CASE DIGESTSCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25:30PM-7:30PM Friday

CASE NO. 1Santiago v. COMELEC270 SCRA 106

Facts:Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an orderdirecting the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case forhearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon,PublicInterestLawCenter, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onpeoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat has been delegated cannot be delegated (potestas elegate non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

CASE NO. 2Lambino v. COMELEC505 SCRA 160

Facts:Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:(1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.(2) Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.(3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held:According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed

CASE NO. 3Pirma v. COMELECG.R. No. 129754, September 21, 1997

Facts: A Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition) was filed with the COMELEC on June 23, 1997. Giving the President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively. It was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite submitted to the people for ratification. The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.

PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Courts decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC. The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997.

Issues:(1) Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in COMELECs Refusal to Act.(2) Whether there was a need to the Court to re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735.

Held:No grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein. . Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the COMELEC. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

On the second issue, RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily provided by COMELEC Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer . . . ." Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes COMELEC "to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." The PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

CASE NO. 4Mabanag v. Lopez Vito78 Phil 1

Facts:Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.

Issue:Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held:It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

CASE NO. 5PRC v. Arlene de Guzman, et. Al.June 21, 2004

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

Issue: Whether the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

CASE NO. 6Agustin v. EDU88 SCRA 195

Facts:Leovillo Agustin, theowner ofa Beetle, challenged theconstitutionalityof Letter of Instruction 229 and itsimplementingorder No. 1 issued by LTOCommissionerRomeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this. The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning deviceinstalledon a vehicle to reduceaccidentsbetween moving vehicles and parked cars. The LTO was the issuer of the device atthe rateof not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. The triangular reflector plates were set whenthe carparked on any street or highway for30 minutes. It was mandatory.

Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation ofpolicepower, equal protection, and due process/ 2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense of car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the petition.

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation ofpolicepower to such acts. The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation ofpolicepower.

Issue:Whether the Letter of Instruction constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation ofpolicepower?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:Policepower, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty. The case also says thatpolicepower is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare. Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.J. Carazo- government limitations to protectconstitutional rightsdid not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace. There was no factualfoundationon petitioner to refute validity. Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption ofconstitutionalitymust prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing the statute. Brandeis-constitutionalitymust prevail in the absence of some factualfoundationin overthrowing the statute. Even ifthe carhadblinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.SC-blinking lightsmay lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned. Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because itsinstalledwhen parked for30 minutesand placed from 400 meters fromthe carallowing drivers to see clearly. There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any constitutional provision. LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes requirement from any source. The objective ispublic safety. The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the declaration of principles in the Constitution. On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

CASE NO. 7Taxicab Operators vs. Juinio119 SCRA 897

Facts: Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old.Pursuant to the BOT circular, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing the implementation of said circular andformulatinga schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years is arbitrarily and oppressive because the road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected and therefore their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of the registration.

Issue: Whether or not a circular phasing out taxicabs more than 6 years old is unreasonable and arbitrary.

Held: No. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly. The span of 6 years supplies that reasonable standard. By the time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public.Taxicabs in Manila, compared to those in other places are subject to heavier traffic pressure and constant use.

DIGESTED BY: MARIA JOBE CRIS C. VIDAL, JD-1