LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.)DCOS, Chief Operations

25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry BrigadeHungarian Home Defense Forces

Tata, Hungary

Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. (EBAO)

Effects Based Approach to Operations

EDUCATION:1998-04 Ph.D. in Security Policy, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Hungary

Dissertation with Summa Cum Laude: “The Five Central Pillars of the European Security”2002-03 #1 Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA

Thesis: “The role of the Partnership for Peace Program and the State Partnership Program in the Process of NATO Enlargement. The Case of the Hungarian-Ohio Cooperation”

2002-03 #2 Master of Arts in International Security and Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USAThesis: “Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy”

1992-95 #3 Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, HungaryThesis: “Social Psychological Methods for Cognition of a Personality”

1992-93 Miklós Zrínyi General Staff Collage with concentration in Intelligence, Hungary 1986-89 #1 Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence with concentration in Long Range Special Operations and

#2 Bachelor of Science in Military Automotive Engineering, Lajos Kossuth Military College, HungaryThesis: “Development of Military Intelligence”

ASSIGNMENTS:2009- Chief Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade, Hungarian Home Defense Forces, Tata, Hungary2005-09 Strategic Representative, Office of the Hungarian Military Representative to NATO and EU, NATO HQ, Brussels2003-05 Chief Consultant, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense2001-03 Postgraduate Student, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA2000-01 Deputy Head, Partnership Cooperation Branch, Ministry of Defense1998-00 Deputy Head, NATO Relations Branch, Ministry of Defense1995-98 Senior Military Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence Office1993-95 Graduate Student, National Defense University1989-93 Long Range Reconnaissance Special Team Commander, Hungarian Defense Forces

COMMISSIONS:2008-09 Dean, NATO Military Committee Strategic Representatives, NATO HQ, Brussels2005-09 Chief Coordinator in Scientific Development

Deputy Chief of Hungarian Transformation2003-05 Chief Coordinator in NATO/EU-Russia, NATO/EU-Ukraine, Mediterranean Dialogue, EUROMED and Iraq affairs

Chief Coordinator of the Political-Military Steering Committee, NATO HQ, Brussels1999- Hungarian Representative to PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Strategic Studies Institutes1999-01 Chief Coordinator of the NATO Membership Action Plan, Ministry of Defense1999-00 Chief Coordinator of the Western European Union, Ministry of Defense1997-98 Hungarian Representative to Intelligence Working Group on NATO Enlargement, NATO HQ, Brussels

CV

OUTLINE

• Introduction

• ACT-video

• Basic points (ppt)

• Forum-like discussion • Pointing out key elements

• Escalating problems

• Suggesting ways out

TIMELINE

• 2002 – Prague Summit > NATO Transformation > Capabilities

• 2005 – CPG > §17 Effects Based Planning

• 2006 – Riga Summit > CA

• 2006 June 6 – Concept on EBAO by NATO MC/ACT

• 2008 – Bucharest Summit > Plan of Action and CA

• 2009 – Strasbourg-Kehl Summit > Progress Report

1. Planning and conduct of operations2. Lessons learned, training, education and exercises3. Enhancing cooperation with external actors4. Public messaging5. Stabilization and reconstruction

Operational spectrum

Leve

l of i

nvol

vem

ent

Military PowerEffect Based Approach to Operations

Other Elements of Power(political, economic, civil)

Comprehensive Approach

”CA vs./& EBAO”

ReconstructionStabilityWar fighting Security

INTEGRATED ”END STATE” APPOACH

Mechanism (Cause)

Effect (Result)

Mechanism (Cause)

Action (Tasks)

Action (Tasks)

BASIC MODEL

PROCESS

OUTCOME

Better identification of keyPMESII nodes and linkages

within Area of Operation

Better identification andarticulation of key

PMESII effects

Better prediction of PMESIIreactions and behaviorswithin Area of Operation

Better dialog and interactionamong relevant PMESII experts

(Hq staff, JIACG, COEs)

Better identification of actions / capabilities

required for desired effects

Better synchronization of effects and actions across

DIME options

Better prioritization andlinkage of nodes-effects-actions

with Command Intent

Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects and

unintended consequences

Greater % of targets andeffects within Daily ETO

contribute to Command Intent

Lower % of targets andeffects within Daily ETO

lead to unintended outcomes

More effective and efficientuse of military force

Greater synergy in achievingNational Security Objectives

More accurate and fasterdevelopment of node-effect-

action matrix

Improved Effects-BasedPlanning Process

FocusedCombat Power

ImprovedInformationSuperiority

and KnowledgeManagement

SituationAwareness

SituationUnderstanding

Decision Making

ForceAgility

”Network Centric” Perspective

”Transformational”Perspective

More Effectiveand Synchronized ETO

Command andControl Agility

COMPLEX MIL. STRAT. MODEL

”Dictatorial”Perspective

THEORY OF PLANNING VS. EXECUTION

NATO Effects – Based Approach to Operations

NATO Instruments NON - NATO Instruments

ACTIONS

EFFECTS

OBJ ECTIVES OBJ ECTIVES

NATO END - STATE NON - NATO AIMS

ASSUMED INTERNATIONAL AIM

Military Political CivilEconomic

PLANNING

EXECUTION

NATO Effects – Based Approach to Operations

NATO Instruments NON - NATO Instruments

ACTIONS

EFFECTS

OBJ ECTIVES OBJ ECTIVES

NATO END - STATE NON - NATO AIMS

ASSUMED INTERNATIONAL AIM

Military Political CivilEconomic

PLANNING

EXECUTION

DYNAMIC ”NC” MODULE APPOACH

GRAVITATIONAL MODEL

CAPABILITY APPOACH

~150K Troops

HQ MNF-I

MNC-I

Divisions

BCTs

Battalions

Company/Teams

~1100

Provincial/Local Level Engagement/Operations

National Level GoI Engagement/Operations

USM-I / MNF-I Vertical Integration Structures and Key Tasks

AMB

USM-I

~1000

USAID(~350)

&

25x PRTs (~500)

Policy & StrategyMinisterial Capacity Development

Joint Campaign Plan(Iraqi) Ministerial

Committee for National Security

Iraq Nat’l Sec Strategy

Joint Campaign PlanLegislationCustomsBankingBudgetWTO

ProvincialCapacity

Development

Programs:Agriculture

Micro-FinanceCSP

Vocational-Education

Combat Operations

Tactical Missions:

SeizeSecurePatrolClear

(Coordination)

CIV. VS. MIL. STRUCTURES

Transition Period

Stitch Nation Seams

Integration of NRF

Capabilities

Effects-Based, Collaborative, Network Centric

and Interdependent

DeconflictingDeconflicting CoordinatingCoordinating IntegratingIntegrating CoherenCoherencece

Land Forces

Air Forces

SOF MaritimeForces

Land Forces

Air Forces

SOF MaritimeForces

Land Forces

Air Forces

SOF MaritimeForces

Deconflict Services & Cultures

”EFFECTS BASED TRANSFORMATION”

Attributes of a Transforming NATO Force

GlobalSituation

Awareness

CRISIS

Objectives Tasks TASK

LEVEL

ANALYSIS

Now

Air & SpaceControlForce

Support

Force Application

ForceEnhancement

Bridge 4 Destroyed

Destroy Bridge 4

Disrupt

Delivery of POLEffect

TasksDestroy Bridge 6

Plan

Indicators

Bridge 6 Destroyed

Physical effects that lead to…

…desired behavioral outcomes.

CASE STUDY ”SERBIA”

Expansion West - 2005

Expansion South - Jul 2006

Expansion North - Dec 2003

Start - Kabul - Dec 2001

Finish - Expansion East - 2006 ?

Expansion West - 2005

Expansion South - Jul 2006

Expansion North - Dec 2003

Start - Kabul - Dec 2001

Finish - Expansion East - Oct 2006

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 1

Source: CSIS Burke Chair, “Developments in NATO and ISAF” Forces available from:http://www.csis.org/images/stories/burke/090423_developments_nato-isaf_and_us_forces.pdf

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 2

Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 3

Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 4

Expansion West - 2005

Expansion South - Jul 2006

Expansion North - Dec 2003

Start - Kabul - Dec 2001

Finish - Expansion East - 2006 ?

Expansion West - 2005

Expansion South - Jul 2006

Expansion North - Dec 2003

Start - Kabul - Dec 2001

Finish - Expansion East - Oct 2006

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 52011 ???

CASE STUDY ”IRAQ VS. AFGHANISTAN”

”…oooops”

”…now watz da plain?”

• Both military and non-military capabilities must be transformed

• Definition of ”Engagement Space”• Lack of political will will kill both CA and EBAO• An effects based approach to the Comprehensive

Approach is imperative• EBAO is part of CA• Understanding multinationality and sectorial

differences (resources, cultures) in CA/EBAO• Overall integrated CA/EBAO is needed

SUGGESTIONS

The EndLTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.)Chief Operations, DCOS

25th György Klapka Infantry BrigadeHungarian Home Defense Forces

Tata, Hungary

Email: babostibor@yahoo.comPhone: +36-34-589-111

”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover, lost time never.”