Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions

STEWART COHEN

CONTEXTUALISM DEFENDED:COMMENTS ON RICHARD FELDMAN’S

SKEPTICAL PROBLEMS, CONTEXTUALIST SOLUTIONS

Contextualism explains our inconsistent inclinations about skepti-cism by appealing to contextual shifts in the standards at which weevaluate the truth of our knowledge ascriptions. Richard Feldmanobjects that a better explanation is that there are conflicting argu-ments for and against the truth of our knowledge ascriptionsevaluated at a single standard.1 If Feldman is correct, then thecontextualist resolution of the sketpical paradox fails.

Feldman notes that for many disputes, e.g., about whether aperson counts as tall or wise, an appeal to context-sensitivity seemslike a natural way to resolve the conflict. But for other disputes,e.g., about the cause of the extinction of dinosaurs, or the moralityof abortion, a contextualist resolution is not plausible. Sometimes,we just have good arguments for opposing views. According toFeldman,

The general lesson to be drawn from these examples [abortion, the origins ofdinosaurs] is that sometimes the existence of varying inclinations regarding aparticular sentence is not a sign of context dependence. . . Sometimes there aregenuine conflicts. In my view, our varying inclinations regarding knowledge attri-butions are more like the morality and scientific controversy cases than they arelike our inclinations in cases in which context dependence is the right response.(pp. 61–85)

Feldman is right, of course, that the mere fact that there arevarying inclinations does not by itself indicate context sensitivity.So how do we tell whether the conflict between our everydayknowledge ascriptions and our skeptical inclinations is genuine, orwhether the conflict is only apparent and so can be resolved by anappeal to context sensitivity? If the conflict is genuine, then theskeptical dispute is more like the disputes concerning the originsof dinosaurs and the morality of abortion. If the conflict is merely

Philosophical Studies103: 87–98, 2001.© 2001Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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apparent, then the skeptical dispute is more like some disputesconcering tallness or wiseness ascriptions.

We can approach this question by considering why we areinclined to view some disputes concerning tallness ascriptions asmerely apparent and so resolvable by appeal to context sensitivity:The predicate ‘. . . is tall’ can be satisfied to varying degrees – wecan talk about someone being taller than someone else – and it canalso be satisfiedsimpliciter – we can talk about someone beingtall simpliciter. How tall does someone have to be in order to betall simpliciter? Surely the correct answer to this question will varyacross contexts. Thus, insofar as we can view apparently conflictingtallness ascriptions as resulting from different standards concerninghow tall someone has to be in order to be tallsimpliciter, we canview the conflict between the ascriptions as merely apparent. Eachascription can be correct given the context in which it was made.

Analogously, justification is a predicate that can be satisfied tovarying degrees and that can be satisfiedsimpliciter. In the sameway, it’s plausible to suppose that how justified a belief must be inorder to be justifiedsimpliciterdepends on the context. And sincejustificationsimpliciteris a component of knowledge, ascriptions ofknowledge will likewise be context sensitive.2 Thus insofar as wecan view apparently conflicting knowledge ascriptions as resultingfrom different standards concerning how justified a belief must be inorder to be justifiedsimpliciter, we can view the conflict as merelyapparent. Each knowledge ascription can be correct relative to thecontext in which it was made.3

So there is a natural way to model the dispute about skepticismwhere it looks very much like some disputes about whether someoneis tall or wise, disputes with no genuine conflict. These are thekinds of dispute that are suitable for a contextualist resolution. AndI see no way to model the disputes about the origins of the dino-saurs and the morality of abortion that would make sense of such acontextualist treatment.

I don’t want to overstate the point. I am not saying that if youcan come up with some model of a dispute according to which youcan view it as resulting from contextual factors, then it follows thatthe contextualist treatment is correct. At a minimum, the reasons foraccepting the model have to outweigh the reasons for rejecting it. So

COMMENTS ON SKEPTICAL PROBLEMS, CONTEXTUALIST SOLUTIONS 89

let’s turn to the objections Feldman raises against the plausibility ofthe contextualist model.

Feldman argues that Contextualism makes a false predictionabout how we should view our own knowledge ascriptions.

According to contextualism, when I first think that I know, but then think aboutskepticism and come to think that I don’t know, I should look back on my previousclaim to knowledge and think that it was correct as well. But I don’t. I think thatI was (or may have been) wrong. . . Once skepticism becomes appealing, I thinkthat my previous claim to know was false. (pp. 61–85)

If Feldman is correct that Contextualism predicts that we shouldview our skeptical and everyday knowledge ascriptions as not inconflict, then the view is surely a non-starter. As Feldman notes,such a prediction is not borne out by the facts. But Contextualismmakes no such prediction. According to Contextualism, competentspeakers can fail, at least explicitly, to be aware of the contextsensitive standards that govern their knowledge ascriptions. Thismisleads them into thinking that certain knowledge ascriptionsconflict, when in fact they are compatible. Contextualism thuscombines a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions withwhat Stephen Schiffer has called “a kind of error theory” – a claimthat competent speakers are systematically misled by the contextsensitivity.4

It’s important to be clear about what is meant by the claim thatContextualism is a kind of error theory. Contextualism is decidedlynot an error theory regarding our judgements about when someoneknows. On the contrary, Contextualism seeks to preserve the truth ofour everyday knowledge ascriptions, while allowing that our seem-ingly conflicting skeptical judgments are correct as well. In thisrespect, Contextualism is the antithesis of an error theory.

Contextualismis an error theory with regard to certain ofour meta-judgments. For it holds that certain of our judgementsconcerning which knowledge ascriptions conflict are in error.We mistakenly think that the knowledge ascriptions we make ineveryday contexts conflict with the skeptical judgements we makein stricter contexts.

So it’s just false that, “according to contextualism, when I firstthink that I know, but then think about skepticism and come to thinkthat I don’t know, I should look back on my previous claim to know-

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ledge and think it was correct as well”. The error theory componentof Contextualism predicts that competent speakers will be misledby shifts in context and sowill feel a conflict between their skepticalinclinations and their everyday knowledge ascriptions.

This raises the issue of whether the combination of a contextu-alist semantics with an error theory, viz., the claim that competentspeakers are systematically misled by the contextualist semantics,is a plausible view. Perhaps Feldman means to be doubting theplausibility of this story. Stephen Schiffer has explicitly doubted itsplausibility. Schiffer thinks it is obvious that if ascriptions of know-ledge are relative to context-sensitive standards, then competentspeakers will know this. And if they know this, then they will notget confused about which standards apply to their own ascriptions.5

But we can see that there is nothing implausible in general aboutcombining a contextualist semantics with an error theory.6 Considerascriptions of flatness. You can lead competent speakers to questiontheir everyday ascriptions of flatness by making salient “bumps” thatordinarily we do not pay attention to. As Peter Unger demonstrated,taking this strategy to the extreme, e.g., by calling attention tomicroscopic surface irregularities, one can lead competent speakersto worry whether anything is really flat.7 But Unger’s case forflatness skepticism is interesting precisely because many who feelthe pull of flatness skepticism look back on their previous flatnessascriptions and think they may have been wrong.

Should we worry that all along we have been speaking falselywhen we have called things ‘flat’? Surely not. Philosophical reflec-tion will convince most that ascriptions of flatness are relative tocontext-sensitive standards.8 Flatness comes in degrees, and howflat a surface must be in order to count as flatsimpliciter dependson the context. Roads that count as flat in a conversation amongColoradans, do not generally count as flat in a conversations amongKansans. And while one can truly ascribe flatness to a table ineveryday conversations, one might not be able to truly ascribeflatness to that same table when setting-up a sensitive scientificexperiment. If we implicitly raise the standards high enough (bymaking salient microscopic bumps), then perhaps, relative to thatcontext, no physical surface really is flat. But of course, that does


not impugn our ascriptions of flatness in everyday contexts wherethe standards are more lenient.

So the controversy over whether anything is flat can be resolvedby noting that ascriptions of flatness are context-sensitive. Surelywe should not say that we simply have cogent arguments for flat-ness skepticism and weighty considerations against it. But thenwhy can we get competent speakers to question their everydayflatness ascriptions by implicitly raising the standards? It must bethat although ascriptions of flatness are context-sensitive, competentspeakers can fail to realize this. And because they can fail to realizethis, they can mistakenly think that their reluctance to ascribe flat-ness, in a context where the standards are at the extreme, conflictswith their ascriptions of flatness in everyday contexts.

So there is nothing implausible about combining a contextualistsemantics with an error theory of the sort endorsed by Contextu-alism. As we have seen in the case of flatness skepticism, competentspeakerscanbe unaware of, and so misled by, the kind of context-sensitivity I have argued is involved in ascriptions of knowledge.So the tendency of competent speakers to think that their skep-tical inclinations conflict with their everyday knowledge ascriptionsdoes not count against a contextualist interpretation of those ascrip-tions. On the contrary, the error theory component of Contextualismpredicts that competent speakers will think there is a conflict.

Now even if speakers can shift contexts without realizing it, still,if knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive, competent speakersshould, by and large, adjust their ascriptions, perhaps unknowingly,to the standards of their conversational context. Feldman argueshowever that this does not seem to happen.

On contextualist views, all competent speakers of the language should understandthe term ‘knows’ and they should be able to adjust to its contextually determinedstandards of application. So, in all contexts in which the standards for knowledgeare raised to unmeetable heights, all competent speakers should acknowledgethat we know very little. But that’s not my experience. There are intransigentskeptics who deny knowledge in virtually all contexts. There are those who areunmoved by skeptical considerations. On my view, such people react differentlyto complicated considerations for and against skepticism. On contextualist views,they don’t understand language. (pp. 61–85)

So Feldman’s point is not merely that as the error theorycomponent would have it, competent speakers fail to realize that

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they have shifted standards and so make false meta-judgmentsregarding when their knowledge ascriptions conflict. Rather hispoint is that these speakers actually fail to adjust their ascriptionsto the standards that govern their context. Those who, according toFeldman, deny knowledge in all contexts are failing to adjust tothe standards of most everyday contexts. And those who remainunmoved by skeptical considerations are failing to adjust to thestandards of certain skeptical contexts. That is to say, if Contex-tualism is true, otherwise competent speakers fail to be competentin their use of the knowledge predicate.

But Contextualisn has no such result. To begin, I know of no one“who seems to deny knowledge in virtually all contexts”. As bothHume and Descartes noted, even the most avowed philosophicalskeptic has trouble maintaining a skeptical stance in everyday life.Now there are those who are inclined towards skepticism wheneverthey consider skeptical arguments. But the contextualist will say thatthis is because considering skeptical arguments causes the stand-ards to rise (and so causes the context to shift). In this case, thesespeakers are judging in accordance with the standards governingtheir context.

Now there are some individuals who, as Feldman says, areunmoved by skeptical considerations. But this fact does not, byitself, lead to any untoward consequence for Contextualism. Noticethat precisely the same thing is true with regard to flatness skep-ticism. Some speakers fall quite readily into flatness skepticism(by focusing on microscopic “bumps”) while others will remainunmoved. And surely, as we’ve noted, this controversy can beresolved by noting that ascriptions of flatness are context sensitive.We should not say that we simply have good arguments for the viewthat nothing is flat, along with persuasive considerations in favor ofholding that lots of common surfaces are flat.

How then does Contextualism explain why some speakers remainunmoved by skeptical arguments? On a contextualist view, thestandards that govern a context are determined by a compli-cated pattern of interaction among the intentions, expectations, andpresuppositions of the members of the conversational context.9

Though skeptical considerations frequently lead to a strong upwardpressure on the standards, the shift to a skeptical context is not


inevitable. The pressure toward higher standards can sometimes beresisted. One device for doing this is adopting a certain tone ofvoice. So in response to the skeptic, one might say, “C’mon, you’vegot to be kidding – I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat!”. If this isthe dominant response among the conversational participants, theneveryday standards may remain in effect. In such a case, the speakerunmoved by skeptical doubt is not failing to adjust his ascriptionsto contextually determined standards. Rather, such a speaker ismanaging to keep the standards from rising.10

Having said, that, I must allow that there will be cases whereit looks as if a speaker ascribes knowledge in contexts where theskeptic’s standards are in effect. And there will be cases whereit looks as if a speaker refuses to ascribe knowledge in contextswhere everyday standards are in effect. Consider again the context-sensitive term ‘flat’. A Coloradan who has just moved to Kansasmay, in a conversation with Kansans, assert that a road is flat. Eventhough the Coloradan is intending to use looser standards, if hisaudience does not cooperate by accepting what he says, stricterstandards may be in effect. And a Kansan, recently having movedto Colorado, may assert that a road is not flat in a conversationwith Coloradans. If the Coloradans resist, the weaker standards mayremain in effect. Of course, if he persists by pointing out the smallchanges in the grade of the road, he may get the Coloradans tocooperate and the standards will rise.

In the same way, someone unmoved by skeptical doubt, mayassert (intending everyday standards) that he knows, in a conver-sation where consideration of skeptical alternatives has movedeveryone else to skeptical doubt. The skeptics by refusing tocooperate and accept his claim can make their strict standardsgovern the context. And a skeptic, in a conversation in everydaylife, may assert (intending strict standards) that no one knows. If hislisteners resist, the weaker standard may remain in effect. But if hepersists by raising skeptical alternatives, his listeners may cooperateand the standards will rise.

So there will be occasions when a particular speaker’s ascrip-tions fail to conform to the standards determined by the dominantresponse of the other members of the context. Moreover, in someconversations where there fails to be a dominant response to skep-

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tical considerations, i.e., where there is a considerable lack ofconformity in intentions, expectations and presuppositions, it maybe unclear, or perhaps there may be no fact of the matter, as to whatstandard is in effect. But I don’t see that these facts commit contex-tualists to any unacceptable consequence about otherwise competentspeakers misunderstanding language. Again the analogy with flat-ness ascriptions shows that there is nothing here that should lead usto abandon a contextualist account ofknowledgeascriptions.11,12

Assuming there are no serious problems with the contextu-alism model, is there anything reason to prefer it over Feldman’scompeting arguments model? As we have seen the contextualistmodel can explain the appeal of skeptical arguments in a waythat preserves the truth of our everyday knowledge ascriptions. OnFeldman’s competing arguments model, what explains the appealof skepticism? It’s just this: despite the strong considerations infavor of saying we know, skeptical arguments are quite cogent.Feldman holds that “it is far from obvious how to deal with skepticalarguments.” (pp. 61–85)

So is skepticism true? Here Feldman joins me in assuming thatskepticism can not be true, enough I hold this only for everydaycontexts. According to Feldman then, we are faced with seem-ingly cogent arguments for skepticism – a view that we otherwisethink we have reason to deny. So the advantage of the contextu-alist model over Feldman’s competing arguments model is just this:The competing arguments model is, at best, simply a statement ofthe skeptical problem whereas the contextualist model, if correct,provides a resolution of the problem.

Finally, Feldman argues that contextualists “fail to come to gripswith some important arguments for skepticism”. (pp. 61–85) Letme respond by reviewing what Contextualism is a response to – atleast in my view.13 We begin with a paradox – a set of inconsistentpropositions each of which has considerable intuitive appeal:

(1) I know I have a hand,(2) I do not know I am not a brain-in-a-vat,(3) If I know I have a hand, then I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat.

Now if you don’t yourself feel the intuitive pull of all three of thesepropositions, then you should not be interested in Contextualism.But if you do, Contextualism provides a strategy for resolving the


paradox. Now one constraint on providing a satisfactory resolutionof the paradox is that you explain how the paradox arises. So it’s notacceptable to just pick two members of the inconsistent set and usethem to argue against the remaining third. Such a strategy does notexplain the intuitive appeal of the third proposition and so does notexplain the paradox. Contextualism attempts to resolve the paradoxby arguing that while each proposition is true in some context, thereis no context in which all three are true. In particular, in everydaycontexts, (1) is true and (2) is false, in skeptical contexts, (2) is true,and (1) is false, while (3) is true in every context. The paradox arisesbecause of our failure to pay attention to shifts in context.

Now Feldman objects to the contextualism taking (2) to be true.“I don’t even have that intuition” (pp. 61–85) he protests. Now if thisis so, then as I noted, Feldman does not face this skeptical paradox.But the fact of the matter is that for many of us, when we reflecton the fact that this is just how our experience would be if we werebrains-in-a-vat, it seems very hard to say that we can know we arenot brains-in-a-vat. And this is something that needs to be explained.

But why not say that we’re just wrong when, in skeptical moods,we think that (2) is true? Well, that would raise the raise the questionof why we are so strongly inclined to think, in some moods anyway,that it is true. Contextualism attempts to answer that question bysaying that when we do think it is true, this is because the context isone in which it actually is true.

This is not to deny that most of us have moods where we thinkthat it is crazy to suppose we do not know we are not brains-in-a-vat. The advantage of Contextualism is that it can explain this‘shiftiness’ of our intuitions. A robust feature of those intuitionsis that we tend to vacillate between worrying about whether weknow anything, worrying that skepticism is true, and thinking thatskepticism is just crazy. According to Contextualism the shifting ofour intuition is explained by the shifting of contexts.

Feldman also objects that contextualists “seem simply to assumethat we do meet ordinary standards for knowledge” (pp. 61–85).And, as I noted, he thinks that this leads them to ignore importantskeptical arguments to the contrary.

Do contextualists take it for granted that (1) is true? We beginby noting the very strong intuitive pull of (1). And certainly I take

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it as a constraint on any acceptable resolution of the paradox thatit preserve the truth of (1) relative to everyday contexts. After all,in the end, skepticism is crazy. But that does not mean you cansimply dismiss skepticism. Because (2) and (3), which also haveconsiderable intuitive appeal, together entail the falsity of (1). Thepoint of Contextualism – at least as I see it – is not to prove that(1) is true. Rather the point is to reconcile the truth of (1) with theapparent truth of (2) and (3).

Now this is not to say that the deductive closure argument consti-tuted by (2) and (3) is the only skeptical argument – the only basisfor denying (1). As we have seen, Feldman mentions another – thepuzzle about the structure of justification and the claim that there isno non-circular justification of our perceptual beliefs. And Feldmanis right that Contextualism does not address this puzzle. But I don’tsee that it is a serious criticism of Contextualism that it does respondto this other skeptical argument. As I see it, combating skepticismis a matter of refuting skeptical arguments. It is not a matter ofsomehow proving once and for all that we know things. And thereshould be nothing surprising about the fact that a response to onekind of skeptical argument does not apply to another kind of skep-tical argument. In fairness to Feldman, it is certainly true that somecontextualists have tended to overadvertise their view as a solutionto theproblem of skepticism. But, since there is no such thing astheproblem, there is no such thing asthesolution.

Notice that a proposed solution to the circularity problem willnot necessarily address the deductive closure problem. Considerone such proposal noted by Feldman – Coherentism. Suppose weembrace circularity and hold that my belief in the reliability ofperception can play a role in justifying my perceptual beliefs whileat the same time, my perceptual beliefs can justify me in believingthat perception is reliable. Such a view, if correct, would solve thecircularity problem. But I don’t see that this view does anything toresolve the deductive closure problem. Even if we grant the truthof Coherentism, we are no further along toward understanding theappeal of (2). And I take it that the fact that Coherentism does notaddress the deductive closure paradox does not count as a seriousobjection against it. In the same way, I don’t think the fact that


Contextualism does not address the circularity problem counts asa serious objection against it.

Now perhaps Feldman thinks that the circularity problem issomehow a more interesting and central problem than the deductiveclosure problem. But offhand, I don’t see any argument for thatview.14

NOTES

1 Feldman 2001. All page references in the text are to this paper.2 Feldman objects (pp. 61–85) that it does not follow from the context sensitivityof ordinary ascriptions of justificationsimpliciter that ascriptions of knowledge-level justification are context sensitive. But surely some ordinary ascriptionsof justification simpliciter just are ascriptions of knowledge-level justification.Feldman also objects that it does not follow from the fact that a constituent ofknowledge, viz., justification, is context-sensitive, that ‘knows’ itself is contextsensitive (note 14). But I do not see why he says this.3 I make this argument in Cohen, 1999.4 Schiffer 1996.5 Schiffer 1996.6 I make the following argument in Cohen 1999.7 Unger 1975.8 Lewis (1979), Dretske (1981), Unger (1984).9 See Lewis, 1979.10 In 1996, Lewis posits a rule of attention that seems to rule out the possibility ofresisting the rise in standards, once a skeptical alternative is mentioned. But it justseems wrong to say that the mere mention of a skeptical alternative is sufficent toraise the standards, even if no one takes it seriously.11 I mention the case of ‘flat’, but there are many other examples, e.g., ‘rich’,‘wise’, ‘tall’, ‘bald’, ‘hot’, etc.12 On pp. 61–85, Feldman argues that were he to say in a philosophy class,“There are many skeptical possibilities, such as the possibility that I am a brain ina vat. . . Even though this is a possibility, I know that it is false. Similar possibil-ities are available to you. Nevertheless, you and I know lots of ordinary things”,Contextualists are committed to saying that what he said is false. I hope it’s clearfrom the preceding discussion that this is far from clear.13 See Cohen 1988 and 1999.14 A version of this paper was read at the Oberlin Colloquium, April 1999.Thanks to John Devlin and Tom Blackson for helpful discussion.

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REFERENCES

Cohen, S. (1999): ‘Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons’,Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 13, J. Tomberlin (ed).

Dretske, F. (1981): ‘The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge’,PhilosophicalStudies40.

Feldman, R. (2001): ‘Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions’,PhilosophicalStudies(this issue).

Lewis, D. (1979): ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’,Journal of PhilosophicalLogic8.

Lewis, D. (1996): ‘Elusive Knowledge’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy74(4).

Schiffer, S. (1996): ‘Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism’,Proceedings of theAristotelian Society96(3).

Unger, P. (1975):Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism, Oxford.Unger, P. (1984):Philosophical Relativity, University of Minnesota.

Arizona State UniversityTemple, AZ 85287USA

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Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions