Conceptual analysis and specification of Fayol’s management principles using the CAST method Taken from: Gazendam, Henk W.M. (1993). Variety Controls Variety: On the Use of Organization Theories

in Information Management. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff. 400 pp. ISBN 90-01-32950-0.

4.8. Explanation and discussion of Fayol's management principles

4.8.1. Main concepts in Fayol's theory According to Fayol (1916/1956; 1916/1984), an organization consists of a social body ('organisme social', 'corps social') and a material organism ('organisme matériel'). The 'corps social' consists of persons. Persons perform activities. Activities can be classified according to their function in the 'corps social'. These functions are: technical, commercial, financial, security, accounting, and managerial. The managerial function corresponds to a management process that consists of five subactivities: to plan, to organize, to coordinate, to command, and to control. These subactivities are defined as follows (Fayol, 1916/1984: 13):"

1) To plan: ... lay out the actions to be taken. 2) To organize: lay out the lines of authority and responsibility, build up the

dual structure, material and human, of the organization. 3) To coordinate: lay out the timing and sequencing of activities ... 4) To command: put the plan into action; set the work in operation. 5) To control: monitor and correct; see that everything occurs in conformity

with established rules and expressed command."1 1"Administrer, c'est prévoir, organiser, commander, coordonner, et contrôler;

Prévoir, c'est-à-dire scruter l'avenir et dresser le programme d'action;

Organiser, c'est-à-dire constituer le double organisme, matériel et social, de

l'entreprise;

Commander, c'est-à-dire faire fonctionner le personnel;

Coordonner, c'est-à-dire relier, unir, harmoniser tous les actes et tous les efforts;

Contrôler, c'est-à-dire veiller à ce que tout se passe conformément aux règles établies

et aux ordres donnés." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 5)

Note how in the English translation of Irwin Gray the role of the coordinating activity

has shifted from an information processing and adjusting activity, logically following

the command activity, to a scheduling activity that logically precedes the

commanding activity.

Based on this analysis of the management process, we can conclude that the organizational structure is created by acts of planning, organization, and coordination, while work is done based on commands and obedience to commands. Obedience to commands and adherence to rules is stimulated by control activities. Discipline, which can be seen as the obedience to commands and rules, is a key concept in Fayol's theory. According to Fayol, discipline is dependent on the personal authority of management (based on qualities such as leadership, mental and moral qualities, equitable behavior), and fair agreements about remuneration of personnel. Therefore, the quality of personnel -- especially managers -- and the quality of agreements are other key concepts in Fayol's approach. Fayol does not provide a structured overview of the organizational structures that are the result of the managerial activities. He mentions the human structure and the material structure in his description of the organizing activity, and elaborates these in his rule about order ("everything in its place" and "the right man in the right place"). Furthermore, he assumes an information processing structure in his rules about unity of command, unity of direction, and scalar chain. Most of the structures on which the human activities work are, however, implicit.

4.8.2. The fourteen management principles The first five principles explain how work can be done most efficiently by division of work, a clear command structure, and obedience to these commands. The second five principles contain refinements of the first five principles. Principles 6 and 7 explain the nature of the contracts between organization and personnel, resulting in a subordination of the individual interest to the general interest and a fair remuneration of personnel.. The next two principles (8 and 9) explain the organization as an information processing system and, using this perspective, discuss the principles of centralization of initiative and hierarchical paths of communication. These principles follow more or less from the unity of command and unity of direction principles, but have to be applied in proportion because of the demands of information processing. In discussing these principles, Fayol identifies the exceptions to these principles like the 'passerelle'. Then, there is the principle of order (Principle 10), which is an extension of the first five principles leading to refinements such as the distinction of person and position. Finally, four principles are stated that can be seen as criteria for the evaluation of the functioning of the organization: equity, stability of personnel, initiative, and unity of personnel2.

4.8.3. Division of work Division of work can be seen as the application of the principle of specialization to the 'corps social'. Specialization can be observed in the animal world:

2Irwin Gray calls this principle 'esprit de corps'. Fayol, however, uses 'l'union du

personnel' and never mentions 'esprit de corps'.

"Specialization belongs to the natural order. . . the more highly developed the creature, the more highly differentiated its organs. . . " (Fayol, 1916/1984: 82). 3

The more developed the 'corps social', the more specialized its members will be (Hypothesis 1.1.4). This enables the production of more and better work with the same effort (Hypothesis 1.2.). This positive effect of the division of work rests on the acquisition of abilities through learning in practice (Hypothesis 1.3.), the minimization of learning of new tasks (Hypothesis 1.4.), and on an optimization of the attention paid to the items that have to be processed during the task (Hypothesis 1.5.).

"The worker who always makes the same part, or the manager who is always concerned with the same matters, acquires an ability, sureness, and accuracy which . . . usually lead to an increased output. Each change of work brings in its train an adaptation that reduces output. Division of work permits a reduction in the number of items to which attention and effort must be directed. . . " (Fayol, 1916/1984: 82)5

The learning-based optimization of the division of work will lead to narrow task domains when the frequency of changes of work is high (Hypothesis 1.4.a.). The attention-based optimization of the division of work will lead to narrow task domains if the number of items to be processed per time unit is high (which is the case in mass production), or if the production process is complex (Hypothesis 1.5.a.). A third reason for the division of work is the separation of powers that is necessary when control must be exercised over resources such as money (Hypothesis 1.6.). Division of work, however, cannot be applied out of proportion because it can create boredom and, as a result of that, a lower quality of work6.

3"La division du travail est d'ordre naturel . . . plus l'être est parfait, plus il possède

d'organes chargés de fonctions différentes . . ." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 20).

4This hypothesis numbering of Fayol's hypotheses uses double numbers and has to be

distinguished from the hypothesis numbering of the thesis as a whole which uses

single numbers.

5"L'ouvrier qui fait toujours la même piece, le chef qui traite constamment des mêmes

affaires, acquièrent une habileté, une assurance, une précision qui accroisent leur

rendement. Chaque changement d'occupation entraîne un effort d'adaptation qui

diminue la production. La division du travail permit de réduire le nombre d'objets sur

lesquels l'attention et l'effort doivent se porter." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 21)

6The observation that division of work creates boredom is not due to Fayol, but to

Fayol's editor Irwin Gray.

Strangely enough, it would follow from the principle of division of work that narrower task domains have to be applied when work changes frequently as a result of a turbulent environment. This seems in contradiction with modern organistic approaches to organization (for instance, Morgan's (1986: 98) holographic organization) that predict optimal performance in a turbulent environment when organization units and people engage in broad tasks by applying principles such as the requisite variety of functions and the redundancy of functions. This apparent contradiction would be bad for organistic organization theory because the principle of division of work has a high plausibility in the light of cognitive science theories. This contradiction may not be as it looks, because we can reason our way out by saying that the principle of division of work only is valid for individuals, and that the principle of requisite variety and redundancy of functions only holds for organization units. But even if we interpret the contradictory principles in this way, the contradictory nature of them may emerge at other places, because these principles state two opposite strategies for coping with changing environments: (1) invest in the ability to learn quickly as soon as new tasks arise by keeping tasks narrow (division of work), or (2) invest in learning a diversity of skills before the new tasks arise (requisite variety and redundancy of functions).

4.8.4. Authority and responsibility The principle of authority and responsibility states that (1) formal authority can only be exercised effectively by a manager if he / she has also personal authority, (2) the authority of a manager should be congruent to his / her responsibility, (3) a system of rewards and penalties should be created in order to encourage useful actions and to disencourage the opposite, (4) people seek authority but shun responsibility, and (5) the abuse of authority should be prevented by ensuring the personal integrity of employees, and developing a goal orientation of employees that is compatible with the goals of the governing body of the organization. The principle of authority and responsibility is apparently connected to the importance of authority initiated by the managers. The organization is driven by the commands of managers, and runs based on the work that is carried out by workers in obedience to that commands. This is shown by Fayol's definition of authority:

"Authority is the right to give orders and to exact obedience." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 63) 7

Fayol observes that formal authority cannot be exercised properly if no personal authority is present (Hypothesis 2.1). Personal authority is seen to be dependent on:

". . . intelligence, experience, technical knowledge, moral worth, ability to lead, past services, and so on." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 63)8

7"L'autorité, c'est le droit de commander et le pouvoir de se faire obéir." (Fayol,

1916/1956: 21)

8"d'intelligence, de savoir, d'expérience, de valeur morale, de don de commandement,

de services rendus, etc." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 21)

Responsibility is defined in a much less clear way by Fayol. It can be seen as a measure determining to which extent a person should receive rewards or penalties for doing a task correctly. In connection with authority, responsibility can be defined more clearly. Responsibility is defined as the obligation to receive rewards or punishments based on the fulfillment of the duty to make sure that the necessary tasks are carried out and the necessary decisions are made. 'Authority and responsibility should be connected' is a normative statement resting on the hypothesis that if authority and responsibility are balanced, useful actions will be encouraged optimally (Hypothesis 2.2.). The normative character of this statement is, however, hidden by Fayol as he describes it as a kind of natural law:

"Responsibility is the corollary of authority, its natural consequence and essential counterpart, and wherever authority is exercised, responsibility is also present." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 63) 9

A system of rewards an penalties will encourage useful actions (Hypothesis 2.3.). This hypothesis underlies the connection of authority and responsibility.

"The need for rewards or penalties is part of our sense of fair play or justice; in the general interest, useful actions have to be encouraged and their opposite discouraged." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 63)10

Nowadays, we would say that the system of rewards and penalties works because it is a (primitive) system of learning from experience. The problem with the relation between authority and responsibility is that authority is sought after, while responsibility is feared (Hypothesis 2.4.). This can be seen as a hypothesis:

"Generally speaking, responsibility is feared as much as authority is sought after, and fear of responsibility paralyzes much initiative and destroys many

9"La responsibilité est un corollaire de l'autorité, sa conséquence naturelle, sa

contrepartie nécessaire. Partout où une autorité s'exerce, une responsibilité prend

naissance." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 21)

10"Le besoin de sanction, qui a sa source dans le sentiment de justice, est confirmé et

accru par cette considération que, dans l'intérêt général, il faut encourager les actions

utiles et décourager les autres." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 22)

good qualities. A good leader should possess and infuse into those around him courage to accept responsibility . . ." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 64)11

Two qualities of a manager that prevent abuse of authority are personal integrity ('valeur morale') and a goal orientation that is compatible with the goals of the governing body of the organization (Hypothesis 2.5.).12 The principle of authority and responsibility presents us another interesting apparent contradiction between Fayol's ideas and organistic organization theory. According to Burns and Stalker (1961), organic organizations are characterized by an authority system that is diffuse, with constantly changing authority patterns that are mainly based on skills and abilities. Such a system of authority would have a high risk to develop in the direction of a system in which authority is exercised by everybody and responsibility is carried by nobody because of the tendency, clearly described by Fayol, of persons to seek authority but to fear responsibility. Such a system would succeed in encouraging initiative, but fail in learning from experience.

4.8.5. Discipline Discipline is the existence of obedience, application, activity, behavior, and outward marks of respect, all in accordance with the prevailing conventions in an organization13. Fayol defines discipline as relative to established conventions14:

11"Cependant la responsibilité est généralement aussi redoutée que l'autorité est

recherchée. La peur des responsabilités paralyse beaucoup d'initiatives et annihile

beaucoup de qualités. Un bon chef doit avoir et répandre autour de lui le courage des

responsibilités. " (Fayol, 1916/1956: 22)

12The idea that goal orientation prevents abuse of authority was added by Irwin Gray.

13I do not use the English translation of Gray here because it misses the point. A

convention is something else than an agreement. Fayol's definition of discipline reads:

"La discipline, c'est essentiellement l'obéissance, l'assiduité, l'activité, la tenue, les

signes ectérieures de respect réalisés conformément aux conventions établies entre

l'entreprise et ses agents." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 23)

That conventions rather than agreements are concerned is shown in the text explaining

the origins of these conventions.

14For the reasons explained in the foregoing footnote, I prefer to use the French text

here.

"Que ces conventions aient été librement débattues ou q'elles soient subies sans discussion préalable; qu'elles soient écrites ou tacites; qu'elles résultent de la volonté des parties ou des lois et des usages, ce sont ces conventions qui fixent les modalités de la discipline. . . . la discipline se présente . . . différent . . . d'une entreprise à une autre, d'une catégorie d'agents à une autre dans la même entreprise, d'une région à une autre, d'un temps à un autre temps." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 23)15

Fayol observes that public opinion sees discipline as essential for the smooth running of an organization, especially military organizations, and that without discipline, no enterprise can prosper. In this way, he implicitly brings forward his own hypothesis that discipline is necessary for a good performance of organizations (Hypothesis 3.1.). His argument takes an original turn when he states that lack of discipline in most cases should not be blamed on the undisciplined nature of those who are commanded, but instead originates from bad leadership (Hypothesis 3.2.). In an analysis of the conditions for discipline, Fayol (1916/1956: 25) concludes that the most effective way to reach and maintain discipline is to provide for (1) good leadership at all levels of the organization, (2) remuneration rules that are as equitable as possible, and (3) judiciously applied sanctions for undisciplined behavior (Hypothesis 3.3.).

4.8.6. Unity of command The principle of unity of command reads:

"For any action whatsoever, an employee should receive orders from one superior only." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 66)16

If this principle is violated, persons receive orders from two or more bosses and may be confused by contradicting orders or feel uneasy because of incompatible forms of discipline that are expected (Hypothesis 4.1.). As a result, discipline is compromised, order disturbed, and stability endangered. Fayol compares this situation with an organism infected by a disease: just like the organism feels uneasy until the foreign bodies are removed, the organization will feel uneasy until the superfluous superiors are removed. Furthermore, he observes that dual command is a perpetual source of conflicts (Hypothesis 4.2.).

15Whether these conventions have been freely debated or be borne without prior

discussion, whether they be written or tacit, whether they derive from the wishes of

the parties or from laws and customs, these conventions determine the forms of

discipline. . . . discipline presents itself . . . in different forms . . . from one

organization to another, from one category of persons to another within the same

organization, from one region to another, and from one period to another.

16"Pour une action quelconque, un agent ne doit recevoir des ordres que d'un seul

chef." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 25)

According to Irwin Gray, unity of command can be threatened by technological change (Hypothesis 4.3.):

"which has brought about frequent separation between those who are knowledgeable about a technical matter and those who are in a position in the hierarchy where they must make decisions concerning those matters." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 66)

4.8.7. Unity of direction The principle of unity of direction implies that those activities within the organization that have the same objective should be directed by one manager using one plan.

"Un seul chef et un seul programme pour un ensemble d'opérations visant le même but." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 27)17

Unity of direction is necessary to focus efforts and coordinate the activities of people, which in turn is necessary for the corps social to survive (Hypothesis 5.1.). Violation of the principle of unity of direction is discussed by Fayol based on the organism metaphor:

"A body with two heads is in the social as in the animal sphere a monster, and has difficulty surviving." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 67)18

Unity of direction should be distinguished from unity of command. Unity of command relates to how personnel functions in an organization (the 'Ablauf') and examines person-to-person relations, whereas unity of direction concerns the structure of the corps social (the 'Aufbau'), which is determined by the assignment of authority and responsibility of managers for task domains, and the assignment of jobs belonging to those task domains to workers . Unity of command cannot exist without unity of direction (Hypothesis 5.2.). Again, we see that Fayol's principles advise something else than organistic organization theory. Morgan (1986: 73) mentions the matrix organization as an example of an organic organization. Based on his principles of unity of command and unity of direction, Fayol would advise against such matrix organizations19. According to his management principles, a deterioration of performance can be expected if an organization migrates from a simple, hierarchical command structure to a matrix organization.

4.8.8. Subordination of individual interest to general interest The principle of subordination of individual interest to general interest reads: 17One and only one manager and one and only one action program for a collection of

activities having the same objective.

18"Un corps à deux têtes est, dans le monde social, comme dans le monde animal, un

monstre. Il a de la peine à vivre." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 27)

19In this respect, Fayol differs from Taylor (1911), who was a proponent of matrix

organizations 'avant la lettre'.

"In a business, the interests of one employee or group of employees should not prevail over those of the concern . . ." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 68)20

Only if individual interests do not prevail over the organization's general interests, the organization will be able to function optimally (Hypothesis 6.1.). There is, however, a strong tendency to pose individual interests above the organization's general interests (Hypothesis 6.2.):

"But ignorance, ambition, selfishness, laziness, weakness, and all human passions tend to cause the general interests to be lost sight of in favor of individual interests, and a perpetual struggle has to be waged against this trend." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 68)21

Individual and general interests confront each other and demand attention of managers in order to reconcile them. Means for effecting this state of reconciliation are (1) firmness and good example on the part of the managers, (2) remuneration rules that are as equitable as possible, and (3) attentive supervision by managers (Hypothesis 6.3.).

4.8.9. Remuneration of personnel The remuneration of personnel follows logically from the fact that personnel renders services to the organization. The method of remuneration should be considered fair (equitable) by both employee and employer in order to let the organization function optimally (Hypothesis 7.1.). Furthermore, the remuneration rule system can encourage productivity and disencourage abuse, provided its rules are clear, comprehensible and uniformly applicable to all employees (Hypothesis 7.2.). Therefore, the organization should adopt a remuneration rule system that is considered fair by employees and employer, that encourages productivity, disencourages abuse, is clear and comprehensible, and that is uniformly applicable to all employees in order to let the organization function optimally (Hypothesis 7.3.). After stating these general principles for remuneration of personnel, Fayol discusses several remuneration systems, a discussion that would be too detailed to include in this analysis.

4.8.11. Hierarchy In his principle concerning hierarchy22, Fayol adds a refinement to the centralized information processing image of organization stemming from the centralization

20". . . dans une entreprise, l'intérêt d'un agent, ou d'un groupe d'agents, ne doit pas

prévaloir contre l'intérêt de l'entreprise . . ." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 27)

21"Mais l'ignorance, l'ambition, l'égoïsme, la paresse, les faiblesses et toutes les

passions humaines tendent à faire perdre de vue l'intérêt général au profit de l'intérêt

particulier. C'est une lutte continuelle à soutenir." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 27)

22Irwin Gray translates 'hiérarchie' with 'scalar chain', 'la voie hiérarchique' with 'the

line of authority', and 'la passerelle' with 'the gangplank'. I translate 'hiérarchie' with

principle, which in turn was a consequence of the unity of command and unity of direction principles. This refinement is necessary for an efficient and swift information processing. The argument starts with a definition of 'hierarchy (1)' and 'hierarchical path':

"La hiérarchie est la série des chefs qui va de l'autorité supérieure aux agents inférieurs." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 37)23

Thus, hierarchy (1) is defined as a structure dependent on command relationships. As a logical consequence of the unity of direction principle, the hierarchy (1) satisfies the condition that each person, except the ultimate authority, has only one boss (Hypothesis 9.1.).

"La voie hiérarchique est le chemin qui suivent en passant par tous les degrés de la hiérarchie, les communications qui partent de l'autorité supérieure ou qui lui sont adressées. Ce chemin est imposé à la fois par le besoin d'une transmission assurée et par l'unité de commandement." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 37)24

The hierarchical path of communication is a logical consequence of the principle of unity of command (Hypothesis 9.2.). The existence of the hierarchical path of communication ensures the transmission of information from the bottom of the organization to the top, and of commands from the top to the bottom (Hypothesis 9.3.). The use of this hierarchical path of communication, however, is not always the most short or swift one (Hypothesis 9.4.).

". . . but it is not always the swiftest. It is even at times disastrously lengthy in large concerns, notably in government ones. Since the success of many activities depends on speedy implementation of plans or speedy response to a

'hierarchy', 'la voie hiérarchique' with 'the hierarchical path', and 'la passerelle' with

'the lateral path'.

23The hierarchy is the chain of superiors ranging from the highest authority to the

lowest employees.

24The hierarchical path is the path that passes all levels of hierarchy, which is

followed by all communications starting from the highest authority or directed

towards him. This path is dictated both by the need to ensure information

transmittance, and by the principle of unity of command.

situation, respect for the [hierarchical path of communication] must be reconciled with the need for swift action." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 75)25

Therefore, in many situations, a lateral path of communication (a 'passerelle') is used (Hypothesis 9.5.). The working of such a lateral path of communication is explained in detail by Fayol:

"Let us imagine that section F has to be put into contact with section P in a business whose [hierarchy] is represented by the following double ladder:

A B L C M D N E O F---------P G Q

If the [hierarchical path of communication] is followed, the ladder must be climbed from F to A and then descended from A to P, with a stop at each [level], then ascended again from P to A, and descended once more from A to F, in order to get back to the starting point. It is much simpler and quicker to go directly from F to P by making use of a direct interaction FP as a [lateral path of communication], and that is what is most often done. The [hierarchy] will be safeguarded if managers E and O have authorized their respective subordinates F and P to deal with each other directly. . . As long as F and P keep their superiors informed, and as long as the superiors continue to approve their actions, direct contact may be maintained. But from the instant there is no approval from the superiors, direct contact comes to an end, and the [hierarchical path of communication] is immediately resumed." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 75)26

25"Mais il n'est pas toujours le plus rapide; il est parfois même désastreusement long

dans les très grandes entreprises, notamment dans l'Etat. Or, il y a beaucoup

d'opérations dont le succès repose sur une exécution rapide; il faut donc pouvoir

concilier le respect de la voie hiérarchique avec l'obligation d'aller vite." (Fayol,

1916/1956: 38)

26"Supposons qu'il se agisse de mettre en rapport le service F avec le service P dans

une entreprise dont la hiérarchie est représentée par l'échelle double G-A-Q. En

suivant la voie hiérarchique il faudra gravir l'échelle de F en A, puis descendre de A

en P en s'arrêtant à chaque échelon, remonter ensuite de P en A et redescendre de A

en F pour revenir au point de départ. Il est évidemment beaucoup plus simple et plus

Here we see that hierarchy (2) is used as the principle that agreements of a subordinate with persons outside the sphere of command of his superior, as well as the initiative to interact aimed at those agreements, always should be approved by his superior. Furthermore, an interesting enrichment of the dynamic information processing image is provided by introducing the two superiors that 'switch on and off' the lateral path of communication between their respective subordinates. As a design principle, hierarchy (1) logically follows from the principles of unity of direction, unity of command, and centralization. This does not add anything new. The interesting part of the principle of hierarchy is triggered by the observation that lateral communication exists on a large scale, and implies the (implicit) reformulation of hierarchy to a hierarchy (2) concept stating that superiors must approve of the lateral communications and the resulting agreements of their subordinates.

4.8.10. Centralization In his principle of centralization, Fayol presents us an interesting information processing image of organization. As usual, he uses the organism metaphor to express his ideas:

"Like division of work, centralization belongs to the natural order: in every organism, animal or social, sensations converge toward the brain or directive part, and from the brain or directive part, orders are sent out that set all parts of the organism in movement." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 74)27

rapide d'aller directement de F en P prenant la passerelle F--P. Et c'est ce que l'on fait

le plus souvent. Le principe hiérarchique sera sauvegardé si les chefs E et O ont

autorisé leurs agents respectifs F et P à entrer en relations directes; et la situation sera

tout à fait régularisée si F et P renseignent immédiatement leurs chefs respectifs sur ce

qu'ils ont fait d'un commun accord. Tant que F et P restent d'accord et que leurs

opérations sont approuvés par leurs chefs directs, les relations directes peuvent se

puorsuivre; dès que l'accord disparaît ou que l'approbation des chefs manque, les

relations directed cessent et la voie hiérarchique est immédiatement rétablie." (Fayol,

1916/1956: 38)

27"Comme la 'division du travail', la centralisation est un fait d'ordre naturel; celui-ci

consiste en ce que dans tout organisme, animal ou social, les sensations convergent

vers le cerveau ou la direction, et que du cerveau ou de la direction partent les ordres

qui mettent en mouvement toutes les parties de l'organisme." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 36)

This image of organization is also interesting because it shows us the dynamics of an organization: a top-down flow of commands sets the organization in movement, while a continuous bottom-up flow of sensations about, amongst others, that movement, enables the directive part to do its coordinating work resulting in commands. Apparently, centralization (1) is defined implicitly here as the applicability of the presented image in which one and only one directive part is present to an organization. Fayol states that this type of centralization (1) is always present in organizations (Hypothesis 8.1.).

"Centralization . . . is always present to a greater or lesser extent." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 74)28

If we consider centralization (1) in terms of a design principle, Fayol implicitly states that centralization (1) is necessary for optimal functioning of an organization (Hypothesis 8.2.). This hypothesis is, in fact, the structural counterpart of the unity of direction principle. Fayol continues with discussing the appropriate degree of centralization.

". . . in large concerns, where a long scalar chain is interposed between top managers and the lower grades, orders and information have to go through a series of intermediaries. Each employee, intentionally or unintentionally, puts something of himself into the transmission of information and the execution of orders. He does not operate merely as a cog in the machine." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 74)29

After having explained this further refined information processing image of organization, the degree of centralization can be defined in relation to the role of intermediary agents in the information flow and command flow:

28"La centralisation . . . existe toujours plus ou moins." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 36)

29". . . dans les grandes affaires, où le chef est séparé des agents inférieurs par une

longue hiérarchie, les ordres, comme les impressions de retour, passent par une série

d'intermédiaires obligés. Chaque agent met, volontairement ou involontairement, un

peu de lui-même dans la transmission et l'exécution des ordres comme dans la

transmission des impressions reçues, il n'agit pas comme un simple rouage

mécanique." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 36)

"Everything which goes to increase the importance of the subordinate's role is decentralization; everything that serves to reduce it is centralization." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 74)30

Apparently, we have to distinguish centralization (1), which is the applicability of the information processing image in which only one directive part is present, from centralization (2) which is the proportion of the initiative and discretion of the directive part related to the initiative and discretion permitted to agents not belonging to the directive part. When Fayol talks about finding the optimum degree of centralization, he is referring to centralization (2). The important issue for management is to find the appropriate degree of centralization (2) for the particular organization. In small organizations, there is absolute centralization (2) (Hypothesis 8.3.). In larger organizations, the degree of centralization (2) is situation-dependent. The degree of initiative and discretion that a person may exercise in an organization that utilizes the qualities of all personnel in the best way possible depends on a person's qualities, the qualities of his / her subordinates, the qualities of his / her superior, and the condition of the business (Hypothesis 8.4.):

"The degree of initiative that an intermediary may exercise depends on the personal character and moral worth, and on the reliability of his own subordinates, the character of his own superior, and the condition of the business. The objectives to pursue are the optimum utilization of all qualities of the personnel." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 74)31

The principle of centralization turns out to be a two-layered design principle. Firstly, centralization (1) has to be applied, which means designing an organization with a single directive part that issues commands and receives information. Secondly, the appropriate degree of centralization (2) has to be determined, which means assigning admitted degrees of initiative to persons not belonging to the directive part in order to use the qualities of all personnel in the best way possible.

30"Tout ce qui augmente l'importance du rôle des subordonnés est de la

décentralisation; tout ce qui diminue l'importance de ce rôle est de la centralisation. "

(Fayol, 1916/1956: 37)

31"Du caractère du chef, de sa valeur, de la valeur des subordonnés et aussi des

conditions de l'entreprise, dépend la part d'initiative qu'il convient de laisser aux

intermédiaires. Le degré de centralisation doit varier selon les cas. Le but à poursuivre

est la meilleure utilisation possible des facultés de tout le personnel. " (Fayol,

1916/1984: 37)

4.8.12. Order The principle of order consists of two subprinciples: one for material order, and one for social order. Thus, the order principle follows Fayol's idea of an organization as a double organism: a material organism and a social organism:

"The formula for order in the case of material things is: "a place for everything and everything in its place". The formula in the human order is: "a place for everyone and everyone in his place" (Fayol, 1916/1984: 77)

If the places for materials are well-chosen, and these materials are in their place, losses of material and time are minimized and work can be done efficiently (Hypothesis 10.1).

"The objective of order is to avoid losses of material and time . . ." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 77)

In the case of social order, there must be an appointed place for each employee, and each employee must be in his / her place. The place chosen for an employee must be suitable for the employee and the employee must be suitable for the place, as expressed in the formula: "the right man in the right place". The establishment of social order enables to use the human resources of the organization in an optimal way (Hypothesis 10.2.). The establishment of social order presupposes good organization and good selection of personnel (Hypothesis 10.3.). The argument that this task involves no more than deciding about the positions that are necessary for the smooth running of the organization, and the subsequent selection of those who will fill that positions is wrong. Instead, a continuous effort to strike a balance between the organization's need for personnel and its personnel resources is necessary (Hypothesis 10.4.):

"Social order demands precise knowledge of the human requirements and resources of the concern and a constant balance between these requirements and resources. This balance is very difficult to establish and maintain . . . " (Fayol, 1916/1984: 78)

Establishing and maintaining this balance is so difficult because the pursuit of individual interests at the expense of general interests tends to upset the balance (Hypothesis 10.5.).

". . . when management, acting out of ambition, nepotism, favoritism, or merely ignorance has multiplied positions without good reason or filled them with incompetent employees . . . management will need . . . talent, strength of will, and persistence in order to sweep away abuses and restore order." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 78)

It is interesting to note that Fayol distinguishes positions here that are possibly different from the physical positions of employees. The objective of the principle of order is to avoid loss of time and material in the case of material order, and to avoid unnecessary positions and incompetent employees in the case of social order. In the case of social order, a balance has to be maintained between the human requirements and the human resources of the organization.

4.8.13. Equity Equity is the first of the four management principles that state a general objective that can also be used as a performance indicator for the organization.

"Justice means putting into execution established conventions . . . equity results from the combination of respect and justice." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 79)32

Equity or fairness can be defined as the state resulting from the application of justice supplemented by actions recognizing the dignity, the worth, and the sense of integrity of personnel. Equity is related to the principle of equality of treatment. Management should strive toward maximum equity and equality of treatment in dealing with personnel, without neglecting any other principle of management. The application of the principle of equity and equality by managers encourages personnel to carry out their duties with devotion and loyalty (Hypothesis 11.1).

4.8.14. Stability of personnel Stability of personnel is the second of the four management principles that state a general objective that can also be used as a performance indicator for the organization. Stability of personnel is important because:

"Time is required for an employee to get used to new work and succeed in doing it well, assuming that he possesses the requisite abilities. If he is terminated before he has got used to his work, he will not have rendered any worthwhile service." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 79)33 (Hypothesis 12.1.)

Stability of personnel can be defined in terms of the relative number of personnel that have not been replaced in a certain time period. The stability of personnel influences the ratio between experienced personnel and inexperienced personnel. The opposite of stability of personnel is personnel turnover. This can be defined as the relative number of personnel that have been replaced in a certain time period. An optimal stability of personnel is necessary for a prosperous organization (Hypothesis 12.2.). Stability of personnel is a matter of proportion. A stability of personnel that is too high could result in unnecessary stagnation because employees may become incapable for doing their jobs, while other employees may have become fit for assuming greater responsibilities.

4.8.15. Initiative Initiative is the third of the four management principles that state a general objective that can also be used as a performance indicator for the organization.

"Thinking out a plan and ensuring its success are two of the keenest satisfactions that an intelligent person can experience. The opportunity to plan

32"La justice est la réalisation des conventions établies. . . . l'equité résulte de la

combinaison de la bienveillance avec la justice." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 43)

33"Il faut du temps à un agent pour s'initier à une fonction nouvelle et pour arriver à la

bien remplir -- en admettant qu'il soit pourvu des aptitudes nécessaires. Si, lorsque son

initiation s'achève ou avant qu'elle soit achevée, l'agent est déplacé, il n'aura pas eu le

temps de rendre un service appréciable. Et si la même chose se répète indéfiniment, la

fonction ne sera jamais bien remplie." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 43)

and implement is also one of the most powerful stimulants of human endeavor." (Fayol, 1916/1984: 80)34

Initiative can be defined as thinking out a plan and ensuring its successful implementation. Taking initiative leads to zeal, energy, and satisfaction of employees at all levels of the hierarchy (Hypothesis 13.1.).

4.8.16. Unity of personnel Unity of personnel is the fourth of the four management principles that state a general objective that can also be used as a performance indicator for the organization. Unity of personnel can be defined as the combination of unity of command, commitment to common goals and harmonious working relationships. In order to reach unity of personnel, one should avoid splitting up personnel in situations where teamwork can prosper, and use oral communications rather than written communications in order to avoid the counterproductive effect of written communications (Hypothesis 14.1.).

". . . differences and misunderstandings that a conversation could clear up grow more protracted and even bitter in writing. "(Fayol, 1916/1984: 81) (Hypothesis 14.2)35

"Too many of these communications are grounded in fear -- the writer believes that the memo will cover his actions should anything go wrong. Consequently, the contents, phrasing, and timing of the notes are all designed not to get the business of the firm done, but rather to protect the writer. " (Fayol, 1916/1984: 81) (Hypothesis 14.3.)36

4.8.17. A discussion of Fayol's theory Some striking characteristics of Fayol's theory are his use of the organism metaphor, the abundant psychological hypotheses underlying his management principles, the attention paid to learning, his cultural relativism, and a dynamic information processing image of organization. Furthermore, Fayol pays much attention to leadership and human resource management. Fayol uses the organism metaphor for stating that an organization consists of two organisms, a material and a social. The social organism is called the corps social. In discussing the principle of unity of direction, the image of a body with two heads is used, and the distress in the organization without unity of direction is compared with the illness of an organism. Fayol uses the organism metaphor also at other places. 34"Concevoir un plan et assurer le réussite est l'une des plus vives satisfactions que

puisse éprouver l'homme intelligent; c'est aussi l'un des plus puissantes stimulants de

l'activité humaine." (Fayol, 1916/1956: 44)

35"On sait d'ailleurs que des conflits ou des malentendus, qui pourraient se résoudre

dans une conversation, s'enveniment souvent par correspondance." (Fayol, 1916/1956:

45)

36This interesting hypothesis was added by Irwin Gray.

If we identify the hypotheses stating psychological mechanisms, we see that hypotheses 1.3. (learning), 1.4. (learning), 1.5. (attention), 2.1. (personal authority), 2.2. (rewards and punishments), 2.3. (rewards and punishments), 2.4. (greed and fear), 2.5. (personal integrity), 4.1. (confusion), 6.2. (passions), 10.5. (ambition), 12.1. (learning), 13.1. (intellectual satisfaction). The hypotheses that pay attention to learning are 1.3., 1.4., 12.1. Fayol sees positive effects of learning (acquisition of skills) as well as negative aspects (suboptimal productivity during the time one is not yet fully qualified, and learning). In his definition of discipline, which is a key concept in his theory, Fayol takes a position of cultural relativism. That what is understood as being disciplined, is culture-dependent. In the principle of centralization and in the principle of hierarchy, Fayol sketches an information processing image of organization (Hypotheses 8.1., 8.2., 8.3., 8.4., 9.1., 9.2., 9.3., 9.4., 9.5.). Commands flow from the directive part of the organization to the lowest agents, and information flows from the lowest agents to the directive part. Intermediate managers add to these information flows, and sometimes change and redirect them. An example is the switching on and switching off of lateral paths of communication, vividly described by Fayol when explaining his 'passerelle'. In his principles concerning discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, and unity of personnel, Fayol pays attention to leadership (Hypotheses 3.1., 3.2., 3.3., 4.2., 5.1., 5.2., 14.1., 14.2., 14.3.). Human resource management is discussed under the principles of subordination of individual interest to general interest, remuneration of personnel, order, equity, and stability of tenure of personnel (Hypotheses 6.1., 6.3., 7.1., 7.2., 7.3., 10.2., 10.3., 10.4., 11.1., 12.2).

If we take the number of hypotheses as a measure of the importance of the respective subjects in Fayol's theory -- which is, of course, a very debatable measure, but nevertheless interesting --, we get the following impression (see figure 4.5.):

4.9. Conceptual analysis of Fayol's Management Principles

4.9.1. Main line of reasoning of Fayol The main line of Fayol's reasoning starts with personal qualities and organization structures such as the authority structure, the social order, the material order, and the remuneration rules. These qualities and structures are determining for the personal qualities such as the quality of a person's work, a person's productivity, a person's discipline, and a person's satisfaction. These personal qualities, in turn, determine organizational qualities through aggregation. The resulting organizational qualities,

Subject Number of hypotheses

psychological mechanisms 13

human resource management 10

leadership 9

information processing 9

other 4 Figure 4.5. Subjects discussed in Fayol's management principles

especially the ones defined in the last four management principles, can be seen as performance indicators. This is the static picture of Fayol's theory. The dynamic picture of Fayol's theory sees the personal qualities discussed above, and symbol structures such as authority relationships, assigned tasks, and so on, as determining for the actions that are taken. The organizational qualities are not directly aggregated from the personal qualities, but are instead aggregated from the actions taken during a certain time period. Only in this way, it is possible to depict certain action-dependent aspects of Fayol's theory, such as the quest for authority, the flow of commands and the execution of them (if the subordinate obeys), and the switching on and off of lateral communication paths. A general problem in the formalization is the way in which relationships between micro characteristics of people and the macro characteristics of an organization should be handled. An example of this problem area is within the concept of discipline. Discipline can be defined as the state of an organization in which all person behave according to the rules and obey their superiors. This means that discipline, a macro characteristic, is derived from the micro characteristics of people. On the other hand, one can state that people will behave disciplined when discipline is a characteristic of the organization. This means that micro characteristics of people are dependent on the macro characteristics of the organization they are member of. A possible solution to this problem is to distinguish discipline as a state of the organization from discipline as a culture characteristic of the organization. This solves the loop problem but creates another: how is the cultural characteristic of discipline created, from which phenomena is it dependent? A similar problem exists between structures or states and actions. On the one hand, actions create states and structures; on the other hand, specific states or structures are the preconditions for taking specific actions. Some of these problems will be solved or circumvented by the approach explained in the next paragraph.

4.9.2. Types of reasoning In his theory, Fayol uses several types of reasoning: comparative reasoning, calculatory reasoning, conditional reasoning, reasoning about the necessary presence of a quality in a population, reasoning about the probabilistic presence of a quality in a population, aggregation, network-based aggregation, reasoning about the composition and best way to accomplish tasks, opportunity-based reasoning, equilibrium-maintaining reasoning, and flow-based reasoning. Comparative reasoning employs a special type of fact, namely comparative facts. A comparative fact compares two states, which may be two states of the same

organization, or the states of two different organizations37. The comparative facts may concern real states or conceived states. An example of such a comparative fact is the statement that organization A has employees that are more specialized than the employees of organization B. Looking at Hypothesis 1.1., we see:

The more developed the 'corps social', the more specialized its members will be (Hypothesis 1.1.)" (This thesis, Paragraph 4.8.3.)

Based on the comparative fact mentioned above, and Hypothesis 1.1., we will be able to derive that organization A is more developed than organization B. If we would have only facts about the present state of organization A, Hypothesis 1.1. would not be able to derive anything. The system of hypotheses that use comparative facts is worked out by Fayol in a way that we are able to decide which of the two states which are compared is favorable. This enables managers to decide about their actions when performing one of the activities of the management process. The problem with rules using comparative facts is that they may guide decisions, but are unable to predict states of an organization. Take, for instance, the conclusion derived above that organization A is more developed than organization B. This conclusion does not enable us to say how developed organization A is, and we are not able to infer a similar conclusion for organization B either. This does not mean that Hypothesis 1.1. is not testable. We can test Hypothesis 1.1. by gathering facts about the measure of specialization and the measure of development of organizations, and decide based on these facts whether Hypothesis 1.1. has an absolute validity (no falsifications were found), or only a statistical validity (some falsifications were found, but the hypothesis is sufficiently supported by the empirical material according to social science standards), or no validity. The calculatory reasoning we encounter in Fayol's theory is a kind of calculation using proportions and rates, for instance the rate of change of work contents and the rate of turnover of personnel. An example is the calculation of the proportion of time that an employee does worthwhile work (TWW): TWW = (TW – (TL/S)) / TW

37Statements using comparative facts, which concern two states of possibly the same

organization, or two organizations, are to be distinguished from statements using

statistical facts. Statements using statistical facts do not say something about one or

two organizations, but about a large population of organizations or possible states.

From a statement using a statistical fact, the chance of the truth of a comparative fact

can often be estimated. Our strategy will be to consider the hypotheses of Fayol as

being about comparative facts, and not about statistical facts, until incompatibilities

arise. In that case, we will be forced to assume that Fayol speaks about statistical

facts.

In this formula, TW is the total employment period of a person in a certain unchanged function, TL is the learning time per task unit, and S is the specialization of the function occupied. Conditional reasoning follows the reasoning pattern saying that the presence of a quality determines whether another quality can be present. For instance, unity of command can only be present if unity of direction is present. Conditional reasoning can be subdivided in deriving person qualities from person qualities, deriving organization qualities from organization qualities, and deriving person qualities from organization qualities. If one wants to model conditional reasoning, the following types of statements have to be asserted if A is a condition for B: <<A> is a condition for <B>> ::= {notPossible(<B>) if not(<A>). possible(<B>) if <A>. }. Reasoning about the necessary presence of a quality in a population claims that a quality is (necessarily) always present in a collection or class of objects. An example is Fayol's thesis that centralization is always present in organizations. Reasoning about the probabilistic presence of a quality in a population is a type of reasoning that states that a majority or other part of the objects belonging to a class or collection of those objects, do or do not have a certain quality. An example is Fayol's statement that the majority of organizations use lateral communication. This type of reasoning takes statistical facts into consideration. Therefore, reasoning using probabilities that are based on (large) populations should be subsumed under this type of reasoning. Task analysis states that to perform a task, one has to perform certain subtasks, or that a task should be done in a particular way. For instance, the establishment of social order presupposes the following subtasks according to Fayol: (1) continuous observation of the human resources of the organization, and continuous estimation of the human requirements of the organization, (2) deciding about the necessary positions, and (3) selecting personnel for these positions. We can distinguish two types of reasoning that derive qualities of the whole from qualities of the parts: simple aggregation and network-based aggregation. Simple aggregation determines a quality of the whole by a simple sum, average, or product of the underlying properties of the parts. An example is the determination of organizational productivity. Network-based aggregation is based on the determination of topological properties of the agent network. Deduction of network properties is, for instance, used in the principles of unity of command and centralization: each person has to have one and only one superior, and there is only one topmost superior or directive part. Opportunity-based reasoning uses tendencies or attitudes to describe what people would do when a certain situation would arise. For instance, if people get the chance to gain authority, they will do that, but they will try to get rid of responsibility:

". . .authority is sought after, while responsibility is feared (Hypothesis 2.4.)" (This thesis, Paragraph 4.8.4.)

The approach to solve the problem of formalizing this kind of reasoning is to look for chains of actions. The actions that create the situation with an opportunity are identified, as well as the actions that tend to be done in that situation. Equilibrium-based reasoning uses the picture of an equilibrium that must be maintained by management while people tend to take actions that disturb this equilibrium. This is, for instance, the case in the principle of subordination of

individual interest to general interest, and the maintenance of social order. In both cases, selfish interests or impulses such as ambition, ignorance or simply human passions lead to actions that disturb the equilibrium; management has to prevent and counteract these disturbing actions. This type of reasoning can be modeled using the following management actions: defining equilibrium, preventing disturbing actions, reacting on disturbing actions by counteractions. Opportunity-based acting of persons can be seen as a special case of taking disturbing actions. Flow-based reasoning uses flows to describe action patterns. Flows are used to describe the actions of persons that are dependent on each other by passing information or objects. For instance, he distinguishes a command flow from the top of the organization to the bottom, and an information flow from the bottom to the top. This picture is refined further by distinguishing lateral flows of communication. Reasoning using flows can be formalized using parallel and sequential processes; these processes are the steady sate flows that form the basis of our second part of the formalization. If we look at the hypotheses that are identified in the explanation of Fayol's theory, we can distinguish the following types of reasoning:

Reasoning about qualities 1. comparative reasoning: use of comparative facts (Hypothesis 1.1., 1.2., 1.3.,

1.4., 1.5.); 2. calculatory reasoning: use of calculations based on rates or proportions

(Hypothesis 1.3., 1.4., 1.5.,12.1.); 3. conditional reasoning at the level of persons: a person quality is present, if some

other person quality is present (Hypothesis 2.1., 3.2., 6.3., 10.1., 11.1., 13.1.); 4. conditional reasoning at the level of the organization: (Hypothesis 3.1., 4.2.,

4.3., 5.2., 6.1., 7.1., 8.2., 8.3., 10.2., 12.2., 13.1., 14.1.); 5. conditional reasoning where an organizational quality is determining whether a

quality at the person level is present: (Hypothesis 3.3., 4.1., 5.1., 6.3., 7.3., 8.4., 11.1.);

6. reasoning about the necessary presence of a quality in a population (Hypothesis 8.1.);

7. reasoning about the probabilistic presence of a quality in a population (Hypothesis 9.5.);

Reasoning about collections and networks 8. aggregation: derive properties of the whole as simple sums of properties of the

parts (Hypothesis 3.1., 6.1., 7.1., 7.2., 10.1., 10.2., 12.2., 13.1., 14.1.); 9. network-based reasoning: derive properties of the whole based on (topological)

properties of the underlying network of parts (Hypothesis 4.1., 5.1., 5.2., 8.1., 9.1., 14.1.);

Reasoning about actions 10. task analysis: a task consists of smaller tasks, how should a task be done

(Hypothesis 10.3., 10.4., 14.1., 14.2., 14.3.); 11. opportunity-based reasoning: use of tendencies to describe what people would

do when an opportunity arises (Hypothesis 1.6.; 2.4., 2.5., 4.2., 4.3., 6.2., 7.2., 8.4., 10.5.);

12. equilibrium-maintaining reasoning: use of coordinative actions to restore equilibrium after a disturbing action (Hypothesis 2.2., 2.3., 3.3., 6.1., 6.3., 7.1.; 10.4.);

13. flow-based reasoning: use of flows to describe actions (Hypothesis 9.2., 9.3., 9.4., 9.5.).

4.9.3. Approach of the formalization Where should formalization be targeted? Some possibilities are: 1. the specification of the structure of the theory in rules in a way that enables the

investigation of the consistency of the theory, and to specify a framework for observation and hypothesis testing (note that this option does not require a dynamic version of the theory);

2. the specification of a special category of rules, namely design rules that help in designing an optimal organization; this will lead to a kind of diagnostic and advisory expert system (this option does not require a dynamic version of the theory either);

3. the specification of a dynamic simulation model of the theory (this seems to have sense only if the theory explicitly describes dynamic mechanisms, and dynamics can be generated based on probability distributions or the draw of events from an event database, or something like that);

4. the specification of a model of an organization that cannot generate events (perhaps except those resulting from steady state processes), but can react to events that are generated by the user of the model in some way; this would allow for the testing of interventions in the organization, or of external events;

5. the specification of knowledge of an intelligent agent (e.g. an agent using action logic) that enables him / her to decide about what to do next in an organization (this approach is perhaps only successful if the organization knowledge is complemented by task domain knowledge).

It appears that each type of formalization poses its own requirements. This means that we have to choose the purpose or task our formalization will serve. We will try to develop a model of type 4. This is a combination of a model in which (parallel) processes are running (the "steady state processes"), and logical rules are present that formulate the hypotheses of Fayol's theory in a logical language. The problem, of course, is how these two components are related to each other. The relationship between actions and the qualities or structures that are changed by these actions will be solved in a very simple manner, namely by allowing for assignment and annihilation (in addition to the creation of new facts and structures, which was already allowed in First Order Logic). Assignment retracts all previous bindings of a variable in a predicate and binds it to one new value; annihilation retracts all facts of a certain kind. The logic implementation of the formalization developed will have to decide how these proposed assignments and annihilations are handled in a proper way; for instance by a special kind of modal logic. The steps to be taken in the formalization of Fayol's theory will be to (1) to analyze the conceptual frame of each of the principles, (2) to integrate these conceptual frames, (3) to formulate rules based on the hypotheses stated in terms of the developed conceptual frame, (4) to specify a basic (steady state) process based on the basic functions, the management process activities, and the information processing image of Fayol, and (5) to reformulate the basic process based on details stemming from the hypotheses; including the identification of event types and their effects.

4.9.4. Key concepts In order to appeal to the reader of this thesis, the listings of key concepts, design parameters, design goals, contingency factors, and key performance indicators of Fayol's Management Principles are documented in Appendix F.

4.10. Interpretation frame specification of Fayol's Management Principles

4.10.1. Organization level The interpretation frame specification follows the basic organization model by specifying the entities at the organization level, at the person level, in the realm of symbol structures, and in the sphere of actions,. Furthermore, there are concepts that are relationships between these basic four spheres: person-task relations (which are person-symbol structure relations), and manager-worker relations. Finally, an entity-relationship model and an analysis based on the basic organization model are provided.. <Fayol's organization> ::= {<corps social>, <material organism>, <contingency factor>+,

<symbol structure>+, <person&task relation>+, <person&action relation>+, <management process>+}.

<corps social> ::= {<person>+, <person&person quality>+, <corps social quality>+,

<corps social network quality>+}. <corps social quality> ::= {balanceBetweenHumanRequirementsAndHumanResources(<the corps

social>, <value>)| centralization2(<the corps social>, <value>) "= the measure to which

decisions are taken by the directive part"| commitmentToCommonGoals(<the corps social>, <value>)| condition(<the corps social>, <value>)| controlOfResources(<the corps social>, <value>)| discipline(<the corps social>, <value>)| divisionOfWork(<the corps social>, <value>)| equalityOfTreatment(<the corps social>, <value>)| equilibriumOfAuthorityAndResponsibility(<the corps social>, <value>)| equilibriumOfGeneralInterestAndIndividualInterest(<the corps social>,

<value>)| equity(<the corps social>, <value>)| health(<the corps social>, <value>)| humanRequirements(<the corps social>, <employee class>, <value>)| humanResources(<the corps social>, <employee class>, <value>)| initiative(<the corps social>, <value>)| minimalTimeLosses(<the corps social>, <value>)| optimalUseOfHumanResourceTime(<the corps social>, <value>)| optimalUseOfHumanResourceQualities(<the corps social>, <value>)| performance(<the corps social>, <value>)| personnel turnover(<the corps social>, <value>)| productivity(<the corps social>, <value>)| qualityOfWork(<the corps social>, <value>)| remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<the corps social>, <value>)| rewardAndPenaltySystemQuality(<the corps social>, <value>)| socialOrder(<the corps social>, <value>)| speedOfActionAndReaction(<the corps social>, <value>)| stabilityOfPersonnel(<the corps social>, <value>)|

survival(<the corps social>)}. <corps social network quality> ::= {centralization1(<the corps social>)" = the existence of only one directive

part"| hierarchy1(<the corps social>) "= a quality of a formal authority

structure"| harmoniousWorkingRelationships(<the corps social>)| unityOfCommand(<the corps social>, <value>)| unityOfDirection(<the corps social>, <value>)| unityOfPersonnel(<the corps social>, <value>)} <material organism> ::= {materialOrder(<the material organism>, <value>)| minimalMaterialLosses(<the material organism>, <value>)| actualPlace(<a material>, <a place>) assignedPlace(<a material>, <a place>)}. <contingency factor> ::= {complexityOfProductionProcess(<the organization>)| development(<the corps social>, <value>)| frequencyOfChangeOfWork(<a task>, <frequency>)| size(<the corps social>)| changeOfTechnology(<the organization>, <frequency>)}.

4.10.2. Person level <person> ::= {<person quality>+}. <person quality> ::= { abilityToLead(<a person>, <value>)| ambition(<a person>, <value>)| commitmentToCommonGoals(<a person>, <value>)| devotion(<a person>, <value>)| energy(<a person>, <value>)| equilibriumOfAuthorityAndResponsibility(<a person>)| experience(<a person>, <value>)| fear(<a person>, <value>)| generalInterestPerception(<a corps social>, 'felt by' <a person>,

<strength>)| humanPassions(<a person>, <value>)| ignorance(<a person>, <value>)| individualInterest('felt by' <a person>, <strength>)| intelligence(<a person>, <value>)| moralQuality(<a person>, <value>) " = personal integrity(<a person>)"| nepotism(<a person>, <value>)| performance(<a person>, <value>)| persistence(<a person>, <value>)| personalAuthority(<a person>, <value>)| personalDiscipline(<a person>, <value>)| productivity(<a person>, <value>)| qualityOfWork(<a person>, <value>)| reliability(<a person>, <value>)| satisfaction(<a person>, <value>)| selfishness(<a person>, <value>)| specialization(<a person>, <value>)| strength of will(<a person>, <value>)|

talent(<a person>, <value>)| technical knowledge(<a person>, <a field>, <value>)| uneasyness(<a person>, <value>)| usefulActionsEncouraged(<a person>)| weakness(<a person>, <value>)| zeal(<a person>, <value>)}. <person&person quality> ::= {exercisableAuthority(<'boss' person A>, <'subordinate' person B>)| goodExample(<'given by' person A>, <'to' person B>)| harmoniousWorkingRelationship(<person A>, <person B>)| workingRelationship(<person A>, <person B>)| hierarchicalPath(<'boss' person A>, <'subordinate' person B>)| lateral path(<person A>, <person B>)| loyalty(<'boss' person A>, <'subordinate' person B>, <strength>)}.

4.10.3. Symbol structures <symbol structure> ::= {[<symbol structure id>], [<symbol structure quality>], (<authority&responsibility structure>| <rule>| <message>| <task description>| <membership structure>)}. <authority&responsibility structure> ::= {assignedPosition(<a person>, <a position>)| assignedTask(<a person>, <a task>)| authorityDomain(<a person>, <a task>)| formalAuthority(<'boss' person A>, <'subordinate' person B>)| hierarchicalPosition(<a position> ,<level of hierarchy>)| responsibility(<a person>, <a task>)}. <rule> ::= {hierarchy2(<the corps social>, <rule content>) "= rule for deciding

about lateral paths"| remunerationRule(<a person>, <the corps social>, <rule content>)| ruleForAddingExtraInformation(<the corps social>, <rule content>)| ruleForAdmittingInitiative(<the corps social>, <rule content>)}. <message> ::= {command(<'source' person>, <'addressee' person>, <content>)| evaluation(<'source' person>, <'addressee' person>, <'subject'

activity>, <content>)| note(<'source' person>, <'addressee' person>, <content>)| plan(<'source' person>, <'addressee' person>, <objective content>,

<activity content>)| sensation(<'source' person>, <'addressee' person>, <content>)}. <task description> ::= {numberOfItemsToConsiderPerTaskUnit(<a task>, <number>)| numberOfTaskCyclesToBeProcessedPerTimeUnit(<a task>, <number>)| learningTimePerTaskUnit(<a task>, <time period>)| objective(<a task>, <objective>)| taskDomainWidth(<a task>, <number of task units>)| taskField(<a task>, <a field>)| taskStructure(<task>, <subtask>+)|

actionProgram(<a task>, <a plan>)| neededPosition(<a position>)| positionAndTask(<a position>, <a task>)| resourceAndTask(<a resource>, <a task>)}. <membership structure> ::= {organizationOrganism(<the corps social> | <the material organism>,

<the organization>)| coupledOrganism(<the corps social>, <the material organism>)| organizationMember(<a person>, <the corps social>)| organizationRule(<a rule>, <the corps social>)| organizationPosition(<a position>, <the corps social>)| organizationTask(<a task>, <the corps social>)| organizationMaterial(<a material>, <the material organism>)}. <symbol structure quality> ::= {remunerationRuleQuality(<a rule>, <value>)| remunerationRuleEquity(<a rule>, <value>)| ruleApplicability(<a rule>, <value>)| ruleClearness(<a rule>, <value>)}.

4.10.4. Person-task relations <person&task relation> ::= {ability(<a person>, <a task>, <value>)| actualPosition(<a person>, <a position>)| attentionPaidToTaskItems(<a person>, <a task>, <value>)| capability(<a person>, <a task>, <value>)| competence(<a person>, <a position>, <value>)| durationOfService(<a person>, <a task>, <time period>)| effort(<a person>, <a task>, <energy spent>)| learningTime(<a person>, <a task>, <time period>)| materialLosses(<a person>, <a task>, <a material>, <quantity lost>)| power(<a person>, <a resource>, <a task>)| productivity(<a person>, <a task>, <value>)| qualityOfWork(<a person>, <a task>, <value>)| specialization(<a person>, <value>)| timeLosses(<a person>, <a task>, <time period>)| totalPowerOverResource(<a person>, <a resource>)| worthwhileService(<a person>, <a task>, <time period>)}.

4.10.5. Actions <management process> ::= {<plans>+; <organizes>+; (<commands>+, <performs>+,

<disturbs>+, <controls>+)+; <coordinates>+}. <plans> ::= {<thinks out a plan>| <designs task structure>| <estimates human requirements>}. <organizes> ::= {<organizes material organism>| <organizes corps social>}. <organizes corps social> ::= {<creates rule> | ([<applies for authority>], [<applies for responsibility>]; <assigns formal authority to person>; <assigns authority domain to person>;

<assigns responsibility to person>)| <creates position>| (<selects person>; <hires person> ; <assigns position, boss, and task to person>)| (<proposes lateral communication>; <approves of lateral communication>; <disapproves of lateral communication>)| (<annihilates position>; <lays off superfluous personnel>)}. <commands> ::= {([<receives command>]; [<takes plan or command to implement>; <puts extra information in command>; <gives command>])| <encourages useful actions>| <rewards useful actions>| <puts penalty on non-useful actions>| <lays off incompetent personnel>}. <performs> ::= {<receives command>; <obeys command>; (<performs task>; (<pays attention>; <learns>)+)+}. <disturbs> ::= {<abuses formal authority>| <favors individual interests>| <seeks after authority>| <shuns responsibility>| <gets rid of responsibility>}. <controls> ::= {<inspects personnel>| (<receives information>; <evaluates information>; <puts in extra information in message>; <sends information>)}. <coordinates> ::= {<maintains balance of general interest and individual interest>| <maintains balance of social order>}. <action> ::= {<action id>, [<time>], [<action quality>]}. <action> ::= {<plans>| <organizes>| <commands>| <performs>| <disturbs>|

<controls>| <coordinates>}. <action quality> ::= {applicationOfEquity(<an action>, <value>)| conflicting(<an action>, <value>)| oralCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)| splittedUpPersonnel(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)| teamwork(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)| transmissionSpeed(<an action>, <value>)| usefulness(<an action>, <value>)| writtenCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)}. In order to be able to specify which action types can be performed in a situation by a person, which actions are current, and which actions have been performed by a person, we add an actionPerformable, a currentAction and an actionPerformed

predicate. Note that with respect to performable actions, we reason about action types, although we are able to specify this action types by adding information about roles played by persons, input, output, work method, situation, and time. In the reasoning about performable actions, the preference plays an important role. The placement (and removal) of action types on the list of performable actions, and influencing their preference, is a mechanism that can be used to depict some of the reasoning of Fayol concerning tendencies of people to do things, proportions of preferences, and so on. It can be seen as the agenda-setting process. In order to be able to reason about preferences for actions, we add a preference value ranging from 1 (high preference) via 0 (no special preference or avoidance) to -1 (high avoidance). As soon as actions are chosen and become current, that is, carried out, we no longer speak of action types, but of action instantiations (which, of course, can belong to an action type). After the action (or better: the action instance) has been carried out, it is remembered as a performed action. The resulting basic process for an action is, therefore, the following one: <basic action process> ::= {(true) while true: (<make an action performable> | <retract an action as performable>; <influence an action's preference>; <choose the next action and perform it>, <remember the action>)}. <person&action relation> ::= {actionPerformable(<a person>, <an action>, [preference: <preference>], {<role>:

<a person>}*, [input: <input object>], [output: <output object>], [method: <work method>], [situation: <a situation>], [time: <time point>])|

currentAction([id: <action instantiation id>], <a person>, <an action>, {<role>: <a person>}*, [input: <input object>], [output: <output object>], [method: <work method>], [situation: <a situation>], [time: <time point>])|

actionPerformed([id: <action instantiation id>], <a person>, <an action>, {<role>: <a person>}*, [input: <input object>], [output: <output object>], [method: <work method>], [situation: <a situation>], [time: <time point>])}.

}. Furthermore, we want to know to which task an action belongs. <task&action relation> ::= {taskAndAction(<a task>, <an action>, [< an action instantiation id>])}. The actions that are performable in a situation form, together with a representation of the task environment of a person in that situation, the problem space that a person uses to reason about what is to be done next. This reasoning, however, is no explicit subject of Fayol's theory. Implicitly, this type of reasoning is assumed when Fayol speaks about certain actions as being useful and others as not being useful. The useful actions can be seen as belonging to a path through the problem space that is evaluated as being satisficing.

4.10.6. Manager and worker actions Manager and worker can be distinguished as person subtypes. We investigate the relationship between manager and worker. Manager actions are easy to define. In order to define worker actions, the actions in which managers and workers cooperate have to be identified. In order to do this, actions are classified as cooperative with

manager initiative, cooperative with worker initiative, cooperative parallel with manager responsibility, cooperative parallel with worker responsibility, disturbing by manager, disturbing by worker, and noncooperative with manager responsibility. <person> ::= {<manager>| <worker>}. <management action> ::= {<plans>| <organizes>| <commands>| <disturbs>| <controls>| <coordinates>}. <worker action> ::= {<cooperative action with manager initiative>| <cooperative action with worker initiative>| <cooperative parallel action with worker responsibility>| <disturbing action by worker>}. <action> ::= {<cooperative action with manager initiative>| <cooperative action with worker initiative>| <cooperative action between managers>| <cooperative parallel action with manager responsibility>| <cooperative parallel action with worker responsibility>| <disturbing action by manager>| <disturbing action by worker>| <noncooperative action with manager responsibility>| <noncooperative action with worker responsibility>}. <cooperative action with manager initiative> ::= {(<assigns formal authority to person>; <assigns authority domain to person>; <assigns responsibility to person>)| (<selects person>; <hires person> ; <assigns position, boss, and task to person>)| <disapproves of lateral communication>| <lays off superfluous personnel>}. <cooperative action with worker initiative> ::= {<applies for authority>, <applies for responsibility>; <proposes lateral communication>| <sends information>}. <cooperative action between managers> ::= {<plans>| <organizes>| <commands>| <controls>| <coordinates>}. <cooperative parallel action with manager responsibility> ::= {<commands>| <controls>}. <cooperative parallel action with worker responsibility> ::= {<performs>}. <disturbing action by manager> ::= {<disturbs>}. <disturbing action by worker> ::=

{<favors individual interests>| <seeks after authority>| <shuns responsibility>| <gets rid of responsibility>| <sends information>}. <noncooperative action with manager responsibility> ::= {<plans>| <creates rule>| <creates position>| <annihilates position>| <puts extra information in command>| <inspects personnel>| <evaluates information>| <puts in extra information in message>}.

4.10.7. Entity-Relationship model and basic organization model The interpretation frame can be described at a high level of abstraction by the following entity-relationship model (see Figure 4.6.). The entities and relationship entities are depicted by rectangles. For the relationship arcs between entities, the Coad and Yourdon notation is used.

organization

action

corps social

symbol structure

task

person

position

materialorganism

person&personrelationship

person&actionrelationship

person&taskrelationship

1

1 1

1

0m

1

2

m0

1m

1

0 m 0m

1

1

m1

1

0m

0 m

0 m

1

1

m0

action&symbolstructurerelationship

1

1

0

m

0m

Figure 4.6. Entity-relationship model of Fayol's theory

The part-whole relationship is depicted by a triangle; the type - subtype relationship by a half circle. At the point where the arc meets the entity rectangle, the minimum and maximum cardinality of the slot in the entity that contains the pointers to the related entity are provided in terms of 0, 1, 2, and m. The basic organization model for Fayol's Management Principles is as follows (Figure 4.7.). We see that Fayol's theory leads to a rather complete version of the basic organization model.

PersonQualities

Actions

SymbolStructureQualities

OrganizationQualities

Inferences in the theory Figure 4.7. The basic organization model for Fayol's Management Principles

4.11. Rule specification of Fayol's Management Principles

4.11.1. Division of work <Hypothesis 1.1.> ::= {moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>) if moreDeveloped(<corps social A>, <corps social B>) and organizationMember(<person A>, <corps social A>) and organizationMember(<person B>, <corps social B>). moreDeveloped(<corps social A>, <corps social B>) if development(<corps social A>, DA) and development(<corps social B>, DB) and DA > DB. moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>) if specialization(<person A>, SA) and specialization(<person B>, SB) and SA > SB.} <Hypothesis 1.2.> ::= {higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>,

<person B>).

betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>).

higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <personB>) if productivity(<person A>, <task TA>, PA) and productivity(<person B>, <task TB>, PB) and PA > PB. betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if qualityOfWork(<person A>, <task TA>, QA) and qualityOfWork(<person B>, <task TB>, QB) and QA > QB.} In the formalization of Hypothesis 1.2., we have taken the somewhat arbitrary decision that in the comparison of the productivity and quality of work of persons, their tasks do not have to be the same. <Hypothesis 1.3.> ::= {higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>,

<person B>). betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>,

<person B>).} because {higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if

moreAbilitiesAcquiredThroughPractice(<person A>, <person B>). betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if

moreAbilitiesAcquiredThroughPractice(<person A>, <person B>). moreAbilitiesAcquiredThroughPractice(<person A>, <person B>) if ability(<person A>, <task TA>, AA) and ability(<person B>, <task TB>, AB) and AA > AB. ability(<person A>, <task T>, AA) if durationOfService(<person A>, <task T>, TA) and specialization(<person A>, SA) and AA = TA * SA.}. Note how we have shifted from comparative reasoning to calculatory reasoning in the formalization of Hypothesis 1.3. For the calculations, we have to measure the specialization in some way. We do this by measuring the number of task units N the task of a person is composed of, and define the specialization of that person as the reciprocal of the number of task units, that is, (1 / N). <Hypothesis 1.4. (First attempt)> ::= {(higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person

A>, <person B>). betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>,

<person B>)).} because {(higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreWorthwhileService(<person A>, <person B>). betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreWorthwhileService(<person A>, <person B>). moreWorthwhileService(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>) and

equalChangeOfWorkRate(<person A>, <person B>).}. The latter part of the formalization is somewhat unsatisfactory because it is meant to express that the time that a person works in a fully skilled way (the worthwhile service) depends on (1) the learning time, which is negatively proportional to the specialization, and (2) the change rate of work, which is the number of times someone

has to learn new work per time unit. Furthermore, if the change rate of work in a certain job is zero, the employment duration of the employee on a job becomes determining for the worthwhile service, as is noticed in the stability of personnel principle. It seems that we have to switch here between comparative and calculatory reasoning. Therefore, we try again to formalize Hypothesis 1.4. <Hypothesis 1.4. (Second attempt)> ::= {higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>). betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>).} because {higherProductivityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreWorthwhileService(<person A>, <person B>). betterQualityOfWork if moreWorthwhileService(<person A>, <person B>). worthwhileService(<person A>, <task T>, TW) if specialization(<person A>, S) and learningTimePerTaskUnit(<task T>, TL) and frequencyOfChangeOfWork(<task T>, (1 / TC)) and durationOfService(<person A>, <task T>, TD) and min(TC, TD, TX) "TX is the minimum of TC and TD" and TW = TX – (TL / S). moreWorthwhileService(<person A>, <person B>) if worthwhileService(<person A>, <task TA>, TWA) and worthwhileService(<person B>, <task TB>, TWB) and TWA < TWB.}. The total learning time TTL that is necessary to learn a task is the learning time needed for learning one task unit TL multiplied by the number of task units the task contains, which is the inverse of the specialization S. TTL = TL / S Furthermore, we must determine the minimum of the time period between two changes of work. We also have to know the duration of service of a person that is specifically dedicated to a task in order to determine the total service time that has to be taken into account. The worthwhile service is simply the total service time minus the total learning time. One can see that in order to retain the same average learning time to work time ratio with a higher frequency of change of work, one has to enlarge the specialization of workers. The formalization of Hypothesis 1.5. follows roughly the same pattern as the formalization of Hypothesis 1.4. <Hypothesis 1.5.> ::= {betterQualityOfWork(<person A>, <person B>) if moreSpecialized(<person A>, <person B>).} because {betterQualityOfWork if moreAttentionToTaskItems(<person A>, <person B>). moreAttentionToTaskItems(<person A>, <person B>) if lessTaskItemsToConsider(<person A>, <person B>). taskItemsToConsider(<person A>, <task T>, TI) if specialization(<person A>, S) and numberOfItemsToConsiderPerTaskUnit(<task T>, UI) and TI = UI / S. lessTaskItemsToConsider(<person A>, <person B>) if

taskItemsToConsider(<person A>, <task TA>, AI) and taskItemsToConsider(<person B>, <task TB>, BI) and AI < BI.}.

4.11.2. Authority and responsibility <Hypothesis 2.1.> ::= {exercisableAuthority(<'boss' person A>, <'subordinate' person B>) if authority(<'boss' person A>, <'subordinate' person B>) and personalAuthority(<'boss' person A>).}. <Hypothesis 2.2.> ::= {usefulActionsEncouraged(<person A>) if equilibriumOfAuthorityAndResponsibility(<person A>). equilibriumOfAuthorityAndResponsibility(<person A>) if forall(<domain D>, authorityDomain(<person A>, <domain D>) and responsibility(<person A>, <domain D>)). equilibriumOfAuthorityAndResponsability(<corps social A>, E) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), PE, equilibriumOfAuthorityAndResponsibility(<person A>), E). }. It is interesting to note that Hypothesis 2.1. sees authority as a relational structure between people, while Hypothesis 2.2. concerns the domain of the authority. In Hypothesis 2.2., we have the difficulty that we have to express a tendency, namely the tendency that useful actions are encouraged. Unfortunately, we do not know which actions are useful; in this respect, Fayol's theory is not detailed enough. Furthermore, how would we express that these actions are encouraged? A solution would be to maintain a list of possible actions of a person, distinguish the useful from the not-useful (which may be situation-dependent and time-dependent distinction), and assign some extra probability to the choice of useful actions. This mechanism supposes that agents (modeled persons) choose before they act, and that this choice is determined by probabilities or similar mechanisms. Because a choice of the precise modeling of the preconditions of actions, including possible choice mechanisms, would be premature in this phase of our analysis, we will register the fact that the choice mechanism is modified by the predicate 'usefulActionsEncouraged' and leave the details of the modification of the choice process to the phase in which the dynamics of choice are specified in detail. Another detail could be added to the specification of Hypothesis 2.2. by describing the mechanisms why a person would be encouraged to do more useful actions. A person's authority gives him / her the right to give commands regarding an authority domain of tasks; a person's responsibility gives his / her superior the right to reward or punish the person with respect to the commanding activity performed in the responsibility domain of tasks. The hypothesis is that if a person expects to be rewarded or punished based on the responsibility for a task, this expectancy will lead to more attention in performing the task and a better resulting performance. It may also be so that the rewards and punishments lead to a kind of operant learning in which a person learns to do a task in the way the superior wants it. These mechanisms beyond 'usefulActionsEncouraged' may also be subject of further specification in the phase of specification of the details of the dynamics of the theory. Furthermore, we have used the forall(<object>, <predicate>) metapredicate stating that the <predicate> is true for all <object> present in the model. The specification of <object> has to include an identifier and a class to which the object belongs, and may include a set to which the object belongs, or a condition that has to be true for object. In the specification of <predicate>, the identifier of <object> must be used as a

variable that can be substituted by each of the objects that result from the <object> specification. The 'averageAggregate' predicate is explained below under Hypothesis 3.1. <Hypothesis 2.3.> ::= {usefulActionsEncouraged(<person A>) if rewardAndPenaltySystemQuality(<corps social C>, good) and organizationMember(<person A>, <corps social C>). rewardAndPenaltySystemQuality(<corps social C>, good) if forall(<manager M> memberOf: <corps social C>, findall(<action A>, actionsPerformed(<manager M>, <action A>),

<action collection AC>) and {<encourages useful actions>, <rewards useful actions>, <puts penalty on non-useful-actions>} ⊂ <action collection AC>). }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 2.3. we use some set-based reasoning to state that the reward and penalty system quality of an organization is good when all managers consider 'encourage useful actions', 'reward useful actions', and 'put penalty on non-useful actions' as action belonging to their action repertoire that has been put in practice. <Hypothesis 2.4.> ::= {"Firstly, the main hypothesis is explained." <disturbance D> ::= {<seeks after authority>| <shuns responsibility>| <gets rid of responsibility>}.} if: exists(<situation S>, actionPerformable(<person P>, <disturbance D>,

<preference A>, <situation S>)) then: <preference A> = 1. "Secondly, the actions or conditions leading to the opportunity in which the disturbances D are possible are specified." actionPerformable(<person P>, <seeks after authority>, <preference A>, <situation

S>) if designsTaskStructure(<person B>, <task T>) and notExists(<task T>, authorityDomain(<a person>, <task T>)). actionPerformable(<person P>, <shuns responsibility>, <preference A>, <situation

S>) if authorityDomain(<person P>, <task T>) and notExists(<task T>, responsibility(<a person>, <task T>)). actionPerformable(<person P>, <gets rid of responsibility>, <preference A>,

<situation S>) if authorityDomain(<person P>, <task T>) and responsibility(<person P>, <task T>) and actionAndTask(<action A>, <task T>) and usefulness(<action A>, U) and U < 0. "Thirdly, the disturbing actions a specifies a little further." <seeks after authority> ::= {appliesForAuthority(<person P>, <person P>, <task T>)}. <shuns responsibility> ::= {appliesForResponsibility(<person P>, <person A>, <task T>) and <person P> <> <person A>}. <gets rid of responsibility> ::= {appliesForResponsibility(<person P>, <person A>, <task T>) and

<person P> <> <person A>}. }. Hypothesis 2.4. is a difficult hypothesis to formalize because of its dynamic nature. It is an example of opportunity-based reasoning. If people have the opportunity to do so, they will acquire authority and get rid of responsibility, or not take responsibility. This is the way in which the main hypothesis is explained. It is done in terms of preferences that will be applied when the opportunity arises. A situation with opportunities is created through the actions of persons. Secondly, the conditions and actions leading to the opportunity situation are specified. The opportunity to seek authority is created when a task is planned, but no formal authority has been assigned yet. The opportunity to shun responsibility is when one has the authority, but not yet the responsibility. The opportunity to get rid of the responsibility is when one has authority and responsibility over a task domain, and an action has happened belonging to that task domain that is not useful. Thirdly, the disturbing actions have to be specified as actions that apply for specific authority or responsibility. <Hypothesis 2.5.> ::= {if: exists(<situation S>, actionPerformable(<person P>, <abuses formal authority>,

<preference A>, <situation S>)) and moralQuality(<person P>, good) then: <preference A> = -1.} Hypothesis 2.5. is formalized in a simple way stating that a person with good moral quality will avoid abuse of authority.

4.11.3. Discipline In Hypothesis 3.1., we encounter conditional reasoning. Let us first define two equivalent formulas for conditional reasoning. These formulas suppose a logical system that can handle the possibility formulas, for instance by maintaining lists of the instances with evidence of <B>, possible(<B>), and notPossible(<B>). Based on these lists, the system has to decide whether <B> can be considered to be true or not true. <<A> is a condition for <B>> ::= {notPossible(<B>) if not(<A>). possible(<B>) if <A>. }. <<B> on condition <A>> ::= {notPossible(<B>) if not(<A>). possible(<B>) if <A>. }. <Hypothesis 3.1.> ::= {performance(<corps social C>, good) on condition discipline(<corps social C>, good). discipline(<corps social C>, D) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), PD, personalDiscipline(<person P>, PD), D). averageAggregate(<object>, <membership predicate>(<object>, <collection of

objects>), <object attribute value>, <object attribute predicate>(<object>, <object attribute value>), <average>) if

findall(<object attribute value>, (<membership predicate>(<object>, <collection of objects>) and <object attribute predicate>(<object>, <object attribute value>)), <set of object attribute values>) and

sumOf(<set of object attribute values>, <sum>) and

cardinalityOf(<set of object attribute values>, <count>) and <average> = <sum> / <count>. averageAggregate(<object>, <membership predicate>(<object>, <collection of

objects>), <object>, <object attribute predicate>(<object>), <average>) if

findall(<object>, <membership predicate>(<object>, <collection of objects>) , <set of objects 1>) and

findall(<object>, (<membership predicate>(<object>, <collection of objects>) and <object attribute predicate>(<object>)), <set of objects 2>) and

cardinalityOf(<set of objects 1>, <count 1>) and cardinalityOf(<set of objects 2>, <count 2>) and <average> = <count 2> / <count 1>. }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 3.1, we see a simple aggregation by averaging. <Hypothesis 3.2.> ::= {discipline(<group G>, bad) if exists(<person P>, leader(<group G>, <person P>) and abilityToLead(<person P>, bad)). leader(<group G>, <person P>) if forall(<person A> where: organizationMember(<person A>, <group G>), hierarchicalSuperior(<person P>, <person A>)). hierarchicalSuperior(<person B>, <person S>) if formalAuthority(<person B>, <person C>) [and hierarchicalSuperior(<person C>, <person S>)]. discipline(<group G>, D) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <group

G>), PD, personalDiscipline(<person P>, PD), D). }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 3.2., we have assumed that if there exists at least one person that can be considered as a leader of group G, and who has poor leadership abilities, then the discipline of group G will be poor. The major part of the formalization consists of a recursive definition of leadership. A boss of a boss is also a boss. Like in Hypothesis 3.1., group discipline is obtained by simple average aggregation of personal discipline. <Hypothesis 3.3.> ::= {personalDiscipline(<person P>, good) if forall(<person B> where: leader(<person P>, <person B>), abilityTo Lead(<person B>, good)) and organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social C>) and remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, good) and rewardAndPenaltySystemQuality(<corps social C>, good). remunerationRuleQuality(<rule R>, Q) if remunerationRuleEquity(<rule R>, Q1) and ruleApplicability(<rule R>, Q2) and ruleClearness(<rule R>, Q3) and Q = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3) / 3. remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, QQ) if averageAggregate(<rule R>, organizationRule(<rule R>, <corps social

C>), Q, remunerationRuleQuality(<rule R>, Q), QQ). }. The remuneration rule system quality of the corps social can be obtained through a simple average aggregation of the average of equity, applicability, and clearness of each individual remuneration rule.

4.11.4. Unity of command <Hypothesis 4.1.> ::= {unityOfCommand(<corps social C>, good) if forall(<person P> where: organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social

C>), findall(<person B>, receivesCommand(<person P>, "from", <person B>,

<command X>), <person B collection>) and cardinalityOf(<person B collection>, 1)). performance(<corps social C>, good) on condition unityOfCommand(<corps social C>, good). {performance(<corps social C>, good) on condition unityOfCommand(<corps social C>, good).} because: {uneasyness(<person P>, strong) if: findall(<person B>, receivesCommand(<person P>, "from", <person B>,

<command X>), <person B collection>) and cardinalityOf(<person B collection>, BB) and BB > 1. performance(<person P>, below average) if uneasyness(<person P>, strong).}. }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 4.1., we see a simple network aggregation. For each member of the corps social, the command relationships are scanned based on the received commands. If the number of bosses giving those commands to a person is 1 for all members of the organization, there is unity of command. <Hypothesis 4.2.> ::= {conflicting(givesCommand(<person B1>, "to" <person A>, <command content

C1>), rather) if givesCommand(<person B2>, "to" <person A>, <command content

C2>) and incompatible(<command content C1>, <command content C2>) and <person B1> <> <person B2>. overruling(givesCommand(<person B1>, "to" <person A>, <command content C1>,

<time T1>), rather) if givesCommand(<person B1>, "to" <person A>, <command content

C2>, <time T2>) and incompatible(<command content C1>, <command content C2>) and <Time T1> > <time T2>. not(conflicting(<action A>, rather)) on condition unityOfCommand(<corps social C>, good) and organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social C>) and actionPerformed(<person P>, <action A>). }. In the formalization of Hypotheses 4.2., which states that lack of unity of command is a source of conflicts, we first distinguish conflicting commands from overruling commands. Conflicting commands are incompatible commands stemming from two different superiors. An overruling command is a command given by one and the same superior following an earlier command, which is retracted automatically. Because of these definitions and associated mechanisms, conflicting commands can occur if a person is commanded by two or more superiors. Conflicts cannot occur if there is unity of command. <Hypothesis 4.3.> ::=

{lessUnityOfCommand(<organization A>, <organization B>) if moreChangeOfTechnology(<organization A>, <organization B>).}. In the formalization of Hypothesis 4.3., the less. . . and more. . . predicates are defined in the usual way (see for instance the formalization of Hypothesis 1.1.). A more abstract formulation of the definition of this type of predicates is: less<predicate>(<object A>, <object B>) if <predicate>(<object A>, <value A>) and <predicate>(<object B>, <value B>) and <value A> < <value B>. more<predicate>(<object A>, <object B>) if <predicate>(<object A>, <value A>) and <predicate>(<object B>, <value B>) and <value A> > <value B>.

4.11.5. Unity of direction <Hypothesis 5.1.> ::= {unityOfDirection(<corps social C>, good) if forall(<objective O> where: organizationTask(<task T1>, <corps social

C>) and objective(<task T1>, <objective O>), findall(<task T2>, objective(<task T2>, <objective O>), <task collection

TT>) and findall(<person P>, (taskDomain(<person P>, <task T3>) and

member(<task T3>, <task collection TT>)), <person collection PP>) and findall(<program R>, (actionProgram(<task T3>, <program R>) and

member(<task T3>, <task collection TT>)), <program collection RR>) and cardinalityOf(<person collection PP>, 1) and cardinalityOf(<program collection RR>, 1)). health(<corps social C>, good) on condition unityOfDirection(<corps social C>, good). }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 5.1., we have to define unity of direction first. In order to do that, we determine the collection of objectives belonging to the organization first. For each objective, we determine the collection of tasks belonging to it. Each member of this collection of tasks must satisfy two conditions. Firstly, the cardinality of the collection of persons that have authority over the task must be 1; secondly, the cardinality of the collection of action programs for the task must be 1. After this definition, the hypothesis can be provided in a very simple manner. <Hypothesis 5.2.> ::= {unityOfCommand(<corps social C>, good) on condition unityOfDirection(<corps social C>, good). }. Hypothesis 5.2. can be formalized as a condition for existence.

4.11.6. Subordination of individual interest to general interest <Hypothesis 6.1.> ::= {health(<corps social C>, good) on condition equilibriumOfGeneralInterestAndIndividualInterest(<corps social C>, good). equilibriumOfGeneralInterestAndIndividualInterest(<corps social C>, E) if

forall(<person P> where: organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social C>), individualInterest('felt by' <person P>, S1) and

generalInterestPerception(<corps social C>, 'felt by' <person P>, S2) and S2 > S1). }. <Hypothesis 6.2.> ::= {<favors individual interest> ::= change: individualInterest('felt by' <person P>, S1) and: generalInterestPerception(<corps social C>, 'felt by' <person P>, S2) until: S1 > S2. actionPerformable(<person P>, <favors individual interest>, <preference N>) if (ignorance(<person P>, <preference N>) or selfishness(<person P>, <preference N>) or weakness(<person P>, <preference N>) or ambition(<person P>, <preference N>) or human passions(<person P>, <preference N>)) and formalAuthority('boss' <person B>, 'subordinate' <person P>) and not(good example('given by' <person B>, 'to' <person P>) and remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, good)). }. <Hypothesis 6.3.> ::= {<favors general interest> ::= change: individualInterest('felt by' <person P>, S1) and: generalInterestPerception(<corps social C>, 'felt by' <person P>, S2) until: S1 < S2. actionPerformable(<person P>, <favors general interest>, <preference N>) if good example('given by' <person B>, 'to' <person P>) and remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, <preference N>) and rewardAndPenaltySystemQuality(<corps social C>, <preference N>). }.

4.11.7. Remuneration of personnel <Hypothesis 7.1.> ::= {health(<corps social C>, good) on condition remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, good). remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, QQ) if averageAggregate(<rule R>, organizationRule(<rule R>, <corps social

C>), Q, remunerationRuleQuality(<rule R>, Q), QQ). }. <Hypothesis 7.2.> ::= {actionPerformable(<person P>, <performs>, <preference N>) if remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, <preference N>) and organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social C>). actionPerformable(<person P>, <disturbs>, negated(<preference N>)) if remunerationRuleSystemQuality(<corps social C>, <preference N>) and organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social C>). }. <Hypothesis 7.3.> ::= {remunerationRuleQuality(<rule R>, Q) if remunerationRuleEquity(<rule R>, Q1) and ruleApplicability(<rule R>, Q2) and ruleClearness(<rule R>, Q3) and

Q = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3) / 3. }.

4.11.8. Centralization <Hypothesis 8.1.> ::= {forall(<corps social C>, centralization1(<corps social C>)). "centralization1 = the existence of only one directive part" centralization1(<corps social C>) if forall(<person P> where: (organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social

C>) and not(formalAuthority(none, <person P>)), findall(<person B>, formalAuthority(<person B>, <person P>), <person set BB>) and

cardinalityOf(<person set BB>, 1)) and findall(<person T>, formalAuthority(none, <person T>), <person set

TT>) and cardinalityOf(<person set TT>, 1). }. Hypothesis 8.1. is an example of the reasoning type that states that all objects of a certain class necessarily have a certain quality. In this case, it is stated that all organizations are centralized. In the formalization of the concept of centralization1, we have defined centralization1 as the quality of the corps social that is present when each person has one boss at the most, and there is only one person that has no boss (which has to be the top manager). <Hypothesis 8.2.> ::= {health(<corps social C>, good) on condition centralization1(<corps social C>)}. <Hypothesis 8.3.> ::= {centralization2(<corps social C>, absolute) if size(<corps social C>, small). "centralization2 = the measure to which decisions are taken by the directive

part" }. <Hypothesis 8.4.> ::= {centralization2(<corps social C>, CC) if size(<corps social C>, not small) and averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), D, initiativeAndDiscretion(<person P>, D), CC). initiativeAndDiscretion(<person P>, <preference N>) if actionPerformable(<person P>, (<puts extra information in command> |

<puts extra information in message>, <preference N>). actionPerformable(<person P>, (<puts extra information in command> | <puts extra

information in message>, <preference N>) if quality(<person P>, Q1) and subordinateReliability(<person P>, Q2) and formalAuthority(<person B>, <person P>) and quality(<person B>, Q3) and condition(<corps social C>, Q4) and <preference N> = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4). subordinate(<person S>, <person P>) if formalAuthority(<person B>, <person S>). subordinateReliability(<person P>, RR) if averageAggregate(<person S>, formalAuthority(<person S>, <person

P>), R, reliability(<person S>, R), RR). optimalUseOfHumanResourceQualities(<corps social C>, good) on condition

{initiativeAndDiscretion(<person P>, Q) if quality(<person P>, Q1) and subordinateReliability(<person P>, Q2) and formalAuthority(<person B>, <person P>) and quality(<person B>, Q3) and condition(<corps social C>, Q4) and Q = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4).}. In the formalization of Hypothesis 8.4., we have assumed that the tendency of a person to put in information into the command stream downwards or the information stream upwards is a simple average of the four factors it depends on, namely his / her quality (whatever that may be), the average reliability of his / her subordinates, the quality of his / her boss, and the condition the business is in. All values are normalized on a scale ranging from -1 to +1. A more sophisticated formalization of this hypothesis will have to use weight factors, and will have to make up a hypothesis about which 'qualities' (Fayol is very vague about this) are considered relevant.

4.11.9. Hierarchy <Hypothesis 9.1.> ::= {hierarchy1(<person P>, <corps social C>, <hierarchy1 chain P>) if formalAuthority(<person B>, <person P>) and hierarchy1(<person B>, <corps social C>, <hierarchy1 chain B>) and append('head' <person P>, 'to tail' <hierarchy1 chain B>, 'giving'

<hierarchy1 chain P>). hierarchy1(<person P>, <corps social C>, <hierarchy1 chain P>) if formalAuthority(none, <person P> and append('head' <person P>, 'to tail' <empty chain>, 'giving' <hierarchy1

chain P>). hierarchicalSuperior(<person B>, <person S>) if formalAuthority(<person B>, <person C>) [and hierarchicalSuperior(<person C>, <person S>)]. }. The hierarchy1 concept is defined as the chain of superiors from the highest superior to the lowest rank. Therefore, it is a chain that depends on the lowest rank as well as the corps social; each lowest rank has its own hierarchy1. A related concept is the concept of a hierarchical superior; the members of the set of all hierarchical superiors is also the set of members of the hierarchy1 chain of a person. <Hypothesis 9.2.> ::= {findall(<hierarchy1 chain P>, hierarchy1(<person P>, <corps social C>,

<hierarchy1 chain P>), <hierarchy1 chain collection PP>) and cardinalityOf(<hierarchy1 chain collection PP>, 1) if centralization1(<corps social C>). "This is presented as a logical consequence by Fayol and should be

provable." hierarchicalPath('from' <person P>, 'to' <person B>) if hierarchy1(<person P>, <corps social C>, <hierarchy1 chain P>) and append('head' <person P>, 'to tail' <hierarchy1 chain B>, 'giving'

<hierarchy1 chain P>) and append('head' <person B>, 'to tail' <hierarchy1 chain B1>, 'giving'

<hierarchy1 chain B>). <hierarchical path communication> ::=

{ako: <process>, <person B(1)> <gives command>; {<person B <rank>> <receives command>; <puts extra information in command>; <gives command>;}* for <rank> = (2) to (n), <person B(n + 1)> <receives command>; <performs>, <disturbs>, <person B(n)> <perceives>, <disturbs>; <sends information>; {<person B <rank>> <receives information>; <puts extra information in message>; <sends information>;}* for <rank> = (n - 1) to (2); <person B(1)> <receives information>, <person B(1) evaluates information>} where:

hierarchicalPath('from' <person B(x + 1)>, 'to' <person B(x)>). }. If the principle of centralization is fulfilled in a corps social, a person can have only one solution for his / her hierarchy1 chain. The information processing path 'upwards' from a person is determined by his / her hierarchy1 chain; in this case only one path is possible, the hierarchical path. <Hypothesis 9.3.> ::= {actionPerformed(<person A>, <receives command>, input: <command M>, time:

T2) if actionPerformed(<person B>, <gives command>, output: <command

M>, time: T1) and T1 < T2 and hierarchicalSuperior(<person A>, <person B>) if organizationMember(<person A>, <corps social C>) and organizationMember(<person B>, <corps social C>) and actionPerformed(<corps social C>, <hierarchical path communication>,

time period: T1 to: T2). actionPerformed(<person B>, <receives information>, input: <sensation M>, time:

T2) if actionPerformed(<person A>, <sends information>, output: <sensation

M>, time: T1) and T1 < T2 and hierarchicalSuperior(<person A>, <person B>) if organizationMember(<person A>, <corps social C>) and organizationMember(<person B>, <corps social C>) and actionPerformed(<corps social C>, <hierarchical path communication>,

time period: T1 to: T2).}. }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 9.3., the transmission of information and commands as a result of the hierarchical path communication is formalized as follows. It is stated that, at some time T2 > T1, person A will receive a command given by person B at time T1, and this as a result of the fact that the corps social as a whole performed hierarchical path communication between T1 and T2. In a similar way, the transmission of sensations is handled. <Hypothesis 9.4.> ::= {speedOfTransmission(from: <person F>, to: <person P>, method: <hierarchical path

communication>, transmission time: T) if hierarchy1(<person F>, <corps social C>, <hierarchy1 chain F>) and hierarchy1(<person P>, <corps social C>, <hierarchy1 chain P>) and length(<hierarchy1 chain F>, LF) and length(<hierarchy1 chain P>, LP) and T = LF + LP + LP + LF. speedOfTransmission(from: <person F>, to: <person P>, method: <lateral path

communication>, transmission time: 2). }.

In the formalization of Hypothesis 9.4., the speed of transmission of one message between two persons is seen as equal to the number of transmission steps to be taken if an appropriate time unit is used. It is easily seen that the transmission time for lateral communication is always less than the transmission time in hierarchical communication. One could argue, however, that the establishment of a lateral communication path requires at least one hierarchical communication, in which case efficiency of lateral communication depends in the number of times N the lateral path is used after its establishment as well as the length of the hierarchical paths of the two communicating persons LF and LP. The average transmission time of hierarchical communication TH is: TH = 2 * (LF + LP) The average transmission time of lateral communication TL is: TL = (2 * (LF + LP) + 2 * N) / N <Hypothesis 9.5.> ::= {majorityUseOfLateralPathCommunication(<all organizations>). majorityUseOfLateralPathCommunication(<collection of organizations OO>) if cardinalityOf(<collection of organizations OO>, NO) and findall(<corps social C>, member(<corps social C>, <collection of

organizations OO>) and actionPerformed(<corps social C>, <lateral path communication>), <collection of organizations LL>) and

cardinalityOf(<collection of organizations LL>, NL) and NL > (NO / 2). approvedLateralCommunication(<person P>) if formalAuthority(<person B>, <person P>) and actionPerformed(<person B>, <approves of lateral communication>, time:

T1) and not(actionPerformed(<person B>, <disapproves of lateral

communication>, time: T2)) and T2 > T1. lateralPath(<person F>, <person P>) if approvedLateralCommunication(<person F>) and approvedLateralCommunication(<person P>). <lateral path communication> ::= {ako: <process>, <person B(1)> <gives command>; {<person B

<rank>> <receives command>; <puts extra information in command>; <gives command>;}* for <rank> = (2) to (n), <person B(n + 1)> <receives command>; <performs>, <disturbs>, <person B(n)> <perceives>, <disturbs>; <sends information>; {<person B <rank>> <receives information>; <puts extra information in message>; <sends information>;}* for <rank> = (n - 1) to (2); <person B(1)> <receives information>, <person B(1) evaluates information>} where:

lateralPath('from' <person B(x + 1)>, 'to' <person B(x)>). }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 9.5., we encounter a type of reasoning that refers to the probabilistic presence of a quality in a population of organizations. It is stated that the majority of organizations use lateral communication.

4.11.10. Order <Hypothesis 10.1.> ::= {coupledOrganism(<corps social C>, <material organism M>) if organizationOrganism(<corps social C>, <organization O>) and

organizationOrganism(<material organism M>, <organization O>). health(<corps social C>, good) on condition coupledOrganism(<corps social C>, <material organism M>) and optimalUseOfHumanResourceTime(<corps social C>, good) and minimalMaterialLosses(<material organism M>, good). optimalUseOfHumanResourceTime(<corps social C>, good) if minimalTimeLosses(<corps social C>, good). minimalTimeLosses(<corps social C>, good) if coupledOrganism(<corps social C>, <material organism M>) and materialOrder(<material organism M>, good). minimalMaterialLosses(<material organism M>, good) if materialOrder(<material organism M>, good). materialOrder(<material organism M>, MO>) if averageAggregate(<material A>, organizationMaterial(<material A>,

<material organism M>), <material A>, inItsPlace(<material A>), MO). inItsPlace(<material A>) if actualPlace(<material A>, <place S>) and assignedPlace(<material A>, <place S>). }. <Hypothesis 10.2.> ::= {optimalUtilizationOfHumanResourceQualities(<corps social C>, good) on condition socialOrder(<corps social C>, good). socialOrder(<corps social C>, good) if balanceBetweenHumanRequirementsAndHumanResources(<corps social

C>, good. balanceBetweenHumanRequirementsAndHumanResources(<corps social C>, SO)) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), <person P>, inHisPlace(<person P>), PO) and averageAggregate(<position T>, organizationPosition(<position T>,

<corps social C>), <position T>, necessaryAndFulfilled(<position T>), TO) and

SO = (PO + TO) / 2. inHisPlace(<person P> if assignedPosition(<person P>, <position T>) and actualPosition(<person P>, <position T>) and competence(<person P>, <position T>, C) and C > 0 and C < 0.5. necessaryAndFulfilled(<position T>) if neededPosition(<position T>) and assignedPosition(<person P>, <position T>) and actualPosition(<person P>, <position T>) and competence(<person P>, <position T>, C) and C > 0. }. In the formalization of Hypothesis 10. 2. above, social order is formalized along the path indicated by Fayol, namely through the use of two conditions. The first condition is that every person should be in a position that is assigned to him / her, and that he / she should be competent (but not overcompetent) for that position. The second condition is that every position in the organization should be a necessary position, and that these necessary positions should be fulfilled by competent people. We assume that competence is measured on a scale from -1 (very incompetent) to +1 (very overcompetent), with the value 0 as being simply competent. If a person has a competence of over 0.5, his / her competence exceeds the needs of the position, and a promotion should be considered. (Of course, this scale is somewhat arbitrary, but we

need some scale to express Fayol's reasoning about people being incompetent, competent or overcompetent.) <Hypothesis 10.3.> ::= {balanceBetweenHumanRequirementsAndHumanResources(<corps social C>, good,

time period: TP) if actionPerformed(<corps social C>, <human resource management>, time

period: TP). <human resource management> ::= {<estimates human requirements>, (<creates position>; <selects person>; <hires person>; <assigns position, boss, and task to person>)*, <inspects personnel>, (<annihilates position>; <lays off superfluous personnel>)*}. }. <Hypothesis 10.4> ::= {balanceBetweenHumanRequirementsAndHumanResources(<corps social C>, good,

time period: continuous) if actionPerformed(<corps social C>, <human resource management>, time

period: continuous) }. <Hypothesis 10.5.> ::= {{<person P> <favors individual interest> ::= actionPerformed(<person P>, (<creates position>; <selects person>),

output: assignedPosition(<person F>, <position T>)) where: ((competence(<person F>, <position T>, CF) and CF < 0) or not(neededPosition(<position T>))). actionPerformable(<person P>, <favors individual interest>, <preference N>) if (ignorance(<person P>, <preference N>) or nepotism(<person P>, <preference N>) or ambition(<person P>, <preference N>)) and formalAuthority('boss' <person B>, 'subordinate' <person P>) and not( talent(<person B>, sufficient) and strengthOfWill(<person B>, sufficient) and persistence(<person B>, sufficient) ). }.

4.11.11. Equity <Hypothesis 11.1.> ::= {equity(<corps social C>, EE) if averageAggregate(<action A>, managementActionPerformed(<action

A>), E applicationOfEquity(<action A>, E), EE). managementActionPerformed(<action A>) if actionPerformed(<person B>, <action A>) and (<person B> ako: <manager>). devotion(<person P>, E) and loyalty(<person P>, E) if

organizationMember(<person P>, <corps social C>) and equity(<corps social C>, E). }.

4.11.12. Stability of personnel <Hypothesis 12.1.> ::= {stabilityOfPersonnel(<corps social C>, DD) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), D, durationOfService(<person P>, <task T>, D), DD). worthwhileService(<corps social C>, WW) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), W, worthwhileService(<person P>, <task T>, W), WW). worthwhileService(<corps social C>, WW) if stabilityOfPersonnel(<corps social C>, DD) and WW = <factor> * DD. worthwhileService(<person A>, <task T>, TW) if specialization(<person A>, S) and learningTimePerTaskUnit(<task T>, TL) and frequencyOfChangeOfWork(<task T>, (1 / TC)) and durationOfService(<person A>, <task T>, TD) and min(TC, TD, TX) "TX is the minimum of TC and TD" and TW = TX – (TL / S). }. For the determination of the worthwhile service of a person, we use the formula already used in the formalization of Hypothesis 1.4. <Hypothesis 12.2.> ::= {health(<corps social C>, good) on condition stabilityOfPersonnel(<corps social C>, DD) and maximized(DD, under condition: socialOrder(<corps social C>, good))}. An organization can have good health if the stability of personnel is maximized under the condition that social order, which is defined as the equilibrium of 'the right man at the right place', is maintained.

4.11.13. Initiative <Hypothesis 13.1.> ::= {satisfaction(<person P>, much) and zeal(<person P>, much) and energy(<person

P>, much) if initiative(<person P>). initiative(<person P>) if actionPerformed(<person P>, (<thinking out a plan>; <takes plan or

command to implement>)). initiative(<corps social C>, II) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), <person P>, initiative(<person P>), II). health(<corps social C>, good) on condition initiative(<corps social C>, sufficient). }. In order to be able to use the rules of Hypothesis 13.1. fruitfully, we have to determine a level of initiative that is considered sufficient. This level may be situation-dependent.

4.11.14. Unity of personnel

<Hypothesis 14.1.> ::= {unityOfPersonnel(<corps social C>, UU) if unityOfCommand(<corps social C>, UC) and commitmentToCommonGoals(<corps social C>, GG) and harmoniousWorkingRelationships(<corps social C>, HH) and UU = (UC + GG + HH) / 3. commitmentToCommonGoals(<person P>, G) if individualInterest('felt by' <person P>, S1) and generalInterestPerception(<corps social C>, 'felt by' <person P>, S2) and G = S2 - S1. commitmentToCommonGoals(<corps social C>, GG) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), G, commitmentToCommonGoals(<person P>, G) , GG). harmoniousWorkingRelationships(<corps social C>, HH) if averageAggregate(<person P>, organizationMember(<person P>, <corps

social C>), <person P>, harmonious(<person P>) , HH). harmonious(<person P>) if forall(<person Q> where: workingRelationship(<person P>, <person Q>), harmoniousWorkingRelationship(<person P>, <person Q>)). health(<corps social C>, good) on condition unityOfPersonnel(<corps social C>, good). cooperation(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) if performableAction(<person P>, <action A>, time: T) and performableAction(<person Q>, <action B>, time: T) and taskStructure(<action C>, 'subtask' <action A>) and taskStructure(<action C>, 'subtask' <action B>). cooperation(<person P>, <person Q>', 'on' <action C>) if performedAction(<person P>, <action A>, time: T) and performedAction(<person Q>, <action B>, time: T) and taskStructure(<action C>, 'subtask' <action A>) and taskStructure(<action C>, 'subtask' <action B>). harmoniousWorkingRelationship(<person P>, <person Q>) if cooperation(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) and oralCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) and not(writtenCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>))

and teamwork(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) and not(splittedUpPersonnel(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)). }. <Hypothesis 14.2.> ::= {conflicting(<action C>, C2, time: T2) if conflicting(<action C>, C1, time: T1) and cooperation(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) and writtenCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) and T2 > T1 and C2 = C1 * <conflict multiplier>}. <Hypothesis 14.3.> ::= {(actionPerformable(<person P>, <action C>, preference: R1) where: writtenCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)) and (actionPerformable(<person P>, <action C>, preference: R2) where: writtenCommunication(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>)) and R1 > R2 if conflicting(<action C>, rather) and cooperation(<person P>, <person Q>, 'on' <action C>) and (fear(<person P>, some)).

}. In the formalization of Hypotheses 14.2. and 14.3. a vicious circle appears: written communication aggravates an existing conflict according to Hypothesis 14.2., while an existing conflict, combined with fear, tends to lead to written communication according to Hypothesis 14.3. In Hypothesis 14.3., the relative preferences of two modes of communication (oral or written) related to a performable action are derived from the qualities of the situation. This could be done in a more elegant way if the modes of communication are incorporated in the performable action predicates.

4.12. Dynamics specification of Fayol's Management Principles In the dynamics of Fayol's Management Principles, the following perspectives or types of description of what is happening in organizations can be distinguished: 1. the management process , explicitly described as such by Fayol; 2. the communication process, explicitly described by Fayol in his centralization

and hierarchy principles, 3. the dynamics of the corps social in terms of its collection of parts: persons,

relations between persons (e.g., formal authority), symbol structures (a.o. tasks and positions), relations between persons and tasks ; these dynamics are assumed by Fayol in for instance the order principle;

4. the dynamics of the individual decision process of agents as described in Paragraph 4.10.5. which we have used to formalize Fayol's reasoning concerning tendencies to do certain things and preferences;

5. the dynamics form the perspective of work process, which Fayol calls the technical function, as described by the tasks to perform and their decomposition into subtasks.

These types of dynamics relate to different perspectives, each having its own way of abstracting from what happens. Some dynamics seem to happen on a very detailed time scale, for instance the dynamics of the individual decision process, while other types of dynamics relate to more coarse periods that are selected according to a special interest or perspective. Therefore, we take the individual decision process as the basic process and examine how the other processes at a more coarse level of description relate to it. The individual decision process is a process taking place in a single agent. This means that a multitude of these processes is running in parallel in the corps social. The individual decision process consists of the following phases: a. putting possible actions into, and removing possible actions from the agenda

space; b. determining the preferences of these possible actions; c. choosing an action, and performing it; d. remembering the action as being performed. Possible actions can be specified in a way that input objects, output objects, the method of work, the other agents that cooperate are added to the possible action object structure. In this way, the agenda space resembles Newell and Simon's problem space. The way the individual decision process works can fruitfully be described following the impasse-recognition and subgoaling mechanism of the SOAR theory (Newell, 1990). Let us consider some possible impasses and the default actions that can be performed to resolve these impasses in order to be able to specify relationships between the basic individual decision process and the other processes we have distinguished. Some possible impasses are:

a. no actions are present in the agenda space; in this case, the next action of the management process (possibly the first action) is to be inserted into the agenda space;

b. the preference of an action in the agenda space is unknown; in this case, goals and preference-determining rules are searched that apply to the action, and applied; if this does not lead to success a random preference that is below the level of urgent actions is determined;

c. the action is not specified enough to be able to apply preference rules; in this case the action is specified using information from the current task description; the corresponding part of the task process is considered to be carried out as soon as the action is performed;

d. the choice cannot be made (a draw); in this case an action is chosen at random; e. the method to be used for the performance of the action is unknown; in this case

the action is specified using information from the current task description; the corresponding part of the task process is considered to be carried out as soon as the action is performed.

We see that the detailed process cycle of the individual decision process leads to the forwarding of the corresponding more coarse management process and work process. The management process, in turn, contains command actions and information processing actions that are part of the communication process, and in this way triggers the communication process mechanisms. The dynamics of the collections making up the corps social seems to be a dynamic resulting from the underlying decision processes, management processes, work processes, and communication processes.