Constitutional choices

Consensus v. majoritarian democracies

Lijphart 2

Policy Areasy

Map ofMap of Program Options

Constitutions IDEA

Human rights, justice,

rule_lawAmnesty

Democratic governance

ElectionsACE/UNDP

Media freedom

Amnesty

governance UNDPIFES

Parlt, tiCivic

CPJ

parties, womenQuotas Project

PAR, decentralization, anti-corruption

TI

Civic society, soc

capCIVICUS

TI

Lijphart 3

Class Structure

I Lijphart’s typology of types of I. Lijphart s typology of types of democracy

II Majoritarian democracy II. Majoritarian democracy Case study of the UK May 2005 election

III Consensus democracy III. Consensus democracy Case study of the Swiss 2003 election

IV Discussion exercise IV. Discussion exercise What might be the arguments for adopting either type

of democracy for new constitutions in Iraq, Af h i t S d d N l?Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?

Lijphart 4

Additional resources

Pippa Norris Pippa Norris Driving Democracy (CUP 2008)

www pippanorris com (under ‘books’)www.pippanorris.com (under books ) Comparative Constitutions Project

http://netfiles uiuc edu/zelkins/constitutions http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions

International Constitutional Law DocumentsDocuments

http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/index.html

Lijphart 5

Lijphart 6

Lijphart 7

Theoretical framework: Lijphartjp

Arend Lijphart Arend Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968) Democracy in Plural Society (1979) Democracy in Plural Society (1979) Democracies (1984) Electoral systems and party systems (1994)y p y y ( ) Institutional design in new democracies (1996) Patterns of Democracy (1999) Thinking about Democracy (2008)

Lijphart 8

Why focus on constitutions?y

Institutions can influence democratic governance e.g.

Electoral rules have a mechanical impact on the number of parties in parliament and in governmentp p g

Executive-legislative relations influences state capacity for effective governance

Potential for practical political reforms e.g. Potential for practical political reforms e.g. Electoral reform in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitution-building in Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa,

Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, SudanAfghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan Peace-settlements in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Kosovo

2001, Northern Ireland 1998

Lijphart 9

Constitutions

Formal institutions Formal institutions Written constitutions, legal statutes,

administrative decisions, executive decrees, judicial rulings, budgetary allocations

Open to short-term political reform Informal institutions

Norms, values and common practices which h d t i h b h ishape and constrain human behavior

Open to long-term cultural evolution

Lijphart 10

Stages of Institutional Reformg

State building State building Post-conflict peace settlements

E.g. Afghanistan constitution

State reform Transition from autocracy

Eg Choice of electoral system in post-Communist statesEg Choice of electoral system in post Communist states Common in established democracies

Improving existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options p p

eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)

Lijphart 11

Consociational democracyy

Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensus Why? Constitutional arrangements Why? Constitutional arrangements

Executive power-sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in

elected/appointed officeelected/appointed office Cultural autonomy for groups

Model for other divided (plural) societies? E g Belgium Switzerland Lebanon Cyprus E.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus

Lijphart 12

Normative valuesMajoritarian

(Westminster) Consociational democracy( )

democracy Goals…

government accountability

democracy Goals…

consensual decision-making bargaining and government accountability

and transparency of decision-making

single-party executives,ff ti iti ti

making, bargaining and compromise

multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in coalition government and effective opposition parties,

vigorous parliamentary debate, and

decisive elections.

coalition government, and dispersed decision-making

processes. Yet dangers of decisive elections.

Yet dangers of elective dictatorship, permanent majorities,

g ineffective governance, extreme multiparty

fragmentation, l k f t bilit

lack of checks and balances.

lack of accountability.

Lijphart 13The logical sequence of consociational theoryconsociational theory

PR electoral systems or

reserved seats

Election ofethnic minority

partiesPeaceful

democratic consolidation

Greater support within minority communities

Plural societies

Federalism & decentralization

Election ofethnic minority

parties

Does the logic make sense? Criticisms?

Lijphart 14

Potential criticisms?

For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings gshaped by political structures and elites. Power-sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)g

Eg Bosnia-Herzegovina

By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote-pooling across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)

Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victoryM j it i l ti b ff ti i Majoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)

Lijphart 15

Types of DemocraciesypSource: Lijphart Democracies (1999)

Democracies

Majoritarian Mixed Consensus(Westminster) (Consociational)

egUK?

N Z l d?

egUSA

C t Ri

egEU

B l iNew Zealand?Barbados

Costa RicaFrance

BelgiumSwitzerland

Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

‘Majoritarian’ ModelEffective and accountable

‘Consensus’ ModelInclusive and representativep

Exec-Parties One-party cabinet Coalition government

Parliament Executive dominant Balanced exec-legislature

Party system Two-party Multi-party

Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional Representation

Interest groups Pluralist Corporatist

Federal-UnitaryFederal Unitary

Government Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federal

Parliament Unicameral Balanced BicameralParliament Unicameral Balanced Bicameral

Constitution Flexible More Rigid

Judiciary Parlt sovereign Judicial reviewJudiciary Parlt. sovereign Judicial review

Central Bank Dependent Independent

Lijphart 19Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

3

USGER

Consensual

eral

2SWI

CAN

AUT

AUL

ary-

Fede 1

0VEN

TRI

SPAPNGNET

MAUJPN

BELBAH

Uni

ta 0

1 UK

TRI

SWEPOR NORMAL

JAM ITA

ISR

IRE

ICE

GRE

FRA

FIN

DENCRBOTBAR

BAH

-1

-2

UK

NZ

Majoritarian

Executive-Parties

2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0j

Lijphart 20

Consensus democracy mattersy

For the inclusion of minority parties For the inclusion of minority parties For the protection of minority interests

F ’ t ti For women’s representation For public policy, economic outcomes,

and welfare states

II: Majoritarian institutions

Case study: UK 5th May 2005 y ygeneral election

Lijphart 22

Institutions: UK 1945-1997

Unwritten constitution – Magna Carta etc.g One-party cabinet government since 1945

Collective responsibility, primus inter pares

Two-party parliamentary competition Two-party parliamentary competition Labour and Conservative in govnt and opposition

Programmatic & disciplined partiesMass branch part organi ations fe independents fe Mass-branch party organizations, few independents, few backbench rebellions, manifesto program

Parliamentary sovereignty (no Supreme Court)U it t t (l l t d i i t ti ) Unitary state (local government administration)

Bicameral parliament but Commons predominant Plurality FPTP elections – exaggerates votes: seats u a ty e ect o s e agge ates otes seats

for winner

Lijphart 23

UK House of Commons, June 2005

923100%

62

Conservative

LibDems

197

50%

OthersNatsLd

Majority 66

355

50% LdemConLab

Labour

355

0%

MPs in UK House of Commons

Lijphart 24

UK Ballot paperp p

Lijphart 25

2005 UK election resultJune 2005 % of Votes % of seats Ratio Number of

seatsLabour 35.2 54.9 1.56 355

Conservative 32.3 30.4 0.94 197

Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62

SNP 1.5 0.9 0.60 6

PC 0.6 0.5 0.83 3

Other 8.4 3.4 0.40 23

Labour Maj. 2.9 24.5 66

Total 100 100 659

Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

Lijphart 26

‘Winner’s bonus’ UK

1 541.56

1.60

1.441.46

1.54

1.50

1.28 1.27 1.28

1.37

1.30

1.40

s: s

eats

ratio

1 09 1.10

1.171.14

1.20

1.13

1.221.23

1.20

Vote

s

1.091.07

1.10

1.00

1.10

1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005

Note: The votes-seats ratio is calculated as the percentage of UK seats divided into the percentage of UK votes for the governing party. A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no electoral bias for the government. Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005

Lijphart 27

UK % Vote 1900-200570

50

60

30

40

% o

f UK

vote Con

LabLDOther

20

% Other

0

10

19001906191019101918192219231924192919311935194519501951195519591964196619701974197419791983198719921997200120050 6 0 0 8 2 3 4 9 1 5 5 0 1 5 9 4 6 0 4 4 9 3 7 2 7 1 5

Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press

Lijphart 28

UK % Seats600

400

500

300

umbe

r of M

Ps ConLabLDOther

100

200Nu

0 1900190619101910191819221923192419291931193519451950195119551959196419661970197419741979198319871992199720012005

Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press

Lijphart 29

Why exaggerative bias for winner?

1 Malapportionment1. Malapportionment Unequal size of electorates in each seat Decline of urban pop/Labour constituencyDecline of urban pop/Labour constituency Delayed effect of boundary changes

Differential turnout Differential turnout Lowest in safe Labour seats

Anti-Conservative tactical voting Anti Conservative tactical voting Efficient distribution of party votes

Lijphart 30

Geography also matters:UK 2005 Election SeatsUK 2005 Election Seats

Source: Pippa Norris Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

Lijphart 31

Simulated seats GB June 2005

355400

239300

350 LabConLd239

197 207

140150

200

250 LdemUKIPNat

62

119 1850

100

150 GreenBNPOther

0 119 180 50 44 30

50

Actual results FPTP List PR

Source: Dunleavy and Margetts in Pippa Norris (Ed) Britain Votes 2005 OUP

Lijphart 32

Projection next UK general election

380

400

320

340

360

380

e M

Ps

7

8

9

Conservative Government

Vote swing is the %

260

280

300

of C

onse

rvat

ive

3

4

5

6

Hung Parliament

change in the two-party vote

200

220

240

Num

ber o

0

1

-1

2

140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400

N b f L b MP

140

160

180 Labour Government

Number of Labour MPs

Note: The estimates assume a Con-Lab uniform national swing across the UK with no change in the share of the vote for the other parties.A positive swing indicates a fall in the Labour party, and increase in the Conservative party, share of the total vote. A negative denotes theopposite. The ‘winning post’ necessary to assure an overall parliamentary majority for one party is half the 646 MPs ie 324. Source: NorrisBritain Votes 2005 OUP.

Lijphart 33

Moderate party competitionp y p

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project/ Judith Bara EPOP 2005

Lijphart 34

Breakdown of classic ideal type since 1997

Federalism: Devolution for Scotland and Wales Northern Ireland assembly Elected Mayor/Assembly for London

Electoral reform: Party list PR for Europe AMS for Scotland/Wales AMS for Scotland/Wales STV for Scottish local elections

House of Lords reform (?) Written Bill of Rights- Euro. Convention Direct referendums

Advantages andAdvantages and disadvantages?

III: Consensus democracyy

Switzerland

Lijphart 37

Swiss democracyy

Pop 7.4mp Plural cleavages

Religion (46% Catholic, 40% Protestant) Language

(65%German, 10% Italian, 18% French),

Region/canton Region/canton Class ($32,800 per capita PPP 2003)

Social divisions, yet elite consensus? Stable power-sharing coalition but lack of

accountability?

Lijphart 38

Swiss democracy y

Since 1848, Switzerland has been a confederation, tl ith 26 t d 2873currently with 26 cantons and 2873 communes.

The Government (Federal Council) has 7 members elected by parliament for 4 yearsy p y

From 1959-2003, ‘magic formula’ 2 seats each for the FDP, CVP, and SPS, and 1 seat for the SVPSVP.

October 2003, 2 seats given to SVP, 1 CVP Annual president rotates as primus inter pares

Lijphart 39

Swiss parliamentp

Bicameral Federal Assembly: Bicameral Federal Assembly: Direct elections PR List elections w. high proportionality votes : seats

Th N ti l C il ( l t ti 200 t The National Council (popular representation, 200 seats, based on population size per canton) and

The Council of States (cantonal representation, 46 seats, 2 t )2 per canton)

Eight party factions in Federal Assembly and 13 parties in total.

Federal Supreme Court Many popular initiatives and referendums.

Lijphart 40

October 2003 Election resultsNationalrat and Ständerat: 19 october 2003 (%) %Vote 200 %Seats 46

Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 26.6 55 27.5% 8

Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz SPS 23.4 52 26.0% 9

Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz FDP 17.3 36 18.0% 14

Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz CVP 14.4 28 14.0% 15

Grüne Partei der Schweiz GPS 7.4 13 6.5% -

Liberale Partei der Schweiz LPS 2.2 4 2.0% -

Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz EVP 2.3 3 1.5% -

Eidgenössische Demokratische Union EDU 1.3 2 1.0% -

Schweizer Demokraten SD 1 0 1 0 5%Schweizer Demokraten SD 1.0 1 0.5% -

Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz PdA 0.7 2 1.0% -

Lega dei Ticinese LdT 0.4 1 0.5% -

Solidarités Sol 0.5 1 0.5% -

Christlich-Soziale Partei CSP 0.4 1 0.5% -

Alternative Liste AL 0.5 1 0.5% -

- Sozialistisch Grüne Alternative Zug SGAZ 1

Freiheitspartei der Schweiz FPS 0.2 - -

Lijphart 41

Swiss party competitionp y p

European LiberalEuropean Liberal

SP Social Free CVP Christian Democrats

RightLeft

Democratic Democrats

SVP Radical right

Green Party right

Conservative

Note: Legislative voting patterns 1999-2003

Advantages andAdvantages and disadvantages?

Lijphart 43

IV: Discussion exercise

In designing new constitutions for In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each typewhat are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?

What would be the major consequencesWhat would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?and effectiveness?

Lijphart 44

Conclusions

Useful classification of democratic institutions From ideal types to continuous measures Clarifies values and normative debates Systematic comparisons Consequences of institutional design?

Next class: Electoral Systems

Lijphart 45

Next classPart III: Options: reform strategies and agencies

h13 Mon 16th Mar Strategies and options for strengthening democratic governance

#1

14 Wed 18th Mar Constitution-building: International IDEA

15 Mon 30th Mar Elections: ACE and IFES

16 Wed 1st Apr Strengthening parliaments, parties, and women’s empowerment: the Inter-parliamentary Union

17 Mon 6th Apr Building the state: public administration reform, local governance, and anti-corruption: Transparency International

18 Wed 8th Apr Civil society social capital and media: the Open Society18 Wed 8th Apr Civil society, social capital, and media: the Open Society Institute and CIVICUS, Committee to Protect Journalists

19 Mon 13th Apr Human rights, justice, and rule of law: Amnesty International # 2

Lijphart 46