations with Central Bank's main office in Manila.2He then purchased a round trip plane ticket to Manila. He also phoned his sister Elsie Carloto-Concha to send him ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) for his pocket money in going to Manila and some rediscounting papers thru petitioner's LBC Office at Dipolog City.3On November 16, 1984, Mrs. Concha thru her clerk, Adelina Antigo consigned thru LBC Dipolog Branch the pertinent documents and the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) to respondent Carloto at No. 2 Greyhound Subdivision, Kinasangan, Pardo, Cebu City. This was evidenced by LBC Air Cargo, Inc., Cashpack Delivery Receipt No. 34805.On November 17, 1984, the documents arrived without the cashpack. Respondent Carloto made personal follow-ups on that same day, and also on November 19 and 20, 1984 at LBC's office in Cebu but petitioner failed to deliver to him the cashpack.Consequently, respondent Carloto said he was compelled to go to Dipolog City on November 24, 1984 to claim the money at LBC's office. His effort was once more in vain. On November 27, 1984, he went back to Cebu City at LBC's office. He was, however, advised that the money has been returned to LBC's office in Dipolog City upon shipper's request. Again, he demanded for the ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) and refund of FORTY-NINE PESOS (P49.00) LBC revenue charges. He received the money only on December 15, 1984 less the revenue charges.Respondent Carloto claimed that because of the delay in the transmittal of the cashpack, he failed to submit the rediscounting documents to Central Bank on time. As a consequence, his rural bank was made to pay the Central Bank THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00) as penalty interest.4He allegedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation.Petitioner LBC, on the other hand, alleged that the cashpack was forwarded via PAL to LBC Cebu City branch on November 22, 1984.5On the same day, it was delivered at respondent Carloto's residence at No. 2 Greyhound Subdivision, Kinasangan, Pardo, Cebu City. However, he was not around to receive it. The delivery man served instead a claim notice to insure he would personally receive the money. This was annotated on Cashpack Delivery Receipt No. 342805. Notwithstanding the said notice, respondent Carloto did not claim the cashpack at LBC Cebu. On November 23, 1984, it was returned to the shipper, Elsie Carloto-Concha at Dipolog City.Claiming that petitioner LBC wantonly and recklessly disregarded its obligation, respondent Carloto instituted an action for Damages Arising from Non-performance of Obligation docketed as Civil Case No. 3679 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on January 4, 1985. On June 25, 1988, an amended complaint was filed where respondent rural bank joined as one of the plaintiffs and prayed for the reimbursement of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00).After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Ordering the defendant LBC Air Cargo, Inc. to pay unto plaintiff Adolfo M. Carloto and Rural Bank of Labason, Inc., moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00; attorney's fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and litigation expenses of P1,000.00;2. Sentencing defendant LBC Air Cargo, Inc., to reimburse plaintiff Rural Bank of Labason, Inc. the sum of P32,000.00 which the latter paid as penalty interest to the Central Bank of the Philippines as penalty interest for failure to rediscount its due bills on time arising from the defendant's failure to deliver the cashpack, with legal interest computed from the date of filing of this case; and3. Ordering defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings.SO ORDERED.6On appeal, respondent court modified the judgment by deleting the award of attorney's fees. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 11, 1993.Hence, this petition raising the following questions, to wit:1. Whether or not respondent Rural Bank of Labason Inc., being an artificial person should be awarded moral damages.2. Whether or not the award of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00) was made with grave abuse of discretion.3. Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the trial court's decision ordering petitioner LBC to pay moral and exemplary damages despite performance of its obligation.We find merit in the petition.The respondent court erred in awarding moral damages to the Rural Bank of Labason, Inc., an artificial person.Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.7A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish.8Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life9 all of which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.We can neither sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the private respondents. The right to recover moral damages is based on equity. Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 21.10Part of conventional wisdom is that he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands.In the case at bench, respondent Carloto is not without fault. He was fully aware that his rural bank's obligation would mature on November 21, 1984 and his bank has set aside cash for these bills payable.11He was all set to go to Manila to settle this obligation. He has received the documents necessary for the approval of their rediscounting application with the Central Bank. He has also received the plane ticket to go to Manila. Nevertheless, he did not immediately proceed to Manila but instead tarried for days allegedly claiming his ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) pocket money. Due to his delayed trip, he failed to submit the rediscounting papers to the Central Bank on time and his bank was penalized THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00) for failure to pay its obligation on its due date. The undue importance given by respondent Carloto to his ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) pocket money is inexplicable for it was not indispensable for him to follow up his bank's rediscounting application with Central Bank. According to said respondent, he needed the money to "invite people for a snack or dinner."12The attitude of said respondent speaks ill of his ways of business dealings and cannot be countenanced by this Court. Verily, it will be revolting to our sense of ethics to use it as basis for awarding damages in favor of private respondent Carloto and the Rural Bank of Labason, Inc.We also hold that respondents failed to show that petitioner LBC's late delivery of the cashpack was motivated by personal malice or bad faith, whether intentional or thru gross negligence. In fact, it was proved during the trial that the cashpack was consigned on November 16, 1984, a Friday. It was sent to Cebu on November 19, 1984, the next business day. Considering this circumstance, petitioner cannot be charged with gross neglect of duty. Bad faith under the law can not be presumed; it must be established by clearer and convincing evidence.13Again, the unbroken jurisprudence is that in breach of contract cases where the defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the branch of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could reasonable have foreseen. The damages, however, will not include liability for moral damages.14Prescinding from these premises, the award of exemplary damages made by the respondent court would have no legal leg to support itself. Under Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The established facts of not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner LBC.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent court dated September 30, 1992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3679 is ordered DISMISSED. No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 141994 January 17, 2005FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,petitioner,vs.AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F. AGO,respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis petition for review1assails the 4 January 1999 Decision2and 26 January 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 14 December 1992 Decision3of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 8236. The Court of Appeals held Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. and its broadcasters Hermogenes Alegre and Carmelo Rima liable for libel and ordered them to solidarily pay Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.The Antecedents"Expos" is a radio documentary4program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima ("Rima") and Hermogenes Jun Alegre ("Alegre").5Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. ("FBNI"). "Expos" is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas.6In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine ("AMEC") and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago ("Ago"), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages7against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. Quoted are portions of the allegedly libelous broadcasts:JUN ALEGRE:Let us begin with the less burdensome:if you have children taking medical course at AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all subjects because if they fail in any subject they will repeat their year level, taking up all subjects including those they have passed already. Several students had approached me stating that they had consulted with the DECS which told them that there is no such regulation. If [there] is no such regulation why is AMEC doing the same?xxxSecond:Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had complained that the course is not recognized by DECS. xxxThird:Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the subject does not have an instructor - such greed for money on the part of AMECs administration. Take the subject Anatomy: students would pay for the subject upon enrolment because it is offered by the school. However there would be no instructor for such subject. Students would be informed that course would be moved to a later date because the school is still searching for the appropriate instructor.xxxIt is a public knowledge that the Ago Medical and Educational Center has survived and has been surviving for the past few years since its inception because of funds support from foreign foundations. If you will take a look at the AMEC premises youll find out that the names of the buildings there are foreign soundings. There is a McDonald Hall. Why not Jose Rizal or Bonifacio Hall? That is a very concrete and undeniable evidence that the support of foreign foundations for AMEC is substantial, isnt it? With the report which is the basis of the expose in DZRC today, it would be very easy for detractors and enemies of the Ago family to stop the flow of support of foreign foundations who assist the medical school on the basis of the latters purpose. But if the purpose of the institution (AMEC) is to deceive students at cross purpose with its reason for being it is possible for these foreign foundations to lift or suspend their donations temporarily.8xxxOn the other hand, the administrators of AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High School and the AMEC-Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to accept "rejects".For example how many teachers in AMEC are former teachers of Aquinas University but were removed because of immorality? Does it mean that the present administration of AMEC have the total definite moral foundation from catholic administrator of Aquinas University. I will prove to you my friends, thatAMEC is a dumping ground, garbage, not merely of moral and physical misfits. Probably they only qualify in terms of intellect. The Dean of Student Affairs of AMEC is Justita Lola, as the family name implies. She is too old to work, being an old woman. Is the AMEC administration exploiting the very [e]nterprising or compromising and undemanding Lola? Could it be that AMEC is just patiently making use of Dean Justita Lola were if she is very old. As in atmospheric situation zero visibility the plane cannot land, meaning she is very old, low pay follows. By the way, Dean Justita Lola is also the chairman of the committee on scholarship in AMEC. She had retired from Bicol University a long time ago but AMEC has patiently made use of her.xxxMEL RIMA:xxx My friends based on the expose, AMEC is a dumping ground for moral and physically misfit people. What does this mean? Immoral and physically misfits as teachers.May I say Im sorry to Dean Justita Lola. But this is the truth. The truth is this, that your are no longer fit to teach. You are too old. As an aviation, your case is zero visibility. Dont insist.xxx Why did AMEC still absorb her as a teacher, a dean, and chairman of the scholarship committee at that. The reason is practical cost saving in salaries, because an old person is not fastidious, so long as she has money to buy the ingredient of beetle juice. The elderly can get by thats why she (Lola) was taken in as Dean.xxxxxx On our end our task is to attend to the interests of students. It is likely that the students would be influenced by evil.When they become members of society outside of campus will be liabilities rather than assets.What do you expect from a doctor who while studying at AMEC is so much burdened with unreasonable imposition? What do you expect from a student who aside from peculiar problems because not all students are rich in their struggle to improve their social status are even more burdened with false regulations. xxx9(Emphasis supplied)The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre "transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation." AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an Answer10alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the "goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest."Thereafter, trial ensued. During the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss11on FBNIs behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed a separate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo an apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview. FBNI likewise claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language." Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass theKapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas("KBP") accreditation test and to secure a KBP permit.On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision12finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelousper se. The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them to show good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only participation was when he agreed with Alegres expos. The trial court found Rimas statement within the "bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds for the plaintiff.Considering the degree of damages caused by the controversial utterances, which are not found by this court to be really very serious and damaging, and there being no showing that indeed the enrollment of plaintiff school dropped,defendants Hermogenes "Jun" Alegre, Jr. and Filipinas Broadcasting Network (owner of the radio station DZRC), are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM) the amount ofP300,000.00 moral damages, plusP30,000.00 reimbursement of attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.13(Emphasis supplied)Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is herebyAFFIRMED, subject to the modification that broadcaster Mel Rima isSOLIDARILY ADJUDGEDliable with FBN[I] and Hermo[g]enes Alegre.SO ORDERED.14FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution.Hence, FBNI filed this petition.15The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling that the questioned broadcasts are libelousper seand that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to overcome the legal presumption of malice. The Court of Appeals found Rima and Alegres claim that they were actuated by their moral and social duty to inform the public of the students gripes as insufficient to justify the utterance of the defamatory remarks.Finding no factual basis for the imputations against AMECs administrators, the Court of Appeals ruled that the broadcasts were made "with reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false." The appellate court pointed out that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to present in court any of the students who allegedly complained against AMEC. Rima and Alegre merely gave a single name when asked to identify the students. According to the Court of Appeals, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of the broadcasters claim that they were "impelled by their moral and social duty to inform the public about the students gripes."The Court of Appeals found Rima also liable for libel since he remarked that "(1) AMEC-BCCM is a dumping ground for morally and physically misfit teachers; (2) AMEC obtained the services of Dean Justita Lola to minimize expenses on its employees salaries; and (3) AMEC burdened the students with unreasonable imposition and false regulations."16The Court of Appeals held that FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees for allowing Rima and Alegre to make the radio broadcasts without the proper KBP accreditation. The Court of Appeals denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the libelous remarks were directed against AMEC, and not against her. The Court of Appeals adjudged FBNI, Rima and Alegre solidarily liable to pay AMEC moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.1awphi1.ntIssuesFBNI raises the following issues for resolution:I. WHETHER THE BROADCASTS ARE LIBELOUS;II. WHETHER AMEC IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES;III. WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER; andIV. WHETHER FBNI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RIMA AND ALEGRE FOR PAYMENT OF MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.The Courts RulingWe deny the petition.This is a civil action for damages as a result of the allegedly defamatory remarks of Rima and Alegre against AMEC.17While AMEC did not point out clearly the legal basis for its complaint, a reading of the complaint reveals that AMECs cause of action is based on Articles 30 and 33 of the Civil Code. Article 3018authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense. On the other hand, Article 3319particularly provides that the injured party may bring a separate civil action for damages in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. AMEC also invokes Article 1920of the Civil Code to justify its claim for damages. AMEC cites Articles 217621and 218022of the Civil Code to hold FBNI solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre.I.Whether the broadcasts are libelousA libel23is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.24There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and contempt. Rima and Alegres remarks such as "greed for money on the part of AMECs administrators"; "AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage of xxx moral and physical misfits"; and AMEC students who graduate "will be liabilities rather than assets" of the society are libelousperse. Taken as a whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers abound.However, FBNI contends that the broadcasts are not malicious. FBNI claims that Rima and Alegre were plainly impelled by their civic duty to air the students gripes. FBNI alleges that there is no evidence that ill will or spite motivated Rima and Alegre in making the broadcasts. FBNI further points out that Rima and Alegre exerted efforts to obtain AMECs side and gave Ago the opportunity to defend AMEC and its administrators. FBNI concludes that since there is no malice, there is no libel.FBNIs contentions are untenable.Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious.25Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the public issues "free frominaccurateand misleading information."26Hearing the students alleged complaints a month before the expos,27they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of the students alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students "because they were many and not because there is proof that what they are saying is true."28This plainly shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of whether their report was true or not.Contrary to FBNIs claim, the broadcasts were not "the result of straight reporting." Significantly, some courts in the United States apply the privilege of "neutral reportage" in libel cases involving matters of public interest or public figures. Under this privilege, a republisher whoaccuratelyand disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the republishers subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the accusation.29Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the privilege of neutral reportage because unfounded comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing controversy involving AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is involved in an existing controversy, and a party to that controversy makes the defamatory statement.30However, FBNI argues vigorously that malice in law does not apply to this case. CitingBorjal v. Court of Appeals,31FBNI contends that the broadcasts "fall within the coverage of qualifiedly privileged communications" for being commentaries on matters of public interest. Such being the case, AMEC should prove malice in fact or actual malice. Since AMEC allegedly failed to prove actual malice, there is no libel.FBNIs reliance onBorjalis misplaced. InBorjal, the Court elucidated on the "doctrine of fair comment," thus:[F]air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.32(Emphasis supplied)True, AMEC is a private learning institution whose business of educating students is "genuinely imbued with public interest." The welfare of the youth in general and AMECs students in particular is a matter which the public has the right to know. Thus, similar to the newspaper articles inBorjal, the subject broadcasts dealt with matters of public interest. However, unlike inBorjal, the questioned broadcasts arenotbased onestablished facts. The record supports the following findings of the trial court:xxx Although defendants claim that they were motivated by consistent reports of students and parents against plaintiff, yet, defendants have not presented in court, nor even gave name of a single student who made the complaint to them, much less present written complaint or petition to that effect. To accept this defense of defendants is too dangerous because it could easily give license to the media to malign people and establishments based on flimsy excuses that there were reports to them although they could not satisfactorily establish it. Such laxity would encourage careless and irresponsible broadcasting which is inimical to public interests.Secondly, there is reason to believe that defendant radio broadcasters, contrary to the mandates of their duties, did not verify and analyze the truth of the reports before they aired it, in order to prove that they are in good faith.Alegre contended that plaintiff school had no permit and is not accredited to offer Physical Therapy courses. Yet, plaintiff produced a certificate coming from DECS that as of Sept. 22, 1987 or more than 2 years before the controversial broadcast, accreditation to offer Physical Therapy course had already been given the plaintiff, which certificate is signed by no less than the Secretary of Education and Culture herself, Lourdes R. Quisumbing (Exh. C-rebuttal). Defendants could have easily known this were they careful enough to verify. And yet, defendants were very categorical and sounded too positive when they made the erroneous report that plaintiff had no permit to offer Physical Therapy courses which they were offering.The allegation that plaintiff was getting tremendous aids from foreign foundations like Mcdonald Foundation prove not to be true also. The truth is there is no Mcdonald Foundation existing. Although a big building of plaintiff school was given the name Mcdonald building, that was only in order to honor the first missionary in Bicol of plaintiffs religion, as explained by Dr. Lita Ago. Contrary to the claim of defendants over the air, not a single centavo appears to be received by plaintiff school from the aforementioned McDonald Foundation which does not exist.Defendants did not even also bother to prove their claim, though denied by Dra. Ago, that when medical students fail in one subject, they are made to repeat all the other subject[s], even those they have already passed, nor their claim that the school charges laboratory fees even if there are no laboratories in the school. No evidence was presented to prove the bases for these claims, at least in order to give semblance of good faith.As for the allegation that plaintiff is the dumping ground for misfits, and immoral teachers, defendant[s] singled out Dean Justita Lola who is said to be so old, with zero visibility already. Dean Lola testified in court last Jan. 21, 1991, and was found to be 75 years old. xxx Even older people prove to be effective teachers like Supreme Court Justices who are still very much in demand as law professors in their late years. Counsel for defendants is past 75 but is found by this court to be still very sharp and effective.l^vvphi1.netSo is plaintiffs counsel.Dr. Lola was observed by this court not to be physically decrepit yet, nor mentally infirmed, but is still alert and docile.The contention that plaintiffs graduates become liabilities rather than assets of our society is a mere conclusion. Being from the place himself, this court is aware that majority of the medical graduates of plaintiffs pass the board examination easily and become prosperous and responsible professionals.33Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.34However, the comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelousper se.The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code35of theKapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, Ink.("Radio Code"). Item I(B) of the Radio Code provides:B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC ISSUES AND COMMENTARIES1. x x x4.Public affairs program shall present public issues free frompersonal bias, prejudice andinaccurate and misleading information. x x x Furthermore, the station shall strive to present balanced discussion of issues. x x x.x x x7. The station shall be responsible at all times in the supervision of public affairs, public issues and commentary programs so that they conform to the provisions and standards of this code.8. It shall be the responsibility of the newscaster, commentator, host and announcer to protect public interest, general welfare and good order in the presentation of public affairs and public issues.36(Emphasis supplied)The broadcasts fail to meet the standards prescribed in the Radio Code, which lays down the code of ethical conduct governing practitioners in the radio broadcast industry. The Radio Code is a voluntary code of conduct imposed by the radio broadcast industry on its own members. The Radio Code is a public warranty by the radio broadcast industry that radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a code by which their conduct are measured for lapses, liability and sanctions.The public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast practitioners live up to the code of conduct of their profession, just like other professionals. A professional code of conduct provides the standards for determining whether a person has acted justly, honestly and with good faith in the exercise of his rights and performance of his duties as required by Article 1937of the Civil Code. A professional code of conduct also provides the standards for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss or injury to another has acted in a manner contrary to morals or good customs under Article 2138of the Civil Code.II.Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damagesFBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation.39A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.40The Court of Appeals citesMambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al.41to justify the award of moral damages. However, the Courts statement inMambulaothat "a corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages" is anobiter dictum.42Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 221943of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.44Moreover, where the broadcast is libelousper se, the law implies damages.45In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages.46Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages.47In this case, the broadcasts are libelousper se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.However, we find the award ofP300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelousper se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages fromP300,000 toP150,000.III.Whether the award of attorneys fees is properFBNI contends that since AMEC is not entitled to moral damages, there is no basis for the award of attorneys fees. FBNI adds that the instant case does not fall under the enumeration in Article 220848of the Civil Code.The award of attorneys fees is not proper because AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorneys fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to warrant the award of attorneys fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorneys fees.49InInter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,50we held that:[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.51(Emphasis supplied)While it mentioned about the award of attorneys fees by stating that it "lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of each case," the Court of Appeals failed to point out any circumstance to justify the award.IV.Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suitFBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the payment of damages and attorneys fees because it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI maintains that its broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a "very regimented process" before they are allowed to go on air. "Those who apply for broadcaster are subjected to interviews, examinations and an apprenticeship program."FBNI further argues that Alegres age and lack of training are irrelevant to his competence as a broadcaster. FBNI points out that the "minor deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima and Alegre do not in any way prove that FBNI did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising them." Rimas accreditation lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual fees while Alegres accreditation card was delayed allegedly for reasons attributable to the KBP Manila Office. FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is merely voluntary and not required by any law or government regulation.FBNIs arguments do not persuade us.The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.52Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.53Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.1a\^/phi1.netAs operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the Court of Appeals, "recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had from theowner of the station, a licensee,theoperator of the station, or a person who procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements."54An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation.55In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in theselectionandsupervisionof its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised diligence in theselectionof its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in thesupervisionof Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language" is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its broadcasters. Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct, sufficient information on libel laws, and continuous evaluation of the broadcasters performance are but a few of the many ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters.FBNI claims that it "has taken all the precaution in theselectionof Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications." However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNIs "regimented process" of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP accreditation,56which is one of FBNIs requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates the broadcasters strong commitment to observe the broadcast industrys rules and regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show FBNIs lack of diligence in selectingandsupervising Rima and Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and Alegre.WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of 4 January 1999 and Resolution of 26 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced fromP300,000 toP150,000 and the award of attorneys fees is deleted. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.ERMAN C. CRYSTAL, LAMBERTOG.R. No. 172428C. CRYSTAL, ANN GEORGIA C.SOLANTE, and DORIS C.Present:MAGLASANG, as Heirs ofDeceased SPOUSES RAYMUNDOQUISUMBING,J.,I. CRYSTAL and DESAMPARADOSChairperson,C.CRYSTAL,CARPIO MORALES,Petitioners,TINGA,VELASCO, JR., andBRION,JJ.-versus-Promulgated:November 28, 2008BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS,Respondent.x----------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:Before us is a Petition for Review[1]of the Decision[2]and Resolution[3]of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 2005 and 31 March 2006, respectively, in CA G.R. CV No. 72886, which affirmed the8 June 2001decision ofthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, ofCebuCity.[4]The facts, as culled from the records, follow.On28 March 1978, spouses Raymundo and Desamparados Crystal obtained aP300,000.00 loan in behalf ofthe Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. (CCCC) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands-Butuanbranch (BPI-Butuan). The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on heavy equipment and machinery of CCCC.On the same date, the spouses executed in favor of BPI-Butuan a Continuing Suretyship[5]where they bound themselves as surety of CCCC in the aggregate principal sum of not exceedingP300,000.00.Thereafter, or on29 March 1979,Raymundo Crystal executed a promissory note[6]for the amount ofP300,000.00, alsoin favor of BPI-Butuan.Sometime inAugust 1979, CCCC reneweda previousloan, this timefrom BPI,CebuCitybranch (BPI-CebuCity). The renewalwas evidenced by a promissory note[7]dated13 August 1979, signed by the spouses in their personal capacities and as managing partners of CCCC. The promissory note states that the spousesare jointly and severally liable with CCCC.It appears that before the original loan couldbe granted,BPI-CebuCityrequired CCCC to put up a security.However, CCCC had no real property to offer as security for the loan; hence, the spouses executed a real estate mortgage[8]over their own real property on22 September 1977.[9]On3 October 1977, they executed anotherreal estate mortgageover the same lot in favor ofBPI-CebuCity, to secure an additional loan ofP20,000.00 of CCCC.[10]CCCC failed to pay its loans to both BPI-Butuan andBPI-CebuCitywhen they became due.CCCC,as well as the spouses, failed to pay their obligations despite demands. Thus, BPI resorted to the foreclosure of thechattel mortgage and the real estate mortgage.The foreclosure sale on the chattel mortgage was initially stalled with the issuance of a restraining order against BPI.[11]However, followingBPIscompliance with the necessary requisites of extrajudicial foreclosure, the foreclosure sale on the chattel mortgage was consummated on28 February 1988, with the proceeds amounting toP240,000.00 applied to the loan from BPI-Butuan which had then reachedP707,393.90.[12]Meanwhile, on7 July 1981, Insular Bank ofAsiaand America (IBAA), through its Vice-President for Legal and CorporateAffairs,offeredtobuythelot subject of the two (2) real

estate mortgages and to pay directly the spouses indebtedness in exchange for the release of the mortgages.BPI rejectedIBAAsoffer to pay.[13]BPI filed a complaint for sum of money against CCCC and the spouses before theRegionalTrialCourtofButuanCity(RTCButuan), seeking to recover the deficiency of the loan of CCCC and the spouses with BPI-Butuan.The trial court ruled in favor of BPI. Pursuant to the decision, BPI instituted extrajudicial foreclosure of the spouses mortgaged property.[14]On10 April 1985, the spouses filed an action forInjunction With Damages, With A Prayer For A Restraining Orderand/ or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[15]The spouses claimed that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgages is illegal because BPI should have exhaustedCCCCsproperties first, stressing that they are mere guarantors of the renewed loans. They also prayed that they be awardedmoral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and cost of suit. Subsequently, the spouses filed an amended complaint,[16]additionally alleging that CCCC had opened and maintained a foreign currency savings account (FCSA-197) with bpi,Makatibranch (BPI-Makati), and thatsaid FCSA was used as security foraP450,000.00 loan also extended by BPI-Makati.TheP450,000.00 loan was allegedly paid, and thereafter the spouses demanded the return of the FCSA passbook. BPI rejected the demand; thus, the spouses were unable to withdraw from the said account to pay for their other obligations to BPI.The trial court dismissed the spouses complaint and ordered them to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to BPI.[17]It ruled that since the spouses agreed to bind themselves jointly and severally, they are solidarily liable for the loans; hence, BPI can validly foreclose the two real estate mortgages. Moreover, being guarantors-mortgagors, the spouses are not entitled to the benefit of exhaustion. Anent the FCSA, the trial court found that CCCC originally had FCDU SA No. 197 with BPI, Dewey Boulevard branch, which was transferred to BPI-Makati as FCDU SA 76/0035, at the request ofDesamparadosCrystal. FCDU SA 76/0035 was thus closed, butDesamparadosCrystal failed to surrender the passbook because it was lost.The transferred FCSA in BPI-Makatiwas the one used as security for CCCCsP450,000.00 loan from BPI-Makati. CCCC was no longer allowed to withdraw from FCDU SA No. 197 because it was already closed.The spouses appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, but their appeal was dismissed.[18]The spouses moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the Court of Appeals also denied their motion for reconsideration.[19]Hence, the present petition.Before the Court, petitioners who are the heirs of the spouses argue that the failure of the spouses to pay the BPI-Cebu City loan ofP120,000.00 was due toBPIsillegal refusal to accept paymentfor the loan unless theP300,000.00 loan from BPI-Butuan would also be paid. Consequently, in view ofBPIsunjust refusal to accept payment of the BPI-Cebu City loan, the loan obligation of the spouses was extinguished, petitioners contend.The contention has no merit. Petitioners rely onIBAAsofferto purchase the mortgaged lot from them and to directly pay BPI out of the proceeds thereof to settle the loan.[20]BPIsrefusal to agree to such payment scheme cannot extinguish the spouses loan obligation.In the first place, IBAA is not privy to the loan agreement or the promissory note between the spouses and BPI. Contracts, after all, takeeffectonly between the parties, their successors in interest, heirs

and assigns.[21]Besides, under Art. 1236 of the Civil Code, the creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. We see no stipulation in the promissory note which states that a third person may fulfill the spouses obligation. Thus, it is clear that the spouses alone bear responsibility for the same.In any event, the promissory note is the controlling repository of theobligation of the spouses. Under the promissory note, the spousesdefined the parameters of their obligation as follows:On or before June 29, 1980 on demand, for value received, I/we promise to pay, jointly and severally, to the BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,at its office in the city of Cebu Philippines, the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS(P120,0000.00), Philippine Currency, subject to periodic installments on the principal as follows:P30,000.00 quarterly amortization starting September 28, 1979. xxx[22]A solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.[23]A liability is solidary only when the obligation expressly sostates,whenthelawsoprovidesorwhenthenatureofthe

obligation so requires.[24]Thus, when the obligor undertakes to be jointly and severally liable, it means that the obligation is solidary,[25]such as in this case.By stating I/we promise to pay, jointly and severally, to the BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, the spousesagreed to be sought out and be demanded payment from, by BPI.BPI did demand payment from them, but they failed to comply with their obligation, promptingBPIsvalid resort to the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and thereal estate mortgages.More importantly, the promissory note, wherein the spousesundertook to be solidarily liable for the principal loan, partakes the nature ofasuretyshipand therefore is an additional security for the loan. Thus we held in one case thatif solidary liability was instituted to guarantee a principal obligation, the law deems the contract to be one of suretyship.[26]And while a contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the suretysliability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary, and absolute; in other words, the surety isdirectly and equally bound with the principal.The surety therefore becomes liable for the debt or duty of another even ifhe possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefittherefrom.[27]Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not granting their counterclaims, considering that they suffered moral damages in view of the unjust refusal of BPI to accept the payment scheme proposed by IBAA and the allegedly unjust and illegal foreclosure of the real estate mortgages on their property.[28]Conversely, they argue that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral damages to BPI, which is a corporation, as well as exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.[29]We do not agree.Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.[30]Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.[31]There being no wrongful or unjust act on the part of BPI in demanding payment from them and in seeking the foreclosure of the chattel and real estate mortgages, there is no lawful basis for award of damages in favor of thespouses.Neither is BPI entitled to moral damages.Ajuridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.[32]The Court ofAppeals found BPIas being famous and having gained its familiarity and respect not only in the Philippines but also in the whole world because of its good will and good reputation must protect and defend the same against any unwarranted suit such as the case at bench.[33]In holding that BPI is entitled to moral damages, the Court of Appealsrelied on the case ofPeople v. Manero,[34]wherein the Court ruled that [i]t is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation, that moral damages may be awarded.[35]We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.A statement similar to that made by the Court inManerocan be found in the case ofMambulao Lumber Co.v. PNB, et al.,[36]thus:

xxxObviously, an artificial person like herein appellant corporation cannot experiencephysical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or social humiliation which are basis of moral damages.A corporation may have good reputationwhich, if besmirched may also be a ground for the award of moral damages.xxx(Emphasis supplied)Nevertheless,inthe more recent casesofABS-CBN Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[37]andFilipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM),[38]the Courtheld that the statementsinManeroandMambulaowere mereobiter dicta,implying that the award of moral damages to corporations is not a hard and fast rule.Indeed, while the Court may allow the grant of moral damages to corporations, it is not automatically granted; there must still be proof of the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the defendants acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant foractual injurysuffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.[39]Thespouses complaint against BPIproved to be unfounded, but it does not automatically entitle BPI to moral damages.Although theinstitutionof a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal

justification for an award of attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Otherwise, moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.[40]BPI may have been inconvenienced by the suit, but we do not see how it could have possibly suffered besmirched reputation on account of the single suit alone.Hence, the award of moral damages should be deleted.The awards of exemplary damages and attorneys fees, however, are proper.Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner, while attorneys fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[41]The spouses instituted their complaint against BPI notwithstanding the fact that they were the ones who failed to pay their obligations. Consequently, BPI was forced to litigate and defend its interest.For these reasons, BPI is entitled to the awards of exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 2005 and 31 March 2006, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damagestoBank of the Philippine Islands isDELETED.Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12719 May 31, 1962THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.THE CLUB FILIPINO, INC. DE CEBU,respondent.Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.V. Jaime and L. E. Petilla for respondent.PAREDES,J.:This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, reversing the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the "Club Filipino, Inc. de Cebu", the sum of P12,068.84 as fixed and percentage taxes, surcharge and compromise penalty, allegedly due from it as a keeper of bar and restaurant.As found by the Court of Tax Appeals, the "Club Filipino, Inc. de Cebu," (Club, for short), is a civic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines with an original authorized capital stock of P22,000.00, which was subsequently increased to P200,000.00, among others, to it "proporcionar, operar, y mantener un campo de golf, tenis, gimnesio (gymnasiums), juego de bolos (bowling alleys), mesas de billar y pool, y toda clase de juegos no prohibidos por leyes generales y ordenanzas generales; y desarollar y cultivar deportes de toda clase y denominacion cualquiera para el recreo y entrenamiento saludable de sus miembros y accionistas" (sec. 2, Escritura de Incorporacion del Club Filipino, Inc. Exh. A). Neither in the articles or by-laws is there a provision relative to dividends and their distribution, although it is covenanted that upon its dissolution, the Club's remaining assets, after paying debts, shall be donated to a charitable Philippine Institution in Cebu (Art. 27, Estatutos del Club, Exh. A-a.).The Club owns and operates a club house, a bowling alley, a golf course (on a lot leased from the government), and a bar-restaurant where it sells wines and liquors, soft drinks, meals and short orders to its members and their guests. Thebar-restaurantwas a necessary incident to the operation of the club and its golf-course. The club is operated mainly with funds derived from membership fees and dues. Whatever profits it had, were used to defray its overhead expenses and to improve its golf-course. In 1951. as a result of a capital surplus, arising from the re-valuation of its real properties, the value or price of which increased, the Club declared stock dividends; but no actual cash dividends were distributed to the stockholders. In 1952, a BIR agent discovered that the Club has never paid percentage tax on the gross receipts of its bar and restaurant, although it secured B-4, B-9(a) and B-7 licenses. In a letter dated December 22, 1852, the Collector of Internal Revenue assessed against and demanded from the Club, the following sums: As percentage tax on its gross receiptsduring the tax years 1946 to 1951P9,599.07

Surcharge therein2,399.77

As fixed tax for the years 1946 to 195270.00

Compromise penalty500.00

The Club wrote the Collector, requesting for the cancellation of the assessment. The request having been denied, the Club filed the instant petition for review.The dominant issues involved in this case are twofold:1. Whether the respondent Club is liable for the payment of the sum of 12,068.84, as fixed and percentage taxes and surcharges prescribed in sections 182, 183 and 191 of the Tax Code, under which the assessment was made, in connection with the operation of its bar and restaurant, during the periods mentioned above; and2. Whether it is liable for the payment of the sum of P500.00 as compromise penalty.Section 182, of the Tax Code states, "Unless otherwise provided, every person engaging in a business on which the percentage tax is imposed shall pay in full a fixed annual tax of ten pesos for each calendar year or fraction thereof in which such person shall engage in said business." Section 183 provides in general that "the percentage taxes on business shall be payable at the end of each calendar quarter in the amount lawfully due on the business transacted during each quarter; etc." And section 191, same Tax Code, provides "Percentage tax . . . Keepers of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating places shall pay a tax threeper centum, and keepers of bar and cafes where wines or liquors are served fiveper centumof their gross receipts . . .". It has been held that the liability for fixed and percentage taxes, as provided by these sections, does notipso factoattach by mere reason of the operation of a bar and restaurant. For the liability to attach, the operator thereof must be engaged in the business as a barkeeper and restaurateur. The plain and ordinary meaning ofbusinessis restricted to activities or affairs where profit is the purpose or livelihood is the motive, and the term business when used without qualification, should be construed in its plain and ordinary meaning, restricted to activitiesfor profitor livelihood (The Coll. of Int. Rev. v. Manila Lodge No. 761 of the BPOE [Manila Elks Club] & Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-11176, June 29, 1959, giving full definitions of the word "business"; Coll. of Int. Rev. v. Sweeney, et al. [International Club of Iloilo, Inc.], G.R. No. L-12178, Aug. 21, 1959, the facts of which are similar to the ones at bar; Manila Polo Club v. B. L. Meer, etc., No. L-10854, Jan. 27, 1960).Having found as a fact that the Club was organized to develop and cultivate sports of all class and denomination, for the healthful recreation and entertainment of its stockholders and members; that upon its dissolution, its remaining assets, after paying debts, shall be donated to a charitable Philippine Institution in Cebu; that it is operated mainly with funds derived from membership fees and dues; that the Club's bar and restaurant catered only to its members and their guests; that there was in fact no cash dividend distribution to its stockholders and that whatever was derived on retail from its bar and restaurant was used to defray its overall overhead expenses and to improve its golf-course (cost-plus-expenses-basis), it stands to reason that the Club is not engaged in the business of an operator of bar and restaurant (same authorities, cited above).It is conceded that the Club derived profit from the operation of its bar and restaurant, but such fact does not necessarily convert it into a profit-making enterprise. The bar and restaurant are necessary adjuncts of the Club to foster its purposes and the profits derived therefrom are necessarily incidental to the primary object of developing and cultivating sports for the healthful recreation and entertainment of the stockholders and members. That a Club makes some profit, does not make it a profit-making Club. As has been remarked a club should always strive, whenever possible, to have surplus (Jesus Sacred Heart College v. Collector of Int. Rev., G.R. No. L-6807, May 24, 1954; Collector of Int. Rev. v. Sinco Educational Corp., G.R. No. L-9276, Oct. 23, 1956).1wph1.tIt is claimed that unlike the two cases just cited (supra), which are non-stock, the appellee Club is a stock corporation. This is unmeritorious. The facts that the capital stock of the respondent Club is divided into shares, does not detract from the finding of the trial court that it is not engaged in the business of operator of bar and restaurant. What is determinative of whether or not the Club is engaged in such business is its object or purpose, as stated in its articles and by-laws. It is a familiar rule that the actual purpose is not controlled by the corporate form or by the commercial aspect of the business prosecuted, but may be shown by extrinsic evidence, including the by-laws and the method of operation. From the extrinsic evidence adduced, the Tax Court concluded that the Club is not engaged in the business as a barkeeper and restaurateur.Moreover, for a stock corporation to exist, two requisites must be complied with, to wit: (1) a capital stock divided into shares and (2) an authority to distribute to the holders of such shares, dividends or allotments of the surplus profits on the basis of the shares held (sec. 3, Act No. 1459). In the case at bar, nowhere in its articles of incorporation or by-laws could be found an authority for the distribution of its dividends or surplus profits. Strictly speaking, it cannot, therefore, be considered a stock corporation, within the contemplation of the corporation law.A tax is a burden, and, as such, it should not be deemed imposed upon fraternal, civic, non-profit, nonstock organizations, unless the intent to the contrary is manifest and patent" (Collector v. BPOE Elks Club, et al.,supra), which is not the case in the present appeal.Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent Club is not engaged in the business as an operator of a bar and restaurant, and therefore, not liable for fixed and percentage taxes, it follows that it is not liable for any penalty, much less of a compromise penalty.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed without costs.G.R. No. 79182 September 11, 1991PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and DANILO MERCADO,respondents.Bacorro & Associates for petitioner.Alberto L. Dalmacion for private respondent.PARAS,J.:pThis is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Resolution*dated July 3, 1987 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC for brevity) which affirmed the decision dated April 30, 1986 of Labor Arbiter Vito J. Minoria of the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII at Cebu City in Case No. RAB-VII-0556-85 entitled "Danilo Mercado, Complainant, vs. Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation, Respondent", ordering the reinstatement of complainant Danilo Mercado and the award of various monetary claims.The factual background of this case is as follows:Private respondent Danilo Mercado was first employed by herein petitioner Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC for brevity) on August 13, 1979. He held various positions ranging from clerk, general clerk to shipping clerk during his employment at its Cebu office until his transfer to its establishment at Palimpinon, Dumaguete, Oriental Negros on September 5, 1984. On June 30, 1985, private respondent Mercado was dismissed. His last salary was P1,585.00 a month basic pay plus P800.00 living allowance (Labor Arbiter's Decision, Annex "E" of Petition, Rollo, p. 52).The grounds for the dismissal of Mercado are allegedly serious acts of dishonesty committed as follows:1. On ApriI 12, 1985, Danilo Mercado was ordered to purchase 1,400 pieces of nipa shingles from Mrs. Leonardo Nodado of Banilad, Dumaguete City, for the total purchase price of Pl,680.00. Against company policy, regulations and specific orders, Danilo Mercado withdrew the nipa shingles from the supplier but paid the amount of P1,000.00 only. Danilo Mercado appropriated the balance of P680.00 for his personal use;2. In the same transaction stated above, the supplier agreed to give the company a discount of P70.00 which Danilo Mercado did not report to the company;3. On March 28, 1985, Danilo Mercado was instructed to contract the services of Fred R. Melon of Dumaguete City, for the fabrication of rubber stamps, for the total amount of P28.66. Danilo Mercado paid the amount of P20.00 to Fred R. Melon and appropriated for his personal use the balance of P8.66.In addition, private respondent, Danilo Mercado violated company rules and regulations in the following instances:1. On June 5, 1985, Danilo Mercado was absent from work without leave, without proper turn-over of his work, causing disruption and delay of company work activities;2. On June 15, 1985, Danilo Mercado went on vacation leave without prior leave, against company policy, rules and regulations. (Petitioner's Memorandum, Rollo, p. 195).On September 23, 1985, private respondent Mercado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, retirement benefits, separation pay, unpaid wages, etc. against petitioner PNOC-EDC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII docketed as Case No. RAB-VII-0556-85.After private respondent Mercado filed his position paper on December 16, 1985 (Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 28-40), petitioner PNOC-EDC filed its Position Paper/Motion to Dismiss on January 15, 1986, praying for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Labor Arbiter and/or the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case (Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-45), which was assailed by private respondent Mercado in his Opposition to the Position Paper/Motion to Dismiss dated March 12, 1986 (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-50).The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent Mercado. The dispositive onion of said decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents are hereby ordered:1) To reinstate complainant to his former position with full back wages from the date of his dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges;2) To pay complainant the amount of P10,000.00 representing his personal share of his savings account with the respondents;3) To pay complainants the amount of P30,000.00 moral damages; P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P5,000.00 attorney's fees;4) To pay complainant the amount of P792.50 as his proportionate 13th month pay for 1985.Respondents are hereby further ordered to deposit the aforementioned amounts with this Office within ten days from receipt of a copy of this decision for further disposition.SO ORDERED.(Labor Arbiter's Decision, Rollo, p. 56)The appeal to the NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit on July 3, 1987 and the assailed decision was affirmed.Hence, this petition.The issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition are:1. Whether or not matters of employment affecting the PNOC-EDC, a government-owned and controlled corporation, are within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.2. Assuming the affirmative, whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent, payment of his savings, and proportionate 13th month pay and payment of damages as well as attorney's fee.Petitioner PNOC-EDC alleges that it is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the government; that the Energy Development Corporation is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company which is a government entity created under Presidential Decree No. 334, as amended; that being a government-owned and controlled corporation, it is governed by the Civil Service Law as provided for in Section 1, Article XII-B of the 1973 Constitution, Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) and Article 277 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (Labor Code).The 1973 Constitution provides:The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.Petitioner PNOC-EDC argued that since Labor Arbiter Minoria rendered the decision at the time when the 1973 Constitution was in force, said decision is null and void because under the 1973 Constitution, government-owned and controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law. Even assuming that PNOC-EDC has no original or special charter and Section 2(i), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution provides that:The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.such circumstances cannot give validity to the decision of the Labor Arbiter (Ibid., pp. 192-193).This issue has already been laid to rest in the case ofPNOC-EDC vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26 (July 5, 1989), involving the same petitioner and the same issue, where this Court ruled that the doctrine that employees of government-owned and/or con controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the General Corporation law are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, has been supplanted by the present Constitution. "Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law are the manner of its creation, such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the General Corporation Law are not within its coverage."Specifically, the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the General Corporation Law was held to be a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code (Ibid.).The fact that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect, does not deprive the NLRC of jurisdiction on the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision (NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69870, 168 SCRA 122 [1988]).In the case at bar, the decision of the NLRC was promulgated on July 3, 1987. Accordingly, this case falls squarely under the rulings of the aforementioned cases.As regards the second issue, the record shows that PNOC-EDC's accusations of dishonesty and violations of company rules are not supported by evidence. Nonetheless, while acknowledging the rule that administrative bodies are not governed by the strict rules of evidence, petitioner PNOC-EDC alleges that the labor arbiter's propensity to decide the case through the position papers submitted by the parties is violative of due process thereby rendering the decision null and void (Ibid., p. 196).On the other hand, private respondent contends that as can be seen from petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal dated July 28, 1986 (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 57- 64), the latter never questioned the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter but simply limited its objection to the lack of legal basis in view of its stand that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case (Private Respondent's Memorandum, Rollo, p. 104).Petitioner PNOC-EDC filed its Position Paper/Motion to Dismiss dated January 15, 1986 (Annex "C" of the Petition Rollo, pp. 41-45) before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII of Cebu City and its Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal dated July 28, 1986 (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 57-64) before the NLRC of Cebu City. Indisputably, the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers. What the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to ventilate a party's side. There is no denial of due process where the party submitted its position paper and flied its motion for reconsideration (Odin Security Agency vs. De la Serna, 182 SCRA 472 [February 21, 1990]). Petitioner's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal has the effect of curing whatever irregularity might have been committed in the proceedings below (T.H. Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308 [January 22, 1990]).Furthermore, it has been consistently held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality (Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA 784 [July 27, 1990]; Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA 179 [August 30, 1990]). Judicial review by this Court does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion (Filipinas Manufacturers Bank vs. NLRC, 182 SCRA 848 [February 28, 1990]). A careful study of the records shows no substantive reason to depart from these established principles.While it is true that loss of trust or breach of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, such loss or breach of trust must have some basis (Gubac v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 412 [July 13, 1990]). As found by the Labor Arbiter, the accusations of petitioner PNOC-EDC against private respondent Mercado have no basis. Mrs. Leonardo Nodado, from whom the nipa shingles were purchased, sufficiently explained in her affidavit (Rollo, p. 36) that the total purchase price of P1,680.00 was paid by respondent Mercado as agreed upon. The alleged discount given by Mrs. Nodado is not supported by evidence as well as the alleged appropriation of P8.66 from the cost of fabrication of rubber stamps. The Labor Arbiter, likewise, found no evidence to support the alleged violation of company rules. On the contrary, he found respondent Mercado's explanation in his affidavit (Rollo, pp. 38-40) as to the alleged violations to be satisfactory. Moreover, these findings were never contradicted by petitioner petitioner PNOC-EDC.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and the resolution of respondent NLRC dated July 3, 1987 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the moral damages are reduced to Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, and the exemplary damages reduced to Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos.SO ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.Sarmiento, J., is on leave.G.R. No. L-22619December 2, 1924NATIONAL COAL COMPANY,plaintiff-appellee,vs.THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE,defendant-appellant.Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.Perfecto J. Salas Rodriguez for appellee.JOHNSON,J.:This action was brought in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila on the 17th day of July, 1923, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P12,044.68, alleged to have been paid under protest by the plaintiff company to the defendant, as specific tax on 24,089.3 tons of coal. Said company is a corporation created by Act No. 2705 of the Philippine Legislature for the purpose of developing the coal industry in the Philippine Islands and is actually engaged in coal mining on reserved lands belonging to the Government. It claimed exemption from taxes under the provision of sections 14 and 15 of Act No. 2719, and prayed for a judgment ordering the defendant to refund to the plaintiff said sum of P12,044.68, with legal interest from the date of the presentation of the complaint, and costs against the defendant.The defendant answered denying generally and specifically all the material allegations of the complaint, except the legal existence and personality of the plaintiff. As a special defense, the defendant alleged (a) that the sum of P12,044.68 was paid by the plaintiff without protests, and (b) that said sum was due and owing from the plaintiff to the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of section 1496 of the Administrative Code and prayed that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against the plaintiff.Upon the issue thus presented, the case was brought on for trial. After a consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, the Honorable Pedro Conception, judge, held that the words "landsownedby any person, etc.," in section 15 of Act No. 2719 should be understood to mean "landsheld in leaseor usufruct," in harmony with the other provision of said Act; that the coal lands possessed by the plaintiff, belonging to the Government, fell within the provisions of section 15 of Act No. 2719; and that a tax of P0.04 per ton of 1,016 kilos on each ton of coal extracted therefrom, as provided in said section, was the only tax which should be collected from the plaintiff; and sentenced the defendant to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P11,081.11 which is the difference between the amount collected under section 1496 of the Administrative Code and the amount which should have been collected under the provisions of said section 15 of Act No. 2719. From that sentence the defendant appealed, and now makes the following assignments of error:I. The court below erred in holding that section 15 of Act No. 2719 does not refer to coal lands owned by persons and corporations.II. The court below erred in holding that the plaintiff was not subject to the tax prescribed in section 1496 of the Administrative Code.The question confronting us in this appeal is whether the plaintiff is subject to the taxes under section 15 of Act No. 2719, or to the specific taxes under section 1496 of the Administrative Code.The plaintiff corporation was created on the 10th day of March, 1917, by Act No. 2705, for the purpose of developing the coal industry in the Philippine Island, in harmony with the general plan of the Government to encourage the development of the natural resources of the country, and to provided facilities therefor. By said Act, the company was granted the general powers of a corporation "and such other powers as may be necessary to enable it to prosecute the business of developing coal deposits in the Philippine Island and of mining, extracting, transporting and selling the coal contained in said deposits." (Sec. 2, Act No. 2705.) By the same law (Act No. 2705) the Government of the Philippine Islands is made the majority stockholder, evidently in order to insure proper government supervision and control, and thus to place the Government in a position to render all possible encouragement, assistance and help in the prosecution and furtherance of the company's business.On May 14, 1917, two months after the passage of Act No. 2705, creating the National Coal Company, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2719 "to provide for theleasing and developmentof coal lands in the Philippine Islands." On October 18, 1917, upon petition of the National Coal Company, the Governor-General, by Proclamation No. 39, withdrew "from settlement, entry, sale or other disposition, all coal-bearing public lands within the Province of Zamboanga, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of Polillo, Province of Tayabas." Almost immediately after the issuance of said proclamation the National Coal Company took possession of the coal lands within the said reservation, with an area of about 400 hectares, without any further formality, contract or lease. Of the 30,000 shares of stock issued by the company, the Government of the Philippine Islands is the owner of 29,809 shares, that is, of 99 1/3 per centum of the whole capital stock.If we understand the theory of the plaintiff-appellee, it is, that it claims to be the owner of the land from which it has mined the coal in question and is therefore subject to the provisions of section 15 of Act No. 2719 and not to the provisions of the section 1496 of the Administrative Code. That contention of the plaintiff leads us to an examination of the evidence upon the question of the ownership of the land from which the coal in question was mined. Was the plaintiff the owner of the land from which the coal in question was mined? If the evidence shows the affirmative, then the judgment should be affirmed. If the evidence shows that the land does not belong to the plaintiff, then the judgment should be reversed, unless the plaintiff's rights fall under section 3 of said Act.The only witness presented by the plaintiff upon the question of the ownership of the land in question was Mr. Dalmacio Costas, who stated that he was a member of the board of directors of the plaintiff corporation; that the plaintiff corporation took possession of the land in question by virtue of the proclamation of the Governor-General, known as Proclamation No. 39 of the year 1917; that no document had been issued in favor of the plaintiff corporation; that said corporation had received no permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; that it took possession of said lands covering an area of about 400 hectares, from which the coal in question was mined, solely, by virtue of said proclamation (Exhibit B, No. 39).Said proclamation (Exhibit B) was issued by Francis Burton Harrison, then Governor-General, on the 18th day of October, 1917, and provided: "Pursuant to the provision of section 71 of Act No. 926, I hereby withdraw from settlement, entry, sale, or other disposition, all coal-bearing public lands within the Province of Zamboanga, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of Polillo, Province of Tayabas." It will be noted that said proclamation only provided that all coal-bearing public lands within said province and island should be withdrawn from settlement, entry, sale, or other disposition. There is nothing in said proclamation which authorizes the plaintiff or any other person to enter upon said reversations and to mine coal, and no provision of law has been called to our attention, by virtue of which the plaintiff was entitled to enter upon any of the lands so reserved by said proclamation without first obtaining permission therefor.The plaintiff is a private corporation. The mere fact that the Government happens to the majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation. Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, makes it subject to all of the provisions of the Corporation Law, in so far as they are not inconsistent with said Act (No. 2705). No provisions of Act No. 2705 are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Corporation Law. As a private corporation, it has no greater rights, powers or privileges than any other corporation which might be organized for the same purpose under the Corporation Law, and certainly it was not the intention of the Legislature to give it a preference or right or privilege over other legitimate private corporations in the mining of coal. While it is true that said proclamation No. 39 withdrew "from settlement, entry, sale, or other disposition of coal-bearing public lands within the Province of Zamboanga . . . and the Island of Polillo," it made no provision for the occupation and operation by the plaintiff, to the exclusion of other persons or corporations who might, under proper permission, enter upon the operate coal mines.On the 14th day of May, 1917, and before the issuance of said proclamation, the Legislature of the Philippine Island in "an Act for the leasing and development of coal lands in the Philippine Islands" (Act No. 2719), made liberal provision. Section 1 of said Act provides: "Coal-bearing lands of the public domain in the Philippine Island shall not be disposed of in any manner except as provided in this Act," thereby giving a clear indication that no "coal-bearing lands of the public domain" had been disposed of by virtue of said proclamation.Neither is there any provision in Act No. 2705 creating the National Coal Company, nor in the amendments thereof found in Act No. 2822, which authorizes the National Coal Company to enter upon any of the reserved coal lands without first having obtained permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.lawphi1.netThe following propositions are fully sustained by the facts and the law:(1) The National Coal Company is an ordinary private corporation organized under Act No. 2705, and has no greater powers nor privileges than the ordinary private corporation, except those mentioned, perhaps, in section 10 of Act No. 2719, and they do not change the situation here.(2) It mined on public lands between the month of July, 1920, and the months of March, 1922, 24,089.3 tons of coal.(3) Upon demand of the Collector of Internal Revenue it paid a tax of P0.50 a ton, as taxes under the provisions of article 1946 of the Administrative Code on the 15th day of December, 1922.(4) It is admitted that it is neither the owner nor the lessee of the lands upon which said coal was mined.(5) The proclamation of Francis Burton Harrison, Governor-General, of the 18th day of October, 1917, by authority of section 1 of Act No. 926, withdrawing from settlement, entry, sale, or other dispositon all coal-bearing public lands within the Province of Zamboanga and the Island of Polillo, was not a reservation for the benefit of the National Coal Company, but for any person or corporation of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.(6) That the National Coal Company entered upon said land and mined said coal, so far as the record shows, without any lease or other authority from either the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or any person having the power to grant a leave or authority.From all of the foregoing facts we find that the issue is well defined between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff contends that it was liable only to pay the internal revenue and other fees and taxes provided for under section 15 of Act No. 2719; while the defendant contends, under the facts of record, the plaintiff is obliged to pay the internal revenue duty provided for in section 1496 of the Administrative Code. That being the issue, an examination of the provisions of Act No. 2719 becomes necessary.An examination of said Act (No. 2719) discloses the following facts important for consideration here:First. All "coal-bearing lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands shall not be disposed of in any manner except as provided in this Act." Second. Provisions for leasing by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of "unreserved, unappropriated coal-bearing public lands," and the obligation to the Government which shall be imposed by said Secretary upon the lessee.lawphi1.netThird. The internal revenue duty and tax which must be paid upon coal-bearing lands owned by any person, firm, association or corporation.To r