Conflict of Laws- C-F Cases

8/18/2019 Conflict of Laws- C-F Cases

1/30

G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,vs.THE GOVERNENT O! THE "HILI""INE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.THE REGISTER O! DEEDS O! THE #IT$ O! ANILA, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.

Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.

B%TTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiringthe register of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 2!!,2!""# and 2!""$, covering lands located in the City of Manila, %hilippine Islands, andissue in lieu thereof ne& certificates of transfer of title in favor of 'llison (. )i**s

&ithout requiring him to present any document sho&ing that the succession ta+ dueunder 'rticle I of Chapter of the 'dministrative Code has *een paid.

The said order of the court of March $, $"$, recites that the parcels of land covered*y said certificates of title formerly *elonged to the con/ugal partnership of 'llison (.)i**s and 0va 1ohnson )i**s that the latter died intestate in %alo 'lto, California, onNovem*er 2!, $2 that at the time of her death she and her hus*and &ere citi3ensof the 4tate of California and domiciled therein.

It appears further from said order that 'llison (. )i**s &as appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased &ife in case No. "#56 in the same court, entitled 7Inthe Matter of the Intestate 0state of 0va 1ohnson )i**s, (eceased7 that in saidintestate proceedings, the said 'llison (. )i**s, on 4eptem*er 22,$", filed an ex

parte petition in &hich he alleged 7that the parcels of land hereunder descri*ed *elongto the con/ugal partnership of your petitioner and his &ife, 0va 1ohnson )i**s7,descri*ing in detail the three facts here involved and further alleging that his said &ife,a citi3en and resident of California, died on Novem*er 2!,$2 that in accordance&ith the la& of California, the community property of spouses &ho are citi3ens of California, upon the death of the &ife previous to that of the hus*and, *elongsa*solutely to the surviving hus*and &ithout administration that the con/ugalpartnership of 'llison (. )i**s and 0va 1ohnson )i**s, deceased, has no o*ligationsor de*ts and no one &ill *e pre/udiced *y ad/ucating said parcels of land 8andseventeen others not here involved9 to *e the a*solute property of the said 'llison (.)i**s as sole o&ner. The court granted said petition and on 4eptem*er 22, $",entered a decree ad/ucating the said 'llison (. )i**s to *e the sole and a*soluteo&ner of said lands, applying section $$ of the Civil Code of California. )i**s

presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a 7transfer certificate of title7.

4ection $65 of 'rticle I of Chapter of the 'dministrative Code provides in partthat:

;egisters of deeds shall not register in the registry of property anydocument transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattelmortgage, *y &ay of gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless thepayment of the ta+ fi+ed in this article and actually due thereon shall *esho&n. 'nd they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal ;evenueor the corresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of the ta+discovered *y them. . . .

'cting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila,declined to accept as *inding said decree of court of 4eptem*er 22,$", and refusedto register the transfer of title of the said con/ugal property to 'llison (. )i**s, on theground that the corresponding inheritance ta+ had not *een paid. Thereupon, under date of (ecem*er 2#, $", 'llison (. )i**s filed in the said court a petition for an

order requiring the said register of deeds 7to issue the corresponding titles7 to thepetitioner &ithout requiring previous payment of any inheritance ta+. 'fter due hearingof the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of 4eptem*er 22, $", and entered theorder of March $, $"$, &hich is under revie& on this appeal.


2/30

2. ' parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented *y transfer certificate of title No.2!""#, dated May $, $25, in &hich it is certified 7that spouses 'llison (. )i**s and0va 1ohnson )i**s are the o&ners in fee simple7 of the land therein descri*ed.

". ' parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented *y transfer certificate of title No.2!""$, dated 'pril #, $25, &hich it states 7that 'llison (. )i**s married to 0va

1ohnson )i**s7 is the o&ner of the land descri*ed therein that said 0va 1ohnson)i**s died intestate on Novem*er 2!, $2, living surviving her her hus*and, theappellee, and t&o sons, 'llison 1. )i**s , no& age 26 and Finley 1. )i**s, no& aged22, as her sole heirs of la&.

'rticle I of Chapter of the 'dministrative Code entitled 7Ta+ on inheritances,legacies and other acquisitionsmortis causa7 provides in section $6"# that 70verytransmission *y virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall *e su*/ect to thefollo&ing ta+.7 It results that the question for determination in this case is as follo&s:=as 0va 1ohnson )i**s at the time of her death the o&ner of a descendi*le interestin the %hilippine lands a*ove-mentioned>

The appellee contends that the la& of California should determine the nature and

e+tent of the title, if any, that vested in 0va 1ohnson )i**s under the three certificatesof title Nos. 2!!, 2!""# and 2!""$ a*ove referred to, citing article of the CivilCode. ?ut that, even if the nature and e+tent of her title under said certificates *egoverned *y the la& of the %hilippine Islands, the la&s of California govern thesuccession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article $ of the Civil Code.

'rticle of the Civil Code is as follo&s:

The la&s relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, andlegal capacity of persons, are *inding upon 4paniards even though theyreside in a foreign country.7 It is argued that the con/ugal right of theCalifornia &ife in community real estate in the %hilippine Islands is apersonal right and must, therefore, *e settled *y the la& governing her

personal status, that is, the la& of California. ?ut our attention has not *eencalled to any la& of California that incapacitates a married &oman fromacquiring or holding land in a foreign /urisdiction in accordance &ith the lex rei sitae. There is not the slightest dou*t that a California married &omancan acquire title to land in a common la& /urisdiction li@e the 4tate of Illinoisor the (istrict of Colum*ia, su*/ect to the common-la& estate *y thecourtesy &hich &ould vest in her hus*and. Nor is there any dou*t that if aCalifornia hus*and acquired land in such a /urisdiction his &ife &ould *evested &ith the common la& right of do&er, the prerequisite conditionso*taining. 'rticle of the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations andstatus and capacity for /uristic acts, the rules relating to property, *othpersonal and real, *eing governed *y article $ of the Civil Code.

Furthermore, article , *y its very terms, is applica*le only to 74paniards78no&, *y construction, to citi3ens of the %hilippine Islands9.

The


3/30

death as though required *y himself. ... It never *elonged to the estate of thedeceased &ife.7

The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he ta@es nothing *ysuccession from his deceased &ife, ho& can the second paragraph of article $ *einvo@ed> Can the appellee *e heard to say that there is a legal succession under the

la& of the %hilippine Islands and no legal succession under the la& of California> Itseems clear that the second paragraph of article $ applies only &hen a legal or testamentary succession has ta@en place in the %hilippines and in accordance &iththe la& of the %hilippine Islands and the foreign la& is consulted only in regard to theorder of succession or the e+tent of the successional rights in other &ords, thesecond paragraph of article $ can *e invo@ed only &hen the deceased &as vested&ith a descendi*le interest in property &ithin the /urisdiction of the %hilippine Islands.

In the case of Clar@e vs. Clar@e 8$5! B. 4., $!#, $$ Aa& ed., $2!, $"$9, thecourt said:

It is principle firmly esta*lished that to the la& of the state in &hich the landis situated &e must loo@ for the rules &hich govern its descent, alienation,

and transfer, and for the effect and construction of &ills and other conveyances. 8Bnited 4tates vs. Cros*y, 5 Cranch, $$6 " A. ed., 2!5Clar@ vs. )raham, # =heat., 655 6 A. ed., "" Mc)oon vs. 4cales, =all.,2" $ A. ed., 66 ?rine vs. Dartford F. Ins. Co., # B. 4., #25 2 A. ed.,!6!.97 8See also 0state of Aloyd, $56 Cal., 5, 56.9 This fundamentalprinciple is stated in the first paragraph of article $ of our Civil Code asfollo&s: 7%ersonal property is su*/ect to the la&s of the nation of the o&ner thereof real property to the la&s of the country in &hich it is situated.

It is stated in 6 Cal. 1ur., 5!:

In accord &ith the rule that real property is su*/ect to the lex rei sitae, therespective rights of hus*and and &ife in such property, in the a*sence of an

antenuptial contract, are determined *y the la& of the place &here theproperty is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place&here the marriage &as cele*rated. 8See also 4aul vs. Dis Creditors, 6Martin GN. 4.H, 6# $# 'm. (ec., 2$2 GAa.H Deidenheimer vs. Aoring, 2# 4.=., GTe+asH.9

Bnder this *road principle, the nature and e+tent of the title &hich vested in Mrs. )i**sat the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must *edetermined in accordance &ith the lex rei sitae.

It is admitted that the %hilippine lands here in question &ere acquired as communityproperty of the con/ugal partnership of the appellee and his &ife. Bnder the la& of the

%hilippine Islands, she &as vested of a title equal to that of her hus*and. 'rticle $5of the Civil Code provides:

'll the property of the spouses shall *e deemed partnership property in thea*sence of proof that it *elongs e+clusively to the hus*and or to the &ife.

'rticle $"6 provides:

7The con/ugal partnership shall *e governed *y the rules of la& applica*le to thecontract of partnership in all matters in &hich such rules do not conflict &ith thee+press provisions of this chapter.7 'rticle $$ provides that 7the hus*and maydispose *y &ill of his half only of the property of the con/ugal partnership.7 'rticle $2#provides that upon dissolution of the con/ugal partnership and after inventory andliquidation, 7the net remainder of the partnership property shall *e divided share andshare ali@e *et&een the hus*and and &ife, or their respective heirs.7 Bnder theprovisions of the Civil Code and the /urisprudence prevailing here, the &ife, upon theacquisition of any con/ugal property, *ecomes immediately vested &ith an interest andtitle therein equal to that of her hus*and, su*/ect to the po&er of management anddisposition &hich the la& vests in the hus*and. Immediately upon her death, if thereare no o*ligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her share in thecon/ugal property is transmitted to her heirs *y succession. 8'rticles #65, #6, ##$,Civil Code cf. also Coronel vs.


4/30

the e+clusive o&ner of the %hilippine lands included in the three certificates of titlehere involved.

The /udgment of the court *elo& of March $, $"$, is reversed &ith directions todismiss the petition, &ithout special pronouncement as to the costs.

Avance"a# C. $.# %alcolm# &illa-!eal# Abad Santos# Hull# and &ic'ers# $$.# concur.

Street# $.# dissents.

SE#OND DIVISION

&G.R. No. '5242. Se()ember 2, 1992.*

ANILA RESO%R#E DEVELO"ENT #OR"ORATION, Petitioner , +. THENATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS #OISSION R%BENANAHAN, Respondents.

#e/er0o " L O//0ce /or Petitioner .

R/e $. V0o /or Respondents.

S$LLAB%S

$. A'?


5/30

that provisions of applica*le la&, especially provisions relating to matters affected &ithpu*lic policy are deemed &ritten into the contract. GCommissioner of Internal ;evenuev. Bnited Aines Co., 6 4C;' $56 8$#29H. %ut a little differently, the governing principleis that parties may not contract a&ay applica*le provisions of la& especiallyperemptory provisions dealing &ith matters heavily impressed &ith pu*lic interest. Thela& relating to la*or and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not atli*erty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of la*or la&s and

regulations *y simply contracting &ith each other. It is thus necessary to appraise thecontractual provisions invo@ed *y petitioner %I' in terms of their consistency &ithapplica*le %hilippine la& and regulations.7crala& virtua$a& li*rary

6. A'?


6/30

pleading dated March $$, $! furnishing the Commission &ith a +ero+ copy of thecomplete file of the case in his possession in compliance &ith an


7/30

documents in its possession &ithin ten 8$9 &or@ing days. The case &ould then *edeemed su*mitted for decision. $5 ?oth petitioner and private respondent signed their conformity to said agreement on reconstitution of records.chanro*les.com : virtual la&li*rary

%etitioner filed a Manifestation opposing the, apparent reconstitution *y privaterespondent of the case &ithout complying &ith 'ct No. "$$. $! 'lso, &hen %rivate

respondent filed on 1anuary $, $!6 a 7verified Motion to 'dmit ;econstructed;ecords %reviously Filed,7 $ petitioner opposed the same *ut still did N


8/30

governing principle is that parties may not contract a&ay applica*le provisions of la&especially peremptory provisions dealing &ith matters heavily impressed &ith pu*licinterest. The la& relating to la*or and employment is clearly such an area and partiesare not at li*erty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of la*or la&s and regulations *y simply contracting &ith each other. It is thus necessary toappraise the contractual provisions invo@ed *y petitioner %I' in terms of their consistency &ith applica*le %hilippine la& and regulations.7crala& virtua$a& li*rary

7+ + +

7%etitioner %I' cannot ta@e refuge in paragraph $ of i ts employment agreement&hich specifies, firstly, the la& of %a@istan as the applica*le la& of the agreement and,secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection&ith the agreement only GinH courts of arachi, %[email protected] The first clause of paragraph$ cannot *e invo@ed to prevent the application of %hilippine la*or la&s andregulations to the su*/ect matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship*et&een petitioner %I' and private respondents. =e have already pointed out thatrelationship is much affected &ith pu*lic interest and that the other&ise applica*le%hilippine la&s and regulations cannot *e rendered illusory *y the parties agreeingupon some other la& to govern their relationship . . . Finally, and in any event, thepetitioner %I' did not underta@e to plead and prove the contents of %a@istan la& onthe matter it must therefore *e presumed that the applica*le provisions of the la& of

%a@istan are the same as the applica*le provisions of %hilippine la&. GMiciano v.%rimo, 6 %hil. !#5 8$29 Collector of Internal ;evenue v. Fisher, $$ %hil. #!#G$#$H. 2!

Aastly, as to petitionerLs complaint of denial of due process, settled is the rule thatsu*mission of position papers and memoranda in la*or cases fulfills the requirementsof due process. 2 In the case at *ar, aside from filing a position paper &ith the=''


9/30

;epu*lic of the %hilippinesS%"REE #O%RT

Manila

TDI;( (IKI4I


10/30

ste&ardesses &ould *e terminated 7effective $ 4eptem*er $!, conforma*ly toclause # 8*9 of the employment agreement Gthey had9 e+ecuted &ith G%I'H.7 2


11/30

%reventive suspension cases, no& made cogni3a*le for the firsttime, are also placed under the ;egional (irector. ?efore %( !6,termination cases &here there &as a C?' &ere under the

/urisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary ar*itration,&hile termination cases &here there &as no C?' &ere under the

/urisdiction of the Conciliation 4ection.

In more details, the ma/or innovations introduced *y %( !6 andits implementing rules and regulations &ith respect to terminationand preventive suspension cases are:

$. The ;egional (irector is no& required to rule on everyapplication for clearance, &hether there is opposition or not,&ithin ten days from receipt thereof.

+++ +++ +++

80mphasis supplied9

2. The second contention of petitioner %I' is that, even if the ;egional (irector had /urisdiction, still his order &as null and void *ecause it had *een issued in violation of petitioners right to procedural due process . 6 This claim, ho&ever, cannot *e givenserious consideration. %etitioner &as ordered *y the ;egional (irector to su*mit notonly its position paper *ut also such evidence in its favor as it might have. %etitioner opted to rely solely upon its position paper &e must assume it had no evidence tosustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing &as conducted,petitioner had ample opportunity to e+plain its side. Moreover, petitioner %I' &as a*leto appeal his case to the Ministry of Aa*or and 0mployment. '

There is another reason &hy petitioners claim of denial of due process must *ere/ected. 't the time the complaint &as filed *y private respondents on 2$ 4eptem*er $! and at the time the ;egional (irector issued his questioned order on 22 1anuary

$!$, applica*le regulation, as noted a*ove, specified that a 7dismissal &ithout prior clearance shall *e conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without acause7, and the ;egional (irector &as required in such case to7 order the immediatereinstatement of the employee and the payment of his &ages from the time of theshutdo&n or dismiss until . . . reinstatement.7 In other &ords, under the then applica*lerule, the ;egional (irector did not even have to require su*mission of position papers*y the parties in vie& of the conclusive 45uris et de 5ure9 character of the presumptioncreated *y such applica*le la& and regulation. In Cebu nstitute of echnolog) v.%inister of +abor and 0mplo)ment , the Court pointed out that 7under ;ule $,4ection 2, of the Implementing ;ules and ;egulations, the termination of GanemployeeH &hich &as &ithout previous clearance from the Ministry of Aa*or is

conclusively presumed to *e &ithout G/ustH cause . . . Ga presumption &hichH cannot *eoverturned *y any contrary proof ho&ever strong.7

". In its third contention, petitioner %I' invo@es paragraphs 6 and # of its contract of employment &ith private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that itsrelationship &ith them &as governed *y the provisions of its contract rather than *y

the general provisions of the Aa*or Code. 9

%aragraph 6 of that contract set a term of three 8"9 years for that relationship,e+tendi*le *y agreement *et&een the parties &hile paragraph # provided that,not&ithstanding any other provision in the Contract, %I' had the right to terminate theemployment agreement at any time *y giving one-months notice to the employee or,in lieu of such notice, one-months salary.

' contract freely entered into should, of course, *e respected, as %I' argues, since acontract is the la& *et&een the parties. 1 The principle of party autonomy in contractsis not, ho&ever, an a*solute principle. The rule in 'rticle $"#, of our Civil Code is thatthe contracting parties may esta*lish such stipulations as they may deemconvenient, 6provided they are not contrary to la&, morals, good customs, pu*lic order

or pu*lic policy.7 Thus, counter-*alancing the principle of autonomy of contractingparties is the equally general rule that provisions of applica*le la&, especiallyprovisions relating to matters affected &ith pu*lic policy, are deemed &ritten into thecontract. 11 %ut a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may notcontract a&ay applica*le provisions of la& especially peremptory provisions dealing&ith matters heavily impressed &ith pu*lic interest. The la& relating to la*or andemployment is clearly such an area and parties are not at li*erty to insulatethemselves and their relationships from the impact of la*or la&s and regulations *ysimply contracting &ith each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractualprovisions invo@ed *y petitioner %I' in terms of their consistency &ith applica*le%hilippine la& and regulations.

's noted earlier, *oth the Aa*or 'r*iter and the (eputy Minister, M


12/30

'rt. 2!$. !egular and Casual 0mplo)ment . The provisions of &ritten agreement to the contrary not&ithstanding and regardlessof the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall *edeemed to *e regular &here the employee has *een engaged toperform activities &hich are usually necessary or desira*le in theusual *usiness or trade of the employer, e+cept &here theemployment has *een fi+ed for a specific pro/ect or underta@ingthe completion or termination of &hich has *een determined atthe time of the engagement of the employee or &here the &or@ or services to *e performed is seasonal in nature and theemployment is for the duration of the season.

'n employment shall *e deemed to *e casual if it is not covered*y the preceding paragraph: provided, that, an) emplo)ee whohas rendered at least one )ear of service# whether such service is

continuous or bro'en# shall be considered as regular

emplo)ee &ith respect to the activity in &hich he is employed andhis employment shall continue &hile such actually e+ists.80mphasis supplied9

In (rent School# nc.# et al. v. !onaldo 7amora# etc.# et al.# 12 the Court had occasion toe+amine in detail the question of &hether employment for a fi+ed term has *eenoutla&ed under the a*ove quoted provisions of the Aa*or Code. 'fter an e+tensivee+amination of the history and development of 'rticles 2! and 2!$, the Courtreached the conclusion that a contract providing for employment &ith a fi+ed period&as not necessarily unla&ful:

There can of course *e no quarrel &ith the proposition that wherefrom the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been

imposed to preclude ac8uisition of tenurial securit) b) the

emplo)ee# the) should be struc' down or disregarded as contrar)

to public polic)# morals# etc . ?ut &here no such intent tocircumvent the la& is sho&n, or stated other&ise, &here the

reason for the la& does not e+ist e.g. &here it is indeed theemployee himself &ho insists upon a period or &here the natureof the engagement is such that, &ithout *eing seasonal or for aspecific pro/ect, a definite date of termination is a sine 8uanon &ould an agreement fi+ing a period *e essentially evil or illicit,therefore anathema =ould such an agreement come &ithin thescope of 'rticle 2! &hich admittedly &as enacted 7to prevent thecircumvention of the right of the employee to *e secured in . . .8his9 employment>7

's it is evident from even only the three e+amples already giventhat Article 9:; of the +abor Code# under a narrow and literal

interpretation# not onl) fails to exhaust the gamut of emplo)ment

contracts to which the lac' of a fixed period would be an anomal)#

but would also appear to restrict# without reasonable distinctions#

the right of an emplo)ee to freel) stipulate with his emplo)er the

duration of his engagement# it logicall) follows that such a literal

interpretation should be eschewed or avoided . The la& must *egiven reasona*le interpretation, to preclude a*surdity in itsapplication.


13/30

0+amining the provisions of paragraphs 6 and # of the employment agreement*et&een petitioner %I' and private respondents, &e consider that those provisionsmust *e read together and &hen so read, the fi+ed period of three 8"9 years specifiedin paragraph 6 &ill *e seen to have *een effectively neutrali3ed *y the provisions of paragraph # of that agreement. %aragraph # in effect too@ *ac@ from the employee thefi+ed three 8"9-year period ostensi*ly granted *y paragraph 6 *y rendering such periodin effect a facultative one at the option of the employer %I'. For petitioner %I' claimsto *e authori3ed to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory toitself, to a one-month period, or even less *y simply paying the employee a monthssalary. ?ecause the net effect of paragraphs 6 and # of the agreement here involved isto render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig *asicallyemployment at the pleasure of petitioner %I', the Court considers that paragraphs 6and # &ere intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of privaterespondents even during the limited period of three 4=> )ears, 13 and thus to escapecompletely the thrust of 'rticles 2! and 2!$ of the Aa*or Code.

%etitioner %I' cannot ta@e refuge in paragraph $ of its employment agreement &hichspecifies, firstly, the la& of %a@istan as the applica*le la& of the agreement and,secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection&ith the agreement 7onl) GinH courts of arachi %a@istan7. The first clause of paragraph

$ cannot *e invo@ed to prevent the application of %hilippine la*or la&s andregulations to the su*/ect matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship*et&een petitioner %I' and private respondents. =e have already pointed out that therelationship is much affected &ith pu*lic interest and that the other&ise applica*le%hilippine la&s and regulations cannot *e rendered illusory *y the parties agreeingupon some other la& to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invo@e thesecond clause of paragraph $, specifying the arachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute *et&een the contracting parties. 0ven a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case &ill sho& the multiple and su*stantive contacts*et&een %hilippine la& and %hilippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship*et&een the parties, upon the other: the contract &as not only e+ecuted in the%hilippines, it &as also performed here, at least partially private respondents are%hilippine citi3ens and respondents, &hile petitioner, although a foreign corporation, islicensed to do *usiness 8and actually doing *usiness9 and hence resident in the

%hilippines lastly, private respondents &ere *ased in the %hilippines in *et&een their assigned flights to the Middle 0ast and 0urope. 'll the a*ove contacts point to the%hilippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes *et&een the parties. Bnder these circumstances, paragraph $ of the employment agreement cannot *e given effect so as to oust %hilippine agenciesand courts of the /urisdiction vested upon them *y %hilippine la&. Finally, and in anyevent, the petitioner %I' did not underta@e to plead and prove the contents of %a@istanla& on the matter it must therefore *e presumed that the applica*le provisions of thela& of %a@istan are the same as the applica*le provisions of %hilippine la&. 14

=e conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig &ere illegally dismissedand that pu*lic respondent (eputy Minister, M


14/30

S%"REE #O%RT

Manila

0N ?'NC

G.R. No. L-16'49 NAR, E?ec)or L%#$ #HRISTENSEN, He0r o/ )8e

ecee, 0+ecutor and Deir-appellees,vs.HELEN #HRISTENSEN GAR#IA, oppositor-appellant.

%. !. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

+eopoldo %. Abellera and $ovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of (avao, Don. KicenteN. Cusi, 1r., presiding, in 4pecial %roceeding No. #22 of said court, dated 4eptem*er $, $, approving among things the final accounts of the e+ecutor, directing thee+ecutor to reim*urse Maria Aucy Christensen the amount of %",# paid *y her toDelen Christensen )arcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Aucy Christensenentitled to the residue of the property to *e en/oyed during her lifetime, and in case of death &ithout issue, one-half of said residue to *e paya*le to Mrs. Carrie Aouise C.?orton, etc., in accordance &ith the provisions of the &ill of the testator 0d&ard 0.Christensen. The &ill &as e+ecuted in Manila on March 6, $6$ and contains thefollo&ing provisions:

". I declare ... that I have *ut


15/30

. I further declare that I no& have no living ascendants, and nodescendants e+cept my a*ove named daughter, M';I' ABCCD;I4T0N40N ('N0.

+ + + + + + + + +

5. I give, devise and *equeath unto M';I' D0A0N CD;I4T0N40N, no&married to 0duardo )arcia, a*out eighteen years of age and &ho,not&ithstanding the fact that she &as *apti3ed Christensen, is not in any&ay related to me, nor has she *een at any time adopted *y me, and &ho,from all information I have no& resides in 0gpit, (igos, (avao, %hilippines,the sum of TD;00 TD


16/30

TD0 A


17/30

permanent a*ode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the onlyproper one. 8)oodrich, p. 29

The la& that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in 'rticle$# of the Civil Code of the %hilippines, &hich is as follo&s:

';T. $#. ;eal property as &ell as personal property is su*/ect to the la& of the country &here it is situated.

Do&ever, intestate and testamentary successions, *oth &ith respect to theorder of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to theintrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall *e regulated *y thenational la& of the person &hose succession is under consideration,&hatever may *e the nature of the property and regardless of the country&here said property may *e found.

The application of this article in the case at *ar requires the determination of themeaning of the term 6national law6 is used therein.

There is no single 'merican la& governing the validity of testamentary provisions inthe Bnited 4tates, each state of the Bnion having its o&n private la& applica*le to itsciti3ens only and in force only &ithin the state. The 7national la&7 indicated in 'rticle$# of the Civil Code a*ove quoted can not, therefore, possi*ly mean or apply to anygeneral 'merican la&. 4o it can refer to no other than the private la& of the 4tate of California.

The ne+t question is: =hat is the la& in California governing the disposition of personal property> The decision of the court *elo&, sustains the contention of thee+ecutor-appellee that under the California %ro*ate Code, a testator may dispose of his property *y &ill in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of 0state of Mc(aniel, 55 Cal. 'ppl. 2d !55, $5# %. 2d 62. ?ut appellant invo@es the provisions of

'rticle # of the Civil Code of California, &hich is as follo&s:

If there is no la& to the contrary, in the place &here personal property issituated, it is deemed to follo& the person of its o&ner, and is governed *ythe la& of his domicile.

The e+istence of this provision is alleged in appellants opposition and is not denied.=e have chec@ed it in the California Civil Code and it is there. 'ppellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to *y a &itness. 87


18/30

or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied *y the forum,*ut any further reference goes only to the internal la&. Thus, a persons titleto land, recogni3ed *y the situs, &ill *e recogni3ed *y every court andevery divorce, valid *y the domicile of the parties, &ill *e valid every&here.8)oodrich, Conflict of Aa&s, 4ec. 5, pp. $"-$.9

, a citi3en of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leavingmova*le property in Massachusetts, 0ngland, and France. The questionarises as to ho& this property is to *e distri*uted among s ne+t of @in.

'ssume 8$9 that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There therule of the conflict of la&s as to intestate succession to mova*les calls for anapplication of the la& of the deceaseds last domicile. 4ince *y hypothesiss last domicile &as France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts courtto do &ould *e to turn to French statute of distri*utions, or &hatever corresponds thereto in French la&, and decree a distri*ution accordingly. 'ne+amination of French la&, ho&ever, &ould sho& that if a French court &erecalled upon to determine ho& this property should *e distri*uted, it &ouldrefer the distri*ution to the national la& of the deceased, thus applying theMassachusetts statute of distri*utions. 4o on the surface of things the

Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: 8a9 either toapply the French la& is to intestate succession, or 8*9 to resolve itself into aFrench court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distri*utions, on theassumption that this is &hat a French court &ould do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it &ill follo& the latter course, thus applying its o&nla&.

This is one type of renvoi . ' /ural matter is presented &hich the conflict-of-la&s rule of the forum refers to a foreign la&, the conflict-of-la&s rule of &hich, in turn, refers the matter *ac@ again to the la& of the forum. This isrenvoi in the narro&er sense. The )erman term for this /udicial process is;uc@ver&eisung.7 8Darvard Aa& ;evie&, Kol. "$, pp. 62"-65$.9

'fter a decision has *een arrived at that a foreign la& is to *e resorted to asgoverning a particular case, the further question may arise: 're the rules asto the conflict of la&s contained in such foreign la& also to *e resorted to>This is a question &hich, &hile it has *een considered *y the courts in *ut afe& instances, has *een the su*/ect of frequent discussion *y te+t&ritersand essayists and the doctrine involved has *een descriptively designated*y them as the 7;envoyer7 to send *ac@, or the 7;uchvers&eisung7, or the7=eiterver&eisung7, since an affirmative ans&er to the question postulatedand the operation of the adoption of the foreign la& in toto &ould in manycases result in returning the main controversy to *e decided according tothe la& of the forum. ... 8$# C.1.4. !52.9

'nother theory, @no&n as the 7doctrine of renvoi 7, has *een advanced. Thetheory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determiningthe question *efore it, must ta@e into account the &hole la& of the other

/urisdiction, *ut also its rules as to conflict of la&s, and then apply the la& tothe actual question &hich the rules of the other /urisdiction prescri*e. Thismay *e the la& of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally *eenrepudiated *y the 'merican authorities. 82 'm. 1ur. 2#9

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also *een defined and the reasons for itsapplication in a country e+plained *y %rof. Aoren3en in an article in the ale Aa&1ournal, Kol. 25, $$5-$$!, pp. 62-6"$. The pertinent parts of the article are quotedherein *elo&:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of la&s are to *e understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internalla& of the foreign state or country, *ut its rules of the conflict of la&s as &ell.

'ccording to this theory the la& of a country means the &hole of its la&.

+ + + + + + + + +

Kon ?ar presented his vie&s at the meeting of the Institute of InternationalAa&, at Neuchatel, in $, in the form of the follo&ing theses:

8$9 0very court shall o*serve the la& of its country as regards theapplication of foreign la&s.

829 %rovided that no e+press provision to the contrary e+ists, the court shallrespect:

8a9 The provisions of a foreign la& &hich disclaims the right to*ind its nationals a*road as regards their personal statute, anddesires that said personal statute shall *e determined *y the la&

of the domicile, or even *y the la& of the place &here the act inquestion occurred.

8*9 The decision of t&o or more foreign systems of la&, provided it*e certain that one of them is necessarily competent, &hich agreein attri*uting the determination of a question to the same systemof la&.

+ + + + + + + + +


19/30

If, for e+ample, the 0nglish la& directs its /udge to distri*ute the personalestate of an 0nglishman &ho has died domiciled in ?elgium in accordance&ith the la& of his domicile, he must first inquire &hether the la& of ?elgium&ould distri*ute personal property upon death in accordance &ith the la& of domicile, and if he finds that the ?elgian la& &ould ma@e the distri*ution inaccordance &ith the la& of nationality J that is the 0nglish la& J he mustaccept this reference *ac@ to his o&n la&.

=e note that 'rticle # of the California Civil Code is its conflict of la&s rule, &hile therule applied in In re aufman, Supra, its internal la&. If the la& on succession and theconflict of la&s rules of California are to *e enforced /ointly, each in its o&n intendedand appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re aufman should apply to citi3ensliving in the 4tate, *ut 'rticle # should apply to such of its citi3ens as are notdomiciled in California *ut in other /urisdictions. The rule laid do&n of resorting to thela& of the domicile in the determination of matters &ith foreign element involved is inaccord &ith the general principle of 'merican la& that the domiciliary la& shouldgovern in most matters or rights &hich follo& the person of the o&ner.

=hen a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, andleaves a &ill directing the manner of distri*ution of the property, the la& of

the state &here he &as domiciled at the time of his death &ill *e loo@ed to indeciding legal questions a*out the &ill, almost as completely as the la& of situs is consulted in questions a*out the devise of land. It is logical that,since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in caseof intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of anattempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Dere, also, it is not thatthe domiciliary has effect *eyond the *orders of the domiciliary state. Therules of the domicile are recogni3ed as controlling *y the Conflict of Aa&srules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the caseof intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The Ne&or@ court has said on the point: The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the o&ner, is valid any&here, isone of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity&hich &as one of the first fruits of civili3ation, and it this age, &hen *usiness

intercourse and the process of accumulating property ta@e *ut little notice of *oundary lines, the practical &isdom and /ustice of the rule is more apparentthan ever. 8)oodrich, Conflict of Aa&s, 4ec. $#, pp. 2-".9

'ppellees argue that &hat 'rticle $# of the Civil Code of the %hilippines pointed out asthe national law is the internal la& of California. ?ut as a*ove e+plained the la&s of California have prescri*ed t&o sets of la&s for its citi3ens, one for residents thereinand another for those domiciled in other /urisdictions. ;eason demands that =eshould enforce the California internal la& prescri*ed for its citi3ens residing therein,and enforce the conflict of la&s rules for the citi3ens domiciled a*road. If &e mustenforce the la& of California as in comity &e are *ound to go, as so declared in 'rticle$# of our Civil Code, then &e must enforce the la& of California in accordance &ith the

e+press mandate thereof and as a*ove e+plained, i.e., apply the internal la& for residents therein, and its conflict-of-la&s rule for those domiciled a*road.

It is argued on appellees *ehalf that the clause 7if there is no la& to the contrary in theplace &here the property is situated7 in 4ec. # of the California Civil Code refers to

'rticle $# of the Civil Code of the %hilippines and that the la& to the contrary in the

%hilippines is the provision in said 'rticle $# that the national law of the deceasedshould govern. This contention can not *e sustained. 's e+plained in the variousauthorities cited a*ove the national la& mentioned in 'rticle $# of our Civil Code is thela& on conflict of la&s in the California Civil Code, i.e., 'rticle #, &hich authori3esthe reference or return of the question to the la& of the testators domicile. The conflictof la&s rule in California, 'rticle #, Civil Code, precisely refers *ac@ the case, &hena decedent is not domiciled in California, to the la& of his domicile, the %hilippines inthe case at *ar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case *ac@to California such action &ould leave the issue incapa*le of determination *ecausethe case &ill then *e li@e a foot*all, tossed *ac@ and forth *et&een the t&o states,*et&een the country of &hich the decedent &as a citi3en and the country of hisdomicile. The %hilippine court must apply its o&n la& as directed in the conflict of la&srule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to *e decided, especially as theapplication of the internal la& of California provides no legitime for children &hile the

%hilippine la&, 'rts. !!589 and !, Civil Code of the %hilippines, ma@es naturalchildren legally ac@no&ledged forced heirs of the parent recogni3ing them.

The %hilippine cases 8In re 0state of 1ohnson, " %hil. $6# ;iera vs. %almaroli, %hil. $6 Miciano vs. ?rimo, 6 %hil. !#5 ?a*coc@ Templeton vs. ;ider ?a*coc@, 62%hil. $" and )i**s vs. )overnment, 6 %hil. 2".9 cited *y appellees to support thedecision can not possi*ly apply in the case at *ar, for t&o important reasons, i.e., thesu*/ect in each case does not appear to *e a citi3en of a state in the Bnited 4tates *ut&ith domicile in the %hilippines, and it does not appear in each case that there e+istsin the state of &hich the su*/ect is a citi3en, a la& similar to or identical &ith 'rt. # of the California Civil Code.

=e therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citi3en of

California, is the %hilippines, the validity of the provisions of his &ill depriving hisac@no&ledged natural child, the appellant, should *e governed *y the %hilippine Aa&,the domicile, pursuant to 'rt. # of the Civil Code of California, not *y the internal la&of California..

=D0;0F


20/30

/ +. Tre) Am0m #o.

55 N.


21/30

&ith an oncoming vehicle driven *y 1oseph (avis. Mr. (avis and his &ife and child,

&ho &ere Io&a domiciliaries, &ere in/ured in the accident. Their claims have no& *een

settled *y defendants insurance carrier. The sole question presented *y this appeal is

&hether the Io&a guest statute is applica*le to this action.

In Mell@ v. 4arahson, N.1. 22# 8$#59 this Court a*andoned the old le+ loci delicti

rule for determining choice of la& in tort cases, e.g., Dar*er v. )raham, $6 N.1.A.

6$6 2$", 2$-2$6 80. '. $2!9, #$ '.A.;. $2"2 and adopted the governmental

interest analysis approach. =e did so *ecause &e *elieved that the le+ loci delicti

doctrine &or@ed un/ust results in many cases and ignored the interests &hich

/urisdictions other than that &here the tort occurred may have in the resolution of the

particular issues involved. Id. at 22. In Mell@, the plaintiff &as in/ured &hile riding as a

passenger in the defendant-drivers car &hen it struc@ a par@ed vehicle in


22/30

invited to ride as a courtesy,7 ;ains*arger v. 4hepherd, 26 Io&a !#, 2, $$!

N.=.2d $, , $ '.A.;."d $5 8$#29 to prevent ingratitude *y guests, nutson v.

Aurie, 2$5 Io&a $2, $6, 26$ N.=. $5, $ 8$""9 to prevent suits *y hitchhi@ers,

Id. 7to prevent collusion suits *y friends and relatives resulting in e+cessively high

insurance rates,7 Dard&ic@ v. ?u*lit3, 26" Io&a , 6, $$$ N.=.2d ", "$2 8$#$9.

The a*ove policies e+pressed *y the Io&a courts &ould not appear to *e relevant to

the present matter. This action &ill not increase litigation in the Io&a courts no

hitchhi@er is involved no Io&a insurer &ill *e su*/ected to a 7collusive suit7 since the

insurer is a Ne& 1ersey corporation there is no 7)ood 4amaritan7 Io&a host-driver to

*e protected and finally, there is no Io&a guest displaying his 7ingratitude7 6$5 *y

suing for ordinary negligence. The desire of Io&a to prevent collusive suits and suits

*y ungrateful guests and to cut do&n litigation &ould ordinarily apply to Io&a

domiciliaries, defendants insuring motor vehicles there, and persons suing in its

courts. Meli@ v. 4arahson, supra, N.1., at 2"$.

(efendants contend, ho&ever, that application of the Io&a guest statute is required

*ecause the plaintiff and the individual defendant &ere residing in Io&a at the time of

the accident, *ecause the host-guest relationship *egan and ended in Io&a, and

*ecause non-guest Io&a domiciliaries &ere in/ured in the accident. These factors &ere

treated as significant in the post-?a*coc@ decision of (ym v. )ordon, supra.

In (ym the plaintiff sued for in/uries &hich she suffered in a collision *et&een t&o

automo*iles in Colorado. ?oth the plaintiff-guest and the defendant-host &ere Ne&

or@ domiciliaries &ho &ere attending summer school at the Bniversity of Colorado

&hen the accident occurred. They had gone separately to Colorado. The defendant

&as driving the plaintiff to a near*y golf course &hen the car they &ere riding in

collided &ith another vehicle. (efendants car &as registered and insured in Ne& or@

and he had *rought it to Colorado for use at college. 'fter returning to Ne& or@, the

plaintiff *rought suit to recover for her in/uries. (efendant pleaded the Colorado guest

statute &hich required a sho&ing of intentional misconduct, into+ication, or

7negligence consisting of a &illful and &anton disregard of the rights of others7 in order

for a guest to recover from his host.

In a four to three decision, the Ne& or@ Court of 'ppeals held that the Colorado

guest statute &as applica*le. The ma/ority reasoned that the statute &as *ased on

three policy considerations, i.e., 7the protection of Colorado drivers and their insurance

carriers against fraudulent claims, the prevention of suits *y Uungrateful guests, and

the priority of in/ured parties in other cars in the assets of the negligent 6$!

defendant.7 $# N..2d at $2, 2#2 N..4.2d at ##, 2 N.0.2d at 5. 4ince another

vehicle &as involved in the accident, the ma/ority *elieved that the policy of priority of

claims &as a significant factor. The ma/ority also noted that the parties had *ecome

temporary residents of Colorado, and that the host-guest relationship *egan and

ended in that state. This latter factor the seat of the relationship &as strongly

emphasi3ed.

In a dissent, 1udge Fuld 8no& Chief 1udge9 contended that the case &as not

materially distinguisha*le from ?a*coc@, supra. De noted that the ma/oritys

conclusion that Colorados guest statute envisioned a third party priority policy found

no support in any /udicial or legislative pronouncements in Colorado. $# N..2d at $"2,

2#2 N..4.2d at 5", 2 N.0.2d at 5.

In the later case of Macey v. ;o3*ic@i, supra, the same court, in a si+ to one decision,

su*stantially narro&ed (ym. In Macey, the defendants, hus*and and &ife, &ere Ne&

http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1962/50740-0.htmlhttp://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1962/50740-0.htmlhttp://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1962/50740-0.htmlhttp://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1961/50399-0.htmlhttp://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1961/50399-0.htmlhttp://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1962/50740-0.htmlhttp://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/1962/50740-0.html


23/30

or@ domiciliaries &ho &ere vacationing at their summer home in


24/30

62 The administrator of Miss Too@ers estate sued for &rongful death. The defendant

pleaded as a defense the Michigan guest statute &hich *ars a guests recovery from

his host for ordinary negligence.

1udge eating, this time &riting for the ma/ority of the court, held that the Ne& or@

standard of ordinary care for a guest &as applica*le to the case and that Michigans

guest statute could not *e raised as a defense. The court held that in light of the policy

considerations &hich underlie the ostensi*ly conflicting la&s of Michigan and Ne&

or@, it &as clear that the latter had the only real interest in &hether recovery should

*e granted. 1udge eating reasoned that the application of Michigan la& &ould defeat

Ne& or@s legitimate interest &ithout serving any legitimate interest of Michigan. De

identified Ne& or@s interest as its strong policy of holding all drivers of motor

vehicles financially responsi*le for their negligent acts irrespective of the guest status

of the victims. Michigan, on the other hand, had no interest in &hether a Ne& or@

plaintiff is denied recovery against a Ne& or@ defendant &here the car &as insured in

Ne& or@. De re/ected as 7plainly irrevelant7 the fact that the deceased guest and

driver &ere residing in Michigan for an e+tended period of time. 2 N..2d, at 655, "$

N..4.2d, at 626, 2 N.0.2d ". 'lthough 1udge eating did not specifically treat the

7seat of the relationship7 factor, i.e., that the trip &as arranged for and *egan and

ended in Michigan, it is o*vious that he considered this factor equally irrevelant. 1udge

?ur@e in his concurring opinion, &hile mar@ing the passing of (ym &ith regret,

conceded that the 7origin of the relationship7 could not *e considered in an interest

analysis approach. 2 N..2d, at 6-6$, "$ N..4.2d, at 6"5-6"!, 2 N.0.2d, at

5-!.

Finally, 1udge eating a*/ured the third-party-fund theory enunciated in (ym, saying:

62$ If the purpose of the statute is to protect the rights of the in/ured 7non-guest7, as

opposed to the o&ner or his insurance carrier, &e fail to perceive any rational *asis for

predicating that protection on the degree of negligence &hich the guest is a*le to

esta*lish. 2 N..2d at 656, "$ N..4.2d at 62, 2 N.0.2d at "5.

In Mullane v. 4tavola, $$ N.1. 4uper. $! 8Aa& (iv. $#!9, a pre-Too@er decision,

1udge Dalpern, sitting in the Aa& (ivision in our state, reached the same result on

similar facts. There, plaintiffs-guests and defendant-host &ere all Ne& 1ersey

domiciliaries in attendance at 4t. Aeos College in Florida. The defendants vehicle &as

registered and insured in Ne& 1ersey. =hile returning to the campus from (ade City,

Florida, the automo*ile operated *y the defendant, =illiam 4tavola, and o&ned *y his

mother, Mary 4tavola, collided &ith a telephone pole. Btili3ing the same governmental-

interest analysis approach ta@en later in Too@er, the court refused to apply Floridas

guest statute &hich *arred guests suits for the ordinary negligence of their hosts.

1udge Dalpern reasoned that since all of the parties &ere domiciled here and since

the car &as registered and insured here, Ne& 1ersey had the 7paramount

governmental interest, or concern, in fi+ing the rights and lia*ilities *et&een the

parties.7 Id., at $!5-$!. De e+plicitly re/ected the result and rationale in (ym.

=e are in accord &ith *oth Too@er and Mullane. =hile Io&a &as the 7seat of the

relationship7 in the instant case, this 7contact7 does not relate to any interest or policy

*ehind Io&as guest statute. Nor do &e attach any importance to the temporary Io&a

residence of plaintiff and defendant. ?oth parties &ere still permanently domiciled in

other states &hich retained interests. Moreover, the insurer is a Ne& 1ersey

corporation &hich issued its policy at rates applica*le to Ne& 1ersey. 4ee 0hren3&eig,

7)uest 4tatutes in the Conflict of Aa&s To&ards a Theory of 0nterprise Aia*ility Bnder


25/30


26/30

%laintiffs later *ecame California domiciliaries. The estates of Mrs. ;eich and the

deceased child &ere *eing administered in


27/30

and uniformity, and does not relate to a states interest in having its la& applied to

given issues in a tort case. 4ee ?. Currie, 7The (isinterested Third 4tate,7 2! Aa&

Contemp. %ro*. 56, 5!-!6 8$#"9 Cavers, The Choice-of-Aa& %rocess at $#

0hren3&eig, Conflict of Aa&s at 2"6 Comment, 7False Conflicts,7 66 Calif. A. ;ev. 5,

!-!6 8$#59. It is significant that in ;eich v. %urcell, supra, the California 4upreme

Court applied the su*stantive la& of


28/30

GH =e note in this connection that contrary to defendants contention, it is not clear

&hat su*stantive la& Io&a &ould apply to this case. That state has recently departed

from the traditional le+ loci delicti rule, see Fuerste v. ?emis, $6# N.=.2d !"$ 8Io&a

4up. Ct. $#!9, and it cannot *e assumed that Io&a &ould apply its guest statute to

this case. 'dditionally, although Connecticut remains a le+ loci delicti state, it has in

the past employed some of the traditional escape devices to avoid the doctrines harsh

results. Thus, in Aevy v. (aniels B-(rive 'uto ;enting Co., $! Conn. """, $" '. $#"

8$2!9, the 4upreme Court of 0rrors of Connecticut avoided applying Massachusetts

la& &here the automo*ile accident occurred *y characteri3ing the pro*lem as one of

contract rather than tort. 4ee Cavers, The Choice-of-Aa& %rocess at $5". It is possi*le

that Connecticut &ould avoid applying the Io&a guest statute to these facts. If, as

defendants urge, &e should loo@ to Connecticuts &hole la&, i.e., *oth its su*stantive

la& and its choice-of-la& rule, &hy should not Connecticut loo@ to Io&as &hole la& if

suit &ere *rought in Connecticut> If it did loo@ to Io&as &hole la&, Connecticut might

&ell *e led *ac@ to its o&n su*stantive la&. 4ee Aeflar, 'merican Conflicts Aa& at 2$6-

$#. 4ee generally, 4eidelson, 7The 'mericani3ation of ;envoi,7 5 (uquesne A. ;ev.

2$ )ris&old, 7;envoi ;evisited,7 6$ Darv. A. ;ev. $$#6, $$##-5 8$"!9.

G.R. No. L-236'


29/30

%,. each or a total of %$2,.. In the pro/ect of partition, the e+ecutor Jpursuant to the 7T&elfth7 clause of the testators Aast =ill and Testament J dividedthe residuary estate into seven equal portions for the *enefit of the testators sevenlegitimate children *y his first and second marriages.


30/30

'ppellants &ould also point out that the decedent e+ecuted t&o &ills J one to governhis Te+as estate and the other his %hilippine estate J arguing from this that heintended %hilippine la& to govern his %hilippine estate. 'ssuming that such &as thedecedents intention in e+ecuting a separate %hilippine &ill, it &ould not alter the la&,for as this Court ruled in %iciano v. (rimo, 6 %hil. !#5, !5, a provision in aforeigners &ill to the effect that his properties shall *e distri*uted in accordance &ith%hilippine la& and not &ith his national la&, is illegal and void, for his national la&

cannot *e ignored in regard to those matters that 'rticle $ J no& 'rticle $# J of theCivil Code states said national la& should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, 'mos ). ?ellis, &as a citi3en of the 4tate of Te+as, B.4.'., and that under the la&s of Te+as, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.

'ccordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the &ill and the amount of successional rights are to *e determined under Te+as la&, the %hilippine la& onlegitimes cannot *e applied to the testacy of 'mos ). ?ellis.

=herefore, the order of the pro*ate court is here*y affirmed in toto, &ith costs againstappellants. 4o ordered.

Concepcion# C.$.# !e)es# $.(.+.# Dion# !egala# %a'alintal# 7aldivar# Sanche and

Castro# $$.# concur.

Documents

Conflict of Laws- C-F Cases