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TheoryEuropean Journal of Political

DOI: 10.1177/14748851080969612009; 8; 76European Journal of Political Theory

Maeve CookeBeyond Dignity and Difference: Revisiting the Politics of Recognition

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Beyond Dignity and DifferenceRevisiting the Politics of Recognition

Maeve Cooke University College Dublin, Ireland

AB S T R AC T : Revisiting Taylors 1992 account of the politics of recognition, I argue thathe is right to discern a strand in contemporary politics that goes beyond the demand for

recognition of dignity. Against Taylor I contend that this is best understood as a concernnot for recognition of difference but for the value of something that is not universally

shared, such as a particular ethical conception, cultural tradition or religious belief andpractice. Using the examples of three social movements I show the relevance of this forcontemporary politics. My empirically based argument is supported normatively by a

discussion of Hegels critique of morality as conscience in hisPhenomenology. Referringto Axel Honneths theory of recognition I highlight the lack of attention to this kind ofconcern for recognition in contemporary political and social theory. I conclude byspecifying the key features of the concept of recognition most appropriate for

responding to it publicly under conditions of value-pluralism.

K E Y W O R D S : difference, Hegel, Honneth, politics of recognition, Taylor

What is the point of the politics of recognition? What does the concept of recog-

nition add to our thinking about justice or freedom or any other normative aim of

political association and action? This question is not easy to answer. Certainly,

Charles Taylors seminal essay The Politics of Recognition seemed to capture

the mood of the times when it first appeared in 1992.1 His essay sparked off a

variety of theoretical attempts to conceptualize demands for political justice as

demands for recognition and may well have contributed towards the new idiom of

recognition in political claims-making that emerged in the 1990s. However, from

the beginning it was subjected to vigorous criticism and, rereading it some 15

years later, it is hard to see why the essay was quite so influential. Nonetheless, I

will suggest in the following that Taylors discussion is guided by an important

intuition that has continued relevance for political theory and practice. In my

view, he is right to suggest that there is a strand in contemporary politics that goes

beyond the demand for recognition of universal capacities or qualities; moreover,

that this should be seen as a demand for recognition of the worth of something

76

article

Contact address: Professor Maeve Cooke, School of Philosophy, University CollegeDublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.Email: [email protected]

EJPTEuropean Journal

of Political Theory SAGE Publications Ltd,

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issn 1474-8851, 8(1) 7695

[DOI: 10.1177/1474885108096961]

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that is not universally shared. However, Taylors efforts to address this kind of

concern for recognition are hindered by his interpretation of specificity as differ-

ence and, in particular, his correlation of the politics of difference with the norm

of authenticity. In order to understand what is at stake and to respond to it appro-

priately, therefore, we shall have to move beyond the framework of Taylors

politics of recognition. Three contemporary social movements will be used to

illustrate my point and to provide empirical support for my thesis that this kind

of concern for recognition calls for an appropriate public response. In the follow-

ing section, drawing on Hegels critique of morality as conscience in his

Phenomenology of Spirit, I reinforce this empirically based argument with a norma-

tive one. Then, focusing on the work of Axel Honneth, I discuss the lack of

attention paid to this kind of concern for recognition by contemporary political

and social theorists. In conclusion, I identify the key features of the concept of

recognition most appropriate for responding to this kind of concern.

Revisiting Taylor

Taylor famously distinguishes between two meanings of the politics of recogni-

tion. The first is what he calls the politics of equal dignity. This focuses on what

all human beings have in common and is governed by the norm of autonomy. The

second is what he calls the politics of difference. This focuses on each groups or

each persons distinctness from all others and is governed by the norm of authen-

ticity. Taylor connects these two versions of the politics of recognition with two

types of social movements. The politics of equal dignity is held to correspond to

a type of social movement in which a concern for legal issues is paramount: exam-

ples might be current campaigns for human rights in the detention centre in

Guntanamo Bay or for religious freedom in Tibet. By contrast, the politics of

difference is connected with social movements in which the principal issues are

identity-related: examples might be campaigns to protect and celebrate the dis-

tinct ethnic identity of the Roma or Taylors own example of the Qubcois. He

suggests, furthermore, that these two types of social movement form a historicalsequence: the politics of equal dignity is presented as historically prior to the

politics of difference which is not to dispute its persistence in contemporary

politics and, accordingly, the shift to a politics of difference is seen as something

historically new. On his account, the politics of difference grows organically out

of the politics of universal dignity through one of those shifts whereby a new

understanding of the human social condition imparts a radically new meaning to

an old principle.2

Taylors account of the politics of recognition has been subjected to various

criticisms. One objection is that he postulates a sequence of types of social move-

ment that is historically inaccurate and misleading. Some critics argue that

Taylors account obscures the ways in which, historically, issues of legal rights and

issues of identity and, correspondingly, the politics of equal dignity and the poli-

Cooke: Beyond Dignity and Difference

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tics of difference, have always been intermeshed; moreover, that presenting the

politics of difference as a historically new development disregards the ways in

which identity-related issues were central to the resistance movements of the 19th

and early 20th centuries, such as womens campaigns for the right to vote or the

black revolt against slavery.3A second objection is that his account of the politics of

difference is tied to an interpretation of difference as authenticity that seems to

preclude the kind of discriminating recognition this kind of politics demands. This

was one of the objections I raised against Taylor in a critical discussion of his essay

some years ago.4 I argued that the politics of difference runs up against serious

problems when it calls for recognition of authenticity, understood by Taylor as

inwardly generated uniqueness. The main problem is one of critical evaluation.

We can see this by recalling the point of Taylors distinction between the politics

of equal dignity and the politics of difference. If the two are to be distinguished

along the lines he suggests, the kind of recognition called for by the politics ofdifference cannot be an undiscriminating recognition of authenticity. A politics

that recognizes everyone equally for their authenticity fits the model of the politics

of equal dignity: it simply interprets the concept of human dignity in terms of

uniqueness. Taylor is aware of the need to discriminate evaluatively between

manifestations of authenticity, drawing attention to the distinction between

regarding the creative activity of individuals or groups as worthwhile and declar-

ing oneself on their side, even if their creations are not at all impressive.5As he sees

it, failure to critically assess the validity of particular claims to authenticity leads

easily to subjectivism, which, for him, is shot through with confusion.6 He con-

cludes that we should make only apresumption of worth, which serves as a starting

point for critical evaluation. However, critical evaluation runs up against two

serious difficulties. First, in contexts in which there is a plurality of conceptions of

ethical value and no generally acceptable overarching framework for

distinguishing between them, ethical judgements will be contested. Second, in the

case of claims to authenticity there is a further complication. Since this is an

inwardly generated form of uniqueness, no external court of judgement is

available: only the individuals and groups concerned can pass judgement on thevalidity of such claims. In the closing pages of his essay Taylor grapples with these

difficulties but does not resolve them satisfactorily. In my critical discussion of the

essay, my response was threefold. I first argued that he distinguishes too sharply

between two versions of the politics of recognition and, furthermore, proposes a

problematic correlation of the norm of autonomy with the politics of equal dignity

and the norm of authenticity with the politics of difference. If we take autonomy

to mean the capacity to form and develop an identity-specific conception of the

good7 and, if as Taylor suggests, the deep concern of the politics of difference is

singularity, then the norm of autonomy is also central to this version of the poli-

tics of recognition. I then proposed a more differentiated account of the politics of

difference. Whereas Taylor interprets the demand for recognition of difference

solely as a demand for recognition of authenticity, I identified four other interpre-

European Journal of Political Theory8(1)

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tations of this demand, one of which was a demand for recognition of autonomy,

understood in the sense already mentioned. Arguing that some of the other inter-

pretations, too, run up against the problem of critical evaluation encountered by

Taylor, I concluded that only versions of the politics of difference that appeal to

the norm of autonomy are able to avoid the subjectivism he deplores.

At first glance this may seem merely to call for a more fluid boundary-line

between Taylors two versions of the politics of recognition. Closer consideration

reveals, however, that it undermines the very concept of a politics of difference as

Taylor understands it. This is because the versions of the politics of recognition I

ended up endorsing were ones that fit Taylors description of the politics of equal

dignity: they focus on what all human beings have in common, in this case a capac-

ity to form and develop identity-related conceptions of the good. Since, for

Taylor, the politics of difference is the latest stage in a historical progression (we

will recall his contention that it grows organically out of the politics of equal dig-nity as part of a shift in the western modern social imaginary), it also raises a ques-

tion as to the contemporary relevance of the concept of the politics of recognition.

In hindsight I think my conclusion was too hasty. I still hold that Taylors

correlation of the politics of difference with the norm of authenticity is problem-

atic. Moreover, I continue to be suspicious of the demand for recognition of any

kind of difference. At the same time, I think Taylors account of the politics of

recognition is guided by an important intuition. This is the intuition that con-

temporary politics must take seriously a concern for recognition that goes beyond

a demand for recognition of universal qualities or capacities; moreover, that it is a

concern for recognition of the worth or value of things that are not universally

shared.8To be sure, Taylors gaze is rather narrow: he focuses on the worth of

particular cultural identities, specifically, the Francophone culture of Quebec.

Since this is coupled with an interpretation of identity as difference, understood

as authenticity in the sense of inwardly generated distinctiveness, it leads him into

the difficulties I have outlined. It is easier to retain hold of Taylors intuition if we

give up his focus on demands for recognition of particular cultural identities and

expand his gaze to include claims for recognition of the value of particular sub-stantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and

practices. As the following examples show, Taylor is right to identify a concern for

recognition that does not fit the category of the politics of equal dignity. But he is

wrong to suggest that it is captured by the idea of a politics of difference. It is not

a demand for recognition of authenticity, or indeed of difference in any sense, but

a demand for recognition of a substantive value, be it the value of a concrete con-

ception of the good, cultural tradition or religious belief and practice. I will argue

that there are good reasons to take seriously this kind of concern for recognition.

This calls on us to consider what it would mean to respond to it appropriately

under contemporary conditions of value-pluralism.

Let me start with three examples of contemporary social movements that are

motivated, at least in part, by a concern for public recognition of the worth of


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something that is not a universal capacity or quality. Despite some significant

differences between these movements, they all seek recognition for something

that cannot be captured within the framework of the politics of equal dignity.

The Slow Food MovementConstituted in 1989, its manifesto signed in Paris by delegates from 15 different

countries, the international Slow Food movement is founded upon the concept of

eco-gastronomy, which emphasizes the strong connections between plate and

planet.9The movement describes itself as working to defend biodiversity in our

food supply, spread taste education and connect producers of excellent foods with

co-producers through events and initiatives. Its philosophy is that everyone has a

fundamental right to pleasure and consequently the responsibility to protect the

heritage of food, tradition and culture that make this pleasure possible. Let usassume as seems clear from its self-description that this movement seeks pub-

lic recognition for its philosophy and mission. What kind of recognition does it

seek? To describe it as a demand for recognition of what we share in common

seems to miss the point. Despite the movements use of the term right to pleas-

ure, it appears that its main purpose is not to unite all human beings through

appeal to some universal human quality or capacity (for example, dignity or

uniqueness or even pleasure) but to educate people to an appreciation of the ben-

efits of biodiversity, of the value of local food traditions and of the importance of

taking an interest in the food we eat, how it tastes, where it comes from and how it

affects the rest of the world. Correspondingly, it seems less concerned to establish

that right legally than to win public recognition for the value of eco-gastronomy.

It might be objected that there is no difference in principle between the Slow

Food movements campaign for eco-gastronomy and human rights movements

since, like these, it seeks recognition for something that is held to be of universal

value. The difference is merely that the good in question is not yet recognized as

such by everyone. Nowadays, human rights movements can normally take for

granted that the value of, for example, the dignity of the person is universallyrecognized and are concerned instead with inclusion: with expanding the category

of those who count as persons. However, the dignity of the person was not always

recognized as a universal value. The Slow Food movement, so the objection runs,

can be described as a human rights movement in an early stage, when the princi-

pal task is not inclusion, but to establish the universal value of the good in

question.

It is true that the Slow Food movement has a universalizing impulse (I shall

come back to this). Nonetheless, the objection is unconvincing. To categorize it

as a human rights movement is to disregard a central difference between its aims

and those of such movements. Since they are held to be universal, the qualities or

capacities for which human rights movements seek recognition have to be con-

strued sufficiently abstractly to accommodate the multiplicity of particular ends


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motivating human beings. In this sense, the recognition they seek is formal: it

abstracts from the concrete content of particular conceptions of the good, tradi-

tions, beliefs and practices. By contrast, the Slow Food movement is concerned to

win recognition not for an abstract right to pleasure, but for a right to pleasure

that has a determinate content: it seeks recognition for the value of a substantive

end. Eco-gastronomy is a concrete good: it commits those who value it to specific

beliefs and specific ways of life. It is the value of this concrete good that is at stake

in its campaign. This is why it does not fit the category of the politics of equal

dignity. It is also what connects it to my other examples.

The Welsh-Language Initiatives: Mentrau Iaith

These are local organizations in Wales that offer support to communities to

increase and develop their use of the Welsh language.10

Their self-professed aimsare to offer helpful information to parents seeking to raise their children bi-

lingually and/or to educate them through the medium of Welsh; they also counsel

public and voluntary organizations on how to increase their use of Welsh and

advise businesses eager to offer a bilingual service to their customers. In addition

they seek to provide social and leisure opportunities for children and young people

to use Welsh, as well as opportunities for Welsh learners to use their Welsh out-

side the classroom. In this case, too, there is an evident concern for public recog-

nition. And, once again, describing this as a demand for recognition of what we

share in common seems to miss the point. As I read the movements mission state-

ment, its concern is less to unite human beings through appeal to some allegedly

universal norm or quality than to bring to public attention the value of the Welsh

language and the cultural traditions of which this is part. As in the case of the Slow

Food movement, recognition is sought in the first instance not for an abstract

right, but for the value of a concrete good. This is not to say that legal or public

recognition of an abstract universal right for example, a right to linguistic self-

determination is not also at stake: it is to suggest that this movements demand

for recognition would not be fully satisfied by recognition of such a right.

The Assembly for the Protection of Hijab

This is a campaign to allow Muslim girls to wear the hijab in schools.11 Launched

in London in 2004 by the Muslim Womens Group and the Muslim Association

of Britain, this international movement describes itself as seeking the protection

of Muslim womens right to wear the hijab in accordance with their beliefs and of

every womans right to dress as modestly and as comfortably as she pleases. Its

self-professed aims are to bring an end to the hijab ban wherever it has already

been imposed and to prevent any further spreading of the ban. It seeks, in addi-

tion, to provide a platform for Muslim women to express their views, to expose

and discourage any false stereotypes that present Muslim women as being


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oppressed and to liberate Muslim women from any form of race, religious or sex

discrimination. In this case, the appeal to universal rights is particularly striking.

Those involved in the campaign appear to seek recognition for something all

humans share in common, for example, a conception of dignity that is independ-

ent of race, religion and sex or a capacity for self-determination that extends to

matters of dress. Certainly, for many people actively involved in or sympathetic to

the campaign, its purpose may best be captured in these terms. However, two

comments are relevant here. First, despite the rhetoric of its mission statement,

the Assembly clearly sees wearing the hijab as the public expression of a deeply

held religious conviction. It does not consider it simply a matter of personal

preference on a par with a penchant for bright-coloured clothing or the fashions

of the 1950s. To express something publicly is to seek public recognition for the

importance or value of what is expressed. Insofar as the Assembly is also con-

cerned with public expression, therefore, it seeks public recognition not just for aconception of human dignity, or for the right to dress as one pleases, but for the

importance of particular religious beliefs and practices. In this case too, therefore,

recognition is sought for the value of a concrete good. Second, its employment of

the language of universal rights could be due to its adoption of an assimilation

model of social integration. Among contemporary sociologists it is generally

accepted that assimilation is the first ideal-typical mode of incorporation of out-

sider groups into the civil societies of western modernity.12 Incorporation as

assimilation requires outsider groups Jews, blacks, women or, in this case,

Muslims to shed their outsider identities completely upon entering the public

domain. However, assimilative incorporation is usually considered normatively

unsatisfactory. This is because a stigma remains attached to the cast-aside outsider

qualities, infringing against the egalitarian requirements of justice. Some also

consider it empirically unstable, since it is premised on the vilification and exclu-

sion of the identities of those who belong to the formerly outsider groups.13 For

these reasons, it can be expected to give way to a hyphenated mode of incorpora-

tion: here, outsider groups partially give up their outsider identities in favour of a

new form of identity that goes beyond all existing insider or outsider identities.However, some sociologists regard this mode of social integration, too, as nor-

matively unsatisfactory. This is because outsider qualities are not redefined and

there is no valuing of otherness; rather, the new identities adopted by outsider

groups reflect the norms and values of the already dominant social groups. This

suggests the need for a third mode of incorporation. Following this line of argu-

ment, Jeffrey Alexander argues that only the multicultural mode of social

integration leads to the requisite reconfiguration of outsider and insider qualities;

on the multicultural model, outsider qualities are no longer seen as stigmatizing

but as valuable in themselves.14 Following Alexander we could surmise that, on a

multicultural model of incorporation, wearing the hijab would no longer be seen

as irrelevant from the point of view, for example, of equal respect for the dignity

of all women; rather it would be seen in a positive way as a public expression of a


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deeply held religious conviction on the part of a formerly outsider group.15To be

sure, the empirical and normative arguments underpinning this sociological

account are a matter of debate; nonetheless, insofar as they have some initial plau-

sibility, they may help to explain the campaigns focus on what all human beings

share in common and its use of the language of rights, despite its evident belief

that wearing the hijab is not a normatively irrelevant aspect of personal identity

for many human beings and that it is the public expression of an important con-

viction.

From Empirical to Normative Arguments

One implication of the foregoing is that the formulation demandfor recognition

may be misleading. What I have hitherto referred to as demands are sometimes

better described as needs, desires or expectations of recognition, since those towhom such needs, desires or expectations are attributed may not be conscious of

them, may not articulate them explicitly or may misconstrue the kind of recogni-

tion that is required. This implies, in turn, that empirical arguments relating to

actually formulated demands for recognition are insufficient to justify the politics

of recognition: the reasons for responding politically to needs, desires or expecta-

tions for recognition are always also normative in character.

I have suggested that Taylor is correct to discern a concern for recognition that

cannot be accommodated within the framework of the politics of equal dignity,

which, as we have seen, focuses on qualities or capacities that are shared in com-

mon. Using the examples of three contemporary social movements, I identified,

respectively, a concern for recognition of the value of a specific substantive

conception of the good, a specific linguistic and cultural tradition and a specific

religious belief and practice. In each case, I perceived a concern for recognition of

something that is not universally shared; indeed, in the case of the Welsh language

and wearing the hijab, it is not clear that the movements in question even aim at

universalization. But the examples also make clear that the issue is not recognition

of difference. The Slow Food movement does not claim that eco-gastronomy isvaluable because it is different, but because it is the right approach to life for

human beings. The Welsh-language initiatives do not claim that speaking Welsh

is valuable because it is different, but because it is an intrinsic part of a cultural

tradition that is conducive to human flourishing. The Assembly for the Protection

of Hijab does not claim that wearing the hijab is valuable because it is different,

but because it is the public expression of religious belief in the one true God.

Evidently, therefore, in order to take account of this kind of concern for recogni-

tion, we need to move beyond the two categories proposed by Taylor. However,before moving onwards, we should recall one further element of our discussion of

his essay. This is the problem of critical evaluation that arises when recognition is

required for something that is not universally shared. As we have seen, this gives

rise to the following difficulty. On the one hand, there is a need for discriminat-


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ing recognition; if subjectivism is to be avoided, uncritical approbation of the

value of a particular substantive conception of the good, cultural tradition or

religious belief and practice is not an option. On the other hand, in contexts in

which there is a plurality of conceptions of value and no generally acceptable over-

arching framework for distinguishing between them, critical evaluation does not

appear to be an option either. As we have also seen, in my earlier discussion of

Taylor this problem of critical evaluation led me to reject the project of a politics

of difference and to endorse only those versions of the politics of recognition that

are guided by the norm of autonomy. I no longer consider the problem of critical

evaluation quite so intractable; in the next sections, I propose a processual con-

ception of ethical value and corresponding processual conception of recognition

that are initial steps in response to it.16 But responding to the problem of critical

evaluation presupposes that there are good normative arguments for doing so.

For, even if, empirically, I am correct to identify a concern for recognition of thevalue of particular substantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and

religious beliefs and practices, its empirical reality is not sufficient reason to take

it seriously. Just as a normative theory of recognition cannot dispense with evalu-

ative distinctions, a normative political theory has to distinguish evaluatively

between the kinds of claims to recognition it deems worthy of response.

Moreover, as indicated, the fact that a claim to recognition is articulated publicly

is not sufficient reason for regarding it as such. Indeed, we should beware of taking

as our point of orientation those normative claims that have already gained pub-

lic notice in social movements. For one thing, as Axel Honneth points out, there

is a danger here of reducing social suffering and moral discontent to just that part

of it that has already been made visible in the political public sphere by publicity-

savvy organizations.17 For another, in every society there are structural and

political reasons why some groups are more visible than others. Drawing atten-

tion to everyday, embryonic forms of social misery and moral injustice that are no

less pressing for not yet being in the public eye, Honneth makes the case for

thematizing socially unjust states of affairs that so far have been deprived of public

attention, and for speaking on behalf of those who suffer from them.18

Honnethswords of caution are well-taken. Thus, if contemporary political theory is to

respond to a need, expectation or demand for recognition of the kind I have

attributed to the Slow Food movement, Welsh-language initiatives and Assembly

for the Protection of Hijab, it should have good normative reasons for doing so.

In the next section I provide one such reason.

The Relevance of Hegel

Why is public recognition of the value of particular substantive conceptions of the

good, cultural traditions or religious beliefs and practices important from the

point of view of normative political theory? One good reason is to avoid what we

might call the privatization of ethical concerns.19 It is noteworthy that a trench-


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ant critique of ethical privatization can be found in Hegels Phenomenology of

Spirit, to whose account of recognition Taylor is, of course, indebted.20Towards

the end of that book, Hegel presents the Romantic understanding of morality as

conscience as a step forward in the development of Spirit and, specifically, of the

concept of moral freedom.21 In line with his dialectical view of history, he shows

how morality as conscience overcomes some of the limitations of the Kantian

interpretation of moral freedom as duty. At the same time, he shows how it has

weaknesses of its own that give rise to new problems.

Hegel regards the Romantic view of morality as conscience as overcoming the

incoherence and duplicity of the Kantian conception of moral freedom. One

of Hegels criticisms of Kant is that he locates moral dignity in a capacity for self-

determination, while at the same time conceiving of self-determination as subjec-

tion to a moral law whose authority derives from a source external to the self. The

objection, if I understand it correctly, is that we cannot at one and the same timetake seriously the component ofself-prescription in the idea of moral freedom and

attribute to some otherconsciousness the authority of the moral law the individual

prescribes to herself. For Hegel, the Romantic view of morality as conscience

addresses this objection by moving moral authority inwards. Rather than appeal-

ing to an external moral authority (for example, the Kantian moral law), the

Romantic self determines from its own self what is true or right: In the strength of

its own self-assurance it possesses the majesty of absolute autarky.22 By seeing its

own inner voice its conscience as the sole moral authority, it is able to do justice

to the idea of moral freedom as moral self-determination and overcomes the

shortcomings of the Kantian conception. However, its strength in this regard is

also its weakness. As we have seen, the Romantic self possesses absolute autarky.

Since it itself is the sole arbiter of the validity of its judgements and actions, no

other self can judge their morality. Given that the self is always an empirical self,

with a particular physical and psychic constitution, and particular experiences

gained in real historical situations, this means, concretely, that we have no way of

distinguishing between judgements and actions that meet the demands of objec-

tive moral authority judgements and actions in conformity with the morallybinding law and the caprice of the individual and the contingency of her natural

impulses and inclinations. As Hegel puts it: Conscience . . . in the majesty of its

elevation above specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it

pleases into its knowing and willing. It is the moral genius which knows the inner

voice of what it immediately knows to be a divine voice . . .23

There is a second reason why Hegel regards the Romantic view as a step for-

ward in the development of the concept of moral freedom. Unlike the Kantian

conception, in which the validity of the moral law is given prior to all experience

and in which, as a consequence, moral freedom is essentially independent of

recognition by others, the Romantic view ties the freedom of the individual to the

recognition by others of the moral validity of her judgements and actions. But

here, too, the weakness of the Romantic position is apparent. Since conscience is


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the sole arbiter of moral validity, recognition of the morally judging and acting

individual is purely formal. The Romantic self declares itself to be the truth,24 and

in so doing, recognizes every other self as a self who, in acting from conscience,

always speaks the truth; in turn, it is acknowledged by every other self as such a

self.25What is recognized, however, is not the moral quality of the selfs actions,

but its formal capacity for self-determination. Since conscience possesses absolute

autarky, no one individual can judge the moral quality of anothers judgements

and actions; they can merely acknowledge them from the outside, as it were, as the

expression of a self-contained source of moral validity. Using Taylors termin-

ology we might say that this is the politics (or ethics) of equal dignity: Romantic

selves focus on what we share in common, recognizing the universal human

capacity for radical and absolute moral self-determination. However, Hegel holds

purely formal recognition to have at least two unwelcome consequences. He sees

it as leading, first, to feelings of emptiness and a pathological inability to act and,second, to social relations of mistrust and hostility.

One unwelcome consequence of purely formal recognition is that it produces a

hollow self that suffers from feelings of emptiness and incapacity for action;

accordingly, for Hegel, the Romantic self is yet another form of unhappy con-

sciousness.26 Since no external recognition of its substance is available, the self

becomes a hollow object filled with a sense of emptiness. Moreover, in order to

preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world; thus,

its self is reduced to extreme abstraction.27 It becomes disordered to the point of

madness, wastes itself in yearning and pines away in consumption.28As Hegel puts

it: In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy, so-called beautiful soul,

its light dies away within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapour that dissolves

into thin air.29

Another unwelcome consequence of purely formal recognition is that it leads

to relations of mistrust and hostility towards others that seriously threaten social

and political cohesion. As we have seen, the Romantic self exists within purely

formal relations of intersubjective recognition, in which each self is recognized as

its own source of moral authority; since there can be no external acknowledge-ment of the value or worth of its moral judgements and actions, these become a

purely private matter. As Hegel points out, since only each self can assess the

moral validity of its judgements and action, each self can regard only its judge-

ments and actions as morally good. The implication of this is that each self must

regard the judgements and actions of others as evil. As he puts it: Others . . . do

not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil, or rather they not only

cannot know, but they must also take it to be evil.30 His point seems to be that, in

the moral domain, everything that is not judged to be good is judged to be not

good and what is morally not good is evil. At first glance this looks like an implau-

sibly strong claim. On closer examination, however, it is hard to dispute. I take

Hegel to mean that we cannot in the long run abstain from passing judgement on

actions and beliefs we regard as morally relevant. If we do pass judgement on such


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actions and beliefs, our options are simple: they must either be judged to be

morally good or morally not good (evil). If each self regards the others actions

and judgments as evil, because only its own can be judged to be morally good, the

inevitable result is reciprocal feelings of mistrust and hostility, radically under-

mining the possibility of social and political cohesion.

If Hegels argument is convincing, we have good reasons to seek to establish

forms of social and political association that avoid ethical privatization. Moreover,

it suggests that avoiding such privatization is a matter of establishing the right

kind of relations of intersubjective recognition. In this regard Hegels critique of

morality as conscience enhances Taylors account of the politics of recognition in

at least two respects. First, whereas Taylor could be read as simply charting two

steps in the movement of the western modern social imaginary, neither which is

normatively better or worse than the other,31 Hegels approach is unequivocally

normative: he not only insists that purely formal recognition is insufficient forthe purposes of realizing human freedom; he leaves no doubt that it hinders its

realization.32 Second, Hegel suggests a way forward for the politics of recognition

that is blocked by Taylors interpretation of particularity as difference, and dif-

ference as inwardly generated uniqueness. As we have seen, Taylors account

of the politics of difference ends in an impasse: he presents the politics of differ-

ence as the historical successor to the politics of equal dignity, but interprets

difference in a way that prevents the discriminating recognition the politics of

difference requires in order to be coherent. By contrast Hegel indicates a solution

to the problem he identifies. We have seen the problem to be the Romantic selfs

absolute autarky in the domain of moral judgement; in other words, its claim to

exclusive ownership of its ethical judgements and actions. In the final pages of the

relevant section of thePhenomenology, Hegel offers an account of Spirits progres-

sion beyond morality as conscience, which can be read as the eventual resolution

of the problem.

Although his account of the progression is not well developed, it contains some

useful pointers. In this account, morality as conscience undergoes a number of

unstable transitions before finally reaching a mode of consciousness in which theprevious tensions between self and others are reconciled.33 For our present pur-

poses, the most significant feature of this progression is that Hegel describes it as

a movement outwards.34 Instead of keeping its knowledge of itself to itself,35 refus-

ing to let its own inner being come forth into the outer existence of speech,36 the

self now brings its formerly completely inner being into outer existence.37 He

refers to a reconciling Yea in which each self lets go of its formerly antithetical

relation to the other, expanding its existence as a self-contained I into an inter-

subjective one.38

What I take from Hegels story is the claim that each self, if it is to progress

towards the realization of moral freedom, must give up its claims to own its ethi-

cal judgements and actions and release them into the public domain, where they

will face the criticisms and challenges of other selves. In other words, if it is to


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progress towards the realization of moral freedom, the individual self may no

longer see itself as the sole authority determining the value of its ethical judge-

ments and actions; rather, the value of ethical judgements and actions becomes

something to be worked out cooperatively by a plurality of selves in processes of

public challenge and response. On such a view, ethical value is not something

fixed and given, but rather a property that emerges processually by way of public

contestation. I see this as a valuable intuition. In my concluding remarks I contend

that a processual model of recognition fits best with a processual conception of

ethical value.

Beyond Honneths Formal Conception of Sittlichkeit

Hegels critique of ethical privatization shows the importance of public recogni-

tion of the value of ethical conceptions. It can be expanded to include relatedforms of privatization, such as the privatization of cultural traditions and the

privatization of religious beliefs and practices. Thus, his critique of privatization

calls on us to respond to the kind of concern for public recognition I attributed to

the Slow Food movement, the Welsh-language initiatives and the Assembly for

the Protection of Hijab. It is striking, however, that there has been little attention

to a concern of this kind among contemporary theorists of recognition. Our dis-

cussion in the foregoing helps to explain why it slips from view in Taylors

account. But why is it disregarded by the other major contributors to current

debates? Even Honneths critical social theory, which offers one of the most

developed and differentiated contemporary accounts of the relation between

human flourishing and recognition, has no room for the kind of concern for

recognition I have attributed to the social movements mentioned. In the case of

some other theorists, this could be traced back to their understanding of substan-

tive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and practices as

inherently private or local. Jrgen Habermas holds this view. This leads him, in

the case of conceptions of the good and cultural traditions, to confine public dis-

cussion to hermeneutic explication39

and, in the case of religious beliefs andpractices, to a salvaging operation in which the parties involved in discussion seek

to rescue potentially valuable contents for the secular imagination by translating

them into a secular vocabulary.40 Honneth rejects what he sees as Habermass

overly deontological, Kantian approach. In his view, Kantian approaches make

the mistake of splitting off questions of the selfs duties to others from questions

relating to self-realization.41Against this, Honneth seeks to reintegrate the ques-

tions What ought I to do? and What is the best life for me as a human being?

At the same time, he is wary of communitarian approaches, which construe the

good for human beings in terms of the substantive values that constitute the ethos

of a particular community. Instead, he seeks to steer a middle path between

Kantian and communitarian approaches by proposing a formal conception of

ethical life (Sittlichkeit); this specifies only the conditions necessary for self-


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realization, leaving open the question of which substantive values are the right

ones. Since Honneth sees recognition by others in a number of dimensions as a

necessary condition of self-realization, this has consequences for his theory of

recognition. It explains his endeavour to specify the relations of recognition

required for self-realization in terms that make no commitment to substantive

ethical values. Thus, the three principal relations of recognition he identifies are

designed to be sufficiently abstract to avoid raising the suspicion that they reflect

a particular vision of the good life. These are, first, recognition of the other as a

particular object of love or affection; second, recognition of the other as the bearer

of legal rights; and third, recognition of the other for her individual achievements

or contributions to society (Leistung).42The kind of concern for recognition under

discussion in the foregoing cannot be accommodated in this schema. It is obvi-

ously not a form of recognition of the other as a particular object of love and

affection and it is hard to see how it could be construed as a form of recognitionof individual achievements or contributions. The category into which it most

easily fits is that of recognition of the other as a bearer of legal rights. However,

as our examples of certain social movements showed, while recognition of rights

is often also an issue, granting the rights in question would not fully satisfy their

concern for recognition.43

I have suggested that the inability of Honneths schema to accommodate recog-

nition of the value of specific substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions

and religious beliefs and practices is due to his concern to avoid making self-

realization dependent on particular substantive values. This concern is laudable.

Were his theory to specify in advance the ethical ingredients of a good life, it

would undermine the individuals capacity to form and develop her own concep-

tions of the good in other words, her autonomy. Nonetheless, Honneth seems

to have missed the middle path he seeks and to have taken instead the Kantian

turning. In his efforts to avoid the danger he associates with communitarianism,

he adopts a Kantian position on ethical value: one that abstracts from the par-

ticular ends of individual and groups. He needs to set his theory back onto the

middle path. This requires him to find a way of recognizing the value of particu-lar substantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and religious beliefs

and practices without pre-empting the question of which values are the right ones.

In my discussion of Hegel, I hinted at a solution. As I read Hegels account of

Spirits progression beyond morality as conscience, this is to be understood as a

movement outwards, whereby moral authority is released from its confinement in

inner being and discharged into processes of contestation in the public domain.

This means that ethical value is no longer something each individual determines

for herself by looking inwards, but a matter to be worked out with other indi-

viduals in cooperative processes of challenge and response. Such a processual

conception of ethical value has the advantage that it does not specify in advance

which judgements and actions are the right ones; rather, it takes seriously indi-

vidual autonomy by making it a task for the individuals concerned. Honneth could


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find the middle path he seeks by understanding ethical value in this way. To be

sure, he would have to modify his theory of recognition accordingly and expand

his schema of relations of recognition to include a concern for recognition of

particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs

and practices. This is not a problem in principle. Since the schema in its present

form depends on a combination of empirical and normative arguments, it can

easily be expanded if there are good empirical and normative reasons for doing so.

My discussion in the foregoing provides such reasons. In order to see this, a few

words on the status of Honneths theory of recognition may be helpful.

As indicated, Honneth justifies his schema of three relations of recognition by

way of a combination of empirical and normative arguments. To begin with, his

argument has a strong empirical component.44The three relations of recognition

he identifies are held to be normative expectations that have emerged in the

historical passage towards bourgeois modernity.45

He claims that they build oncertain anthropologically rooted conditions of intact personality formation, but

have taken on their specific shape as expectations of love or affection, of equal

respect and of recognition of achievements or contributions only in the course of

the last few hundred years. The claim that these are thesalient relations of recog-

nition in contemporary capitalist societies relies on the support of convincing

empirical arguments. However, on their own, empirical arguments are insuffi-

cient. As we have seen, the actual articulation of a demand for recognition, or even

the empirically verifiable existence of a need or desire for recognition, is not yet

reason to satisfy it. This is why empirical arguments must go hand in hand with

normative arguments, which are always guided by a particular vision of human

flourishing.46 In Honneths case, the vision guiding his theory is one of human

freedom in three dimensions corresponding to the three spheres of recognition

mentioned.47 It is against the background of this idea of freedom that we can

understand one of his central theses: the claim that failure to meet the specified

expectations of recognition results in social pathologies.48

Since Honneths schema of relations of recognition relies on a combination of

empirical and normative arguments, it is open to challenge by convincing argu-ments of these kinds. My discussion in the foregoing has supplied such arguments.

Empirically, it has identified in contemporary social reality a concern for recog-

nition of the value of particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions

and religious beliefs and practices, which cannot be accommodated within his

schema as it stands. Normatively, it has suggested that lack of public recognition

of the value of particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and

religious beliefs and practices may lead to social pathologies, specifically to feel-

ings of emptiness and an incapacity for action and to mistrust of, and hostility

towards, others.

Thus, my argument challenges Honneths schema in a productive manner by

supplying good empirical and normative reasons for why he should expand it.

Furthermore, the processual conception of value I have proposed fits well with his


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processual conception of recognition. For, as the word struggle in the title of his

first major work on recognition makes clear,49 recognition for him is not a static

concept, but a dynamic relation that is fought for in processes of social contesta-

tion and, once obtained, always open to new challenges.

Concluding Remarks

This way of understanding the concept of recognition helps us to answer the ques-

tion of what it would mean to respond to the concern for public recognition of the

value of particular ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and

practices. Drawing together the strands of our discussion, we can now say that

taking seriously this kind of concern for recognition calls for open-ended public

processes of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to convince others

of the value of particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions andreligious beliefs and practices.50 For reasons I have elaborated elsewhere, such

public processes of contestation should always involve the exchange of powerful

arguments and counter-arguments, although non-argumentative forms of public

contestation may play a significant, if subsidiary, role.51 I have also argued that

such public processes of contestation should take place at the formal level of politi-

cal decision-making and law-making, as well as in the informal public sphere.52

Four further observations are important here.

First, in many cases, the projected goal is not general agreement that a particularsubstantive conception of the good, tradition, belief or practice should beembraced by everyone. For example, while the aim of the Slow Food movementdoes seem to be that everyone should adopt eco-gastronomy as a way of life, theother two movements mentioned do not share this universalizing aspiration. Theaim of the Welsh-language initiatives is not that everyone should speak the Welshlanguage, but that everyone should acknowledge that speaking the Welsh lan-guage is a vital element in maintaining a particular valuable cultural tradition.Similarly, the aim of the Assembly for the Protection of Hijab is not that every-

one should wear the hijab, but that everyone should acknowledge that wearing thehijab is the expression of a particular deeply held, valuable religious belief. In suchcases, the projected general agreement does not universalize the value in question:it is not a matter of everyone agreeing that it is valuablefor everyone, but of every-

one agreeing that it as a valuable way of life forsome individuals or groups.53To besure, in order to avoid subjectivism, the argument that something is valuablefor particular individuals and groups must attribute some degree of subject-independent value to the good in question. Thus, the argument would be, forexample, that speaking Welsh is valuable for particular individuals and groups

because that language offers possibilities for expression that would not otherwisebe available; further, that expressivity is good. Or, that wearing the hijab isvaluable for particular individuals and groups because the power of God can beexperienced only by those who live their lives in certain ways and that wearing thehijab is one of these ways; further, that experiencing the power of God is good. In


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allowing for public discussion of the value of something particular, this position issimilar to Taylors presumption of worth: his view that the prerequisite for dia-logue is a presumption that a particular cultural identity is valuable. However,Taylor then blocks the path towards testing this presumption in dialogue byinterpreting particularity as difference and difference as inwardly generated

uniqueness. I unblock the path by focusing, instead, on claims to recognitionraised on behalf of particular substantive conceptions of the good, cultural tradi-tions and religious beliefs and practices.

Second, even in cases where the projected goal is general agreement that the

value in question is valuable for everyone, this should not be understood as a deon-

tological prescription. It should be understood, instead, as an invitation: the indi-

viduals and groups who seek recognition that the value in question is valuable for

everyone invite us to see the world in a new way. In such cases, accordingly, uni-

versalization involves a change in perceptions. If autonomy is to be respected, suchchanges may not be imposed; they can only be encouraged by opening our eyes to

new possibilities and perspectives. Typically, such processes of disclosure and

cognitive transformation involve changes in behaviour as well as powerful argu-

ments. Thus, the Slow Food movement does not insist that eco-gastronomy is

mandatory for all human beings, but hopes that we will all come to recognize it as

a way of life conducive to human flourishing by hearing the movements message

of plate and planet and by taking steps to live our lives in a corresponding way.

Third, the idea of general agreement whether it is agreement by everyone that

something is valuable for some people or agreement by everyone that somethingis valuable for everyone is an imaginative projection. It conjures the idea of a

harmonious condition of perfect understanding and insight. Such a condition is

not an attainable goal of human action; nonetheless, its projection serves to ori-

ent such action. In other words, general agreement is not an achievable state of

affairs, but a regulative idea that orients practices of contestation.54

Finally, as indicated, recognition in practice is a dynamic relation. Individuals

and groups seek to win recognition from others in never-ending struggles for

recognition (Honneth), for recognition, even if obtained and institutionalizedpolitically, is always subject to new contestation.

Taken together these observations provide the basis for the account of recog-

nition most appropriate for responding publicly to claims for the value of

particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs

and practices under conditions of value-pluralism. In the spirit of Honneth, such

an account of recognition allows for a public response to claims of this kind with-

out pre-empting the question of which values are the right ones. In the spirit of

Taylor, it allows for a politics that is hospitable to particularity though indiffer-

ent to difference without endorsing it in an uncritical way.55


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Notes

1. C. Taylor, The Politics of Recognition in A. Gutmann (ed.) (1994)Multiculturalism:Examining the Politics of Recognition, pp. 2572. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

2. Ibid. p. 39.3. See C. Calhoun (1995) Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of

Difference, pp. 21516. Oxford: Blackwell. Citing Calhoun approvingly, Axel Honneth,too, finds Taylors thesis of a shift from a concern with legal equality to a concern withcultural identity and difference historically misleading and accuses him, in addition, ofover-dramatizing the differences between the politics of equal dignity and the politics ofdifference. See A. Honneth, Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy

Fraser, in N. Fraser and A. Honneth (2005)Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, pp. 1224. London: Verso.

4. M. Cooke (1997) Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics ofRecognition,Political Theory 25(2): 26090.

5. Taylor (n. 1), p. 69.

6. Ibid. p. 69.7. I propose a conception of autonomy along these lines in M. Cooke (2006)Re-Presenting

the Good Society, pp. 133145. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

8. Taylor (n. 1), pp. 6373.9. http://www.slowfood.com

10. http://www.mentrau-iaith.com11. http://www.prohijab.net12. See e.g. J. Alexander (2006) The Civil Sphere, pp. 42557. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.13. Alexander (n. 12) holds this view.

14. Ibid. pp. 4507.15. Alexander argues that in the multicultural mode of incorporation rigid distinctions

between insider and outsider groups break down and difference and particularitybecome sources of cross-group identification. In his view, accordingly, multiculturalintegration not only reconfigures the categories of outsider and insider in moreuniversalistic and egalitarian ways; it also extends the range of imagined life-experiences

for members of the insider group.16. I address the problem of critical evaluation in more detail in Cooke (n. 7), where I

outline the key features of a model of practical reasoning appropriate for contexts ofvalue pluralism.

17. Honneth (n. 3), p. 115.18. Ibid. pp. 11316.19. I use the term ethical in a loose sense to refer to conceptions of the good. What I say

about ethical conceptions can, I suggest, be extended to religious beliefs and culturaltraditions.

20. G. W. F. Hegel (1977) The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller. Oxford: ClarendonPress. Cf. Taylor (n. 1), p. 36.

21. Following Hegel I use the terms ethical and moral interchangeably in the following.22. Hegel (n. 20), p. 393, 646.

23. Ibid. p. 397, 655.

24. Hegel underscores the linguistic component of this kind of recognition, seeing it ascrucial to its claim to universality. I cannot explore this further in the present context.

25. Ibid. p. 397, 654.26. Ibid. pp. 399400, 658. It may be noted that Axel Honneth sees feelings of emptiness

of the Hegelian kind as one of the pathologies of contemporary capitalism. See A.


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Honneth (2002) Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung: Paradoxien derSelbstverwirklichung, in A. Honneth (ed.) Befreiung aus der Mndigkeit: Paradoxien des

gegenwrtigen Kapitalismus, pp. 1427 (here p. 146), Frankfurt and New York: Campus

Verlag. See also A. Honneth (2001) Suffering from Indeterminacy. An Attempt at theReactualization of Hegels Philosophy of Right. Amsterdam: Spinoza Lectures.

27. Hegel (n. 20), p. 400, 658.28. Ibid. p. 407, 668.29. Ibid. p. 400, 658.

30. Ibid.31. Taylor does not argue explicitly that the historical progression from the politics of equal

dignity to the politics of difference constitutes a normative gain.32. By contrast, it is not clear whether or not Taylor regards all versions of the politics of

equal dignity as to some degree harmful; certainly, he holds the view that not all versionsare equally homogenizing: see Taylor (n. 1), pp. 5173.

33. Hegel (n. 20), pp. 398409, 65770. The key transitions described by Hegel are frommorality as conscience to the beautiful soul and, from there, to the confessing,

hardhearted and, ultimately, forgiving consciousness.34. Ibid, esp. pp. 4078, 66971.35. Ibid. p. 406, 668.36. Ibidp. 405, 667.37. Ibid. p. 408, 670.

38. Ibid. p. 409, 671.39. J. Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms, tr. W. Rehg, pp. 15768. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.40. J. Habermas (2008) Between Naturalism and Religion, tr. C. Cronin. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.41. A. Honneth (1995) The Struggle for Recognition, tr. J. Anderson, pp. 1729. Cambridge:

Polity Press.42. Ibid., esp. pp. 92130. In this book, Honneth described the third sphere of recognition as

that of solidarity. In his more recent work, he no longer refers to it as such, speaking

instead of recognition of achievements or contributions (Leistung): see e. g. Honneth(n. 3), pp. 14550.

43. In his exchange with Nancy Fraser, Honneth does consider the possibility of theemergence of a fourth principle of recognition within the normative infrastructure of

capitalist societies: a principle that calls for social recognition of members of a culturalgroup: see Honneth (n. 3), pp. 16170. Indeed, he even acknowledges that one of themultiple ways of interpreting this demand is as a demand to recognize the culture inquestion as valuable in itself. However, he sees no possibility of dealing with the problem

of critical evaluation to which this gives rise. In the end, he remains sceptical as towhether this kind of demand represents a legitimate fourth principle of recognition.

44. A. Honneth (2002) Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions,Inquiry45(4): 500.

45. Honneth (n. 3), pp. 1367 and (n. 44), p. 501.

46. See Cooke (n. 7).47. In his exchange with Nancy Fraser, Honneth presents his work as a recognitive theory of

justice: see Honneth (n. 3). It is important to grasp, however, that in this context he usesthe term justice in a broad sense: as more or less equivalent to the normative goal of his

critical social theory, which he variously describes as freedom or autonomy or self-realization. He makes this particularly clear in Honneth (n. 44), pp. 51617.

48. A. Honneth (1994) The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of CriticalTheory Today, Constellations1(2): 25569.


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49. Honneth (n. 41).50. My call for public deliberation concerning substantive values, esp. ones that are particular

to certain individuals and groups, raises a number of epistemological issues, such as

whether we must presuppose a common concern with a shared conception of truth. Idiscuss the issue of truth in M. Cooke (2008) Religion in the Democratic Public

Sphere: Does Truth Matter? Paper delivered at Reset Dialogues on CivilizationIstanbul Seminars, 26 June.51. Cooke (n. 7), esp. ch. 6.

52. See M. Cooke (2007) A Secular State for a Secular Society? Postmetaphysical PoliticalTheory and the Place of Religion, Constellations14(2): 22438.

53. I make a distinction between (a) conceptions whose validity is accepted by everyone andare also deemed to be valid for everyone and (b) conceptions whose validity is merely

accepted by everyone. See M. Cooke (1994) Recognizing the Post-Conventional Self,Philosophy and Social Criticism 20(12): 87101.

54. I discuss ideas of the good society as imaginative projections and make a case for theplace of regulative ideas in critical social thinking in Cooke (n. 7), esp. chs 5 and 6.

55. I am grateful to Jonathan Seglow for helpful comments.


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Documents

Cooke, "Beyond dignity and difference"