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•*&* m
LIBRARY
OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
._.l?lG PAPER,FRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Conflict, and Performance in R & D Organizations:
Some Preliminary Findings
^ • ^ ^ ..; 1William M. Evan
Sept. 1965 ^#l%6-^5
RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND EEVELOPMENT
Conflict and Performance in R & D Organizationsj_
Some Preliminary Findings --i'[
l.n IC.rJ,William M. Evan " ''^-
•;
Sept. 1965 -^___.li.#l^^
Presented at theSecond Conference on Research Program Effectiveness
Sponsored by the Office of Naval ResearchWashington, D.C.
July 28, 1965
The research described in this paper was supported by Grant No.
NsG 235 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research
studies on the organization and management of R&D.
Revised Sept. I965
CONFLICT AND PERFORMANCE IN R Se D ORGANIZATIONS:
SOME PRELIMINARY FDTOINGS*
William M. EvanSloan School of Management
Maseachusetts Institute of Technology
With relatively few exceptions, social scientists studying organizational phen-
omena have not focused their attention on conflicts. Some notable exceptions are
the studies of Robert Kahn and his colleagues on role conflicts and Harrison White
2on managerial conflicts and sociometric structure. Clearly, this paucity of research
on conflict cannot be due to the scarcity of the phenomena. Any denizen of any organ-
ication, whether engaged in manufacturing, R&D, or any other function for that
matter, knows this is not trxie. Hence, why the relative inattention to this facet
of organizational life?
This is indeed a difficult question in the psychology and sociology of research.
Suffice it to say that some problems are less complex than others, some are more
significant from a theoretical or a practical viewpoint, some are more fashionable
or more readily fundable. It may be that conflicts are so omnipresent in organiza-
tions, as well as in the world as a whole, that they tend to be taken for granted.
In addition, they are difficult to investigate because the parties involved are often
not willing to discuss them openly with social scientists. This may be particularly
true where conflicts are triggered off by the exercise of power which give rise to a
3sense of injustice.
The purpose of this study is to investigate some causes and consequences of
several types of conflicts in two R&D organizations, one in government and one
in industry.
2 -
THE PROBLEM
An underlying assumption of this study Is that conflicts are endemic in organiza-
tions because of a lack of consensus as to the expectations and prescriptions for
various organizational positions^ or a lack of uniform commitment to organizational
objectives. A second assumption of this study is that some types of conflicts are
detrimental and some are beneficial from the point of view of both organizational
and individual goals. Thirdly, the principle of minimizing conflict, subscribed to
by some managers and social scientists, may have some validity for crisis organiza-
tions, such as armies, or for so-called routine organizations, such as some manufac-
turing organizations, but not for knowledge- and technology-producing organizations,
ksuch as those engaged in research and development.
In R & D organizations, as in other types of organizations, conflicts arise at
various points in the structure: at top managerial levels in the course of policy
making, between various levels of management, and between various departments at a
given level in the hierarchy which require "lateral relationships' among managers
whose departments are interdependent in function. Another and perhaps distinctive
locus of conflict in R & D organizations is the project team.
In the conduct of R & D, whether in a university, in an industrial organization,
or in a government laboratory, there is a growing trend toward teamwork. This trend
has been encouraged by the emergence of inter-disciplinary areas, the growing size
of research projects, the increasing cost of equipment, and the increasing complexity
of problems which require a systems approach and the complementary skills of several
disciplines. This secular shift away from the academic model of the individual
scholar to a team effort in research has been documented in several studies, including
a recent report by Hagstrom on the incidence of teamwork among the faculty of various
disciplines at the University of California, where it ranges from 29^ in mathematics
and statistics to 97^ in physics.' Whenever such teamwork occurs, there is a huilt-in
opportunity for a variety of conflicts to erupt.
The focus of this study is on the project-team level in the organizational
structure in which two or more individuals of the same or different specialties col-
laborate in the solution of a problem. The major problem to be investigated is:
What kinds of conflicts at the project-group level are beneficial for the performance
of R & D, what kinds are detrimental, and why?
A TYPOLOGY OF PROJECT GROUP CONFLICTS
The theoretical framework for this research was suggested by some of the concepts
developed by Parsons and Bales in analyzing social systems. All groups, organizations,
or social systems, in general, must solve internal and external problems if they are
to survive. Every social system is expected or seeks to perform some function in
relation to its environment. Internally, if the system is to be viable, it must
satisfy the social and psychological needs of its members. Thus, one of the dimensions
of conflict has to do with the external environment of the project group as distinct
from a conflict having to do with social-emotional relations, namely, with inter-
personal relations among the project group members. Problems pertaining to the
environmental demands of the social system may involve technical or task conflicts;
on the other hand, problems concerned with social-emotional factors may involve
interpersonal conflicts. Another dimension of social system conflicts deals with the
status of the parties involved. Do the conflicts arise among peers or do they arise
among one or more of the subordinates and the supervisor of the project group? Since
some research suggests that obstacles to communication are fewer among status equals
Qthan status unequals, we would expect that conflicts arising between subordinates
and project group supervisors would have different effects on performance than those
conflicts occurring among status equals within the project.
- k -
The cross -classification of the two dimensions of conflict, technical versus
interpersonal conflict, on the one hand, and peer conflict versus supervisor-
subordinate conflict, on the other, yields four types of conflicts (Figure l). In
other words, in the performance of project group research, at least four types of
Insert Figure 1 about here
.
conflicts may arise: (a) task conflict among peers, i.e., disagreement among pro-
ject members as to what the objectives of the project shall be and how to achive
them; (b) task conflict between one or more project members and the project super-
visor; (c) interpersonal conflict among peers, for example, personal dislikes or
mutual distrust among project members; and (d) interpersonal conflict between one
or more project members and the project supervisor. We are not, of course, suggest-
ing that this typology of project group conflicts exhausts all those that in fact
occur. A variety of administrative conflicts, for example, do not clearly fall
in any of these four types.
Are all four types of conflict dysfunctional for the attainment of the objec-
tives of a project group? Our principal hypothesis is that technical conflicts have
a positive effect on performance whereas interpersonal conflicts have a negative
effect on the performance of R fis D project teams. In the work of project teams, as
in the history of science and technology as a whole, it was anticipated that contro-
versy would arise over the objectives of a project as well as the means employed to
reach the objectives and, ceteris paribus, that it would have a beneficial effect on
the performance of the group.
Several decades ago, Edwin Boring, in his presidential address to the American
Psychological Association, observed that:
"The history of science, like Hegel's view of the history of tho>i,:;ht,
is one long series of theses, set off by ardently advocated antitheses,
with ultimate syntheses terminating controversy and marking a step
forward. This picture, it seems to me, holds not only for speculative
philosophical psychology but also for the most rigorously observationalwork. Controversy has always been part of the method of science. "H
Controversy in project team work, or technical conflict in our terminology, can
potentially be adjudicated by rational means, and hence could conceivably open the
way to alternative perspectives on the part of project group members. Interpersonal
conflict, because it does not lend itself as readily to rational management, may
prove disruptive and interfere with the performance of the project group. In short,
it was predicted that technical conflict, whether among project group peers or
between members of the project and the supervisor would be positively correlated
with project group performance. In view of the fact that performance in organiza-
tions, particularly in R & D, is a complex, multi-determined phenomenon, any one
variable is apt to account for only a small amount of the variance. Accordingly,
several classes of variables, psychological, social-psychological, and sociological,
were built into the research instrument of this study in the expectation that the
correlations between types of conflict and performance would be mediated in varying
12degrees by these variables.
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
To test the principal hypothesis of the study, a survey was designed involving
the administration of a questionnaire in two R&D organizations, a governmental
and an industrial laboratory. The governmental laboratory is engaged primarly in
basis and applied research in aerodynamics; the industrial laboratory is predomin-
antly concerned with development work in the field of electronics. In each organiza-
tion, we ascertained the pattern of collaboration among scientists and engineers on
13official project teams. The identification of the memberships of various project
teams proved to be a surprisingly difficult problem to solve. Once this identification
was made vith the help of a special questionnaire addressed to the supervisors in
the two laboratories^ all project group members were asked to complete a question-
naire which included a variety of questions pertaining not only to types of con-
flict but also to hypothetical causes of conflict and several measures of perform-
ance.
In selecting the project groups from both organizations, we stipulated that
the project group should number at least 2 individuals, should have a duration of
at least 6 months, and should involve some degree of task interdependence. These
stipulations were deemed necessary if we were to observe any conflicts among the
group members.
The nature of the data, as is already apparent, is cross-sectiorial in character
which means that interpretations of the direction of causality are especially diffi-
cult. Although on theoretical grounds we are predicting that some types of con-
flict have positive "effects" and others have negative "effects" on performance,
what we observe, of course, are only concomitant variations. A panel study, on the
one hand, and laboratory and field experiments, on the other, could overcome these
deficiencies. Another characteristic of the data of this study is that it involves
reports of behavior and attitudes by means of a self-administred questionnaire.
This has the advantage of encouraging anonymity and confidentiality and the disad-
vantage of affording an opportunity for some respondents to distort their responses
at will. Obtaining an accurate measure of response bias is still a challenging
problem in survey research.
The questions pertaining to our four types of conflict were of a sociometric
nature. Each project group member was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how much
he usually disagreed on technical matters with each of his fellow project group
members. Similarly, he was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how much he usually
disliked or had difficulty getting along with each of his fellow project group
members and with his supervisor. The intricacies of measuring conflict and
- 7 -
performance suggested the advisability of obtaining comparable data from three
parties: all members of the project groups, first-level supervisors of the project
groups, and second-level supervisors. Thus, in the government laboratory we obtained
responses from 82 scientists and engineers associated with 27 projects and from 27
first-level and 27 second-level supei-visors. In the industrial laboratory, our
survey included 159 scientists end engineers who were associated with 37 project
groups, 30 first-level supei^isors, and 30 second-level supervisors (Figxire 2).
Insert Figure 2 about here.
The total number of respondents in the survey was 355
•
RESULTS
The measurement of performance in R & D organizations still poses a challenge
to both administrators and social scientists. In this study, two kinds of meas\ires
were obtained, subjective and objective. The subjective measure consisted of a
set of rating scales on how productive the project groups are as seen by the group'
members themselves, by the first-level supervisors, and by the second-level super-
visors. A similar subjective measure was obtained of project group creativity.
Although subjective rating scales are often not very reliable, the two objective
measxires we obtained, number of articles and number of patents, are also not trouble-
free. The number of patents received by project-group members is in part a func-
tion of the kinds of tasks they are engaged in and the organizational policies in
regard to patenting inventive ideas. Similarly, the number of articles published
by project group members is affected by the type of task and the organizational
policies concerning the public sharing of information. Another objective measure
of performance which we sought to obtain was the ratio of budgeted costs to actual
costs. Our efforts, however, were in vain because the unit of the accounting systems
in these organizations was not the project group but an administrative unit equivalent
8 -
to a department or a large-scale project cross-cutting various departments.
The analysis of the data thus far permits an examination of the relationship
between types of conflict and productivity. Since the productivity ratings, as is
clear from Table 1, are, with one exception, significantly intercorrelated in both
Insert Table 1 about here.
laboratories, they were averaged, in the Interest of simplifying the presentation
of the findings, into a composite productivity rating. This composite rating, for
each project group, consists of an average of the ratings of project group members
on how productive their groups are, and of the ratings of first-level and second-
level supervisors on the productivity of their project group. As in the case of
Table 1, the unit of analysis throughout this report is the project group, not the
«
individual engineer or scientist.
The project group means on the four types of conflict and on the composite
productivity rating are shown in Table 2. The group means on the four types of
Insert Table 2 about here
.
conflict appear to be higher in the industrial than in the governmental labora-
tory, and roughly equal on the composite productivity rating. Especially noteworthy
is the fact that the means for the two types of technical conflict are approximately
twice as high as the means for the two types of interpersonal conflict. This find-
ing may mirror the actual relative frequency of these types of conflict or else
the relative difficulty that project group members have in answering questions about
interpersonal conflict as compared with technical conflict.
The zero-order correlation between types of conflict and performance are pre-
sented in Table 3. Since we are dealing with ordinal data, the Kendall rank order
Insert Table 3 about here.
- 9 -
correlation was used rather than the Pearson product-moment correlation. The hypo-
thesis that Interpersonal conflict is negatively correlated with productivity is
partially supported by the results in Table 3. Of the four Kendall Taus in the two
laboratories involving the relationship between interpersonal conflict and produc-
tivity^ three are negative and one reaches the .01 level of significance. The
corollary hypothesis that technical conflict would be positively correlated with
performance is not supported, at least not for the measure of composite rating of
productivity Tfrfiich we have thus far analyzed: two of the four Kendall Taus are
positive, one is negative, end one is zero.
The noticeably higher correlations among the government project groups than
among the industrial project groups may be a function of the difference in organi-
zational climate, of the nature of the missions of the two organizations, or of
the terms of employment of the engineers and scientists. These differences may
be somewhat clarified by exploring the zero-order correlations by means of partial
association. Among the several intervening variables we have so far examined to
ascertaih whether they affect the zero-order correlation between conflict and pro-
ductivity, two seem to be enlightening.
In Table k, we have partialled out the effect of project group loyalty at
Insert Table k about here
,
two levels of this variable, above and below the median, and correlated conflict
with productivity. The scores on project group loyalty are derived from a seven-
point rating scale q^uestion on "How important is your association with your project
group?
"
Among the project groups in the government laboratory, the original signifi-
cant correlation (i.e., the zero-order correlation) of -.38 between interpersonal
conflict among peers and productivity is markedly affected by the degree of project
group loyalty. In groups with a high degree of project group loyalty, the original
- 10 -
negative correlation is enhanced, but it is diminished when project group loyalty
is low. Also noteworthy is the increased negative correlation from .10 to .50
between interpersonal conflict with supervisors and productivity under a condition
of low degree of project group loyalty. The negative effect of interpersonal con-
flict on performance is especially pronounced when there is an absence of social
support from project group members in the form of loyalty as well as a strained
relation with the supervisor.
The original positive correlation of .ik between technical conflict among
peers and productivity among the groups in the government laboratory is also
noticeably affected by degree of project group loyalty. Under a condition of low
degree of project group loyalty, the correlation becomes .25. And even the vir-
tually zero correlation of technical conflict with supervisors and productivity
increases to .12. Also suggestive is the difference in magnitude of the correla-
tions between low degree and high degree of project group loyalty. Under a condi-
tion of high degree of project group loyalty, there is virtually no correlation
between technical conflict and productivity. Evidently, for technical controversy
to develop and engender higher productivity, group cohesion may well be an impedi-
ment. Thus we observe a slight tendency for technical conflict to be positively
associated with productivity, as predicted, only under a condition of low project
group loyalty.
Among the industrial project groups, the mediating effect of project group
loyalty on the relationship between conflict and productivity is not at all evident.
Notwithstanding the higher incidence of various conflicts in the industrial labor-
atory which we observed in Table 2, we did not find any appreciable correlations
between conflict and productivity for these groups in Table 3, nor do we notice
in Table k any consistent effects of project group loyalty on the zero-order
correlations for the industrial groups. This difference between the two laboratories
11
may be due to the higher rate of tiirnover of professional personnel in the indus-
trial laboratory than in the governmental laboratory. If this explanation is true,
we would expect to observe a lower degree of project group loyalty among the
industrial groups than among the governmental groups. Similarly, if in fact the
professionals in the industrial laboratory have less Job security and are more
transient than those in the government laboratory, we might expect them to have
a lower degree of loyalty to the organization as a whole, and possibly, as a conse-
ll^quence, a higher degree of loyalty to their profession. We find some measure of
support for these anticipated differences in Table 5 which presents the means of
the project groups on three types of loyalties : loyalty to the project group.
Insert Table 5 about here.
loyalty to the R&D organization, and loyalty to the profession. Compared with
the governmental groups, industrial groups are lower in degree of project group
loyalty, about equal in loyalty to the organization, and higher in professional
loyalty.
Another group attribute that appears to affect the relationship between con-
flict and productivity is the size of the project group. In Table 6, we partialled
out this variable into project groups with four or less members and five or more
members. The smaller the project group, the greater is the negative correlation
between interpersonal conflict and productivity. This is true for the govern-
mental as well as the industrial project groups. In other words, in smaller
project groups interpersonal conflict is more detrimental to productivity than
in larger groups. Presumably in smaller groups, one cannot as readily avail
oneself of a pattern of avoidance in the event of interpersonal conflict as in
the case of larger groups. As a consequence, interpersonal conflict is more likely
to exert a negative influence on productivity in smaller than in larger groups.
- 12 -
The impact of project group size on the relationship between technical conflict
and productivity is not consistent. However, the effect of group size in the indus-
trial laboratory on the relationship between technical conflict and productivity
is noteworthy. The original correlations of .00 and .Oh become .lU and .12 under
a condition of smaller group size and -.07 and -.23 under a condition of larger
group size. In short, at least among the industrial groups, technical conflict
appears to have a slight positive effect on productivity among smaller groups and
a negative effect among larger groups. If this finding were also true of the govern-
ment project groups, it would be more suggestive than it is. However, among the
government project groups, technical conflict among peers apparently has a more
positive effect on productivity in larger groups than in smaller groups. Whether
the differential impact of project group size on the relationship between technical
conflict and productivity in the two laboratories is due to differences in the
degree of project group loyalty or to other factors is, at this stage of the
analysis, unclear.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A preliminary analysis of survey data on a sample of project groups in two
laboratories provides some measure of confirmation of the hypothesis that inter-
personal conflict is negatively associated with performance and technical conflict
is positively associated with performance. The evidence is more persuasive for
the detrimental effect of interpersonal conflict than for the beneficial effect
of technical conflict.
The relationship between conflict and performance appears to be partly depen-
dent upon at least two variables: group loyalty and group size. Under a high
degree of group loyalty, the negative effect of interpersonal conflict on perform-
ance seems to be more pronounced than under a low degree of group loyalty. This
is true, however, of the project groups in the government laboratory but not in the
- 13 -
industrial laboratory.
Group size also appears to affect the relationship of conflict and performance
in that in smaller project groups, at least in the industrial laboratory, technical
conflict is more likely to arise and have a positive effect on performance than in
larger project groups where interpersonal conflict is more apt to have a negative
effect on performance.
Thus management may have to attend to the possible adverse consequences for
performance of a high degree of project group loyalty. Apparently, a high degree
of project group loyalty, at least in the government laboratory, is not as conducive
as a low degree of project group loyalty to the emergence of technical conflict
and hence to the positive effect that it may have on performance. With respect to
project group size, management seems to be faced with a trade-off between the
negative effects of smaller groups, which seem to be conducive to a high degree of
interpersonal conflict, and the positive effects of smaller groups in facilitating
technical controversy that may be productive
.
If these preliminary findings are confirmed by further analysis of the data
of this study, they would underscore the need for management of R & D organizations
to consider the consequences of such variables as group size and group loyalty for
project group performance and the capabilities of supervisors to manage various
types of conflict that arise in the course of team effort. Otherwise put, mana-
gerial decisions involved in establishing and dissolving project groups should take
account of psychological, social-psychological, and sociological factors affecting
group performance. Vfhile we do not as yet have a firm body of knowledge on the
factors that lead to optimal group performance, particularly in R So D organizations,
some knowledge is accvunulating which could improve managerial decisions pertaining
to the composition of project teams.
Figure 1
TYPES OP CONFLICT IN PROJECT GROUPS
Parties to the Conflict
Issues In Conflict PeersSupervisor-Subordinates
TechnicalConflict
InterpersonalConflict
TC peers
Figure 2
DESIGN OP THE SURVEY
GovernmentalLaboratory
IndustrialLaboratory
Total
Number ofGroups
27
37
6k
Number ofProjectGroupMembers
82
159
2J«1
Number ofFirst-LevelSupervisors
27
30
57
Number ofSecond-LevelSupervisors
27
30
57
Table 1
INTERCORRELATION OP PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR PROJECT GROUPS
IN A GOVERNMENTAL AND AN INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY
(Kendall Taus)
Project Groups In a
Governmental Laboratory(N 21)
Project Groups in anIndustrial Laboratory
(N " 37),
Self-Rating ofProject GroupProductivity
SupervisorRating of Self-Rating ofProject Group Project GroupProductivity Productivity
SupervisorRating ofProject GroupProductivity ._
Plrst-LevelSupervisorRating ofProject GroupProductivity
Second-LevelSupervisorRating ofProject GroupProductivity
.30' .^Z»««
.27» Ik .i*l«»« .28*
' significant at the ,05 level•** aignifleant at the ,001 level
Table 1
INTERCORRELATION OP PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR PROJECT GROUPS
IN A GOVERNMENTAL AND AN INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY
(Kendall Taus)
Project Groups In aGovernmental Laboratory
(N 27)
Self-Rating ofProject GroupProductivity
SupervisorRating ofProject GroupProductivity
Project Groups in anIndustrial Laboratory
(N " 37).
Self-Rating ofProject GroupProductivity
SupervisorRating ofProject GroupProductivity ._
First-LevelSupervisorRating of .30<
Project GroupProductivity
.13»•»
Second-LevelSupervisorRating of .27^
Project GroupProductivity
.I'* .i*l««« .28»
* significant at the .05 level*»» significant at the .001 level
Table 2
PROJECT GROUP MEANS"*" ON CONFLICT AND PERFORMANCE IN
A GOVERNMENTAL AND AN INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY
Project Groups Project GroupsIn a in a
Governmental IndustrialTypes of Conflict. Laboratory Laboratory .
TC .32 *35peers
TC ^ .37 .38sup-sub
,
IC 1 .17 .21peers
IC ^ .15 .17sup-sub
Performance
• Composite Rating .69 .70on Productivity(average of self-rating, supervisorand manager ratings)
i" All group means are based on a scale ranging from to 1*
Table 3
RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPES OP CONFLICT AND PERFORMANCE
IN GOVERNMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROJECT GROUPS
(Kendall Taus)
Composite Rating of Productivity
Oovernmental IndustrialProject Groups Project Groups
Types of Conflict (N-27) (^"37)
IC >-.38»» .
^02peers
IC -.10 -.13sup-sub
TC .1^ 'OOpeers
TC -.02 .04sup-sub
** significant at the .01 level
Table ^
RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPES OP CONFLICT AND COMPOSITE
RATING OP PRODUCTIVITY IN GOVERNMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL
PROJECT GROUPS, CONTROLLING FOR PROJECT GROUP LOYALTY
(Kendall Taus)
Composite Rating of Productivity
Low Degree of High Degree ofProject Group Zero-Order Project Group
Loyalty i Correlations Lovalty
Governmental
Table 5
mean"*" loyalties op project groups in a governmental
and an industrial laboratory
Governmental IndustrialProject Groups Project Groups
(N-27) (N-37)
Type of Loyalty
Loyalty to Project Group ,^1 »3^
Loyalty to the R&D .61 *S^Organization
Loyalty to the Profession .38 .67
* The means computed in this table are based on the means of each ofthe 6^^ project groups*
Table 6
RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPES OF CONFLICT AND COMPOSITE
RATING ON PRODUCTIVITY IN GOVERNMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL
PROJECT GROUPS, CONTROLLING FOR PROJECT GROUP SIZE
(Kendall Taus)
Type o f Con fl ict
GovernmentalProject Croups
ICpeers
IC8Up-8Ub
TCpeers
TCGup-oub
Composite Rating of Productivity
Project Groupsof ^ or less
Members
..as*
-.21
.03
..03
Zero-OrderCorrelations
[..38»»]
C-.io]
C .I'O
C-.02]
Project Groupsof 5 or more
Members ..
-.32
-.06
.33
-.15
IndustrialProject Groups
(JiliZl
ICpeers
ICsup-sub
TCpeers
TCsup-sub
-.05
-.28»
.li»
.12
C .02]
C-.13]
C .00]
-.02
-.09
-.23
-.07
* significant at the .05 level*• significant at the .01 level
FOOTNOTES
* Revised version of e paper presented at the Second ONE Conference on Research
Program Effectiveness, Washington, D.C., July 27-29, I965.
The author is indebted to a NASA grant to M.I.T. which made this study possible.
He is also grateful to James R. Brovm, John Goering, and James R. Miller III for
their help in processing the data,
1. Robert L. Kahn et al ., Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and
Ambiguity, New York: Wiley, 1964.
2. Harrison White, "Management Conflict and Sociometric Structure, " American Journal
of Sociology, LXVII (September, I961), pp. I85-I99.
3. Robert L. Kahn, "Introduction," in Robert L. Kahn and Elise Boulding, eds..
Power and Conflict in Organizations, New York: Basic Books, 196i<-, pp. 1-7;
William M. Evan, "Superior-Subordinate Conflict in Research Organizations, "
Administrative Science Quarterly. 10 (June, I965) PP. 52-64.
k. Walno W. Suojanen, "Management Theory: Functional and Evolutionary,"
Journal of the Academy of Management, 6 (March, I963)/ pp. 12-17.
5. See, for example, H. A. Landsberger, "The Horizontal Dimension in a Bureaucracy,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (December, I961), pp. 299-332; George Strauss,
"Tactics of Lateral Relationships, " Administrative Science Quarterly, 7
(September, I962) pp. I6I-I86; George Strauss, "Work-Flow Frictions, Interfunc-
tional Rivalry and Professionalism: A Case Study of Purchasing Agents, " Human
Organization, 23 (Summer, 1964), pp. 137-14-9.
-2-
6. See, for example, Lowell H, Mattery and George P. Bush, eds,. Team-
work In Research , Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1953»
pp. 171-186; William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man . New York:
Doubleday Anchor, 1956, pp. 219-222; A. H. Cottrell, "Scientists:
Solo or Concerted," in Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsoh, eds., The
Sociology of Science . New York: Free Press, 1962, pp. 388-393*
7. Warren 0, Hagstrom, "Traditional and Modern Forms of Soientific Team-
work," Administrative Science Quarterly . 9 (December, 196^), pp. 241-
263.
8. Cf. Talcott Parsons, "General Theory in Sociology," In Robert K,
Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., eds.. Sociology.
Today . New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. '*-l6; Talcott Parsons et al. «
Theories of Society . Vol. 1, New York: Free Press, 1961, pp. 30-79;
Robert P. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis; A Method for the
Study of Small Groups . Cambridge: Addison-Wesley , 1951
•
9. See, for example, E. P. Torrance, "Some Consequences of Power Dif-
ferences on Decision Making in Permanent and Temporary Three-Man
Groups," in A. P. Hare, E. P. Borgatta, and R. F. Bales, eds..
Small Groups . New York: Knopf, 1955, PP. ^182-1192; N. R. P. Maier
and L. R. Hoffman, "Quality of First and Second Solutions in Group
Problem Solving," Journal of Applied Psychology . ^^ (August, I960),
pp. 278-283; N. R. F. Maier and L. R. Hoffman, "Organization and
Creative Problem Solving," Journal of Applied Psychology . k5 (August,
1961), pp. 277-280.
10. See, for example, Evan, op. clt .
11. Edwin G. Boring, History, Psychology and Science; Selected Papers, New York:
John Wiley, I963, p. 68.
12. For an analysis of the methodology of survey research, see, for example,
Patricia L. Kendall and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Problems of Survey Analysis,"
in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds.. Studies in the Scope and
Method of "The American Soldier," Olencoe. 111.: Free Press, 1950,
pp. 133-196; Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis; Principles. Cases,
and Procedures, Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1955-
13. Cf. William M. Evan, "Organizational Lag," Human Organization, in press.
Ik. Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd editionj
Glencoe, 111.; Free Press, 1957, PP. 225-386; Alvin W. Gouldner,
"Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles-I,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (December, 1957 )> PP« 28I-306;
W. G. Bennis, N. Berkowitz, M. Affinito, end M. Malone, "Reference Groups
and Loyalties in Out-Patient Departments,"" Administrative Science Quarterly,
2 (December, 1957), PP. '+8I-5OO.
15. See, for example, D. Cartvright and A. Zander, eds.. Group Dynamics; Research
and Theory, 2nd edition, Evanston, 111.: Row Peterson, I96O; Barry E. Collins
and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making,
New York; Wiley, 1964; Edwin J. Thomas and Clinton F. Fink, "Effects of Group
Size," Psychological Bulletin, 60 (July, I963), PP. 371-38^+; Donald C. Pelz,
"Some Social Factors Related to Performance in a Research Organization, "
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (December, 1956), pp. 310-325; L. R. Hoffman.
-1*-
and N. R. P. Maler, "Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions
by Members of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups," Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology , 62 (March, 1961), pp. MOl-'iO?.
HUV c » 6«
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