Consolidated Cases in Special Proceedings Under Atty. Tiofilo Villanueva

CASE DIGESTS IN SPECIALPROCEEDINGS

Submitted in Partial Compliance to ATTY. TIOFILO VILLANUEVA

Submitted by:Estella AgustinGrace AquinoJennilyn BacayJay Michael De MesaCarmi DignoRoel EsperaKatrina Dianne GimenezMaria B. ObbaniaMaria Donna PantojaLawrence Villamar

Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data

Title: Secretary Leila De Lima vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528Facts

Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofAmparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed and raffled to the salaof Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary LeilaM. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of theNational Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, et al) Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. to ceaseand desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing boguscharges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambushincident. RTC rendered a Decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTCalso granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production andinspection orders. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filedby De Lima, et al.Issues

1. Whether or not the filing of an answer is appropriate.2. Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the

writ and the filing of a RETURN is proper.3. Whether or not the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is the same as the Writ of Amparo.

RulingOn the first issue, the Court ruled that the insistence on filing of an Answer was

inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for theissuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention ofthe Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security areviolated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

On the second issue, the Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame theissues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. Withouta Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.

Memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. It is asynthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required beforethe case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since thesesubmissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

On the third issue, the Court pointed out that the privilege of the Writ of Amparoshould be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilegeincludes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. After examiningthe petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in thesummary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents thatwill mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life,liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants the privilege of the writ cannot beexecuted. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor tothe petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of veryreal and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic orritualistic as granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

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Title: Spouses Nerio vs. Brgy. Capt. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460

FactsPetitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio

Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008,respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalayafarm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners Nerio and ReyPador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay CaptainArcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not toattend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latterreceived the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign areceipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sendingof the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possibleviolence from respondents gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security andnecessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. After examining the contents of the petitionand the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed respondents to make averified return. Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July2008, it issued the assailed Resolution finding that petitioners claims were based merely onhearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficientlyexplained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceededto deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.Issue

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo.Ruling

The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitionersmust prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are beingviolated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originallyconceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforceddisappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to addressthese extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rightsto life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond thoseavailable under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it isnot, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writthat we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.


Title: Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009

FactsTagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the

Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Morethan a month after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt.Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pensionhouse to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed tobe police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehiclethen sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable source;that he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNPZamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involveand connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed acomplaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead ofhelping her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of thepetition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, whichis a clear indication of the refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating hermissing husband.

The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparopetition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d),and (e) of the Amparo Rule.

IssueDoes the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in stating thethreatened or actual violation of a victims rights for it to be given due course by the court?

RulingThe Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section

5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victimsrights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate factsconstituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of theproceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able todescribe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information maypurposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type ofsituation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitionersapparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicialconcern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read theRules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, thetest in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details availableto the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing aviolation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private partyaction. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolatedcomponent parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, theState or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty orsecurity are present.


Title: Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010

FactsThis is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December

3, 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and inparticular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fullyaccountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held that Col.Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to theenforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was ordered that Col.Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for thesuppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the sameobligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.

However, before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead.

IssueWhether or not Col. Kasims death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic.

RulingThe Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case

has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny thepetitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can nolonger be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise.His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col.Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was inthe service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves aninterwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with thepolice and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing theextraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access orreconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset" or network of assets duringhis lifetime.


Title: Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795Facts

The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have beendeprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in ourConstitution, as the result of the nefarious activities of both the Private and PublicRespondents. Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy.Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filingof the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment which wasaffirmed with finality in four other cases.

IssueWhether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.

RulingNo. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened

demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included amongthee numeration of rights covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding no legal basis for theissuance of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new remedy of writ ofamparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highestpossible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Courtwill not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered bythe writ.


Title: Arthur Balao vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050Facts

On the early morning of September 17, 2008, James Balao was abducted byunidentified armed men. With no idea where he is, the siblings asked the assistance of theorganization Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) and other NGOs to locate James. One of theteams also went to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of theMilitary Intelligence Group in Camp Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in saidoffices denied any knowledge on Jamess whereabouts. Contending that there is no plain,speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect Jamess life, liberty and security, petitionersprayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose whereJames is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from furtherinflicting harm upon his person.

The RTC granted the petition.IssueWhether or not the order of the court granting the petition for writ of amparo was correct.

RulingThe Supreme Court partially granted the petitions and modified the judgment of the

RTC. Writ of Amparo was formulated amidst rising incidents of extralegal killings andenforced disappearances.

The trial erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility onthe part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However,the Court agreed with the trial in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials arevery limited, superficial and one-sided.

In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to dischargetheir burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of Jamess abduction. Suchineffective investigation extant in the records of this case prevents us from completelyexonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James disappearance.The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City PoliceStation do not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of theinvestigation made.

In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of theconstitutional rights to liberty and security of James who remains missing to date, the Courtdeems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for further investigation by thePNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the standardof diligence required by the Amparo Rule.


Title: Edgardo Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467

FactsThis petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision6 of the RTC of Malolos

which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent against thepetitioners. The petition was filed due to the mysterious disappearance of respondentshusband after he was arrested by the security of Asian Land. The petition does not containany allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that thegovernment or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of itsagents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petitionwhether as responsible or accountable persons

IssueWhether or not allegation and proof that the persons subject of the petition for Writ of

Amparo are missing are enough for such writ to issue.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. The Court pointed out that in an amparo petition,

proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that suchdisappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support oracquiescence of the government. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforceddisappearances or threats thereof.

"Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, orabduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or apolitical organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or togive information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removingfrom the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive thefollowing elements that constitute it:(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the Stateor a political organization;(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or giveinformation on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of thelaw for a prolonged period of time.


Title: Lourdes Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871

FactsOn 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa

Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and SecuritySquadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite.She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a weekafter relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be amilitary asset.Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaintwith the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrarydetention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, butnothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to theDasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resultedfrom their investigation.

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation whichindicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abductionof Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo withthe Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist fromperforming any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsmanto immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravatingcircumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and forrespondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.Issue

Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an Amparopetition.Ruling

No. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparoproceedings Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied underinternational law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. There is no Philippinelaw that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility Whilethere are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law thatprovides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended thatcommand responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to thisjurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes aprinciple of international law or customary international law in accordance with theincorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to theseproceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as aform of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, ifthere be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in suchproceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infractionof an administrative rule may have been committed.

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not topose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in questionto its natural end.


Title: Daniel Masangkay vs. Judge Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484

FactsSpouses Gregorio and Mar Lourdes Samson filed a complaint for forcible entry and

damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against hereinpetitioner Daniel Masangkay Tapuz et al, for entering without permission and against theirobjection the disputed land in Aklan registered under the name of the spouses armed withbolos and carrying suspected firearms and unidentified persons numbering 120 and forbuilding a nipa and bamboo structure. The Municipal Trial Court decided in favor of thespouses, herein private respondent. The herein petitioners appealed the ruling to RegionalTrial Court which affirmed the decision and granted the issuance of writ of preliminaryinjunction and subsequently, ruled positively on the motion of the spouses to demolishedthe structure built by Masangkay Tapuz et. al. While their petition for review of thepermanent mandatory injunction and order of demolition at the Court of Appeals is pending,the sheriff issued notice to vacate and for demolition. Petitioners now seek the succor of theSupreme Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court andissuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo.

IssueWhether or not writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is the proper remedy.

RulingNo, the Supreme Court found the petition for certiorari and issuance of writ of habeas

data and writ of amparo as fatally defective in this case.

The writ of amparo does not issue to protect concerns that are purely property orcommercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Itwas originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings andenforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies toaddress these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to therights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond thoseavailable under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.

On the other hand, the writ on habeas data on the other hand, is intended to addressthe unjustified/unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty andsecurity, which was not concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of the writ.


Title: Fr. Robert Reyes vs. Raul Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161

FactsPetitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on

November 30, 2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crameto await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice(DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz andAristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there wasprobable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/orInciting to Rebellion. Upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalesissued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner ofImmigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration andDeportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned casein the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause againstpetitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed anInformation before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City. RTC issued an Order dismissing thecharge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitionerfiled the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case againstpetitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Every time petitioner would leave and return to thecountry, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutesbecause of the existing HDO.

IssueWhether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.Ruling

No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rightsthat fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rulesthereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. Therestriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminalcase filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his rightto travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a seriousviolation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily availablelegal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparodue to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitionersapprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat tohis right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by the Supreme Court isintended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or herright to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part inorder to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste itsprecious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.


Title: Noriel Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November15, 2011

FactsOn September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was

forced to confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he wasrepeatedly threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess thewhereabouts of NPA camp and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring that hehad surrendered to the military and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he becamea military asset. On his last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered tosign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scaredand desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anythingto the media.

On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petitionfor Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the Protection Order, Inspection of Place andProduction of Documents and Personal Properties. The Supreme Court granted therespective writs on December 15, 2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently allegedthat Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by the members of the 17 thInfantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

IssueWhether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after

the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

RulingThe Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of

temporary protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist thecourt before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interimreliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case,it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarilyentails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner theprivilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a ytemporary protection orderindependently of the former.


Title: So vs. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108 (2010)

FactsPetitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and

amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of QualifiedTheft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the institution of the criminalproceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment andcare at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest ofGuisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for BipolarMood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personalpsychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. Acting on the prosecutions Urgent Motion to ReferAccuseds Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisandes referral to theNCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisandes mental health to determine ifshe would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisandebe physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legalcustody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order ofconfinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that shewas ready for trial. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various eventsoccurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court, The Criminal Case forQualified Theft was dismissed.

Issue1. Is issuance of writ of amparo and habeas corpus a proper remedy based on the facts

at hand?2. Does the dismissal of the criminal case for qualified theft warrants the dismissal of

the petition for writ of habeas corpus and amparo?

Ruling

On the first issue, The Court ruled in the negative.The Rules on the Writs of HabeasCorpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omissioncomplained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat toviolate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.In this case , the confinement and custody of Accused Guisande is proper.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individualseeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under someform of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainted via some legal process, thewrit of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ ofhabeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntarydeprivation of freedom of action.

On the second issue, The court completely agreed with the OSG, that with thedismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril tobe confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes person,and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longerbe subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases havenow been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of superveningevents, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."


Title: Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165 (2009)

FactsRespondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses

Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused tovacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (theProvince) which intended to utilize it for local projects. Amanda and her co-respondentsrefused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of PermanentInjunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing thelatter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and otherforms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a motion for writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights.2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal

case already filed.

RulingOn the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of

Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protectionof rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats ofunlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v Manalo teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intendedto address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuzvs. Del Rosario also teaches: What is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purelyproperty or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertaingrounds.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, reposndents must meet the thresholdrequirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with anunlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property disputebetween the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexusbetween the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty, andsecurity, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation,imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitionerswill not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undueconfinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail forthe offenses a day after their arrest.

On the second issue, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo andhabeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them hadcommenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against inaccordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or theproceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents duringtrial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.


Title: Burgos vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155

FactsOn April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son

Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if theperson abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTOverification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLTvehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The poloce was able to generate cartographicsketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KACARLO, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elementsof the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. As for the PNP-CIDG, theCA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. The CA tooknote that P/Supt. Estomos investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt.Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56 th IB, and failed to consider them assuspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the PNP-CIDGs investigationshould focus on the criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of RepublicAct No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrestof criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.

IssueWhether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and

meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of theirduties is fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

RulingThe Supreme Court ruled that, Considering the findings of the CA and our review of

the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed toconduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos,and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Ruleon the Writ ofAmparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot ruleon the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, isundertaken. It was further noted that no independent investigation appeared to have beenmade by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonaswas abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unitRYG.

The case was referred to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agencytasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gatheringof evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to theCourt.


Title: Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010)

FactsIn the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the

failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibilityanent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinarydiligence on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court ordered theconduct of further investigations, this time, to be spearheaded by the Commission onHuman Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating agency for purposes of thispetition. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well as arecommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, retained jurisdiction of thiscase. Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the investigations and submit tothe Court its own report and recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, finaldisposition.

IssueCan the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal

appearance of confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegationsunder oath?

Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that while the CHRinvestigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate anyof the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized.CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHRinvestigations were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone inparticular for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither didthe ocular inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conductedby the CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.

The Court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region IIIconfidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summaryhearing before the Court of Appeals will serve as a huge step towards identifying thepersons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. Certainly, it may aid an on-goinginvestigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right direction. Before disposingof this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every possible lead ortheory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.


Title: Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010)

FactsCleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of

Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the thenChief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved toissue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ beforethe Court of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include MarcianaMedina ) and to implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos astherein additional respondents.

In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sonsNicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, BarangayBueno,Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the wives of Nicolas, namely,Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed menin soldiers uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdezand Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers,pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged thatJosephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp ofthe Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ ofAmparo, the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspectionof certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, andthe rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.Issue

1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to provethat the public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of theirduty is ground for the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.

2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule isproper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance ofthe alleged victim.

Ruling

As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required inAmparo petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinarydiligence in the performance of their duty the requirement for a government official oremployee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses theextraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizens constitutionalrights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforceddisappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinarydiligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilegeof the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim bysubstantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides,however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interimreliefs.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisionalremedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before itarrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition Section 14 of theAmparo Ruleprovides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia,protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, Theseprovisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judiciousdetermination of the amparo petition.


Title: Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)

FactsMarynette Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, filed a petition for the issuance ofwrit of habeas data before the Regional Trial Court alleging that her right to privacy wasviolated by her supposed inclusion in the enumeration of indiiduals maintaining a privatearmy group in the report of the Philippine National Police, made pursuant to theadministrative order no. 275 by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. She also prayed fordestruction of the report which she claimed was unverified and to restrain the PNP fromforwarding it. The RTC denied her petition for failure to establish the source of theinformation.

IssueWhether or not the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.

Ruling

No, it is not proper. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court cited the ruling of theEuropean Commission on Human Rights in Leander vs Sweden which it says, illustrates howthe right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yieldto an overriding legitimate state interest. While the Court held that petitioner establishedthat the PNP was indeed the source of the report, she nevertheless failed to impute that theleakage came to third parties on the PNP and such made her and her supporters moresusceptible to harassment and increased police surveillance. The Court ruled, takingcognizance of the Constitutional fiat of dismantling private armed groups, the state interestoutweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa as the collection of forwardingof the report was pursuant to a lawful mandate.

In this case, the Court also cautioned investigating entities that information sharingmust observe strict confidentiality and the intelligence gathered must be releasedexclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information.

It must be emphasized the in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, theremust exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life , libertyor security on the other.


Title: Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010)

FactsRosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at

the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of theMetering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at whichrespondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOSMONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONGPALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB. Copies of the letter were also inserted in thelockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter to thePlaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum, petitioner AlexanderDeyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent toMERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 inlight of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against[her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety andsecurity. Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President,appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns andmisgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to adenial of due process. Citing the gruelling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabangand back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective BargainingAgreement (CBA). Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation ofher transfer. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition forthe issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Bulacan.IssueWhether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the Rule on the Writ ofHabeas Data.Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. Respondents plea that she be spared fromcomplying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector,under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, doesnot fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue toprotect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support ofthe petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right underthe context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondentsreservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the termsand conditions of ones employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinaryremedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with theNLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presentedthat petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right toprivacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her posture unwittingly concedes thatthe issue is labor-related.


Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of Court)Title: Hagans vs. Wislizenus, No. 16680 (1920)

FactsThis is an original petition for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are

admitted by a demurrer. The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that theprovision of Act 190 permit him to appoint assessors in special proceedings. The petitionercontends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of assessors in suchproceedings.

IssueWhether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in special proceedings, is

authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due toan administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, andsettlement of the estate of a deceased person.

RulingThe Court held that in the proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First

Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. The only provisions of law which couldpermit this are sections 153 161 of Act appointment of assessors in a special proceedingare sections 153 161 of Act No. 190. Section 154 provides that either party to an actionmay apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of suchapplication, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided

Upon examination of Section 1 of Act 190, there is a distinction between an actionand a special proceeding. Said section 1 provides that an action means an ordinary suitin a court of justice, while every other remedy furnished by law is a special proceeding.


Title: Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242 (2001)

FactsTroadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his

eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age. The Respondents, who are eight (8) of thesurviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent RegionalTrial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, TroadioManalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, alleging that there wasabsence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.According to them, the petition is an ordinary civil action involving members of the samefamily hence the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rulesof Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground thata condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with.

Issue1. Whether or not the case on hand is in the nature of an ordinary civil action involving

members of the same family.2. Is Article 222 of the civil code applicable to Special proceeding cases?

RulingWith regard to the first issue, the Court declared that the nature of the case partakes

that of a Special proceeding. The court reiterated that it is a fundamental rule that in thedetermination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character ofthe relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. Thesaid petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement ofestate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio, as well as hisresidence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of thedecedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all thesubsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also contains anenumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left bythe deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, therelief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of thepetitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate oftheir deceased father, Troadio Manalo. Although, it contains certain averments which may betypical of an ordinary civil action, the Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purposeof the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The rule hasalways been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant natureof an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defensescontained in the answer.

As to the second issue, the Court declared that Art. 222 of the civil code whichprovides that : " No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same familyunless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but thatthe same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035" is applicable only to ordinarycivil actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from the term 'suit' that itrefers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice inwhich the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injuryor the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filedin a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or theprevention or redress of a wrong.


Title: Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

FactsSpouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel ofland. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, enteredinto an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing amongthemselves the mentioned real property. In 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner PatriciaNatcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to hiswife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,as heirs. The private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioner before RTC Manila.They alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment offraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear thatGraciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation ofTCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence ofsuch fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

IssueMay a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for

reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to thesettlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancementof property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Ruling

The Court answered in the negative. The court ruled that an action for reconveyanceand annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlementof the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the applicationof specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.Matters which involve settlement anddistribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probatecourt in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules ofCourt, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased toany heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estateproceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raisingthe questions and on the heir.

In the case at hand, RTC is acting in its general jurisdiction is devoid of authority torender an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor ofherein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as aprobate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedentGraciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.


Title: Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)

FactsRespondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of

administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui,Tarlac. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, ErlindaLising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents ErnestoLising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalitiesof Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which wereallegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of abond, pending settlement and distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs

Petitioner Anna Reyes opposed such petition, claiming that she was an adopted childof Lising and the latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos. She asserted that the petitionshould be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, sinceshe was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She hasattached, as supplement to her opposition, the judicial decree issued under seal by the CivilRegistrar. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition forannulment of the adoption decree. They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption ofpetitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioners natural mothersupposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adoptedby the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing was published in aweekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.Issue

Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that petitioner had to prove heradoption due to imputations of irregularities in view of Section 47 of Rule 39.Ruling

No, petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than thosewhich she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted acertification from the local civil registrars office. Both certifications were issued under theseal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumedto have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. Itshould be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by law to beentered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicialpronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as wellas the court which rendered the judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public recordsmade in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the factstherein stated. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on theadoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof tothe contrary is offered.


Title: Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)

FactsSpouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American

citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entireestate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in real estate improvements atForbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Twoyears after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, exceptfor his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Petitioner, as ancillaryadministrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion todeclare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. Themotion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator withregards to Richards will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undividedinterest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereofwas allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the lawof the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee theentire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.Issue

Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under thecircumstances.Ruling

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the landof the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, inexceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack ofjurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested ina probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason ofcircumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable tonegligence. Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estateaccording to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted toextrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.


Title: Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)

FactsPetitioner Crisologo Domingo filed for the registration of parcels of lands in Tagaytay

and was opposed by Landicho et. al. During the pendency of the case, Domingo died and hislawyer failed to inform the court. The Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, but was laterreversed by the Court of Appeals. The heirs of Domingo interposed the defense that therewas no valid substitution of parties and therefore, they are not bound by the reversal of theCourt of Appeals. Hence, they now come to the succor of the Supreme Court.

IssueWhether or not failure to substitute parties is fatal to the proceedings.

Ruling

Yes, the Supreme Court held that when a party dies in an action that survives and noorder is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs ofthe deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution hasbeen effected , the proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or heirsand the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void, because the court acquired nojurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom trial andjudgment would be binding. However, in this case, the Court deemed objection on thejurisdiction over the person of the parties as waived as the surviving heirs participated in thepresent petition, albeit belatedly.


Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

Title: Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 133359 (2000)

FactsOn July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he

had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo deSantos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximatevalue of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of thenamed executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On Feb. 16 1996, MakatiRTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing thewill, the court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died.

Petitioner (testators nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceaseds sisterAlicia de santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditorof the deceased. Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in MakatiBranch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTCBranch 65. Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating againhe was a full blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter waspending in Branch 61.

Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61. Meanwhile Judge Gorospe inBranch 61 denied the petitioners motion to intervene, and denied taking cognizance of thecase forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of DecentArturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when hewas alive and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and again tookcognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.

Issue1 Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate

proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.2 Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance

of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.3 Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a

right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filedby the respondent.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioners contentionthat that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawfulheirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court iswithout merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court islimited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being ofsound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.This was already done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr. De Santos will during his lifetime.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was


nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the willpursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule73, 1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of thePhilippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, orletters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in theprovince in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreigncountry, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court firsttaking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction tothe exclusion of all other courts.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for thesettlement of the estate of deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define thejurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law ofprocedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction overthe subject matter is another.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates withapproximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in MetroManila) belongs to the regional trial courts. The different branches comprising each court inone judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with eachother.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petitionfor probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of thesame court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after hisdeath.

Lastly, regarding petitioners claim as heir and creditor the Court said that Theprivate respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo deSantos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateralrelative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since thedecedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his propertiesthe private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in thedecedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of theestate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to theopposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported byevidence.


Title: Malig vs. Bush, G.R. No. L-22761 (1969)

FactsThe plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural

children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush; that thedefendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secureher appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased; that she submitted to thecourt for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will; thatthe defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of thedeceased; and that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by thedefendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the project of partition be annulled. Thedefendant filed a motion to dismiss stating that since the action was one to annul a projectof partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could takecognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.Issue

Whether or not the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional ground based on Rule75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) of the Rules of Court.Ruling

No. The case should be remanded for further proceedings. Section 1 of Rule 73 of theRules of Court fixes the jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlementof the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of thedecedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the captionof Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assumejurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all othercourts."

In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition alreadymade and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that anew partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their allegedinheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived.

Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, the Courtbelieves that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.


Title: Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906

FactsPrivate respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk

of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile thepetitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was laterwithdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez wassubsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal ofthe special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purportedwill, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.Issue

Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

Ruling

Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon thedelivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowancewas filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the correspondingnotices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules ofCourt. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlementof the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts,intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy onlytakes place in the absence of a valid operative will.


Title: Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24742

FactsSenator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two

minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters ofAdministration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator diedintestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. Whilepetition was still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed apetition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was namedexecutrix. Hence, Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but thiscourt held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted onthe probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon,on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu alreadyacquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss weredenied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFIQuezon.

IssueWhether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in

taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings inpursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence ofprobate over intestate proceedings.

Ruling

The rules on venue and jurisdiction, under Rule 73, provides that the court first takingcognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. However, upon learning that a petition for probate of thedecedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously hadhis conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and thatthe allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate maybe actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition beforeit in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition forprobate of the decedent's alleged last will. The residence of the decent or the location of hisestate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If thiswere otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. Therefore, the CFI ofQuezon City did not act with grave abuse of discretion nor it acted without jurisdiction.


Title: San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No.

FactsThe case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his

lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first marriage contracted in 1942 hehad six children, two of whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 andhis second marriage to an American citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, the respondent in this case, in the USA. They had nochildren but lived together for 18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.After Felicisimo death,Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and filed a petition forletters of administration. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage opposed this onthe grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wifesubsisting. The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot begiven retroactive effect to validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair thevested rights of Felicisimo is legitimate children.Issue

Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters ofadministration?Ruling

Yes, Felicidad haslegal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may beconsidered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during theircohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by aninterested person.


Title: Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. L-31174 (1972)

FactsPetitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for review

by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, ManuelSosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. Itappearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this CourtSpecial Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the deceased RosinaMarguerite Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of herestate. It being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceasedperson and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court orbranch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement (Branch VIII) in thiscase. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in hiscomplaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Courtof First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelonapresiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The Petitoner filed a separate civil case inBranch X, seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina.Issue

Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance can legallyinterfere with, or pass upon the validity of said orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as theprobate court.Ruling

No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of thedecedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of theestate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residuethereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of allother courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement ofthe estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII ofthe Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of theCourt of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlementof the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is stillpending. The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of adeceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administrationof that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court,which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to twoor more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. TheCourt cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actionscovering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is undulyburdening the courts.


Title: Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148

FactsCapili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his wife,

cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamedBernardo. Reyes died the following year. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernando, executor ofthe estate of Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs. Theexecutor filed a project of partition in the estate proceeding in accordance with the terms ofthe will, adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception ofReyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. These relatives filed anopposition to the executors project of partition and submitted a counter-projection of theirown, claiming of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Capili on the theorythat they belong not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for the reason that itfalls under Article 133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between spouses during themarriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both projects of partition and directedthe executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testamentof Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, between the instituted heirsof Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of thedeceased spouses.

IssueWhether or not a probate court in special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine

the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title orownership of the properties mentioned in the will.

Ruling

The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Court held that thedetermination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Theprobate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to liquidate the conjugalpartnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributedamong his heirs who are all parties, who are all parties to the proceedings, including thewidow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted uponpetition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.

The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputedlands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in questionthe issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of probate court.


Title: Ermac vs. Medelo, G.R. No. L-32281 (1975)

Facts

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent court in itsSpecial Proceeding No. 1517 approving the project of partition filed by private respondent,pursuant to the order of the same court providing for summary settlement of the intestateestate of the deceased spouses Potenciano