Contextualizing Turkey`s Darfur Policy

8/8/2019 Contextualizing Turkey`s Darfur Policy

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S E T A | F o u n d a t i o n o r P o l i t i c a l , E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l R e s e a r c h | J u l y , 2 0 1 0 | w w w . s e t a v . o r g | B r i e N o : 4 5

Why Welcome Al Basheer?Contextualizing TurkeysDarur Policy

Mehmet zkan, Birol Akgn

Policy BriefSETA


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S E T AP O L I C Y B R I E F

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Mehmet zkan, Birol Akgn

J u l y , 20 1 0 | B r i e N o : 4 5

ABSTRACTThis study analyses the underlying elements o the Muslim worlds reaction toward the Darur crisis by critically evaluating

Turkeys involvement. Turkey is important because it has been cited as a rising star o 21st century in the Muslim world

not only or its growing economic potential and deepening democratic credentials, but also with its recent pro-active

diplomatic initiatives in conlict areas such as in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Turkeys Darur policy has been one o its most criticized in recent times. Although the criticisms leveled against this

policy have some merit, they do not provide much insight into the motivations behind Turkeys approach to Darur.

Thus, Ankaras distinctive approach to Darur and Khartoum requires a thorough, in-depth analysis within the context

o Turkeys changing role in regional and global aairs. It is argued that on the Darur issue, Turkish policy has been

characterized by convergence and distinction rom the oicial position o the Muslim-Arab world.

We argue that the Turkish approach to Darur has been mainly shaped by three elements: the international environment/

discourse on the war on terror since 2002; Turkeys recently deepening political and economic engagement with theArab world and Arica; and Ankaras search or a new political language on Darur, a middle ground between the Wests

claims o genocide and deending al Basheer. In sum, Turkeys Darur policy can be described as an example o passive

quiet diplomacy in a highly complex international environment.

WHY WELCOME AL BASHEER?

CONTEXTUALIZING TURKEYS

DARFUR POLICY

CONTENTS

Introduction: What is at Stake? | 3

From Past to Present: A Periodization o the Darur Conict | 4

What Drives Turkeys Darur Policy? | 5

International Environment, Discourse on Genocide and the War on

Terror | 6

Limitations o Multidimensional Foreign Policy | 7

Toward a new language and beyond: Passive Quiet Diplomacy? | 10

Concluding Remarks | 13

2 0 1 0 A l l R i g h t s R e s e r v e d

S E T A | R e i t G a l i p C d . H e r e k e S o k a k N o : 1 0 G a z i o s m a n p a a / a n k a y a 0 6 7 0 0 A N K A R A T R K Y EP h o n e : + 9 0 3 1 2 . 4 0 5 6 1 5 1 F a x : + 9 0 3 1 2 . 4 0 5 6 9 0 3 w w w . s e t a v . o r g | i n o @ s e t a v . o r g

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C O N T E X T U A L I Z I N GT U R K E Y S D A R F U R P O L I C Y

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Mehmet zkan*, Birol Akgn**

Introduction: What is at Stake?

Since 2003, a conict has been ongoing in Darur. Although a ragile peace agreement

has been signed and elections took place in April 2010, the situation on the ground is

still ar rom a lasting peace. The exact number o the death toll in the Darur conict

remains the subject o speculation. Nevertheless, the range is estimated as anywhere

rom 200,000 to 400,000. To the surprise o many, this total is two to our times the toll

o the Bosnian wars o the 1990s,1 while reaction rom Turkey and Turkish civil society

have been extremely low in comparison to the conicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Turkeys

Darur policy today stands as one o the most criticized and less understood topics

in Turkish oreign policy. Why is this so? What are the main determinants o Turkeys

approach to Darur? Is it an example o a double-standard or does it ow rom Turkeysnew and evolving oreign policy? Here, the central question is to what extent Turkeys

Darur policy is driven by political and economic considerations or is characterized by

a bias or its Muslim brethren or umma.

This brie tries to portray the underlying elements o the Muslim worlds reaction

toward Darur by critically evaluating Turkeys involvement in the conict. Turkey is

important because it has been cited as a rising star o 21st century in the Muslim world

not only or its growing economic potential and deepening democratic credentials,

but also with its recent pro-active diplomatic initiatives in conict areas such as in the

* Mehmet zkan is a PhD Candidate at Sevilla University, Spain, [email protected].** Birol Akgn is a Proessor o International Relations at Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey, [email protected]. Ahmet Alibasic, Wheres the Muslim outrage over Darur? The Wall Street Journal(Europe), 10 March 2009.

WHY WELCOME AL BASHEER?CONTEXTUALIZING TURKEYSDARFUR POLICY


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A seriousinternational

eort to resolvethe Darur crisis

culminated in theDoha talks where

an agreement wasreached in April

2010.

Middle East, Balkans and Caucasia. Turkey is not an Arab country, thereore, not a party

to the Darur conict rom an ethnical point o view, nor a country that initially showed

no interest in the conict. However, Turkey as a rising power in the international arena

is aware o its diplomatic limits and careully operates between the concerns o the

Muslim consciousness and the interests o other actors at international and regional

levels. As Turkey strengthens its relations with Western institutions, such as NATO

and the EU as well as being an elected member o the UN Security Council or 2009-

2010, it can neither ignore the genocide claims nor the decision o the International

Criminal Court (ICC) or the role o the Sudanese President Omer al Basheer. However,

Turkey seemingly does not want to jeopardize its developing relations with the Arab

and Arican countries by joining the Western position o Darur. Basically, Turkey seems

to be between rock and hard place in its Darur policy. This brie is an inquiry on the

underlying elements o Turkeys Darur policy. A critical appraisal o Turkeys approach

to the issue may not only help us understand Turkeys growing sot-power instruments

in the Muslim world, but also reveals the limitations o Turkeys new proactive oreign

policy.

From Past to Present: A Periodization o the Darur Confict

Although a thorough discussion o the historical roots and all the political aspects o

the Darur conict are beyond this paper, the Darur conict has three stages and it

is imperative to outline those to understand and situate the crisis in an internationalcontext. The st phase o the crisis was between February 2003 and the end o 2004.

It has been characterized as the site o brutal counterinsurgency2 with a death toll

estimated somewhere between 100.000 and 400.000.3 The second phase, rom early

2005 up until the International Criminal Courts (ICC) indictment o al Basheer on 14

July 2008, has been marked by a decrease in ghting. During this period, the death toll

decreased, however, the crisis nally attracted international interest accompanied by

a campaign against genocide.4 This is noteworthy because, in the initial stages o the

conict when the mass killings occurred, international interest in Darur was relatively

low in comparison to later stages. This can be explained because international attention

was diverted to the invasion o Iraq. Third stage is the post-ICC process. Here, a seriousinternational eort to resolve the Darur crisis culminated in the Doha talks where an

agreement was reached in April 2010. However, the international community is divided.

While the Arican Union (AU)5, Arab League (AL),6 and the Organization o the Islamic

2. Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darur, Politics, and the War on Terror, (New York: Pantheon, 2009),p.32.

3. There is huge debate about this number as it is usually used as a political motivation to show the greatness othe brutality, and the numbers increased and decreased rom time to time depending on agencies that releasethe statistics. For an excellent summary, presentation and discussion about numbers can be ound in Mamdani,pp.25-39.

4. Ibid, p 33.5. AU criticizes ICC ruling on Basher genocide charges, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34022 (ac-cessed 10 April 2010).

6. Arab leaders back wanted Basher, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7971624.stm (accessed 5 April 2010).


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Turkeys Darurpolicy convergesand distinguishesitsel rom theoverall reaction othe Muslim world.

Conerence (OIC)7 see the ICC decision as an obstacle to peace eorts, the UN and the

EU see it as an advancement in the process toward ending the mass killings. It is certain

that with the decision o the ICC, the international community remains divided as to

how to urther peace eorts despite the peace agreement. However, there are signs

that al Basheer has sotened his support to the rebels. Consequently, the conict may

be winding down with the ICC indictment against al Basheer.8 Since April 2010, we

have entered a ourth phase that will dene uture developments within Sudan as well

as the reaction o the international community.

Such a periodization is important in understanding the Muslim worlds overall reaction

to the conict because such an understanding may help us to better contextualize

Turkeys approach to the issue. During the rst period, almost all international attention,

both the Muslim world and the West, was ocused on the invasion o Iraq. Simply stated,the international community turned a blind eye to the developments in Darur. In the

second period, the Western media through NGOs (i.e. Save Darur Coalition) launched

an oensive to garner support or Darur. However, the Muslim worlds reaction was

very limited. In act, it took a highly deensive against the Western discourse o the

claim o genocide. What we have seen in the third period is that Western attention

has virtually disappeared while the Muslim world, namely Qatar and the OIC, played

a critical role in reaching agreement along with the eorts o the AU. Turkeys Darur

policy converges and distinguishes itsel rom the overall reaction o the Muslim world.

These distinctions require urther explanations.

What Drives Turkeys Darur Policy?

Turkeys approach to Darur has been subject to criticism by analysts and human rights

groups as contradictory and holding a double standard. This criticism was particularly

strong when the Sudanese Vice-President, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, visited Turkey

ater Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stormed out o the 2009 Davos meeting accusing

the Israelis o knowing how to kill people in Gaza. According to ormer Turkish oreign

minister and retired diplomat, Ilter Turkmen, it was obvious that there is a contradiction

in Erdogans approach toward Gaza and Darur. The President o the Turkish HumanRights Association, Ozturk Turkdogan, openly declared the visit to Turkey an indication

o the governments double-standard policy. Proessor Mensur Akgun also criticized

Turkeys invitation o Taha by stating that i Taha did not come to Turkey or a discussion

over a solution in Darur, it is not an accurate act on the part o Turkey to receive him. 9

The International communitys reaction towards the Sudanese leaders visit to Turkey

was also interesting. The Armenian National Committee o America (ANCA) has tried to

use Sudanese-Turkish ties to legitimize its lobbying on the recognition o the Armenian

7. OIC asks ICC and UN Security Council to Cancel ICC Decision against President o the Republic, http://www.sol-sd.com/print.php?a=3408 (accessed 10 April 2010).

8. We are grateul to Serhat Orakci or this point. See also War in Sudans Darur is over, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/arica/8224424.stm (accessed 27 August 2009).

9. Fulya Ozerkan, Domestic Double standards in Darur policies, Hurriyet, 4 February 2009, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10920646.asp (accessed 10 January 2010).


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Turkeys policyhas been mainlyshaped by three

actors: theinternational

environment/discourse on

the war onterror; Turkeys

new politicaland economic

engagementpolicies with theArab world and

Arica; and Ankarassearch or a new

political languageon Darur.

genocide in Washington and elsewhere. It even claimed that an axis o genocide has

been established between Turkey and Sudan.10 Due to growing international criticism

and pressure particularly rom the EU, Sudanese president al Basheer cancelled at the

last minute his ofcial visit to Istanbul or the OIC meeting hosted by Turkish president

Abdullah Gul in November 2009.11

As a long-time strong western ally and as a rising Muslim democratic state, Turkeys

distinctive oreign policy approach to Darur and Khartoum requires a closer and in-

depth analysis. It should be viewed within the context o Turkeys changing role in

regional and global aairs. On the Darur issue, Turkeys policy has been mainly shaped

by three actors: the international environment/discourse on the war on terror;

Turkeys new political and economic engagement policies with the Arab world and

Arica; and Ankaras search or a new political language on Darur, a middle ground

between accusations o genocide and deending al Basheers position. This approach

can be qualied more accurately as a passive quiet diplomacy.

International Environment, Discourse on Genocide and the War on

Terror

Turkeys interest in Darur and its policy toward the conict have been directly shaped

by the current international environment; however, Turkey has taken a unique position.

During the rst phase o the Darur conict, the attention o the Muslim world wasdiverted towards the Iraqi War. This conict weighed more strategically, politically and

economically due to its heavy all out and long-term implications or Muslim states.

In this context, Iraq had more relevance or Turkey. Turkey is not only a neighboring

country to Iraq but because o the Kurdish issue, the Iraqi conict represents an

immediate ully-edged threat to the unity and sovereignty o Turkey. Thereore, in

the rst phase o the Darur conict, Turkey was not initially really involved during the

debates. In the second phase, when Turkey started to show interest in the crisis by

ofcially hosting al Basheer in Ankara or his rst state visit to Turkey in January 2008,

genocide claims were at its height but al Basheer was not indicted by the ICC yet. 12

Turkey has had its own reasons to reject the term genocide. Within the context o an

international environment in which the war on terror rhetoric is dominant and the

images o Arabs and Muslims in western media are presented as potential terrorists

since September 11th, it has been politically difcult or the Muslim World and Turkeys

ruling conservative government to accept the genocide argument or the conict in

Darur. Furthermore, qualiying the conict as genocide has had ar-etching results in

political and legal terms. The argument that a genocide carried out in Darur by Muslim

Arabs on Muslim Aricans was yet another selective and unair judgment o the

10. Armenians use Turkey-Sudan tie or recognition, Turkish Daily News, 23 February 2009.11. See Basheer cancels visit to Istanbul, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8349678.stm (accessed 10 April 2010).

12. ICC decision was issued later in July 2008. Later in August 2008, al Basheer second time visited Turkey or par-ticipating in Turkey-Arica Coopertaion Summit.


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Turkish ofcialshave gone onrecord, severaltimes, saying thatSudans territorialintegrity mustbe protected- aposition in linewith Turkeysposition on Iraq.

West according to the overall understanding o Turkey and the Muslim world. 13 Thus,

neither the Arab states nor the Arab League accepted the idea o genocide. Turkeys

approach towards Darur was also a reection o the potential negative discourse due

to environment the war on terror has engendered. It is possibly because o this concern

that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan questioned the charges brought

against Omer al Basheer and said that no Muslim could perpetrate a genocide, and I

there was such a thing (a genocide), we could talk about it ace to ace with President

Basheer, when he is asked about the situation in Darur. 14 Turkey wanted to prevent

such a negative discourse rom taking place, especially in the context o an East-West

dialogue, which Turkey has been co-chairing. This is the the alliance o civilizations

project under the auspicious o the UN Secretary-General, which is to promote peace

and harmony.When the ICC indicted al Basheer as the person responsible or the atrocities in Darur,

Turkey had to clariy its policy on Darur. Ater the ICC decision, the West asked other

countries to cooperate and support the ICC. However, neither the AU nor the Arab

League expressed its willingness to cooperate with the ICC. They requested that the

international community delay its decision on the grounds that it could threaten the

peace process in Sudan. At the same time, Turkey was a newly elected member o the

UN Security Council or the period o 2009-2010, thus orcing Ankara to take sides.

Ankara ofcially preerred to be silent about the issue. However, policy actions reveal

that Ankara leaned towards also requesting a postponement o the charges against al

Basheer. The act that al Basheer visited Turkey twice in 2008, amidst all the atrocities

in Darur, is taken as a clear indication that Ankara is not willing to ollow the western

position and alienate Sudans political leadership. Similarly, Turkish ofcials have gone

on record, several times, saying that Sudans territorial integrity must be protected-

a position in line with Turkeys position on Iraq. However, Turkey has expressed its

unhappiness with the humanitarian tragedy in Darur and several times diplomatically

raised the issue with al Basheer behind the closed doors.15 In a recent interview, Turkish

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu argued that Turkey is working on providing a

better dialogue between the parties in Darur and the Sudanese government, and

when President al Basheer came to Turkey, our (Turkish) president criticized him in a

most sincere and open way.16

Limitations o Multidimensional Foreign Policy

Turkeys Darur policy is precariously positioned because o Turkeys multidimensional

oreign policy and opening towards both Arica and the Middle East since 2002. Ankara

has been involved in many issues since the Iraqi war o 2003, not only in its surrounding

13. Eric A. Heinze, The Rhetoric o Genocide in US Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darur Compared, PoliticalScienceQuarterly, Vol.122, No.3, 2007, pp.377-378; and Alex de Wall, Who are the Darur ians? Arab and Arican identities,

violence and external engagement, Arican Afairs, Vol.104, No.415, 2005, pp.200-201.14. Basher cancels visit to Istanbul, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8349678.stm (accessed 10 April 2010)

15. Today`s Zaman, 2 March 2009.

16. Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, Newsweek, 28 November 2009.


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Since 2002Turkey has clearly

diversied itsinternational

relationsdeveloping

economic andpolitical ties withthe AU, the ArabLeague, and the

OIC.

regions (Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East) but also in regions urther aar, such as

Arica. However, while Turkeys inuence in these regions has been on the rise, similar

outcomes cannot be observed with such clarity in others. This is not because o a lack o

interest on Turkeys part, rather, it has more to do with global politics and the position

o the states in those areas. For example, Turkeys Darur policy has been inuenced by

both the position o Western and non-Western countries, specically the AU and the

Arab League. Ankaras position is situated between the West and the East; however a

closer look would reveal Turkeys quiet interest in the conict as it tried to chart a policy

while weighing its options, limitations and margins.

Turkeys Darur policy has been strained by international and regional involvement. On

the one hand, Ankaras active involvement in every conict, initiative and organization

in its surrounding regions has tremendously increased its standing, inuence and

weight in relations with those regions. On the other hand, such an active involvement

orces Turkey to be cautious and develop sometimes a rather ambiguous policy line

that will not exclude other actors or share-holders in a conict. What we see here is a

so-called contradiction or side-eect o the multidimensional oreign policy that the

ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) has carried out since it took ofce in 2002.

Indeed, since 2002 Turkey has clearly diversied its international relations developing

economic and political ties with the AU, the Arab League, and the OIC. Turkey now

holds a strategic partnership status with the AU and a permanent invitee status with

the Arab League. Turkeys economic and political ties with the Arab world and Arica

are such that Ankara cannot take a strong political position toward any conict in the

region without taking into consideration the position o these regional organizations,

otherwise it may jeopardize its newly emerging relations.

The Arab League took the position that the situation in Darur was neither genocide

nor ethnic cleansing and accused the US and the West exploiting the situation in

Darur.17 However, as mentioned, it was not this position that brought Turkey closer to

the Arab world on the Darur issue. There were basically two reasons which shaped and

led to this virtual cooperation. First, economic and political relations have developedso much that Turkey cannot ignore the Arab worlds policy on Darur, as the Sudan is

an important part o the Arab world. Secondly, because o the current discourse on the

war on terrorism and Islam, as discussed earlier, Turkeys position has moved closer to

that o the Muslim world.

As the largest regional organization, the AU remained central to the international

response on Darur. It made a signicant appearance rom the start and demonstrated

a willingness to play an active role, despite limited military capacity and political

constraints. Initially, the AU deployed a peacekeeping orce in Sudan called the AU

Mission in Sudan (AMIS), but the ability o AMIS to protect civilians and humanitarian

17. Moataz El Fegiery and Ridwan Ziyada, The Tragedy o Darur, Double Standards Being Applied, 2007, http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-732/i.html (accessed 22 December 2009).


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Turkeys diplomaticalignment with theAU is also in linewith its growingeconomic interestsin Arica.

operations was difcult due to its limited capacity, insufcient resources and political

constraints. However, it has played an active role in nding a solution or the Darur

crisis through the Arican Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Darur,

chaired by ormer South Arican President Thabo Mbeki. There have been two reasons

which shaped Turkeys understanding and support o the AU activities. First, as it was

the case beore the Iraqi war, Turkey rejected external involvement in any country. In

its oreign policy, Turkey has also requently emphasized the principle osovereignty.

These principles were directly in line with the position o the AU on Darur and thus

Turkish decision-makers did not hesitate to align themselves with the AU.

Turkeys diplomatic alignment with the AU is also in line with its growing economic

interests in Arica.18

Turkey is now an emerging new player in Arica, in terms oeconomic involvement. Its trade with Arica has grown more than our times since

2002, reaching almost $17 billion in 2009.19 Supporting the argument or claims o

genocide and external involvement would certainly have an impact on Turkeys newly

developing relations with the continent.

The OIC, a 57-member Islamic organization, has also held the same position on the

Darur issue as other regional organizations such as the AU and the Arab League. In a

statement, OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu reiterated that there was no

evidence to support this [genocide] allegation and urged the Sudanese government

to continue its investigations on the human rights violations in Darur. In general, theOIC supported negotiations in Doha and asked or the international community to

take concrete steps to support the eorts aimed at resolving the Darur issue through

the Doha process.20 Considering Turkeys active involvement in the OIC, its growing

socio-economic ties with the Muslim Middle Eastern countries, and the election o a

Turkish candidate closer to the ruling JDP circles or the position o secretary-general

o the OIC;21 it is not without reasons that Turkey would try to mobilize the OIC and

other organizations on Darur, while agreeing with them on the way orward at least

in principle.

In addition, economic imperatives may have also inuenced Turkish policy on Darur

and motivated Ankara to work behind closed doors to urge al Basheer to end the

conict. Sudan has played a role in Turkeys economic and political opening towards

the Arab and Arican world. As an Arab country, located in Arica, Sudan has been a

gateway or Turkeys entrance into Arica, especially or trade. Thereore, Turkey has

traditionally enjoyed a trade link with Sudan in comparison to other Arican countries.

Again, with Turkeys multidimensional oreign policy, there have been advances in the

18. See more about Turkeys involvement in Arica, Mehmet Ozkan, Turkey Discovers Arica: Implications and Pros-pects, SETA Policy Brie No: 22, September 2008.

19. Turkish PM, the Undersecretary o Foreign Trade, http://www.dtm.gov.tr (accessed 3 May 2010).20. See, http://www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=2858&x_key=darur (accessed 20 December 2009).

21. See Mehmet Ozkan, Turkey in the Islamic World: An Institutional Perspective, Turkish Review o Middle EastStudies, 18, 2007, pp.159-193.


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Turkeys Darurpolicy can be seen

as an exampleo passive quietdiplomacy in ahighly complex

internationalenvironment in

which Turkishoreign policy

operates.

elds o trade, agriculture, health, security, construction, energy and education with

Sudan. While the volume o oreign trade between Ankara and Khartoum was only $35

million in 2002, it has increased tremendously in 2007 to $200 million. Turkey mainlyexports to Sudan machinery, iron steel, automotive and spare parts. It is believed that

80 Turkish rms have operations in Sudan, exceeding $300 million investments.22

Turkey has also oered its sot-power elements to help ending the suerings in Darur

while diplomatic endeavors evolve. Turkeys ofcial development agency, TIKA, has had

its ofce in Khartoum since 2006. It has contributed to a number o projects in many

sectors, ranging rom agriculture to the health sector. Along with ofcial humanitarian

agencies, Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent) and some other Turkish humanitarian NGOs

have signicant projects in Sudan as well. One project stands out among others; it is theCataract project o the Istanbul-based NGO, the Humanitarian Relie Foundation (IHH).

The IHH initiated the Cataract Campaign in 2007 with the slogan o i you see theywill see too to help those who lost their vision by hot temperatures, eating habits and

climatic conditions in ten Arican countries. Sudan orms the 40 % o the project and

takes the central place in the project, and so ar more than 15 thousand people have

been operated within the project.23 Similarly, while Ankara has ounded a hospital in

Darurs capital, Nyala, oering its service to those who need medical care; the Ankara

Chamber o Industry is working to establish an industrial zone in Khartoum.

Toward a new language and beyond: PassiveQuiet Diplomacy?

It is argued above that Turkey neither shared the western perspective on Darur, nordeended the position o the Arab world. I thats the case,, what is Turkeys exact

position on Darur? It is possible to argue that, in general, Turkeys Darur policy can

be seen as an example o passive quiet diplomacy in a highly complex international

environment in which Turkish oreign policy operates.

Basically the term quiet diplomacy describes the congruence o two basic ideas: theoverall ramework should be diplomacy, rather than sanctions and military actions,

while the adjective quiet reers to the style o the diplomatic engagement dened

as a combination o measures that include behind the scene engagements, secret

negotiations, and subtle coaxing.24 In sum, it is a way o discussing problems with

ofcials o another country in a calm way.25 In the literature, as Graham argues, theterm quiet diplomacy is used extensively to reer to many types o sot diplomatic

initiatives.26 However, drawing on the existing literature27 it is possible to describe

quiet diplomacy by three characteristics.

22. Hasan Kanbolat, Turkey and Sudan: Darur and Trade, Today`s Zaman, 29 January 2009.

23. More on the Cataract Project and the latest news see the ofcial website o the IHH, http://www.ihh.org.tr/katarakt/en/

24. Kuseni Dlamini, Is Quiet Diplomacy an Eective Conict Resolution Strategy? South Arican Yearbook o Inter-national Afairs, 2002/03, (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2003), p.171.

25. Peter H. Collin, Dictionary o Government and Politics, (Middlesex: Peter Collin, 1997), p.89.

26. Victoria Graham, A Comparison o South Aricas Quiet Diplomacy towards Nigeria and Zimbabwe, UnpublishedMA Thesis, (Johannesburg: University o Johannesburg, 2004), p.25.

27. Among others, see Graham (2004) and How rm the handshake? South Aricas use o quiet diplomacy inZimbabwe rom 1999 to 2006, Arican Security Review, Vol.15, No.4, 2006; Martin Adelmann, Quiet Diplomacy:The Reasons behind Mbekis Zimbabwe Policy, Arica Spectrum, 39 (2), 2004; Miriam Prys, Regional Hegemon orRegional Bystander: South Aricas Zimbabwe Policy 20002005, Politikon, Vol.36, No.2, 2009.


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The rst and oremost characteristic or any initiative to be described as quiet

diplomacy is that there must be personal and direct diplomatic contact between

heads o states or governments. Only with this type o interaction, can the initiator talk,

reason and discuss the issue in order to persuade his/her counterpart or the involved

parties in the conict. This style is also important as it demonstrates the sincerity o the

parties involved providing reassurance to acilitate the resolution o the conicts at

hand. Despite the strong critique against the two visits o Sudanese President Omar

al Basheer in 2008 and several other meetings at international orums such as the

Arab League summit in Khartoum; they served or the ramework o quiet diplomacy.

Turkish leaders were able to talk directly to the Sudanese head o state and criticize him

in a most sincere and open way.28 This diplomatic style was also intended to create

a balanced approach between the EU and the US position and that o the Arab andArican countries opposing political stances.29

The second characteristic o quiet diplomacy is to limit outside intererence either

through action or inaction. Although this can trigger a great deal o criticism and

disapproval, it reects the underlying goals o quiet diplomacy, which are persuasion,

inuence and pressure through a strategy that may seem as inactive but is actually

based on the willingness o the parties involved to talk with each other. While this is

the backbone o this diplomatic style, it is also reects a certain weakness. Because it

not only attracts criticisms but it also places the state that engages in quiet diplomacy

in an awkward position in the eyes o the international community. While the state

pursues a very careul dialogue and engagement with the target country, it can appear

as being ineective and ar rom producing results in the short run.30 According to the

media, Turkeys Darur policy has hardly produced any direct results on the ground

so ar. That is why, when Turkey hosted al Basheer, it seems to support the claim that

Turkey was in act supporting al Basheers position in the conict. This is reinorced,

as Turkey never stated that it was pursuing quiet diplomacy in resolving the conict

in Darur. Nevertheless, Turkish leaders have openly spoken to al Basheer, asking that

the conict and killings cease.31 Many saw Turkeys eort as a waste o time and as

awkward diplomatically. Turkey wanted to use the quiet diplomacy as it also ts within

the reaches o its diplomatic power. In a political environment where the internationalcommunity has been divided into two camps around the conict, Turkeys goal was

to conduct its quiet diplomacy outside the glare o the media while carrying out

persuasions behind closed doors. Turkeys implementation o this passive quite

diplomacy attracted much criticism and even led to the claim o the existence o an

axis o genocide between Turkey and Sudan.32 In this situation, Turkey neither could

28. Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, Newsweek, 28 November 2009.

29. Cansu Arisoy, What is Happening Between Turkey and Darur?, 26 March 2010, http://www.bilgesam.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=256:what-is-happening-between-turkey-and-darur&catid=80:analizler-arika&Itemid=138 (accessed 5 May 2010).

30. Graham (2004), p.27.31. Turkey urges Sudan to resolve Darur, Los Angeles Times, 20 August 2008.

32. See, Armenian National Committee o America, 18 February 2009, http://www.anca.org/assets/pd/hill_notes/021809.pd (accessed 5 May 2010).

Turkish leadershave openlyspoken to alBasheer, askingthat the conictand killings cease.


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deend its position by producing a new language nor pave the way or a solution in

the immediate uture. However, Turkey believes that its apparently sincere eorts

to convince the government o Khartoum to resolve the issue peaceully may have

contributed to change in al Basheers approach to the crisis in Darur.

The third characteristic o quiet diplomacy is that states preer their careully

planned constructive engagements in the context o bilateral and multilateral

orums, whenever possible. In some cases they act as unassigned appointees o a

regional or/and international organization, while in some cases they are recognized

ofcially as mediators, brokers or intermediaries. Turkeys engagement in Darur

through international organizations only came to the surace during the Doha

meetings. Although in earlier periods, Turkey supported the eorts o all international

organizations to solve the Darur conict, Turkey actively participated in the OICsDarur Donors Conerence held in Cairo on March 21, 2010, by co-chairing with Egypt

and promised to donate 60-75 millions to projects o water, education and agriculture

until 2015.33

Quiet diplomacy occurs usually behind closed doors and tries to keep initiatives out

o the light o media coverage to prevent sensationalism, outside involvement and

excessive or unrealistic optimism. Nevertheless, states engaging in such diplomacy

preer to eed the media in small doses, in order to gain a certain degree o international

support, credibility and even some sort o benet or its oreign policy. Turkey ailed,

at the beginning o the process, to sufciently inorm the media, or at least to explain

its position and intentions. This oversight in communicating even minimally with

the media led to the misinterpretation o Turkeys involvement in the Darur conict.

I Turkey had had an eective approach towards the media, it would have been less

criticized or its stance on the crisis in Darur. Instead, the outcome may have been a

constructive public discussion on Turkeys Darur policy.

The policy o quiet diplomacy has been popularized with the South Arican experience

with Zimbabwe. A close examination o this case reveals that this type o diplomacy has

the benet o keeping channels open or communication between the Mugabe regime

and the outside world.34 However, the main criticism was that this style o diplomacy

is too sot and does not produce a substantial outcome nor does it bring about a quicksolution to a conict, and the situation may even deteriorate. The result is the same with

Turkeys Darur policy: more criticism and no quick solution. Unlike the South Arican

case, there has been no sign that the international community appreciated that Turkey

kept channels o communication open with the Sudanese head o state in the case o

Darur. Obviously, this maybe because Turkey never ofcially announced that it would

ollow such a policy, nor did the outside world witness what Turkey was attempting to

accomplish. That is why we have been describing Turkeys engagement as a passive

quiet diplomacy. The termpassive, however, is not intended to mean ineective, rather

it means that Turkey has not stated it to be its ofcial policy.

33. See, http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=55785 (accessed 5 May 2010).

34. Adelmann (2004), p.252.

Turkey activelyparticipated in the

OICs Darur DonorsConerence held

in Cairo on March21, 2010, by co-

chairing with Egyptand promised

to donate 60-75millions to projectso water, education

and agricultureuntil 2015.


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Concluding Remarks

It is clear that Turkeys Darur policy is the one o the most criticized policies amongstudents o Turkish oreign policy. Ironically, it also represents one o the less researched

and debated issue among experts. This brie argues that Turkey has a Darur policy that

requires an in-depth analysis because it is an example o a policy position that was not

ormally presented to the outside world and the media. We argued that Turkey has not

aligned itsel with the western position o criticizing the Sudanese government and its

leader al Basheer by describing the conict in Darur as genocide. However, we have

also argued that Turkey has not ignored the developments and human tragedy that

occurred in its ofcial dealings with the Sudan. Ankaras policy on Darur is basically

a strategy o passive quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement, supported by

its developing economic and political ties with the Sudan. This policy seems to be incontradiction with the positions taken by Washington and Brussels, but have much in

common with the positions o the Arab world, Arican nations and Muslim states in

general. However, Turkeys policy targets peace and stability in Sudan in the long-term,

which is also the U.S. and the EUs desired outcome.

With the 21st century, many states seem to attach greater value to soter oreign policy

strategies and quieter ways o solving conicts. Indeed, Turkey had demonstrated the

efcacy o such a policy in its involvement in negotiations between Israel and Syria,

Serbia and Bosnia and in other regional conicts. However, Turkey was not able to

properly explain its intention to create, albeit in a passive way, a new language on

Darur in order to go beyond the or and against dilemma o the role al Basheer played

in the Darur crisis and the essence o the conict. The international discourse on the

war on terror and the limitations o developing a multidimensional oreign policy

have also shaped Turkeys passive stance on Darur, leaving it to the international

organizations. However, despite good intentions, Turkey was also not able to produce

a convincing alternative to the situation, thus attracting more criticism at home and

abroad. Nevertheless, Turkeys Darur policy is an example o passive quiet diplomacy

in a highly complex international environment.


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S E T A | F O U N D A T I O N F O R P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M I C A N D S O C I A L R E S E A R C HR e i t G a l i p C d . H e r e k e S o k a k N o : 1 0G O P a n k a y a 0 6 7 0 0 A n k a r a T R K Y E

P h : + 9 0 3 1 2 . 4 0 5 6 1 5 1 | F a x : + 9 0 3 1 2 . 4 0 5 6 9 0 3w w w . s e t a v . o r g | i n o @ s e t a v . o r g

S E T A | W a s h i n g t o n D . C . O i c e

1 0 2 5 C o n n e c t i c u t A v e n u e , N . W . , S u i t e 1 1 0 6W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 2 0 0 3 6

P h : 2 0 2 - 2 2 3 - 9 8 8 5 | F a x : 2 0 2 - 2 2 3 - 6 0 9 9w w w . s e t a d c . o r g | i n o @ s e t a d c . o r g

This study analyses the underlying elements o the Muslim worlds reactiontoward the Darur crisis by critically evaluating Turkeys involvement. Turkey isimportant because it has been cited as a rising star o 21st century in the Mus-lim world not only or its growing economic potential and deepening demo-cratic credentials, but also with its recent pro-active diplomatic initiatives inconict areas such as in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Turkeys Darur policy has been one o its most criticized in recent times. Al-though the criticisms leveled against this policy have some merit, they donot provide much insight into the motivations behind Turkeys approach toDarur. Thus, Ankaras distinctive approach to Darur and Khartoum requires

a thorough, in-depth analysis within the context o Turkeys changing role inregional and global aairs. It is argued that on the Darur issue, Turkish policyhas been characterized by convergence and distinction rom the ofcial posi-tion o the Muslim-Arab world.

We argue that the Turkish approach to Darur has been mainly shaped bythree elements: the international environment/discourse on the war onterror since 2002; Turkeys recently deepening political and economic en-gagement with the Arab world and Arica; and Ankaras search or a new po-litical language on Darur, a middle ground between the Wests claims ogenocide and deending al Basheer. In sum, Turkeys Darur policy can bedescribed as an example o passive quiet diplomacy in a highly complexinternational environment.

Mehmet zkan

Mehmet zkan is a PhD Candidate at Sevilla University, Spain. Ater graduating rom In-

ternational Relations at the Faculty o Political Science at Istanbul University, he studied in

South Arica (University o Johannesburg) and Sweden (Linkoping University) where he

obtained masters degree. Email: [email protected]

Birol Akgn

Ater graduating rom Ankara University, Political Science Faculty in 1993, Birol Akgn

completed his MA (1996) and Ph.D. (2000) in Political Science at Case Western ReserveUniversity, in Cleveland, Ohio. Email: [email protected]

Documents

Contextualizing Turkey`s Darfur Policy