Consequences NewMadrid EQ Aug2008 USGS

8/12/2019 Consequences NewMadrid EQ Aug2008 USGS

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Consequences ResultingConsequences Resulting

from a Major Earthquake infrom a Major Earthquake inthe Central U.S.the Central U.S.

for thefor theNew Madrid Seismic Zone ConferenceNew Madrid Seismic Zone Conference

Wednesday August 13, 2008Wednesday August 13, 2008Rolla, MissouriRolla, Missouri

J. David RogersJ. David Rogers

Missouri University of

Science & Technology


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ActiveActive

MidwestMidwest

SeismicSeismic

ZonesZones

New Madrid SeismicNew Madrid SeismicZone rediscovered inZone rediscovered in1973 NRC study of West1973 NRC study of WestMemphis power plantMemphis power plant

Wabash Valley SeismicWabash Valley SeismicZone generated M 5+Zone generated M 5+quakes in 1968, 1987,quakes in 1968, 1987,and 2008.and 2008.

South Central IllinoisSouth Central Illinoisspawned a M 5+ quakesspawned a M 5+ quakesin 1838, 1857, and 1891.in 1838, 1857, and 1891.Initially recognized inInitially recognized in1999.1999.


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TheThe 1895 M6.0 Charleston, MO earthquake1895 M6.0 Charleston, MO earthquake affected an area 20Xaffected an area 20X

greater than an equivalent magnitude quake in Californiagreater than an equivalent magnitude quake in California


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EARTHQUAKE SHAKINGI N T E N S I T Y

versusD I S T A N C E

Midwest quakes are less frequent, but much more lethal thanMidwest quakes are less frequent, but much more lethal thanCalifornia quakes because there isCalifornia quakes because there is less dampingless damping of seismicof seismicenergy.energy.

Conclusion: DonConclusion: Don t use chartst use charts

generated with seismic datagenerated with seismic datataken from California !taken from California !


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Shaking IntensityShaking Intensity

alsoalso

Varies from One Area toVaries from One Area toAnotherAnother


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Seismic Site ResponseSeismic Site Response

The type, depth and size of fault, combined with physicalThe type, depth and size of fault, combined with physicalproperties of crust and geophysical properties of overlyingproperties of crust and geophysical properties of overlying

surficialsurficial soils, all combine to affectsoils, all combine to affect site responsesite response..


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Magnitude 6.8 quake

emanating from

South Central Illinoisat 110 km

Effect of SoilEffect of SoilThicknessThickness

on Peak Groundon Peak Ground

AccelerationAcceleration(PGA)(PGA)

ff f S


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Effect of SoilEffect of SoilThicknessThickness

on RESPONSEon RESPONSE

SPECTRASPECTRA


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Variation in expectedVariation in expected spectral accelerationspectral acceleration withwith alluvial thicknessalluvial thickness

in the St Louis, MO areain the St Louis, MO area


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Left Deeper alluvial cover (~31 m) tends to magnifylong period (SA 1.0 sec) motions

Middle Medium alluvial cover (~18 m) tends tomagnify motions for 0.2 sec SA

Right Upland sites mantled by loess tend to magnifybedrock motion because of impeedance contrastbetween bedrock and soil cap.


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Future Earthquake Hazard Mapsuture Earthquake Hazard Maps The earthquakeThe earthquake

hazard maps ofhazard maps oftomorrow willtomorrow will

likely looklikely looksomething likesomething likethis;this;

highlightinghighlightingthose areasthose areasunderlain byunderlain by

unconsolidatedunconsolidatedalluviumalluvium, along, alongmajor rivermajor riverchannelschannels


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What would be theWhat would be the

Economic Impacts of aEconomic Impacts of aMagnitude 6.0 to 6.8Magnitude 6.0 to 6.8

EarthquakeEarthquake..if it happenedif it happenedtomorrow?tomorrow?


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What would get whacked in aWhat would get whacked in a

Magnitude 6.5 earthquake ?Magnitude 6.5 earthquake ? Structures sitting on alluvium and otherStructures sitting on alluvium and other

unconsolidated materials deeper than about 15 metersunconsolidated materials deeper than about 15 meters(50 feet)(50 feet)

Structures or improvements situated on filled ground,Structures or improvements situated on filled ground,where fill + alluvium thickness > 15 mwhere fill + alluvium thickness > 15 m

Taller structures, with fundamentals periods ofTaller structures, with fundamentals periods ofvibration > 0.70 secondsvibration > 0.70 seconds

Embankments placed on unconsolidated alluvialEmbankments placed on unconsolidated alluvialmaterials, where fil l + alluvium > 15 m thickmaterials, where fil l + alluvium > 15 m thick

Tall structures (>8 stories) situated on old soilTall structures (>8 stories) situated on old soil --filledfilledbasins greater than 25 to 35 m thickbasins greater than 25 to 35 m thick


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Critical Infrastructure that would likelyCritical Infrastructure that would likely

be impacted by a M 6.5 earthquake:be impacted by a M 6.5 earthquake: Multiple span bridges; in particular, tail spansMultiple span bridges; in particular, tail spans

Buried oil, gas, coal slurry, water, and sewerBuried oil, gas, coal slurry, water, and sewerpipelines crossing flood plainspipelines crossing flood plains

High voltage (tall tower) transmission linesHigh voltage (tall tower) transmission lines

crossing flood plainscrossing flood plains Power plants situated along major riverPower plants situated along major river

channelschannels

Water treatment and sewage treatment plantsWater treatment and sewage treatment plantsalong channelsalong channels

Underground storage tanksUnderground storage tanks


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NonNon--critical transportation infrastructurecritical transportation infrastructureelements that would likely be affected:elements that would likely be affected:

Barge traffic on navigable channels (manyBarge traffic on navigable channels (manyunknowns, but lateral spreads likely)unknowns, but lateral spreads likely)

Fuel pumps made inoperative by loss ofFuel pumps made inoperative by loss ofelectricityelectricity

Drainage ditch network in reclaimed floodDrainage ditch network in reclaimed flood

plainsplains Railroad corridorsRailroad corridors

Interstate and secondary highway networkInterstate and secondary highway network

Airport runways, and fuel handling facilitiesAirport runways, and fuel handling facilities

Municipal offMunicipal off--stream water storage tanksstream water storage tanks

and water distribution systemsand water distribution systems


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Major Refined Oil Products PipelinesMajor Refined Oil Products Pipelines

Refined productRefined productservice lines conveyservice lines conveypetroleum productspetroleum productsbetween refineries andbetween refineries and

major metropolitanmajor metropolitanmarkets, from whichmarkets, from whichthese products arethese products aredistributed.distributed.

Significant disruptionSignificant disruptionof the domestic refinedof the domestic refinedproduct distributionproduct distributionlineslines has neverhas never

occurredoccurred TheThe shock factorshock factor ofof

fuel unavailabilityfuel unavailabilitywould bewould beunprecedented, likelyunprecedented, likelynecessitating rationingnecessitating rationing

C d Oil dC d Oil d


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Crude Oil andCrude Oil and

Natural GasNatural Gas

PipelinesPipelines

This map shows the largestThis map shows the largest

crude oil transmission lines incrude oil transmission lines inthe New Madrid Seismic Zonethe New Madrid Seismic Zone

5 of the 6 main l ines crossing5 of the 6 main lines crossingthe Mississippi River could bethe Mississippi River could be

compromised in a Magnitudecompromised in a Magnitude6.5 earthquake emanating6.5 earthquake emanatingfrom the NMSZfrom the NMSZ

4 of 9 lines crossing the upper4 of 9 lines crossing the upperMississippi Embayment couldMississippi Embayment couldalso be compromised in aalso be compromised in aMagnitude 6.5 quakeMagnitude 6.5 quake

L t t ti f i liL t t ti f i li


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St. Louis Area PipelinesSt. Louis Area PipelinesSt. Louis Area Pipelines

Largest concentration of pipelinesLargest concentration of pipelinescrossing the Mississippi River occurscrossing the Mississippi River occurs

in St. Charles County, just above thein St. Charles County, just above the

confluence of Missouri andconfluence of Missouri andMississippiMississippi

Corridor of Vulnerability:Corridor of Vulnerability:


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Corridor of Vulnerability:Corridor of Vulnerability:

Pipelines in St. Charles CountyPipelines in St. Charles County

There are 7 majorThere are 7 majorpipelines crossing thepipelines crossing theMississippi River inMississippi River in

eastern St. Charleseastern St. CharlesCountyCounty

All of these lines areAll of these lines areburied in the looseburied in the loose

unconsolidatedunconsolidatedsediments of thesediments of theMissouriMissouri--MississippiMississippiRiver flood plain mostRiver flood plain mostsusceptible tosusceptible to

liquefactionliquefaction Spillage wouldSpil lage would

contaminate thecontaminate themunicipal water supplymunicipal water supply

for St. Louisfor St. Louis Chain of Rocks Water Treatment Plant

Fib O ti C blFiber Optic Cables


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Fiber Optic CablesFiber Optic Cables

They can transmit tremendous amounts of data whenThey can transmit tremendous amounts of data whencompared to electrical conductors, such as coppercompared to electrical conductors, such as copperwire.wire.

Third Generation Fiber Optical Cables can transmitThird Generation Fiber Optical Cables can transmit 1010tril lion bits per second down a single strandtril lion bits per second down a single strand, using the, using thesame cables buried 25 years ago!same cables buried 25 years ago!

This is the same amount of data stored on 1,900 fullThis is the same amount of data stored on 1,900 full --length audio CDs or 150 million simultaneous phonelength audio CDs or 150 million simultaneous phoneconversations.conversations.

Are composed of thinAre composed of thinstrands of glass or plasticstrands of glass or plasticbundled together.bundled together.

Transfer laser light throughTransfer laser light throughthese fibers using thethese fibers using theprinciple of total internalprinciple of total internalreflection.reflection.

MajorMajor


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MajorMajor

FiberFiber

OpticOpticCableCable

RoutesRoutesin thein the

St. LouisSt. Louis

MetroMetroAreaArea

Major riverMajor rivercrossings arecrossings aremarked withmarked withblack 4 pointblack 4 point

starsstars30 switching offices in STL area30 switching offices in STL area


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A lot of people have expressedA lot of people have expressed

concern about the vitality of theconcern about the vitality of thenationnationss Electric Power GridElectric Power Grid

Is there enough energy to meetIs there enough energy to meet

the needs ?the needs ?

Answer: There IS sufficient power (e.g.enough generators) available to meetthe US national load..

AmerenUEAmerenUE


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AmerenUEAmerenUE

Power PlantsPower Plants Impact of power generationImpact of power generation

loss depends on a numberloss depends on a number

of factors, including theof factors, including thetime of year or decade thattime of year or decade thatan earthquake strikes.an earthquake strikes.

Biggest impacts would beBiggest impacts would beonon stalling disasterstalling disasterrecoveryrecovery, and some short, and some shortterm overloading of theterm overloading of the

surrounding transmissionsurrounding transmissiongridgrid

Recovery time is greatestRecovery time is greatest

single impact on economicsingle impact on economiclossloss

M P Pl tM P Pl t


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Many Power PlantsMany Power Plants

located along riverslocated along rivers Most fossil fuel andMost fossil fuel and

nuclear power plantsnuclear power plantsare located onare located onunconsolidatedunconsolidatedalluviumalluvium

The greatest numberThe greatest numberof plants are locatedof plants are locatedalong the Mississippialong the Mississippiand Missouri Riversand Missouri Rivers

The New MadridThe New Madridpower plant is shownpower plant is shownat upper leftat upper left


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Transmission NetworkTransmission Network

The most vulnerable aspect of our power grid isThe most vulnerable aspect of our power grid is

problem we have isproblem we have is transmissiontransmission -- getting thegetting thepower from where it is generated to where thepower from where it is generated to where thedemand centers are.demand centers are.

Many large plants (coal, nuclear, hydro) areMany large plants (coal, nuclear, hydro) aregeographically remote from our urban centersgeographically remote from our urban centers

If one of the major transportation corridorsIf one of the major transportation corridorsgoes down, thengoes down, then transmission congestiontransmission congestionoccurs and power lines overloadoccurs and power lines overload causingcausing

cascading failures.cascading failures.


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Not in My Backyardot in My Backyard. TransmissionTransmission gridlockgridlock is only going to getis only going to get

worse in the next decade, because while thereworse in the next decade, because while there

is sufficient generation, there are not sufficientis sufficient generation, there are not sufficienthigh voltage transmission lineshigh voltage transmission lines nobodynobodywants a large transmission line going nearwants a large transmission line going near

their property.their property.

There was the electromagnetic field scare aThere was the electromagnetic field scare a

few years ago when people thought that thefew years ago when people thought that theEMF was causing cancer (this was ultimatelyEMF was causing cancer (this was ultimatelydisproved, but people are still very wary) anddisproved, but people are still very wary) and

besides, transmission lines are unsightly.besides, transmission lines are unsightly.

High Voltage Electrical TransmissionHigh Voltage Electrical Transmission


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High Voltage Electrical TransmissionHigh Voltage Electrical TransmissionLines CrissLines Criss--Crossing the New MadridCrossing the New Madrid

Seismic ZoneSeismic Zone TransmissionTransmission

towers foundedtowers foundedon >15 m ofon >15 m ofunconsolidatedunconsolidatedsedimentsediment in majorin major

flood plains canflood plains canbe expected tobe expected toexperienceexperiencefoundation failure,foundation failure,

dropping the linesdropping the lines Reconstruction ofReconstruction of

downed towersdowned towerswill be expensivewill be expensive

and timeand time--consumingconsuming

Why does it take so long forWhy does it take so long for


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Why does it take so long forWhy does it take so long for

power to be restored whenpower to be restored whenoutages occur?outages occur?

This is a failure of the distribution system (asThis is a failure of the distribution system (asopposed to the transmission system).opposed to the transmission system). WhenWhenmany, many low voltage lines are damagedmany, many low voltage lines are damaged(such as ice, wind, etc.) they have to be manually(such as ice, wind, etc.) they have to be manually

repaired.repaired. The recovery time depends onThe recovery time depends on manpowermanpower

availabilityavailability .. Many major metropolitan areas haveMany major metropolitan areas have

similar problems.similar problems. They only way to protectThey only way to protectagainst this is to put lines undergroundagainst this is to put lines underground butbutthis is more expensive and underground linesthis is more expensive and underground linesare subject to interruptions caused by flooding.are subject to interruptions caused by flooding.



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LinesLines CrissCriss--Crossing the NMSZCrossing the NMSZ

TransmissionTransmissiontowers founded ontowers founded on

>15 m of>15 m ofunconsolidatedunconsolidatedsediment in majorsediment in majorflood plains can beflood plains can be

expected toexpected toexperienceexperiencefoundation bearingfoundation bearingfailure, droppingfailure, dropping

the linesthe lines Reconstruction ofReconstruction of

downed towers willdowned towers willbe expensive andbe expensive and

timetime--consumingconsuming

Highway andHighway and


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Highway andHighway and

Railway BridgesRailway Bridges Only one major highwayOnly one major highway

bridge south of St. Louisbridge south of St. Louishas been designed to resisthas been designed to resist

earthquake ground motionsearthquake ground motions The newer highway bridgesThe newer highway bridges

in St. Louis, constructedin St. Louis, constructedsince 1995, have beensince 1995, have beendesigned for seismic loadsdesigned for seismic loads

The IThe I--64/US 40 double deck64/US 40 double decksection in downtown Stsection in downtown StLouis is being retrofit tedLouis is being retrofittedfor seismic loadingfor seismic loading

None of the railroadNone of the railroadbridges have beenbridges have beendesigned or detailed fordesigned or detailed forseismic loadsseismic loads

Damage toDamage to


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gg

Highways andHighways and

RailroadsRailroads Upper plot shows levels ofUpper plot shows levels of

expected damage toexpected damage tohighways in the NMSZ areahighways in the NMSZ area

The lower plot showsThe lower plot showsexpected damage to theexpected damage to the

railroad networkrailroad network crisscriss--crossing the NMSZcrossing the NMSZ

Rail and truck traffic wouldRail and truck traffic would

have to be rehave to be re--routed to therouted to thenorth and south whilenorth and south whilerestorative work isrestorative work iscompletedcompleted

Data from FEMA (1994)Data from FEMA (1994)


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How does theHow does the

1)1) Speed of RecoverySpeed of Recovery ;;

2)2)

Ease of RecoveryEase of Recovery

;;

3)3) Time Span of RecoveryTime Span of Recovery ;;

and, 4)and, 4) Public Perception ofPublic Perception ofRecovery SuccessRecovery Success

Influence theInfluence the EconomicEconomicImpact of the Disaster ?Impact of the Disaster ?

Public Confidence:Public Confidence: Who will be inWho will be in


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charge of the recovery, and managecharge of the recovery, and manage

it wisely ?it wisely ? Answer:Answer: fourfour

separateseparateDHS/FEMADHS/FEMARegionsRegionsshareshare

jurisdictionjurisdictionin the Newin the NewMadridMadridSeismicSeismic

ZoneZone

Disaster PlanningDisaster Planning that tricklesthat trickles


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ggdown to the local bus drivers isdown to the local bus drivers is

essential for recoveryessential for recovery Local government agencies have to developLocal government agencies have to develop coherentcoherent

disaster plansdisaster plans,, posted on the Internetposted on the Internet for everyone to seefor everyone to seeand understand, especially teachers (e.g. 1962 Cubanand understand, especially teachers (e.g. 1962 CubanMissile Crisis)Missile Crisis)

Those same agencies need to conductThose same agencies need to conduct periodic disasterperiodic disasterresponse exercisesresponse exercises

Every personEvery person who will be tapped in an emergencywho will be tapped in an emergency needs toneeds toknow what will be expected of themknow what will be expected of them; such as:; such as: bus drivers,bus drivers,medical personnel, law enforcement, etc.medical personnel, law enforcement, etc.

Disaster plansDisaster plans need to include contingencies for extendedneed to include contingencies for extended

loss of: power, vehicle access, fuel availabili ty, sanitation,loss of: power, vehicle access, fuel availability, sanitation,communications, and lifeline supportcommunications, and lifeline support

Mobilizing FEMAMobilizing FEMA doesndoesn t solve any of these problemst solve any of these problemsimmediately, it only sets the rescue wheels into motion; e.g.immediately, it only sets the rescue wheels into motion; e.g.

calling the cavalrycalling the cavalry

Restoration ofRestoration of


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Restoration ofRestoration of

the Power Gridthe Power Grid In todayIn todays culture, thes culture, the

economic impact of beingeconomic impact of being

without electrical power iswithout electrical power isstupendousstupendous

Our information technologyOur information technologybased culture canbased culture can t survivet survivefor more than a few daysfor more than a few dayswithout electricitywithout electricity

Businesses forced toBusinesses forced to

relocate rarely return torelocate rarely return totheir original pretheir original pre--disasterdisasterlocations, because of thelocations, because of thecostcost

Portage des Sioux power plant nearconfluence of Missouri and MississippiRivers

Hidden Costs LurkHidden Costs Lurk


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Hidden Costs LurkHidden Costs Lurk

EverywhereEverywhere One of the hidden costs of earthquakes is theirOne of the hidden costs of earthquakes is their

impact on retail businessimpact on retail business The 1989 LomaThe 1989 Loma PrietaPrieta and 1994 Northridgeand 1994 Northridge

earthquakes saw a record number of business failuresearthquakes saw a record number of business failuresoccur in the wake of these events. Impact lasted foroccur in the wake of these events. Impact lasted for

10 years.10 years. Retail businesses cannot survive more than about 6Retail businesses cannot survive more than about 6

weeks without meaningful cash flowweeks without meaningful cash flow

70% of the downtown businesses in New Orleans has70% of the downtown businesses in New Orleans hasbeen lost since Hurricane Katrinabeen lost since Hurricane Katrina

The economic impact will likely extend over severalThe economic impact will likely extend over several

decades.decades.

Underground Storage TanksUnderground Storage Tanks


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Underground Storage TanksUnderground Storage Tanks

Underground fuel storageUnderground fuel storage

tanks tend to be lifted out oftanks tend to be lifted out ofthe ground duringthe ground during

earthquakes, if situatedearthquakes, if situatedclose to the permanentclose to the permanentgroundwater tablegroundwater table

This upward movementThis upward movementusually compromises theusually compromises thefeeder connections, negatingfeeder connections, negating

serviceabilityserviceability These leaks can also promoteThese leaks can also promote

costly cleancostly clean--upsups

AboveAbove--GroundGround


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Storage TanksStorage Tanks

AboveAbove--ground storage tanks are also susceptible toground storage tanks are also susceptible to

earthquakeearthquake--induced distress, especially partialinduced distress, especially partial

liquefaction of their foundation soils, shown here.liquefaction of their foundation soils, shown here.

Barge TrafficBarge Traffic


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Barge TrafficBarge Traffic

Waterborne commerceWaterborne commerce along the Mississippi River fluctuates withalong the Mississippi River fluctuates withthe cost of diesel fuelthe cost of diesel fuel; but continues to rise through each decade.; but continues to rise through each decade.

Barges provide an environmentally clean alternative (much lowerBarges provide an environmentally clean alternative (much lowerCOCO22 emissions per tonemissions per ton--mile) and redundancy frommile) and redundancy from

rail and truck transportrail and truck transport


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So, What Will Be theSo, What Will Be the

Final Cost?inal Cost?

@ t t FEMA t di@ t t FEMA t di


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@ to recent FEMA studies@ to recent FEMA studies....

A 1994 study estimated that a repeat of a M 7.5 toA 1994 study estimated that a repeat of a M 7.5 to

7.7 event on the New Madrid Seismic Zone would7.7 event on the New Madrid Seismic Zone would

cause upwards ofcause upwards of $30 bill ion$30 bill ion in damagein damage

A 2006 study estimated that a M 7.7 event on theA 2006 study estimated that a M 7.7 event on thesouthwest arm of the NMSZ would cause $200southwest arm of the NMSZ would cause $200

million in hard damage to Memphis alone, andmillion in hard damage to Memphis alone, and $50 to$50 to$70 bill ion$70 bill ion in overall damage to the affected regionin overall damage to the affected region

Comparisons between projected damages andComparisons between projected damages and

actual damages are extremely complex, for manyactual damages are extremely complex, for manyreasons, not the least of which is that fickle factor soreasons, not the least of which is that fickle factor soaptly dubbedaptly dubbed public confidencepublic confidence

Actual economic impactsActual economic impacts


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Actual economic impactsActual economic impacts Local, Regional, and National ImpactsLocal, Regional, and National Impacts

FEMA HAZUS models do not come close toFEMA HAZUS models do not come close toaccurately gauging things likeaccurately gauging things like::

the infrastructure disruption impacts (asthe infrastructure disruption impacts (asopposed to structural damage)opposed to structural damage)

trickletrickle

--down economic impacts, such as loss ofdown economic impacts, such as loss of

confidence by consumersconfidence by consumers

People tend to hold onto their money after anyPeople tend to hold onto their money after anysort of disaster (e.g. 9/11)sort of disaster (e.g. 9/11)

e.g. record number of retail business failurese.g. record number of retail business failuresfollowing 1989 and 1994 earthquakes infollowing 1989 and 1994 earthquakes inCaliforniaCalifornia

OtherOther Spin OffSpin Off andand


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OtherOther Spin OffSpin Off andand

Spin DownSpin Down factorsfactors In Hurricane Katrina, the government isIn Hurricane Katrina, the government is

implementing a plan to remunerate thoseimplementing a plan to remunerate thosepeople who lost their homes and personalpeople who lost their homes and personalpropertyproperty

This process, along with reThis process, along with re--building, will likelybuilding, will likely

take 3 to 10 years, or longertake 3 to 10 years, or longer Adjacent residents may not have lost theirAdjacent residents may not have lost their

homes, but have lost:homes, but have lost:

1) their jobs/livelihood1) their jobs/livelihood 2) The ability to sell their homes and2) The ability to sell their homes and

relocaterelocate

3) Difficulty getting insurance3) Difficulty getting insurance

Regional versus NationalRegional versus National


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Regional versus NationalRegional versus National

Economic ImpactsEconomic Impacts When raw materials or product stockpiles areWhen raw materials or product stockpiles are

suddenly or unexpectedly reduced/or their flowsuddenly or unexpectedly reduced/or their flowis constricted; the news media reports theis constricted; the news media reports thePOTENTIAL shortagesPOTENTIAL shortages and all sorts ofand all sorts ofspeculation ensuesspeculation ensues....

This speculation can easily lead to inflatedThis speculation can easily lead to inflatedprices, which triggers consumer reaction; andprices, which triggers consumer reaction; and

We may witness unforeseeable consequences,We may witness unforeseeable consequences,such as a drop in sales of SUVs while everyonesuch as a drop in sales of SUVs while everyonewaits to see what will happen to the price ofwaits to see what will happen to the price ofgasoline at the pump.gasoline at the pump.

If spinIf spin off and spinoff and spin


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If spinIf spin--off and spinoff and spin--down losses are tied todown losses are tied to

public confidencepublic confidenceWhat influences thisWhat influences this

confidence in the wakeconfidence in the wake

of a disaster ?of a disaster ?

Television and Print MediaTelevision and Print Media


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Television and Print MediaTelevision and Print Media

Media coverageMedia coverage isis ESSENTIALESSENTIAL to the successto the successor failure of any emergency response scenarioor failure of any emergency response scenario

Media tends to search out stories that elicitMedia tends to search out stories that elicitemotional responsesemotional responses oror show graphic imagesshow graphic imagesto spike their viewing audienceto spike their viewing audience

Media market consultants recognize thatMedia market consultants recognize thatviewers tend to select one channel over allviewers tend to select one channel over allothers during any important eventothers during any important event , often, often

remaining loyal to that station thereafterremaining loyal to that station thereafter(e.g. CNN in 1990(e.g. CNN in 1990--91 Gulf War; Fox News in91 Gulf War; Fox News in2003 Iraq invasion)2003 Iraq invasion)

The Public Is Informed Through the MediaThe Public Is Informed Through the Media


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gg

The media swiftly deployed theirThe media swiftly deployed their bestbestcorrespondentscorrespondents into harminto harms way to report ons way to report on

conditions.conditions. Live streaming via satelliteLive streaming via satellite andand

video phone has changed viewervideo phone has changed viewers expectationss expectationsof being able to witness historic events whenof being able to witness historic events whenthey occurthey occur

The media depends onThe media depends on cuingcuing from: 1)from: 1)government agencies and officials; 2) the publicgovernment agencies and officials; 2) the public(via cell phones and e(via cell phones and e--mail); or, 3) from othermail); or, 3) from other

media outlets (local affi liates, wire services,media outlets (local affil iates, wire services,newspapers)newspapers)

They only report what failsThey only report what fails; not what remains; not what remains

standingstanding

Like it or not, we, as emergencyLike it or not, we, as emergency

d bli d t t th did bli d t t th di


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responders, are obliged to court the mediaresponders, are obliged to court the media

The television media covers theThe television media covers the breaking newsbreaking news as never beforeas never before

Those stories can install publicThose stories can install public

confidence or hinder itconfidence or hinder it We shouldnWe shouldn t forget that newst forget that news

networks are profitnetworks are profit --makingmaking

corporations operating in a highlycorporations operating in a highlycompetitive marketplacecompetitive marketplace

Courting positive media coverageCourting positive media coverageis not only an essential aspect ofis not only an essential aspect of

disaster response,disaster response, it will be goodit will be goodfor the nationfor the nations economy ands economy andbenefit the recoverybenefit the recovery, more than, more than

most scientists or engineersmost scientists or engineersrealize.realize.


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Thank Youhank YouThis presentation will be postedThis presentation will be postedon my website at:on my website at:

www.mst.edu/~rogersdawww.mst.edu/~rogersdaunder folder titledunder folder titled

Seismic Hazards in theSeismic Hazards in theMidwestMidwest
http://www.mst.edu/~rogersdahttp://www.mst.edu/~rogersdahttp://www.mst.edu/~rogersda

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Consequences NewMadrid EQ Aug2008 USGS