CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE - THE FACTSinsidethecoldwar.org/sites/...IN_EUROPE_-_THE_FACTS... · (1) National totals cover other armoured vehicles in fully or partially manned units

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N A T O ------ ------ O T A N

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SERV ICE DE PRESSE i P R E S S S E R V I C E

NATO/OTAN, 1110 Brussels/Bruxelles • Tel.: 728 41 11 - Telex: 25-599

Telefax/Télécopieurs : 728 50 57 - 728 50 58

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE :

THE FACTS

REGISTR Y P.A. .BUREAU 1.270

NOV 88!INTER/BRUXL. 32469

920700

. 3 ^ - P R E N 4 ( ^ P R FR

1. At their meetings in Brussels in 1986 and at Reykjavik

in 1987, Allied Ministers proposed the initiation of two distinct

and autonomous sets of negotiations on conventional arms control

within the framework of the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process: one, involving all 35 CSCE

participating states on Confidence and Security Building Measures

(CSBMs), the other, limited to the 23 members of the North

Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization on

Conventional Stability (CST).

2. A detailed programme was set out by the Allied countries

in the statement "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead",

issued under the authority of the Heads of State and Government

participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in

Brussels in March 1988. That Statement emphasized that the

imbalance in conventional forces remains at the core of Europe's

security concerns, and it stressed the salient features of this

imbalance(1). The Allies remain committed to this programme and

look forward to the early opening of the negotiations which we

have p r o p o s e d .

3. Meanwhile, without prejudice to either of these

forthcoming negotiations, we believe that the cause of openness

about military matters and increased transparency, which we have

long supported, would be well served if information about force

strengths was more generally available. We are therefore

publishing - and are transmitting simultaneously to all CSCE

participating states - our own assessment of the strengths of the

armed forces in Europe belonging to the countries of the North

Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The

relevant data, together with some explanatory comments, are

attached. The information which we are making available today is

not a substitute for the data which all participants will need to

provide in the course of two new negotiations. Nor does it seek

to pre-judge the categories of forces to be covered, or the

degree of detail necessary.

(1) The full text of this statement is attached.

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4. At the talks on confidence and security building

measures, improved openness about military forces and their

activities will be a fundamental objective. The Allies will

therefore present, as we did at the Stockholm Conference, a

proposal that participating states should provide each year, on

the basis of an agreed formula, information about the

composition, organisation and deployment of their armed forces in

Europe. We hope that on this occasion our proposal will evoke a

more positive response.

5. At the conventional stability talks, our aim will be to

remove those disparities in weapon systems which give the East a

capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

The provision of detailed information on relevant forces and

weapons systems will be necessary in the context of a verifiable

agreement on how to achieve stability at lower levels. We are

prepared to provide during the course of the talks, in

substantiation of our proposals, full details of the forces to be

addressed, together with the appropriate counting rules and

d e f i n i t i o n s .

6. The data which we are circulating today are a

demonstration of our commitment•to military openness, itself an

essential element in the building of confidence between East and

West. They may differ in some respects from those available from

other sources. It is, therefore, important that differences in

counting rules and definitions, as well as in the forces covered,

are fully understood. The figures for Allied countries reflect

information which, for the most part, has already been published,

for example in support of regular statements to national

parliaments. Those for the Warsaw Treaty Organization members

are necessarily estimates: no facility comparable to data

published in the West is available to assist our understanding of

Eastern force strengths, nor are these subject to the same public

scrutiny as those of the Allies.

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7. This document includes figures on ground forces and

aircraft, but not on naval forces. Naval forces are capable of

global deployment, and this makes it artificial to identify

specific numbers of ships associated with any one region.

However, general information on naval forces can be found in a

variety of sources p u blished in the Allied countries.

8 . We note with interest some recent indications of

willingness by countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to

provide military data in Europe. We hope that, following our

example, they will now demonstrate this willingness in deeds

rather than words. We would, of course, also welcome any move

from neutral and non-aligned countries to provide similar figures

for their own forces.

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GROUND FORCES

The following tables and charts provide information as

of January 1988 on different equipment categories and on manpower

of ground forces belonging to the member countries of the North

Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization that are

stationed in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, i.e. in the

areas to be covered in the future negotiations. Each category

contains relevant explanatory information.

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MAIN BATTLE T A N K S (1)

Country National T o t a l s (2)


BELGIUM 320 BULGARIA 1,800

CANADA 60 CSSR 3,800

DENMARK 228 GDR 3,000

FRANCE 1,250 HUNGARY 1,300

G ERMANY 4, 330 POLAND 3,400

GREECE 1,420 ROMANIA 1,200

ICELAND - USSR 37,000

ITALY 1,500

LUXEMBOURG -

NETHERLANDS 750

NORWAY 117

PORTUGAL 66

SPAIN 866

TURKEY 3,000

UNITED KINGDOM 717

UNITED STATES 1,800

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(1) Includes the following types: Challenger, M- l , Leopard I and II, AMX-30, M-60, Chieftain, Centurion, M-47 and M-48 for the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and T - 8 0 , T - 7 2 , T - 6 4 , T-62, T-55/54 and T-10/10M for the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

(2) National totals cover Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) in fully or partially manned units. The member countries of the North. Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 5,800 MBTs held in storage. MBTs held in storage by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are estimated to be in excess of those o f the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

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MAIN BATTLE TANKS(IN UNITS)

CA DA

RO

M E M B ER C O U N TR IES OF THE NORTH A TLA N TIC ALLIANCE

M E M B E R C OUNTRIES OF

THE W A RS AW TR EA TY O R G A N IZA TIO N

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ARMOURED INFANTRY FIGHTING V E H IC L E S (1)

Country National totals(2)

(3)


(3)

BELGIUM 208 BULGARIA 100

CANADA - CSSR 1,100

DENMARK - GDR 800

FRANCE 750 HUNGARY 300

GERMANY 1,960 POLAND 1,100

GREECE 100 ROMANIA -


ITALY -

LUXEMBOURG ’ -

NETHERLANDS 585

NORWAY -

PORTUGAL ' -

SPAIN -

TURKEY / -

UNITED KINGDOM -

UNITED STATES 550

(1) Covers the following types: Marder, AMX-10P, M-2(Bradley) and YPR-765 (25mm) for the member countries of the North Atlantic A lliance and BMP-l/2 and BMD1 for the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

(2) National totals cover Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs) in fully or partially manned units. The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 575 AIFVs held in storage. The corresponding figure for the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is estimated to be in excess of that of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

(3) AIFVs and other armoured fighting vehicles in the next table, which, in their secondary role, are platforms for anti-tank systems, are also referred to in the Anti-Tank Weapons table.

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ARMOURED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHIC LES (IN UNITS)

FR

M E M B ER COUNTRIES OF

THE NORTH A TLA N TIC ALLIANCE


THE W ARSAW T R EA TV ORGANIZATIO N

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OTHER ARMOURED V E HICLES

Includes light tanks, armoured personnel carriers, armoured command vehicles and military support carriers that are not covered in the preceding table.



BELGIUM 1,378 BULGAR IA 4, 300





GREECE 1,753 ROMANIA 4, 200


ITALY 4, 900

LUXEMBOURG 5

NETHERLANDS 1,435

NORWAY 356

PORTUGAL 269

SPAIN 2,740

TURKEY 1,700

UNITED KINGDOM 5,048

UNITED STATES 6,000

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(1) National totals cover other armoured vehicles in fully or partially manned units. In this category, the overall storage of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance is 7,560. Other armoured vehicles held in storage b y the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are estimated to be in excess of those of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

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OTHER ARMOURED VEHICLES

USSR

(IN UNITS)CA

POL HU


THE NO RTH A T L A N T IC ALLIANCE

T T T T T T T T T T T T T T r

M E M B ER COU NTRIES OF

THE W ARSAW T R E A T V O R G A N IZA TIO N

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ARTILLERY

Includes artillery, mortars and multiple rocket launchers with tubes of 100mm and above.

Country National Tota l s (1)

Country National To t a l s (1)

BELGIUM 248 BULGARIA 2,000


DENMARK 542 GDR 1, 700


GERMANY 2, 220 POLAND 2, 500

GREECE 1,752 ROMANIA 1, 300


ITALY 2, 100

LUXEMBOURG -

NETHERLANDS 667

NORWAY 522

PORTUGAL 260

SPAIN 1,038

TURKEY 2,800

UNITED KINGDOM 394 ~

UNITED STATES 1, 100

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(1) National totals cover artillery in fully or partially manned units. The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 2,870 artillery pieces held in storage. Artillery pieces held in storage by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are estimated to be in excess of those of the member countries of the North Atlantic A l l i a n c e .

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ARTILLERY(IN UNITS)

USSR

.

.

M E M B ER C O UNTRIES OF

THE N O RTH ATLAN TIC ALLIANCE


THE W A R S AW T R E A TY O R G A N IZA TIO N

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ANT I-TANK WEAPONS

Includes veh icle mounted and non-vehicle mounted antitank guided missile launchers, anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles. Armoured fighting vehicles and helicopters whose primary purpose is not anti-tank but which are equipped with anti-tank guided missiles are also covered.(1)

Country National Tot a l s (2)





FRANCE 1,460 HUNGARY 800


GREECE 2,267 ROMANIA 700


ITALY 2,200

LUXEMBOURG 6

•̀ NETHERLANDS 674

NORWAY 550

PORTUGAL 362

SPAIN 1,222

TURKEY 2,400


UNITED STATES 3, 300

(1) The overall figures of armoured fighting vehicles and helicopters accounted for due to their secondary role as anti-tank weapon platforms are 2,400 systems for the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and 23,000 systems for the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. These armoured fighting vehicles and helicopters are also referred to in their respective tables.

(2) National totals cover anti-tank weapons in fully or partially manned units. The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 2,700 anti-tank weapons held in storage. Anti-tank weapons held in storage by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are estimated to be in excess of those of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

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USSR

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS(IN UNITS)

CA

M E M B ER C OUNTRIES OF

THE NORTH ATLAN TIC ALLIANCE


THE W ARSAW TR EA TY O R G A N IZA TIO N

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Covers anti-aircraft artillery and fixed and mobile surface-to-air missiles.

AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS

Country National Totals(1)

Country National T ot a l s (1)



DENMARK 279 GDR 800

FRANCE 1,160 HUNGARY 500


GREECE 480 ROMANIA 700


ITALY 850

LUXEMBOURG -

NETHERLANDS 275

NORWAY 527

PORTUGAL 110

SPAIN 393

TURKEY 1,700

UNITED KINGDOM 350

UNITED STATES 600

.

.

(1) National totals cover air defence systems in fully orpartially manned units. The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 770 air defence systems held in storage. The corresponding figure for the air defence systems held in storage by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is estimated to be in excess of that of the member countries of the North Atlantic A l l i a n c e .

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AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS(IN UNITS)

CA

USSR

M EM B ER COU NTRIES OF



THE W ARSAW TR EA TY O R G A N IZA TIO N

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HELICOPTERS

Covers attack helicopters equipped with anti-tank guided missiles and machine guns and assault/transport helicopters.

Country National Tota l s (1)

(2)

Country National Tot a l s (1)

(2)

BELGIUM - BULGARIA 100

CANADA - CSSR 200

DENMARK - GDR 150


GERMANY 554 POLAND 200


ICELAND . - USSR 2,850

ITALY 170

LUXEMBOURG -

NETHERLANDS 54

NORWAY -

PORTUGAL -

SPAIN 160

TURKEY 160

UNITED KINGDOM 287

UNITED STATES 700

.

(1) National totals cover helicopters in fully or partially manned units. The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 180 helicopters of this category held in storage. Helicopters held in storage by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are estimated to be in excess of those of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

(2) Helicopters which are platforms for anti-tank systems are also referred to in the Anti-Tank Weapons table.

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HELICOPTERS(IN UNITS)

FR

RO p o l HU




THE W ARSAW TREAT'/ O R G A N IZA TIO N

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A RMOURED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGES

Includes assault bridges mounted as an integrated system on armoured carriers.

Country National . T ot a l s (1)



CANADA 7 CSSR 200

DENMARK 4 GDR 200

FRANCE - HUNGARY 50

GERMANY 180 POLAND 250



ITALY 60

LUXEMBOURG -

NETHERLANDS 18

NORWAY -

PORTUGAL 2

SPAIN 7

TURKEY -

UNITED KINGDOM 36

UNITED STATES 100

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(1) National totals cover Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLBs) in fully or partially manned units. The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 160 AVLBs held in storage. AVLBs held in storage by the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are estimated to be in excess of those of the member countries of the North Altantic Alliance.

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ARMOURED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGES

(IN UNITS)

SP


THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE


THE 'WARSAW TR EA TY O RG A N IZA TIO N

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PERSONNEL

Covers full-time military personnel of Land Forces, including Army personnel who perform ground-based air defence duties. Also included are Command and General Support troops and Other Ministry of Defence troops. Paramilitary forces are excluded .

Country NationalTotals

Country NationalTotals

BELGIUM 68,000 BULGARIA 135,000

CANADA .. 5, 000 CSSR 145,000

DENMARK . 20,540 GDR 120,000



GREECE 116,990 ROMANIA 180,000

ICELAND - USSR 2,200,000

ITALY 297,000

LUXEMBOURG 695

NETHERLANDS 68,000

NORWAY 25,059

PORTUGAL 46,949

SPAIN 210,000

TURKEY 380,000 `


UNITED STATES 216,000

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PERSONNEL

USSR

(Ground Forces)CA

NO

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ORGANIZATIONCovers active combat and artillery divisions and independent combat and artillery brigades

which are presently manned at above 5% of their full wartime strength.

COUNTRY

ACTIVE COMBAT AND ARTILLERY DIVISIONS

ACTIVE INDEPENDENT COMBAT ARTILLERY BRIGADES

AND

On national territory

Outside national territory

Nationaltotals

On national territory

Outside national territory

Nationaltotals

BELGIUM 1 1 2 1 1 2CANADA - - - - 1 1DENMARK 2 - 2 1 - 1FRANCE 12 3 15 - . - -

GERMANY 12 - 12 4 - 4GREECE 12 - 12 11 ' - 11ICELAND - - - - - -

ITALY - - 24 - 24LUXEMBOURG - - ■ a ■ . - - . - -

NETHERLANDS 22/ 3 1/3 3 - - -

NORWAY - - - 1 - . 1PORTUGAL - - - 5 - 5SPAIN 5 - 5 8 - 8TURKEY 13 - 13 23 - . 23UNITED KINGDOM 1 3 4 6 2 8UNITED STATES — 4 4 5 5

BULGARIA 8 _ 8 6 __ 6CSSR 11 - 11 3 - 3GDR 6 - 6 1 - 1HUNGARY 6 - 6 4 - 4POLAND 13 - 13 7 - 7ROMANIA 10 - 10 5 - 5USSR 125 31 156 9 8 17

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. . . .

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DIVISIONSSTATIONED OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY

USSR

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AIRCRAFT

Aircraft are, by nature, highly mobile and possess such

inherent flexibility that it is difficult to attribute them to a

particular region. Moreover, most modern aircraft are capable of

performing more than one role and cannot therefore be easily

categorised. Any figures for aircraft in the European theatre

are thus inevitably somewhat selective. The following table

gives national holdings as of January 1988 of combat aircraft

stationed on land in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

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COMBAT AIRCRAFT(1)

Country N a t i o n a l (3) Totals (4)

(5)

Country(2)

N a t ional(3) Totals (4)

(5)

BELGIUM 144 BULGARIA 250CANADA 40 CSSR 400DENMARK 87 GDR 350FRANCE 450 HUNGARY 150GERMANY 547 POLAND 700GREECE 319 ROMANIA 350ICELAND - USSR 6,050ITALY 250LUXEMBOURG -

NETHERLANDS 162NORWAY 78PORTUGAL 99SPAIN 186TURKEY 370UNITED KINGDOM 445UNITED STATES 800

(1) The following types of combat aircraft are included:For the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:F - 1 6 , F-4, F - 5 , NF-5, F-104, F-100, F-18, CF-18, F-lll, F-35/RF-35, T-2E, A-7/TA-7, A-10, Alphajet, G-91, Buccaneer, Harrier, Jaguar, Mirage Fl/3/5, Tornado, F-15, Mirage 2000, Lightning, RF-4, TR-1, C -212, PD808, EF-111, EC-130H, DC-8 Sarigue, C-160 Gabriel, RF-5, RF-16, RF-84, Hunter,C a n b e r r a .For the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: MIG-15, MIG-17, MIG-21, MIG-23, MIG-25, MIG-27, MIG-29, MIG-31, S U - 7 , SU-15, SU-17, SU-22, SU-24, SU-25, SU-27, YAK-28, YAK-28P, L-29, L-39, IL-28, AN-12, TU-16, TU-22, T U - 1 2 8 , T U - 2 2 M .

(2) TU-22M (Backfire) is included, as it may be used for missions in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals.However, it can also be used as an intercontinental bomber and is under discussion in the START negotiations.

(3) Land-based naval aircraft are also included.(4) National totals cover combat aircraft in units. The member

countries of the North Atlantic Alliance have, overall, 530 combat aircraft held in storage. The corresponding figure for the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is estimated to be in excess of that of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

(5) Combat-capable training aircraft are excluded from national totals. This accounts for, overall, 530 aircraft for the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and in excess of 5,700 aircraft for the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

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COMBAT AIRCRAFT(IN UNITS)

USSR

ROPOL

M E M B ER COUNTRIES O FTHE NORTH A TLA N TIC ALLIANCE

M E M B E R C OU NTRIES OF

THE W ARSAW T R E A TV O R G A N IZA T IO N

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ANNEX

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL: THE WAY AHEAD

STATEMENT ISSUED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE HEADS OF STATE

AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING

OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS

[2nd-3rd MARCH 1988]

At Halifax in 1986, our governments issued a clear call

to strengthen stability in the whole of Europe through

conventional arms control negotiations. At Brussels later that

year they elaborated the basic purposes and methods for such

negotiations.

The military confrontation in Europe is the result, not

the cause, of the painful division which burdens this continent.

While seeking to overcome this division in other ways, we also seek security and stability in Europe at the lowest possible

level of armaments. Both arms control and adequate defence

programmes can contribute towards this goal.

A . THE PRESENT REALITIES

1. The Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level

far in excels of its needs for self defence, directly challenges

our security as well as our hopes for change in the political

situation in Europe. Thus the conventional imbalance in Europe

remains at the core of Europe's security concerns. The problem is

to a large extent a function of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in

key conventional weapon systems. But it is not only a matter of

numerical imbalances. Other asymmetries are also important, for

example:

- the Warsaw Pact, based on the Soviet Union's forward-deployed

forces, has a capability for surprise attack and large-scale

offensive action; the Allies neither have, nor aspire to,

such a capability;

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- the countries of the Warsaw Pact form a contiguous land mass;

those of the Alliance are geographically disconnected;

- the Warsaw Pact can generate a massive reinforcement

potential from distances of only a few hundred kilometres; many Allied reinforcements need to cross the Atlantic;

- the Warsaw Pact's military posture and activities are still

shrouded in secrecy, whereas those of Allied countries are

transparent and under permanent public scrutinyv

2. These asymmetries are compounded by the dominant

presence in Europe of the conventional armed forces of the Soviet Union. They represent 50% of all the active divisions in Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals. This Soviet conventional superiority and its military presence in other Eastern European

countries serve a political as well as a military function. They

cast a shadow over the whole of Europe.

3. Conventional arms control is not merely a technical corrective to a self-contained problem. It should be seen in a

coherent political and security framework.

B. A POLITICAL AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK

4. We reiterate our conviction that military forces should only exist to prevent war and to ensure self defence, not for the

purpose of. initiating aggression and not for the purposes of political or military intimidation. Our ability to prevent every

kind of war, nuclear or conventional, rests on our capacity and

determination to deter any form of aggression. All the Allies' military resources are designed to contribute to that objective.

This approach is shared alike both by those Allies who belong to

the integrated military organisation and by those who do not.

5. The relationship between nuclear and conventional forces

is complex. The existence of a conventional imbalance in favour

of the Warsaw Pact is not the only reason for the presence of

nuclear weapons in Europe. The countries of the Alliance are, and

will remain, under the threat of Soviet nuclear forces of varying

ranges. Although conventional parity would bring important benefits for stability, only the nuclear element can confront a

potential agressor with an unacceptable risk; therefore, for the

foreseeable future deterrence will continue to require an

adequate mix of nuclear as well as conventional forces.

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6i Hence the determination of our nations to ensure

défence preparedness as a means of achieving the stability we

seek. We will continue to ensure that our military forces are

effective and up-to-date, in particular by:

- continued compliance with the principle of shared risks and

responsibilities and acceptance of the priorities essential

to the strengthening of our defence capabilities;

- provision of adequate defence expenditure, together with

efforts to obtain the greatest return on our defence

investment?

- closer cooperation designed to remedy key deficiencies and,

in this context, support for recent legislative and other

initiatives designed to foster cooperation in the area of

conventional armaments, especially research, development,

production and procurement;

- helping to meet the needs of the less advantaged Allies in

strengthening their conventional defences, thus redressing

important existing déficiences.

7. It will be important that defence and arms control

policies remain in harmony in order to ensure their complementary

contribution to the security of the countries of the Alliance. In

framing their negotiating proposals for conventional stability,

the Allies will ensure that the continued requirement for

deterrence and defence is not prejudiced; accordingly they will

neither make nor accept proposals which would involve an erosion

of the Allies' nuclear deterrent capability.

8. Security in Europe involves not just military, but also

political, economic and, above all, humanitarian factors. We look

forward to a Europe undivided, in which people of all states can

freely receive ideas and information; enjoy their fundamental

human rights; and determine their own future. Allied forces are

stationed outside their national territory to protect these

values and to uphold the solidarity of our free Alliance. They

cannot therefore be equated with Soviet forces stationed in

Eastern Europe. A just and lasting peaceful order in Europe

requires that all states enjoy relations of confidence with their

own citizens; trust them to make political or economic choices of

their own; and allow them to receive information from and

exchange ideas with citizens of other states.

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9. Conventional arms control talks should be guided by a

coherent political vision which reflects these values. It was

their adherence to this vision which enabled the Allies to secure

a successful outcome to the Stockholm Conference. It is these

same considerations that have led the Allies to decide that both

the negotiations which they have now proposed, on conventional

stability, as well as those on confidence and security building

measures, will be undertaken within the framework of the CSCE

process.

10. Those on confidence and security building will involve

all 35 CSCE signatory states and will have as their objective to

build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference;

the agreement reached there marked a significant step towards

reducing the risk of war in Europe. Fully implemented over time,

it would create more transparency and contribute to greater

confidence and predictability of military activities in the whole

of Europe. The momentum generated by Stockholm must be

maintained.

11. At the same time we are conscious of the specific

responsibility of the 23 members of the two military alliances

in Europe whose forces bear most directly on the essential

security relationship in Europe. Hence our decision that distinct

and autonomous negotiations on conventional stability should take

place between the 23 States.

12. The adoption of mandates for both of the negotiations

must be part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up

Meeting, which necessitates substantial progress in all areas of

the Helsinki Final Act.

C. THE A L L I E S’ OBJECTIVES

13. In accordance with the principles of our approach to

conventional arms control, as set out in the Brussels

Declaration, our objectives in the forthcoming conventional

stability negotiations will be:

- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of

conventional forces at lower levels;

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- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and

security;

- and, as a matter of high priority, the elimination of the

capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating

large-scale offensive action.

14. This latter capability is the most worrying in relation

to the seizure of territory by an aggressor. Its essential

ingredient is the forward deployment of conventional forces

capable of rapid mobility and high firepower. Tanks and artillery

are among the most decisive components, though other elements of

combat capability could prove to be similarly significant.

Manpower is also important. But not all items of equipment are

appropriate for limitation, if only for technical reasons, and

manpower alone is an imprecise guide to offensive capability.

15. Our aim will be to establish a situation in Europe in

which force postures as well as the numbers and deployments of

weapon systems no longer make surprise attack and large-scale

offensive action a feasible option. We shall pursue this aim on

the basis of the following criteria:

- we need to enhance stability in the whole of Europe from the

Atlantic to the Urals; and to do so in a way which, while

safeguarding the security of all Allies, takes account of the

concentrations of Warsaw Pact forces and the particular

problems affecting the Central, Southern and Northern

regions ;

- in seeking to eliminate the ability to conduct large-scale

offensive action, we shall focus on the key weapon systems;

- we shall propose provisions dealing with stationed forces,

taking account of the weight of forward-deployed Soviet

conventional forces; we shall also take into consideration

capabilities for force generation and reinforcement;

- equal number or percentage reductions by both sides would not

eliminate the disparities which threaten stability in Europe.

Our proposals will concentrate instead on results and

residual entitlements;

- our goal is to redress the conventional imbalance. This can

be achieved through a set of measures including, inter alia,

reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions and related

measures as well as the establishment of equal ceilings;

-5-

-6-

- this outcome will require highly asymmetrical reductions by

the East and will entail, for example, the elimination from

Europe of tens of thousands of Warsaw Pact weapons relevant

to surprise attack, among them tanks and artillery pieces;

- reductions of combat-decisive equipment and modification of

the Soviet forward deployment posture will only be part of

our approach to reducing the risk of conflict. As a

concurrent element in any effort to enhance stability and

security, we shall also propose measures to produce greater

openness of military activities throughout Europe, safeguard

the maintenance of lower force lèvels, and support a

rigorous, effective and reliable monitoring and verification

regime»* __

- this monitoring and verification regime will need to include

the exchange of detailed data about forces and deployments;

and the right to conduct sufficient on-site inspections to

provide confidence that agreed provisions are being complied

w i t h .

D. THE WAY AHEAD

16. Early agreement on a conventional stability mandate, as

part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, would be an

important step forward. We seek the elimination of the

conventional imbalances which so threaten stability and security

in Europe. We also seek enhanced respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms on which lasting security and stability

ultimately depend.

.

Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters.

Documents

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE - THE FACTSinsidethecoldwar.org/sites/...IN_EUROPE_-_THE_FACTS... · (1) National totals cover other armoured vehicles in fully or partially manned units