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© Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan 1979

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a re"trieval · systern, or trans1nitted in any fonn or by any 1neans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherv,ise without the prior permission of the publisher

First published in 1979 by Heinemann Educational Books Reprinted 1980, 1982

Reprinted 1985, 1987, 1988by Gower Publishing Company Limited Reprinted 1992 by Ashgate Publishing Limited

Reprinted 1993, 1994 by Arena

Reprinted 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008 byAshgate Publishing Limited Gower HouseCroft Road AldershotHants GUl 13HREngland

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Burrell, Gibson

Sociological paradigms and organisationalanalysis : elements of the sociology of corporate life.1.OrganizationL Title II. Morgan, Gareth 302.3'5 HM I 3 l

ISBN13: 978 O 566 05148 7 (Hbk)13: 978 l 85742 114 9 (Pbk)

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Comwall

i, 1S j

111X

Contents

List of Figures List of TablesAck nowledgemen ts lntroduction

PART 1: lN SEARCH OF A FRA MEWOR Kl Assumptions aboul lhe Nature of Social

Science The Strands of DebateAnal y"sing Assumptions abou t the Nature of Social

Sci.ence2 Assumptions about lhe Nature of Society

Toe Order-Conflict Debate 'Regulation· and 'Radical Change'

3 Two Dimensions: Four ParadigmsToe Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms Toe Fu nctionalist ParadigmToe lnterpretive ParadigmToe Radical Humanist Paradigm Toe Radical Structuralist Paradigm Exploring Social Theory

PART li: TH E PA RADIG MS EXPLORED4 Functionalist Sociology

Origins and lntellectual Tradition Toe Structure of the Paradigm Social System Theorylnteractionism and Social Action Theorylntegrative Theory ObjectivismToe U nderl yi ng U ni ty of the Paradigm

S Functionalist Organisation TheoryTheories of Organisation wi thin the·Functionalist

ParadigmSocial System Theory aad ObjectivismTheories of Bureaucratic Dysfu nctions

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278 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

creation - of autonomous hu man bei ngs i nvolved i n lhe tlow of everyday life, the problem will be to develop epistemologies and methodologies adequate for studying the nature of this world. For those for whom structure and pattern i n social reality appear ali too 'real', a consideration of the power dimension i nherent in the ability of the individual to create his reality is likely to prove a major issue and , pursued to i ts logical end, will undoubtedly éall for a major reorientation i n theoretical perspective. lt will cal! for a perspecti ve which has much more i n common with radical hu man ism than with the sociolqgy of regulation which characterises the i nterpretive paradigm.

Notes and Referencesl. Silverman, in defence of Bi ttner's view, has suggested that

he uses 'structural determi nants' in a highly specific sense (Silverman in McKinlay, 1975, p. 282).

2. We shall not consider here Silverman's book Reading Castaned a ( 1975b), w h i ch seeks to prov i de an elhnomethodological analysis of Castaneda (1970) and lhus does not focus upon practices wilhin organisational contexts.

3. We shall confine our discussion here to lhe implications of ph enomenol ogy for theories characteristic of the functionalist paradigm. lt is clear lhat lhere are also implica tions for theories located in the other paradigms. U nfortu nately, it is beyond lhe scope of our present endeavour to address lhese here.

4. For a discussion of some of the epistemological and melhodological implications of phenomenological sociology, see, for example, Blumer (1%9), Cicourel (1964), Douglas (1970b). Many of lheir argu menls are conveniently brought together in Menne!I (1974).

5. We wish to emphasise here lhe point made in note 3 above. Toe nature of lhe concept of paradigm, as used here, necessarily implies that the !egitimacy of the world view reflected in a particular paradigm is fundamentally opposed by lhe perspectives characteristic of lhe other lhree.

8. Radical Hu mani sm

Origins and Intellectual TraditionThe i ntellectual origi ns of the radical humanist paradigm can be traced back to the tenets of German idealism and the Kantian notion that the ul ti mate reali ty of the u niverse is spiritual rather than material i n nature. lt thus derives from the sarne intellectual source as the i nterpretive paradigm , though the essentiall y subjec tivist orientation which the two paradigms have in common are made to serve fundamentall y different ends.

Toe i nterpretive and radical hu manist paradigms are both fou nded upon the notion that the indi vidual creates the worl d in which he lives. Bu t, whereas the i nterpretive theorists are content to understand the nature of this process, the radical hu manists subject it to critique, focusing upon what they regard as the essen tially alienated state of man.

This critique proceeds along two avenues of discourse. One of these is associated wi th a 'subjective idealist' position, which derives from the sarne source as the philosophy of Husserl and other phenomenologists discussed i n Chapter 6. Although the roots of the subjective idealist tradi tion can be traced back to the philosophy of Kant and earlier, ít is i n the work of Fichte ( 1762-1814) lhat i t first receives i ts most explicit and coherent expression. 1 Fich te was a follower of Kant, and his brand of subjective idealism rested upon the assu mption that i ndi vidual consciousness is a continuousl y creative entity generating a per petuai stream of ideas, concepts and perspectives through which a world externai to mi nd is created. From Fichte's poi nt of view, any u nderstanding of this created reali ty involved u nderstandi ng the nature, structure and fu nctioni ng of conscious mi nei. However, he was at paios to disti ngu ish between this i nternai domai n of consciousness and what was created by it and thus made externai to it. ln so doing he was able to steer clear of the solipsist perspecti ve by recognisi ng the existence of an externai world, thus establishi ng a position some way between the i mmaterialism of Bíshop Berkeley and the perspective of 'objective idealism' as, for example,

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reflected i n the work of Hegel(l770-183 I ). For Fichte, the exter. nal world was to be u nderstood in terms of the projection 0{.t>i ndi vid ual consciousness. Fich te saw h u man beings as externalisl '{i ng thei r experiences i nto a form ofreality which i n turn is reflectecf'} back upon them , and through which they became conscious of >. .themsel ves and t hei r actions. As noted above, this perspecti ve has :•y had a widespread i nfluence u pon contemporary ph ilosoph y and social theory th roug h the work of H usserl and other . phenomenologists. lts _i nfluence upon the radical hu manist para. digm is most clearl y ev,den_t rn the work of Sartre and h1s followers with i n the French ex1stent1ahst movement. ln essence, they have radi calised the phenomenological perspective which characterises the subjective idealist's posi tion , viewi ng the individual as trappedwi th i n the mode of existence wh ich he creates. Ontologicall y , they view the world as the product of i ndividual consciousness; con-sciousness is seen as bei ng projected onto the externai th rough

·r:accs of i ntenti onali ty '. thereby creati ng i t. The subjecti_ve idealists ··.. ,•_ withi n radical hu manism focus upon the pathology of mtent1onal- ,. ity, whereby, i n creating the externai world, man separates h i mself • ·.. from h is true 'Being'.

·!·The second avenue of díscourse wi thín radical hu manism is ;

based upon the tradi tíon of 'objective ídealis':"', which received its [earliest and most comprehens1ve express,on m the work of Hegel.'

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_ Radical Humanism 281

111ent. This dialectical process is seen as a universal pri ncipie, which generates progress towards the state of 'absolute knowledge' in which the distinction between subject and object is over come and human consciousness becomes aware of its location within 'absolute spirit'.

Hegel , li ke Fichte, saw individual consciousness as a focal pointfor the understandíng of lhe nature of the social world. However, whereas in Fichte's brand of subjective idealism , the individual creates his world , i n Hegel's brand of objective idealism , indi vidual consciousness is subservient to an externai pattern of u ni versal reason which reflects the existence of a u niversal force or spírit above and beyond the individual. Human consciousness and buman history, for Hegel , are to be u nderstood in terms of the unfolding of the universal spirit which will lead wi th certainty to the perfect society. ln his !ater years, Hegel increasi ngly saw the Prussia of his day as the embodi ment of the 'absolute spirit', the perfect society in which the individual became subservíent to the state.

Hegel's philosophy thus became wedded- to a very conservativepoli tical creed, and has been subjected to a wide range of inter pretation. Ear!y on a deep cleavage of opinion arose between the perspectives of the so-called 'Right Hegelians', who more or less acceQt.ed Hegel's system of philosophy in its entírety, and the

The He_gelian system of though t rests upon his first a_nd perhps f,. ·i

views of the 'Left' or 'Young Hegelians', who directed Hegel'smost s,gmficant work, The Phenomenolofly of Mind , wh1ch ·· i nvestigates the ontological status of hu man knowledge. ln this : book Hegel seeks to demonstrate how knowledge passes through a

1· series of forms of consciousness u ntil a state of 'absolute knowl- · edge' is reached , wherei n the_i ndi vid ual is at one wi th the 'absolutespiri t' wh ich pervades the u m verse. For Hegel , the ulti mate reali ty · rests í n 'spi rít' (Gl'isr ). 'Absolu te knowledge· rests upon lhe real isacion that consciousness is 'spirit' and thal the object of con sciousness is nothi ng other than itself. Hegel presents hu man beings as livi ng í n a world characterised by a constant i nterplay between i ndivid ual conscíousness and its objectification in the externai world. Consciousness and the externa! world are viewedas two sides of the sarne reali ty. They are locked i n a dialectical relacionship i n whích each defi nes and i nfluences lhe other.3 For Hegel , everyth i ng is i ts own opposite. The truth líes on both

sides of every question in an antagonistíc relationship to itself. As a method of anal ysis the dialectíc stresses that there is a basic antagonism and conflíct withi n both the natural and the social world which , when resolved , leads to a higher stage of develop-

system of thought to fundamentall y different ends.Prominent among the 'Young Hegelians' was the young Karl Marx (1818-1883),

who in essence ínverted the Hegelian system and united it with a critique of the society of his day .• ln sodoing he laid the basis for the development of a radical h u manism i n the objective idealist mould. Marx employed Hegel's historical per spectíve and dialectical method of analysis wi thí n the context of a philosoph y which placed the i ndividual rather than 'absolute spiri t' ai the centre of the stage. Marx, along with the other You ng Hegelians, particularl y Feuerbach ,' argued that there was noabso lute above man. They argued that religion and the State were the creations of man rather than reílections of any ·absolute spirit'. They emphasised that all objectífications encountered i n the social world were hu manl y created and poi nted the way to an emancipat ory philosophy which stressed how i ndividuais, through self consciousness, could create and thus change the society i n which they lived. Marx, in particular, started from the premíse of the alienation of man. He saw the society of his day as dominating human experience; objectified social creations reflected back

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282 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Ana/ ysis -

·upon man as an _alienati ng f?rce, dominating his esential being' nature. Th,s point of v,ew 1s expressed most forc1bly in Econó and Philosophical Mauscripts (1844), in _which Marx deiti, strated how the cap1tahst system of productJon lay at the hearb man's alienation.6 Whereas for Hegel alienation was a neces · phenomenon on the path to self-realisation and 'absoÍiÍ' knowledge', for Marx it beca me a concept wedded to an attat upon the status quo and the shortcomi ngs of the tota!ity of capi•'

m.ln !ater work Marx moved away from the idealist perspective: ,_ ,

one rooted in a more realist interpretation of the· nature of the'ii'social world. ln The German ldeofog y ( 1846), W?tte with Engel{{;;>, Marx sought to settle accounts with German 1deal1sm, and !bis''\work is often seen as defining the so-called 'epistemo!ogical breai(•, )'in Marx's thought (Althusser, 1969); Fo the point of view of th:e 5·.1_._

Radica/ Humanism 283

line in terms of detailed development. We may consider the work 1ocated within this paradigm under four broad headi ngs: (a) solips ism; (b) French existentialism; (e) anarchistic individualism; (d) criticai theory.

Toe broad interrelationships between these four categories ofsocial theory are illustrated in Figure 3.3.

Solipsism characterises the most subjectivist region of the paradigm, just as it does withi n the interpretive paradigm. As we have argued, it represents a philosophical position without sociological equivalent, although some social theories, when taken to their logical extremes, ru n dangerousl y close to what Sartre (1969) has described as the 'reef of solipsism'. Since we considered this perspective in Chapter 6, we will not discuss it further here.

French existentialism occupies the middle range of the paradigm. li represents a perspective in the tradi tion of subjective

anal yt1cal scheme presented here, li s1grufies Marx's break with \ iradical hu manism, and the begi nning of a move towards radica( • i structuralism. Toe perspectives characteristic of the latter para digm, which are explored in Chapter l O, receive increasing atteO:tion in Marx's Grundrisse and Capital. Í Despite these earl y origins, the radical humanist perspective J emained dormat until the early 1920s, when _Lukác , under the Í 10fluence of neo-1dealism, sought to re-emphas1se the influence of fHegel upon Marx. The discovery of the iost Economic and Philosophical M_anuscript orne ten yers !ater rinforced, nd in -_, .some ways leg1t1mated, th1s mterest, whtch found tts express,on in · a radical hu manist criticai theory. The growth of criticai theory, -• along with French existentialism, its subjective idealistcou nterpart, can largel y be understood as the radical response to 1the renewal of i nterest in the idealist tradition which , as we have ·seen from Chapter6, emerged at the turn of the twentieth century.

ideaiism. Deriving largely from the work of Fichte and Husserl, itreceives its clearest expression in the work of Sartre. This variety of existentialism has influenced li terary interpretation and some psychiatry, as well as philosophy.

Anarchistic i ndividualism, most usuall y associated wi th the thought of Max Stirner, occupies a position in the least subjectivist and most change-orientated region of the paradigm.It is a category of thought which few subscribe to, but it is worthy of consideration asan example of an extreme social theory which advocates radical change, focusing upon individual consciousness as the basic u nit of analysis.

Criticai lheory represents the principal tine of development in the objective idealist tradition and is located i n the least subjectiv ist region of lhe radical humanist paradigm. Within criticai theory we recognise three broad schools of thought based upon Lukác sian sociology, Gramsci's sociology and the work of the Frankfurt School. These differ considerably at a substantive leve!but are ali predicated upon Marx's inversion of the Hegelian system of thought.

The Structure of the Paradigm 1 We begin our detailed consideration of these categories of thought wilh 'Criticai Theory'.As will be apparent from lhe above discussion, the radical huma n- 1 ist paradigm comprises the subjective and objective idealist stra11of thought, both of which have their origi ns in Gerrnan idealistu. 1 These constitu te the principal philosophical perspectives. ln addition. it is possible to identify the shaping influence of solipsism and 1

a category of anarchist thought which, though deriving largely from Hegelianism, must be regarded as having followed a different

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Criticai TheoryCriticai theory represents a category of sociological thought built explicitly upon the work of the yoong Marx.' As a term it is often

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. used as a synonym for the work of the Frankfurt,School of social

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theorists, but we wish here to expand its usage to cover three i nterreiated yet discrete schools of.!flought. The Frankfurt Schoo! owes much to the work of Lukács, which , in turn , bears a remark able similarity to that of Gramsci, so that these approaches have substantial areas of overlap. Criticai theory is a brand of social philosophy which seeks to operate simultaneously at a philosophi cal , a theoretical and a practical levei. lt stands firmly in the ideaiist tradition of critique deriving from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ; its proponents seek to reveai society for what it is, to unmask its essence and mode of operation and to lay lhe founda tions for human emancipation through deep-seated social change. lt is an overtl y political philosoph y , in that it stresses the need to follow lhe logic of one's philosophical and sociological analysis with practical action of a radical kind. Lukács, Gramsci and lhe Frankfurt School , whilst sharing this overall aim, differ in the nature and methods of their specific critiques. We will examine each in tum.

Lukácsian sociologylnthe early 1920s Georg Lukács (1885-1974) sought to deveiop a criticai theory which offered an alternative to the orthodox Marx ism of his day.• ln essence, he was concemed to overhaul its socio-philosophical foundations, by emphasising and restoring the strong Hegelian i nfluence which characterised Marx's work before the so-cal led 'epistemological break'. ln particular, Lukács sought to develop a theory of revo!ution which laid strong emphasis u pon the role of the proletariat and its class conscious ness i n the overthrow of capitalist society. For Lu kács, as we shall see, the proletariat provided a soiution to the epistemological, theoretical and practicai issues facing Marxism in the 1920s.

Lu kács's i nfluence, li ke that of his one-time teacher Simmel , is dissipated and fragmented. Lukácsian sociology consists nol much of Lukácsians who are dogmatically faithful to his key texts, problems and conceptualisations, as of a widel y constituted body of though t which uses, to a greater or lesser·extent, Lu kács's key notions. This influence has been felt i ntemationaily, so that in France Lu kács's work has been developed by Lucien Goidmann, in Bri tai n by Mészáros and i n the USA by Alvi n Gouldner, who has gene sofar as to describe Lu kács as 'the greatest Marxist theorist of lhe twentieth century' (Gouldner, 1976, p. x).

from his early work and tha t his later output is steadfastly ignored. ln fact, Lu kács is a thi nker whose work can be located on at least three.points on the subjective-objective dimension of our analyt ical scheme. He began his career i n Hu ngary with the publication of a series of books connected wi th the theory of the novel, in which he acknowledges his position to be that of subjective ideal ism. Lukács had been attracted to subjective idealism under the influence of Dilthey 's approach to the Geisteswissenschaften and Husserl's phenomenology th rough his studies at Berli n and !ater Heidelberg. At Heidel berg Lukács was introduced to Hegel's work and by !923 had produced a collected series of essays entitled History and C/ass Consciousness .Based u pon Hegelian objective idealism, this work represemed an attempt to emphasise the hu manist, more subjective aspects of Marxism some len years before lhe rediscovery of Marx's Economic and Phi/osophical Manuscripts of 1844. The reaction against History and Class Con sciousness withi n orthodox Marxism was such that Lu kács was labelled an ultra-Leftist and a heretic insofar as Engels' interpreta tion of dialecticai materialism was concerned. 9 As a result, he retracted his views on the li nk bet ween Hegel and Marx and moved to a position of middie-of-the-road materialism. This was done, one might suggest without exaggeration; in order to survive in Stalinist. Russia at a time when the life expectancy of heretical intellectuals was not high. ln our terms, Lukács made a complete paradigmatic shift in the face of this threat. So total was his embrace of materialism, and so u nexceptionable his treatment of ít, that Lichthei m maintains that Lukács's writings in the thirties were 'the work of a man who had performed a kind of painless lobotomy upon himself, removed part of his brai,:i and replaced it by slogans from the Moscow propagandists' (Lichthei m, 1970, pp. 83-4).

ln the sixties, however, relations with the West were 'normal ised' and Stalin's intellectual and political i nfluence explicitly rejected. Lu kács could assert again that History and Class Con sciousness , aithough flawed , was a book he was prepared to dis cuss and seerepu blished u nder his name. This book has had a quite crucial i mpact u pon Marxism and is significant i n that 'material ism' and the ideas of Engels play only a minor role. Lu kács stresses lhe role of superstructural factors within society and their part in its transformation. Emphasis is placed u pon consciousness, ideology, literature and art, which are seen not as epiphenomenal to the relations and means of production, but as quite central to any

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understandi ng_ of capitalism.· Consciousness, in particular, assigned key importance, for proleterian consciousness was cru cial to both Lukács's philosoph y and his political methodology.

Class consciousness was central for Lukács, because he saw it · as the escape route from a fundamental problem associated with Hegel's notion of alienation. For Hegel , alienations occurred as a result of the objectificatíon of 'ideas' in the externai world which reasserted themselves withi n man's consciousness. Toe abi!ity to move beyond alienation withi n this dialectical loop was providedby the existence of an 'identical subject-object' which is 'at one· "

Radical Humanism 281

and stands revealed to ali menin·the moments of history beforé its overthrow.

A central aspect of this notion of totality lies i n the intimateconnection, first postulated by Hegel , between objective and sub jective dimensions withi n social reality, which are synthesised, according to Lukács, within the class consciousness of the pro letariat. The process whereby these dimensions are made falsely discrete and differentiated , so that they are no longer seen as 'identical'. Lukács calls 'reification•. This has clear links with both Hegelian and Marxist views of alienation, which revolve in differ

with itself and not internall y alienated. Hegel explained this 1•· • ent ways arou nd the separation of objective and subjective factors.through the notion of 'absolute spirit'; Lu kács replaced this notion •.•.· ·...• with that of the proletariat, which becomes an 'identicat subject- · • object' not alienated within itself if and when it acquires true or .T'imputed' consciousness of the reality of capitalism and of its !ability to transform and overthrow it.10 The class consciousness of ·1· the proletariat then both provides a philosophical solution to oneof '..· the Hegelian puzzles and represents the means whereby uistingsociety can be overthrown. By this device Lukács seeks to evade 1some of the primary epistemologícal and practical problems facing •. Marxism. · !

Toe proletariat represents an identical subject-object not onl y in jt

its ability to transcend alienation, but also in its position in the • centre of the world historical stage, from which it can comprehend. ·1· more than any other group or class, the 'totality' of capitalist ·•· society .11 Lukács's notion of 'totality' serves to unify History and · Class Consciousness , but it is a difficu!t concept to comprehend.lna most general sense it refers to the Hegelian and Marxist view •that everything must be grasped as a whole; lhe whole domi natesthe parts in an all-embraci ng sense. Marx used the notion of 1

'totality' to conceptualise the process of social change. 'Stages· in 1societal development represent specific 'totalities', so that each 1transformation of society replaces one totality by another. Capital- jism is one such totality, quite disti nct from feudalism or commun- 1

ísm, and it is one in which objecúve and subjective elements are 11combined within a complex , dynamic, structured process which 1can only be comprehended ilolistically. This implies that one . cannot understand any aspect of capitalism without first under i

Arguably, 'reification' is one of the central concepts of History and Class Consciousness , for it provides the focus for Lu kács's critique of the capitalist form of society. Reification, of course, refers to the fact that whilst men in their day-to-day productive activities create their social world, these activities and what results from them are seen as divorced from men, as independent, objectified 'things'. Whilst objectification of man-made artefacts is probably necessary and inevitable in ali forms of social life, Lukács, like Marx, seeks to stress the política! , constraining aspects of reification and the effective barrier it provides to the comprehension. by the working class, of the totali ty in which they live. Put simply , for Lu kács alienatíon i n the form of reification is somethi<1g to be overcome, since it is the key to the release of the explosive energies of the proletariat. which is so necessary for the transformation and reconstruction of capitalist society.

ln terms of our major analytical dimensions, Lukácsiansociology occupies a position on the least subjectivist wing of the radical hu manist paradigm. Ontologically, it i nvokes the omnipresent dialectic, since social processes are seen to consist of the 'objective' acting upon the 'subjective' and of the 'subjective' acting in its tum upon the 'objective'. For Lukács, then , the ontologícal nature of the world is neither crudely nomi nalist nor crudely realist. Lukácsians invoke the dialectic to meet the need to synthesise objective and subjective factors within ao integrated harmonious socio-philosophical approach. However, since revolutionary proletariats have rarely, if ever, succeeded. and since they have rarel y understood the totality which is capitalism,the achievement of the 'identical subject-object' through the

standing capitalísm i tself in its entirety. As we have seen. for Lukács it is the proletariat which has the ability to comprehend socíety, to see the internai connections of the parts within .it and the whole network of relationships in the total social

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dialectic has remained an u nfulfilled promise. 12

Epistemologícally, Lukács takes up an interesting position. He maintained that Marxism was a revolutionary methodology rather than a set of laws or truths. For Lukács, truth was always histori-

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288 S ociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

cally specific, refaiiveto givert set,of circumstances, so that one , , did not search for generahsat.10s or the laws of motion of capital ism. For example. succes w1thm a reolut1on was not guaranteed by the im manent ?ynam1cs.of the cap,tahst system; there was 00'!aw of nature or h1storY wh1ch sa1d that ti would be so. Revolutidepended upon the actions of. the working class and the tacti: developed í:>y its leaers. Lukacs1ans, then, are not epistemolog ical positívists seek1ng general laws of soc,etal development. They are tacticians and :nethodolog,sts of revo_lt and revolution stressing the scope of acu?n oen_ to th: proletanat. They indicate the volu ntarist aspects of hfe wtthm cap1tal1sm, not the determi nist ones, continuallY pointrng to thefreedom of choice in the type of class consciousness the proltanat accepts. Al most by an act of will , the ·actual' class consc,ousness of the vast majority of the proletariat could become 't,:ue' class. co.nsciousness through an intellectual grasp of the totabty of capttabsm. Lu kácsians seek 10 change the world; thelf ep1stemology and methodology blend to form a body of thought wh1ch seeks not general laws for füture contemplatíon but pracúcal methods for radicall y transformingsociety here and now.

Gramsci' s sociolog yToe i nfluence of Antonio Gramsci ( 1891-1937). an ltalian Marxist theoretician and political activist, has been rapidly i ncreasing in Western academic ctrcles smce the early !%Os, when English translations of his work tarted to become more readil y available. His 'philosophy of prax_,s' represents not only a rigorous social theory, bu t also a pohtacal methodology for the worki ng class.Gramsci's Marxism, like that of Lukács, presents aradical human list critique of capitalism and also a methodology for achieving its overthrow. As Boggs has noted. 'the Marxism that emerges from rthe pages of Gramscí's Prison Notebooks can be defined as a critica / theory that fuses elernents of structure and consciousness. scienceand philosophy, subJect and obJect - a conception which however unsystematically formulated: is a marked advance upo what, until the J 920s, was the parad1gm of orthodox Marxism'( Boggs. 1976. p. 32).

Gramsci's ídeas. which developed i ndependentl y of Lukács areextremel y similar to the Hungarian's. While studying at Tri n,Gramscí became influenced by the Hegelianism of Benedetto

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Radical Humanism 289Croce, which , stood opposed to ,orthodox Marxism: Gramsci believed that the Marxism of his day had lost its revolutíonary zeal through a misguided incorporation of positivist notions and a crude almost mechanistic determinism which totall y ignored the vol u nta ri st, pract ical aspects of worki ng-class radical potentialities. 13 He felt that what was needed wa a trul dialecú cal theory wh1ch transcended the class,cal ph1losoph1cal anú nomies of voluntarism-determinism , idealism-materialism and the subjective--objective. Such a theory would constitute a 'philosophy of praxis' which would represent a total world view, in that it would transcend in itself, ali previous philosophical dichotomies and the philosophies based upon only one element within them. As Gramsci put it, 'the philosophy of praxis is "suffi cient u nto itself'' in that it contains in itself all the fundamental elements needed to construct a total and integral conception of the world, a total philosophy and theory of natural science and not only that but everything that is needed to guide life to an integral practical organisaúon of society , that is, to become a total integral civilisation' (Gramsci , 1971, p. 406).

This 'philosophy of praxis', this truly 'criticai theory', sought to introduce into orthodox Marxism comprehension of and sympathy for an understandi ng of 'superstructural' factors within capitalist societies. Gramsci believed that power and domination in capitalism rested not only with the materially located means of coercion and oppression , but also wi thi n men's consciousness, through 'ideological hegemony'. 14 The ruli ng class, it was maintained, always seeks to legitimate its power through the creation and perpetuation of a belief system which stresses the need for order, authority and discipline, and consciously attempts to emasculate protest and revolutionary potential. For Gramsci, it was precisely in the area of ideological hegemony in the schools, famil y and workshop that capitalism was most likely to develop and increase the unseen power of the ruli ng class, by attacking or infiltratíng the consciousness of the individual worker. But this is the crucial weakness of ideological hegemóny, too. For whilst hegemony creates alienation, the individual worker is still his own theorist, his own source of class consciousness, and is therefore the most able to resist the forces of hegemony. lt is from such ideological resistance i n the day-to-day life of workers that, for Gramsci, revolutionary struggle and victory would first come. O!mscious ness was not treated as being abstract and spirituai; it was a concrete force for a political end. ,

Gramsci's 'philosophy of praxis' stressed practical involvement

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irt pofftics, and he, more tilan any of the other criticai theorists ·· became engaged in revolutionary activity. He aimed to produc; within ltalian society a 'network of proletarian institutions' mainly factory cou ncils, which were to be the foundations upo which the workers' State could be built. This activity of his declined in the years after 1920, as the factory occupations which had taken place were gradually ended. ln 1926 Gramsci was imprisoned by the Fascists for his role in the Commu nist Party, and whilst in prison he wrote his Prison Notebooks , upon which his reputation stands today.

Gramsci's sociology is clearl y orientated to action and radicalchange. More than any other criticai theorist, Gramsci stresses the i mportance of 'praxis' - the unification of theory and practice. Whilst his conceptualisation of the criticai problems withi n society differs from those of other criticai theorists, his location in terms of the subjective-objective dimension of our anal ytical scheme is much the sarne. Li ke that of Lu kács, Gramsci's approach to Marx ism stresses the Hegelian influence. Reali ty does not exist on its own account i n a strict materiaJist sense. but it ex.ists i n a historical relationship with the men who modify i t. His position retlects an objective idealism i n the tradi tion of cri ticai theory and the work of the young Karl Marx.

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Radical Humanism 291

<-"ííífrnber of places. U nder the i nfluence of members such âs Hork heimer, Adorno, Benjami n, Fromm, Kirsch hei mer, Lowenthal , Marcuse, Habermas and many others, cri ticai theory has developed i n many directions. 15 Based upon the ontological and epistemological fou ndations retlected in the theories of the 'You ng Hegelians' particularl y Marx, these criticai theorists have forged a wide-ranging perspective which has consistentl y aimed to reveal the na.ture of capitalist society for what i t is. They have sough t to lay bare i ts u nderlying natu re and set the basis for social change th rough a revolu tion of consciousness. ln this endeavou r they have subjected a wide range of social practice to critique in the tradition of criticai theory: they have provided thorough-goi ng Ku/turkritik of the superstructure of capitalism. Positivist science, modes of rationa!ity, tech nology , the legal system, the family unit, patterns of bureaucracy , language, art, music, literature, the authoritarian personali ty and psychoanalysis have ali been subjected to critique from a radical hu manist perspective. Thus criticai theory i n lhe Frankfurt tradition embraces a polymathic criticai philosoph y geared to emancípatory aims. As in the case of Lu kácsian sociology and that of Gramsci, it developed in reaction to developments withi n orthodox Marxism, wi th its emphasis upon historical determi nism, and the general trend towards totali tarianism in the USSR and Nazi Germany. lt has aiso

The Frankfu rt SchoolToe Frankfurt School's claim on criticai theory as its own property owes much to Horkheimer's famous essay of 1937 (reprinted in Horkheimer, 1972), which drew a disti nction between tradi tional scienceand critica! theory. ln this, Horkheimer attempted to relate Marx's Critique of Political Economy to the German idealist tradi tion. Just as Marx a!tacked bourgeois political economy , so Hork heimer differentiated between the traditional approach to social science and the cri ticai theory perspecti ve. Whereas tradi tional science rested upon the disti nction between the observer and his subject and the assu mption of value freedom, criticai theory emphasised the importance of the theorist's commitment to change.

The 'Frankfurt School' is now used as a generic title for awell-known group of German scholars who have shared, th rough their li nks with the lnsti tute for Social Research , common academic and political interests over a number of decades and in a

· developed i n reaction to the posi ti vist tradi tion in a more general sense, particularl y as re!lected in the sociology of the fu nctionalist paradigm. ln many respects, criticai theory inverts the fu nctional ist problematic, subjecti ng its tools and basic concepts to thorough-goi ng analysis. The antithetica! stances of cri ticai theory and the functionalist paradigm are clearl y illustrated, for example,

í in the philosophicai debates between Adorno and Popper, 16

and f the writi ngs of the social theorists to be considered in this section and the followi ng chapter. ln recent years criticai theory has also

1 developed i n opposi tion to trends i n i nterpretive sociology and, aswe shall see, has sought to incorporate central notions i n the

1 hermeneu tic tradi tion within the bounds of its criticai philosoph y. ln contrast to the work of Lu kács and Gramsci, criticai theory i n

the Frankfurt tradi tion places far less emphasis upon political action. lts proponents tend to be theoreticians rather than activ ists,

and with lhe passage of time, the School has moved increas1 ingly towards philosophy and i ntellectual criticism rather than

revol u tionary practice. l nteresti ngl y enough , after playing a relatively minor role from the 1930s to the early 1960s, it carne into

t increasing prominence in the wake of student revolu tion in France

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attd the counter-culture movemenl-in the USA. Criticai theory.in the Frankfurt:radi tion provide the idel i ntellectual cou nterpan to the ·revolut1on through consc,ousness sought by the 1dealists of the ear!Y J970s. Within the limited context of our present work it is i mpossible to provide a detailed overview and analysis f the work of the Frankfurt School as a whoie. In the rest of th1s sectiontherefore, we will focus upon lhe ideas of Herbert Marcuse andJürgen Habermas, two of the School's_ leadin contemporary theorists, whose work may be regarded as 11iustra11veof the criticaitheory perspective.

Marcus• has become well known for bis scathing attack uponthe •one-dimensional' natu re of modem technological society oarticularly under capitalism. His work stands in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition of criticai !heory, an_d represents a conscious attempt to present an emanc1patory philosophy which stands agai nst both .the phenomeno !ogy and the sociological positivism charactensllc of the soc,ology of regulation. For

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since they are able to put an end to material shortages of ali kinds. n,e need to repress instinctive desires in such a society is thus no tonger so strong. However, it continues, and the levei of reprcs sion we now find i n the advanced industrial state is that of 'surplus repression' - constraint over and above that which is necessary to mainlain civilisation. Surplus repression, perceived and retained withi n the psyche, and supporting the system of production, is seen by Marcuse as lying at the core of man's psychological domination by, and alienation within, the modem world. He sees human emancipation from this dominating social order as being brought about by riddi ng society of surplus repression, thus giving more emphasis to the 'pleasure principie' expressed through libid inal drives. The message of Eros and Civilisation is an optimistic one which views advanced technology as a force for liberation in its ability to eliminate material scarcity.

ln One-Dimenional M an Marcuse moves to a more Weberianstance, though the direct links with Weberian sociology are not18

Marcuse. phenomenoiogy is inadequate, in that it ignores the j specifically acknowledged or developed to any degree.

Itis a less

scope for, and influence of, hu man potentiality; positivism is also i nadequate, because of i ts false assumptions with regard to valueneutrali ty and its role as ao i nstru ment of control i n the interests of

1

the status quo. Marcuse's special contribution to criticai theory lies in his attempt to incorporate the ideas and insights of Freud and Weber within the Hegelian-Marxist perspective characteristic of much of the radical hu manist paradigm. 17 His critique is most forcibly expressed i n wo of _his major works -Eros and Civílisa tion ( 1966; first pubhshed m 1955) and One-Dimensional Man

9ln Eros an ,v, ,satwn arcuse, ,o owmg Adorno and

Fromm, seeks to evl<;>P lhe li nks bet_ween human ersonali ty and lhe totality ín wh1ch 1t 1s located , taki ng the Freud1an concepts of the 'pteasure priciple' and the :reality priniple'.a_the_ starting points for analyts. ln the rud,an pespect1ve 1V1hsat1on rests upon the repress1on of_man s internai dnves. The pleasure princi pie' by which these dnves are allowed to follow an unconstrained search for satisfaction is seen as bei ng subjugated in a civilised society by the 'reality principie', according to which men are prepared to postpone self-gratification i n the interests of social order. Marcuse starts from lhe position that the 'reality pri ncipie' is a historically speific e!ement. lt is found of necessity oniy in eras of scarcity, wh1ch presuppose the need to master nature in order to survive. Marcuse maintains hat scarcity is no longer a characteristic of modern, technolog1cally advanced societies,

optimistic book, in that the liberalising potential of Eros is seen as undermined by lhe ·one-di mensional' nature of technological societies, in which the centrifugal forces in human and social life are dominated by technology and a one-sided commitment to efficiency and material progress. Marcuse puts forward the thesisthat

technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and co-ordination, creates fonns of life (and of power) which appear to reroncilc the forces opposing the system to defeat, or refute ali protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domina tion. Contemporary society secms to be capable of containing social change - qualitative change which would establish esscntialiy diffcr ent institutions, a new direction of the productive process, new modes of human existence. This containment of social change is perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced industrial society. (Marcuse,1964, p. 10)

Marcuse argues that modem society is essentially totalitarian, in that the technical apparatus of production and distribution imposes i tself upon lhe whole society. lts products and thc indi viduais it ostensibly serves are moulded to serve its own internai requirements. Technology is seen as a political force, a system of domí nation which evolves new. increasingly effective and 'more pleasant' means of social control and cohesion. lt produces the 'one-dimensional' society, in which there is a flattening out o!lhe

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diff<,renc and conflict between actua!ityan<l"potentiality; in whicb} altematives appear to be increasingly u nrealistic; in which lhe· industrial system appears to have a logic of its own. Marcuse'J argues that aflluence and the creation of false needs impedes thé • development of radical protest against lhe established order. Con sciousness is seen as bei ng moulded and controlled through lhe media. The welfare state and the 'warfare state' are seen as instru ments for mai ntai ni ng the leve! of consu mption necessary for sustaining a 'happy' workforce. Ali are seen as part of the 'one dimensional' nature of the totality of modem technological soci ely, i n which the logic of pu rposive rationality pervades modes of thought and the organisation of the material world. For Marcuse, it is the task of criticai theory to investigate the roots of this 'totali tarian universe of technoiogical rationality', and to examine lheir historical alternatives, as a means of revealing unused capacities for i mproving lhe iives of hu man beings.

Within the last few years the writi ngs of Jürgen Habermas have attracted iitcreasing attention as his major works (Habermas, 1970a and b, l971a and b, 1972, 1974 and 1976) have become available in English translation. A leading exponent of contempor ary criticai theory, his work is i mpressive for its range and ability to utilise ideas and concepts drawn from a variety of perspectives in the service of a radical hu manism. ln essence, bis work can be Únderstood as a reaction against the shortcomings of interpretive sociology and sociological positivism. Habermas believes that lhe discourses of these two traditions are i nadequate and that they rellect and serve lhe interests of those who use them. He distin guishes between the empirical /analytic sciences of a positivist orientation, which serve the i nteresls of control; lhe histori cal/hermeneutic sciences of the phenomenoiogical tradition, which aim at understanding meaning without influencing it; and the criticai science perspective characteristic of lhe Frankfurt School, which aims bolh to understand lhe world and lo change it (Habermas, 1972). The criticai theory which he favours incorp orates notions derived from Parsonian systems theory and its latter-day German equiva!e111s; hermeneutics, as rellected, for examp!e, in the work of Gadamer (196.5); and various concepls drawn from psychoanalysis. These diverse perspectives are welded together into a critical theory which for Habermas must be emancipatory, dialectical (in transcendi ng the philosophical anti nomies of subject and object, observer and observed, fact and value), and hermeneutic in ils endeavour to understand the socio cultural world in which subjective meaning is located.

Radical Humanism 295Hâbermas has-attempted to shift the attention within Marxism -

_ awaY from a consideration of the economic structure of capitalism• wards some of the key features of post-capitalist societies.-

0Marcuse has created a similar shift in attention by point

jpg 1owards the Weberian minotaur of purposive or technical rationality, Habermas has stressed the structure of domination embedded within our language and evef yday discourse. For Hab ermas, the structure of language, its natnre and use, provide a key with which to unlock many insights int!) the fundamental mode of operation of different social formations.

Recent developments in linguistics and ordinary langnagephilosophy demonstrate to Habermas's satisfaction that tóday the 'problem of language' nas replaced the traditional 'problem of consciousness'. ln order to deal wilh these developments, he has developed a theory of 'communicative competence', which borrows conceptualisations from hermeneutics in order to provide the link between the political macro-structure and speech acts wilhin a conteKt of symboiic interaction. Habermas develops the concept of an 'ideal speech situation', in which 'symbolic interac tion' is possible since genuine consensus is arrived at between parties in communication and is recognised as aconsensus without the operation of power. This 'ideal speech situation' is contrasted with one characterised by 'communicativedistortion', in-which a supposed consensus is arrived at through discourse within the context of an unequal power distribution.

Habermas illustrates the difference between these two situa tions through the concepts of 'work' and 'interaction'. These are seen as being fundamentally different categories of social life, wilh purposive rationality dominating lhe former, and symbolic interac tion the latter. 'Work' is viewed by Habermas as the dominant form of social action withi n capitalist industrialised society. He sees this social form as based upon a purposive rationality which stresses the importance of goal attainment, defined in terms of means-ends relationships. The system develops technical rules to guide action and modes of thi nking, and places stress upon the

1 learning of skills and quaiificalior.s. Social life is compartmental ised and language is 'context-free'. The rationalisation of the system of action as a who!e lies in the growth of productive forces and the extension of power of technical contrai. 'Work' is seen as a form of 'communicative distortion' characterised by asymmetrical choice in the use of speech acts which reflects an unequal power relationship.

'lnteraction', on the other hand, is based on communicative

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action between men in which _shared - normsc-dev,elop and are-" reflected i n an intersubjectively shared ordinary ianguage. · lmplicitly, 'interaction' is seen as more typical of societies i n the pre-capitalist era, wilh their low leveis of specialisation and rela tively undeveloped division of labour. '.Jnteraction' subsu mes 'iabou r' as a cohesive and integral part of social life. Within this social form there are reciprocai expectations about behaviour violations of which attract widel y based social sanctions. Th; norms and values which govern social affairs are acquired througha process of role i nternalisation. The rationalisation of this system of action lies in 'emancipation', 'individuation' and the ·extension of commu nication free of domination' (Habermas, 1971b). 'lnteraction' is seen as based u pon 'ideal speech' situations in which man is emanci pated from 'work' and domination. Haber mas 's vision is of apost-modern world based on 'interaction ·, with equal access to speech acts afforded to al_l and an equali ty of opportunity withi n discourse. As Schroyer ( 1'971) has noted, to the extent that Habermas's version of criticai theory is based u pon the liberati ng potential of self-reflexive language, the new form of cri ticai science which he advocates is essentially based u pon a 'pathology of communication'.

Despite the emphasis placed u pon language as a focus for social analysis, Habermas is also at pai ns to stress that the theory of

communicative competence must be linked to the fu ndamental assu mptions of historical materialism if i t is to be adequate and effective. ln his more recent works, however, in which he deals

with the variety of crises which might affect modern society, the crucial area is seen as the legiti matory supers!ructure of lhe

political system (Habermas, 1976). He argues that a permanent economic crisis is no longer li kely withi n advanced capitalísm because of lhe pervasive intervention of the State. Thus, Marx's

analysis, with its dependence on class struggles and their relationship to economic crises, is implicitl y seen as outdated. For

Habermas, the key problem within advanced capitalism is lhe 'Jegiti mation crisis'.'9 Therefore, whilst recognising the analytical i mportance of material production, bis concern is pri marily with 'superstructural' factors, which are normally seen wilhin orthodox

Marxism as epiphenomenal to any u nderstandi ng of the economic foundations of society. The materialist and idealist strands wi thin

Habermas's work are always yoked i n a relationship of great tension, and his theoretical orientation aims at thei r reconciliation.

Like Marcuse, Habermas has sought to update the HegelianMarxist critique of contemporary society and, i n so doing, has

Radical Humanism m, draWil heavily upon developments taking place within the-socio- · ·· Jogy of regulation for lhe purpose of analysis. Their work clearly demonstrates the way i n which criticai theory i n lhe Frankfurt tradition inverts the concerns and problematic of regulative social theory, particular!y that characteristic of the functiopalist para digm. The functionalíst tends to accept the norm of purposive rationalíty, the logic of science, the positive functions of technologY, and the neutrality of language, and uses them as building blocks i n the construction of supposedl y value-freesocial theories. 11te Frankfurt theorists concentrate u pon demolishing this struc ture, indicating the essentially poli tical and repressive nature of the whole enterprise. They seek to demonstrate lhe way i n·which science, ideology , tech nology, language and other aspects of the superstructure of modem capitalist social formations are to be understood in relation to the role which they play i n sustaini ng and developing the system of power and domination which pervades the totality of this social form. Their function is to influence the consciousness of the people livi ng withi n it, wíth a view to eventual emancipation and the pursuit of alternative forms of life.

Thefocus of criticai theory u pon the 'superstructural' aspects of capi talist societ y is highl y significam, i n that it reflects lhe attempt of lheorists worki ng within this tradition to move away froril the 'economism· of orthodox Marxism and to elevate the Hegelian concern for the role of the dialectic i n social affai rs. lt is through the dialectic that the objecti ve and subjective aspects of social life are though t to be reconciled. The 'superstructure' of capitalist society is of key i nterest to the criticai theorists, partly because it is the mediu m through which the consciousness of humán beings is controlled and moulded to fit the requirements of the social formation as a whole. lt thus lies ai the i nterface between subjec tive and objective worlds. ln early Hegelian_-Marxist theory vari ous elements of the superstructu re, such as religion and the State

1 were seen as the sources of hu man alienation. As Marx argued i nhis earl y writings, these 'intermediaries • which exist between man and his experience of the world 'mystify" , projecti ng a spurious uni ty and order. He argued that they stood as seemingl y i ndepen dent and alienating forces, created by man, yet reflecti ng back upon hi m as i ndependent presences. lt was lhe task of the work of the youthful Marx to 'de-mystify' through critique, in the true idealist traditíon.

Toe criticai lheorists reviewed in this section are ali firmlylocated in this intellectual tradi tíon , and their work is to be under stood in similar terms. The relationship between key concepts

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-such- as- -'t-otaiity-'., , 'consciousness', 'aJienation' ·and-- ·c-riif · which seem to permeale Marx's early work are not always out and, indeed, do not always attract specific attention in: writings of criticai theorists. We wish to dose our discussion ·

i by emphasising how crucial these four notions are to the -spective upon which criticai theory is buiit, and we present t8.J as a m<eans of demonstrating some of the links which ezj

1 between the work of the writers which we have considered herí1l'i Table 8.11 Criticai t:beory: central concepls and orientaüonst11 Totality1l Thc nolion lhat any undcrstanding of socicty must cmbracc in thcir

cntirctythe objectivc andsubjcctivc worids which charactcrisca given epoch. Totality cmbraccs cverything; it has no boundary. An undcrstanding of this totality must precede an understanding of its clcmcnts. sincc thc whoic dominates thc parts in an all-cmbracing scnse.

1i Consciousness

1 Thc force which ultimatcly creates and sustains the social world. Consciousncss is intcrnally gencratcd but influcnccd by thc forms which it assumes through the process of objectification and lhe dialcctic between subjcctivc and objective worlds.

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Alit'nationlf The statc in which, in certain totalities. a cognitivc wcdgeis drivcn bctwccn1 man·s consciousness and the objec:tificd social world, sothat man sces

whatare cssentially thc creations of his own consciousness in the form of 2

hard, dominating, CÃtcmal rcaJity. This wedgc is thc wcdgc of alicnation, which

' divorces man from bis lJ'Ue sclf and binders the fuifilmcnt of his polen tia.lities as a human bcing.

Radical Humanism 299

- -T11ble-&.l (continued)

Critique

ln thcir critique of contcmporary society, critica) thcorists focus upon thc forms and sourccs of alienation, which they secas inhibiting the possibilitics of truc hu man fuifilmcnL Thc various exponcnts of this pcrspectivc approach it in somcwhat different ways, al varying levc1s of gcncrality.

Lukács focuses upon thc conccpt of re,"fication. which providcd the socio-philosophical solution to lhe cpistemological and practi cal problems facing M.arxism in thc 1920s.

Gramsci focuscs upon thc notion oíideologicol lreemony as reflecting a bclief systcm among thc prolctariat fostcrcd by thc ruling class. ln bis vicw. the bclief systcm stressed thc importancc of order, authority and discipline. and was propagated through institutions such as thefamily. sch0-0l and workploce.

Marcuse through his notion of one--d,"mensional man. focuscs attcntion upon the alienating charactcristics which hc sccs as l;ieing embcddcd in thc growth of purposive rationality within advanced industrial socicties. Jn particular. he emphasiscs the alienating role of technology. scienct! and logic. Thesc sup plemenl other forces identificd ia bis earlier work relating to thc cxcessivc reprcssion of libido and lhe maintenancc of a happy·work force lhrough the crcation of afJluence and fals.t! nt'eds.

Habermas focuses upon thc role which ian,uage plays as an alicnating force in all aspects of social life. His thcory of communicatlve competence sceks thccommon denominator in human interac tion, whether verbal, sexual. productive or whatevcr. and sccks to show how in cootemporary Westem socicties therc is an elcment of communicatlv di.stortlon which lics at thc heart, and most basic levcl, of man's alicoation.

Anarchistic IndividualismLike so many large-scale intellectual movements, anarchism is not so much a relatively unified, political and theoretical position as a clustering of perspectives. Anarchistic individualism represents one such perspective, advocating total individual freedom, untrammelled by any fonn of externai or internai regulation.2° Anarchistic individualism is a doctrine closely associated with Max Stimer, a Gennan school-teacher, whose inversion of the Hegelian system of philosophy went far beyond that of Marx in its rejection of all social institutions and lhe notion of the 'absolute' in any fonn.21 His position resembles that of the existentialists in

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some respects, since his notion-of the ego comes close,.as.we shall see, to Sartre's concept of 'being-for-self . Stirner emphasised lhe primacy of individual existence and totally rejected any search for universal laws governi ng social life. Far from sharing the Hobbesian vision of the cataclysmic 'war of ali against a!l' as the crucial problem facing man, Stimer celebrates such a 'war' as the so/ution to man' sproblems. Only through a 'union of egoists' - men who pursue ruthlessly, without constraint, their own i ndividual interests - can lrue release and hu man freedom be anained.

Stirner studíed at Berlin under Hegel and became associated with the Left-Hegeiians aboul the sarne time as Karl Marx. On the publication of his principal work, The Ego and His Own (1907), Stimer became branded as a fanatic and a dangerous revolutionary, not only by those committed to mainlenance of the status quo, but also by his less violently disposed anarchist and socialist coileagues. His book focused upon what we might now term the forces of the id and argued that only by releasi ng these from ali restraints and restrictions could true human freedom be attained. Human freedom, for Stimer, is freedom not for the hu man species but for lhe individual ego. Toe Hegelian concept of individual freedom within State control is totally overlhrown in this perspective, which emphasises emancipation lhrough lhe entire remova! of the State and its trappings.

Toe State, in Stimer's eyes, was the greatest enemy of hu man freedom, since it represented a regulatory collectivity which , in de-emphasising the i ndividual's happiness, stood for ali he rejected. Its overthrow and demolition was envisaged not through revolution but through rebellion and insurrection. In The Ego and His Own Stimer suggests:

Revo!ution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. Toe former consists inan OYerturning of conditions, of the cstablishcd conditions or status. the State or society. and is accordingiy apoli tical or social act; the Jatter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence.a transformation of circumstanccs, yet does not start from it, but from men'sdiscontent with themseives. is not an armed rising, but a rising cá individuais, a getting up, without regard 10 lhe arrangements that spring from it. {Woodcock, 1977, p. 167)

Stirner saw such a rebellion as being i nitiated by 'the union of egoists', nol acting in concert in any organised way, but as i ndi viduais carrying out disruption of an ostensibly similar order. Anarchist individualism meant putti ng anarchist notions into prac tice immediatel y, without awaiting any societal lransformations.

Radical Humanism 301

The core issue was the cogni tive disposition of the individüal, his attitude of mind, rather than structural constraints or any externai ideolo_gical hegemony. Stirner's book is i n the tradition of objective idealism and focuses upon the subjecti ve disposi tions within the individual as the starting poi nt for any radical transformation of society, i n which, i ndeed, the whole notion of society is itself th reatened.

Anarchistic i ndividualism has l)ever made a great i mpact,although i t enjoyed a brief revivai with the artistic resurgence of interest i n i ndividua!ism of ai! kinds before Wor!d War 1.There are few anarchists today who accept or adhere to Stirner's position, although Woodcock maintains that 'as late as the 1940s l encoun tered a group of anarchist working m·en in Glasgow for whom [Stirner's book] was still a belated gôspei' (Woodcock, !975, p. 91).

However, many of Stirner's ideas have been incorporated intothe canons of 'mainstream' anarchism, and his emphasis upon·cognitive liberation' and 'freedom for the ego' have been taken up by writers such as Murray Bookchin (1974). Although himself committed to the more objectivist 'anarchistic communism', Bookchi n echoes some of Stirner's feetings when he emphasises the subjective aspects which li nk our understanding of society wilh the individual psyche. As he suggests, 'anarchists have probably given more attention to the subjective problems of revolution than any other revolutionary movement. Viewed from a broad his torical perspective, anarchism is a libidinal upsurge of the people, a stirring of the social unconscious that reaches back, under many different names, to the ear!iest struggles of humanity against domi nation and authority' (Bookchi n, 1974, p. 19).22

Stimer's work is a political document, designed as an exhorta tion to individuais of ali classes to rebel. Toe nature of the rebellion envisaged, with its total commitment to the rejection of ali exist i ng social institutions, identifies anarchistic individualism as oneof lhe most extreme theories of radical change that one is likely to encounter. Since there is scarce!y any room for 'society' in such a conceptualisation, this brand of anarchism has come in for much criticism, particuiarly from Marxists. Anarchistic individualism 's rejection of the 'sociological' category places it outside the Marx ist concem for replaci ng one form of society wilh another through revolutionary means. For many Marxists, anarchism of this kind is seen as essentially reactionary. From our point of view here, it provides a good example of a philosophy of radical change emphasising lhe importance of subjectivist factors. Whilst not

302 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

claiming many sociological adherents,cit serves asan illustration ofan extreme perspective within lhe radical hu manist paradigm.

French ExistentialismFrench existentialism reflects a philosophical perspective firmly located in the subjective idealist tradi tion deriving from the work of Fichte and Husserl. ln terms of our subjective-objective dimension, it occupiesa position between solipsism and the objec tive idealism characteristic of criticai theory. Phenomenology and existentialism are often seen as related schools of thought, and are sometimes considered identical.23 ln line with our distinction be tween the perspectives characteristic of the sociologies of regu!a tion and radical change, we find it helpful toemphasise the distinc tion between !hem. Existential phenomenology characteristic of the work of Schutz, as discussed in Chapter 6, is quite different from the existentialism characteristic of the work of Sartre, to be discussed here. Whilst from a distance they may appear to focus upon similar areas of enquiry and to lend each other mutual sup port, their basic orientations are fu ndamentally distinct. Whilst thework of Schutz focuses upon the social construction of everyday !!ife as a basis for u nderstanding (almost as an end i n itself), theexistentialism of Sartre is concemed with the u nderstandi ng of the pathoiogy of such constructions, with a view to changing them. 1Exislentialism differs from phenomenology i n its vigoróus hu manism and its poli tical commitmellt tolhe desirabili ty of change in the 1existing social order.

However, it would be wrong to suggest that existentialist phiiosophers and social theorists comprise a coherent school of thought in lhe manner, for example, of the Frankfurt School. 1

Rather, existentialism stands for a somewhat broad and amorphous movement, comprising theorists who acknowledge a common debt to Kierkegaard. Among these theorists Jean-Paul Sartre hasemerged as by far the mos!important, and it is through a considera 1

tion of his work that we wish to characlerise the essential orien!a tion of French existentialism as an illustration of the existentia!ist movement as a whole.

liis the early writings of Jean-Paul Sartre which have established him as a leading exponent of lhe French existentialist mode of thought. Sartre's philosophical and literary works are extremely diverse and wide-ranging, and they testify to the direct influence of

Radical Humanism 303

··a nüniber of social theorists including Hegel, Husserl, -Kier- · kegaard, Lukács and Marx." His exislentialist views reflect a time when the influence of the first three of these theorists was in the ascendency and are expressed most forcibly in Being and Nothingness , first published in 1943, and Existentialism and Humanism , published just a few years !ater in 1948. ln bis later work Sartre moved to a philosophical position consonant with a Hegelianised forrn of Marxism, and the concepts emerging from his existentialist works are harnessed in a critique of society inthe mould of a criticai theory reflectiag a more objective idealist view of the world. This is most evident, for example, in Sartre'sCritique of Dialectícal Reason (1976).

Sartre defines existentialism i n the tradition of Kierkegaard as the conviction that 'existence comes before essence'; this be!ief implies that 'we must begin from lhe subjective' - that is, the individual located wi thin existence is the fundamental concem of the philosophicai enterprise. It precedes any emphasis of i nterest in the 'essences' of the 'real' world and i n the make-up of externai reality. The i ndividual is actively involved in the creation of his world and not a mere observer or reflection of it. As Sartre puts it, we do no!'survey the world' but rather, 'are engaged' by it. Sartre, in the tradition of phenomenology, takes the consciousness of man as a starting point for his philosophical enquiry and weds it to humanism and a basic concern for human freedom. lt is this theme which preoccupies his early work. For Sartre, existentialism is humanism, and he is concerned to demonstrate the way in which 'nothinghess' and 'freedom' are essential aspects of the ontologi cal relationship between subjective and objective worlds as experienced by i ndividual hu man bei ngs.

Before one can get to grips with Sartre's concept of 'nothingness' and its i nti mate relationship with 'freedom', it is essential first to u nderstand h is th ree concepts of 'modes of being', which have their origi ns, more or less, i n H egel' s Phenomeno/ogy. Sartre identifies 'being-in-itself' (en-soi), lhe world of externai reality or the stuff of which this real world is made up; 'being-for-self' (pour-soi) which denotes consciousness and the inner subjectivity of men; and 'being-for-others'. Sartre's problem, like that of so many idealist philosophers before hi m, is the nature of the rela tionship, if any. bet ween pour soi and en-sOi . between conscious ness and reali ty. His treatment of this central issue rests upon lhe idea that consciousness is always ofsomething in the real world, so that the relationship between pour-soi and en-soi is that between the knower and the known. This relationship, however, depends

t:;

304 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

·upon a distance orgap óetweeri thé real world and the conscious, · ness of individual men, so that the separation between them is alwa_ys evident. Such a vacancy Sartre calls 'nothingness', for herem lies the ability to conceptualise that which does not exist. 'Nothingness' allows men to think beyond the limitations of today and this place and to i magi ne non-objects, new forms of social life or any type of alternative reality in the future. 'Nothingness' represents freedom, therefore, in the sense that it is here that man has total freedom to dream and to hope. The measure of a man's fredom, then, is the degree to which he can conceive of non obJects and can iook topotential actions rather than be constrained by lhe pre-existing actuality of the en-soi . For Sartre, individuais who relain the ability to conceive of 'nothingness' are free and unconstrained, their lives bounded only by what amou nts to a voluntarist theory of action or, more precisely, interaction.

Sartre's posi tion is i nteractive not so much in a sociological sense but in terms of man's consciousness, in a way faintly

redo lent of Mead's phenomenological concepts of the T and ·me'. To myself, 1 am obviousl y pour-soi (a ·bei ng-for-self'), since I am a consc1ous, sentient bei ng. However, to other men, lam but a real, exemal , ph ysicall y concrete object - a ·bei ng-in-

itself' (en-soi). Tlus paradoxical relationship between hu man bei ngs in social con tex!s creates the third category of being -

·being-for-others', wh1ch is the i nterface between different individuais' conscious ness_ i n which en-soi and pour-soi meet

in day-to-day interaction. lt1sfrom this anaiysis that Sartre's notion of ·bad faith' emerges. Sartre uses this concept torefer to

situations i n which self-imposed constrai nts are placed upon human freedom; i n which men come to accept externai

constrai nts from outside their pour-soi and conse quently reduce lhe ·11othingness' or gap in consciousness which forms

the core of their hu manity. To the extent that men accept a determining, outside i nterference, their i nternai ability to

concep!uaise 'nothingness' is reduced. Sartre illustrates this clearly by

md1cating the way i n which men often become imprisoned by their roles. lnstead of bei ng ·rree', we become what we are, just as an oak lree is a11 oak tree. A waiter is a wai ter and a father is a father, incapable of being radically free and unable to escape at will from

!he roles which they play. Sartre mai ntai ns that tolive i n one·s role s :'- form of self-deception. We know that as conscious i ndividuais li!s false lo see ourselves from outside ourselves as objects, but

!h•s Pocess is part of an attempt to escape from the problem of angu1sh'. As Sartre puts it,·we flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or as a thing'

Radical Humanism 305

(Sartre. 1966, p. 82). lt0 isín the flight from 'anguisb' that ·bad · faith· appears. Sartre's most famous example ohhis is his con sideration of the waiter in Being and Nothingness;

Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise. a li ttle too rapid. He comes towards the patrons wi tb a step a little too quick. He bends forward a iittle .too eagerly: his voice. his eyes, express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Fi nally there he retums. trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightrope wal ker by putting in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibriu m which he perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. AII his b<:haviour seems to us a game. He applies hi mself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other: his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms: he gives himself the quicknessand pililess rapidily of things. He is playing. he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playi ng at heing a waiter in a café. There is nothi ng there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation. The child plays with his body in order to explore it. to take inventory of it: the waiter in the café plays with his condition in order to realise it. This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly one of ceremony. The public demands of them that lhey realise it asa ceremony; there is lhe dance of the grocer, of the tailor. of the auctioneer, by which they endeavour topersuade theirclientele that they are nothing buta grocer, an auctioneer. a tailor. A grocer whodreams is offensive to the buyer. because such a grocer is not wholly grocer. Society demands that he limits himself to his function as a grocer,just as the soldier at attention

1 makes himself into a soldier-thing with a direct regard which does not see at ali, which is no longer meant tosee. since it is lhe rule and not lheinterest of the moment which deternúnes the point he must fix his eyes on(the sight fixed at ten paces'). There are indeed many precautions·to imprison a man in what he is, as if he lived in perpetuai fear that he might escape from it, thal he might break away and suddenly elude his condition. (Sartre, 1966, pp. 101-2)

The waiter here is playing at a role in a way which impiies a fundamental alienation from bis true being. The concept of ·bad failh' which it is intended to illustrate has much in common with Marx's concept of alienation, in which i ndividuais meekly accept their social situation to the detriment of their true hu.man poten tialities. No doubt, for Max Stimer, Sartre's 'bad faith' would succinctly ilescribe the constraining phenomellt>n his ·union of egoists' woold seek to overthrow.

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306 Sociologica/ Paradigms and Organisational Ana/ysis,· Wbilst he has attracted few really •committoo disciples,

Sartre•s influence has becn widespread. His brand of existcntialism has becn important as far as certain developments i n psychoanalytic theory are concemed, particularl y through the work of R. D. Laing, and as a result of the influence of his novels and other literary work. However, the reaction to Sartre's work in general has been somewhat confused. His shift i n intellectual position to a form of Hegelianised-Marxism, his writings and activities i n con nection with the magazine Les Temps Modernes , and his political activism, particularly since the events of 1968, have drawn criticism and indeed abuse from many sides. Despite ali this, however, his contribution to the deveiopment of French existentialísm is beyond dispute and stands as a major achievement in its hamess ing of the phenomenological approach in lhe service of radical humanism.

The Underlying Unity of the ParadigmThe work of theorists located within the radical humanist paradigm is underwritten by a common concem for the freedom of human spirit. Radical humanists focus upon human consciousness within the context of the totality which characterises a particular social formation. There tends to be a concem with what may be described as the 'pathology of consciousness', by which men come to see themselves as trapped within a mode of social organisation which they both create and sustain in their everyday lives. Radical humanists are concemed with understanding lhe manner in which this occurs, with a view to setting human consciousness or spirit free and thus facilitating the growth and development of human potentialities.

Llke theories characteristic of the interpretive paradigm, radical humanist approaches to lhe study of social affairs are rooted in a subjectivism wbkh recognises lhe precarious onto!ogical status of the social world. Wlillst varying in their degree of subjectivism, the differenl schools of thought within lhe paradigm are at one in emphasising that reality is socially created and socially sustained. Thus their perspective stands in fundamental opposition to approaches characteristic -0f lhe radical structuraiist and functionalíst.Paradigms. This opposition is clearly reflected i11 thc ontoiogical and epistemological divides wilhin Marxism and the rare, but generally hoslile, excbanges between social theorists

Radical Humanism 307

adheringto lhe radical humanist and functionalist traditions. Thc divisions between the latter two are compounded by the fact that the ontological and epistemological distinctions are wedded to fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of society. They are divided in terms of both the dimensions of our basic analytical scheme. According to the radical humanist, functionalist social theorists create and sustain a view of social reality which reinforces the status quo and which is to be understood as but one aspect of the network of ideological domination which pervades contemporary Westem society. The functionalist usually dismisses radical humanists as Utopian radicais hell-bent upon fanning the flames of revolutionary consciousness, or as mindless existentialists who will not or cannot adjust to the world of everyday 'reality' and accept tbe inevitable march of•progress .· Many contemporary radical humanists have developed their

critique of society with the functionalist perspective firmly ín mind and, consequently, are able to attack it on many fronts. Thus, as we have seen, within criticai theory specific attention has been paid to demonstrating the role of scicnce, logic, rationalíty, tech nology, language and other aspects of the superstructure of capitalism as vehicles of cognitive domination, which, from the radical humanist perspective, act as alíenating 'intermediaries · which present a barrier to the achievement of full humanness. ln the tradition of the work of the young Marx, the radical humanists are concerned with the alienation of modem man. They start from the premise that man lives in a world which constrains rather than develops his full range of possibiiities, and they are committed to providi ng an analysis and critique of lhe way in which this occurs. ltis a critique which reflects a complete inversion of the functional problernatic and the view of society which it represents.

lt is lhe emphasis which is given to consciousness in general and alienation in particular which distinguishes the substance of the radical humanists' thought from lhat of lhe radical structurali"sts. Theorists in both these paradigms are committed to revolu:ionary changes in society but, as we shall see, the radical structuralists!end to place much more emphasis upon deep economic and políti ca! 'structures' in their ana!ysis. As we shall see, within the con text of the radical structuralist paradigm, the concepts of 'totality', 'structure', 'contradiction' and 'crisis' take over as unifying fearures from those of 'totality', 'consciousness', 'alienation' and 'critique', which can serve as a convenient shorthand for the common concems not only of criticai theory, but also of the

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308 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

· esscntial -oricof the radical ·humanisl ·paradigm "in tnn,.·

general terms.

Notes and References1. For a general discussion of Fichte·s work, see lhe

introduc tion to Fichte (1970).2. Fora discussion of the Hegelian system of thought, see Hegel

(1931) and Kaufmann (1966).3. For a discussion of the Hegelian use of 'dialectic', see

Kaufmann (1966), pp. 167-75.4. For a discussion of Marx's views at this time, see

McLellan (1975 and 1976).5. The influence of Feuerbach is of considerable importance

and calls for much greater attention than it is possible to give here. For more extensive discussion, see Althusser (1969) and McLellan (1976).

6. For a furlher discussion of Marx's theory of alienátion, see Avineri (1968), McLellan (1976), Mészáros (1970b) and Ollman (1971).

7. For a further discussion of criticai theory, see. for example,Jay (1973), Corinerton (1976) and O'Neill (1977).

8. As will become evident from our discussion in Chapter 10, orthodox Marxism in the 1920s was based upon an extreme interpretation of the radical structuralism characteristic of Marx·s !ater work.

9. For a discussion of Engels' influence on the interpretation ofMarx's work, see Chapter 10.

10. For a discussion of Lukács'sconcept of the dialectic, see the article by Mészáros in Parkinson (1970).

l i. For a discussion of Lukács's use of 'totality', see Lukács (1971) and lhe article by Pascal in Parkinson (1970).

12. For a further discussion of this point in relation lo lhe con sciousness and action of lhe working class, see Mann ( 1971).

13. See, for example, Gramsci'sattack on positivism in 'CriticaiNotes on an Attempt at Popular Sociology' in Gramsci (1971).

14. For a discussion of this important concept, see Gramsci (1971) and Boggs (1976).

15. Jay (1973) provides an excellent analysis of lhe role of these key figures in lhe development of lhe Frankfurt School and its work.

Radical Humanism 309

..J6, Fora good dis.cussion.,.see. for example, Frisby ( 1972lc-lnter-c-. estingl y enough, the work of both Popper and Adorno is

directed against totalitarianism; lheir di!Terent responses reflect their different paradigmatic perspectives.

17. Toe possibility of a marriage between lhe ideas of Marx and Freud has received i ncreasing attention i n recent years. For a discussion of some of the issues i nvolved, see Rieff (1959) and Brown (1973).

18. See, however, Marcuse (1968) and Habermas (1971b).19. ln Legitimation Crisis (1976), especiall y Part li, 'Crisis

Tendencies in Advanced Capitalism', Habermas deals wilh four types of crisis, of which one is 'economic crisis' in the classic Marxist mould.

20. For a discussion of anarchism in general and 'anarchistic i ndividualism' in particular, see Woodcock (1975 and 1977).

21. Woodcock comments upon this most extraordinary man in lhe following terms:

STIRN ER MAX. ( 1806-1856). Kaspar Schmidt was a German schoolteacher. employed in a Berlin academy for young !adies. when he wrote his single important book The EKO and His Own. This extremely individualist anarchist was closely associated with the Radical Young Hegelians who clustered around Arnold Ruge and Bruno Bauer, and took the nom-de-plume of Max Stirner because of the loftiness of his brow (stirn). The victim of an unhappy maniage, he became in his )ater years a hack trans lator, and The EKo and His Own.which intluenced Nietzsche, remains his only work of real significance. (Woodcock, 1977. p. 379)

22. Bookchin's paper 'Listen Marxist' (1974) also makes inter esting readi ng in this respec!, whelher or not one is being directiy addressed.

23. For a discussion of some important differences as well as links between lhe two schools of thought, see Lee and Mandelbaum (1971).

24. For a discussion of Sartre's life and work, see Murdoch (1967), Spiegelberg (1965), Warnock (1965) and Natanson (1973a).

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