Concepts, Crises and Campaigns

This article was downloaded by: [The University of British Columbia]On: 29 October 2014, At: 14:23Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Political MarketingPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wplm20

Concepts, Crises and CampaignsR. Sam Garrett aa American National Government , The Congressional ResearchServicePublished online: 22 Sep 2008.

To cite this article: R. Sam Garrett (2006) Concepts, Crises and Campaigns, Journal of PoliticalMarketing, 5:1-2, 127-148

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J199v05n01_07

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wplm20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J199v05n01_07

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Concepts, Crises and Campaigns:How Political Professionals

Define Electoral Crisis

R. Sam Garrett

SUMMARY. This article enhances understanding of congressionalcampaigns by exploring how political professionals define campaigncrises. Existing academic literature uses binary measures of candidatescandals as a proxy for campaign crises. However, in-depth interviewswith senior political consultants and other experienced campaignersdemonstrate that political professionals view crises as complex, interac-tive events. While scandals are one kind of campaign crisis, a variety ofother factors account for most crises. After categorizing the differentkinds of crises political professionals describe, a typology is developedto analyze the internal, external, expected and/or unexpected dimen-sions of campaign crises. This article focuses on crises in U.S. House

R. Sam Garrett serves as Analyst in American National Government at the Congres-sional Research Service. He received his PhD in political science from American Uni-versity’s School of Public Affairs in 2005. He completed this article while AssistantDirector for Research at the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, and In-structor in the Department of Government at American University, where he continuesto serve as a research fellow and Adjunct Professor. The views expressed in this articleare those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the CongressionalResearch Service or the Library of Congress.

Address correspondence to: R. Sam Garrett (E-mail: [email protected]).

[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Concepts, Crises and Campaigns: How Political Professionals De-fine Electoral Crisis.” Garrett, R. Sam. Co-published simultaneously in Journal of Political Marketing (TheHaworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 5, No. 1/2, 2006, pp. 127-148; and: Campaigns and Political Marketing (ed: WayneP. Steger, Sean Q Kelly, and J. Mark Wrighton) The Haworth Press, Inc., 2006, pp. 127-148. Single or multi-ple copies of this article are available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service[1-800-HAWORTH, 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST). E-mail address: [email protected]].

Available online at http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JPOLM© 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1300/J199v05n01_07 127

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

and Senate campaigns, although general lessons apply to campaigns atother levels. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Docu-ment Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <[email protected]> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by TheHaworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]

KEYWORDS. Crises, scandals, political consultants, campaign man-agement, congressional elections

Political campaign crises are as old as campaigns themselves. Politi-cal folklore is filled with stories of candidate gaffes, extramarital affairsand even candidate deaths.1 All these events, and others like them,shape modern political campaigns. On the surface, these “campaign cri-ses” are a disparate collection of political misfortunes. However, thepreceding view is incomplete. This article broadens the dialogue byasking how political professionals–political consultants, party officialsand campaign managers–define campaign crises. The article enhancesour understanding of congressional elections by uncovering a virtuallyuntouched area of campaign politics. Rather than treating campaign cri-ses as a dichotomous, independent variable (presence of crisis or not), Iallow political professionals who combat campaign crises to definewhat the term means in a practical sense, which sheds light on academicconstructs of campaign crises and related concepts.

Political professionals view campaign crises as complex, interactiveevents. Although popular and scholarly wisdom focus on campaignscandals as key variables in congressional elections, the data show thatpolitical professionals classify a range of behavior and events beyondscandals as campaign crises. While scandals are one kind of campaigncrisis, they are not necessarily those which concern political profession-als most. Although scandals are usually created by candidates, broadercampaign crises result from a variety of internal and external factors.After categorizing the different campaign crises political professionalsdescribe, I develop a typology of campaign crises, which provides ananalytical tool for considering crises as internal, external, expectedand/or unexpected events. Four brief examples from U.S. Senate racesillustrate the typology.

EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP AND THE FOCUS ON SCANDAL

Existing political science confines its analysis of campaign crises al-most exclusively to political scandals, which normally mean candi-

128 CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL MARKETING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

dates’ ethical transgressions. Most of this work focuses on U.S. Houseand Senate campaigns, as does this article. Although campaigns andelections scholarship might use the word “crisis” as a broad reference todamaging campaign events, exhaustive research reveals no work ad-dressing crises in a theoretical and systematic manner. For now, scandalmust serve as a theoretical starting point–albeit a narrow one–forexploring crises.

Contemporary analyses operationalize “scandal” via coded keywordsearches in national publications such as Congressional Quarterly, TheNew York Times and The Washington Post (Peters and Welch 1980;Roberds 1997; Lough 1998; Brown 2001). Political scientists disagreeabout what scandal means. Definitions vary widely when they are of-fered at all. For example, Roberds (1997, 86) defines political scandalas:

Any issue concerning the candidate that is raised by the mediaand/or opponent that questions the propriety, morality, or legalityof some behavior, action, personality trait, either present or past,and as such is known (or could reasonably be known) by voters inthe district and poses the risk of potential divisiveness, disapprovalor condemnation by sizeable numbers of the public.

As Miller and Medvic (2002) note, many scandal definitions include amoral element. Smith (2002) argues that scandals include interactionsbetween three key players: the media, political actors (such as candi-dates) and institutions (Congress, parties, etc.). Some authors focus on“official misconduct,” which necessarily restricts the discussion to in-cumbents (Whaley 2003; Roberds 1997). Examples include campaignfinance violations and abuse of official resources. Peters and Welch(1978) provide the classic statement on official corruption, and codevarious behaviors as “corrupt,” but do not differentiate between scandaland corruption. However, both “corruption” and “misconduct” imply atleast some form of illegality. But, as Roberds (1997, 87) notes, “not allscandals involve illegal behavior.”

Although political scientists cannot agree on what scandals are, theydo agree that scandals matter. Scandals of all kinds have a negative im-pact on electoral outcomes, either in vote share or retirement decisions(Peters and Welch 1980; Roberds 1997; Lough 1998; Jacobson andDimock 1994; Dimock and Jacobson 1995; Bridgmon 2002; McCurleyand Mondak 1995; Mondak 1995).2 Goidel and Gross (1994) find thatscandal has the most predictive power of any independent variable on

R. Sam Garrett 129

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

challenger quality, challenger and incumbent expenditures and incum-bent vote share. Overall, scandals cost House incumbents about 7 per-cent of total vote share and yield an additional $100,000 in challengerfundraising (Goidel and Gross 1994, 140-142). Scandal is so electorallyand professionally dangerous because blame is easily affixed to individ-uals. For example, even though the House bank scandal broke no laws,it “ended many more congressional careers than policy disasters such asthe savings-and-loan debacle, which left taxpayers holding the bag forhundreds of billions of dollars” (Jacobson 2001, 176-177). Despite thissolid overview of how scandals affect campaign outcomes, we know lit-tle about how broader campaign crises affect campaigns internally,including which events political professionals believe represent crises.

POLITICAL PROFESSIONALS AND CAMPAIGN CRISES

Although political professionals such as campaign managers (Rosen-bloom 1973; Goldenberg and Traugott 1984) and party officials(Kolodny 1998; Monroe 2001) play vital roles in congressional cam-paigns, political consultants are increasingly the major strategic deci-sion-makers in congressional campaigns (Dulio 2004; Garrett 2004;Thurber and Nelson 2000). Most studies of political consultants de-scribe who consultants are and what they do (Rosenbloom 1973; Sabato1981; Luntz 1988; Johnson 2000, 2001; Medvic 2000; Thurber andNelson 2000; Thurber, Nelson and Dulio 2000; Dulio 2004; Dulio andNelson 2005), focus on the impact political consultants have on elec-toral outcomes such as vote margin or fundraising (Dulio 2004;Herrnson 1992; Medvic and Lenart 1997; Medvic 2001) or provide an-ecdotal data about consultant activity through case studies (Loomis2001; Thurber 2001). Few works explore what consultants actuallythink, how their thinking influences campaign strategy or how they be-have in critical campaign situations.3 This article fills the knowledgegap. To gain a broader understanding of campaign crises, we must turnto the political professionals charged with diagnosing and managingthem–especially political consultants.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This article relies on grounded theory, which utilizes practitioner ex-pertise to illuminate theoretically important, but unexplored, phenom-


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

ena (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Rubin and Rubin 1995; King, Keohaneand Verba 1994). Because of the emphasis on unexplored territory andtheory-building, quantitative hypothesis testing is inappropriate (Glaserand Straus 1967; Yin 1994). I allow political professionals to bridge thegap between theory and practice in their own terms. The complexitywith which political professionals view campaign crises, and that theyactively distinguish between crises and scandals, fills a major gap in theliterature, which would have been difficult to identify without insiderperspectives.

This article employs a mixed methodology and relies mainly onin-depth interviews with 37 experienced political professionals. Theseinterviews establish, for the first time in the scholarly community, howexperienced political professionals from both parties define campaigncrises. The typology of campaign crises discussed at the end of the arti-cle relies on brief case studies of four recent U.S. Senate races (the 2002races in Georgia, New Jersey and Minnesota and the 2000 U.S. Senaterace in Washington).4

The analysis is based on two interview questions. The first exploreshow political professionals define campaign crises and what examplesof crises they offer in doing so. The second asks political professionalsif crises must involve scandals. All but four interviews were tape re-corded and transcribed for detailed analysis. Interviews were conductedin person and by telephone in the Washington, D.C., area in 2003 and2004. There is no evidence of significant differences in interviewquality in either setting.

The interview methodology is designed around theoretical general-izability rather than statistical generalizability (Yin 1994). Given timelimitations inherent in elite interviewing (Rubin and Rubin 1995), theinterview format is more structured than much grounded theory orFenno’s (1978) “soak and poke” method, for example. However, thequestions are designed to solicit interpretive responses (Rubin and Ru-bin 1995, 33-35), which is beneficial in allowing political professionalsto consider campaign crises in depth.

I employ a two-stage purposive (“snowball”) sampling method to se-lect interviewees.5 The first stage relies on established contacts betweenthe Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies’ Campaign Man-agement Institute and the political-consulting industry, including theAmerican Association of Political Consultants. Many of the senior con-sultants generated from these contacts represent the most active andprominent firms working in congressional politics, as reflected in Cam-paigns & Elections magazine’s annual post-election reports. Based on

R. Sam Garrett 131

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

the literature, I identified senior political consultants regarded as experi-enced decision-makers, and whose specialties are among the most ac-tive roles in developing campaign strategy and crisis management(general, media and polling consultants). To reduce selection bias, I re-lied on the initial set of interviewees to generate additional recommen-dations (the second stage of the sample). This reputation-based methodis similar to previous research techniques exploring political con-sultants (Thurber and Nelson 2000; Medvic 2001).

The method is successful in gaining political professionals’ trust. Al-most 70 percent of those approached completed interviews. Seventeen(45.9 percent) interview subjects were identified through the first stageof the interview sample, while 20 (54.0 percent) were referrals fromfirst-stage interviewees. The sample also achieves partisan balance with19 Democrats and 18 Republicans (51.4 percent and 48.6 percentrespectively).

Most interview subjects are political consultants holding the rank ofprincipal or vice president in major firms actively engaged in providingstrategic advice to U.S. House and Senate candidates. The dataset alsocontains interviews with experienced campaign managers, nationalparty officials and other senior political professionals. Additional infor-mation on the interview pool appears in Table 1. Given the exploratorynature of the project, I coded answers broadly, searching for common


TABLE 1. First-Round Interviews: Professional Demographics

ProfessionalSpecialization

Democrats Republicans Total

Election Attorneys 0 1 1

Hill Staffa 4 3 7

General Consultants 1 2 3

Media Consultants 5 3 8

Members of Congressb 1 1 2

Opposition Researchers 1 1 2

Party Officialsc 4 4 8

Pollsters 3 3 6

Total 19 18 37

Note: Includes current or most recent professional position only.aRefers to senior staff such as chief of staff and communications director.bFormer political consultant and senior hill staff.cRefers to senior staff. Titles are concealed at interview subjects’ requests.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

themes within the answers and continually narrowing down the catego-ries into a set of distinct frames which reflected political professionals’definitions of campaign crises.6 This approach follows the “constantcomparative” method for coding interview data (Glaser and Strauss1967, 105).

HOW POLITICAL PROFESSIONALSDEFINE CAMPAIGN CRISES

Political professionals’ complex view of campaign crises is a far cryfrom the singular campaign “scandals” covered in existing literature.Their belief that crises are complex events is evident in the multipleframes they use when defining crises. Across all interviews, politicalprofessionals define crises using a median of 4 different descriptions.Table 2 lists the nine frames political professionals use to define cam-paign crises and how often they use each definition. There is no evi-dence that party affiliation or professional specialty significantly affectviews on crisis complexity.

“Strategic Disruption” Crises

The “strategic disruption” description of crises best represents the in-teractive and complex nature of campaign crises political professionalsdescribe in the interviews. It is the most commonly employed frame,present in almost 90 percent of the interviews. In a business in whichplanning is everything, major changes in the strategic environment cer-tainly represent potential crises. A candidate death is a far greater crisisthan an unexpected runoff election, even though both fall into the “stra-tegic disruption” category because they entail major changes to theplanned agenda. Political professionals consistently describe both situa-tions–and others like them–as uniquely complex and interactive kindsof crises. It is often unexpected resources changes in time, personnel,money, etc.–some of which are impossible to redirect or replace–whichare the most damaging element of crises. Therefore “strategic disrup-tion” answers also foreshadow how crises can both result from individ-ual events, and spur additional crises. While other crisis framesrepresent individual events associated with campaign crises, politicalprofessionals imply a significant environmental shift during crisescharacterized by strategic disruptions.

R. Sam Garrett 133

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

A Republican pollster who asked not to be named explains:

The best description of a campaign I ever heard is chaos that is allmoving in the same direction. So, I always think of 27 tumble-weeds all rolling in the same direction down the prairie. But, whenall the tumbleweeds have to stop and address something, they’renot rolling. And a campaign has limited time, limited budget. Ev-erything is limited, and every second of every minute little bit ofresources is taken away from what you’re supposed to be doing isslowing [and] killing your campaign.

Author: So the idea of disruption is one of the key elements in a crisis?

Interviewee: I would think so. I would think that would be the key.7

“Candidate Scandal” Crises

“Candidate scandals” are the most obvious kinds of crises and the fo-cus of existing literature. Political professionals offer examples of sen-sational events such as drug or alcohol abuse, messy divorces and thelike. Unlike errors in political judgment (addressed below), candidatescandals require the revelation of actual or alleged unethical or illegalbehavior by the candidate. Despite being the most obvious form of cam-paign crises, candidate scandals are not the most common type of cam-


TABLE 2. How Political Professionals Define Campaign Crises

Rank Frame N Valid Percentage

1 Strategic Disruption 32 86.5

2 Candidate Scandal 25 67.6

3 Attack 23 62.2

4 Organizational 18 48.6

5 Candidate Political Error 15 40.5

6 Fundraising 14 37.8

7a Constant Crisis 11 29.7

7a Media 11 29.7

8 Polling 4 10.8

Source: Elite-interview data compiled by author. Percentages do not sum to 100 since clas-sification into multiple categories is possible.a Represents tie rankings.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

paign crisis. In fact, many political professionals volunteered that theycould think of only a few clients–and often none–who had experiencedgenuine scandal. The interviews therefore reveal an important cautionagainst using scandals as a proxy for campaign crises. “Candidate scan-dal” is the second most common way in which political professionalsdescribe campaign crises (present in almost 70 percent of theinterviews).

“Candidate Political Error” Crises

Crises described as “candidate political errors” are related to candi-date scandals, but political professionals describe them as very distinctkinds of crises. Candidate scandals allege unethical or illegal candidatebehavior. Crises involving candidate political errors emphasize a candi-date’s tactical mistake. This includes candidate gaffes, misstatementswhich foster attacks or media scrutiny, or poor campaign skills. Theyalso include principled but unpopular policy decisions, such as sponsor-ing controversial legislation. As with many crises, candidate politicalerrors might not be particularly damaging on their own. However, thepoor public image and invitations for outside attacks they create can bequite serious.

Republican media consultant Tom Edmonds explains:

I had a candidate–a sitting congressman–I interviewed him andended up making the interviews into spots, and one of them was abio[graphical] spot. And he had a line that said, “I was born in atarpaper shack.” Well, it became an issue. His family lived in atarpaper shack, like tenant farmers, but he was born in the hospitaland went home to the tarpaper shack–a very minor point. It would-n’t have made any difference if he hadn’t said it. . . . “When I wasborn, my family lived in a tarpaper shack.” That wouldn’t havebeen any different than, “I was born in a tarpaper shack.” But it be-came an issue. And it wasn’t major, but it just hurt him.8

“Attack” Crises

Attacks represent each side’s attempt to gain advantage by criticizingthe opposition, usually based on some other event which can also becharacterized as a crisis (i.e., a candidate political error or candidatescandal). The “attack” frame also includes all references implying “neg-

R. Sam Garrett 135

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

ative” or “attack” advertising. Political professionals report that a majorcomponent of modern campaign management is either causing crisesfor the opposition via attacks, or responding to attacks from opponentswhich threaten to cause crises in the receiving campaign. Therefore, at-tacks can be both offensive and defensive. A Democratic official whoasked not to be identified explains, “You’re always trying to trip youropponent up and get them off message. That’s the goal basically. . . .You want to get [your opposition] off message. And if you get them offmessage enough times, and they are having trouble responding to thecrisis, then you’re going to win.”9 As the official suggests, the attack isan attempt to cause an immediate, internal crisis for the opposition bydistracting the campaign from its planned strategy. This feeds anotherlong-term goal of hampering the opponent’s ability to control theagenda and communicate with voters. The “attack” description ofcampaign crises appears in more than 60 percent of the interviews.

“Organizational” Crises

Many “organizational” crises highlight poor relationships amongcandidates, consultants and campaign staff. If not properly managed,dysfunctional relationships can become campaign disasters by limitingthe organization’s ability to function and execute strategy. However,even simple staff problems can foster poor decision-making whichleads to campaign crises. Former Democratic Congressional CampaignCommittee (DCCC) official Jenny Backus explains:

[S]ometimes crises are very small things . . . like a campaign man-ager not having enough sleep, or a staff change. Crises can comeon like tidal waves or they can start off as like a sort of annoyingripple that just sort of keeps hitting and hitting and hitting, and allof a sudden you’re in the middle of a crisis. . . . [C]ampaigns thatare very tightly disciplined tend to do very well, except for wherethey can’t realize that their candidate has a problem . . . I think op-posing campaigns like to create or put [on] the sense of crisis be-cause that looks like loss of control and loss of ‘electability’ and‘winability’ [for the opposition]. So who names the crisis, whetheror not it’s a crisis, I think, depends on, sort of, how much it disruptsthe game plan of the campaign. . . . And sometimes, someone cancreate a crisis by saying, “There’s a crisis in the Garrett campaignbecause he’s fired three managers.” Now, that may not be a crisis.That may be [the] Garrett campaign responding to a crisis because


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

they had a bad manager and [are] solving it. But the other side canturn that into a crisis in the perception of the media. So there’s ex-ternal, perceived crises and there’s actual crises inside.10

Additional Crisis Types

Political professionals also describe three other kinds of crises: “me-dia,” “fundraising” and “polling” crises. These definitions are men-tioned infrequently, but their consequences can be serious. For all thehuman drama campaign crises often include, political professionals saythat even the best campaigns experience crises if they fail to raiseenough money to be competitive, if their messages are not absorbed bythe public or if a media feeding frenzy makes what were potential crisesinto full-blown public debacles.

Aren’t All Campaigns Crises?

Most political professionals agree that crises are distinct events andrepresent serious threats to campaigns. They also say that crises are fairlycommon. However, a vocal minority of political professionals (about 30percent) hesitate to define campaign crises and argue instead that the term“crisis” can be misleading. Political professionals who hold this view saythat modern campaigns are always crises, or that only poorly managedcampaigns should experience crises. Those rejecting campaign crises ar-gue that what appear to be crises are, in fact, “normal” events, even if theturmoil of political warfare causes some candidates and political profes-sionals to believe they are crises. From this perspective, campaigns are in-herent crises; hence the “constant crisis” label. For those questioning thevalidity of campaign crises, expectedness is essential. According to aDemocratic pollster who asked not to be named:

I always say that [our firm does not] use the word “crisis” verymuch. We don’t think that’s a very helpful frame. We would usethe frame where, “This is a serious attack, but we have a plan for it,so let’s implement our plan.” If a team is run well and the job of theteam has been done well, then we’re anticipating the crises.11

Professional Demographics and Crisis Descriptions

Professional demographics, such as party affiliation or professionalspecialty (i.e., media consultant, pollster, etc.), generally do not affect

R. Sam Garrett 137

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

how political professionals define campaign crises. However, there areinteresting exceptions. Crosstabs comparing use of each crisis defini-tion (frame) against party affiliation reveal only one instance in whichthere is a statistically significant difference in how Democrats and Re-publicans define campaign crises.12 Almost 80 percent of Democratsdefine campaign crises by talking about attacks (the “attack” frame),compared to only 44 percent of Republicans.13 Furthermore, whileDemocrats talk about being attacked, Republicans focus on doing theattacking. This does not mean that Republicans are unscrupulous or thatDemocrats are inherently unprepared. However, it does suggest that, atleast during interviews, Democrats’ thinking focuses on being caughtoff guard by attacks, while Republicans consider attacks part of a strat-egy to create crises for opponents. This finding is not surprising givenDemocrats’ recent high-profile losses, especially in House and Senateraces. Major cases involving surprise attacks (such as Max Cleland andJohn Kerry’s recent losses) have become focal points for manyDemocrats.

The other difference among professional groups is evident in the“constant crisis” frame. Pollsters describe crises differently than otherpolitical professionals. Almost 67 percent of pollsters use the “constantcrisis” frame compared to less than 23 percent of other political profes-sionals.14 It is no surprise that pollsters think differently about campaigncrises. Their jobs depend on being analytical and dispassionate. Crisesinvolve adrenaline, emotion and stress. Pollsters’ often dispassionatethinking is central to the “constant crisis” frame, which suggests thatmost crises could be avoided through good research. Media consultants,campaign managers and others say that even with solid research, humanerror and political context make crises inevitable.

Campaign Crises versus Traditional Scandals

Political professionals view a range of events and behaviors as cam-paign crises. Of course, campaign crises may include scandals (the“candidate scandal” frame). But, the key lesson from this research isthat scandals are only one kind of crisis. Campaign professionals differ-entiate between crises and scandals, and believe that the two conceptscan be mutually exclusive. In addition, although scandals are usuallyexternal, ethical events, crises may be internal and often have little ornothing to do with ethics. Crises can sometimes have even more direcampaign consequences than traditional scandals.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

After defining campaign crisis, political professionals were askedwhether all campaign crises must involve scandals. The answers areoverwhelming. Of the 37 political professionals asked whether crisesmust always involve scandals, only one person answered affirma-tively–and even he later voluntarily softened that position. When askedif all campaign crises involve scandals, many respondents answeredflatly, “No, not at all,” implying that the separation between the twoconcepts is obvious. Most of these answers are so straightforward thatlittle is left for analysis.

When they do elaborate, political professionals provide crisis exam-ples that could be missed by existing scandal typologies. When asked ifall crises must involve scandals, Paul Curcio, a Republican media con-sultant and former National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC)official, explains:

No. No, they don’t. And, in fact, I’d say probably, if by “scandal”you mean something like a character–an event that questions the[candidate’s] character, no, no I really don’t [think crises must in-volve scandals]. In fact, I would say that the majority of [campaigncrises] do not. The majority of [crises] are difficult political situa-tions. For example, you take a particularly tough piece of advertis-ing run against you, it may simply be dealing with a particularseries of votes or something like that and it’s going to be difficultto explain. Or you know you have to deal with it, you have to ex-plain it in some way. A disastrous performance in a debate isn’t ascandal; it’s a performance question. So, I would say the majorityof [crises] are not [scandals]. [Scandals] probably are the juiciest,because of human nature, but I would say they are absolutely notthe majority [of crises].15

Former DCCC official Jenny Backus agrees. When asked in whethercrises must involve scandals, Backus responds:

Oh, no, not at all. I mean, most of the time crises in campaignsdon’t involve scandal. They involve really mundane things likeforgetting to fill out your [Federal Election Commission report].Here’s the link between crisis and scandal: it’s when someone elsecan characterize a crisis as a scandal. You can have somebody, afirst-time FEC filer, who forgets to put the employment of all yourdonors on [the report] and you don’t know better and you’re in afirst-time House race and a newspaper catches it. And all of a sud-

R. Sam Garrett 139

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

den the other campaign is putting out releases everyday saying,“Come clean about your dishonest fundraising.” Then that’s a cri-sis. But, initially, it was a crisis because you hired somebody whodidn’t know how to fill out your FEC reports correctly. So it’s nota scandal, but if it’s characterized as a scandal, it gets out control.16

The sloppy FEC filing causes what Backus views as a traditional cri-sis, which becomes a scandal when opponents exploit the issue. Inbroadly defined crises, the campaign organization suffers an electoraldifficulty or defeat. Traditional scandals, however, are personal. Just asthe candidate is often uniquely responsible for scandals, the candidatealso uniquely suffers the consequences. Crises affect entire organiza-tions. In addition, while political professionals are confident in theirabilities to address most crises, such as attacks from opponents, they re-port that campaign scandals can quickly become disastrous. Most otherkinds of crises can at least be managed. Assuming that crises and scan-dals are synonymous–or ignoring crises altogether–is a major omissionin the current literature.

THE TYPOLOGY OF CAMPAIGN CRISES

Political professionals describe a building-block approach to think-ing about campaign crises. When crises occur, they are usually multi-faceted, with various types of crises interacting. Political professionalssay that this interactivity among frames make crises so dangerous. Thetypology of campaign crises provides a tool for analyzing differentkinds of crises, how they develop and how they interact (see Figure 1).This includes revealing common links across the nine ways politicalprofessionals define crises. The interview data reveals four broad di-mensions political professionals use in defining campaign crises. Politi-cal professionals describe crises in internal and external terms. Theyalso describe campaign crises as being expected or unexpected. Thesefour dimensions each represent a quadrant in the interactive typology ofcampaign crises.

I illustrate the typology with examples from the four case studies ofrecent U.S. Senate races (the 2002 Georgia, New Jersey and Minnesotaand 2000 Washington State).17 The following brief summaries arebased on 39 additional in-depth interviews with senior officials fromeach campaign and extensive media research. These cases representsome of the most frequently mentioned and diverse examples of cam-


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

paign crises from the interviews and are particularly appropriate for il-lustrating the complex, interactive nature of campaign crises. Thefollowing discussion is not a normative account of what went wrong orright in each case, but a demonstration of how seemingly singular cam-paign crises can be quite complex when considering them using thetypology.

The expected/unexpected dimension of the typology is the moststraightforward: either the campaign in crisis expected a crisis or it didnot. Unexpected crises are those which completely surprise the cam-paign in crisis. These surprises are the hallmark of the “strategic disrup-tion” frame because they require such drastic changes to the campaignplan–if the plan can be changed at all. Unexpected crises are usually ex-ternal. This is especially true of surprise attacks from the opposition. Insuch cases, the attacking campaign executes its campaign plan by creat-

R. Sam Garrett 141

Expected

Internal

External

Unexpected

AttackConstant Crisis

Organizational

CasesNJ SenateWA Senate

CasesGA SenateMN SenateNJ Senate

Strategic DisruptionAttackMedia

AttackMedia

Strategic Disruption

FundraisingAttackPolling

Candidate ScandalCandidate Political Error

Strategic DisruptionPolling

CasesGA SenateMN SenateNJ SenateWA Senate

CasesGA SenateMN SenateNJ SenateWA Senate

CasesGA SenateMN SenateNJ Senate

FIGURE 1. Crisis Frames, the Crisis Typology, and Cases

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

ing internal turmoil for the opponent–usually in a very public waywhich redefines the external campaign environment. Meanwhile, thecampaign in crisis struggles to adapt to that new environment internallyand externally, all while those environments are being controlled by theopposition.

That “perfect storm” environment has been used to describe the 2002U.S. Senate race in Georgia between Saxby Chambliss (R) and MaxCleland (D). In interviews, there is broad agreement from both sidesthat the Chambliss campaign experienced no major crises. However, ina major “strategic disruption” which represented an unexpected crisisfor the Cleland team, the Chambliss campaign aired a controversial ad(representing the “attack” frame) which included pictures of Cleland,Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein and criticized Cleland’s re-cord on homeland security. The Chambliss team vigorously arguesthat the ad took issue with Cleland’s Senate voting record (a “candi-date political error”), while the Cleland campaign vehemently chargesthat the ad was a direct attack on Cleland’s patriotism. Regardless,Chambliss’ message took hold, aided by a massive GOP field operation.

Expected crises are those events which the campaign team can rea-sonably anticipate will present a crisis, allowing time for preventivemeasures. The presence of expected crises does not mean that the cam-paign knows for certain a crisis will occur, but at least the potential forcrisis is recognized in advance. The 2000 U.S. Senate race in Washing-ton State between Maria Cantwell (D) and Slade Gorton (R) provides anexample. The main attack in the race occurred when the Cantwell teamaired a hard-hitting ad late in the campaign (an “attack”) hammeringGorton for shepherding a rider through Congress which reversedClinton administration restrictions on a controversial mining procedure.Although the Gorton team anticipated an attack, they did not expect theattack to come when it did. When the attack finally aired just before theelection, it was too late for the Gorton team to implement its plan to re-spond (a “strategic disruption”). Nonetheless, because they anticipatedsome major attack on the mining issue, the Gorton team was able tomove forward quickly with the rest of its planned agenda.18

External crises result from outside forces and “happen to” the cam-paign in crisis. “Attacks” and “strategic disruptions” are the major crisisframes falling under the external typology dimension. “Media” crisesinvolving feeding frenzies and investigative journalism are anothermajor component of the external typology dimension. The 2002 NewJersey Senate race provides an illustration. Throughout the campaign,Bob Torricelli’s (D) team was plagued by an ongoing and high-profile


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

campaign-finance investigation targeting the senator and a formercampaign contributor (a “candidate scandal”). Torricelli campaign of-ficials report that they were never able to control their external envi-ronment and wage the campaign on the campaign’s own terms. Amedia feeding frenzy was supplemented by continual attacks from Re-publican Douglas Forrester.

“Organizational” crises are the major frame within the internaltypology dimension. All three campaigns in the 2002 U.S. Senate racein Minnesota faced profound organizational–and other–crises whenPaul Wellstone died in a plane crash 12 days before the election. Thecrisis represents a “strategic disruption” to say the least, not only in theloss of Wellstone as a person and a candidate, but also as a major unex-pected change for Republican Norm Coleman’s campaign, and later forthe upstart Walter Mondale campaign. Internally, what remained of theWellstone campaign (which also lost staff members in the crash, alongwith Wellstone’s wife and daughter) was in turmoil–personally and or-ganizationally. Meanwhile, the Coleman campaign was suspended, assenior advisers quietly huddled to sort out what lay ahead, and as Demo-crats recruited former Vice President and Senator Walter Mondale to re-place Wellstone on the ballot. Once Mondale was nominated, hiscampaign faced immediate organizational and fundraising crises inmounting a vigorous campaign, all while reintroducing voters anddonors to the elder statesman.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Burton and Shea (2003) play down rational-choice approaches tocampaign decision-making, arguing that context and constant changemake definitive “rules” impractical.19 The variations in political profes-sionals’ interview comments supports the idea that context is king whendefining campaign crises. Most of what determines a campaign crisis iswhether or not the campaign team thinks the event is a crisis. I offer thefollowing theoretical definition of campaign crises based on the inter-view data: Campaign crises are interactive events which the campaignteam believes represent a significant disruption to the campaign strat-egy or plan. Campaign crises may be internal or external, and are usu-ally unexpected. The full complexity of campaign crises is rarelyexplained by a single event. Ultimately, only political context, how acampaign reacts to that context, professional skill and gut instinct cantruly define campaign crises. Just like existing definitions of campaign

R. Sam Garrett 143

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

scandals, campaign crises are complicated. The typology developedhere does not reduce that complexity, but it does provide an analyticaltool for considering the complex, practical reality of campaign crises inan academic framework.

The broader view of campaign crises expands future research hori-zons. While the universe of possible campaign scandals is relativelysmall under existing definitions (Brown 2001; Lough 1998; Jacobsonand Dimock 1994), the data reveal that campaign crises are a constantthreat. Even if campaigns are not currently defending against or foster-ing crises, their political professionals are constantly on the watch forevents that might develop into crises. If we want a deeper understandingof campaign tactics and strategy, we must consider those campaignswith crises in mind, because the political professionals charged withmanaging campaigns are surely doing so. We must also consider howpolitical professionals’ specializations, party affiliations and overall ex-periences affect when and how they recognize campaign crises and howthey lead strategic crisis management.

The data presented in this article demonstrate that if we only studycampaign scandals, we miss half the picture. Our view of campaign pol-itics is incomplete because we fail to consider many of the events whichso often make or break campaigns but do not meet existing, quasi-ethi-cal notions of what constitutes a “scandal.” Campaign crises are anever-present force in congressional campaigns–even when those cam-paigns have not yet begun. To ignore campaign crises–whether in fullbloom or below the public radar–neglects a component of congressionalpolitics as fundamental as campaigning itself.

NOTES

1. Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2003 Northeastern Politi-cal Science Association annual meeting and the 2004 American Political Science As-sociation annual meeting. The author thanks the editors for invaluable feedback and theopportunity to share this work. James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, Paul S. Herrnsonand David A. Dulio also provided input and encouragement. Karen E. T. Garrett pro-vided critiques throughout the research and generously designed Figure 1. Most of all,the author thanks the political professionals who participated in the interviews. This re-search is supported by the Improving Campaign Conduct project, sponsored by ThePew Charitable Trusts, the American University School of Public Affairs and theDirksen Congressional Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the au-thor and do not necessarily represent the views of the Congressional Research Serviceor the Library of Congress.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

2. Most works do not differentiate between scandal types. However, there are no-table exceptions. In their examination of House corruption charges between 1968 and1978, Peters and Welch (1980, 705) find that morals and bribery charges have particu-larly damaging impacts on incumbents, leading to vote losses between 12 percent and22 percent for members of both parties.

3. There is little scholarly discussion of strategy and tactics in congressional cam-paigns. Works which do address strategy and tactics do so from one of two perspec-tives: either that strategic decision-making is completely contextual (Burton and Shea2003), or that it can be reduced to “rational” choices made by candidates and politicalprofessionals (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). For an introduction to rational-choice the-ory in campaigns, see Brams (1976). See Garrett (2005, chapter 5) for a discussion ofstrategy and tactics during crises.

4. The summary of each case relies on 39 additional interviews with senior offi-cials from each campaign. However, the case-study interviews are not included in theanalysis of how political professionals define campaign crises. For more informationon the case studies, see Garrett (2005).

5. The focus on theoretical generalizability minimizes selection-bias concernsfrom the snowball sample. More importantly, a random sample would not do this pro-ject justice. Eight field-test interviewees confirmed that political professionals wereunwilling to provide thorough data (or sometimes participate in interviews at all) with-out trusted verification of my identity and objectives, which makes random samplingimpractical. Second, since this project is ultimately about enhancing our scholarly un-derstanding of campaign crises based on input from experienced political profession-als, it makes little sense to conduct a random sample and hope the respondents’experiences in decision-making and crisis management will be as thorough as those ofa group of senior political professionals.

6. All interview data were analyzed with the N5 qualitative analysis software.However, N5 is merely a mechanism for organizing and labeling qualitative data. I per-sonally performed all analysis and coding, using N5 simply as a mechanism for storingthe result of that analysis.

7. “Republican pollster,” personal interview with author, July 2003, Washington,D.C. Emphasis in original. Additional citation information is omitted to protectsource’s requested confidentiality.

8. Tom Edmonds, personal interview with author, 7 November 2003, Philadel-phia, Pa. [111-123]. Data in the preceding brackets refer to quote location in the N5dataset. All named sources consented to be identified.

9. “Democratic official,” personal interview with author, May 2004, Washington,D.C. Additional citation information is omitted to protect source’s requested confiden-tiality.

10. Jenny Backus, personal interview with author, 30 July 2003, Washington, D.C.[35-76]. Emphasis in original.

11. “Democratic pollster,” telephone interview with author, August 2003. Addi-tional citation information omitted to protect source’s requested confidentiality.

12. The cell frequencies are small enough to make large-N inference inappropriatein most cases. I instead turn to Fisher’s exact test for comparing groups within thecoded interview data. Designed specifically for small-N analysis, Fisher’s exact test re-ports a P-value significance which is read as one would read a chi-square significance(Agresti and Findlay 1997, 224; Blalock 1979, 292-293).

13. Crosstab tables are omitted to conserve space. P-value � .033.

R. Sam Garrett 145

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

14. P-value � .051.15. Paul Curcio, personal interview with author, 16 July 2003, Washington, D.C.

[228-248].16. Jenny Backus, personal interview with author, 30 July 2003, Washington, D.C.

[82-94]. Emphasis in original.17. See Garrett (2005, chapters 6-9) for detailed analysis of crisis management in

each case. On the media aftermath of Paul Wellstone’s death in Minnesota, see Garrett(2005, chapter 8), Amy Jasperson’s article in this volume, Jasperson (2004) andRackaway, Smith and Anderson (2004).

18. Importantly, however, there is disagreement within the Gorton team aboutwhether the attack represents a crisis at all. Some members of the consulting team viewthe ad as the extension of a fierce campaign in which the Gorton campaign simply lost.This logic is consistent with the “constant crisis” view of campaign crises.

19. In fairness, however, much strategic thinking in campaigns depends on antici-pating opponents’ actions and reacting accordingly–not at all unlike the ratio-nal-choice games Brams (1976; 1985) describes.

REFERENCES

Agresti, Alan and Barbara Findlay. 1997. Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences,3e. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. 1979. Social Statistics, Revised 2e. New York, NY: McGrawHill.

Brams, Steven J. 1985. Rational Politics: Decisions, Games and Strategy. Washing-ton, DC: Congressional Quarterly.

______. 1976. Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in PoliticalScience. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Bridgmon, Phillip Brandon. 2002. “Presidential Scandal, Impeachment Politics, andU.S. House Elections: Strategies and Choices in 1998 and 2000.” Ph.D. diss. TheUniversity of Alabama.

Brown, Lara Michelle. 2001. “The Character of Congress: Scandals in the UnitedStates House of Representatives, 1966-1996.” Ph.D. diss. University of California,Los Angeles.

Burton, John Michael and Daniel M. Shea. 2003. Campaign Mode: Strategic Vision inCongressional Elections. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Dimock, Michael A. and Gary C. Jacobson. 1995. “Checks and Choices: The HouseBank Scandal’s Impact on Voters in 1992.” Journal of Politics. 57: 1143-1159.

Dulio, David A. 2004. For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants Are ChangingElections in the United States. Albany: SUNY Press.

Dulio, David A. and Candice J. Nelson. 2005. Vital Signs: Perspectives on the Healthof American Campaigning. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston:Little, Brown.

Garrett, R. Sam. 2005. “’Adrenalized Fear’: Crisis-Management in U.S. House andSenate Campaigns.” Ph.D. diss. American University.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

______. 2004. “Congressional Campaign Crises and the Candidate-Centered Cam-paign.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Associa-tion, New Orleans.

Glaser, Barney and Anselm Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chi-cago: Aldine.

Goidel, Robert K. and Donald A. Gross. 1994. “A Systems Approach to Campaign Fi-nance in U.S. House Elections.” American Politics Quarterly. 22(2): 125-153.

Goldenberg, Edie N. and Michael W. Traugott. 1984. Campaigning for Congress.Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Herrnson, Paul S. 1992. “Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising in CongressionalElections.” Journal of Politics. 54: 859-870.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2001. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5e. New York: Addi-son Wesley/Longman.

Jacobson, Gary C. and Michael A. Dimock. 1994. “Checking Out: The Impact of BankOverdrafts on the 1992 House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science.38: 601-624.

Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell. 1983. Strategy and Choice in CongressionalElections, 2e. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Jasperson, Amy. 2004. “The Perfect Storm of Politics: Media and Advertising Duringthe 2002 Senate Campaign(s) in Minnesota.” In Lights, Camera, Campaign! Media,Politics, and Political Advertising, David A. Schultz, ed. New York, NY: PeterLang, 149-187.

Johnson, Dennis W. 2001. No Place for Amateurs: How Political Consultants Are Re-shaping American Democracy. London: Routledge Press.

______. 2000. “The Business of Political Consulting.” In James A. Thurber andCandice J. Nelson, eds. Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 37-54.

Kolodny, Robin. 1998. Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees inAmerican Politics. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Loomis, Burdett A. 2001. “Kansas’s Third District: The ‘Pros from Dover’ Set UpShop.” In James A. Thurber, ed. The Battle for Congress: Consultants, Candidatesand Voters. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 123-159.

Lough, Todd Allen. 1998. “The Effects of Scandal on Elections for the United StatesHouse of Representatives: 1976-1994.” Ph.D. diss. Loyola University of Chicago.

Luntz, Frank I. 1988. Candidates, Consultants, and Campaigns: The Style and Sub-stance of American Electioneering. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.

McCurley, Carl and Jeffery J. Mondak. 1995. “Inspected by #1184063113: The Influ-ence of Incumbents’ Competence and Integrity in U.S. House Elections.” AmericanJournal of Political Science. 39(4): 864-885.

Medvic, Stephen K. 2001. Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections. Co-lumbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press.

______. 2000. “Professionalization in Congressional Campaigns.” In James A.Thurber and Candice J. Nelson, eds. Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants inElections. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 91-109.

Medvic, Stephen K. and Silvo Lenart. 1997. “The Influence of Political Consultants in the1992 Congressional Elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. 22: 61-77.

R. Sam Garrett 147

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

Miller, Dale E. and Stephen K. Medvic. 2002. “Civic Responsibility or Self-Interest?”In Candice J. Nelson, David A. Dulio and Stephen K. Medvic, eds. Shades of Gray:Perspectives on Campaign Ethics. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 18-38.

Mondak, Jeffery J. 1995. “Competence, Integrity, and the Electoral Success of Con-gressional Incumbents.” Journal of Politics. 57: 1043-1069.

Monroe, J.P. 2001. The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization. Al-bany: State University of New York Press.

Peters, John G. and Susan Welch. 1980. “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Vot-ing Behavior in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review. 74:697-708.

______. 1978. “Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a The-ory.” American Political Science Review. 72: 974-84.

Rackaway, Chapman, Michael Smith, and Kevin Anderson. 2004. “The Eulogy EffectRedux: A Study of Campaign News Coverage After a Candidate has Died.” Pre-sented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Portland,Ore.

Roberds, Stephen C. 1997. “Sex, Money and Deceit: Incumbent Scandals in U.S.House and Senate Elections, 1974-1990.” Ph.D. diss. University of Missouri-St.Louis.

Rosenbloom, David Lee. 1973. The Election Men: Professional Campaign Managersand American Democracy. New York, NY: Quadrangle Books.

Rubin, Herbert J. and Irene S. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hear-ing Data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sabato, Larry. 1981. The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elec-tions. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Smith, James T. 2002. “The Institutionalization of Politics by Scandal and the Effect onthe American View of Government.” Ph.D. diss. University of Nebraska.

Thurber, James A. 2001. The Battle for Congress: Consultants, Candidates and Vot-ers. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Thurber, James A., Candice J. Nelson, eds. 2000. Campaign Warriors: Political Con-sultants in Elections. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Thurber, James A. and Candice J. Nelson and David A. Dulio. 2000. “Portrait of Cam-paign Consultants.” In James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson, eds. CampaignWarriors: Political Consultants in Elections. Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-tion Press, 10-27.

Whaley, John. 2003. “The Evolution and Maintenance of Ethics Regimes in Con-gress.” Ph.D. diss. American University.

Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design & Methods. Newbury Park, CA:Sage.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

ritis

h C

olum

bia]

at 1

4:23

29

Oct

ober

201

4

Documents

Concepts, Crises and Campaigns