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Concert or Cacophony?
In Search of a New International Order
Brad Glosserman, Peter Walkenhorst, Ting Xu
Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011
3Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 KeyFindings 6
2.1 GlobalGovernanceIsNotWorking 6
2.2 IncrementalismtotheRescue 8
2.3 RegionalPerspectives 10
2.4 AgentsofChange 16
3 Conclusions 20
4 TheWayForward 22
5 ListofParticipants 24
6 Agenda 26
AbouttheBertelsmannStiftungandthePacificForumCSIS 30
Imprint 31
Concert or Cacophony?
In Search of a New International Order Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011
Brad Glosserman, Peter Walkenhorst, Ting Xu
4 1 Introduction
TheglobalorderhasbeeninfluxsincetheendoftheColdWar.
Twofundamentaltrendsarereshapingtheinternationalsystem:
Power shifts at the global level are creating a more diverse
international order, in which emerging and resurgent players
pursue and assert their own interests. While it is not clear
whether Western economic, political, and cultural dominance
iscomingtoanend, there isnomistakingtheworld’sgrowing
pluralism.Atthesametime,theemerginginternationalconcert
–orcacophony–ischaracterizedbydeepeninginterdependence.
All major (and minor) powers are facing challenges of economic growth, energy security, and
environmentalsustainability,allofwhichareintimatelyinterconnectedandwhichnonationcan
successfullyconfrontonitsown.Moreover,thepaceatwhichchangeisoccurringisaccelerating,
requiring decision makers to move faster at the very time that problems are becoming more
complex. This creates a fundamental dilemma as managing this interdependence through
multilateralcooperationdemandsenlightenedself-interestwhenestablishedmeansofinteraction
arebeingundermined.Thus,theinteractionofshiftingpowerandincreasinginterdependenceis
transformingglobalpolitics,pushingittowardsanunprecedentedconfigurationofinternational
relations.
Effectiveglobal governance isdifficult, if not impossible,when
a new international order is emerging. The emergence of
powerssuchasChina,India,andBrazilinconjunctionwiththe
resurgenceofRussiaandtheseemingdeclineoftheUnitedStates
and Europe have increased the number of global and regional
players (including regional organizations and arrangements),
reducing the likelihood of effective policy coordination among
them. Diverging interests as well as diverse perspectives
on how to approach the growing number of emerging and
longstanding issues on the international agenda have led to
greaterfragmentationofworldpolitics.Asaresult,theprospects
foreffectiveglobalgovernance–broadlydefinedasthecollective
management of common problems at the international and
transnationallevel–aredeterioratingbecausechallengesontheglobalagendaareincreasingin
number,scale,andcomplexityattheverytimethatinternationalandnationalgovernmentsare
beinghobbledintheircapacitytoaddressthem.
Managing interdependence
through multilateral
cooperation demands
enlightened self-interest
when established means
of interaction are being
undermined.
The prospects for effective
global governance are
deteriorating because
challenges on the global
agenda are increasing
in number, scale, and
complexity at the very time
that international and
national governments are
being hobbled in their
capacity to address them.
5
Existinginstitutionsandforaofglobalgovernanceneedtoadjustquicklyandeffectivelytothe
dynamic andevolving international system.Leadersdedicated to constructive changeshave to
addressfundamentalquestions:Whatarethenewrealitiesoftheinternationalorder?Whoarethe
agentsofchange?Howcannationalgovernmentsandinternationalinstitutionsremainrelevantin
amoredynamicandinterdependentworld?Toaddresstheseissues,theBertelsmannStiftungand
thePacificForumCSISjointlyinitiatedtheworkshop“CreativeDestruction:TowardanEffective
InternationalSystem.”Theprograminaugurateda“TrilateralPractitionersWorkshop”inBerlin
onJuly7-8,2011.
ThegatheringbroughttogethertwodozenforeignpolicypractitionersandobserversfromEurope,
theUnitedStates,andAsiatodiscussthechallengesandfutureoftheinternationalsystemand
the prospects for more effective forms of global governance. The workshop aimed to explore
challenges,identifydifferences,findcommonground,andseewhetherparticipantscouldidentify
and agree on forces changing the world, and outline a process that would allow narrowing of
thediscourse,reachingconclusionsandcreatinganactionplan.Participantsrepresentednext-
generation leaders from a broad range of sectors including government, the media, business,
andthenon-profitcommunity.Inaddition,Mr.RodolfoC.Severino,HeadoftheASEANStudies
CentreattheInstituteofSoutheastAsianStudiesinSingaporeandformerSecretaryGeneralof
theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),Mr.JamesF.Hoge,Chairman,HumanRights
WatchandformerChairattheCouncilonForeignRelationsandeditorofForeignAffairs,Professor
Dr.EberhardSandschneider,OttoWolff-DirectoroftheResearchInstituteoftheGermanCouncil
onForeignRelations,Mr.RalphCossa, President, Pacific ForumCSIS, aswell asMr.Andreas
Esche,ProgramDirectorwiththeBertelsmannStiftungjoinedasseniorexperts.
ThisreportattemptstodrawtentativeconclusionsfromtherichdiscussioninBerlin.Thepaperis
notasummaryofthesediscussions.Instead,itoffersasubjectivereflectionontheinternational
system and ways to address some of its shortcomings. While our thinking has been informed
bycommentsandwrittenreflectionsofworkshopparticipants, theconclusionsareoursalone.
Consequently,wearesolelyresponsiblefortheideashere,aswellasforanymistakesthatmay
haveslippedthrough.
6 2 Key Findings
Therewasaconsensusamongparticipantsthateffective forms
ofglobalgovernanceareneededmorethanevertosolveglobal
challengeslikeclimatechange,poverty,foodinsecurity,nuclear
proliferation, or economic crises. At the same time, however,
there was a significant degree of uncertainty whether and
how this could be accomplished, primarily because of a basic
paradox: challenges are complex and interconnected while the
international system appears increasingly fragmented. The
prevailingnotionwasthatwearelivingintimesofradicaluncertaintyininternationalaffairsand
apotentiallyunstableglobalorderwithhigherrisksforstatesandindividualcitizens.Despitethis
senseofuncertainty,thefollowingkeyfindingsemergedfromthediscussion:
2.1 Global Governance Is Not Working
Thereisastrongsensethatthesystemofglobalgovernanceis
notworking.Itdoesnotseemrepresentativeofthecurrent(and
future)distributionofwealthandpower,noristhereconfidence
thatitcanrespondtomajorglobalchallenges,threats,andtrends.
Thissenseofdiscomfort,justifiedornot,isbyitselfdangerous,
becausethemerebeliefthatthesystemofglobalgovernanceis
not working is contributing to the erosion of its effectiveness.
A sense of foreboding about the future that defines opinion in
manypartsofthedevelopedworld,especiallyintheWest,risks
becomingaself-fulfillingprophecy.
Therearesignsthatthisprocessisalreadyunderway.Thefailure
of the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit is probably the most
prominent example. From a European perspective, the global
summit was not only disappointing – it was a diplomatic disaster. Although Copenhagen was
a rarecaseof theEuropeanUnionshowingsignsofglobal leadershipbyhavingameaningful
commonposition, itsvoicewasmutedand itsrepresentativesmarginalizedonthe finaldayof
theconference.Inessence,urgentproblemsweredisplacedand
remainunsolved.Moreover,theCopenhagenSummitmadeclear
thattheemerginginternationalordernolongerrevolvesaround
EuropeanorevenWesternpriorities.Asaconsequence,European
trust in the ability of the international system to successfully
cope with emergent and longstanding challenges diminished
significantly.AEuropeanparticipantatourmeetingarguedthis
erosion of trust could be fatal: “The liberal order can survive
marginalizationoftheUnitedStates,butnotthemarginalization
ofEurope.Europeprovides the ideas that form the core of the
internationalsystem.”
There is a basic paradox:
challenges are complex
and interconnected while
the international system
appears increasingly
fragmented.
The mere belief that
the system of global
governance is not working
is contributing to the
erosion of its effectiveness.
A sense of foreboding
about the future that
defines opinion in many
parts of the developed
world, especially in the
West, risks becoming a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
“The liberal order can
survive marginalization
of the United States, but
not the marginalization of
Europe. Europe provides
the ideas that form the
core of the international
system.”
7
SimilardoubtssurroundtheglobalfreetradeagendaandtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).The
DohaRoundhasbeenmarkingtimeforalmostadecade;asuccessfulconclusiontonegotiationsis
nowhereinsight.Thisdeadlockhasspurredmanystatestopursuebilateraltradeagreementsas
wellasbroaderregionalarrangements,anticipatingthatagloballegallybindingagreementwill
notbeadoptedanytimesoon(orever).Thisfragmentationissuboptimalintermsofeconomic
performanceandevenunderminesglobalnegotiationsasgovernmentsdevotelimitedtimeand
resourcestootherpriorities.
Twodistinct criticismsof the systemof global governanceemerged fromourdiscussions. The
first is a somewhatprosaic criticism that the system isnotworkingbecause its structureand
procedureshavenotkeptpacewitharapidlychangingworld.AsoneAsianparticipantargued,
“international institutions are beset by scandals, lack effectiveness, cannot provide member
countriesasenseofsecurityandthelike.Thesearethereasonswhyanumberofcountriesgofor
unilateralactions.”AnotherAsianspeakeragreed,notingthatsmallercountriestendtofocuson
theUNsystemand“ithasfailedintheperspectiveofmanysmallercountries;theyexpectittodo
more.”AEuropeanparticipantdifferentiatedamongtheseproblems,separatingthosethatleaders
donotunderstandfromthosetheylackthepoliticalwilltoaddress.
Asecondcriticismarguesthattheproblemismorefundamental
andthatthenatureoftheinternationalorderitselfisaproblem.It
isnotwhoisincharge,butthefundamentalvaluesandoperating
principlesofthesystem.AsanAmericanparticipantexplained,
we are seeing “the emergence of alternative ideologies that
threaten Western liberalism.” One US participant argued that
theclaimthatdisputesare really interest-basedmissesamore
fundamentalpoint:questionsabout thedistributionofgoodsor
powerultimatelygototheheartofhowthesystemworks.
Our participants characterized this split in a variety of ways:
one called it a clash of values vs. a clash of interests.Another
suggestedwedistinguishbetweenchallengesforthesystemand
challengestothesystem.
The problem is more
fundamental … It is not
who is in charge, but the
fundamental values and
operating principles of the
system. As an American
participant explained, we
are seeing “the emergence
of alternative ideologies
that threaten Western
liberalism.”
8 Key Findings
2.2 Incrementalism to the Rescue
Despite fears that the international system is not working, our group agreed that no radical
alternativeisconceivableorfeasible.Therearetoomanyvestedinterests,andproblems,while
evident, are slow moving. There is no crisis on the horizon that can force action. Therefore,
“creativedestruction”isnotanoption;rathergradualreformoftheexistingsystemisthegoal.A
Europeanparticipantagreed,arguingthat,“thereisnosuchthingasnewglobalgovernance.We
arenotmovingfromonesystemtoanother.Rather,thereisacontinuityofglobalgovernance.”
Thechallengethenistoidentifyandpromoteinnovativeapproachestoglobalgovernance.Two
possibilitieshaveshownpromiseinrecentyears:adhocinstitutionalarrangementssuchasthe
G20ormoreformalregionalarrangementssuchastheEuropeanUnionorASEAN.
The G20 is the most important recent innovation in global
governance.Thisgroupplayedacrucialroleindealingwiththe
immediatechallengesposedbythefinancialandeconomiccrisis.
Indeed, the finaldeclarationof theSeptember2009Pittsburgh
G20summitdeclaredthat itwouldbecome“thepremierforum
for our international economic cooperation.”1 It is tempting to
concludethatitsinitialsuccessinmanagingthiscrisisresulted
fromagenuinefearamongG20membersthataglobalfinancial
breakdownwasavery realpossibility; as soonas the senseof
urgency abated, diverging interests reasserted themselves to
dominate discussions and frustrate action. Real solutions to
the world’s financial problems remain beyond reach, and even
the legitimacy of this new organization is being contested.
Nevertheless,creationoftheG20hassignaledthattheinternationalsystemistryingtorespondto
newchallengesandfixurgentproblemsthroughnewinitiativesbasedonachangedglobalorder.
Italsoreinforcedtheperceptionthatglobalgovernanceisinessenceglobalcrisismanagement;
in other words, that a coordinated and coherentmultilateral policy is onlypossible under the
pressureofaglobalcrisisthatthreatenstohaveimmediateandsevereimpactonamultitudeof
domesticpopulations.
A second avenue for cooperation is regional institutions and arrangements. There is much to
commendinthesemechanisms.Theyareclosertoproblemstheyaretryingtoaddress,witha
betterunderstandingoflocalperspectives,challenges,resources,anddynamics.Theycanfashion
solutions that better fit local needs andminimizenegative impacts.Not surprisingly, they are
oftenseenasmore legitimateresponsesandcancommandmorerespect fromindividualsand
1 Leaders’ Statement The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-25 2009, p. 3; URL: http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
Global governance is
in essence global crisis
management … A
coordinated and coherent
multilateral policy is
only possible under the
pressure of a global crisis
that threatens to have
immediate and severe
impact on a multitude of
domestic populations.
9
organizations affectedby their decisions.At the same time, theyoften lack resources and the
“hardpower”toenforcedecisions.Thelowestcommondenominatorapproachtodecisionmaking
–whichmakesdecisionsmorelegitimate–canelevatenationalorregionalperspectivesabove
the“norms”theyareostensiblytryingtosupport.Inshort,therecanbe(andoftenis)atension
betweenregionalandglobalimperatives.
The growth of economic, environmental, and security inter-
dependenceiscreatingademandforarules-basedinternational
system that fosters multilateral cooperation and institutions.
Yetinternationalinstitutions,inmanycases,aremutatingfrom
organizationsfocusedonsolvingproblemsintoarenasforwaging
conflictasnewlyempoweredstatesasserttheirparticularnational
interests.Despiteagrowingsenseofinterdependence,thereisa
lackoffaithintheabilityofthesystemtoprotectthoseinterests,
eitherbecausetheinstitutionsofgovernanceareweakorbecause
theyareconstitutionallyflawed.
As a guiding principle, an effective international system must be capable of resolving (and
preferablypreventing)conflictamongstates.Thisrequisiteisalwaysimportant,butitseemstobe
increasinginsignificanceinaworldofmoreassertivestateswithdivergentinterests.Atpresent,
thereappeartobetwocompetingperspectivesonhowtoachievethatobjective.Thefirstisthe
“ASEANway”ofsoftinstitutionsandinclusive,non-coercivecollaboration.Avariantonthistheme
isChina’sproclaimedconceptofinternationalrelations–“harmony.”Thisprovidesmemberstates
withspacetoasserttheirowninterestsandmakesnationalsovereigntyanirreducibleminimum.
It draws upon a 19th-century model of statehood – ironically, a European model – that holds
nationalbordersinviolableandseemsquaint(ifnotoutdated)given21st-centurycommunications
technologies and capabilities. The second option is the (more recent) European experience of
mitigatingconflictsthroughpoliticalintegrationandrule-basedprocedures.Thisrequiresmember
statestovoluntarilyrelinquishpartoftheirsovereigntyanddelegateittosupranationalintuitions.
Most(ifnotall)emergingcountriesareunwillingtodoso.Andindeed,theEuropeanexperience
maynotbeamodelastherearerisingquestionsabouthowmuchsovereigntyEuropeancountries
arethemselveswillingtogiveup,particularlyinthewakeoftheEurozone’ssovereigndebtcrisis.
Their flaws notwithstanding, these two options outline directions in which the international
systemcanevolve.
International institutions, in
many cases, are mutating
from organizations focused
on solving problems into
arenas for waging conflict
as newly empowered states
assert their particular
national interests.
10 Key Findings
2.3 Regional Perspectives
Westernconcernsaboutthefutureoftheinternationalsystememanatefromthe“riseoftherest.”2
TheriseofEastAsiaandIndiaandarebalancingofglobalgovernance–withmorepowerflowing
toAsia–havecreatedanxietyintheWestaboutthefutureofthatsystem.Therearefearsthat“the
riseoftherest”willresultinnewglobalnorms,newoperatingprinciplesforglobalinstitutions,
anddifferentoutcomesininternationaldecision-makingthat,evenif“fair,”willdisadvantagethe
currentholdersofpowerandprivilege.
Thereisasense–indeedabelief–thatChina,inparticular,is
(orwillsoonbe)challenging internationalnorms.China insists
thatisnottrue,butthoseassertionsarenotbelieved.Asaresult,
mistrustandsuspicionpermeateChina’s relationswith theUS
andmanyotherstates, includingtheEuropeanUnionandeven
some of China’s neighbors. Against this background, the idea
of a world order dominated by a G2, i.e., an informal rather
than formal joint US-Chinese leadership in global affairs, was
dismissedasunrealisticbyall.At the same time,however, the
developmentofUS-Chinarelations,waswidelyconsidereda (if
notthe)determinantofhowtheinternationalsystemwillevolve.
The rise of China to the status of a global power is one of the
most significant events of the early 21st century. There are,
however,strikingdifferences inhowthis rise isperceived.Manypeople in theUScontinue to
see the world in realist terms and assume that China’s economic rise will make it a regional
andglobalmilitarypowerthatchallengesvitalAmericanstrategicandsecurityinterests.Those
strategistssee“hegemonicambitions”inalmostanyactionthatBeijingtakesanddemandmoves
tocounterthatplan.Inrecentmonths,Chinesebehaviortodealwithterritorialdisputesinthe
SouthandEastChinaSeasseemstoconfirmthesesuspicions.3Whilethis isasimplifiedview
ofa(sometimes)morenuancedandsophisticatedassessmentofstatetrajectories,thisthinking
appears to be based upon notions of geostrategic interests and great power rivalries deriving
fromthe19thand20thcenturies. It treats international relationsasazero-sumgame inwhich
oneparticipant’sgainsarebalancedbythelossesofanother.ApplyingthisframeworktoChina’s
risereinforcesthenotionthatitistantamounttoadeclineoftheUSandEurope.SincetheUS
hasbeenaprimaryarchitectand‘supporter‘oftheinternationalorder,China’sriseisperceived
notjustasachallengetothestatusquobutasathreattothesystemitself.4Someuncertainty
aboutChineseintentionsisunderstandable.OneChineseparticipant–likemanyotherChinese
2 FareedZakaria,TheFutureofAmericanPower.HowAmericaCanSurvivetheRiseoftheRest,in:ForeignAffairs,Vol.82,No.3,May/June2008,pp.18-43.
3 Ofcourse,USviewsofChinaarenotmonolithic.AndUSpolicy,while‘hedging’againstthepossibilityofconflictwithChina,istoengageBeijingandworkwithittosolveregionalandglobalproblems.
4 Thisviewisnotwithoutprecedent.AsoneofourAsianparticipantspointedout,thereisaparallelbetweenChinatodayandJapanbackinthe1980s.
A world order dominated
by informal rather than
formal joint US-Chinese
leadership was dismissed
as unrealistic by all. At the
same time, however, the
development of US-China
relations, was widely
considered a (if not the)
determinant of how the
international system will
evolve.
11
scholarsandprofessionalswhoworkinthesefields–insistedthatChinaunderstandsthestresses
createdbyitsrise, that its leadershavestudiedhistoryandappreciatethetensionscreatedby
rising powers, and argued that China has benefited from the existing international order and
needspeaceandstabilitytocontinuetorise.Atthesametime,however,thereisanunmistakable
senseofdisenfranchisementflowingfromcriticismoftherulesoftheexistinginternationalorder
whenChineseprerogativesarechallenged.Thecallforamoredemocraticinternationalsystem
thatisbasedon“thefiveprinciplesofpeacefulcoexistence”suggestsademandfornewoperating
principlesininternationalrelations.
In contrast to theUS,Europe– theEUaswell as itsmember states–has fewer geostrategic
and security concerns in Asia. After the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asia after 1945,
Europehasre-engagedAsiancountriesinanefforttostrengtheneconomicandculturalties.Some
EuropeansapplaudtheriseofChinaasacounterbalancetoUSdominance;some,includingsome
of ourmost vocal participants, insist that the rise ofAsia shouldgive renewedvigor to trans-
Atlanticrelationstogirdaninternationalsystemthatisunderthreat.Moreover,Europeansdonot
havethesamesecuritytiestoAsiaasdoAmericans(whoseallianceswithAsianpartnersarefor
manythefoundationofregionalsecurityandstability).TheUSwouldbedirectlyinvolvedinany
instability,crisis,orconflictandisthereforemoresensitivetotheimpactofchangesinthestatus
quo.Europe’sdistanceaffordsitamorebenignperspectiveanditislessinclinedtoseeregional
changeinAsiaasdestabilizing.5
AsianperspectivesembraceelementsofbothUSandEuropeanviewsoftheinternationalsystem.
Againgeneralizationsaredifficult,sinceAsiaistoolargeanddiversetohaveasingleperspective.
Pick a dimension – size of state, population, GDP, GDP per capita, type of government, type
of economy, religion, etc–and there is anAsiannationoneverypointon thespectrum.And
whennon-Asiansmention“theriseofAsia,”AsianspeakersinsistthatthereisnosingleAsian
perspective.Indeed,theriseofAsiancountriesandtheriseofChinaareoftenusedsynonymously
butshouldnotbe.Theideathatatripolarglobalorderisemergingisbasedonthecreationofan
AsianpolethatismuchmorethanjustChina.SoutheastAsiahassome560millioninhabitants,
a“community”largerthanthatofEurope.ItseconomicdevelopmentlongpredatesthatofChina:
Japan ‘rose’ in the ‘60s and ‘70s, the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and
Taiwan) followed, whichwere in turn chased by the “Tiger Cub” economies inSoutheastAsia
(Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,andThailand).China’sriseisonlythemostrecentphenomenon
andit isbeingfollowedbygrowthinVietnamandIndia.It isthebroad-basednatureofAsia’s
growthanditspotentialforinternallysustainabledynamismthatdistinguishesthismomentfrom
itspredecessors.
5 HeretooitmustbenotedthatEuropeanviewsofChinaarenotmonolithicandtherearehawksonthecontinentwhocangotoetotoewiththeirUScounterpartswhenitcomestosuspicionofChinesemotives.
12 Key Findings
Thishastwocontradictoryimplications.Thefirstisthatdiscussionsofglobalgovernancehaveto
movebeyondafacileandsimplisticfocusonChina;Chinaispartofabiggerstory.Nocountry,
nomatterhowbig,canundo theentire internationalsystemon itsown; itmusthavealliesor
similarlyinclineddiplomaticpartners.Asianintellectualshavesuggestedthatsuchamassexists.
Concepts andvisions of “Asia” as an entity or a shared “Asian identity”have a long tradition
bothwithinandoutsidetheregion.Thelastdecadewitnesseddiscussionsof“Asianvalues”and
“Asiancapitalism.”CurrentdebatesabouttheroleofChinaandIndiaasemergingglobalpowers
substantiatedclaimsofthe21stcenturyasan“Asiancentury.”
Yet,theveryterm“Asia”isimprecise.Itsmeaningdependsoncontextandwhoisusingtheterm.
Itsgeographicboundariesareuncertain,andthusitsreferentsareunclear.Moreover,theduality
ofmodernlife,withitspenetrationofcapitalistgoods–manyofwhich,whilemadeinAsia,have
Westernorigins–contributestoasenseofconfusion.Westerngoods,values,andculturepenetrate
Asiansocietieseffortlesslyandcountriesandcitizensmustbalancetheirworthwithindigenous
valuesandgoods.AsoneAsianparticipantbemoaned,“Asianscan’ttelltheirpositioninrelation
totheliberalorder.”(Inthisreport,weuse“Asia”primarilytorefertoEastAsia(meaningthe
ASEANPlusThree)withoutdisregardingthegreatdiversityofthisregion.)
WhenreferringtotheanxietiesintheWesternworldcausedby
the “rise of Asia,” in our view, this distinction does not really
matter,becausethesefearsareas impreciseandelusiveasthe
term “Asia.” Indeed, a clear-eyed assessment of the anxiety
triggered by the rise of Asia would note that “the problem” is
not just the riseofChinabut theprospectof aworld inwhich
Westerndominancehasended.Itis“theriseoftherest”andthe
resulting loss of Western privilege that generates anxiousness.
(Nonetheless, our discussion did not include participants from
emergingpowersthatarenotinAsia,Europe,orNorthAmerica.)
AsiansthemselvesaredividedaboutChina.Theyunderstandthe
geographicrealityoftheChinesestate;unliketheUS,itisphysically
situated in the region and cannot withdraw. They seek to exploit the economic opportunities
affordedbyChinesegrowthandseeitisacriticaltradeandinvestmentpartner.Atthesametime,
theyworryaboutChina’slong-termintentionsandfearthatitmaybecomeahegemonicpowerin
theregion.TheyareequallyconcernedaboutuncontrolledrivalryorconfrontationbetweentheUS
andChinathatwouldforcethemtotakesides.TheypreferagoodrelationshipbetweentheUSand
China,aslongasitisnot“toofriendly”;aG2isasworrisometothemasaworldinwhichtheyarein
conflict.Chineseparticipantsinsistedthatallfearsareunfounded,arguingthattheircountryneeds
astableregionalenvironmentsothatitcanimprovelivingstandardsandthatBeijinghasdomestic
problemsofitsownandhasnopretensiontoaG2systemthatformallyorinformallysharespower
withtheUS.Thus,itisinChina’sinteresttocontributetoandhelpmaintainapeacefulandstable
(“harmonious”)internationalenvironment.
A clear-eyed assessment
of the anxiety triggered by
the rise of Asia would note
that “the problem” is not
just the rise of China but
the prospect of a world in
which Western dominance
has ended. It is “the rise of
the rest” and the resulting
loss of Western privilege
that generates anxiousness.
13
There is no mistaking Chinese dissatisfactions with the existing system of global governance,
however;ourparticipantswerequick topointout its flaws.Andeven ifChina’s toppriority is
domesticstability,therearemanywaysthatagovernmentfocusedonsuchconcernscanthreaten
theinternationalsystem: itcandeflect theangerofadissatisfiedcitizenryontooutsideforces,
blamingthemforsetbacksordomesticproblems.Moreconcretely,thedesiretopromotegrowth
hasproducedtradeandcurrencypoliciesthathavebeenlabeled‘mercantilist’or‘predatory.’
ThedistinctionbetweenChina’sriseandthatofAsiaasawholemattersinotherways.Looking
atallofAsiadilutesChina’sroleandstatus;itismerelyone–albeitbig–countryamong13.A
regionalconstruct limitsChina’s freedomofmaneuverandcapacityto influencethesystem.A
similarlogiccanbeappliedtotheUS;forallthecomplaintsofUSunilateralisminrecentyears,
WashingtonhasbeenandcontinuestoberestrainedbyalliancesinAsiaandEuropeaswellasby
theinternationalinstitutionalorderithelpedcreateafterWorldWarII.Smallerpowershavean
importantroletoplay,constrainingpartners,supportingnorms,andprovidingthenumbersthat
createmajoritiesininstitutions.(Thiscutstwoways:smallernationscanactasabulwarkforthe
existing internationalorder, restrainingrevanchiststates,or theycanbandwith revisionists to
demandchange.)ASEANisaperfectexampleofthesmallernationsofSoutheastAsiaengaging
andcircumscribingthediplomacyofthelargerstatesofNortheastAsia.Theycanalsobringissues
totheattentionoflargernations(astheyhavewiththeSouthChinaSea).Norshoulditbeforgotten
thatemergingmiddlepowerssuchasIndonesia,arebecomingmoreconfidentplayingarolein
regionalandglobalgovernance.However,whileinsistingonmoreinputinsuchmatters,ourAsian
participantswereskepticalthatsuchchangeswouldalter“thewaytheworldworks.”Moreover,
theyconcededthatmanyofthemostpressingproblemsaretoocomplexforthemtotackle.Their
roleinanewworldorder,howeveritisstructured,willofnecessitybelimited.
In the West, there is a sense that rising powers are not being
held accountable nor are they ready to take responsibility for
globalgovernance.Onceagain,Chinaisattheforefrontofthose
criticized, although other countries are blamed as well. At the
coreofthiscriticismisthefreeriderproblem:risingpowersare
blamedfortakingadvantageoftheinternationalsystem,playing
anincreasinglyimportantrolewithinit,butareunwillingtoshare
theburdensofglobalgovernance.Theyoftenseekbilateraldeals
instead of trying to strengthen institutional capacity or playing
by the rules of international institutions. In this view, the key
issue ishowemergingpowerscanbe induced to takeonmore
responsibilitiesinglobalgovernance.Regardlessofthevalidityof
allegationsoffreeriding,theyhavedeepenedWesternanxieties
aboutthe“Asian”challengetotheglobalorder.
In the West, there is a
sense that rising powers
are not being held
accountable nor are they
ready to take responsibility
for global governance …
At the core of this criticism
is the free rider problem:
rising powers are blamed
for taking advantage of
the international system,
playing an increasingly
important role within it,
but are unwilling to share
the burdens of global
governance.
14 Key Findings
Partoftheproblemistheunderstandingoftheinternationalsystem,especiallywhenitisdefined
asa“liberalworldorder.”Formanyofourparticipants,thisisa“Western”characterization,which
raises severalproblems.First, if this is indeeda ‘Western”description, then it is implied that
Asia’srisewillchangetheorder tobetterreflect itsnewmakeupandcharacter.Second, there
arequestionswhetherAsiansare“accepted”inthis“Westernorder.”Inotherwords,regardless
ofintent,thereisasuspicion–sometimesgroundedinfact–thatAsiannationsarenotafforded
equalstatuswhentheygetaseatatthetable.
Third,therearequestionsaboutwhatthisorderis–whatvaluesarepresent,whatinstitutionsareits
backbone,andhowitshouldoperate.Atthemostfundamentallevel,thereareatleasttwodifferent
notionsordefinitions:ThefirstisthetraditionalWestphalianorderbasedontheprincipleofstate
sovereignty andnonintervention.The second,more recent idea of a “liberalworld order”gives
muchgreaterswaytoindividualhumanrights,institutionalizedmultilateralcooperationandthe
ruleoflaw.ThisnotionoriginatedafterWorldWarIIandwasinspiredbytheEuropeanexperience
ofpoliticalintegrationandpoolingofsovereigntytodealwithcommonproblems.Morerecently,
proponentsof thisnotionhavesought to legitimizearmedhumanitarian interventionunder the
conceptof“theresponsibilitytoprotect”,thusweakeningthenormofsovereigntybymakingit
conditionalonstates’conductandprotectionofhumanrights.WhileAsianstates,includingChina,
have lessdifficultiessubscribing to the first,more traditionalWestphaliannotion, theystrongly
rejectthesecond,whichisbelievedtoreflectaWesternagenda.Theydemandthatnormsbetter
reflecttheirculturesandhistories.Thisisnotarejectionofsomeofthosenorms–humanrights,for
example–buttheirredefinitionandconceptualizationtoreflectdifferentcircumstances.Without
meaningtoputathumbonthescale,therecanbeadebateabouttherightfulbalancebetween
politicalandeconomicrightsorfreedomofspeechandtheneedforsocialorder.
Whilethestatehasservedastheessentialunitofinternational
order,oneofourEuropeanparticipantsarguedthatglobalization
challengestraditionalconceptsofsovereignty.Statebordersare
being renderedporous,makingnotionsofabsolutestatepower
increasingly unrealistic. That process is complemented and
acceleratedbytechnologiesthatenableandempowernewactors.
New challenges and threats demand new forms of cooperation
thatundercutsovereigntyaswell.ManyemergingpowersinAsia,
however,arerelativelynewstates(andinmostcasesformerWesterncolonies)withastrongsense
ofsovereignty.Thisisanaturaloutgrowthofthestate-buildingproject.Theyhavelittleinterest
in giving up some national sovereignty for collective security or contributing to global public
goods.Thisattitudeisapowerfulobstacletoeffortstopromoteandactivelystrengthenregional
integrationandglobalgovernance.AsoneofourAsianparticipantsconceded,“theEUmodelis
great,butAsiaisnotyetthere,thoughmodernityisdefinitelypushingAsiainthatdirection.”In
otherwords,sovereigntyisakeyissueforanyreformoftheinternationalsystemandeffective
globalgovernancemaybeimpossiblewithoutmodificationsofit.
Sovereignty is a key issue
for any reform of the
international system and
effective global governance
may be impossible without
modifications of it.
15
In addition to divergent attitudes toward sovereignty, European
anxieties about the “rise of Asia” are fueled by the fear that
Europe’s role in the international system is as contestedas that
of Asia. The shift in the balance of power from the Atlantic to
thePacificOceanseems tocomeatEurope’sexpense.Although
the institutional provisions in the Lisbon treaty to strengthen
EU foreign policy are ambitious, Europe’s future role in global
governance is in question. The Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis
andthelackofpoliticalleadershipinaddressingitscoreproblems
arenurturingperceptionsofdeclinewithinandoutsideEurope.As
aresult,theEUanditsmemberstateshavelostcredibilityinterms
ofcoherenceandefficiencyinpolicymakingandtheyare,inthe
wordsofoneparticipant,“disappearingasreferencepointsofglobalgovernance.”Europeansagree
thattheEUisunderperformingasaglobalactor,althoughithasthecapacityandresourcestoplaya
strongandinfluentialroleontheglobalstage,specificallyinthesectoroftechnology,environmental
protection,andsocialdevelopment.Theyare,however,dividedoverwhethertheEUanditsmember
statescanmobilizethepoliticalwillandleadershipthatisnecessarytoovercomeinternaldivisions
andtoplaysucharole.WhilepessimistspointtogrowingeconomicproblemsoftheEurozoneand
therelatedresurgenceofnationalisminmanyEuropeancountries,whichthreatenthecoherence
andeventheexistenceoftheEU,optimistsarguethatEuropeanintegrationhasalwaysadvanced
throughcrises.Intheirview,thecurrentsovereigndebtcrisisisnoexception,andwillserveasa
catalystfordeeperpoliticalintegrationthatinthelongrunwillallowEuropetoupgradeitsroleas
aglobalactor.
Therearefundamentalquestionsaboutthevalueandprospectsforgreaterintegrationthatfollows
theclassicEuropeanmodel.Wehadlittlediscussionofthevalueofregionalismanditsrelationship
toglobalgovernance.Thereislittleunderstandingofhowregionalandglobalinstitutionsinteract.
Regionalgovernancecouldbecomeabuildingblockofglobalgovernance.Thereis,forexample,
anincreasingconvergenceofnormsamongChinaandASEAN.ASEANhaspresseditspartner
countriestosigntheTreatyofAmityandCooperation(TAC)asaconditionforjoiningtheEast
AsiaSummit; itskey interlocutorshavedoneso,helpingpromoteTAC’scorevalueofpeaceful
resolutionofdisputes.Moreover,ASEANhasbeeninstrumentalinpushingChinatoadoptaCode
ofConductfortheSouthChinaSea;thathasbeenaslow-movingprocessbut ithaspickedup
momentuminrecentmonths.Allthesedevelopmentsareintheirearlystagesanditistooearly
totellwhatimpacttheywillhaveonglobalgovernance.Thereishope,however,thattheycanplay
alargerandmoresignificantrole,atleastincertainareas.AnAsianparticipantunderscoredhow
regionalinstitutionsplayalargersocializationrole,pointingoutthat“China’scloseinteraction
withASEAN isnot justaboutconvergenceofnorms,but the fact thatASEAN isan important
forumforChina,JapanandSouthKoreatoengageeachother.”
European anxieties about
the “rise of Asia” are fueled
by the fear that Europe’s
role in the international
system is as contested as
that of Asia. The shift in
the balance of power from
the Atlantic to the Pacific
Ocean seems to come at
Europe’s expense.
16 Key Findings
Ourdiscussionconcludedthatmajorinnovationswithintheinternationalsystemareunlikelyin
theshortterm.Blameestablishedandemergingpowersthathaveaninterestinpreservingthe
statusquoandthefactthatemergingregionalinstitutionsaretooweaktochangethewaythe
internationalsystemworks.Ifso,whowillbeagentsofchange?
2.4 Agents of Change
As international relations become more diverse and complex,
powerisnotonlyshiftingfromestablishedtoemergingcountries,
but also toward individuals and non-state actors. Modern
information and communication technologies have empowered
individualsandsocialgroups toanunprecedenteddegree.The
internetandsocialmediahaveextendedthereachandinfluenceof
individualsandorganizationsandenabledthemtodirectlyengage
ininternationalaffairs.Yet,whilerelationsbetweenthestateand
the individual are being rebalancedby information technology,
thestate remains thecentral actor in the international system.
Whilestatesmaynotbeaseffectiveinimplementingchangeas
in the past, they are extremely effective in blocking reform or
adaptation.Thus,thekeytoaffectingchangeisidentifyingways
tomovestates(ortheirorgans)toimplementchange.
Plainly,moremustbedonetofigureouthowtoutilizenon-state
actors as agents of positive change. The growing importance
and impact of non-state actors in international politics is one
distinctive political development. Transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil
society groups, social entrepreneurs, faith-based organizations, multinational corporations and
otherbusinessbodies,aswellastrans-sectoralpublicpolicynetworksareincreasinglyeffective
in framing issues,settingagendas,andmobilizingpublicopinion.At thesametime,non-state
actorssuchascriminalorganizationsandterroristnetworks,alsoempoweredbynewinformation
andcommunicationtechnologies,poseseriousthreatstotheinternationalsystem.Althoughnon-
stateactorsusuallyhavenoformaldecision–makingpoweranddonotnecessarilyalterthepolicy-
makingprocess,theirimpactonworldpoliticsissignificantandlikelytogrow.Takeyourpick–
asdidoneUSparticipant–“BillGates.vs.BinLaden.Anindividualcanhaveahugeinfluencein
aninterconnectedworld.”(Ofcourse,thatinfluencecanbelimited;anotherUSparticipatedwas
quicktonotethat“non-stateactorsdon’tnecessarilyalterthepolicy-makingprocess.Wikileaks
didn’tcracktheUSsystemanditonlyplayedaminorroleintheArabSpring.”Crudelyput,power
stillmatters.)
While relations between
the state and the individual
are being rebalanced
… the state remains
the central actor in the
international system.
While states may not be as
effective in implementing
change as in the past, they
are extremely effective
in blocking reform or
adaptation. Thus, the key
to affecting change is
identifying ways to move
states (or their organs) to
implement change.
17
Relationsbetweenstatesandnon-stateactorsarenotazero-sumgame.Thekeyquestion,therefore
is,howcantheyworktogether?TheincreasedparticipationoftransnationallyengagedNGOsand
other civil societyorganizations (CSOs) in internationalpoliticsprovidesexamplesof effective
collaboration with national governments and intergovernmental institutions. This is a mutual
process: a strong international system reinforces the actions ofNGOsand similargroups. The
growingnumberandproliferationofCSOsandsocialentrepreneurs inthe internationalpolicy
arena reflects the steady increase in resources from governments, international institutions,
corporations, and foundations, accompanied by greater reliance by state-based actors on the
outsourcingofpublicservices.Newlyempowered,CSOsfillrolesinglobalgovernancethatcanbe
broadlyseparatedintocategoriesofadvocacyandoperationsbutthatmorespecificallyinclude
workinagenda-setting,negotiationofnormsandagreements, implementationandmonitoring,
andreactiontonon-compliance.Asaparticipantfromcivilsocietynoted,stateandnon-stateactors
haveamutualrelationship,workingtogethertoachievesharedgoals.Ideally,non-stateactorshelp
governmentstackledifficultproblems.
Intheabsenceofanoverarchingapproachtoglobalgovernance,collaborativeeffortsamongstates
andCSOswillincreasinglyprovidetheframeworkforaddressingchallengesofaglobalizedworld.
However,despite theirgrowing importance,civil society isnotasilverbulletbecausenational
governmentsandinternationalinstitutionscontinuetobemorepowerfulinmanyrespects–and
insomecasesareopposedtoactionsofcivilsociety.Afterall,oneofthegoalsofthesenon-state
effortsistohelporempowerthedisenfranchisedorignored;thus,theyimplicitlychallengethe
structureofpower.
18 Key Findings
Moreover,civilsocietyisnotmonolithic,butapluralistuniverse
of values, opinions, and interests ranging across the political
spectrum. All too often, this universe resembles the Tower of
Babel,displayingahighdegreeof fragmentationthat limits its
effectiveness and undermines its legitimacy. In addition, CSOs
are not exclusively norm-driven actors but organizations that
pursue self-interested strategies to ensure their institutional
survival, often competing with each other for influence and
funding.Inotherwords:linesofconflictamongactorsofglobal
civilsocietyaremultipleandshifting.Giventhisdiversityand
political fragmentation, the only thing that can be stated with
certaintyisthatCSOscontributetothepluralizationofglobalgovernance.Theyfosterpluralism
onthegloballevelastheydoonthelocal,regional,andnationallevelbyenablingmultiplevalues,
perspectives,andintereststoberepresented,differentfunctionstobeperformed,andarangeof
capacitiestobedeveloped.
Thus, a central issue in the discussion of agents of change is leadership. Any government,
international institutionor individualpolitical leaderwillingandcapableofexercisinggenuine
leadership could be an agent of change. Hence, it was no surprise that there was an almost
unanimousagreementamongworkshopparticipantsonthenecessityforanewkindofleadership
to fosteramoreeffective internationalsystem– leadership thatcanaddressglobal issuesand
engagethenecessarystakeholderslongenoughtoproducesustainablesolutions.Yettherewas
no agreement on how to define leadership, how to promote it, and how to distinguish it from
power.Consequently,therewasnoconsensusonhowtoovercometheallegedlackofleadership
in international affairs. The fundamental problem is that leaders are accountable to domestic
constituencies.Yetthesolutionofinternationalproblemsrequirespower,authority,andinfluence
beyondnationalborders.Howdo leadersengage individualswhentheirauthority issoclearly
defined? On what basis do they rally forces to tackle those pressing problems? How do they
convinceotherleaderstomakesacrificesforthepublicgood?Thereneedtobeincentivesand
accountabilitystructuresthatrewardpoliticalleaderswhoactinsupportofglobalpublicgoods;
withoutthem,globalgovernancewillfail.
There was no agreement on
how to define leadership,
how to promote it, and
how to distinguish it from
power. Consequently, there
was no consensus on how
to overcome the alleged
lack of leadership in
international affairs.
19
Insomecases, leadership is itsownpunishment.Stickingone’sheadabovetheparapet (so to
speak),invitescriticismandcondemnation.Governmentscanbeforcedtobearcoststheymight
nototherwisehavetoformerelybeingaudaciousenoughtoattempttosolveaproblem.OneAsian
participantsuggestedthatheretheASEANexamplecouldhelpsince“thekeytoASEAN’ssuccess
isthatitleadswithoutappearingasaleader.”
This raises the issue of US leadership. As long as emerging
powers are not willing and Europe is not able to provide
leadership at the international level, the US remains the only
candidate,notwithstandingthemanychallengesitfaces.Yet,its
shrinking resources and domestic constraints have forced the
UStorethinkitstraditionalleadershiprole–orassomecritics
charge,toretrenchorabandonthatrolealtogether.However,there
isasyetnosubstituteforUSleadership.Whilethegroupdidnot
addressin-depththeUSroleintheinternationalsystemandthe
implicationsofdiminishedUSinternationalactivism(nordidittacklethequestionwhetherthat
wasdesirable),USparticipantsarguedthattheUSshouldtrytoleadbythepowerofexample,
notbytheexampleofpower.Theonlyconclusionfromthediscussionswasthatintheabsence
ofproactivepoliticalleadershiponaninternationalscale,inalllikelihood,criseswillcontinueto
serveasthecatalystforchangeinglobalgovernance.
In the absence of proactive
political leadership on
an international scale, in
all likelihood, crises will
continue to serve as the
catalyst for change in
global governance.
20 3 Conclusions
Thereisagrowingsensethatthesystemofglobalgovernanceis
notentirelysuited to the21stcentury.Existing institutionsand
mechanisms cannot solve the world’s most urgent challenges.
Thatshouldnotbesurprisingsincemanyoftheseproblemsare
ofasizeandscaleneverbeforeexperienced.Asoneparticipant
explained,“themanagementofglobalplanetaryproblemsisofa
differentnatureanddimensionthantheproblemsof thepast.”
Recent attempts by the international community to address
problemslikeclimatechange,environmentalpollution,financial
regulatoryreform,tradepolicy,nuclearnon-proliferation,global
free trade, and energy security have failed. This realization is
intensifiedbytheperceptionthattimeisrunningout.Problems
areoutpacingthecapacityoftheinternationalsystemtocope.Whileweapplaudthespreadof
wealth and prosperity, there is little indication that leaders and thinkers have anticipated the
impactofthecreationofaglobalmiddleclassinaworldoflimitedresources.Asoneparticipant
suggested,perhapsitistimetostartthinkingintermsof“lose-lose”solutions.
Globalchallengesaregrowingasthemechanismsofgovernance,thetoolsweusetotacklethose
problems,arebeingundermined.Unlessthereisaradicalshiftinthewaytheworld’smainactors
approach global challenges, the situation will deteriorate. In the absence of global leadership,
politicalleadersandotherdecision-makerswillmuddlethrough,reactingtochallengesinstead
ofpreventingthem.Untilacrisiscreatesasenseofurgency,responseswilladdresssymptoms
ratherthanrootcauses.Inshort,globalgovernancewillbelimitedtocrisismanagement.
The new configuration of international relations is, by and large, inherently chaotic and
ungovernable. Power is increasingly geographically dispersed and politically fragmented. It is
shiftingfromestablishedWesternpowerstoemergingcountries,butalso,tosomeextent,tonon-
stateactorswhoassumepreviouslypublicresponsibilitiesorpursueagendasoftheirown.This
diffusionofpoweriscreatinganewinternationalenvironmentthatdefiescleardefinition.Inour
understanding,thenewglobalordercannotbeaccuratelydescribedasamultipolarworld,inwhich
afewgreatpowersaresettingtherulesofthegameanddiscipliningthosewhoviolatethem.We
seelittleagreementonwhatthosepowersare,theirwillingnesstoworktogether,northeefficacy
ofactions ifandwhen theydo.But this isnotaworld inwhich,as IanBremmerandNouriel
Roubini have argued, “no single country or block of countries has the political and economic
leverage–orthewill–todriveatrulyinternationalagenda.”6Their“G-Zeroworld”seemstoo
state-centrictograspcontemporaryglobaldynamics.NordoweacceptRichardN.Haass‘notionof
“nonpolarity:aworlddominatednotbyoneortwoorevenseveralstatesbutratherbydozensof
actorspossessingandexercisingvariouskindsofpower.”7Butwhilewedonotenvisionaconcert,
cacophonymaynotbetheonlyotheroption.
There is little indication
that leaders and thinkers
have anticipated the impact
of the creation of a global
middle class in a world of
limited resources. As one
participant suggested,
perhaps it is time to start
thinking in terms of “lose-
lose” solutions.
6 IanBremmerandNourielRoubini,AG-ZeroWorld.TheNewEconomicClubWillProduceConflict,NotCooperation,in:ForeignAffairs,Vol.90,No.2,March/April2011,pp.2-7(quote:p.2).
7 RichardN.Haass,TheAgeofNonpolarity.WhatWillFollowU.S.Dominance,in:ForeignAffairs,Vol.87,No.3,May/June2008,pp.44-56(quote:p.44).
21
Whatdoesthismean?Areweontheroadtowardaworldofanarchywithoutorderandleadership?
Howcannonpolaritybemanaged?OptimistslikeHenryKissingerbelievefunctionalnecessities
willeventuallyovercomeapowervacuumininternationalrelations:“Itissaidthatnatureabhors
avacuum;sodoestheinternationalsystem.Chaos,ifitoccurs,willsoonerorlatersettledowninto
aneworder.”8ForpessimistslikeNeilFerguson,“aworldwithoutpower,”isverywellconceivable,
albeitas“theanarchicnightmareofanewDarkAge.”9
Ourdiscussionssuggestthatneitherscenarioisordained.Global
governancewillbecomemoredifficult,butnotimpossible.Even
inaworldwithoutpowerfulorganizingforces,therearemagnetic
pulls and tugs that canalignnationsand facilitate cooperation
and collaborative efforts. Let’s call this “weak polarity.” A new
internationalorderwillnotemergespontaneously,butthereare
manythingsthatcanandshouldbedonetofosteritscreation.One
definingcharacteristicoftheemergingnewageisthatpower,at
leastinthesenseoftraditional“hard”power,andleadershipare
lesslinked.Intheabsenceofacomprehensive,unitaryapproach
toglobalgovernance,newformsofleadershipwillemerge,notas
enduringastraditionalalliancesorinternationalinstitutions,but
ratherpatchworksofoverlapping,oftenadhocand fragmented
efforts,involvingshiftingcoalitionsofstateandnon-stateactors
concentrating on specific issues. The leadership exercised by
“coalitionsof thewilling”willbemore fragmented, situational,
andvolatilethanpreviousattempts.Buttheyneverthelessmight
achieveconcreteresults.
Multi-stakeholderglobalactionnetworksconcentratingonspecific
issues are an appropriate organizational structure for today’s
world. Non-state actors, especially NGOs, social entrepreneurs
andcivilsocietygroups,canplayan importantrole increating
thesekindsofnetworksthatspangeographical,institutional,and
sectoral boundaries. Establishing more such transformational
networks,therefore,wouldbeastepforward.Althoughthiswouldnotsolveallchallengesofthe
globalizedworld,itwouldhelpmanagethemandpreventtheinternationalsystemfromcollapsing
undertheweightofitscollectivefailures.
Even in a world without
powerful organizing
forces, there are magnetic
pulls and tugs that
can align nations and
facilitate cooperation and
collaborative efforts. Let’s
call this “weak polarity”
… In the absence of a
comprehensive, unitary
approach to global
governance, new forms
of leadership will emerge,
not as enduring as
traditional alliances or
international institutions,
but rather patchworks of
overlapping, often ad hoc
and fragmented efforts,
involving shifting coalitions
of state and non-state
actors concentrating on
specific issues.
8 Dr.HenryA.Kissinger,KeynoteAddressforthe8thIISSGlobalStrategicReview“GlobalSecurityGovernanceandtheEmergingDistribution of Power,” Geneva, Friday 10 September 2010; URL: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-review/global-strategic-review-2010/plenary-sessions-and-speeches-2010/keynote-address/henry-kissinger/.
9 NiallFerguson,AWorldWithoutPower,in:ForeignPolicy,July/August2004;URL:http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/vac.htm.
22 4 The Way Forward
Thereisathicklayerofoverlappingandcompetingauthoritiesintheexistingsystemofglobal
governanceandmostemergingcountrieshavenointerestinupendingthissystem;theyprefer
tomakeadjustments.But, thefuture internationalorderwillbenomereoutgrowthofexisting
mechanisms. Planetary problems pose new challenges and require new problem-solving
mechanismsasmanagementofthemisofadifferentnatureanddimensionthanpastchallenges.
Thelowestcommondenominatorisnolongerasufficientstartingpointformeaningfulcoordinated
actionontheglobal level.Whetherthismeansthecreationofnewinstitutionsisofsecondary
importance.Eitherexistingintuitionsmaytakeupthechallengesornewoneswillbecreated.
Thereisalackofvisionaboutthefutureoftheinternationalsystemandtheemergingglobalorder.
Tofacilitatethecreationofsuchavision,thefollowingquestionsneedtobeexploredingreater
depth:whoisrisingandwhatsortofinstitutionalstructuresandvaluesdothesenationssupport?
HowcantheEUandUSadapttheinternationalsystemtoaccommodatetheviewsandpreferences
ofrisingcountrieswithoutsacrificingfundamentalinterestsandvalues?Howcanrisingcountries
contributetoglobalpublicgoodswithoutsacrificingtheir fundamental interests insovereignty
anddomesticdevelopment?Whatare themutual interestsandsharedchallenges that theEU,
theUS,andrisingcountriescanjointlyaddress?Howdotheregionalandgloballevelsinteract?
Finally,howcanthecontributionsofnon-stateactorsbeenhancedandleveraged?Futureiterations
oftheBerlinworkshopwillfocusonthesequestions.
ConcretemeasurestoovercomethelackoftrustamongtheEU
and US and emerging countries are essential. This applies not
only to theUSandChina–although thisbilateral relationship
willbepivotalfortheentireworld–butalsotoEuropeandAsia.
AsthediscussionsinBerlincrystallized,thereisanurgentneed
for a more dynamic dialogue between Europe and Asia. While
thereisastrongtrans-Atlanticpolicycommunitythat joinsthe
USandEurope,asimilarpolicycommunitybetweenEuropeand
AsiabeyondtheformalAsia-EuropeMeeting(ASEM)isneeded
to keep pace with the agendas discussed in the myriad policy
dialoguesandtrackIIforumsintheAsia-Pacificcommunity.
A policy community
between Europe and Asia
beyond the formal Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) is
needed to keep pace with
the agendas discussed in
the myriad policy dialogues
and track II forums in the
Asia-Pacific community.
23
ThecontinuationofthetrilateraldialogueinitiatedbytheBertelsmannStiftungandthePacific
ForumCSIScancontributetothedevelopmentofsuchanAsian-European-USpolicycommunity
bycreatinganetworkofdistinguishedpractitionersandexperts.Moreover,itcanandshouldfocus
ontrilateralrelations:Whatdoes“Asia”meanforthetrans-AtlanticallianceandwhatdoesEurope
meanfortrans-Pacificrelations?Thesequestionsarenotyetsufficientlyunderstoodanddebated.
Atrilateraldialoguecanprovideaforumfordoingexactlythat.
Thus,goingforward,futuremeetingswillpaygreaterattentionandfocusmoredeeplyonthese
questions as well as on emerging issues that transcend traditional concerns. Of particular
importanceisthegrowinginfluenceof innovativetechnologies,suchastheinternetandsocial
media thathave thecapacity todestabilizeanddisrupt the internationalsystem.Likewise, the
conceptofglobalpublicgoodsandthesharingoftheburdenstocreateandmaintainthemareof
paramountimportance.
At the core of thesenon-traditional issues are very often emergentnon-state actors, agents of
change,activists,andagitatorsthattheBerlinworkshopoutlined,butdidnotexploreinfulldetail
anddepth.Thereisaneedfordialoguethatfocusesontheroleofthesenon-stateactorsandtheir
implicationsfortheinternationalsystem.Thenextsetofdiscussions,therefore,shouldinclude
theseemergingactorsaswell.
It isespecially important thatwe identifyand reachout to thenextgenerationof leadersand
decisionmakers.Wemustgetinfrontofthecycleofchange,toheartheviewsofthosewhowillbe
inpositionsofpowerandauthoritysothatweunderstandtheirthinkingandanticipatethefuture
contoursofourworld.Equallyimportantweneedtofacilitateadialogueamongtheseleadersthat
buildsfamiliarityandconfidenceamongthemsothattheybeginbuildingacommunityofthinkers
anddoersthatisreadytoaddress–andhopefullysolve–futurechallenges.
24 5 List of Participants
This report has benefited tremendously from the contributions of all those who participated
in the gathering “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System. A Trilateral
PractitionersWorkshop”heldinBerlinonJuly7-8,2011.Wearedeeplyindebtedtoallparticipants
andwouldliketoexpressourgratitudeforsharingtheirinsightsandsuggestions:
Mr.HusainiALAUDDIN
DeputyDirector,MinistryofForeignAffairsandTradeofBruneiDarussalam,
BandarSeriBegawan
Mr.ThorstenBENNER
AssociateDirector,GlobalPublicPolicyInstitute,Berlin
ProfessorAxelBERKOFSKY
SeniorAssociateResearchFellow,InstituteforInternationalPoliticalStudies,Milan
Mr.I.B.MadeBIMANTARA(Sade)
DeputyAssistanttotheSpecialStaffofthePresidentofIndonesia,OfficeoftheSpecialStaffof
thePresidentforInternationalAffairs,Jakarta
Mr.RalphCOSSA
President,PacificForumCSIS,Honolulu,Hawaii
Mr.AbrahamDENMARK
Asia-PacificSecurityAdvisor,CenterforNavalAnalyses,WashingtonD.C.
Mr.LucaDIPRESO
Official,EuropeanParliament,CommitteeonForeignAffairs,Brussels
ProfessorJoernDOSCH
Head,DepartmentofEastAsianStudies;DeputyHead,SchoolofModernLanguagesand
Cultures,UniversityofLeeds,Leeds
ProfessorDanielW.DREZNER
ProfessorofInternationalPolitics,TheFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacy,TuftsUniversity,
Medford,Massachusetts
Mr.AndreasESCHE
Director,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung,Gütersloh
Mr.L.GordonFLAKE
ExecutiveDirector,TheMaureenandMikeMansfieldFoundation,WashingtonD.C.
Mr.BradGLOSSERMAN
ExecutiveDirector,PacificForumCSIS,Honolulu,Hawaii
Mr.LutzGÜLLNER
PolicyCoordinator,EU-USEconomicRelations,EuropeanCommission,DirectorateGeneralfor
Trade,Brussels
25
Mr.WolframvonHEYNITZ
PolicyPlanningStaff,FederalForeignOffice,Berlin
Mr.JamesF.HOGEJr.
Chairman,HumanRightsWatch;FormerEditor,ForeignAffairs,NewYork
Mr.MarkLEONARD
Director,EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations,London
Ms.FanLI
ExecutiveDirector,GlobalLinksInitiative,Shanghai
Mr.JinsongLIU
DeputyDirector-General,PolicyPlanningDepartment,TaiwanAffairsOfficeoftheStateCouncil,
Beijing
Mr.DewardricL.MCNEAL
SpecialAssistanttoDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefense,EastAsiaandChinaCountry
Director,UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,WashingtonD.C.
Mr.ElyRATNER
AssociatePoliticalScientist,RANDCorporation,WashingtonD.C.
ProfessorDr.EberhardSANDSCHNEIDER
OttoWolff-DirectoroftheResearchInstituteoftheGermanCouncilonForeignRelations,Berlin
Ms.HarukoSATOH
SeniorResearchFellow,OsakaSchoolofInternationalPublicPolicy,OsakaUniversity,Osaka
Ms.AmySEARIGHT
SeniorPolicyAdvisor,BureauforAsia,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,WashingtonD.C.
Mr.RodolfoSEVERINO
Head,ASEANStudiesCentre,InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore
Mr.AndreOmerSIREGAR
AssistanttotheSpecialStaff;InterpreterofthePresidentofIndonesia,OfficeoftheSpecialStaff
ofthePresidentforInternationalRelations,Jakarta
ProfessorMinhTuanTA
Head,OfficeforResearchProjectsManagement,DiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi
Mr.DamianOmarVALDEZ
President,TheEvolutionGroupInc.,NewYork
Mr.PeterWALKENHORST
SeniorProjectManager,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung,Gütersloh
Ms.TingXU
SeniorProjectManager,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannFoundation,WashingtonD.C.
26 6 Agenda
Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System
A Trilateral Practitioners Workshop – Berlin, July 7-8, 2011
AttheGlobalPolicyCouncilhostedbytheBertelsmannStiftunginBerlinin2009,HenryKissinger
declared that“Wewillbe forced to -andweshouldanyway– thinkaboutanew international
system”. As we think about creating a governance system for an increasingly dynamic and
interdependentworld,whatmustcomenext?Thisworkshoplooksforpracticalanswerstothis
questionandexaminesrealisticsolutions.
July6 Arrivalofparticipants
7:00pm OpeningDinner
July 7 The Three Step Process Toward Global Governance
Conferencevenue: Bertelsmann
UnterdenLinden1
10117Berlin
9:00am–9:20am WelcomeRemarks
AndreasEsche
Director,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung
RalphCossa
President,PacificForumCSIS
9:20am–12:00pm Identifyingthetopglobalrisks
Within a 10-year time frame, what are the 3-5 greatest challenges to international order and
stability?Whyandhowaretheythreatening?Howarethesechallengesevolvingovertime?Isthe
worldaddressingthechallengeseffectively?Howdoweprioritizetheseconcerns?
Moderator: BradGlosserman
ExecutiveDirector,PacificForumCSIS
IntroductoryRemarks: MarkLeonard(EU)
ElyRatner(US)
MinhTuanTA(Asia)
27
12:00pm–1:30pm WorkingLunch
1:30pm–3:30pm IdentifyingAgentsofChange
Whoarethemajoractorsintheinternationalsystem?Isthisstillastate-centeredworld?Whoare
thekeynon-stateactors?Whatistheirimpactandinfluence?Whatischanginginthewaythe
worldisgovernedandwhy?Whatforcesareatworkontheinternationalsystem?Whatimpactdo
thesechangeshaveonnationalsecurity,internationalstability,ontheabilityofstatestocontrol
theircitizens,ontheeffectivenessofnon-stateactors?
Moderator: BradGlosserman
ExecutiveDirector,PacificForumCSIS
IntroductoryRemarks: AxelBerkofsky(EU)
DanielDrezner(US)
FanLI(Asia)
3:30pm–4:00pm Break
4:00pm–5:30pm Identifyingelementsofnewglobalgovernance
Arethereorshouldtherebeuniversalnorms?Howcanwecreateasustainablebalancebetween
nationalpoliticalpoliciesandglobaleconomicpolicies?Howshouldweaddresstheimbalance?
Shouldsomecurrentinstitutionsbeterminated?Whichinstitutionsshouldbereformedandhow?
Isthereaneedfornewinternational/multilateralInstitutions?Whatkindofnewsystemshouldbe
inplaceandwhoshouldbedesigningit?
Moderator: TingXU
SeniorProjectManager,BertelsmannFoundation
IntroductoryRemarks: JoernDosch(EU)
AmySearight(US)
AndreOmerSiregar(Asia)
7:00pm Dinner
28 Agenda
July 8 Three Regional Views of Global Governance
Conferencevenue: Bertelsmann
UnterdenLinden1
10117Berlin
9:00am–10:30am RegionalviewsoftheInternationalSystem
Aseniorexpertfromeachregionprovidesanassessmentofinternationalchallengesandtherole
thathis/herregionplaysinresolvingthem.(90minutes)
Moderator: RalphCossa
President,PacificForumCSIS
Panelists: JamesF.HogeJr.
Chairman,HumanRightsWatch;FormerEditor,ForeignAffairs
RodolfoC.Severino
Head,InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies
Prof.Dr.EberhardSandschneider
OttoWolff-DirectoroftheResearchInstituteoftheGermanCouncil
onForeignRelations,Berlin
10:30am–11:00am Break
11:00am–1:00pm WorkingGroupdiscussioncontinued:
reflectionoftheearlierpresentation
Whatistheemergingglobalpoliticalorder?Whataretheimplicationsofthetrendsidentifiedin
Day1?HowdoAsiansviewtheUSandEUandtheirroleinglobalgovernance?HowdoAmericans
viewtherolesofEuropeansandAsiansinglobalgovernance?HowdoEuropeansviewtheroles
ofAmericansandAsian inglobalgovernance?What futurescanweenvision: is thereaworld
withouttheWest?Isthetransatlanticconceptrelevanttothefuture?WheredoesAsialieinthe
newglobalorder?WasUSgloballeadershipeverreal?Whatisitsfuture?Whatisthemeaning
and significance of American exceptionalism? What role do “middle powers” play in the new
internationalsystem?
Moderator: RalphCossa
President,PacificForumCSIS
29
1:00pm–2:00pm Lunch
2:00pm–3:00pm Assessmentsandwrapup
Inthefinalsession,nextgenerationparticipantsassesstheviewsoftheseniorexpertsinlight
ofthediscussionsofthefirstday.Towhatextentdothosethreatassessmentscorrespondtothe
viewsexpressedinsession1?Dotheassessmentsofstaterolesmatchnextgenerationviewsof
theinternationalsystem?Dogenerationaldifferencesyieldsignificantdifferencesinperspectives?
Do regional perspectives differ? What are the key areas of divergence and agreement in our
discussions?Whatarenextstepsforthegroup?
Moderator: PeterWalkenhorst
SeniorProjectManager,BertelsmannStiftung
3:00pm–3:15pm ConcludingRemarks
RalphCossa
President,PacificForumCSIS
AndreasEsche
Director,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung
30About the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Pacific Forum CSIS
The Germany-based Bertelsmann Stiftung, founded in 1977, is a private, independent and
nonpartisan foundation that aims to identify societal challenges at an early stage and develop
solutionstothem.Thefoundationisbothathinktankandanagentforsocialchange.Itsprograms
aregearedtowardsimprovingeducation,strengtheningajustandsustainableeconomicsystem,
promotingpreventativehealthcaresystem,andenhancingcivilsocietyandgreaterinternational
understanding.IntheareaofinternationalpoliticstheBertelsmannStiftunghasgainedexperience
infieldssuchasdemocracy,transformation,andmigration,aswellasEuropeanintegrationand
globalgovernance.
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum’s programs
encompasscurrentandemergingpolitical,security,economic,business,andoceanspolicyissues
throughanalysisanddialogueundertakenwiththeregion’sleadersintheacademic,government,
andcorporateareas.Foundedin1975,itcollaborateswithabroadnetworkofresearchinstitutes
fromaroundthePacificRim,drawingonAsianperspectivesanddisseminatingprojectfindings
andrecommendationstoopinionleaders,governments,andmembersof thepublicthroughout
theregion.
www.pacforum.org
Imprint
©2012BertelsmannStiftung
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33311Gütersloh
Germany
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Responsible
Dr.PeterWalkenhorst
Design
MarkusDiekmann,Bielefeld
Printing
Matthiesen-Druck,Bielefeld
Address | Contact
Brad Glosserman
Pacific Forum CSIS
1003 Bishop Street, Pauahi Tower 1150,
Honolulu, HI 96813
USA
Phone +1-808-521-6745
E-Mail [email protected]
Dr. Peter Walkenhorst
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-81172
Fax +49 5241 81-681172
E-Mail [email protected]
Ting Xu
Bertelsmann Foundation
1101 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 901
Washington, D.C. 20005
USA
Phone +1-202-621-1721
Fax +1-202-384-1984
E-Mail [email protected]
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.shaping-a-globalized-world.org