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Agustin vs Edu, 88 SCRA 195, L- 49112, February 22, 1979

Facts : This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for anearly warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibitionproceeding as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as therules and regulations for its implementation are concerned.

The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to preventroad accidents and in the interest of safety on all streets, highways including expressways.All motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all times one pair of early warningdevice. These hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized byinternational bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roadsand Signs and the United Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D.No. 207 ratified the said Vienna convention requiring the installation of road signs anddevices.Herein respondent Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth theimplementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Issue : Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutionalguarantees of due process.

Held : The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there wasno unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified,police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possessesrelevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of internationallaw as part of the law of the nation.” Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it isnot for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hagueand Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands inthe way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of internationalmorality.In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and

adequately argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his efforts. The law isanything but that.Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.

Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and

to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly cityand municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks theconstitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alien residents theequal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without dueprocess of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the

Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thruhereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it

nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibitionagainst persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, fromengaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibitionin favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed tocontinue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) anexception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) aprovision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of thelaws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other lawsrelating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business topresent for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their 

businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets andliabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provisionallowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue suchbusiness for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It hasbeen said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almostimpossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the Stateitself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensivewith self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of allgovernmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it sounder a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations havemultiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power hasbecome almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have

become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated,as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in thisconstantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achievepublic interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of thepolice power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The mostimportant of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or classprivilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intendedto prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or byterritory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances andconditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection

clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within aspecified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable groundsexists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who donot.

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The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted inpursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfareinvolved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature'spurpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of thelegislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not

merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we askwhen the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equalprotection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and theguarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, theindispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet therecan neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State candeprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; andpersons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equalprotection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonablerelation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification hasbeen made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to nationaleconomy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens andcountry from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scopeof the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality andinsures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien andcitizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens alreadyengaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom andefficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as amatter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any casesuch matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretionthe Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law

are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled thelegislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be voidfor supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been enteredinto on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treatyor any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of thePhilippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by thelaw in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinesenationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except thoseof the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibitedfrom engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the saidtreaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , andthe same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

Lutz vs. AranetaGR L-7859, 22 December 1955First Division, Reyes JBL (J): 8concur

Facts: AWalter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of AntonioJayme Ledesma, sought to recover the sum of P14,6666.40 paid by the estateas taxes from the Commissioner under Section e of Commonwealth Act 567(the Sugar Adjustment Act), alleging that such tax is unconstitutional as itlevied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is in hisopinion not a public purpose.

Issue: Whether the tax is valid in supporting an industry.

Held: The tax is levied with a regulatory prupose, i.e. to provide means for therehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. The act isprimarily an exercise of police power, and is not a pure exercise of taxingpower. As sugar production is one of the great industries of the Philippines; andthat its promotion, protection and advancement redounds greatly to the generalwelfare, the legislature found that the general welfare demanded that theindustry should be stabilized, and provided that the distribution of benefitstherefrom be readjusted among its component to enable it to resist the addedstrain of the increase in tax that it had to sustain. Further, it cannot be said

that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products, etc., as well as to theimprovement of living and working conditions in sugar mills and plantations,without any part of such money being channeled diectly to private persons,constitute expenditure of tax money for private purposes.

The tax is valid.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun1987]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:  The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogramoperators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creatingthe Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervisethe videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amendedthe National Internal Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of fivepesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall

be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect

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a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the casemay be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing areproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.” 

 “Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to theprovince, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality

where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shallbe shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan ManilaCommission.” 

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation andunregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes,discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatlyprejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulatedcirculation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least fortypercent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor'sspecific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial lossesestimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annumfrom rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have notbeen subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximatelyP180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected theviability of the movie industry.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of policepower.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. Thelevy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answerthe need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampantfilm piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and theproliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us inpronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. Whilethe underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie

industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and filmswith brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the

drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of videoestablishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit andmunicipal license fees are required to engage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.]

Case Digest: Lozano v. Martinez

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986 FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner,vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as PresidingJudge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila,and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.YAP, J:Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail thelaw's constitutionality.BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issuesany check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he doesnot have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by

the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have beendishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense isimprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or notless than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in nocase to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at thediscretion of the court.The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "anyperson who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when hemakes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or tomaintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within aperiod of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason itis dishonored by the drawee bank.An essential element of the offense is"knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the

insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon itspresentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, thestatute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge wherepayment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds inor credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the dateof the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statuteprovides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking daysfrom receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makesarrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder theamount of the check.Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of arule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid anddishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or writtenthereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentmentto the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written,stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."Thepresumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course topresent proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.ISSUE:

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Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbiddingimprisonment for debt.HELD: No.The gravamen of the offense punished by BP22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that isdishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of anobligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed tocoerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain

of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them incirculation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practiceis proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense againstproperty, but an offense against public order.The effects of the issuance of aworthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involvedin the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. Themischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injuryto the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers incirculation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfareof society and the public interest.The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by thelegislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of aworthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of 

penal sanctions.ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.HELD: No.The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enterinto "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful.Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as merecontracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, hasbecome a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking systemand therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.ISSUE:

W/N it violates the equal protection clause.HELD: No. Petitioners contend thatthe payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, sincewithout the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of thecheck there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, togive equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and theswindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals,

who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as theclassification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture andSports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for EducationalMeasurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, asamended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 andfrom requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing

certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with acceptingapplications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduledon 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previouslyscheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, knownas the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the followingmanner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the

standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination forregistration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of thepractice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Itsfunctions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognizedcollege of medicine;

x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school andkeep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from saidapplicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to theoperating fund of the Board of Medical Education;” 

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medicalschools:

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student whohas not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offenseinvolving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of abachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance toa medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of goodmoral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts;and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any

college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, otherentrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.” 

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Cultureand Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission testcalled the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirementfor issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes onto state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrumenttoward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medicalschools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in thecountry. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores onthe NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education

after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMATrating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements aspresently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuanceof the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

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Issue:  Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, asamended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held:  Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain

minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in thePhilippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all theimportant interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the generalcommunity. An important component of that public order is the health andphysical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no onecan deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is somereasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a conditionfor admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the healthand safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is

perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of thepractice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as areasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type:the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student bodyof the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission tothose who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies andeventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medicalschools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economicdevelopment, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled toprescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its statedobjective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools"and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We areentitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of theultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful torecall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodiesand minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of therespondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction isAFFIRMED. Costs against petition

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