Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan

Political Law – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA 3019 

On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.

HELD: The Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.  A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : “SEC. 13.  Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a validinformation under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upongovernment or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage ofexecution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.  Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.”

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

But Santiago   committed  the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged.  Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds.  Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case.  All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Disierto

G.R. No. 146710-15      02 March 2001

FACTS:

After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the President’s administration started resigning one by one.  In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate.  The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally.  On January 20, the President submitted two letters – one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution.  Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioner resigned as President; and

2. Whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning

RULING:

1. For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country.  This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign.

2. Petitioner’s contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court.  The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.  But even assuming arguendo that it is an

administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely.  There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned.

Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.  AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments.  A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.  The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country.  It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met:  (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld.  A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.  This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.  Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.

Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines VS Executive Secretary

405 SCRA 497;GR 153888; 9 JUL 2003

Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAPaccredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halalcertifications to qualified products and manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products ashalal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office.

On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

Issue: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Held: It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halalcertifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

Mariano “Mike” Velarde v Social Justice Society (2004)

Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming to the form and substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent (Panganiban) 

Mike Velarde, Petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

Date promulgated: April 28, 2004

Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:

-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.

-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy.

-The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:

1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.

2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."

-The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.

-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14

-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Court’s resolution:

1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;

2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondent’s Petition for declaratory relief;

3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;

4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;

5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.

Issues:

In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velarde’s issues and divided it into 2 groups:

A. Procedural Issues

1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?

2. Did it state a cause of action?

3.Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

B. Substantive Issues

1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

2.                    May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsingcandidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)

Decision:

Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

Holding:

Procedural Issues:

1.                    NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.

The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Why?

a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter.

b.                    It did not sufficiently state a declaration of  its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution,

c.                    The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws, remember the questionability of justice panganiban’s guidelines for article 36 of the family code)

It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even allege any indication ormanifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

2.                    NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)

Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

The court held that the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action became a ground for its outrightdismissal. Why?

The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. (trigger for the cause of action)

In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of “its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested”. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not constitute a legal right or interest, the court’s inferred interest too vague and speculative in character. Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.

To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual ‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. (???)

During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.

3.                    NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.

Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate thatthey have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or importance to the people (IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the transcendental issue.

Substantive Issues

1.                    NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.  No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.

Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :

“A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.”

The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals  where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.

In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.

The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the court’s findings as to the probable facts.  The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented.  Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve.  Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.  The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state.  Without

expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her “Decision” with the clause “SO ORDERED.”

 A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.  More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. 

It was truly obvious that the RTC’s Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?).

Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision.  Stating “Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.”

The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor thatdetermines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.

The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition.  Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.

2.                    It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer)

Alejandro Estrada VS Escritor

492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a

man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband

died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. 

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,

respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the

Watch Tower and the BibleTrace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the

approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a

couple to legalize their union. 

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The

free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in ourConstitution. As Jefferson put

it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be

merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at

bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against

respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced

prohibition. 

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The

jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. 

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room

for accommodation of religiousexercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could

allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the

state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary

to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an

exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. 

German vs Barangan

 and Present Danger

German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Barangan and his underlings from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacanang. And considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacanang.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.

HELD: In the case at bar, German et al are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow the German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impress. Such manner impresses “clear and present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to worship.

Dissenting Opinions

J. Fernando -  It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, man’s veryexistence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.

J. Teehankee -  The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of

Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence.

JUSMAG Philippines vs. NLRC

(Article XVI Sec. 3) (Foreign Government)

Facts: Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at the JointUnited States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-Phils.). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992. When dismissed, heheld the position of Illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAGPhils.- Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc., a labor org. dulyregistered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due tothe abolition of his position.Sacramento filed complaint w/ DOLE on the ground that hewas illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. Heasked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invokingimmunity from suit. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed thecomplaint "for want of jurisdiction". Sacramento appealed toNLRC.NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and held thatpetitioner had lost its right not to be sued bec. (1) the principleof estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee rel. (2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suitwhen it hired the services of private respondent. Hence, thispetition.

Issue:W/N JUSMAG has immunity from suit

Held: Yes. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, itwas performing a governmental function on behalf of the UnitedStates pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between thePhils. and America* JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army groupand its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on airforce, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is one againstthe United States government, and in the absence of any waiver orconsent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAGcannot prosper.Immunity of State from suit is one of the universallyrecognized principles of international law that the Phils.recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. Immunity iscommonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs

from the judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on theprinciple of the sovereign equality of states under which one statecannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maximpar in parem non habeat imperium (an equal has no power over anequal)As it stands now, the application of the doctrine ofimmunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmentalactivities and does not extend to commercial, private andproprietary acts.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

[177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by theconstitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the rightto return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. 

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Almonte vs. Vasquez (1995)

Facts:

This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogadoand Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant andrecord custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) toproduce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and allevidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB'sBudget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and aconcerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including theOffice of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed bythe Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers everyweek for them not to be apprehended.]

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegationswritten on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilegeof an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative toits Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . .will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of itsoperations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

Issue:

Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal protection of laws.

Held:

YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. Inthe case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function isthe gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, suchas, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting. "Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated “protectors of the people” of the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . .the aggrieved parties . . . can only haler espondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction arepublic officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.