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After Operation Lightning Thunder Protecting communities and building peace
Mareike Schomerus and Kennedy Tumutegyereize
April 2009
conciliation resources
UN OCHA map of LRA-affected areas
REG
ION
AL
OVE
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ed a
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oth
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rs
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ce P
roce
ss w
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itiat
ed b
etw
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ndan
gov
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ent
Ces
satio
n of
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tiliti
es b
etw
een
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and
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ndan
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ent s
igne
d
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plet
es w
ithdr
awal
from
nor
ther
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n Li
ghtin
g Th
unde
r’ w
as jo
intly
laun
ched
in G
aram
ba N
atio
nal P
ark,
DR
C, b
yU
gand
a, D
RC
and
Sou
ther
n Su
dan
forc
es w
hen
Jose
ph K
ony
refu
sed
to s
ign
Juba
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ce T
alks
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l Pea
ce A
gree
men
t
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urity
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ncil
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oriz
ed th
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new
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fM
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man
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for 2
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allo
win
g up
to20
,000
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C p
eace
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ers
mai
nly
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eKi
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and
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tect
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ofci
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nd s
uppo
rt to
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anita
rian
actio
n w
aspr
iorit
ised
LRA
reta
liate
to `O
pera
tion
Ligh
ting
Thun
der’
with
cou
nter
atta
cks
on c
ivilia
n ar
eas
in a
ndar
ound
Far
adje
and
Dor
uma,
DR
C
Allie
d co
untri
es a
rmed
forc
es (U
PDF/
FAR
DC
/SP
LA) r
einf
orce
d ‘O
pera
tion
Ligh
tnin
g Th
unde
r’
CE
NT
RA
L A
FR
ICA
N
RE
PU
BL
IC
Hau
te-M
bom
ou
Prov
ince
DE
MO
CR
AT
IC
RE
PU
BL
IC
OF
C
ON
GO
UG
AN
DA
SO
UT
HE
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S
UD
AN
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tern
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toria
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c N
atio
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a G
aram
ba Hau
t-Uel
eD
istri
ct
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tral
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toria
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rly 1
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itize
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illed
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RA
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cks,
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g 50
0ch
ildre
n si
nce
Dec
200
7. T
here
have
bee
n 46
0 ch
ildre
n ab
duct
edan
d 16
2,00
0 or
10%
of t
his
popu
latio
n di
spla
ced
sinc
e Se
pt in
Hau
t-Uel
e. (
OC
HA
DR
C, L
RA
Coo
rdin
atio
n C
ell,
Feb
2009
)
141
pers
ons
kille
d in
LR
A at
tack
san
d at
leas
t 53,
267
disp
lace
d(3
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3 ar
e ID
Ps a
nd 1
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4 ar
ere
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RC
) and
78
pers
ons
abdu
cted
(OC
HA
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hern
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ar 2
009)
OVE
RVI
EW: S
tatu
s of
hu
man
itaria
n co
nseq
uenc
es
due
to L
RA
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cks
kTo
wn
or a
rea
atta
cked
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affe
cted
are
a Ja
n 20
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eb 2
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Allie
d co
untri
es a
rmed
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es
1991
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2002
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2005
-
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l20
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ug20
06 -
Oct 2
006
14 D
ec20
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ec20
08 -
24-2
5 Dec
2008
-
9 Jan
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-
POLI
TIC
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& M
ILIT
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MEL
INE
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ec 2
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undi
ng v
illag
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at l
east
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peo
ple
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d, 1
60 c
hild
ren
abdu
cted
and
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000
disp
lace
d (L
RA
Coo
rdin
atio
n C
ell,
Feb
09; O
CH
A D
RC
, UN
HC
R D
RC
);
Jan
2009
- FA
RD
C a
rmed
forc
es d
eplo
yed
to F
arad
je a
ndD
orum
a. M
ON
UC
con
tinue
s to
sup
port
FAR
DC
act
iviti
es;
Feb
2009
- Ab
out 1
2,00
0 di
spla
ced
from
Aba
into
Sou
ther
nSu
dan.
DR
C
SOU
THER
N S
UD
AN
28 J
an 2
009
– At
leas
t 120
peo
ple
kille
d an
d ne
arly
50,0
00 ID
Ps in
Wes
tern
Equ
ator
ia a
nd C
entra
lEq
uato
ria s
tate
s. T
he to
tal n
umbe
r of L
RA
rela
ted
Con
gole
se re
fuge
es in
Sou
ther
n S
udan
is 1
7,81
4.(U
NH
CR
, OC
HA
Sou
ther
n S
udan
, SS
RR
C)
LRA
AC
TIVI
TIES
IN S
OU
THER
N S
UD
AN
Feb
- Mar
ch 2
008
-Fou
r villa
ges
atta
cked
in th
eso
uthe
rn H
aute
-Mbo
mou
Pro
vinc
e 15
7 pe
ople
abdu
cted
of w
hom
55
wer
e ch
ildre
n.
No
conf
irmed
LR
A ac
tiviti
es in
200
9.
LRA
AC
TIVI
TIES
IN C
AR
AA
B
IDP
Ref
ugee
Kille
dC
ircle
s ar
e no
t dra
wn
to s
cale
Num
ber o
f affe
cted
peo
ple
LRA
AC
TIVI
TIES
IN D
RC
1 Summary 4
2 Methodology 6
3 TheLRAconflict 6
4 ThecurrentsituationintheDRCandWesternEquatoriaState 6
4.1 ConductofOperationLightningThunder 8
4.2 ImpactandperceptionsofOperationLightningThunder 9
4.2.1 Thehumanitariansituation 10
4.2.2 Security 10
4.3 Communitymilitarization 11
4.4 ImpactonSudan’speaceprocess 12
5 Strategiestoendtheconflict 13
5.1 Obstaclestoareturntodialogue 13
5.2 Themoodforapoliticalsolution 13
5.3 Seekingnewopportunities 14
5.4 Prioritizingsupportforcommunities 14
6 Recommendations 15
6.1 Onthepeaceprocess 15
6.2 Onsecurity 15
6.3 Onreconciliationandreintegration 15
Acknowledgements 16
Acronymsandabbreviations 16
Contents
OperationLightningThunder
ThemilitaryoffensiveknownasOperationLightningThunder,launchedon14December2008,markedtheendoftwoyearsofpeacenegotiationsbetweentheLord’sResistanceArmy’s(LRA)andtheUgandangovernment.TheUgandanarmy,inpartnershipwiththeforcesoftheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)andSouthernSudanandsupportedbytheUnitedStates,carriedoutaerialbombingofthemainLRAcampinGarambaParkintheDRC,followedbyathreemonthgroundoffensive.
Between2006and2008,asetofagreementswerenegotiatedbetweentheUgandangovernmentandtheLRA,underthemediationandfacilitationoftheSouthernSudangovernmentinJuba.ButtheFinalPeaceAgreement(FPA),pullingtogetherfiveseparatelysignedagreements,wasneversignedamidtheincreasedinsecurityandviolence.LRAleaderJosephKonyfailedtoturnuptoscheduledsigningceremonies,firstinAprilandtheninNovember2008.
BilledasastrategytoforceKonytosigntheFPA,OperationLightningThunderdestroyedtheLRAbasecampandscatteredtheLRAovertheDRC,SudanandtheCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR).TheUgandaPeople’sDefenceForce(UPDF)startedwithdrawingfromtheoperationinmid-March2009,handingovertotheArmedForcesoftheDRC(FARDC).TheoperationwasdeclaredasuccessthathadsignificantlyweakenedtheLRA’scommandstructure,ledtotherescueofabout300civiliansandthekillingofabout150LRA.Whiletheofficialobjectives–tomakeKonysign,ortocaptureorkillLRAsoldiers–wereonlypartiallyachieved,itremainstobeseenhowmuchtheLRA’scentralcommandhasbeenhurt.FewseniorLRAfigureswerecapturedandJosephKonyremainsatlarge.
Security
SecurityonbothsidesoftheDRC/Sudanborderworsenedduringthesecondquarterof2008.IncreasedLRAactivitywasreported,includingattacksandabductions.InJune,whenmilitarychiefsfromSouthernSudan,UgandaandtheDRCwereplanningstrategiesformilitarycooperation,theLRAattackedthesouthernSudanesePeople’sLiberationArmy(SPLA)stationedneartheLRAassemblysiteinRi-Kwangba.CiviliansintheDRCsufferedincreasedLRAattacksintheprovincesclosertotheborder.
SincetheonsetofOperationLightningThundersecurityformostpeoplelivingintheareahasdeteriorated.WhentheLRAcampwasbombed,LRAfightersscatteredinsmallgroupsinSudanandDRCandcontinuedtoattack.OnChristmasDaytheLRAlaunchedseveralcoordinated
massacresinCongolesetowns.Intotal,itisestimatedthatmorethan1000civilians1havebeenkilledandseveralhundredabductedbytheLRAsincetheyincreasedtheirviolentactivitiesin2008.
Protection
OperationLightningThundercommencedwithoutcleararrangementsforadequatecivilianprotectionandcivilianshavebornethebruntoftheoperation.TensofthousandsofCongoleseandSudanesehavebeendisplacedfleeingpossibleattacks.IntheDRC,citizenseitherfleetomajortownsoracrossthebordertoSudan.ThousandsofSudanesehavelefttheirvillagesalongtheborderandareseekingshelterandsecurityinmajortowns.Yetevenintownsprotectionislimited:itisunclearwhetheranyarmywasspecificallyassignedprotectionduties.TheUnitedNationsOrganizationMissioninDRC(MONUC)lackssufficienttroopstoprovideprotectiontociviliansonanappropriatescale.
Thereappearstohavebeennocoordinatedeffortbetweenthedifferentnationalarmiestoprotectciviliansandasignificantgapbetweenwhattheyofficiallyagreedandhowthisplayedoutontheground.Althoughofficialcooperationbetweenthethreearmieswasannouncedinmid-2008,SPLAmid-levelcommandersclaimtheyweresidelinedintheoperationalplanningandwerethusunwillingtosupportitfromtheSudaneseside.TheFARDC,havingtakenoverfullyfromtheUPDFinmid-March,lackcapacityduetounrestintheKivuregions.Duringtheoperation,theUPDF’sfocuswasclearlyonfightingtheLRA,ratherthanassigningmanpowertocivilianprotection.
Humanitariansituation
Thehumanitariansituationhasbeenequallydevastating.Withtensofthousandsdisplaced,ofteninextremelydifficultterritoryatthestartoftherainyseason,deliveringhumanitarianaidhasbeenchallenging.Lackoffoodandbasicserviceswillbecomeevenmorepronounced:citizenshavebeenunabletotendtheirfieldsduetotheinsecuritysolocalauthoritiesexpectseverefoodshortagesinthecomingmonths.
WhilethegoalofthemilitaryoperationwastorescueasmanypeopleaspossiblefromtheLRA,fewprovisionshavebeenmadetocaterforthosethatreturn,includingyoungwomenwithchildrenfromLRAsoldiers.Secureshelterandreliablemechanismsfortracingfamilymembersandpreparingfamiliesforreintegrationareneeded.
SUMMARY 1
4 • Conciliation Resources
1.EstimatebasedonUNsources,armyreportsandHumanRightsWatchresearch.
Communitymilitarization
Mostcommunitiesalongtheborderhavesetupciviliandefencegroupsasadirectconsequenceoftheincreasedinsecurity.ArmedwithanythingfrombowsandarrowstoAK-47s,thesegroupspatrolthestreetsandvillages,attimeswithsupportfromlocalarmybases.Communitiesseeaneedtoprovidetheirownprotectionsincetheydonotexpecttobeprotectedbynationalorinternationaltroops.Whilestressingtheimportanceofcommunityself-defence,somelocalauthoritiesandcommunityleadershaveexpressedconcernthiswillleadtorenewedmilitarizationandachangeinlocalpowerstructuresthatcouldhaveadamaginglong-termeffectonpeacebuilding.
Prospectsforaresolutiontotheconflict
ThepeacetalksinJubaareover,despitethefactafinishednegotiatedagreementliesunsignedonthetable.YetthemilitaryoperationhasalsofailedtoendtheconflictandforceLRAtosigntheFPA.IntheDRCandSouthernSudan,theLRAthreattociviliansisnowgreaterthanbefore.Itisunlikelythatmilitaryforcewillresultinanydealbeingsigned,andanytrustthatwasbuiltbetweenthenegotiatingpartiesinJuba–howeverfragile–hasgone.Thishascausedlocalfrustrationwiththemilitaryattempttoendtheconflict,andhasmaderevivingapoliticalprocessandestablishingchannelsofcommunicationwiththeLRAmoredifficult.TherecognitionthattheLRAconflictispartofthecomplexwebofviolentpoliticalconflictsandconflictsintheUganda,SudanandDRCborderregionsisanessentialsteptowardsprotectingthecivilianpopulationsoftheseareas.
Thereareotherobstacles.DuringtheJubanegotiations,theLRAdelegationwaslargelydrawnfromtheAcholi
diasporaandseriousriftsdeveloped,repeatedlyunderminingtheprocess.Thelegacyofinternationalinvolvementpresentsfurtherchallenges.Theintenseinternationalinvolvement,unprecedentedinpreviousinitiatives,hadcontradictoryeffects.Ononehand,itmadethepeacetalkspossiblethroughinternationalfundingandadvocacyforapoliticalsolution.Ontheother,itcreatedatremendouslycomplexenvironmentthatwashardfortheLRAtonavigate.Forexample,theLRAwasrequiredtotrustvariousactors,somewithveryconflictingviewsoninternationaljusticesystem.Theobstaclescreatedbythecomplexinternationalmachinerycanbeovercomebyasmaller,civilsocietydrivenprocess.
Anewapproachtoaconflictresolutionisurgentlynecessarytoavoidaprolongedlow-levelmilitarycampaignthatcausesextremeinsecurityforciviliansandagainfailstoendtheLRAcampaign.TherecentrejuvenationofdiplomaticcooperationbetweenKampalaandKinshasaprovidesnewopportunities.ThismaybeastartingpointtoanewregionalapproachtosolvingaconflictthatnowdirectlyaffectsfourcountriesandhasdestabilizedtheentireborderregionbetweenUganda,DRC,southernSudanandtheCAR.
MembersofcivilsocietyinSudan,DRCandUgandaarecallingforincreasedregionalcooperationthatincludescivilsocietyinordertorestartapoliticalprocessandcommunicationwithLRAleaders.Communityleadersstressacomprehensiveapproachtoconflictresolutionisneededsinceallaffectedareassufferparallelviolentconflicts.Aconsistentandinclusivepoliticalprocessacrossregionalbordersisnecessarytobringregionalpeaceandsecurity.
After Operation Lightning Thunder:Protectingcommunitiesandbuildingpeace • 5
Mar
eike
Sch
omer
us
UgandaPeople’sDefenceForcearmouredvehicleinYambio,February2009.
Methodology
The current situation in the DRC and Western Equatoria State
“ This was the most peaceful side of southern Sudan during the war and now in peace, we have war.” Yambiogovernmentofficial
The LRA conflict
2
4
3
AsanappendixtotheConciliationResourcesreportPerilousBorder:SudanesecommunitiesaffectedbyconflictontheSudan/Ugandaborder,2thisreportlooksatthecurrentsituationintheborderareasoftheDRCandSudan’sWesternEquatoriastate.Itreflectstheattitudesofcivilians,governmentandarmyofficialstowardsrecentmilitaryoperationsandonthepeaceprocessbetweentheLRAandtheUgandangovernment.Theseviewswereexpressedinmorethan70interviewsconductedinFebruaryandMarch2009inBuniaandDunguinDRCandinYambio,Ganguran,Ibba,MaridiandJubaCountyinSudan.InSudan’sMakpandurefugeecamp,refugeesfromtheCongolesevillagesofLilika,Duru,Bitima,
Nawenangwa,Bagbele(Garamba),Nakale,Ngilima,Bayotewereinterviewed.
Inaddition,twoworkshopsinformthisreport.On3March2009representativesfromcivilsocietyandlocalgovernmentfromEasternandCentralEquatoriagatheredinJubatodiscusstheongoingproblemsassociatedwiththeLRA.InGulu,on16–18March,aregionalcivilsocietyjointanalysisworkshoponpeacebuildingacrosstheUgandan,SudaneseandCongoleseborderswasheldtodiscussthewayforward.Theworkshopwasattendedbytraditionalandreligiousleadersfromtheaffectedregions,representativesfromNGOsandgovernmentaswellasformerLRAcombatants.
TheLRAhasbeeninrebellionagainsttheUgandangovernmentsince1986.InitiallytheconflictplayedoutinnorthernUganda,andinparticularintheAcholidistricts.TheconflictspreadacrosstheSudaneseborderaround1994,whentheLRAstartedoperatingfrombasesinEasternEquatoria,whichishometo,amongothers,largepopulationsofethnicAcholi.TheLRAbecameaproxysupportedbytheSudanesegovernmentinKhartoum,ostensiblyinretaliationagainstUgandanandinternationalsupportfortheSudanPeople’sLiberationMovement/Army(SPLM/A).
TheLRAconflictenteredanewstagewiththesigningoftheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)betweentheSudanesegovernmentandtheSPLM/Ain2005.In
thesameyear,theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)unsealedarrestwarrantsforthetopLRAleadership.Throughouttheconflict,therehavebeenmanypeaceinitiativeswithdifferentlevelsofsuccess.Motivatedandresilientgrassrootssocial,culturalandreligiousnetworksandorganizationshaveplayedimportantrolesintheseprocesses,despitetheirweakcapacities.After19yearsofwar,theJubaprocessinitiatedin2006renewedhopeforapeacefulresolution.TheimmediatesecuritydividendsoftheJubaprocessweretangibleintheareashistoricallymostaffectedbytheconflict.AsemblanceofdefactopeacecameaboutwhentheLRAmoveditstroopsoutofnorthernUgandaandSudan’sEasternandCentralEquatoriastates.
Sudan’sWesternEquatoriaStateborderstheDRCandtheCAR.Comprisedoftencounties,itcoversanarearoughlythesizeofAustria,muchofitdenseforest.DuringSudan’scivilwartheareawasrelativelypeaceful,withmostfightingconfinedtoareasnearthestateborderstothenorth,quiteremovedfromthestatecapitalYambioortheDRCborder.Approximately360,000peoplearebelievedtoliveinWesternEquatoria,butrecentdisplacementsmakeestimatesunreliable.
OntheothersideoftheborderinDRCisDunguterritory,oneofsixterritoriesthatmakeupHauteUélédistrictoftheOrientaleProvince.Ithasanestimatedpopulationof225,000inhabitantscoveringatotalareaofapproximately32,000squarekilometres,abouthalfthesizeofWesternEquatoria.OtheraffectedterritoriesalongtheborderincludeFaradje,Watsa,Rungu,AngoandNiangaraandtheWandoCollectivitywhereGarambaParkislocated.DunguterritoryisaseverelydeprivedareaevenbyDRC
6 • Conciliation Resources
2.Detailscanbefoundathttp://www.c-r.org/our-work/uganda/documents/Perilous-Border.pdf
After Operation Lightning Thunder:Protectingcommunitiesandbuildingpeace • 7
3.Theexactnumberofdeathsisunclear–UNmilitaryobserverssaythat17SPLAand6civilianswerekilled.
Mar
eike
Sch
omer
us
standards.FewservicesareavailableandagovernmentpresencewasrarelyfeltevenbeforetheLRAattackedthearea.
TheLRAhasbeenpresentinthisareasincelate2005,withapermanentbaseinGarambaParkandmobileunitsinWesternEquatoriabetweenEzoCountytowardstheCARborderandallthewaytoToreandYeitowardsJuba.DuringtheJubapeaceprocess,thenegotiationsheldbetweentheUgandangovernmentandrepresentativesoftheLRAunderthefacilitationoftheSouthernSudangovernment,theonlyLRAcampthatwasaccessibletooutsiderswasinRi-Kwangba,nearthevillageofNabangaontheSudan/DRCborder.
ThestoryoftheLRA’spresencehasbeenoneofgraduallydeterioratingsecurityconditionsandrelations.ResidentsinDRCreportthatfrom2005to2007,theLRAwasmoreorlessa‘friendlyforce’,freelymixingwithsomecommunities.OneofthechiefsofavillageinGarambaparkrecountedhow,“whenLRAcamefromUgandaforthefirsttime,theypassedanddidnotdisturbus.Theyjustpassedtothepark”.HeexplainedthatwhentheLRAcametoDRC,theyconveyedmessagestotheCongoleseciviliansthat
wedon’thaveaproblemwithCongolese,weonlyhaveaproblemwithSudanandCARpeople.Thismadeus[theCongolesecivilians]fearbecausewethought:iftheydon’tlikeSudaneseanditisnottheircountry,whyshouldtheylikeCongolese?
Abductionswerereportedthroughoutthisperiod,albeitonasmallscale.In2006,eightGuatemalanpeacekeepersdiedwhenMONUCengagedtheLRAincombat.
AnticipatingahumanitariancrisisandmilitaryforceagainsttheLRA,in2007MONUCstartedpreparingthenecessaryinfrastructure,includingrebuildingtheairstripinDungu.Aroundthesametime,astringofdefectionsfromtheLRAcausedbyaninternalleadershipstrugglebeganaperiodmarkedbyregularlooting,andattacksonvillagesbyLRAmembers.Inthoseattacks,localchiefswhoreportedlyhelpedsomeLRAcommandersdefectweredirectlytargeted.
WesternEquatoriansexperiencedperiodicLRAhostility,abductionsandlooting.AroundthedesignatedassemblyareainIbbaCounty,reportsoflooting,attacksandabductionsweremorefrequent.Inearly2008,UNmilitaryobserversreportedincreasedsuspectedmovementbytheLRAalongtheborderandwithinDRC.
ThesituationdeterioratednoticeablyafterLRAleaderJosephKonyfailedtoappearatascheduledsigningofthenegotiatedpeaceagreementinearlyApril2008.InJunetheLRAattackedanSPLAdetachmentinNabanga,killing15soldiersand12womenandchildren,accordingtoanSPLAcommanderondutythatday.3WhenaskedwhathefeltpromptedtheLRAattackontheSPLAafteralmosttwoyearsoffriendlyinteractions,hesaidthatjustbeforethatday,hehadheardontheradiothat“SPLA,UPDFandDRCweregoingtoteamupagainsttheLRA,soIthinkthatwasthereason.”
FromSeptember2008,theLRAintensifiedtheirattacksintheDRC,startinginDungutown.Sincethen,theLRAhasextendedtheiroperations,coveringapproximately450kmfromEastFaragitoWesternDuruma,aheavilyforestedandsparselypopulatedarea.Congoleseresidentsofthe
UgandanreligiousandtraditionalleaderswaitingforJosephKonyatthefailedsigningceremonyinRi-Kwangba,April2008.
affectedareashavefledtheirhomes,manymovingintoSudantowardsGanguran,nearYambio,aboutninemilesfromtheDRCborder.SomealsosimplyfledtothebushortowardsDuruinDRC.InSudan,theLRAiscurrentlyactivebetweenEzoandYei,withmostattackshappeningalongorsouthofthemainroadtowardstheDRCborder.
SincethebeginningofOperationLightningThunder,thesecuritysituationforthelocalanddisplacedpopulationhasagaindeteriorated.Afewdaysaftertheinitialaerialbombings,someLRAcommandersregroupedwithKony,havingbeengivenampletimetodosobya72-hourdelayinthearrivalofgroundtroops.TheythenreportedlyreceivedorderstoattackseveralCongolesevillagesonChristmasday.TheseattacksturnedintosomeofthemostgruesomemassacresinthehistoryoftheLRAconflict,withhundredsofpeoplekilled.Dozensofsmallattacksandseverallarge-scalemassacreshaveledtothedeathsofanestimated900civiliansinthreemonths,withtensofthousandsdisplaced.Around800peoplearereportedmissingandpresumablyabducted.ByFebruary2009,theSPLAandthecivilianpopulationreportedregularsightingofsmallLRAgroups(sometimesasfewasfivepeople,rarelymorethan20),whilealsodiscoveringtracesofsleepingplacesforlargergroupsof100ormorenearGanguran,closetoYambio.Sincethen,therehasbeenasteadytrickleofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)tositesinDRCandSudan.
4.1ConductofOperationLightningThunder
ThepeaceprocesssufferedaseveresetbackwhenKonyfailedtosigntheFPAon10April2008.Healsofailedtoturnupforsubsequentmeetingsorganizedathisrequest.TheLRA’sattacksandabductionsofciviliansintheDRCandCARhadalreadybeenexacerbatinginsecurity.InoneincidenttheLRAreportedlyabductedover150peoplearoundObointheeasterncorneroftheCAR,anareacriss-crossedbyvariousarmedgroupsincludingunitsofSudanesejanjaweedandCongoleserebels.
Citingthelackofprogresstowardsapeacedeal,themilitarychiefsofUganda,theDRCandSouthernSudanagreedinearlyJunetocooperatemilitarilyagainsttheLRA.ThestatedobjectivewastoforceKonytosignthepeacedeal.On14December,theUPDFtooktheleadinlaunchingOperationLightningThunderbybombingLRAcampsinGarambapark.ThiswasfollowedbyathreemonthgroundoffensiveinSudanandtheDRC,ledbytheUPDFwithsomesupportfromCongoleseforces.Inmid-March2009,theUPDFwithdrew,declaringtheoperationasuccessandhandingovertotheFARDC,whorenamedtheoffensiveOperationRudia.
LRAreturneesinterviewedforthisreportsaidthatonthedaybeforethebombing,Konyannouncedtherewouldbeaplaneattackthenextdayandthatcampsneededtobeevacuated.Othersseemedtohavebeenlesswell
informed:inUgandaandDRC,parliamentarianssaidtheywerenotconsultedontheuseoftheUgandanmilitaryintheDRC.WhiletheSPLAwastheoreticallyinchargeofsealingofftheborderstopreventtheLRAfromfleeingtoSudan,inpracticeitisnotcleartowhatextenttheSPLAfeltresponsibleforthisorhadthecapacitytodoit.BordervillageslikeSakurehadnomilitarypresencewhenthebombardmentstartedandresidentsreportedtherewasnoreactiontoLRAmovementfromtheSPLA.CriticizingtheUPDF’sapproach,oneSPLAofficialexplainedthelackofSPLAparticipationstemmedfromamutuallackoftrustintheother’scapacity.FromtheSPLApointofview,hesaid,theUPDFwaswrongtoapproachOperationLightningThunder,
asiftheyweregoingtofightaconventionalarmy,butthatwasnotthecase.Theydidnotfollowtheprincipleofwar,whichissurpriseandspeed.Also,SPLA,UPDFandFARDCforcesneversatdowntogether.SPLAwassupposedtosealthebordersandtheyweredrunk.TheUShelpedplanthis,butWesternsystemsnormallyunderminehowoursystemswork.USofficerswillrelyonequipment.Theywanttodotheirownintelligencegatheringwithoutrelyingonbasiclocalintelligence.The[US]StateDepartmenthasnoexperiencewithrealitiesontheground.TheUPDFtroopswereinKobokofordays,itwasliketheyweregoingtoaparty.TherewasnoalliancebetweenSPLAandUPDF,thegovernmentofUgandawantedtokeeptheoperationsecretfrom[SouthernSudan’sVicePresidentandChiefMediator]Riek[Machar].TheSPLAwasnotveryhappy.TheSPLAjustsaidtosomeforces,justgoandsitthere,lettheUgandansseeiftheyreallyarethebest.
ThescopeoftheUPDFmilitaryoperationishardtodeterminewithprecision.Localwitnessescanonlygivesnapshots.Inonecase,theyreportedhavingseen23UPDFvehiclesandfourarmedtanksmovinginSudanfromMariditowardsMadebejustbeforeChristmas.
UponitswithdrawalinMarch2009,theUPDFreportedthattheLRA’spermanentbasecampsinGarambahadbeendestroyed,fiveseniorLRAcommandershadbeencaptured,150LRAkilledandaround300abducteesrescued.Moreover,theLRAcommandstructurehadbeenimpairedanditsabilitytoregroupdestroyed.4
However,theLRAoperatesextremelyeffectivelyinsmallgroupsandthishasbecomethemodeofoperationoncemore.SincethestrengthoftheLRAisunknown,itisimpossibletoverifytheUgandangovernment’sclaimthatafifthoftheLRAwerekilled.Rumoursofhigh-levelindividualorgroupsurrenderremainunsubstantiated.
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4.BarbaraAmong.‘NinetyDaysofWarinGarambaForest’,NewVision,13March2009.
4.2ImpactandperceptionsofOperationLightningThunder
“Theinternationalcommunityhascommunication,theyhavesatellites,yettheyhaveleftusandwearealone.” Yambioresident
OperationLightningThunderbroughtresidentsinDRCandSudanamixtureofhope,despairandeventuallydisappointment.Onelocalleadersaid,“Initiallylocalswereapprehensivethatthemilitarywasnotprotectingthem,butwithcombined[Ugandan,CongoleseandSudanese]forcestheyfeltbetter”.EchoingthehopethatthecampaignwouldconcludewithKony’sarrest,anothersaidthattheincreasedinsecurityandthebombingofLRAabducteeswasapainfulbutnecessarysteptotake:“AttackingKonywithFARDCandUPDFwastheonlyoption.Therearecasualties,butwehavetopaythem.Thereisnopeacewithoutbloodshed.”
Criticismofhowthemilitaryoperationwasexecutedhasbeenvoicedlocally,nationallyandinternationally.Asastrategytoendtheconflict,protectciviliansandencourageLRAmemberstoleavethebush,OperationLightning
Thunderhasbeenweak.ItsofficialobjectivewastoeitherforceKonytosigntheFPA,ortocaptureorkillLRArebels.
Theoperationutilized‘psyops’(psychologicaloperations)toencourageLRAmemberstoleavethebush.ThisincludeddroppingleafletsoverGarambaParkurgingtheLRAtocomehomeandassuringthemtheywouldbereceivedwithopenarms.Yetitwasill-prepared:theleafletinformedtheLRAthattheyshouldreporttothenearestchurchorarmyunits,butchurcheshadnotbeeninformedthattheyweresupposedtoreceivetheLRAorwhattodowiththem.
AlocalgovernmentofficialfromYambiosaidthemilitarycampaignwasdoomedfromthestartbecauseitfailedtotakeintoaccountlocalknowledge:
ThewayUPDFisdoingit,itisnottherightway.Thewaytheystartedwaswrong.Theyshouldhavecometotalktothecommunity.TheycamewithouttalkingtothegovernorofWesternEquatoria.Theyjuststartedbombing.Asaresult,theLRAhasscatteredlikeredants,buttheyareliketheredantsthatcomebackanddestroyyourhouse.
WhentheUPDFstartedtowithdrawitstroopsfromDRCinmid-March2009,themoveconfirmedwhatoneYambioresident’sstancethat“thepeopleknowUPDFis
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AcampsetupbyCongoleserefugeesinMakpandu,Sudan.
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notthesolution,itisonlytemporaryandtheycanleavetomorrow.”FewresidentshaveexpressedconfidenceinthecapacitiesofeithertheFARDCorSPLAtoactuallyarresttheLRAleadership.AlthoughthemilitarycampaignhasbeendeclaredasuccessbytheUPDF,JosephKonyremainselusiveandtheFPAhasnotbeensigned.OnelocalSPLAmemberfeltthatthetasklefttothemhadnowbecomeevenbiggerafterOperationLightningThunder:“Idon’tthinktheLRAwillbewipedout,”hesaid.“Ifanythingtheyhavejustmadethemstronger.”
4.2.1Thehumanitariansituation
Thehumanitariansituationisextremelysevere,andtheoutlookforthenextfewmonthsisbleak.InSudanandDunguterritory,localgovernmentofficialsandaidorganizationsarestillverifyingtheexactnumberofIDPsandrefugees.InMaridiCounty,localofficialsestimatethatmorethan10,000Sudanesehavebeendisplaced,butthatatleast30,000areaffectedalongtheborder.InYambiocounty,officialssaidthat1139individualshadbeendisplaced.TheexactnumberofSudaneseIDPsishardtodeterminesincetheyarenotinoneplace,butscatteredinthebushorwithrelatives.InFebruary,theUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UNOCHA)inDunguterritoryestimatedthatwere160,674CongoleseIDPsand20,000refugees,mostofwhomhadfledtoWesternEquatoriastate.
InbothDRCandSudan,humanitarianassistanceisscarceandthosereceivingassistancearelikelytobestayingwithinmajortownsorcamps.Hopesthatthesituationcanbeimprovedanytimesoonareslimonbothsidesoftheborder,madeworsebythestartoftherainyseason.InDRC,asofmid-February2009,theWFPhadaccessedonly54,511peoplewithfooditemsand27,065withnon-fooditems.
Outsidemajortowns,deliveryofhumanitarianassistanceisextremelydifficultduetoalackofroads.Tocoverthe500kmfromBenitoDungubyroadtakesaminimumof12daysduringdryseason.Inrainyseason,theroadsbecomeimpassable.Niangara(97kmwestofDungu)hosts11,000IDPswhocannotbeaccessed.IDPcampsinGangaraorBodioareconsideredunsafeforhumanitarianworkersduetothelackofanymilitarypresenceorpoliceforce.Protectionofbothciviliansandaidworkersisamajorchallenge.
Localauthoritiesexpectanevenworsefoodshortageinthemonthsaheadduetolackofcultivationinthelastfewmonths.Thosedisplacedorthosewithremotefieldshavenotbeenabletotendtotheircrops.Thelackofaharvestisamajorconcerntoauthoritiesandciviliansalike.
4.2.2Security
ThemajorcomplaintofthelocalpopulationsintheDRCandSudanisthattoolittleconsiderationwasgiventocivilianprotectionintheplanningandexecutionofthemilitarycampaign.InSudan,thekeycriticismisthataerialbombingstartedwithoutpositioningtheSPLAalongthebordertopreventLRAgroupsfromentering.TheareainneedofprotectionisvastanditishardtosaywithcertaintywhetheritwouldhavebeenpossiblefortheSPLAtosealofftheborders.ButintheabsenceofanyattempttodosotheLRAhasroamedfreely,splittingintosmallmobileunitstoavoidmilitaryconfrontationsandtoattackcivilians.
SudaneseandCongolesecivilianshave,intheirownview,becomecaughtbetweenarockandahardplace.ByallowingtheUPDFintotheircountries,theymadethemselvesmorevulnerabletoLRAattacks,asoneyouthleadersaid,because“theUPDFpresencemakesthemlooklikeenemiestotheLRA.”YetthewithdrawalofUPDFfromtheoperationhasleftcivilianswithonelessforcetoprotectthem.ThetaskofcivilianprotectionisnowinthehandsoftheFARDC,andwithCongoleseforcesengagedinfightingintheKivus,thereislittleexpectationthattheywillhavethecapacitytocountertheLRA.
Militaryobservershaveexpresseddoubtaboutthecapacityofthethreearmiesinvolvedtoprovideadequateprotection,whileMONUCforces,whosemandatetheoreticallyallowsthemtoengageinfightingforprotection,havelimitedfightingcapacity.TheUNSecurityCouncilauthorizedanincreaseintroopsforMONUCinNovember2008,5butithasbeenachallengetogetanycountrytocommittocontributingmoretroops.WiththeproblemsinKivus,theprospectsthatMONUCwillmobilizesufficienttroopsinDunguagainsttheLRAseemsunrealistic.
OntheSudaneseside,manyEquatorianshaveanuneasyrelationshipwiththeSPLA,basedonalonghistoryofdistrust.“Thefeelingofprotectionisnottherestrongly,”explainedoneEquatorianleader.“Onereasoncouldbeoneofthosedrunkardsoldierswho,when[theLRA]appear,sayswearetiredoffighting,youciviliansgo.Sowhenthatwassaidcivilianshadlittlehope.”DuringanLRAattackonthevillageofMboroko,amessengerwassenttoalerttheSPLAwhoreportedlysaid“youjustwait,wearecominglater.”Thepersonwhosentthemessengersaidthat,“thearmyisnowreallystrugglingtomakepeoplebelieveinthem.”ThislackofconfidenceisrootedinyearsofstrainedrelationshipsbetweentheEquatoriantribes(suchastheZandeintheYambioareaortheBakaaroundMaridi)andtheNilotictribes(suchastheDinka,whomakeupthemajorityofSPLAsoldiers).EquatorianciviliansperceiveSPLAsoldiers’behaviourandtheirfailuretoactasprotectorsinethnicterms,ratherthanasisolatedincidentsofarmymisconduct.
5.ResolutionS/RES/1843,20November2008.
TheinterventionoftheICChasraisedhopesofanimminentsolutionbasedoninternationallawthatarebothhighandunrealistic.6OnelocalgovernmentofficialinWesternEquatoriasaid,“nothingneedstobenegotiatedhere,thereisnothingtoreconcile.WearewaitingfortheICC.TheICCneedstocomehereandtakecareofthisissue.”Atthesametime,residentsrealizethattheinvolvementoftheICChascausedfrictioninthepeacenegotiationswiththeLRA:“TheICChasneverbeenhere.Maybeitwasjustcreatedtogetsomepeoplepaid.Theyseemtocreateproblemswithoutsolvingit.Konynowsayshewon’tsignpeace,sotheyhavecreatedaproblemwithoutsolvingthem.”
4.3Communitymilitarization
Asaresponsetothelackofprotection,civiliansonbothsidesoftheborderarenowarmingthemselves,eitherindividuallyoraspartoforganizedcivilianpatrols.Whilesomeuseguns,themostcommonweaponsarebowsandarrows.Civilianpatrolssaythattheirowneffortcouldbeseenasaddingtothemilitaryeffortinanattempttomoreeffectivelycoveralargerterritoryandworkwithbetterlocalknowledge.InDRC,thelocalself-defenceunitswerefirstformedin2000,butmostfelldormantuntiltheSeptember2008attacksonDungu.Incommunitieswhereself-defenceunitsareconsideredstrong,suchasBangadi
andDungutown,LRAattackshavebeenminimized.Initiallymadeupofidleyouthandhunters,theseself-defenceunitshavebeenrecognizedbytheterritoryadministratorsandcarryoutjointpatrolswithFARDC.Theymovefreelyintownwiththeirhuntingguns.ThebehaviourofthesegroupsandtheirrelationshipwiththeFARDCandthepolicehasbeenproblematic.Forexample,inNgilima,theselfdefenceunitsattackedpolicemen,woundingthecommanderandtakingfirearms.Insomeotherareas,theyarereportedtobeharassingex-abducteesorkillingthosethattrytoescapefromtheLRA.Thecreationoftheself-defenceunitsunderlinestheexistinggapinprotectioncapacities.
SudaneseresidentsreportthatduringOperationLightningThunder,theyweresometimessuppliedbymilitaryforces:“[TheUPDF]sometimesdistributeammunitionandgowiththecommunity.Andwhenthereis[noincident]theyaskforammunitionbackbecauseitbelongstothegovernment.Thatiswhatthecommunitywants.”HencealongtheYambio-Maridiroad,civilianpatrolshavebeenaregularsightsincemid-February.Makingarrowsduringtheday,thegroupsworkinorganizedpatrolshiftsfrom8pmthroughthenight.Theleaderofonepatrolsaidthatthe“communityhastobeencouragedtousetheirweaponsforfighting.Wecan’thavearmyeverywhereandthegovernmentcannotprovidearmstothecommunity.”
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6.In2005,theICCunsealedfivewarrantsforLRAcommanders,twoofwhomhavesincebeenkilled.InMarch2009,theICCalsoissuedawarrantforSudan’spresidentOmeral-BashirfromcrimescommittedinDarfur.Thefactthatthewarrantsinbothcaseswereissuedbeforepeaceagreementshadbeenmadehasdrawnmuchcriticism.CriticssaythewarrantshavemadeitimpossibletostrikepeacedealsforUgandaorDarfurwhilesupportersbelievethatthewarrantsbringpressuretoresolvetheconflicts.
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CiviliandefencegroupsalongtheYambio-Maridiroad.
Anotherlocalresidentsaidthatwasconfidentthatthecommunitysolutioncouldwork,ifsufficientlysupported:“Ifthelocalcommunityisempoweredtotakethesecurityofthearea,theLRAwillbeflushedout.Buteverybodyissoscaredtogivefirearmstocommunities...InUgandatheyhadthearrowboysanditworked.”OtherslookwithconcerntotheUgandanexample.“WiththearrowboysinUganda,”explainedonemanwhohadbeenarefugeeinUganda,“ittookonlyaverylittlewhileuntiltheystartedtosetuproadblocksandforcingpeopletopaythem.Itisnotavoluntaryforce.Theystartdoingthingsforthemselves.”
LocalleadersinYambioandMaridi,whilesupportiveoftheircommunities’attemptstodefendthemselves,arepessimisticabouttheprospectsofsolvingthegreatersecurityproblemthisway.“Thecommunityisnowdoingself-defencebutinrealitythatdoesnothelp,”saidalocalchurchleader.“Becauseinthelastattack,[theLRA]surprised[thelocals],thebowsandarrowswerethere,buttherewasnotime.Itisjustraisingofmorale.”Anothercivilsocietyleaderexplainedthatcommunitymilitarizationexposestheshortcomingsincommunityprotectionandpsycho-socialprogrammes:“Insomevillages,youngpeoplestartpatrollingthroughoutthenight.Itisabitlikecounselling.Whattheydohelpsthemind.Theydonotfeelpowerless.”
4.4ImpactonSudan’speaceprocess
WithciviliandisarmamentoneofthemajorchallengesinSudan’sownfragilepeaceprocess,rearmamentmayhavefar-reachingimplicationsforSudan’sCPA.Moreover,vastpartsofSudan,includingWesternEquatoria,areexperiencinganextremelyvolatilesecurityenvironmentinwhichtheLRAhasbecomeonemoreseriousdestabilizingfactor.ThisvolatilityunderlinestheurgentneedtofindasolutionfortheLRAconflict.
InWesternEquatoria,divisionsbetweenlocalstateresidentsandSouthernSudanesegovernmentrepresentativesinJubarundeep.LocalsfeelthatthecentralgovernmentandalackofcommunicationaboutthepeaceprocesshasleftthemexposedtoLRAattacks.
Peoplehereareverydisappointedintheprocess.Whatpeoplearesayingaroundnegotiationsisthattheexpenseoflife,theycan’ttolerate.Thatangerwasseenduringthelast[LRA]attack.ThatdeadbodyofanLRAwasputuptotownandeverybodycametoitandcuttheirknivesortheylashedorbeatitwithastick.HereinWesternEquatoriawereallyhadthathighexpectationbecausetheycameandourgovernmentmediated,wesawfoodtakentothem.
SeveralpeopleinterviewedexpressedtheirangerwithaSouthernSudaneseleadershiptheyseeasbiasedalongethniclines.Theyhave“badmemories”ofwar,saidoneWesternEquatorianwhousedtoworkwithaninternationalorganization:
Mostpeoplehavealotofhorribletalesfromourownsoldiers,rape,beating,younggirlsrapedwithbottlesandtheirorgansopenedwitharazorbladetopenetrate.Also,peopledonotnowdifferentiatebetweenSPLAandSPLM[thepoliticalwingoftheSPLA]…Tryingtorepairitmeansif[theSPLA]isthearmy,letitnotonlybeonetribe.Everyroadblockyoufind,itisthesamepeople.Itneedstobeatrulymixedarmyandbothsoldiersandciviliansneedtobeheldaccountable.
Anotherongoingsecurityconcernhasbeenthepresenceofarmedpastoralists,theAmbororo,inbothWesternEquatoriaandBasandHauteUélédistrictsintheDRC.Thisnomadtribeownslargeherdsofcattleandhasbeenseenwithsophisticatedcommunicationequipmentandmodernweaponry,fuellingsuspicionthatthegovernmentinKhartoumisequippingtheminordertofosterinstability.
TheAmbororoareconsideredathreattothelocalagriculturallifestyle:“Theyaredestroyingthelivelihoodbygrazingtheircattle,takingthewateranddestroyingbeehives,”saidalocalaidworker,addingthat,
suchanumberofanimalsdestroysWesternEquatoriafarms,itdestroyslivelihoods.Iftheycanfindbettergrazinglands,theyshouldgothere.WesternEquatoriansdon’tknowwhattheyreallyaredoing,theyaredeepintheforest.Weareconcerned.LRAandAmbororo,weneverknowwhattheydo.Wedon’tknowiftheyareconnected.
Duringseveralmeetings,WesternEquatorianssay,theAmbororochiefsagreedtoleavethearea,evensigningaceasefireandanagreementtoleavethestatebytheendofJuly2008.Butlocalresidentsandofficialssaytheyhavefailedtodoso.WhilesomeZandespokespeoplehavestatedpubliclythattheybelievetheLRAandtheAmbororoareworkinginconjunction,thisseemstobelittlemorethananassumption.Othersbelievethereisnocoordination,butthatthetacticsbehindtheirpresencearethesame:“TheLRAisathreatandalsotheAmbororo,theyareindirectlylinkedbecausetheyhavethesamebossinKhartoum.Buttheyhavenotcarriedoutcoordinatedattacks.”Eveniftheconnectionisnotdirect,thepresenceofthetwogroupsmakespeoplewonderiftheydonot,afterall,supporteachother:“TheAmbororoarelikebulldozerstotheLRA,”saidalocalgovernmentofficialinYambio.“TheytaketheircattlealongtheroadandthentheLRAtakethatroad.Ambororoareintruders.Thereisaverybigquestionabouttheirpresencehere.Theywerenothereduringthewar.OnlysincetheCPAaretheyhere.”Othersstatecategoricallythat“theAmbororosarefaraway,IhaveneverseenthemherewithLRA.”LRAreturneesreportthattheyhadexperiencedclashesbetweenLRAandAmbororo.Yetevenifadirectconnectionishardtoestablish,thedoublethreatfromtwoarmedgroupswithunclearaimsmakesitimpossibleforresidentstofeeltheyhavegainedanythingfromtheCPA.
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5.1Obstaclestoareturntodialogue
DespitethesuccessofOperationLightningThunderindamagingLRAcommandstructuresandrescuingabductees,itsoverridingfailurewasnotprovidingadequatecivilianprotection.WhilethecommandstructureoftheLRAmayhavebeenhurt,itscapacitytoattackandkillinsmallgroupshasnot.ThethreatposedbytheLRAtociviliansisnowgreaterthanbefore.Thishascausedlocalfrustrationwiththemilitaryattempttoendtheconflict,andhasmaderevivingapoliticalprocessmoredifficult.Itseemsunlikelythatmilitaryforcewillresultinanydealbeingsigned,andanytrustthathadbeenbuiltbetweennegotiatingpartiesinJuba–howeverfragile–hasgone.
TheUgandangovernmenthassignalleditisnotpreparedtorevivetheJubaprocessinanyway,althoughitisnotclearwhetherthesameappliestoanykindofpoliticalprocess.TheLRAisonceagainaforcethatcannotbereachedorcommunicatedwith,makingitveryhardforanyone–UN,civilsocietyorNGOs–toenvisionhowaprocesscouldberestarted.CommunicatingwiththeLRAremainsacrucialproblem,evenmoresosincetheyhavesignificantlyreducedtheiruseofsatellitephones.WhilereturneessaythatmanyLRAcommanderslistentotheradionews,itwillbedifficulttoreachthemanyLRAsoldierswhodonothaveaccesstoaradio.
Thereareotherobstacles.DuringtheJubatalks,theLRAdelegationwaslargelydrawnfromtheAcholidiasporaandseriousriftsdevelopedduringnegotiations,repeatedlyunderminingtheprocess.ItisunclearhowclosecommunicationisnowbetweentheLRAandthediasporasupporters.EvenifcredibleoutsiderepresentationfortheLRAwastoemerge,itisunlikelythattheUgandangovernmentwouldacceptanotherprocessofproxynegotiationaftertheexperienceofJuba.
Thelegacyofinternationalinvolvementpresentsfurtherchallenges.Intenseinternationalinvolvement,unprecedentedinpreviousinitiatives,hadcontradictoryeffects.Ononehand,itmadethepeacetalkspossiblethroughinternationalfundingandadvocacyforapoliticalsolution.Ontheother,itcreatedatremendouslycomplexenvironmentthatwashardfortheLRAtonavigate.ForexampletheLRAwasrequiredtotrustanumberofactors,somewithveryconflictingviewsoninternationaljusticeprocedures,thattheywouldnotbeextraditedoncetheyhadsignedtheagreement.Inthefinalmeetings,Konycitedproblemsunderstandingtheframeworkonjusticeandaccountability,drawnuptofulfiltheICC’srequirementsthatlocaljusticeproceduresprotecttheinterestofthevictimssufficiently.Theobstaclescreatedbythecomplexinternationalmachinerycanperhapsonlybeovercomebyasmaller,civilsocietydrivenprocess.
5.2Themoodforapoliticalsolution
CitizensofSouthernSudanandDRCstateclearlythattheyhavebeenleftexposedandvulnerablebytheirgovernmentsandtheinternationalcommunity.Yetdespitehugefrustrationwiththecurrentsituation,theyalsoexpressanunderstandingaboutwhatthenegotiatorshadtriedtoachieve:“Itwasnotamistake,itwasagoodinitiative,”saidoneYambioresidentaboutthepeacetalkswiththeLRA.“Thereisnopeacetalkswhichisperfect,mistakescanbecorrectedlater.Itisalwaysbettertodosomethingthannothing.”
YetsomeSudaneselocalsarenolongerpreparedtooffertheirsupportforpeacetalks:“Anybodywhoistalkingofnegotiationshouldrelocatethenegotiationstotheirowncountry,”saidonememberoftheSPLA.“WhentheSPLAnegotiatedinKenya,wedidnotkillKenyanswhileweweretalking.WhowantstonegotiatewithKonyshouldnotcometoSouthernSudan.Enoughisenough.”
Othersfeltthatallsidesweretoblameforthefailureofthepeacenegotiations.TheLRA,whileofficiallystillatthenegotiationtable,continuedandintensifiedattacksandabductions.TheUPDFonseveraloccasionsbroketheCessationofHostilitiesAgreement.“InSudan,governmentofSouthernSudanhastalkedandalsopreparedtofight,”saidoneyouthleader,referringtotheSPLA’sagreementtoalsopursuetheLRAwhilethepeaceprocesswasostensiblystillalive:
Ugandadidthesame.Thisisneversincerepeacetalk.Weneedpureandtruepeacetalks.UgandaandthegovernmentofSouthernSudanneedtoshowtheirtruecolours.Ifyouwanttonegotiate,don’tfightme.EitherthereneedstobeapropermilitaryresponseoryouhavetonegotiatebetterwithDRCandSouthernSudan.
WhilestressingtheimportanceofimplementingwhathadalreadybeensignedintheJubaprocess,amemberoftheSouthernSudangovernmentsaidthatitwasimpossibletobelievethatKonywouldevertrustUganda’sPresidentMuseveniwithregardtohisownsafety,butalsothattheoptionofstayinginSudanforsafety,
wasneverconveyed.Theinternationalcommunityshouldhavejustsaid‘signandgowherever’.WhenMuseveniseesopportunityforpeace,hisrhetoricchangesfrom‘partnerinpeace’to‘victorinpeace’.Youneedtoconcedeprideandegothatyouarethevictor.Ifyoudon’t,Iwillthinkyourpeacedealisbait.
AseniorSPLAfigureexpressedhisdisappointmentthatintheend,thepromiseofpeaceprovedweakerthanthe
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threatofaninternationalwarrant:“NobodycouldgiveKonystrongenoughguarantees,”hesaid.“Ultimately,thatiswhyitfailed.”
5.3Seekingnewopportunities
Despitethechallengesithasbecomeclearthatinordertomovetowardsaresolutionoftheconflict,strategiesthatgobeyondmilitaryoperationsarenecessary.Themilitaryoption,aimedatachievinganoutrightvictoryagainsttheLRA,hasremainedtheUgandangovernment’sfavouredapproach.YetthereisalitanyoffailedattemptstosecureadecisiveblowagainsttheLRA.InMarch2002,theUgandangovernmentembarkedonamilitaryoperationagainsttheLRAinSudanwiththeencouragementofSudanesegovernment.TheyhadcalculatedthatattackingtheLRAfromtherearwouldresultinadecisivevictory.AlmosteightyearsafterthelaunchofOperationIronFist,theUgandanforcesoperatinginSudanhavenotdefeatedtheLRA.Insteadtheoperationresultedinincreasedabductionsandhadseverehumanitarianconsequences,includingover1.8millioninternallydisplacedpersonsinnorthernUganda.OperationLighteningThunderhasequallyresultedintodevastatingconsequencesforthelocalpopulationinDRCandWesternEquatoriaState.
Continuingonapathtopeaceisnecessaryifanextendedregionalhumanitariancrisiswithlow-levelconflictistobeavoided.Abandoningtheinstitutionsofthepeacetalksandoptingforamilitarystrategyhasworsenedthesituationforthecommunities.Lackingacrediblepathtoanegotiatedalternative,communitieshaveableakoutlookonthefuture.Toavoidprolongeddeterioration,channelsofcommunicationwiththeLRAleadershipneedtobere-established.TheJubaprocessmadeanattemptatinclusivity,callingfortheparticipationofcivilsocietyactors,butitfocusedalmostexclusivelyonUgandanrepresentatives.Recentdevelopmentsseemtosuggestthatapeaceprocessneedstoincludecivilsocietyfromallaffectedcountriesandthatcooperationbetweencivilsocietyactorsacrossbordersneedstobestrengthened.
Strategically,OperationLightningThundermarksaneweraofregionalmilitarycooperation.Paradoxically,giventhedevastatingsecurityandhumanitarianeffectsoftheoperation,thecooperationitsignifiesmayhaveopeneddoorsforincreasedregionaldialogueifapoliticalprocesscanbestartedonthebackofit.
TherecognitionthattheLRAconflictispartofthecomplexwebofviolentconflictsintheUganda,SudanandDRCborderregionsisanessentialsteptowardsprotectingthecivilianpopulationsoftheseareas.Communityleadersfromallthreecountriesstressthatacomprehensiveregionalapproachtoconflictresolutionisnecessary.Communitiesalsoseeurgentneedtoimprovecivilian-militaryrelationsinordertoestablishasenseoftrustvis-à-vistheirownarmy.Theregionalapproachneedstoextendtotheinvolvementofcivilsociety.Communityleadersinallthreecountrieshaveexpressedawishtoengagemore
withtheircounterpartsacrosstheborderandtohaveamoreunitedvoicewhentalkingtogovernments,forexamplewhendiscussingtheimpactofmilitaryoperationsoncommunities.
CommunityleadershavecalledforgovernmentrepresentativesfromUganda,theDRC,andtheSudanesegovernmentsinJubaandKhartoumtocometogetherspecificallytodiscussissuesofcivilianprotection.Themandatesofforeigntroopsneedtobediscussedandconveyedinaclearmannertotheaffectedpopulations,possiblythroughpermanentcommunityrepresentationonaregionalsecuritycommittee.Suchcooperationwouldenablecivilianstoestablishbetterrelationshipswiththeirownarmies,usingtheinformationtoidentifywhethersoldiersweremovingoncommandorwereroguesoldiersposingathreat.SucharelationshipoftrustwasalsoseentobepotentiallybeneficialtoimprovedsecuritynetworksinwhichlocalrepresentativeswouldagreeonearlywarningsignalstoavoidsurpriseattacksbytheLRA.
5.4Prioritizingsupportforcommunities
InadditiontothehumanitarianandprotectionchallengesforrefugeesandIDPs,thecurrentsituationalsobringstolightmanyofthelong-termproblemsthatlocalcommunitieswillface.CongoleserefugeesinterviewedinSudansaidthatthelastsixmonthshadforeveralteredtheircommunities.“Thenumberofmenisnowreducedbecausetheyhavekilledsomanypeople,”explainedonechief.Furthermore,relativelyfewsupposedescapeesfromtheLRAhavereturned,reportingtheremightbeasmanyas500abductedSudaneseandCongolesestillwiththeLRA.
AlocalcommunitycentreinYambioiscurrentlyusedtohousereturneeswhiletheirfamiliesaretraced,butitisunderstoodthatthisisnotaworkablelong-termsolution,especiallyifthenumbersofreturneesincreases.Inadditiontoestablishingsuitableaccommodation,thelocalauthoritiesarepreparingtoputintoplacethemechanismsneededtotraceandpreparefamilies.Anenvironmentneedstobeestablishedthatfacilitatesreturnandreintegration,bothforreturningyoungmenandforyoungwomenwhoinsomecasesmightcomewithbabiesborninthebush,fatheredbytheirLRAhusbands.LocalchurchesintheDRChavedevelopedastrategyof‘fosterfamilies’.Whilethisisonlymeanttobeatemporarystrategy,itisdifficulttofindfamiliestofosterchildrenreturningfromtheLRA.Tracingfamilyisoftenimpossibleinthecurrentvolatilesituationwheremostfamiliesaredisplaced.
Yetlocalauthoritiesarealreadylookingaheadintofuturetasks,saidWesternEquatoria’sSocialDevelopmentMinister:
RealsupportisneededforLRAabductees,butweneedlong-termprojects,lookingintodealingwiththetraumaofthesepeopleandtheirfamilies….Weneedpackages,weneedtocomeupwitha
14 • Conciliation Resources
After Operation Lightning Thunder:Protectingcommunitiesandbuildingpeace • 15
systemtofollow-up.Weneedtodealwithtrauma,particularlymotherswhohavebeencarryingthebabiesoftheseguys.
Localleadersexpectagrowingneedforreintegrationsupportstructures.Communities,onemaninMaridisaid,aresimplynotpreparedforthetremendouslydifficulttaskofreintegration,andtheongoingsecuritythreatanddangertolivelihoodsmeansthatangerisexpectedto
beaimedatreturnees:“Youcanseethestigmanow,”explainedaseniorchurchleader.“Apersonofninetotenyearsoldiscapturedandcomesback.Theywillhearpeoplesaythattheyarerebels.Someofusherewillalsoneedtobecounselled.”
6.1Onthepeaceprocess
Allpartiesshouldrenewtheircommitmentto•endingtheconflictbyendingviolenceandre-establishingcommunication.ThisincludestheLRA,theUgandangovernment,otheraffectedgovernmentsaswellastheUNSpecialEnvoy,butalsodonorgovernments.
Inordertore-establishcommunicationwith•theLRA,itssupportersandallgovernmentsconcerned,aregionalcivilsocietycommitteeshouldbeestablishedasapermanentregionalbodyforconflictresolution.WhilefocusingonrevivingtheLRA/Ugandapeaceprocess,itshouldbemandatedtoaddresslong-termpeacebuildingandreconciliationinthevolatileborderareasinconjunctionwithgovernmentsandsecurityforces.
ThesignedagreementsoftheJubaprocessneed•tobehonouredbytheUgandangovernmentthroughimplementationofthecomprehensivesolutionasnegotiatedinJuba.AnassessmentofachievementsandfailuresoftheJubaprocesswillhelpinadvancingthepeaceprocessandlearningfrompastmistakes.
6.2Onsecurity
Civilianprotectionisapriority.Governments•oftheaffectedareasneedtoworktogethertoensurethattheirsecurityforcesenhancecommunitysecurity.
Humanitarianeffortsbytheinternational•communityneedtobesteppeduptoprovidefoodandshelterforthoserecentlydisplacedinSudanandDRC.
Thelocalcommunitiesneedtodevelopearly•warningmechanismsandcommunicationtobebetterpreparedforattacks.Thisneedstobefacilitated,withanemphasisoncommunicationatthecommunitylevelratherthancommunitymilitarization.
6.3Onreconciliationandreintegration
Therespectivegovernmentsneedtoestablish•aforuminwhichcross-borderissuescanbeaddressedonaregularbasis.Consistentmechanismsforcross-borderdialogueandinteractionareneededtomakethebordersmoresecure,stabilizetheregionandstartonthepathtoreconciliation,particularlyontheSudan/Ugandaborder.
Incommunitiesexpectingreturneesfromthe•LRA,mechanismsshouldbeestablishedtoreceivethosewhohavebeenwiththeLRAandreunitethemwiththeirfamilies.Thisincludessafeaccommodationforreturnees,preparingfamiliesbeforereintegration,andreliablefollow-upprocedures.
6Recommendations
conciliation resourcesConciliationResources173UpperStreetLondonN11RGUnitedKingdom
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Acknowledgements
Thisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthehelpofmanypeople.WeareindebtedtoCharlesTabanandCharlesTolitAityafortheirresearchworkandguidance.ThanksalsogotoFr.BenoitKinaleguinDungu,DRCwhomadethevisitpossible.Inalltheplacesvisitedwewerereceivedwarmlyandassistedbylocalleadersandelders.Wethankalltheinterviewees,andparticipantsintheJubadialogueandthefirstregionaljointanalysisworkshopheldinGulu,northernUgandainMarch2009.WearegratefultoAaronGriffithsandMelissaJonesforvaluableeditorialinput.
AllphotosbyMareikeSchomerus.
Acronyms and abbreviations
CAR CentralAfricanRepublicCPA ComprehensivePeaceAgreementDRC DemocraticRepublicofCongoFARDC ArmedForcesoftheDemocratic
RepublicofCongoFPA FinalPeaceAgreementICC InternationalCriminalCourtIDP InternallyDisplacedPersonLRA Lord’sResistanceArmyMONUC UnitedNationsOrganizationMission
intheDemocraticRepublicofCongoSPLA SudanPeople’sLiberationArmyUNOCHA UnitedNationsOfficeforthe
CoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsUPDF UgandaPeople’sDefenceForce
ConciliationResourcesisanindependentcharitywithoveradecadeofexperienceworkinginternationallytopreventandresolveviolentconflict,promotejusticeandbuildlastingpeace.
Ourpracticalandpolicyworkisguidedbytheneedsofpeoplelivingincountriesaffectedorthreatenedbywar.WeworkintheSouthCaucasus,Fiji,SierraLeone,Liberia,Guinea,UgandaandSudan,andaredevelopingaprojectinIndiaandPakistaninrelationtoKashmir.OureffortstoinfluencepeacemakingpolicyandsharethelessonslearnedalsoincludethepublicationAccord:aninternationalreviewofpeaceinitiativesandaprojectinColombiaandthePhilippines.Ourfundingisthroughgrantsfromgovernments,independenttrustsandfoundations.