Contagion

Contagion from the Russian default / devaluation jumped oceans in August 1998.

Source: Mathew McBrady (2002)

2

Source: Benn Steil, Lessons of the Financial Crisis, CFR, March 2009

The Global Financial Crisis was quickly transmitted to emerging markets in September 2008.

Categories/Causes of Contagion • “Monsoonal effects” (Masson, 1999): Common external shocks

• E.g., US interest rates ↑,

• world recession, GFC, or

• $ commodity prices ↓ …

• “Spillover effects”

• Trade linkages

• Competitive devaluations

• Investment linkages

• Pure contagion

• Stampede of herd

• Imperfect information (“cascades”):  investor perceptions regarding, e.g., Asian model or odds of bailouts 

• Illiquidity in international financial markets or reduced risk tolerance

Major IMF Country-Programstraditional 3 components

• Country reforms (“conditionality”): – macro policy (often devaluation & expenditure-reduction)

– & perhaps structural (controversial).

• Financing from IMF.– “Stamp of approval” is often as important, or more so.

• Private Sector Involvement: “bailing in” lenders rather than “bailing out”

– Rolling over loans, stretching out maturities, standstills…

– Haircuts, restructuring, debt-equity swaps, write-down, default…

DevaluationPoland, the only continental EU member with a floating

exchange rate, was also the only one to escape negative growth in the global recession of 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Exchange Rate

Poland6.2  6.8  5.1  1.7  3.5f 

Floating

Lithuania7.8  9.8  2.9  -14.7  -0.6f 

Fixed

Latvia12.2  10.0  -4.2  -18.0  -3.5f 

Fixed

Estonia10.6  6.9  -5.1  -13.9  0.9f 

Fixed

Slovakia8.5  10.6  6.2  -4.7  2.7f 

Euro

Czech Republic6.8  6.1  2.5  -4.1  1.6f 

Flexible

Hungary3.6  0.8  0.8  -6.7  0.0f 

Flexible Source: Cezary Wójcik, 2010

(de facto)

% change in GDP

The depreciation boosted net exports; contribution to GDP growth > 100%

3,2

3,5

3,7

4,0

4,2

4,5

4,7

I III V VII IX XI I III V VII IX XI I III V VII IX

2008 2009 2010

8,0

13,0

18,0

23,0

28,0

Contribution of Net X to GDP:

2009: 2,5 3,4 3,2 3,4

> 100% ofGDP growth rate: 1,7

Source: Cezary Wójcik

kroon / $Estonia

Latvialats / $

zlotys / $

The Polish exchange rate increased by 35%.

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

After a devaluation, heads of state in developing countries lost their jobs...

…in the 1960s, twice as often within 1 year of devaluation (30%) as compared to control group (14%)

-- Richard Cooper (1971). (Criterion was 10% devaluation)

Updated to 1971-2003: twice as often within 6 months of devaluation (43 cases out of 109 = 23%) as otherwise (12%).

Difference is highly significant statistically at 0.5% level.

(Criterion is 25% devaluation, incl. 10% acceleration, and 3-yr. window.)

Source: -- Frankel, “Contractionary Currency Crashes,” (2005)

Why were devaluations so unpopular?

• The public feels their leaders have misled them?

• Passthrough to import prices & inflation?

• Contractionary impact on the real economy– such as via balance sheet effect?

Frankel (2005)

In both cases the loss of jobs was severe, but reversed in 8 months

CONTRACTIONARY EFFECTS OF DEVALUATION

Question: In the standard model, devaluation raises price competitiveness, thereby boosting TB. Why, then, is devaluation so often associated with loss of GDP?

Carry-over from LECTURE 13: DEVALUATION IN SMALL, OPEN ECONOMIES

• High interest rates raise default probability.

The IMF may not have sufficiently realized this –according to J.Furman & J.Stiglitz; and S.Radelet & J.Sachs; both in Brookings Panel on Ec. Activity, 1998.

• Devaluation is contractionary: 10 possible channels, including real balance effect & balance-sheet effect.

CONTRACTIONARY EFFECTSOF DEVALUATION

Why were the real effects of the East Asia currency crises so severe?

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Edwards (1986):

In 12 LDCs, devaluation is contractionary in 1st year, then expansionary; neutral in LR.

 Kamin (1988):

No evidence of contractionary effects.

 Calvo & Reinhart (2001):

Exports do not increase at all after a devaluation, but rather fall for first 8 months. Credit constraints?

Empirical evidence:Are devaluations contractionary?

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

 In the 1990s currency crises, devaluations apparently were contractionary due to the balance sheet effect.

• Guidotti, Sturzenegger & Villar (2003)  

• Bebczuk, Galindo & Panizza (2006):

Devaluation is only contractionary for the fifth of developing countries with (external $ debt)/GDP > 84%; it is expansionary for the rest.

• Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri & Roubini (2002) 

Empirical evidence:Are devaluations contractionary? (continued)

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

The balance sheet effect

In currency crises, loss in output depends on foreign-denominated debt times real devaluation.

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Would some other combination of devaluation vs. monetary contraction in the 1990s crises have better

maintained internal and external balance?

Textbook version:

When external balance shifts out, there exists an optimal combination of devaluation and interest rate rise that will satisfy external finance constraint without causing recession.

1998 version:

Apparently there exists no such combination, if reserves have been allowed to run low and $ debt to run high.

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Textbook version: there exists a combination of devaluation and interest rate rise that will satisfy external finance constraint without causing recession.

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Lesson-of-1998 version:

There may exist no combination that avoids recession, if reserves have already been allowed to run low and dollar debt to run high.

?

?

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unlesstherwise noted

Why do debtor countries develop such weak balance sheets (currency mismatch)?

1. “Original sin:” Investors in rich countriesare unwilling to acquire exposure in currencies of developing countries. -- Hausmann (1999)

2. Adjustable currency pegs create a false sense of security:

only currency volatility persuades borrowers to avoid unhedged dollar liabilities. -- Eichengreen (1999), Velasco (2001)

3. Moral hazard: borrowing in $ is a way well-connected locals can put the risk onto the government.-- Dooley (2000); Krugman (1999); Wei & Wu (2002)...

4. Procrastination of adjustment: when foreign investors suddenly lose enthusiasm, the government postpones adjustment by shifting to short-term & $-denominated debt.

Peso crisisShocks

1992-94In the months leading up to the Dec. 94 Mexican peso attack,

debt composition shifted...

from peso-denominated (Cetes) to $-linked (tesobonos)...

Copyright 2007 Jeffrey Frankel, unless otherwise noted

API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

…and from longer term to shorter.

Peso crisis

Shocks

Appendices

• The car crash analogy

• Why were the recessions in the Asia crisis so severe?

• Critiques of the IMF

THE CAR CRASH ANALOGY[Might cover at end of semester, L24, instead]

Sudden stops: “It’s not the speed that kills, it’s the sudden stops”

– R.Dornbusch

Superhighways: Modern financial markets get you where you want to go fast, but accidents are bigger, and so more care is required.

– R.Merton

Is it the road or the driver? Even when many countries have accidents in the same stretch of road (Stiglitz), their own policies are also important determinants; it’s not determined just by the system. – L.Summers

Contagion also contributes to multi-car pile-ups.

THE CAR CRASH ANALOGY, continued

THE CAR CRASH ANALOGY, continued

Moral hazard -- G7/IMF bailouts that reduce the impact of a given crisis, in the LR undermine the incentive for investors and borrowers to be careful. Like air bags and ambulances.

But to claim that moral hazard means we should abolish the IMF would be like claiming that drivers would be safer with a spike in the center of the steering wheel column. – M.Mussa

Correlation does not imply causation: That the IMF (doctors) are often found at the scene of fatal accidents (crises) does not mean that they cause them.

Optimal sequence: A highway off-ramp should not dump high-speed traffic into the center of a village before streets are paved, intersections regulated, and pedestrians learn not to walk in the streets. So a country with a primitive domestic financial system should not necessarily be opened to the full force of international capital flows before domestic reforms & prudential regulation.

=> There may be a role for controls on capital inflow (speed bumps and posted limits). -- Masood Ahmed

Reaction time: How the driver reacts in the short interval between appearance of the hazard and the moment of impact (speculative attack) influences the outcome. Adjust, rather than procrastinating (by using up reserves and switching to short-term $ debt) – J.Frankel

Why were the real effects of the Asian currency crises so severe? Continued

The balance sheet effect:$-denominated debts are difficult to service after a large devaluation => layoffs, closures, & bankruptcies

Some of the many references:

Paul Krugman, 1999, “Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem and Financial Crises,” in International Finance and Financial Crises, P.Isard, A.Razin, & A.Rose, eds.

Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 2000, “Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy,” in NBER Macro Annual (MIT Press).

More: Aghion, Banerjee & Bacchetta (2000), Bebczuk, Galindo & Panizza (2006), Caballero & Krishnamurty (2002), Dornbusch (2001), Calvo, Izquierdo, & Talvi (2003), Calvo, Izquierdo & Meija; Cespedes, Chang & Velasco (1999, 2000, 03, 04), Christiano, Gust & Roldos (2002), Dornbusch (2001, 02), Eichengreen & Hausmann (1999), Guidotti, Sturzenegger & Villar (2003), Kiyotaki & Moore (1997), Jeanne & Zettelmeyer (2005), Kiyotaki & Moore (1997), Mendoza (2002), and Schneider & Tornell (2001),

• High import bill and low elasticities

• Real balance effect (MABP)

• Distribution effect: Diaz-Alejandro (1963) (MPC workers > MPC landowners)

• Balance sheet effect: difficulty servicing $-denominated debts

• End of speculative buying: Cooper (1971)

• Simultaneous monetary/fiscal contraction (correlation, not causation)

• Tariff revenue rise: Krugman-Taylor (1978)

• Rise in Pimported inputs, e.g., oil

• Rise in W, e.g., where indexed to CPI

• Rise in cost of firms’ working capital

10 POSSIBLE CONTRACTIONARY EFFECTSOF DEVALUATION (3 slides repeated from L12)

M.Cavallo, K.Kisselev, F.Perri, & N.Roubini, 2002.

Appendix on the Balance Sheet Effect

Appendix 3: Critiques of the IMF

Critics say “The IMF made serious mistakes -- what better evidence could one want than the severity of the 1997-2001 crises in emerging markets? -- and needs to be reformed.” But in what specific direction do critics want the IMF to move?

Frankel’s Law: For every plausible and devastating-sounding critique of the IMF, there exists an opposite critique that is equally plausible and that sounds equally devastating. Here, the most common pairs:

1. Need more exchange rate flexibility. Reluctance to abandon currency targets & devalue in the face of balance of payments deficits led to crises of 1994-2001.

2. Need more exchange rate stability, including institutional commitments like currency boards or dollarization to restore monetary credibility, rather than government manipulation of the exchange rate.

Critiques of the IMF, cont.

3. Need more resources available for IMF emergency programs, bailouts, debt forgiveness (HIPC), & new loans; there was no good reason based in fundamentals for the Asians to suffer the sudden reversal of inflows.

4. The moral hazard problem is the ultimate source of the crises. Investors & borrowers alike are reckless when they know they will be bailed out by IMF & G7.

5. Need to adopt capital controls, to insulate countries from the vagaries of international investors.

6. Need financial openness, so countries can take advantage of international capital markets.

7. Need easier monetary & fiscal targets; IMF programs have too much expenditure-reduction, inflicting needless recessions.

8. Need tighter macroeconomic discipline, since monetary & fiscal profligacy is source of balance of payments problems; private investors can’t be persuaded to keep their money in countries lacking sound policies.

Critiques of the IMF, concl. 9. Need more customization of conditionality to individual country circum-stances; Asia did not have the macro problems familiar from Latin America

10. Conditionality has gone too far into local details (e.g., clove & plywood

monopolies in Indonesia, 1998). Need standardized & strict rules-based pre-certification qualifying countries for uncondnitional IMF assistance (as Contingent Credit Lines, reincarnated in 2008 as short-term loan facility ).

11. Should concentrate loans among poor countries, rather than those that are successfully developing and able to attract private capital. Place more emphasis on poverty reduction in each country program.

12. Need less subsidy in loans, higher interest rate charges, close to private market rates. In any case, leave poverty reduction to World Bank.

13. US has disproportionate influence in the IMF.

14. “IMF is run by European socialists. US needs to exercise more influence” (-- US Congress).